
ARTICLES

MONIKA MICHAŁOWSKA

ORCID: 0000-0001-9415-389X

Medical University of Łódź

email: monika.michalowska@umed.lodz.pl

Roger Roseth in Conversation with Richard FitzRalph on the Cause of Volitions*

Keywords: Cognition, Ethics, Free Will, Fourteenth-Century Ethics, Natural Philosophy, Oxford Calculators

Słowa kluczowe: Poznanie, Etyka, Wolna Wola, Czternastowieczna Etyka, Filozofia Przyrody, Kalkulatorzy Oxfordzcy

Abstract

The first half of the fourteenth century was the golden age of voluntarist debates at Oxford, which thrived as a remarkable shift occurred in both the methodology of ethical argumentation and its focal themes. Triggered by advancements in natural philosophy and propounded by the Oxford Calculators, the new approaches in ethics made it possible to craft novel and original arguments and argumentation tactics. This paper traces one aspect of the will debate, focusing on Roger Roseth's views on free will, which drew substantially on the voluntarist thought of Richard FitzRalph. Although FitzRalph was undoubtedly one of Roseth's most significant influences, Roseth did not blindly follow his fellow Oxonian's reasoning, but instead critically reassessed his arguments on the cause of volitions for safeguarding the freedom of the will.

* The research for this paper was funded in whole by the National Science Centre, Poland, Weave-UNISONO, under grant agreement UMO-2024/06/Y/HS1/00119.

1. Introduction

As has recently been argued,¹ Roger Roseth (d. after 1347) was one of the Oxford Calculators, a similarly minded circle of scholars who lectured and worked at Oxford in the first half of the fourteenth century. Until very recently, Roseth was not traditionally listed among them, yet the scope of his interests, the style of his argumentation, and his employment of logical and physical tools, as well as other analytic techniques distinctive to the Calculators (such as the *secundum imaginationem* procedure, the calculus of compounding ratios, the quantification of qualities, etc.), justify classifying him as a Calculator.

As is the case with many medieval scholars, we know relatively little about Roseth's life and career. Marginal notes in some of the manuscripts containing his only extant work² indicate that he was of English origin and that he belonged to the Franciscan order. While there are two alternative names—Rugosus and Rosetus—by which he is called in the manuscripts, most of them refer to him by the latter, which has also been adopted by contemporary scholars.³ Roseth's sole preserved work

¹ Michałowska & Lukács, 2024.

² Bruxelles, Bibliothèque royale, 1551, Fribourg, Couvent des Cordeliers, 26, Vatican Chigi, B.V. 66. For a detailed account, see Hallamaa, 2005, pp. 6–7.

³ For more information, see Hallamaa, 2005, pp. 6–7. As Hallamaa relates: “Modern scholars refer to the author by the name Roger Roseth, but the Latin form Rosetus has also been used. Both forms appear in manuscripts, although owing to an unnormalized orthography several variants appear. The form Rogerus Roseth appears only once, in the table of contents of the Vatican manuscript Chigi B.V. 66. In the same manuscript the name is also written as Rogerius Rogeth and Rogerii Roger. In the Vatican manuscript Vat. lat. 1108 the name is spelled Roseti, which would give Rosetus as the nominative. Assisi, Biblioteca comunale MS. 173 writes Rossetus; Brugge, Stadtsbibliotheek, MS. 192 ascribes the book to ‘magistri Rosete’; whereas in Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale, MS. 1551 the work is said to be by ‘Rogerii Rugosi’. Thus on the basis of manuscript evidence there are two alternatives for the Latin name: Rugosus or Rosetus. The former is used in only one manuscript and it appears in modern literature only in Stegmüller’s *Repertorium* in brackets as an alternative spelling for Rosetus. The majority of ascriptions seem to indicate that the correct Latin spelling is Rosetus, which is formed from the vernacular name Roseth. For reasons that will be treated later when I discuss the dating of manuscripts, it is probable that the copyist of the Chigi manuscript had first-hand information about the author. Roseth, the name used in the Chigi manuscript, is therefore most likely the one that our author himself used.”

is his theological commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*—*Lectura super Sententias*—and there is actually no evidence that he penned anything else. Judging from the sophisticated composition and the complexity of the *Lectura*, Olli Hallamaa argues that Roseth's question commentary in all probability did not result from actual teaching; rather, Hallamaa says, it can be reasonably assumed that the *Lectura* was composed without preceding lectures.⁴

Although the exact composition date of Roseth's *Lectura* remains unknown, passages from other authors included in this work invite an educated guess. As Hallamaa observes,⁵ the dating of Chigi B.V. 66 manuscript to 1337, which is confirmed by the scribe's note at the end of the codex, makes it the oldest witness preserving the text; consequently, we know that Roseth must have written his *Lectura* before 1337. The quotations from Roseth's contemporaries help us narrow the dating down even further. Roseth's extensive verbatim quotations from Richard FitzRalph's (1299–1360) *Lectura in Sententias* (1328–1329) suggest a later date than the end of the 1320s. Hallamaa proposes 1334–1335 as the most plausible date, given that Roseth references Adam Wodeham's (ca. 1295–1358) views on the finite capacity of the soul—in particular, his argument of the vessel⁶—from the *Ordinatio*, which stemmed from Wodeham's lectures on the *Sentences* in the academic year of 1331–1332.⁷ Roseth's analysis and criticism of one of the arguments for the freedom of the will advanced by Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1290–1349)⁸

⁴ Hallamaa, 2005, pp. 17–18.

⁵ Hallamaa, 2005, p. 16.

⁶ Adam Wodeham, *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* (Sorbonne, 193, f. 5rb): “Aliter igitur mihi videtur dicendum quod et capacitas animae est finita, quia ista non est nisi ipsa substantia animae, et quod ipsa de quavis forma in ea receptibili de cuius specie non est dare maximam possibilem repleti potest proportionaliter in spiritualibus secundum intentionem, sicut vas corporale repleti potest secundum extensionem aqua vel alio liquore ita quod non potest simul sine speciali miraculo plus illius speciei recipi hic et ibi.” (Latin quotation after Kitanov & Slotemaker, 2023, p. 187, footnote 98). For a broader discussion of this notion in Wodeham, see Kitanov & Slotemaker, 2023. See also Courtenay, 1978, pp. 120–121, notes 9–11.

⁷ Schabel, 2020, pp. 66–72.

