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# Proliferation of illicit arms and control mechanisms in Nigeria: A critical socioeconomic analysis

**OLAGOKE OLUWAFEMI AWOTAYO**

ORCID: 0000-0001-9768-8910

Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: olagoke.awotayo@uniosun.edu.ng

**OLAWALE OLUFEMI AKINRINDE**

PH.D., LECTURER

ORCID: 0000-0001-7350-2376

Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: olawale.akinrinde@uniosun.edu.ng

**OLOWOGBOYEGA OYEBADE**

PH.D.

ORCID: 0000-0002-7733-3140

Department of Public Law, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: gboyega.oyebade@uniosun.edu.ng

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## **Abstract**

The study addresses the question of illicit weapons proliferation and many diverse control measures undertaken to counteract it in Nigeria. It further explores the reasons why Nigeria has become an appealing target for illicit weapons in the West African sub-region. Given the ease of in-flows and out-flows of illicit arms within the borders of the Nigerian State, this study contends that Nigeria's firearms law is outdated and insufficient, especially as seen from the perspective of the Protocol to the arms trade agreement that is in force, and even in the light of the dynamics of security issues in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The study demonstrates that the growing proliferation of illicit weapons in Nigeria has had economic, humanitarian and socio-political consequences. Therefore, it concludes that all the regional containment measures, from ECOWAS to weapons trading agreements, have not decreased the proliferation of illicit arms in Nigeria and that the Nigeria's Firearms Act is outdated and unsuitable for the security needs of the Nigerian state, notwithstanding the problems faced by the security dynamics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Introduction

Today, the major safety risks to continental peace are undoubtedly generated by the local and transnational terrorist organizations, the proliferation and trading of small and light weapons, and the cross-border criminal networks. UN Resolution UNGA50/70 B (1995) notes that small arms and light weapons (SALW) are easily accessible and simple to use, and that they are the only instruments of wildness in virtually all current conflicts in which the UN is involved. These weapons are primarily possessed by the determined warriors and outlaws who hardly comply with the International Convention. The UN General Assembly further stresses that these weapons have killed human beings with around 80% of the victims being women and children. In her address at the National Consultation on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) in Abuja, organized by the Small Arms and Light Weapons Agency and the Presidential Committee of SMEs, the Director of the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Olatokunbo Ige, presented these startling statistics. The UN General Assembly also states that the estimated return on guns remaining inside Nigeria is at least 350 million (Vanguard, 2016).

However, the effects of Nigeria's rising weaponry proliferation rate are worrisome for the country's fragility of security. From the onset of the fourth republic, Nigeria has been in and out of different conflicts, which have spurred the unregulated spread of weaponry. According to Omitola and Awotayo (2016), Nigeria has been caught in a web of recurrent incidents of armed conflict and criminal anarchy from the ethnic militias, Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen, and recently kidnapping as a result of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons since the country's democratic transition in 1999. The persistent threat to human security from the savage mass murders, organized and carried out by Fulani Herdsmen across the whole country, is now the clearest and most dangerous explanation of the uncontrollable and limitless access to tiny and light weapons in Nigeria. However, Nigeria's peace and safety agenda is particularly important in preventing the proliferation of small guns and light weapons. In the same vein, it's important for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security to put an end to the illegal access to small arms and light weapons. This mechanism has been specifically dedicated to undertaking preventive measures against the illegal flow of small weapons. Art. 51 stipulates, among other measures, that in the fight against illegal trafficking and trade of small guns, the Western African Economic Community (ECOWAS) should adopt any necessary steps. The armed conflicts, vast arms and light weapons proliferation and trafficking have made it impossible for the Nigerian Government to turn a blind eye to controlling the ever-hideous tendency to prevent catastrophes.

## Proliferation of arms and control initiatives: A conceptual explication

Kelli (2008) and Alusala (2016) pointed to acceleration of arms struggles, abduction, terrorism, robbery, murder, community violence, border crimes, and general insecurity worldwide, reflecting a widespread proliferation of small guns and light weapons. In the same vein, in

addition to ineffectiveness and corruption demonstrated in dealing with certain security issues and conflicts, the absence of cooperation and synergy among numerous security agencies, the rate of extermination of criminals and the wilful destruction of criminal exhibits contribute significantly to the lack of public confidence. In West Africa, we cannot accept the role mercenary and vigilante organizations play in weapons proliferation. Indeed, while considering the nature of the spread of small arms in African countries, one will agree that governments at various levels should be able to manage their countries' security systems. Clamour against crime spurs increased operations of the non-state actors responsible for the expansion of SALW in the Western African geographic region. The rates of ethnic militia, vigilant security organizations, weapons smugglers, crime gang members and bandits, which become a standard in African nations, become worrying. Almost every country on the Continent witnesses the shocking effects of the recent crises in Libya, Mali, Sudan and pro-Sudan caused by the SALW.

Nigeria's borders are 770 km long with the Republic of Benin, 1,500 km with the Republic of Niger, 1,700 km with Cameroon and 90 km with Chad. Nigeria also borders the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of 850 km. The increasing parts of porous borders between Nigeria and the neighbouring countries enable easy trafficking in weapons and other illegal products within the ECOWAS trade centre from one country to another. Arms from conflict areas are trafficked readily in tiny amounts and smuggled clandestinely. The immigration and customs officials are unaware of many smuggling routes. In Nigeria there is also a craft arms production by local blacksmiths, in addition to the geometric progression of small arms proliferation. As many other businesses, blacksmithing in Nigeria is not organized or supervised in any way which favours abuse. Small arms and light weapons trafficking in Nigeria is not ascribed exclusively to poor border control, but also to border porosity. Arms are becoming more accessible because of the poor and inadequate management and control of the borders, resulting from the lack of technological infrastructure, high level of corruption, and lack of personnel at border level. In the country there is a continual armed conflict between ethnical and religious groups.

Adeniyi (2017) claims that many places in Africa are characterized by protracted conflicts, proxy wars and inter-community fightings. Violence continues to create structural poverty and induce cycles of poverty across the continent. For instance, death, sexual abuse, dissolution, pillage, and the belief that life will be well shut up has brought immense misery. It is estimated by global scientists that an average of 500,000 deaths every year and millions more are caused by armed violence and war. Armed wars' human costs are abundantly documented in literature. In Nigeria, and Africa as a whole, armed conflicts affected mostly the poor rural areas and this has significantly diminished poverty reduction and human safety efforts. The rate at which farmers are murdered on their fields and around the country with AK47 in the forests better explains slowdown of the food development. ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP) (2007) observes that the main element contributing considerably to the lethargy and continuous crises of the ECOWAS sub-region is a consequence of the expansion and trade in small-scale arms and light-duty weapons. Besides the expansion of weaponry and the clash between children and warriors of fortune, war has become a challenge for both kinds and lifestyles. The use of or a threat

to use conventional weapons, in particular small arms and lightweight weapons, consistently increases gender-based violence, violence against women and violations of the human rights which occur in Africa. The increased availability of tiny weaponry has added to the worrisome rate at which infantile casualties occur in Africa, because small arms and light weapons can easily be utilized by the children.

