Dwa sposoby interpretacji problemu intersubiektywności w późnej filozofii Husserla i propozycje jego rozwiązania na przykładzie filozofii M. Henry’ego i M. Richira

TWO WAYS OF INTERPRETING THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL’S LATE PHILOSOPHY AND ITS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS BY MICHEL HENRY AND MARC RICHIR Summary This article is an analysis of two conceptions of both awareness of other persons and relations with them put forward by Michel Henry and Marc Richir – philosophers who are associated with “new phenomenology in France”. My aim is to show how they reinterpret Husserl’s view of intersubjectvity and attempt to solve the issues related to traditional phenomenological solution. Thanks to rejecting Husserl’s notion of intentionality, they provide a new ground for analysis. The originality of their account lies in an introduction of the very notion of passivity (Henry) and transcedental interfacticity (Richir). In spite of some differences between them, they can be considered as ideas that shed a new light on the problem of intersubjectivity in phenomenology.