⁸ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 3 (in preparation): “Ex istis conclusionibus patet quod conclusio una quam ponit Bradwardin est falsa, nam ponit quod volitio quae nunc causatur libere causatur, et hoc, quia in illo instanti in quo causatur potest voluntas prius non causare illam volitionem quam causet illam.”

in his *Lectura in Sententias* (1332–1333) “indicate a firm terminus post quem of the fall of 1332,” as Severin Kitanov and Chris Schabel conclude.⁹ Their reasoning is corroborated by the fact that Roseth explicitly quotes from Robert Halifax’s (d. 1349) *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*,¹⁰

⁹ Kitanov & Schabel, 2025, p. 17.

¹⁰ Compare, for example:

Roger Roseth, <i>Lectura super Sententias</i> , q. 2, art. 2 (in preparation)	Robertus Halifax, <i>Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum</i> , q. 5, argumenta principalia (forthcoming)
1	2
(8) Praeterea, ponatur quod angelus bonus descendat de caelo ad terram continue movendo. Capió unum locum in linea descensus inter sphaeram ignis et aeris; et sit ille locus A. Haec tamen aliquando erit vera de angelo illo, volo esse in A et non antequam erit in A nec postquam erit in A, ergo praecise dum erit in A, sed non erit in A nisi tantum per illud instans, ergo non habebit illam volitionem qua velit esse in A nisi tantum per illud instans quo erit in A, et per consequens subito erit ille actus productus.	Praeterea, pono quod aliquis angelus beatus descendat de caelo ad terram continue movendo. Capió unum locum in linea descensus inter sphaeram ignis et aeris. Et sit ille locus A. Iste angelus vult aliquando se esse in A et non ante nec postquam fuerit in A, igitur tantum quando est in A, sed non est in A nisi tantum per unum instans, igitur non habet illam volitionem qua vult esse in A nisi tantum per instans unum. Et per consequens subito fuit iste actus voluntatis productus, quia si successive fuisset productus, prius habuisset actum quo voluisset fuisse in A antequam fuit in A vel non habuit actum quo voluit esse in A quando fuit in A, quorum utrumque est falsum.
(9) Praeterea, si actus voluntatis non possit subito produci a voluntate, ergo, eadem ratione, sequitur quod non possit subito corrumpi a voluntate. Et tunc sequitur illa conclusio quod aliquis peccator est qui non potest poenitere de peccato suo in tota vita sua, quod videtur falsum, quia in quacumque hora peccator conversus fuerit a peccato suo vita vivet et non morietur. Et consequentiam probó, quia capio peccatorem cum intenso actu peccandi. Suppono tunc ex hypothesi quod iste actus per potentiam naturalem voluntatis necessario	Praeterea, si actus voluntatis non posset subito produci a voluntate, eadem ratione, sequitur quod non posset subito corrumpi a voluntate etc., et tunc sequitur quod aliquis peccator non posset poenitere de peccato suo in tota vita sua. Consequens videtur falsum, quia in quacumque hora peccator conversus fuerit a peccato suo vita vivet et non morietur. Consequentiam probó, quia capio aliquem peccatorem cum intenso actu peccandi. Suppono ex hypothesi quod iste actus per potentiam naturalem voluntatis necessario

which was most probably composed concurrently with *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (1332–1333) by Richard Kilvington (ca. 1302–1361),¹¹ to whom Roseth also refers on some occasions.¹² Elżbieta Jung and Monika Michałowska convincingly argue for Kilvington being Bradwardine’s *socius* when Kilvington lectured on the *Sentences*,¹³ and Schabel insists that “Bradwardine was a fellow *sententiarius* of both Robert Halifax and Richard Kilvington.”¹⁴ These findings additionally substantiate Kitanov and Schabel’s dating of Roseth’s *Lectura* to shortly after 1332–1333.¹⁵

1	2
requirat aliquod certum tempus ad hoc ut corrumpatur. Et pono quod calor vel humor radicalis quae sunt principia vitae hominis, per Philosophum <i>De longitudine et brevitate vitae</i> , non possent durare nisi per medietatem huius temporis. Tunc arguo sic: iste peccator non potest poenitere de peccato suo antequam dimittat illum actum peccandi, et non potest eum dimittere per totam vitam, ergo talis peccator habita deliberatione de peccato suo non potest poenitere de peccato suo ante mortem suam, quod fuit probandum. Et, eodem modo, sequitur ex alia parte quod aliquis existens in caritate in aliquo tempore consimiliter non posset peccare ante mortem suam, quia non poterit dimittere actum suum ante finem vitae suae.	requirat aliquod certum tempus ad hoc quod corrumpatur. Et pono quod calor naturalis et humor radicalis quae sunt principia vitae hominis, secundum Philosophum <i>De longitudine et brevitate vitae</i> , non possunt durare nisi per medietatem illius temporis. Tunc arguitur sic: iste peccator non potest poenitere de peccato suo antequam dimittat illum actum peccandi. Ista statim patet, quia actus volendi peccare et actus quo displicet omnem peccatum numquam simul stant, igitur non potest poenitere de peccato suo durante illo actu quo vult peccare. Sed illum actum non potest voluntas dimittere per totam vitam illius hominis, igitur talis peccator habita tali deliberatione de peccato suo non potest poenitere de peccato suo ante mortem. Et, eodem modo, sequitur ex alia parte quod aliquis existens in caritate in aliquo tempore constitutus non potest ante mortem peccare, quia non potest dimittere actum bonum quem habet nisi in tanto tempore etc.

¹¹ Jung & Michałowska, 2023, p. 6.
¹² See, for example, Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 4, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 2005, pp. 217–218); q. 5, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 2005, p. 266).
¹³ Jung & Michałowska, 2023, pp. 1–86.
¹⁴ Schabel, 2024, p. 579. Schabel also gives 1332–1333, 1333–1334, and 1334–1335 as possible dates of Halifax’s year as a *sententiarius*; see Schabel, 2024, p. 573.
¹⁵ Kitanov & Schabel, 2025, p. 18.

Question 2 of Roseth's *Lectura*, the central focus of this paper, is still only available in manuscripts.¹⁶ Seeing that Roseth's notion of the will has been sorely understudied, this paper aims to offer the first account of his views on the freedom of the will. It examines Roseth's engagement in the debate on the freedom of the will and the arguments he borrowed from FitzRalph's question 10 of his *Lectura*. With these aims in mind, I begin by sketching the structure and the main content of question 2. Then, I look into the arguments Roseth crafted to defend the freedom of the will and compare them with those put forward by FitzRalph. Subsequently, I analyze to what extent Roseth follows FitzRalph's arguments, how he critically appraises their value for safeguarding the freedom of the will, and the way in which he contributes to advancing the debate on the will. Finally, I conclude by assessing Roseth's employment of FitzRalph's arguments and his engagement in the discussion.