## The proliferation of arms and the farmers – herdsman conflict in Nigeria

The security situation in the Nigerian political arena has a catastrophic effect on human security and challenges associated with proliferating guns. It can be highly visible as daily killings, abductions and skirmishes between farmers and herders occur. It is a reality that insecurity and crime are a worldwide event. In Nigeria this globalization influenced food security, tourism, direct foreign investments and the development of key infrastructure. However, apart from the effect of globalisation, it should be understood that all crimes are local, and solutions against crimes can be appropriately managed locally. In short, Nigeria has been hammered hard by insecurity and Nigeria seems to be overwhelmed by its security architecture. The response of the government to this safety problem continues to be amazing and not encouraging, as criminal elements are still free.

Keli (2008) notes that in the western sub-region of Africa small and light arms still constitute a severe threat to human safety. In the domains of food security, Keli revealed the ongoing threat to human safety. The savage atrocities that Fulani Herdsmen have organized and carried out in Nigeria are currently explaining the alarming trend towards unrestricted and uncontrolled access to possession and use of small and light arms. Only famine in the country can result from plundering and occupation of communities and farms. Fabiyi and Otunuga (2016) agree that herdsman play a vital role in ensuring food safety. They reported the annual slaughter of around 1,3 million cattle, accounting for 30% of meat consumption by more than 170 million Nigerians. However, the country's recently fragile unity, food security, employment, the right to life and property are all threatened by their activities and actions. Iro (1994) pointed out that the herdsman of Fulani are pastoralists, both nomads and semi-nomads, and the main job of the Fulani is keeping livestock. In line with this, livestock breeding among the Fulanis is a viable career. Yet, their nomadic character in their pursuit of green vegetable land and access to water for their cattle always led to conflicts between herders and farmers. These recurring conflicts have raised year after year a demand for small arms processions. Omitola and Awotayo (2016) argue that they learned to use deadly weapons instead of bow and arrow, machete or spear. The herdsman of the Fulani have a very advanced weapons, such that even our police do not have. The nomadic nature of husbandmen and the patterns of their attacks demonstrate clearly that the increasing crossborder crimes, and, more still, the source of conflict between the husbandmen and the Fulani farmers, can be situated within a conflict between their resources, a concept which is still controversial in the international political space.



## Economic, humanitarian and socio-political costs of uncontrolled arms in Nigeria

In view of the increasing number of terrorists, ethnic militants, secessionists, and other bandits, Nigeria's state structures have been reordered in a sufficient manner by its widespread and continuous misuse of arms. Its harmful activity has converted a large number of Nigerians, even within their own nation, into refugees and internally displaced individuals. The question of security of the internally displaced in the increasing number of refugee camps throughout the country is a source of constant worry. The extent, increasing trend, and cost of these effects should force all stakeholders involved, nationally and internationally, to take decisive action before they escalates beyond a normal level. The United Nations Office on Disarmament (2013) has noted that human costs are evident in different ways, including the killings, injuries and rape of civilians, and even children, who are most sensitive in any conflict. These are the consequences of the not properly regulated world trading in legal weapons. The perpetrator of this abominable crime against human rights and humanitarian law creates internal displacement of people within and across borders and will force the sufferers of armed violence and conflict to endure tremendous insecurity and financial challenges.

The rapid growth of armaments affects our political spaces more negatively. The multiplication of weaponry impacts election behaviour, it initiates and promotes electoral violence. The levels of violence in Nigerian elections and their adverse influence on electoral turnout were noted by Danjibo and Oladeji (2007). The carnage that has always defined our elections has been supported in line with this assumption, because the elections are a door-to-die in Nigeria and the atmosphere surrounding them is always tense and war-like. Hazen and Horner (2007) write that the militarized nature of politics, together with the occurrence of the armed groups, has engendered an association between politics and violence. Armed groups, acting under disguise of the hired hands, have now developed their bases of economic support, thereby freeing themselves from their political patrons. This has led some groups to interact with and try to influence the political procedure themselves.

A factor stimulating the proliferation of light weapons in Nigeria are the elections. Since the Nigerian elections in 2003 and later years, the tools of political violence have evidently shifted from conventional ones, i.e. matches, clubs and knives, to small weaponry, such as the locally manufactured and purchased pistols and a variety of attack fusils. It was mostly young groups, being in fact the political thugs, that were used both for the defence and attack by the politicians. It is necessary to remove these illegal weapons from circulation in order to generate robust, free and fair elections, which can legitimate a government that really reflects the results of voting. Nigeria's sharply decreasing peace and security are a factor counteracting its position as a destination for investment in Africa. It reduces its political and economic impact as the African powerhouse and a major factor in international space. As the Centre for Democracy and Development (2003) has noticed, due to the extremely centralized character of government resulting from a long period of military rule, the political and business resources are concentrated in the hands of the political leaders. As such, Nigeria's politics may be described as an "allocation politics",

which means that the electoral success is closely linked to “access to the country as a means to accumulate riches and to impart prestige”. It is also concerned with internal security issues which cannot be separated from the spread of illegal weapons. The Nigerian tourism potential is great and deserves the position of the Africa touristic hub, with all its different patrimony sites, rivers, fountains, mountain festivals and the carnival. There are also detrimental impacts on weaponry proliferation in the education sector. Cultists are murdering our ivory tower, as well as criminals, teachers or pupils do. The increasing distribution of illicit weapons in our universities, polytechnics or educative colleges have dramatically shown the issue. The threat to education progress in Nigeria is still an albatross.

## Arms control initiatives in Nigeria

Weapons and arms control initiatives have always relied on agreements and procedures to either reduce their growth in number or limit their use. The aim is to stop armaments by regulating the procurement of weapons and the way they are deployed to reinforce the military capacity. This effort is intended to stimulate the adoption of various ways of crisis management. Arms control is a means of negotiating instruments of international treaties, agreements, and regional and sub-regional protocols, both nationally and internationally. However, national commitments to the sub-regional, regional and international agreements are as significant as is their anticipated impact. This means that in order to achieve worldwide weapons control, the international initiatives should achieve certain level of conformity with national weapons control initiatives. The national legislation and other regulations are important in the context of international treaties.

