Przejdź do treści
Analiza i Egzystencja
68 (2024)

O nowych trendach w filozofii analitycznej na przykładzie metaetyki, etyki i filozofii polityki oraz o filozofowaniu w dobie sztucznej inteligencji

DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.68-06
Cytuj

Pełny tekst jest dostępny

ISSN:1734-9923
eISSN:2300-7621
Autorzy: Artur Szutta ORCID
Uniwersytet Gdański
Słowa kluczowe: : filozofia analityczna metaetyka etyka filozofia polityczna realizm metaetyczny intuicjonizm etyka cnót sztuczna inteligencja demokracja merytokracja
Data publikacji całości:2024
Liczba stron:20 (81-100)
OAI-PMH:Metadane
Cited-by (Crossref) ?: Włącz JavaScript, aby pobrać dane cytowań.
CC BY-SA Open Access DOAJ ERIH PLUS Scopus Diamond Discovery Hub
Kod QR

Abstrakt

Artykuł poświęcony jest wybranym nowym trendom w metaetyce, etyce, filozofii polityki oraz uprawianiu filozofii z wykorzystaniem sztucznej inteligencji. Składa się z pięciu części. W części pierwszej analizuję sens pytania o nowe trendy w filozofii analitycznej. W części drugiej prezentuję najnowsze trendy w metaetyce. W trzeciej części skrótowo charakteryzuję etykę sztucznej inteligencji. Czwarta część poświęcona filozofii politycznej zawiera prezentację najnowszych publikacji na temat merytokracji. Artykuł zamykają rozważania na temat uprawiania filozofii w dobie sztucznej inteligencji.