2. The Structure and Content of Question 2 of Roseth's *Lectura*

Roseth's *Lectura* comprises five questions, which are:

Question 1: *Whether one can be obligated by a command to do something that is against one's conscience (Utrum aliquis in casu ex praecepto possit obligari ad aliquid quod est contra conscientiam suam).*

Question 2: *Whether the created will causes the act of enjoyment with respect to God freely or necessarily (Utrum voluntas creata libere vel necessario causet actum fruendi respectu Dei).*

Question 3: *Whether anything can be shown about the divine essence (Utrum de essentia divina possit aliquid ostendi).*

Question 4: *Whether charity can be increased (Utrum caritas possit augeri).*

Question 5: *Whether charity is increased by meritorious actions (Utrum caritas augeatur per opera meritoria).*¹⁷

All the questions exhibit characteristic features of the Calculators' approach and the issues they studied, bespeaking Roseth's interest in the thematic concerns debated at that time. Yet, question 2 is of special interest to this paper because Roseth frequently evokes and literally quotes his Oxonian colleagues, including FitzRalph, Bradwardine, Wodeham,

¹⁶ For the complete list, see below.

¹⁷ Questions 3–5 have been critically edited. See Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias: Quaestiones 3, 4 & 5* (ed. Hallamaa, 2005, pp. 63–288).

Kilvington, and Halifax. All of Roseth's *quaestiones*, including question 2, display all the standard characteristics of the question commentary genre as practiced at Oxford in the first half of the fourteenth century. Firstly, Roseth's work does not follow the order (of books, distinctions, or questions) of Lombard's *Sentences*, but only includes three articles devoted to three selected problems, which Roseth examines in detail. Secondly, the problems Roseth analyzes do not correspond to the topics examined by Lombard, but concentrate on the issues that engrossed Roseth's fellow philosophers and theologians. Finally, Roseth's commentary does not reproduce the structure of the commented text. Instead, the *Lectura*'s internal division is rather complex and accurately mirrors the style of questions composed by the Oxonians. The structure of question 2 incorporates:

- Three *argumenta principalia quaestionis*, which are subsequently developed into three separate articles.
- One argument against the question.
- The order of the question.¹⁸
- Article 1: *Whether the will is the cause of its acts (Utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus)*.
 - Three main conclusions concerning article 1.
 - Arguments against the first main conclusion.
 - The author's opinion.
 - Replies to the arguments against the first main conclusion.
 - Arguments against the second main conclusion.
 - Replies to the arguments against the second main conclusion.
 - Arguments against the third main conclusion.
 - Replies to the arguments against the third main conclusion.
- Article 2: *Whether the will causes its acts instantly or successively (Utrum voluntas causet actus suos subito vel successive)*.
 - The order of the article.¹⁹

¹⁸ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2 (in preparation): "In ista quaestione erunt quattuor articuli; tres iuxta tria argumenta principalia. Primus articulus iuxta primum argumentum: utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus. Secundus articulus iuxta secundum argumentum: posito quod voluntas causet actum suum utrum causet actum suum subito vel successive. Tertius articulus erit videre si aliqua causa libere poterit causare umquam effectum suum, iuxta tertium argumentum. Et quartus articulus erit respondere ad quaestionem et ad argumenta principalia."

¹⁹ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 2 (in preparation): "Supposito quod voluntas aliquos actus suos causet quaeritur utrum causet illos subito vel successive."

- Four main conclusions concerning article 1.
- Arguments against the first main conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the first main conclusion.
- Arguments against the second main conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the second main conclusion.
- Arguments against the third main conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the third main conclusion.
- Arguments against the fourth main conclusion.
- Three additional conclusions.
- Arguments against the first conclusion.
- Arguments against the second conclusion.
- Arguments against the third conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the first conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the second conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the third conclusion.
- Replies to the arguments against the fourth main conclusion (continuation).
- Article 3: *When does the will freely cause its acts? (Quando voluntas libere causat actum suum?)*
The order of the article.²⁰
Six main conclusions.
Bradwardine's opinion.
Arguments against the first main conclusion.
Replies to the arguments against the first main conclusion.
Arguments against the second, third, and sixth main conclusions.
Replies to the arguments against the second, third, and sixth main conclusions.
- Replies to the principal arguments.
All three articles of question 2 explore the voluntarist problems that fall within the scope of the disputes that were rife in Roseth's milieu, which places him at the center of the debates unfolding at Oxford. The issues

Et circa istum articulum sic procedam: primo ponam aliquas conclusiones; secundo arguam contra illas; tertio solvam illa argumenta contra illas conclusiones.”

²⁰ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 3 (in preparation): “Tertius articulus est videre quando voluntas libere causat actum suum. Circa illum sic procedam: primo ponam aliquas conclusiones; secundo arguam contra eas et solvam argumenta; tertio respondebo ad argumenta principalia conclusionibus.”

inspected in question 2 concern the acts of the will (including definitional and classificational problems), the cause of the acts of the will, the question whether the will is the only and proper cause of its volitions and nolitions, the question whether the will can be necessitated by something else or whether it acts entirely freely, instantaneous *versus* successive willing, arguments for and against the freedom of the will, and the relation between the will and cognition. Analyzing this varied array of issues, Roseth not only relies on the standard classical authorities, such as Augustine, Anselm, and Averroes, but also critically engages with the arguments fashioned by his contemporaries. Among these, FitzRalph's work is a fascinating case as Roseth frequently invokes FitzRalph's ideas, but does not mention him by name. Now, let us have a closer look at how he uses FitzRalph's reasoning.