Close collaboration between the Member States that form the sub-regional bloc will ensure the gains from ECOWAS. ECOWAS is an efficient and sensible step towards preventing unlawful expansion of weapons in the sub-region. It also appeals for international peacekeeping missions and for addressing real national safeguards and security needs. Art. 50 of the Convention Instrument (in accordance with the arrangements of the moratorium) force the Member States to put control measures on import, export, and production of light weapons; to register and manage the movement and utilization of the authentic arms stock; to find and obliterate all unlawful and surplus weapons; to permit exemption to the moratorium exclusively in accordance with strict conditions. In December 1999, the Heads of State and Government affirmed a Set of accepted rules formulated in 19 Articles, which prescribe tasks, obligations, and solid activities to be followed by the Member States and the ECOWAS Commission respectively.

Kamavauko and Luvenga (1995) underlined lack of commitment or collaboration of the armed criminals in curbing the threat, noting further that the majority of cases of arms control or enforcement were detected by the police. In Africa it is quite hard to mention any recent incidents of successful prosecution of arms traders. Even in cases of suspected detection of weaponry and/or munitions, it typically goes unheeded. Officials do not conduct investigations in most cases. For example, a United Kingdom based NGO, which is monitoring the transfer of weaponry, published in 2013 a report from the Conflict Armament Research, which documented

10 cases of the trafficking ammunition in illicit marketplaces. The research notes that ammunition is tracked to nine nations: the DRC, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Nigeria, South Sudan, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The report points to the facts. However, none of these countries questioned the results. Indeed, it is rare that authorities attempt to validate such research findings, investigate such situations and prosecute the culprits. Given the enormous armaments in individual holdings, the question arises if it concerns the crimes of robbery and enforcement or a dark motivation for waging war against the state. The massive collection of advanced weapons is paraded by and publicly shown by insurgents and militants, as well as by livestock roasters. The rates of armament intensification call into question the government's resolve to stop the hideous trend. Coulibally (2008) stated that its voluntary character and the lack of legal punishments have hindered the moratorium's efficacy. Duquet (2009) highlights worries over the safety of waterways in the Niger Delta, a resourceful Niger region bordering Nigeria. According to him, the Niger Delta is the portal to the paths through which the international waters of the Gulf of Guinea promote trafficking and piracy. Duquet (2009) argues that these organized criminal networks in oil-rich regions have large elements of illicit weaponry proliferation, a unity of purpose, and vast resources.

The Firearms Law of 1959 was superseded by the Nigerian weapons law of the 1990s. The Nigerian Firearms Act of 1990 was only old wine in a new barrel because the 1959 legislation and the 1990 Act did not radically modify the Nigerian Firearms Act. Section 28(2) of the Firearms Act of 199, however, allows nobody to have any firearms or munitions under one's control unless under a licence granted by the Chairman or Inspector General of the Police. Furthermore, the Act specifies that no person under the age of seven will receive a licence. No person who has been convicted of violence in the last five years will be granted the licence. It is also necessary to confirm that one is not unsound, visually impaired or high-temperamental. In Nigeria, only the inspector general of the police has the sole authority to licence the manufacturers and repairers of weapons, providing them with correct documentation and registration. However, to tackle the 21<sup>st</sup>-century security challenges in a more effective manner, there is a need to make necessary laws that would be in consonance with the current realities in order to effectively reverse the menace.

Ikelegbe (2014) observed that the police are a key agency charged with enforcing all legal frameworks concerning SALW. The "Nation Newspaper" of 23 February 2018, reported that the Inspector-General of Police Mr. Ibrahim Idris directed Commissioners of Police all over the country to commence the recovery of illegal firearms. „The operation will equally include cordon and search and raid, seizure from any premises, hideouts, dwelling houses or buildings or sites that are under construction". The IG was of the opinion that this action would enable the Nigeria Police Force to deal decisively with herders and farmers clashes, kidnappings, armed robbery, cattle rustling, militancy, and terrorism. The reawakening commitment of the Nigeria Police Force to assure protection of lives and property across the country remains unequivocal and unwavering. In another view, as lofty as the directives of the Inspector General of Police seemed, Aremu (1999) asserts that police in Nigeria do not enjoy positive public perception. They

are being faced with various issues starting from the negative perception of the general public and dehumanizing conditions underneath that they perform their duties. Awotayo (2013) observe that Nigeria police has not been successful due to its ineffective communication, technological policing, and the inability to give intelligence to the high-level security threat in the country. Omitola and Awotayo (2016) agree that Nigeria has the feature of a failing state which has been heavily influenced by manifested weak governance and corrupt judicial structures. The high degree of corruption has undermined the lasting control of small arms. However, Yacubu (2005) argues that public support is an indicator of effectiveness in fighting small-scale weaponry proliferation. The general acceptance of government policies, as well as the way the security forces perform their tasks, will be the basis for enjoying and retaining this support from the people.

### **Illicit proliferation of arms and insecurity in Nigeria: The state policing option**

Nigerian State Governors recognized the need to prioritize insecurity and arms control, because most of this crime is committed within states. They realized that the effective participation must be based on a top-down strategy rather than a bottom-up one that does not have an effective answer. The current strategy of the Nigerian police conceals the way the police are overwhelmed by the security situation within the country and the rapid military intervention to such a purely civil protest. The method in which the Nigerian police are currently formed shows that people have little faith in their structures and activities. In recent years, Nigerian police performance has been awful because the crime rate has gone up astronomically. They are incompetent to deal with this country's banditry, terrorism and other safety concerns. Awotayo (2013) stated that the centralized structure and operational demands of the Nigerian police and the monopolization by the federal government of the Nigerian police force under section 214 (1) are clearly rooted in the 1999 constitution. Hence, the calls for creation of the state police have brought to the fore the question of restructuring the current federal arrangement in Nigeria. The 1999 constitution created a conflict and a contradiction when it recognised the state governors as chief security officers of their respective states, and gave the control of police apparatus to the central government. The centralization of the Nigerian police, founded on the constitution, made it difficult for the governors to fulfil their constitutional responsibilities in terms of security on the territories under their jurisdiction. Students and instructors were removed from a school in the country of Niger on Wednesday 17 February 2021. Schools in Nigeria are common targets for the terrorist groups and criminal gangs, yet we are collectively unaware of that if care is not taken. The attack took place at the Government Science College in the town of Kagara in Niger State where it is reported that over 40 people were kidnapped, including at least 26 students. One student was reportedly killed in the attack. Therefore, the arms race going on in the country require immediate response. A gun or a bullet in a wrong hand is only a millimetre from killing, carrying AK-47 by non-state actors, including herdsmen, is a joke taken too far. The security operatives seem to be helpless in the face of disaster. This has clearly shown the government's failure in securing the lives and properties of the citizens, which should be its primary purpose.