PDF

Pobierz PDF
Podgląd PDF

Otwórz PDF

Bibliografia (98)
  1. Adams, R. M. (1979). Divine command metaethics modified again. The Journal of Religious Ethics, 66-79.
  2. Adams, R. M. (2002). Finite and infinite goods: A framework for ethics. Framework for Ethics.
  3. Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. Oxford University Press.
  4. Audi R., (1997). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, New York: Oxford University Press.
  5. Audi, R. (2015). Intuition and Its Place in Ethics. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1, 57–77
  6. Autor, D. (2015). Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(3), 3-30.
  7. Ayer, A.J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Gollancz 1936.
  8. Bai, T. (2020). Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  9. Barry, B. (1965). Political Argument, London: Routledge.
  10. Bell, Daniel A. (2015). The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  11. Bender, S., Nissenbaum, H. (Eds.), (2014). Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (pp. 44-75). Cambridge University Press
  12. Bengson, J., Cuneo, T., & Shafer‐Landau, R. (2020). Trusting moral intuitions. Noûs, 54(4), 956-984.
  13. Benn, S.I., Peters, R.S. (1959). Social Principles and Democratic State, London: Allen & Unwin
  14. Blackburn, S. (1993). Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford University Press.
  15. Bloomfield, P., & Copp, D. (Eds.). (2023). The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press.
  16. Boddington, P. (2023). AI ethics: a textbook. Springer Nature.
  17. Bolender, J. (2001). A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture for Mental Reasoning, „Biology and Philosophy” 2001, vol. 16, s. 339–356
  18. Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford University Press.
  19. Brady, M. S. (2011). New waves in metaethics. Palgrave.
  20. Bregman, R. (2017). Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build the Ideal World. Little, Brown and Company.
  21. Brennan, J. (2016), Against Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  22. Brennan, J., Landemore, H. (2022). Debating Democracy. Do We Need More or Less? Oxford University Press.
  23. Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge University Press.
  24. Bryson, J. J. (2010). Robots Should Be Slaves. In Y. Wilks (Ed.), Close Engagements with Artificial Companions: Key Social, Psychological, Ethical and Design Issues. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 63-74.
  25. Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(9-10), 7-65.
  26. Coeckelbergh, M. (2020). AI ethics. MIT Press.
  27. Collier, J., Stingl, M. (2020), Evolutionary Moral Realism, Routledge.
  28. Cuneo, T. (2011). The Myth of Moral Fictionalism, w: Brady, New Waves in Metaethics
  29. Damasio A. (2002). Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg,tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis.
  30. De Caro M., Vaccarezza M. (Eds). (2021). Practical Wisdom: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Routledge.
  31. DePaul, M. R. (1993). Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry, Florence, KY: Routledge
  32. DePaul, M. R., & Ramsey, W. M. (Eds.). (1998). Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.
  33. Doris, J. M. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge University Press.
  34. Enoch, D. (2011). Taking morality seriously: A defense of robust realism. Oxford University Press, USA.
  35. Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor. St. Martin's Press.
  36. Evans, C. S. (2013). God and moral obligation. Oxford University Press.
  37. Floridi, L. (2023). The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: Principles, Challenges, and Opportunities. Oxford University Press.
  38. Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004). On the Morality of Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines, 14(3), 349-379.
  39. Ford, M. (2015). Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. Basic Books.
  40. Fukuyama, F. (1996). Koniec historii, tłum. T. Biedroń, Poznań: Zysk i S-ka Wydwanictwo.
  41. Geach, P. T. Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (1960): 221–5.
  42. Geach, P. T. Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449–65.
  43. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings: A theory of normative judgment. Harvard University Press.
  44. Goodin, E.E., Pettit, P., red., (1998). Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej, tłum. C. Cieśliński i M. Poręba, Książka i Wiedza.
  45. Gunkel, D. J. (2018). Robot Rights. MIT Press.
  46. Hare R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Clarendon Press.
  47. Hare, J. E. (2015). God's command. Oxford University Press.
  48. Harman, G. (2000, January). The nonexistence of character traits. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Vol. 100, pp. 223-226). The Aristotelian Society, Wiley.
  49. Hart, L.H.A. (1961) The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press.
  50. Hinton, M., & Wagemans, J. H. (2023). How persuasive is AI-generated argumentation? An analysis of the quality of an argumentative text produced by the GPT-3 AI text generator. Argument & Computation, (Preprint), 1-16.
  51. Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical Intuitionism, Palgrave.
  52. Hussain, N.J. (2004). The Return of Moral Fictionalism, Philosophical Perspectives 18, 149-187.
  53. Jaskowska, B. (2023). Książki pisane przez sztuczną inteligencję. Perspektywy Kultury, 42(3), 39-64.
  54. Joyce, J. (2001). The Myth of Morality, Cambridge University Press.
  55. Joyce, J. (2017). Fictionalism in Metaethics, in: D. Plunkett & T. McPherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge, 72-86.
  56. Joyce, J. (2020). Fictionalism: Morality and Metaphor, in B. Armour-Garb & F. Kroon (eds.), Fictionalism in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 103-121.
  57. Kalderon, M. E. (2005). Moral fictionalism. Oxford University Press, USA.
  58. Kahneman D. (2011). Pułapki myślenia. O myśleniu szybkim i wolnym, tłum. P. Szymczak, Poznań: Media Rodzina.
  59. Kamtekar, R. (2004). Situationism and virtue ethics on the content of our character. Ethics, 114(3), 458-491.
  60. Kaspar, D. (2012). Intuitionism. Bloomsbury.
  61. Kramer, M. H. (2009). Moral realism as a moral doctrine. John Wiley & Sons.
  62. Kristjánsson, K., & Fowers, B. (2023). Phronesis: Retrieving practical wisdom in psychology, philosophy, and education.
  63. Krzanowski, R. (2022). GPT-3 and Philosophy. Preliminary Tests Results, hal-03640357.
  64. Kulp, C. B. (2017). Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge. Lexington Books.
  65. Kulp, Christopher B. (2019). Moral Properties. Metaphysics of Morality, 141-188.
  66. Laslett, P. (1956). Philosophy Politics and Society, Seria I, Oxford: Blackwell.
  67. Liao, S. M. (Ed.). (2020). Ethics of artificial intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  68. Loreggia, A., Mattei, N., Rossi, F., & Venable, K. B. (2020). Modelling and reasoning with preferences and ethical priorities in Liao (ed.), AI systems. Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, 127-150.
  69. Mackie J. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin Books.
  70. Michaux, C. (2023). Can Chat GPT Be Considered an Author? I Met with Chat GPT and Asked Some Questions About Philosophy of Art and Philosophy of Mind. Available at SSRN 4439607.
  71. Miller, A. (2013). Contemporary metaethics: an introduction. Second Edition. Polity Press.
  72. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Blackwell Publishing.
  73. O'Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. Crown Publishing Group.
  74. Pasquale, F. (2015). The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money and information. Harvard University Press.
  75. Pettit, P. (1998). Filozofia analityczna, w: Goodin, E. i Pettit, P., red. (1998).
  76. Quinn, P. L. (1978). Divine Command Ethics and Moral Requirements, Clarendon Press.
  77. Railton, P. (1986). Moral Realism, The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no 2, 163-207.
  78. Ranciere, J. (2017). Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steve Corcoran, London: Verso, 2017.
  79. Roberts, R. (2013). Emotions in the Moral Life, Cambridge University Press.
  80. Roeser, S. (2011). Moral Emotions and Intuitions, Palgrave Macmillan.
  81. Russell, D. C. (2009). Practical intelligence and the virtues. Oxford University Press.
  82. Russell, S. (2019). Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control. Viking.
  83. Sautoy du Marcus (2020), Kod kreatywności. Sztuka i innowacja w epoce sztucznej inteligencji, tłum. T. Chawziuk, Copernicus Center Press.
  84. Sayre-McCord, G. (Ed). (1988). Essays on Moral Realism, Cornell University Press
  85. Scanlon, T. (1982). Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in: Sen, A., Williams, B., Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, 103-129.
  86. Schroeder, M. (2008). What is the Frege‐Geach problem?. Philosophy Compass, 3(4), 703-720.
  87. Schwitzgebel, E., Schwitzgebel, D., & Strasser, A. (2023). Creating a large language model of a philosopher. arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.01339.
  88. Searle, John. Meaning and Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 423–32.
  89. Shanahan, M. (2015). The Technological Singularity. The MIT Press.
  90. Stevenson C.L. (1944). Ethics and Language. Yale University Press.
  91. Susskind, R., & Susskind, D. (2015). The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human Experts. Oxford University Press.
  92. Szubka, T. (2009). Filozofia analityczna. Koncepcje, metody, ograniczenia. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
  93. Szutta, A. (2018). Intuicje moralne: O poznaniu dobra i zła. Wydawnictwo Academicon.
  94. Szutta, N. (2017). Czy istnieje coś, co zwiemy moralnym charakterem i cnotą? Wydawnictwo Academicon.
  95. Tappolet, C. (2016). Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford University Press.
  96. Tang, Y. (2023). Is Confucian Political Meritocracy a Viable Alternative to Democracy? A Critical Engagement with Tongdong Bai. The Journal of Value Inquiry (2023) 57:625–640.
  97. Wallach, W., & Allen, C. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. Oxford University Press.
  98. Weldon, T.D. (1953). The Vocabulary of Politics, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.