3. Roseth's Embracement of FitzRalph's Arguments on the Will

Article 1, where Roseth inquires whether the will is the cause of its volitions, opens with a distinction between two kinds of the will's acts: those that follow deliberation and those that precede deliberation. Both kinds of acts are caused by the will, yet the former are produced freely, whereas the latter are produced necessarily. To clarify the nature of the acts necessarily produced in the will, Roseth explains that what we experience (e.g., seeing, desiring, and the first motions of the will) often lies beyond our willing.²¹ To examine which acts of the will are free and which are necessary, he poses and considers three conclusions in depth. Since the second conclusion is of the greatest importance to this paper, I will examine it in detail. It goes as follows: "The second conclusion is that something other than the will, being a prior cognition that naturally precedes such an act of the will, concurs with

²¹ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Primus articulus est: utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus. Et hic ponenda est primo una distinctio: quod quidam sunt actus voluntatis qui libere causantur a voluntate, cuiusmodi sunt actus sequentes deliberationem, et quidam sunt actus voluntatis qui causantur necessario in voluntate sicut actus praecedentes deliberationem qui accidunt in nobis frequenter nobis nolentibus. Non est autem in potestate nostra quin habeamus tales secundum illam vulgatam auctoritatem Augustini: *non est in potestate nostra quibus visus tangamur*. Similiter, quilibet experitur quod ipso volente ad apprehensionem alicuius habet actum volendi respectu talis obiecti delectabilis ita quod non est in potestate sua non habere talem actum. Patet hoc idem de motibus primis qui non sunt in potestate nostra."

the power to freely cause such an act of the will.”²² The conclusion clearly addresses the key issue of the dispute between voluntarists and intellectualists over the primacy of the will or the intellect in producing volitions. Furthering the conclusion, Roseth observes that if a thing is necessary for a volition to be produced by the will, then this thing is the cause of this volition. Consequently, for an object to be willed, some cognition of this object must be acquired. Thus, cognition, if prior to a volition, is the cause of this volition.²³ To argue in favor of prior cognition being the cause of volitions, Roseth marshals four arguments, all of which, including the references to authorities, are borrowed from FitzRalph’s question 10. They are to be found in the section in which FitzRalph presents nine arguments to prove that all desires and love for something proceed from knowledge. While literally quoting these arguments, Roseth slightly modifies and develops arguments 1 and 2.

Richard FitzRalph, <i>Lectura in Sententias</i> , pp. 123–126	Roger Roseth, <i>Lectura super Sententias</i> , q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation)
1	2
Oppositum patet per Augustinum XV <i>De Trinitate</i> , capitulo 67 et 77. Utrobique enim dicit Augustinus quod amor procedit de scientia et de ipsa mente.	Primo sic: per Augustinum V <i>De Trinitate</i> , capitulo 67, qui dicit quod amor procedit de scientia, scilicet de cognitione, et ipsa mente, et per consequens scientia est causa amoris, et quilibet amor est quidam actus voluntatis, et, per consequens, omnis actus voluntatis est volitio vel nolitio; ergo si scientia est causa amoris, ipsa est causa volitionis. Unde intellegendum est hic quod per amorem nihil aliud voco nisi volitionem qua volo rem dilectam et per odium actum quo nolo rem oditam.

²² Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): “Secunda conclusio est quod aliud a voluntate concurrat cum potentia ad talem actum voluntatis libere causatum, scilicet cognitio praevia naturaliter talem actum voluntatis praecedens [...]”

²³ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): “[...] quia illa res quae est necessario requisita ad hoc quod talis volitio naturaliter producat ita quod non poterit naturaliter produci sine tali re, illa res est causa talis volitionis. Sed cognitio praevia de illo obiecto de quo debet habere talem volitionem liberam est necessario requisita ad hoc quod talis volitio naturaliter producat, ergo talis cognitio praevia est causa talis volitionis.”

1	2
Praeterea, Philosophus et Commentator III <i>De anima</i> , commento 50, declarantes motum secundum quem generatur in animali desiderium sive appetitus dicunt quod hoc sit ex hoc quod imaginatio imaginatur rem primo vel intellectus intellegit primo, et post res vel concupiscitur vel respuitur, ergo ipsi volunt quod amor sive desiderium, quod ipsi vocant ibi appetitum intellectivum, sicut ibi dicit Commentator, fiat ex actuali cogitatione.	Secundo sic: probatur eadem minor per Philosophum et Commentatorem III <i>De anima</i> , commento 5 determinantes quod potentia motiva per quam generatur in animali appetitus sive desiderium, dicunt quod hoc fit per hoc quod imaginatio imaginatur rem primo vel intellectus, et postea res concupiscitur vel respuitur, ergo volunt quod imaginatio quae est quaedam cognitio est causa talis appetitus sive desiderii in voluntate. Desiderium enim in homine sive appetitum vocant ipsi volitionem.
Praeterea, commento 54 dicit Commentator quod appetitus fit ab intellectu in actu.	Tertio sic: III <i>De anima</i> consimiliter concedendo hoc dicit Commentator quod appetitus fit ab intellectu.
Praeterea, commento 56 dicit Commentator quod omnis appetitus fit ex imaginatione et imaginatio ex quinque sensibus particularibus.	Quarto: commento 56 dicit etiam Commentator quod omnis appetitus fit ex imaginatione.

FitzRalph's general reply to the problem of knowledge being a cause of volitions relies on two distinctions. In one of them, he identifies the triple meaning of "knowledge" and of "desire," which can be understood as a potency to, as habits of, or as actions. The other distinction concerns the expression "something proceeds from something else," which can be construed either as one thing being an efficient cause of another thing or as something being prior according to our way of thinking and knowing things in terms of cause-and-effect sequences and relations. In FitzRalph's view, whether the claim that all desires proceed from knowledge is true or false depends on what combination of these meanings one adopts.²⁴ Since FitzRalph devotes an entire section of question 10 (article 3) to pondering whether the actual cognition of a desirable object necessarily causes love for or volition of that object, he does not provide detailed replies to the abovementioned arguments. For his part, Roseth develops a lengthy section to argue against the arguments of the second conclusion. Let us have a closer look at his stance on this issue.

²⁴ Richard FitzRalph, *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10, ad quaestionem (ed. Michałowska & Dunne, 2025, pp. 252–253).

4. Roseth on the Cause of Volitions

Arguing against the second conclusion, namely that volition cannot be produced without prior cognition, Roseth presents six arguments to which he responds later. I will examine those of direct relevance to this paper.

The first argument rests on FitzRalph's assumption,²⁵ saying that if cognition were the cause of a free volition, it would be an efficient cause of this volition. More than that, the argument claims that having assumed cognition, we have to assume volition (assumption 1), and consequently that there cannot be volition without cognition (assumption 2). In line with the Oxonians' standard argumentation style, Roseth analyzes these assumptions, availing himself of an analogy between the relation of willing and cognizing and the relations among natural phenomena.²⁶ He constructs two cases. One of them involves the sun and a ray and explicates that while a ray requires the presence of the sun in the physical realm, God may nevertheless be the sole cause of the ray, yet always with the sun present.²⁷ In this scenario, the sun is not the proper cause of the ray; God is this cause by acting miraculously.²⁸

The other case is also borrowed from natural philosophy and revolves around qualitative change. According to the succession theory, which some of the Calculators upheld as an explanation of change,²⁹ the form

²⁵ Richard FitzRalph, *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10, argumenta pro quaestione (ed. Michałowska & Dunne, 2025, p. 123).