The formation Operation *Amotekun*, as part of the control mechanisms against banditry and other sources of insecurity in the southwest, is a real illustration of a communal reaction to security concerns and a model of how the problem of insecurity may be addressed. Due to their profound knowledge of the local environment, the Operation *Amotekun* has been reported to be effective on many occasions in capturing hundreds of killer herdsmen, repelling invasion, and in particular freeing up a number of towns and villages, as well as in helping to ensure their local governments to support the socio-cultural life of the area. Operation *Amotekun*, as a local security network, will be an essential interface inside the intelligence collection network required for other security operations. Indeed, the South-western Security Network is important not only as an immediate response to the threat of banditry, but also as the promise of peace-building within the region and across Nigeria.

## Conclusion

The campaign to curb the spread of small arms is at the top of the peace and security agenda in Nigeria. Stopping the unlawful movement of armaments and small arms proliferation is a key task that can transform the fragile peace we are experiencing in Nigeria into the enduring peace. As the population of Nigeria continues to expand and the demand for limited natural resources continues to grow, conflicts over natural resources will be significantly exacerbated in the next several decades. The possible impact of climate change should be considered on the availability of water, on food safety and on the prevalence of various diseases. The destructive potential of small arms proliferation has never been in doubt. Small weapons are lethal but very easy to use. Therefore, international cooperation is required to combat terrorism, especially considering that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is closely linked to drug trafficking, money laundering, and other transnational organized crime. All arms proliferation control initiatives should start with the consolidation of good governance, reinforcement of legislative measures, and a capacity of law enforcement agencies, as well as promotion of development agendas including appropriate campaigns for awareness-raising on the negative impact of arms proliferation. There is an urgent need to pool pertinent intelligence information and to regulate the detection and apprehension of the illicit cross-border movement of small guns by the police and customs activity.

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# The role of selected financial organizations in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement

**MARKO AĆIĆ**  
PH.D.

ORCID: 0000-0002-8020-9482  
Independent University of Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
e-mail: aciedominus@gmail.com

**MILOŠ GRUJIĆ**  
PH.D.

ORCID: 0000-0001-5566-5921  
Independent University of Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
e-mail: gruja84@gmail.com

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## **Abstract**

The paper lists the major projects of international financial organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) after signing the Dayton Peace Agreement to explore the role of international financial organizations in post-Dayton BiH. It discusses the specific contribution and the role of these organizations in functioning of BiH, including financial assistance, credit means, various funds and projects, which have been supposed to lead to the stable functioning of BiH after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The paper explains the role and attentiveness of the Monetary Board in BiH with a focus on its impact on implementation of the international projects. The research question is: "From which sources did the largest funds in BiH come in the period from 1996 to 2020 and how were they related to GDP?". The paper is based on publicly available data from international financial institutions and the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH. The results show that about 71.45 billion dollars entered BiH from international financial institutions through donations, grants, loans, and other various types of assistance. But the funded projects did not have the same priorities every year and in every area. In addition, international funds were used to finance numerous projects aimed at economic recovery and economic development. In the last few years, there has been a change in priorities, and significant funds have been directed to such projects as the judicial reform, institution building through strengthening the capacity of individual institutions, and the reform of particular areas and their approximation to the European Union standards.



## Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter BiH) today, as a project of the international community confirmed by the Dayton Peace Agreement, is an independent state (Aćić, 2019, p. 25; Hartwell, 2019, p. 44). BiH ties the stability of its currency to the currency board system. The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBiH) began its operations on 11 August 1997 by the decisions made under Article 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Vitomir, Lazić, 2021, p. 206; Vranješ, 2020, p. 81). In monetary terms, the crucial decision is the establishment of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the currency board model. Establishing a currency board arrangement was the best option to bring order and create confidence in the monetary sphere in the postwar country, as well as to bring macroeconomic stability. As part of that, one of the main levers is a stable currency (Gregović, Hodžić, 2017, p. 112). The CBBH does not create currency without cover, and may not lend funds to the government, nor give loans to commercial banks as a “lender of the last resort”. It is not allowed to operate on the open market and cannot use the exchange rate to remedy economic problems in the country (Jović, 2020, p. 9).

In 1999, BiH adopted a “currency board” system. This system brought excellent effects in reducing inflation in the country, made a significant contribution to settling the situation in the financial sector, and was an anchor that kept “BiH ship from wandering unnecessarily in the stormy sea of transition” (Grujić, 2018, p. 205). The described system ensures invariably fixed exchange rate<sup>1</sup>, which implies the possession of foreign exchange reserves in a stable currency at the level necessary to cover the amount of printed and coined money. It also implies unlimited internal convertibility, i.e. the possibility of converting domestic funds into the reserve currency (and vice versa) at a fixed and predetermined exchange rate (Gregović, Hodžić, 2017, p. 114). At the same time, it guarantees the possibility of free export of that foreign currency from the country (external convertibility).

Due to these rules, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot print money without cover to lend it to the state, which is effective, since such loans are the most common cause of high inflation rates in the world. However, for the same reasons, the CBBH does not fundamentally determine the amount of money in the economy<sup>2</sup>. It depends on the inflow of foreign exchange into the country<sup>3</sup>, so the significant advantage of this system can become its biggest drawback if the circumstances do not help. Despite all the above, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not an “ordinary exchange office”. However, in the BiH currency board regime, it is possible to pursue a sovereign, discretionary, and efficient monetary and macroprudential policy and regulation. Economic decisionmakers in BiH should be aware of the effects of

<sup>1</sup> 1 euro is exchanged for 1.955830 convertible marks.

<sup>2</sup> The CBBiH does not affect the amount of paper and metal money, as it can only be printed based on purchased foreign exchange. But it can, to some extent, affect the ability of the commercial banks to generate giro money by changing the reserve requirement rate (the amount of money kept in the central bank which serves as a guarantee that the banks will be able at all times to return the received deposits to those who wish to withdraw them).

<sup>3</sup> The monetary base depends on foreign exchange reserves, while higher monetary aggregates also depend on the population's tendency to save and the ability of commercial banks to place the collected funds.



monetary policy and its instruments and should insist on their further development, as well as on establishing the responsibility of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the situation in the BiH economy. The CBBH can influence both actual and financial variables in the country with the instruments of monetary policy.

Despite that, it is necessary to point out the specific contribution of international financial organizations in the functioning of BiH. It was made through the financial assistance, credit, as well as other funds and projects, which were supposed to lead to the stable functioning of BiH after signing the Dayton Peace Agreement. The leading hypothesis is: “The amount based on donations, loans, grants, project financing and assistance from international financial institutions and countries each enters BiH, exceeds the annual Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter GDP) growth”.

The paper explains the role and attentiveness of the Monetary Board in BiH with a focus on its impact on international projects implementation. The research question is: “From which sources did the largest funds in BiH come in the period from 1996 to 2020, and how were they related to GDP?”.

