John Rodington: The Primacy of the Will over the Intellect in Relation to the Ultimate End

In this paper I present John Rodington’s opinion on the contingent fruition of the supreme good. Upholding Duns Scotus’s opinion against William Ockham’s criticism, Rodington states that the beatific enjoyment is contingent and depends only on the will. In debating this issue, Rodington delves into the nature of the human will, which he conceives as entirely independent from the intellect’s knowledge. In relation to this specific aspect, Rodington distances himself from Richard FitzRalph, despite the fact that the two authors display certain conceptual affinities, which the present article seeks to highlight. Furthermore, Rodington manifests a notable affinity with the theses advanced by Francis of Marchia, an Italian Franciscan who occupies a comparatively marginal position within the English intellectual milieu. The study concludes with a concise examination of what Rodington designates as dubia, a series of subordinate questions that engage with the most distinctive and original dimensions of his thought.