²⁶ For a discussion of the Calculators' tactic of employing analogies between ethical and natural realms, see Lukács, 2022, 2026 (forthcoming); Michałowska, 2024.

²⁷ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Sed istud non valet ad probandum aliquid esse causam alterius, nam ponatur quod Deus sic statueret quod ipsemet se solo causaret radium solis, sed semper quando sol praesens foret ita quod aliter non, tunc sol sic se haberet respectu radii quod sole posito poneretur radius, et non posito sole non poneretur radius. Et tamen, sicut patet, propter hoc non sequitur quod sol foret causa radii [...]."

²⁸ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Sed sic non foret de radio et sole. Si Deus se solo vellet causare radium nisi ad praesentiam solis, tunc sol non foret illud quo posito naturaliter poneretur radius, quia isto casu posito radius non naturaliter poneretur sed solum miraculose."

²⁹ For an account of the notions of change adopted by the Oxford Calculators and their milieu, see Lukács, 2026; Michałowska & Lukács, 2024; Michałowska, 2024; Pickavé, 2026; Sylla, 1973, 1991, 2017.

producing a lower degree of a quality is replaced by a form producing a higher degree of the same quality; thus, a quality, for example whiteness, increases by taking on ever higher degrees, which obviously means that a lower degree of whiteness naturally precedes a higher one. Yet, this lower degree cannot be called the final cause of the increase of whiteness because it neither suffices for nor leads to producing a more intense degree. However, it can be called a material cause if we accept that the lower degree together with a higher one compose a more intense form of whiteness.³⁰ This explanation stems from the so-called addition theory, which holds that accidental, corporeal, and spiritual forms are intensified by adding a new form to the subject. Although Roseth adopts this theory for physical qualities, he recognizes the problem it creates for ethical and theological qualities, since it would be an absurdity to argue that cognition is a material cause of volition. In this way, Roseth provides a theoretical grounding for FitzRalph's claim that "[although] cognition or knowledge in some way is the cause of love, it is certain that it is neither its material nor formal, nor final cause," an idea that is not quoted word by word but is apparently espoused by Roseth.³¹

In his analysis, Roseth formulates yet another argument, one taken from experience, to claim that for the will to be able to produce a free volition, it must be able to produce an act of either willing or nilling. Consequently, if volition were an effect of cognition, a choice between contradictories would not be possible. Roseth rejects this conclusion and asserts³²

³⁰ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Contra: ex ista responsione sequitur quod albedo sub gradu remisso sit causa effectiva respectu albedinis intensae, quia albedo remissa est illud quod naturaliter praesupponitur productionem albedinis sub gradu intenso, et non posita illa non ponitur albedo sub gradu intenso, quia prius est albedo sub gradu remisso quam intenso naturaliter, ergo albedo remissa est causa albedinis intensae, et non finalis nec materialis, quia non habet materiam, quia non recipit eam, ergo est causa efficiens. Ad istud potest dici quod albedo remissa est causa materialis respectu albedinis intensae, quia ipsa cum alia adveniente componit illam intensam, et possent dici partes materiales huius, quia sunt materia illius, vocando materiam alicuius ex quo fit aliquid sicut totum ex partibus."

³¹ Richard FitzRalph, *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10, argumenta pro quaestione (ed. Michałowska & Dunne, 2025, p. 123): "[...] cognitio sive notitia aliquo modo est causa amoris, sed certum est quod non est causa materialis, nec formalis, nec finalis [...]."

³² Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Et cum arguitur contra: ergo idem agens naturale in passo uniformiter disposito posset effectus contrarios producere, concedo."

that even experience proves that it is in humans' power to produce contrary volitions of either willing or nilling something.³³ Advocated by John Duns Scotus, the possibility to choose freely between contradictories was one definition of free will vigorously discussed by fourteenth-century Oxonians.³⁴ While not explicitly articulated, it seems to be endorsed by Roseth, too, as he repeatedly underlines the will's ability to will and nill.³⁵

All the arguments mobilized by Roseth support the idea that there is no general rule for describing the cause-effect relationship in both the natural and the mental realms that would reasonably warrant claiming that cognition is the cause of free volitions.³⁶ While cognition can be a natural cause of volitions, since it naturally precedes any willing or nilling, it cannot be regarded as the proper or the only cause of the acts of the will.

Roseth once again employs analogies between natural phenomena and willing in his examination of the second conclusion. In argument 2, Roseth argues against the claim (resulting from assumption 1 above) that if the strength of the cause increases, the intensity of the effect must also increase. The consequence of this reasoning is that if cognition increases (becoming clearer), willing must also increase (becoming stronger). This view, as Roseth points out, is anchored in the notion that "nothing can be loved unless known."³⁷ If the wording of this idea stems from Thomas Aquinas

³³ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Contra: si cognitio foret causa volitionis liberae, ergo foret causa effectiva illius volitionis, quia ista posita naturaliter potest poni volitio, et ista non posita naturaliter non ponitur volitio, ergo cognitio est causa talis volitionis, et non alia quam effectiva, patet ergo quod cognitio est causa effectiva talis volitionis. Sed probo quod non, quia si foret causa effectiva volitionis liberis, ergo idem penitus agens naturale in eodem passo uniformiter disposito posset causare effectus contrarios, puta velle et nolle. Quia ex quo: libere causat talem volitionem mediante cognitione de tali obiecto, possem ego pro tunc vel alias causare volitiones, sicut expertum est, ergo etc."

³⁴ See, for example, Dunne, 2024; Michałowska, 2022b, 2023a, 2023b; Schierbaum, 2017.

³⁵ See, for example, Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 4, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 2005, p. 218): "Et ita simul volet et nolet sibi subvenire. Et per consequens contraria sunt simul, scilicet volitio et nolitio respectu eiusdem."

³⁶ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Unde credo quod difficile sit dare artem generalem qua sciretur aliquid esse causam alterius. Pro nunc posito istam artem generalem nescio tamen si illa sit sufficiens [...]."

³⁷ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Et confirmatur, quia nihil amatur nisi cognitum, ergo cognitio est causa talis dilectionis."