## Methodology

This paper analyses the major projects of international financial organizations in BiH after signing the Dayton Peace Agreement with the aim to explore the role of the international financial organizations in postDayton BiH. It indicates the specific contribution and the role of these organizations in the functioning of BiH, primarily through financial assistance, credit means, and other funds and projects, which were supposed to lead to the stable functioning of BiH after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Publicly available data from international financial institutions and the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH were analysed.

This paper reports the results of a descriptive and correlational research. The role and position are described of the most important financial institutions, international financial organizations and multilateral development banks in BiH. Relationships among various variables are explored with the aim to establish a causal connection between them. The paper presents the role and contribution of donations, grants, and loans from abroad to the GDP of BiH. Their indirect impact on the postwar recovery of BiH, but also on some segments of its further development, is presented. The paper emphasizes that in the period from 1996 to 2020, there was a medium-strong link between these investments and GDP.

The paper starts with explaining the role and position of the main international organizations, their history and role in the discussed processes. Then the main features of the currency board in BiH are described. Additionally, in order to more clearly indicate the areas in which individual IOs operate, a brief analysis is performed of the sectors and purposes of the projects undertaken in BiH.

## Selected international organizations

International organizations (hereinafter IOs) have been gaining their significance, as subjects of international law, especially since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup>-century. Although attempts had been made to regulate at the regional or world level certain issues such as navigability of individual rivers or harmonizing postal services and tariffs, the IOs gained real significance only by establishing the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization, and especially, the United Nations Organization (Grant, 2010, pp. 36-38). Thus, the IOs were developing in „two basic directions. The first one was forming a unique organization at the world level that would handle the maintenance of security and peace. The second one was to create the IOs whose work would include the social activities across state borders” (Aćić, 2014, p. 165), especially in the areas of cross-border cooperation such as traffic and communications, health, trade, finance, etc. According to Avramov, all of the above inevitably indicates that “the meaning of the existence of international organizations does not lie in themselves but in the realization of the goals for which they were founded” (Avramov, Kreća, 2003, p. 174). Due to everything stated so far, we want to emphasize one common aspect defined by the goals of several different IOs and other similar organizations: financing and lending for postwar renewals of certain countries, in our case, BiH.

## International financial assistance to BiH

Reconstruction programs in BiH after the war began in 1996. The Dayton Peace Agreement had two goals: to stop the war in BiH and to try to build a “sustainable BiH” (Pejanović, 2020, pp. 10-11). From the very beginning, the “Bosnian peace model” was specific in that its construction and implementation took place in the strong presence of the international community<sup>4</sup>. Numerous international financial organizations and their member states participated in the reconstruction of BiH.

Among the largest donor countries and lenders in BiH since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement are Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States, Norway, Sweden, and Spain. Also, through donations and loans, BiH was supported by the most important international financial organizations: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WP), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Development Bank (EDB).

Not all the funded projects implemented in particular areas had the same priority during the first years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and later. At the beginning of the reconstruction of BiH, mainly financed were projects for the reconstruction of the facilities (housing, institutions) and infrastructure (roads, electricity networks, telecommunication networks, water infrastructure, gas pipelines, wastewater systems, etc.). Financed were also projects

<sup>4</sup> See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/Resources/BosniaFinal.pdf> (24.04.2022).

for building a multiethnic society through the support of return and self-employment (so-called “sustainable return”).

In addition, the international funds financed numerous projects aimed at economic recovery and economic development. Those were projects intended to support the development of small and medium enterprises, as well as the loans under special conditions whose aim was to provide favorable credit lines, stimulating agricultural production and rural development, employment support projects, etc. These sources later began to finance projects in the field of environmental protection, energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, modernization and expansion of electricity distribution and telecommunications networks, construction of new transport networks (e.g. Corridor Vc), institution building projects at the state and entity levels, modernization of border crossings, laboratories, and labor market reform.

In recent years, as we have already mentioned, there has been a change in priorities. Significant funds have been directed to the following projects: judicial reform, institution building through strengthening the capacity of individual institutions (e.g. introduction of e-systems in the judiciary, Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) project, biometric passports, equipment for medical-radiological examinations), reform of particular areas and their approximation to European Union standards such as labor market reform, higher education, education of farmers, government institutions and non-governmental organizations aimed at using the Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds, meeting the standards for membership in the European Energy Community, realization of BiH liabilities arising from the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), and other.

It should be mentioned that there is a significant difference between the purposes of projects funded by the IOs and projects funded by the states. The IOs were more focused on financing projects in certain areas (energy, environmental protection, privatereal sector, judiciary, telecommunications, highway construction and modernization projects, railway infrastructure, providing favorable credit lines to encourage micro, small and medium enterprises, and other). Through their donations and loans, the states financed projects for determined purposes (schools, local infrastructure projects such as the construction of water supply, sewerage, renovation of spa centers, and other). Some organizations, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), will “use a strengthened private sector to focus its impact on the wider area and sustainability. Supporting more extensive and open forms of fiscal transparency will enable secure and stable growth of industry, thus greater involvement of the private sector in community development” (USAID, 2020, p. 29).

## **Establishment of domestic currency and its stability as a precondition for the realization of international projects**

The Currency Board is a specific monetary arrangement that is considered one of the options for solving economic problems (currency and exchange rate instability, high inflation, banking crises, and other) in countries with small and open economies. Their financial markets are still

in their infancy, and they want to increase their international credibility or to join a broader trade or monetary union (Gregović, Hodžić, 2017, p. 111).

Three main features of the currency board in BiH are: fixed exchange rate defined by the regulation, full coverage of foreign exchange reserves for all monetary liabilities, and full convertibility of financial debts into “anchor currency”. The monetary liabilities of the CBBH should be covered in 100% by convertible foreign currency assets because the Law on the CBBH stipulates that the total amount of its monetary liabilities may not exceed its net foreign assets. Cash liabilities under the CBBH Law consist of cash in circulation and deposits of domestic banks and other resident clients (Vladušić, 2013, pp. 93-99). The CBBH does not place loans in the banking sector, other legal entities, and the state, nor does it conduct open market operations. It is not possible to place extraordinary contingents of money in circulation since there is a ban on lending to all sectors. It can be considered an advantage, as the inflation is kept low and prevents the emergence of inflationary pressure. On the other hand, it can be a limiting factor of economic development. A convertible mark achieves convertibility based on its 100% coverage in euros. It is the main feature of this arrangement, according to which the CBBH can create a maximum amount of KM as much as it has held foreign exchange reserves.

The CBBH is prohibited from placing loans by issuing money *ex nihilo* (‘out of nothing’), as the typical central banks can. It can place loans only based on increasing its foreign exchange reserves. That is why the stability of the convertible mark is the primary goal of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currency stability directly affects price stability, establishing a balance in public finances and eliminating inflation. All this affected the achievement and maintenance of public opinion confidence in the convertible mark, and thus fulfilled the crucial mandate for a central bank, and at the same time the most important condition for building an economic system.

## The most important financial aspects of postwar reconstruction in BiH

In order to more clearly indicate the areas in which individual IOs operated, we will further try to describe in more detail the areas and aims of projects undertaken in BiH by the IOs and some countries. Analysing the extensive database on financing various projects in BiH through donations and support from IOs, primarily multilateral banks, financial institutions and governments, we want to approximate the size of data and the value of funds that have entered BiH since 1996.

Donations and aid came to BiH from the governments of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Hungary, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and the USA. In addition, IOs that have donated funds or financed certain projects are European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Commission, European Investment Bank (EIB), International Development Association (IDA), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Development Program (UNDP),

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Technical Assistance (UNTA) and World Bank (WB). Only a few of the most important and influential foreign financiers will be covered below.

## The role of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

The EBRD is one of the specific financial institutions that have been engaged in assisting BiH in the implementation of the projects since 1996 (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2020). According to the bank's website, the EBRD has financed the following programs: reconstruction of the wartorn electricity, road, and telecommunications infrastructure, construction of water supply and sewerage, reconstruction of the vital railway network (Pan European Corridor V), reconstruction of interrupted telecommunications services, construction of gas pipelines, building and modernization of central heating systems in cities, rehabilitation of wastewater, expansion of cold storage capacity (strengthening of agriculture), strengthening of the private sector (service and production), an extension of mobile and fixed telecommunications network (EUR 30 million loans to Telekom Srpske for infrastructure strengthening before privatization), providing credit lines under more favorable conditions for domestic entrepreneurs through domestic banks (development of primarily micro and small enterprises), construction of part of the highway Banja Luka – Doboj (section Doboj – Prnjavor). Besides these, the EBRD has been involved in projects financed through the IPA programs. The IPA funded the following: the project of the wastewater system in Bijeljina (phases I and II), the bypass in Brčko, the construction of the road Foča – Han, corridor Vc, the improvement of the regional road infrastructure network in BiH, Mahovljanska loop, and other. Since 2015, the EBRD has invested in the capital of three companies in BiH. These are investments in the companies Manja and Energoprojekt and the European Voluntary Pension Fund<sup>5</sup>. Total investments and approved loans so far exceed 600 million euros.

## World Bank (WB) contribution to project financing in BiH

The World Bank has approved more than 2,107 million euros in financial support to BiH since 1996, financing projects in various fields. According to the data from the website of this bank, the projects financed from the World Bank funds had different purposes. The World Bank began its engagement in BiH after the war ended with the "Emergency Recovery Project" (World Bank, 2004). It is the first major international aid project for BiH since the end of the war. It was adopted in February 1996 and was one of the 16 World Bank "emergency" projects called "emergency operations". The value of the project was 45 million US dollars. Financing the project was

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<sup>5</sup> This is the first capital investment in BiH. Until then, loans and investments are like quasi-equity. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) / Enterprise Expansion Fund (ENEF) helped with policy dialogue with the Government of the Republic of Srpska on improving the regulatory framework for voluntary pension funds, which did not exist before. EBRD / ENEF nominated a supervisory board member.

provided from the funds and resources of the International Development Agency (IDA). The United States, Canada, Switzerland, Great Britain, the EU, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and other countries participated in providing funds for realization of this project. The purpose of this project was to provide a quick financial “injection” with maximum effect on critical points: agriculture, transport, energy, support to key state institutions, loans for small and medium enterprises, and the establishment of an “emergency social fund” to help the poorest. Through the projects of financial assistance of this international financial institution, other projects were financed, such as the project of reconstruction of water supply and sewerage infrastructure, solid waste management, strengthening of agricultural production with an emphasis on the development of small commercial farms, water supply, and flood protection projects. Within the projects of importance for the development of society financed are projects in the field of education, culture, urban infrastructure, employment, projects to strengthen social security, health. It should be stated that in 2007, a project for preventing bird flu was funded from these sources. It was a significant global health problem at the time. Among other things, the World Bank funds financed BiH financial support projects with loans to support the development of small and medium enterprises, strengthen the investment climate, support the development of the private sector. They were aimed at creating a sustainable economy and rebuilding the domestic economy.

## International Monetary Fund as a financier of reforms and projects in BiH

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has so far cooperated with BiH mainly through special arrangements. From 1998 until today, the IMF has approved four standby arrangements for BiH. According to the IMF website, the total value of the stand-by<sup>6</sup> arrangement is 4.1m euros. Of the approved funds, BiH used EUR 1.9 million (Table 1).

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<sup>6</sup> In Bosnia and Herzegovina focus was and still is on supporting restructuring and expansion of the local private sector, forging closer linkages with wider regional markets, and promoting more efficient and sustainable use of resources whilst continuing to coordinate the EBRD's activities with the EU and international financial institutions. The essence of these arrangements is that the IMF approves them to the member states due to their balance of payments difficulties. Funds for these purposes are provided from General Resources Account (GRA). The negotiation system implies that the Fund agrees on the conditions with the Member State under which the arrangement is approved and which are set out in the Letter of Intent. The funds are paid in installments, the so-called tranches, and the Member State shall repay each tranche in eight equal quarterly installments. Before the disbursement of the agreed tranches, the Fund shall monitor the implementation of the conditions to which the Member State has committed itself when negotiating the arrangement.

**Table 1.** Overview of the standby arrangements approved for BiH

Arrangement	Date of arrangement	Expiration date	Approved amount (million SDRs)	Amount withdrawn (SDR million)	EUR	Approved amount (EUR million)	Withdrawn amount (EUR million)
I	29 May 1998	29 May 2001	94.42	80.43	0.582	162,233,677	138,195,876
II	2 Aug 2002	29 Feb 2004	67.6	55.6	0.426	158,685,446	130,516,432
III	8 Jul 2009	7 Jul 2012	1014.6	67.6	0.41	2,474,634,146	164,878,049
IV	26 Sep 2012	30 Jun 2015	558.03	422.75	0.423	1,319,219,858	999,408,983
EFF arrangement 2016-19	9 Sep 2016	31 Aug 2019	443.042	126.825	0.804	551,321,553	157,821,055
RFI arrangement	22 Apr 2020	22 Apr 2020	265.2	265.2	0.7935	334,215,501	334,215,501
						5,000,310,181	1,925,035,897

Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2021, <https://www.cbbh.ba/home/GetTableAttachment?contentId=ab35f66-c332-43a4-b056-9ca342f7f922&lang=hr> (8.09.2021).