(ca. 1225–1274),³⁸ it seems that FitzRalph's question 10 is Roseth's direct source again.³⁹ To challenge the intensity claim, Roseth does not simply embrace FitzRalph's arguments, but he also brings into play an analogy between light and willing to advance his statement. In drawing this analogy, he invites readers to imagine that there are a lighting object (A) and a shading object (B) which oppose each other and produce a shaded area. Then A, which is greater than B, starts to increase even more while B starts to diminish. As a result, the shaded area is simultaneously affected by two causes: the increase of A's intensity and the decrease in B's intensity, both of which must happen at the same time for the area to be less shaded. This leads Roseth to conclude that the increase of one cause (out of the many affecting a given object) does not suffice to make a change in the intensity of the affected object.⁴⁰ In Roseth's view, the same conclusion can be drawn for the relation between the increase of cognition (knowing a desired object better) and the increase of the intensity of volition (desiring it more), since there are other concurrent causes that can simply prevent the intensity of willing from increasing. Although Roseth does not explain what those other causes might be, they might be reasonably assumed to include another act of cognition, other senses blurring the clarity of cognition, or another volition impeding cognition. Because multiple causes act upon one volition, granting precedence to one over the others would mean recognizing it as the proper cause of willing, which would eventually result in accepting that the will is necessitated by something else than itself, a view that obviously jeopardizes the freedom of the will. To safeguard this freedom, Roseth states that although cognition may increase, this increase is not followed by the like increase of the volition. Rather, it is in the will's power to choose the degree of volition with which it wants to act, regardless of how much cognition increases.⁴¹ The notion that the will chooses

³⁸ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae Ia-IIae*, q. 27, art. 2 (editio Leonina, 1891, p. 193): "Sic igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum."

³⁹ Richard FitzRalph, *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10, argumenta pro quaestione (ed. Michałowska & Dunne, 2025, p. 123): "Et III *De libero arbitrio* dicit hoc capitulo 42, quia nihil potest amari nisi cognitum [...]."

⁴⁰ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (Oxford, Oriel College, 15, f. 271va).

⁴¹ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): "Et sic est in proposito de voluntate et dilectione. Nam positus omnibus aliis causis requisitis

the degree of its act's intensity seems fundamental to Roseth, judging by the fact that he employs it time and again in question 2.⁴² Notably, it significantly refines FitzRalph's view on the freedom of the will and the voluntarist debate at fourteenth-century Oxford in general. While both FitzRalph and Roseth seek to defend the freedom of the will, the former falls back on rather standard argumentation. By explicitly articulating the opinion on the gradability of the will, Roseth presents himself as a close follower of his fellow Oxford Calculators Kilvington and Halifax, both of whom considered the will to be absolutely free with respect to the intensity of its acts. Roseth's view clearly echoes Kilvington's notion of the degrees of the intensity of the will,⁴³ which was promptly endorsed by Halifax.⁴⁴ In this framework, the will can be scaled and measured like any other quality, whether physical (coldness, whiteness, etc.) or ethical (generosity, justice, etc.). Moreover, the various degrees of the intensity of willing can be indicated on its latitude.

In his analysis of the cause of volitions, Roseth also examines the possibility of simultaneous contradictories as yet another facet of a free choice between contraries. In argument 6, he argues that if volition were produced by cognition and, at the same time, obviously by the will as well, it would be produced both freely (by the will as a freely acting cause) and necessarily (by cognition as a necessarily acting natural cause). Consequently, freely and necessarily, which are contradictories, could be true at the same time; thus, volition could be not produced (because of freedom) and could not be not produced (because of necessity).⁴⁵ Stephen Dumont has suggested that

ad causationem dilectionis, adhuc libere voluntas causabit dilectionem ita quod non oportet quod causet talem actum diligendi, et, sicut voluntas omnibus aliis causis positis necessario requisitis ad talem effectum, habet in potestate sua [...] ita habet in potestate sua ad ponendum actum suum diligendi in tali gradu vel in tali maiori vel minori sicut sibi placet quantumcumque cognitio illius quae augmentetur.”

⁴² Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): “[...] et hoc propter libertatem voluntatis, quae quidem voluntas ex libertate sua potest velle diligere in gradu minori et maiori, sicut sibi placet quantumcumque cognitio augmentetur cum omnibus causis uniformiter se habentibus [...].” Ibidem: “[...] sicut dictum est, libere ponet dilectionem in tali gradu vel tali.”

⁴³ Michałowska, 2022a, pp. 173–181; 2026.

⁴⁴ Lukács, 2026.

⁴⁵ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): “Praeterea, si cognitio foret causa volitionis, cum non sit causa necessario causans, quia naturaliter,

the dispute around willing contradictories was fueled by an incompatibility that arose when Stephen Tempier and his theological collaborators condemned article 129⁴⁶ as fallacious but endorsed Giles of Rome's (ca. 1243–1316) statement in the *Sentences* known as the *propositio magistralis*. This resulted in the confounding situation where, so to speak, “rectitude and malice can/cannot be present in the will at the same time.”⁴⁷ Thinkers were quick to acknowledge this perplexing development, a realization that prompted systematic efforts geared to finding a way out of this quandary. Early reconciling solutions were sought through different strategies and within various philosophical frameworks, as exemplified by Henry of Ghent's (ca. 1217–1293) staunch voluntarist approach⁴⁸ and John of Pouilly's (d. ca. 1328) intellectualist intervention in his *Quodlibeta*.⁴⁹ These prepared the ground for further debating in the fourteenth century.

Relying on the Aristotelian principle according to which “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not,”⁵⁰ Roseth takes a clear stance in the debate to insist that simultaneous contradictories are not possible. In article 3 of question 2, he puts forth several arguments and conclusions concerning free will. To solve the conundrum noted in argument 6 of article 1, he bases his deliberations on whether the will acts are produced freely or necessarily on the Aristotelian principle and straightforwardly states in the third conclusion “that the will, whenever it wills, wills necessarily, since whenever it wills, it has a volition

ergo sequitur quod eadem volitio simul et semel foret effectus necessario productus et libere productus, quia qua ratione libere producebatur, quia producebatur a voluntate ita necessario producebatur, quia a cognitione necessario producebatur. Et ita sequitur quod eadem volitio potuit non produci, quia libere producebatur et non potuit non produci, quia necessario producebatur, et ita contradictoria simul vera.”

⁴⁶ Article 129 (169) (ed. Piché, 1999, p. 118): “Quod uoluntas, manente passione et scientia particulari in actu, non potest agere contra eam.” See also Dumont, 1992, p. 587.

⁴⁷ “*Propositio magistralis*: There is never malice in the will unless there is error or at least some ignorance in the intellect.” See Dumont, 1992, p. 587.

⁴⁸ On Henry of Ghent's account, see Dumont, 1992.

⁴⁹ On John of Pouilly's account, see Hoffmann, 2023.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *De interpretatione vel Peri hermeneias*, 9 (ed. Verbeke, revised by Minio-Paluello, 1965, p. 17; 19a23–24): “Igitur esse quod est quando est, et non esse quod non est quando non est, necesse est [...]” For an English translation, see Aristotle, *Categories and De interpretatione*, 9 (transl. Ackrill, 1963, p. 52).

which it cannot make not exist, since everything that is, when it is, must be necessarily.”⁵¹ Yet Roseth realizes that adopting the Aristotelian principle entails endorsing the notion that the will acts necessarily. Therefore, to protect the freedom of the will, he rejects the possibility of simultaneous contradictories, insisting that such a possibility refers to the future of either willing or nilling, yet not to the present.⁵²

Given that contradictories are not possible at the same time, volition cannot be produced necessarily and freely at once, as opposed to what argument 6 states. To crack the problem, Roseth comes up with yet another distinction. He affirms that cognition is a cause of volitions, but only a partial one. Thus, although several causes may have an impact on the production of volitions, only the will is their proper and principal cause.⁵³ This standard distinction resonates again with FitzRalph’s voluntarism and his own distinction between the proper and improper acts of the will. While, in FitzRalph’s view, volitions are the proper acts of the will and the will is their principal cause,⁵⁴ other acts, such as corporeal desires, are not caused by the will in a proper sense and, consequently, the will is not their principal cause.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 3 (in preparation): “Tertia conclusio est quod voluntas quandocumque vult necessario vult, quia quandocumque vult habet volitionem quam non potest facere pro tunc non esse, quia omne quod est quando est, necesse est esse.”

⁵² Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 3 (in preparation): “Ad primum dico quod contradictio sequitur quod si possem de illo quod est possibile pro nunc facere quod non sit, nam posito quod aliqua res nunc sit, ex quo omne quod est necesse est esse, sequitur quod haec res necessario est. Si ergo possem facere quod illud quod non est nunc non sit, esset contradictio. Sed talis contradictio non sequitur: si de illo quod erit possum facere quod illud non erit, quia omne quod erit, distinguendo quod erit necessario ab illo quod contingenter erit, et hoc: si illud quod erit sit in libera potestate voluntatis vel alicuius alterius causae libere causantis.”

⁵³ Roger Roseth, *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2, art. 1 (in preparation): “Sed sic non est in proposito, quia etsi necessario producatur a cognitione quae est una partialis causa et minus principalis, producitur tamen cum hoc libere a voluntate quae est causa principalis talis volitionis.”

⁵⁴ Richard FitzRalph, *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10, art. 1 (ed. Michałowska & Dunne, 2025, p. 123): “Ideo teneo in isto articulo quod voluntas est activa respectu cuiuscumque volitionis suae, quia quaelibet volitio est actio propria voluntatis.”

⁵⁵ Richard FitzRalph, *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10, art. 1 (ed. Michałowska & Dunne, 2025, p. 163): “Ad decimum patet per idem. Cum allegatur ab Augustini X *Super Genesim ad litteram*, capitulo 12 quod appetitus carnalis est in voluntate et in ipsa anima

5. Conclusion

The 1320s and 1330s marked the golden age of the voluntarist debate. The arguments crafted at that time reached beyond the standard views on the will and the classic ethical methodology. Roseth's study of the will is testament to both aspects of this shift. He vigorously engages in discussions on free will, the cause of volitions, and kinds of the acts of the will by mustering the new arguments proposed in his day, applying the new methods propounded by the Calculators, and frequently weaving analogies between the ethical and the natural realms. Although Roseth often harnesses FitzRalph's reasoning to his agenda, these borrowings are not a mere imitative reiteration. He critically addresses his older Oxonian fellow's arguments by developing the reasoning for and against. Moreover, he enriches them with the new ideas of the gradability of the will and its ability to increase its intensity. Roseth's exploration of the causes of volitions shows that he was not only an insightful philosopher well-versed in the views on the will debated at Oxford at that time, but was also a skillful interlocutor and critic of his older and contemporary colleagues' arguments and opinions.

Primary Sources

Manuscripts

Roger Roseth. *Lectura super Sententias*, q. 2. Edition in preparation by M. Michałowska & O. Hallamaa.

Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di San Francesco, 173:
art. 1, ff. 28ra–38va; art. 2, ff. 38va–45va; art. 3, ff. 45va–46va;

Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, 192:
art. 1, ff. 21vb–28ra; art. 2, ff. 28ra–33rb; art. 3, ff. 33rb–34ra;

Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale, 1551:
art. 1, ff. 50ra–63(64)ra; art. 2, ff. 63(64)ra–72(73)ra; art. 3, ff. 72(73)ra–73(74)rb;

invita voluntate, ergo non causatur a voluntate, dico quod quidquid sit de antecedente, consequentia non valet, sed solum sequitur quod voluntas non sit causa principalis libera illius, et hoc est verum quando illa causatur ab extrinseco, scilicet a carne concupiscente adversus spiritum.”

Kassel, Landesbibliothek, 2^o theol., 53:

art. 1, ff. 13rb–17ra; art. 2, ff. 17ra–18va; art. 3, ff. 18va–19ra.

Oxford, Oriel College, 15:

art. 1, ff. 264va–272ra; art. 2, ff. 272ra–277ra; art. 3, ff. 277ra–278rb.

Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 238:

art. 1, ff. 23ra–31ra; art. 2, ff. 31ra–36vb (incomplete).

Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigi B.V. 66:

art. 1, ff. 42v–55v; art. 2, ff. 55v–64v; art. 3, ff. 64v–66r.

Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1108:

art. 1, ff. 1r–24v; art. 2, ff. 93r–102v; art. 3, ff. 24v–27r.

Critical Editions and Translations

Aristotle. (2002). *Categories and De interpretatione* (J. L. Ackrill, Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1963).

Aristotle. (1965). *De interpretatione vel Peri hermeneias. Translatio Boethii. Specimina Translatiorum Recentiorum* (G. Verbeke, Ed., L. Minio-Paluello, Rev.). Aristoteles Latinus 2.1–2.

Richard FitzRalph. (2025). *Lectura in Sententias*, q. 10. In M. Michałowska & M. W. Dunne (Eds.), *Richard FitzRalph on the will and instantaneous volition: A critical edition of Book I, Question 10 from Richard FitzRalph's Lectura in Sententias* (pp. 117–251). Brill.