## Council of Europe Development Bank in support of the reconstruction of BiH after the Dayton Peace Agreement

In addition to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), BiH has cooperated with the European Development Bank (EDB) in various projects. The Council of the European Development Bank has approved the financing of projects for BiH for many purposes: institution building, local infrastructure, environmental protection, support to small and medium enterprises. EDB funds were directed to the public and private sectors. Funds from the European Development Bank have been partly used to finance projects approved by the World Bank and for IPA funds projects, especially when funding the public sector (institution building and local infrastructure). Following are the projects financed by the EDB: support for persons housed in collective centers in BiH, support for sports and cultural projects, the State Prison project, support for the development of small and medium enterprises, startup credit line for small



and medium enterprises, support for technological development, strengthening competitiveness, cofinancing of local capital investments, as well as part of projects in the field of health.

## USAID's role in approving and implementing financial projects in BiH

We will also discuss USAID's contribution here, although it could not be classified as a classic international financial organization. USAID<sup>7</sup> has spent over \$ 1.6 billion on funding various projects in BiH since 1994. In BiH, USAID has or has had several different assistance programs. These are the postwar reconstruction and development projects that USAID started in 1996, primarily financing programs for restarting businesses and helping citizens to provide conditions for a sustainable economic existence after returning to prewar homes. One of the most significant USAID projects in BiH is the reconstruction of the Thermal Power Plant in Kakanj, worth 43 million US dollars (USAID, 2020).

Since 1998, USAID has provided more targeted funding for specific projects: water utilities, schools, health facilities, roads, and energy. Of these categories, \$ 372 million in financial assistance was spent on road infrastructure. Grants and credit lines were provided through USAID, and it is believed that it directly helped the return of over 100,000 refugees and displaced persons.

Among several particularly significant ones, the next in our analysis is the USAID's Business Development Program (BDP). This loan program is aimed at assisting in starting business activities. The program existed seven years, and nearly 600 loans were realized, the value of which amounted to 162 million US dollars. Through this program, over 11 million US dollars were invested in agriculture and 8 million US dollars were assigned as support to microcredit organizations. More than 16,000 people were employed through this program, 3.4 million US dollars were invested in the development of cooperatives through grants, 13.5 million were invested in FIMS – The Financial Information Management Systems, a new budget system at the cantonal, entity, and state levels. The counseling and financial assistance from these funds enabled to carry out reforms in the entity banking agencies. The State Deposit Insurance Agency was established, and the state Payment Services were closed, paving the way for the development of commercial banking. Judicial and legislative reforms were funded. As of the end of 2003, this program no longer existed in BiH because, in the opinion of donors, the banking system was already sufficiently strengthened to further support economic development (USAID, 2020, p. 29).

In the field of democracy and the rule of law the following projects were funded: judicial reform in the Federation, adoption of the Law on Freedom of Access to Information, the establishment of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council to achieve judicial independence, assistance for 32 courts in BiH, assistance for 41 onestop shops system, assistance to the NGO sector through the Demnet program (closed in 2004, \$ 7.6 million was spent under this program),

<sup>7</sup> The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is one of the primary agencies of the US Government, operating in more than 100 countries worldwide as an independent government agency. It was founded in 1961 and aims to promote the development of a democratic society as a basis for the development of every country.



assistance to state and entity parliaments in increasing the efficiency of parliamentary clubs and parliamentary committees by improvements to the Rules of Procedure. Within this area, USAID spent \$ 38 million on media programs<sup>8</sup>.

Results and discussion: Effects of help and support from international organizations

So far, about 71.45 billion US dollars have entered BiH from international financial institutions. The research shows that the total amount o donations, grants, loans, and other types of assistance ranges from 115.88% of GDP in 1996 to 12.84% in 2020. Regression analysis shows a medium-strong relationship of 42.44% between the amount that entered BiH and the amount of GDP (Figure 1). Therefore, with 99% certainty we cannot reject the hypothesis that inflows on this basis have no impact on GDP. In other words, there is a significant relationship between these two observed variables. The multiple correlation coefficient (R) is 0.651449, which means that there is a mediumdirect relationship between the independent and dependent variables. At this point, we can offer arguments for a causeandeffect relationship in both directions for both variables (Table 2). For example, these inflows create conditions for GDP growth, and higher GDP attracts new investment.




Figure 1. Regression analysis

<sup>8</sup> USAID’s democracy and governance work in BiH focuses on accountable institutions that meet the citizens’ needs. The Agency’s economic growth work focuses on a competitive, market-oriented economy that provides better opportunities for all.

**Table 2.** Causeandeffect relationship between foreign investments and GDP

Year	Total amount of donations and help	Absolute change of GDP
1997	3.297,52	885,77
1998	3.281,54	444,88
1999	3.616,41	569,03
2000	3.193,21	820,15
2001	2.848,56	243,11
2002	2.766,78	902,11
2003	4.322,29	1.718,77
2004	2.699,75	2.226,33
2005	2.661,93	626,75
2006	2.621,14	1.641,66
2007	2.587,17	2.914,16
2008	2.534,77	3.333,97
2009	2.504,99	- 1.498,90
2010	2.479,50	-437,05
2011	2.455,43	1.467,94
2012	2.737,18	- 1.417,87
2013	2.891,38	951,65
2014	2.801,79	379,84
2015	2.578,92	- 2.346,80
2016	2.728,32	701,79
2017	2.551,90	1.166,79
2018	2.749,27	2.103,39
2019	2.765,74	18,97
2020	2.541,26	-414,06

Source: Author's calculation.

## Conclusion

The paper discusses the role and contribution of donations, grants, and loans from abroad to the GDP of BiH. Their indirect impact has been presented on the postwar recovery of BiH, but also on some segments of its further development. The paper emphasizes that in the period from 1996 to 2020, there was a medium-strong link between these investments and GDP. The work is based on publicly available data from international financial institutions and the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH. The research proves that the most substantial donor countries and lenders

in BiH since the Dayton Peace Agreement are: Austria, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. BiH was also supported with the donations and loans by the most important international financial organizations: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Development Bank. The funded projects did not have the same priorities every year and in every area. From 1996, financed were mainly projects for the reconstruction of facilities and infrastructure. Furthermore, projects for building a multiethnic society through supporting the return and self-employment were funded. In addition to the above, international fundings have financed numerous projects aimed at economic recovery and economic development. In recent years, there has been a change in priorities, and notable funds have been directed to such projects as: judicial reform, institution building through strengthening the capacity of individual institutions, and the reform of particular areas and their approximation to European Union standards.