Robert Halifax. (Forthcoming). *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*, q. 5, *Utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit esse subito productus a voluntate* (M. Michałowska & E. A. Lukács, Eds.).

Roger Roseth. (2005). *Lectura super Sententias: Quaestiones 3, 4 & 5*. O. Hallamaa (Ed.). Luther-Agricola Society.

Stephen Tempier. (1999). *Articuli condemnati anno 1277*. In D. Piché (Ed.), *La condamnation parisienne de 1277: Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire* (pp. 72–155). Vrin.

Thomas Aquinas. (1891). *Summa theologiae* I–II (qq. 1–70). In *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita* (Commissio Leonina, Ed., Vol. 6). Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. De Propaganda Fide.

Secondary Sources

- Dumont, S. D. (1992). Time, contradiction and freedom of the will in the late thirteenth century. *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 3(2), 561–597.
- Dunne, M. W. (2024). Richard FitzRalph on contradictory appetites (*Appetitus contrarii*): An unfinished debate. In E. A. Lukács & M. Michałowska (Eds.), *Calculating ethics in the fourteenth century* (pp. 45–69). Brill.
- Hallamaa, O. (2005). Introduction. In O. Hallamaa (Ed.), *Lectura super Sententias: Quaestiones 3, 4 & 5* by R. Roseth (pp. 4–64). Luther-Agricola Society. (2005).
- Hoffmann, T. (2023). John of Pouilly's intellectualist reading of the March 7, 1277 condemnation. In M. Michałowska & R. Fedriga (Eds.), *Willing and understanding: Late medieval debates on the will, the intellect, and practical knowledge* (pp. 106–146). Brill.
- Jung, E., & Michałowska, M. (2023). Richard Kilvington's and Thomas Bradwardine's questions on future contingents, free will, and predestination. In E. Jung & M. Michałowska, *Richard Kilvington talks to Thomas Bradwardine about future contingents, free will, and predestination: A critical edition of Question 4 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (pp. 1–86). Brill.
- Kitanov, S. V., & Schabel, C. (2025). Introduction. In S. V. Kitanov & C. Schabel (Eds.), *Adam Wodeham, Ordinatio Oxoniensis in primum librum Sententiarum, distinctio 1, quaestiones 8–9* (pp. 9–41). Vrin.
- Lukács, E. A. (2022). Robert Halifax, an Oxford Calculator of shadows. *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval*, 19(1), 77–95.
- Lukács, E. A. (2026). The physical modelling of the will in Robert Halifax's Questions on the Sentences, Question 6. In M. Michałowska & M. W. Dunne (Eds.), *The will discourse in late medieval philosophy and theology* (pp. 218–235). Routledge.
- Michałowska, M. (2022a). Richard Kilvington on the will's acting and time. In R. Fedriga & M. Michałowska, *Safeguarding free will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the will* (pp. 169–200). Księgarnia Akademicka.
- Michałowska, M. (2022b). Walter Chatton on the will and its acts. In R. Fedriga & M. Michałowska, *Safeguarding free will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the will* (pp. 89–113). Księgarnia Akademicka.
- Michałowska, M. (2023a). Cracking the code of the will: Richard Kilvington on the will and logic. In M. Michałowska & R. Fedriga (Eds.), *Willing and understanding: Late medieval debates on the will, the intellect, and practical knowledge* (pp. 210–231). Brill.

- Michałowska, M. (2023b). FitzRalph on the activity of the will. In M. W. Dunne & S. Nolan (Eds.), *A companion to Richard FitzRalph: Fourteenth-century scholar, archbishop, and polemicist* (pp. 101–120). Brill.
- Michałowska, M. (2024). At the intersections of physics and ethics: Richard Kilvington on ethical change. In E. A. Lukács & M. Michałowska (Eds.), *Calculating ethics in the fourteenth century* (pp. 70–98). Brill.
- Michałowska, M. (2026). Richard Kilvington on ethical and theological objects and changes: When ethics meets physics and geometry. In M. Michałowska & M. W. Dunne (Eds.), *The will discourse in late medieval philosophy and theology* (pp. 197–217). Routledge.
- Michałowska, M., & Lukács, E. A. (2024). Calculatory ethics: Methods, arguments, and cases. An introduction. In E. A. Lukács & M. Michałowska (Eds.), *Calculating ethics in the fourteenth century* (pp. 1–25). Brill.
- Pickavé, M. (2026). The power to do otherwise in fourteenth-century philosophy: A first approximation. In M. Michałowska & M. W. Dunne (Eds.), *The will discourse in late medieval philosophy and theology* (pp. 115–136). Routledge.
- Schabel, C. (2020). Ockham, the *Principia* of Holcot and Wodeham, and the myth of the two-year *Sentences* lecture at Oxford. *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales*, 87, 59–102.
- Schabel, C. (2024). The Oxford Franciscan Robert Halifax's principal debate over grace and merit with his Pelagian *socius* and other colleagues in 1332–1333. In M. Brinzei & W. O. Duba (Eds.), *Principia on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Exploring an uncharted scholastic philosophical genre across Europe* (pp. 567–580). Brepols.
- Schierbaum, S. (2017). Intellections and volitions: Ockham's voluntarism reconsidered. In J. Pelletier & M. Roques (Eds.), *The language of thought in late medieval philosophy* (pp. 125–136). Springer.
- Sylla, E. D. (1973). Medieval concepts of the latitude of forms: The Oxford Calculators. *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 40, 223–283.
- Sylla, E. D. (1991). *The Oxford Calculators and the mathematics of motion 1320–1350: Physics and measurements by latitudes*. Harvard Dissertations in the History of Science.
- Sylla, E. D. (2017). Mathematics and physics of first and last instants: Walter Burley and William of Ockham. *Vivarium*, 55(1–3), 103–129.

Author Note

Monika Michałowska, Ph.D. (2007), is Professor of Philosophy at the Medical University of Łódź, Poland. She has critically edited Richard Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum* and *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (Brill, 2016, 2021, 2023, 2027) and Richard FitzRalph's *Lectura in Sententias* (with M.W. Dunne; Brill, 2025).

Address for correspondence: monika.michalowska@umed.lodz.pl.

Citation

Michałowska, M. (2026). Roger Roseth in conversation with Richard FitzRalph on the cause of volitions. *Analiza i Egzystencja*, 75 (3), 87–109. DOI: 10.18276/aie2026.75-05.