The results confirm the basic hypothesis. Regression analysis shows a mediumstrong relationship of 42.44% between the amount of money that entered BiH and the amount of the GDP. Therefore, with 99% certainty we cannot reject the hypothesis that inflows on this basis have no impact on GDP. In other words, there is a significant relationship between these two observed variables. The multiple correlation coefficient (R) is 0.651449, which means that there is a medium-direct relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

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# Kashmir conflict: Yearning for an elusive peace in the contemporary South Asian Region

OSANTHA NAYANAPRIYA THALPAWILA

PH.D., PROFESSOR

ORCID: 0000-0002-5580-7077

Department of Political Science, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka

e-mail: osantha@kln.ac.lk

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## Abstract

The conflict in Jammu & Kashmir has become a critical issue not only for India-Pakistan relations but for the whole of South Asia. After careful analysis, the origin of the conflict has been identified by scholars as a failure in demarcating a practical border between India and Pakistan by the British colonial rulers. The consequence was that after gaining independence, both countries went to war three times over Kashmir. In addition, numerous breakouts of hostilities were reported along the line of control between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region. The United Nations Organization made several attempts to arrive at a permanent solution for the Kashmir issue. In addition, several bilateral meetings were held by India and Pakistan to work out a solution to bring about long-lasting peace in Kashmir. However, all the initiatives failed, and hostilities are still going on. The situation has further deteriorated after several incidents of cross-border terrorism that had its roots in Kashmir politics. Today the Kashmir issue has become a key threat to South Asian security after the changes that have taken place in global politics as well as regional politics. The aim of this paper is to study the conflict in Kashmir to find a way to build peace in the new global context. This paper is based entirely on secondary data and uses the descriptive analysis method. Indian government policy on Jammu & Kashmir has been influenced by past events in Kashmir, while Pakistan is looking for alternative strategies to build peace in Kashmir. The impact of this conflict on the South Asian region will mostly depend on the Indian Government's determination to keep Kashmir under its control while it is continually challenged by the Pakistani regime, which also has claims on this territory.

## Introduction

The Kashmir conflict has become the oldest and most significant conflict in South Asia as it has been raging for decades without showing any sign of coming to an end. The conflict has been exacerbated in recent times, with several incidents of terror attacks, counter military invasions, and the disappearance of all goodwill between India and Pakistan. In 2019, many

tensions developed after the Indian Government decided to scrap Arts. 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, which had granted special status to Jammu & Kashmir state. The constitutional amendment resulted in Jammu & Kashmir losing its position as a “state” in the Indian federal system and being transformed into a union territory. In addition, the amendment brought changes to land ownership rights and gave preferential treatment to the state’s people in providing jobs and education. The changes were made to quell potential unrest among the masses in Jammu & Kashmir caused by the actions of neighboring Pakistan. The immediate reason for New Delhi’s decision was a terrorist attack launched on a convoy of Indian security forces, killing 46 soldiers in Pulwama district in Indian administered Jammu & Kashmir. The incident occurred in February 2019. This terrorist attack proved to be a big setback to the peacebuilding process that was underway between the two countries. However, the violent activities that began in 2019 in Jammu & Kashmir can be identified as being a stepping up of the cross-border terrorism that had been occurring over the previous three decades. India’s and Pakistan’s policies on Kashmir have always been in a state of flux by alternating between bilateral talks and military engagements periodically. The aim of this paper is to examine the continuing attempts at peacebuilding and the contemporary trends in the Kashmir conflict.

### **The historical dimensions of the conflict: A legacy of the British Raj**

Geopolitics play a significant role in South Asian politics because many countries share common borders with India, except Sri Lanka and Maldives, which are islands. Even China shares a part of its south-west border with India. Some complicated border issues remain as important tension-inducing factors in the bilateral relations that India has with many of the neighboring countries. Among those, the disputed border in the Kashmir region that India shares with Pakistan has been a constant source of friction, which has led to several unpleasant experiences for both countries, and in addition posing a threat to the peace and security of the South Asian region. This dispute and the resulting hostilities have been going on ever since both countries gained independence in 1947. Likewise, India and China share a disputed border that separates Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. This border issue has also created mistrust and resulted in sporadic hostilities since 1947. All these border issues stem from the impractical colonial decisions that were made during the demarcation of boundaries in South Asia (Dasgupta, 2002). Of these border issues, the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan has currently emerged as the most serious, badly damaging relations between the two neighbors.

The Kashmir issue has become a decisive factor in defining India-Pakistan relations in the post-colonial period. The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir commenced in 1947 when the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent after dividing it into two nation states. Historically, the British policy that guided the division of their most prized colony into India and Pakistan manifested some failures relating to the “princely states” (Das Gupta, 2002). The decision to allow the Hindu Maharajah’s Kingdom in Kashmir to continue as an independent state in the subcontinent was rejected by Pakistan, which claimed that the entire Kashmir

territory was an area that belonged to Pakistan. Pakistan's logic was totally based on its geopolitical relations with Kashmir over a long period of history. The majority population of Kashmir are Muslims and geographically the Princely State of Kashmir had always enjoyed close relations with the territory that is now Pakistan. Therefore, in order to annex the Kashmir territory, a group of tribal invaders from Pakistan attacked Kashmir in October 1947. The Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir then requested military assistance from India to protect his Kingdom and this involved negotiations with the Indian Government. An agreement was reached followed by the signing of an accord between the Maharajah and the Government of India (Grover, 1995). According to that pact, the Kingdom of Kashmir was ceded to India and soon after that Indian military troops landed in Kashmir to protect the territory from tribal attacks (Grover, 1995). That was the first war that occurred between India and Pakistan, and it happened in 1947. India then complained to the UN Security Council that Pakistan was occupying by force some parts of Kashmir even after it had legally become a part of Indian Territory. The UN appointed a special commission to inquire into this matter, which soon proposed a temporary line of control that would divide Kashmir into two parts between India and Pakistan, according to the areas that each country occupied at the end of the war in 1947. In terms of that provisional ruling Jammu & Kashmir belonged to India and Azad Kashmir remained under Pakistani control. The UN decision further called for the holding of a plebiscite to arrive at a more sustainable solution for the Kashmir issue. However, Pakistan totally rejected the treaty signed by the Maharajah of Kashmir and the New Delhi government, annexing Kashmir as part of the Indian territory. Pakistan still views Kashmir as an integral part of its territory, owing to its strategic location and the valley's Islamic identity. On the other hand, the Indian government has never held a plebiscite in Kashmir to date and instead adopted a constitutional process to achieve permanent annexure. In the meantime, it granted a special status to Kashmir as a member state under the Indian federal system. Since then, Kashmir has continued to remain one of the major issues not only between both countries, but also in the South Asian region due to the security ramifications in the current era. The Kashmir dispute has directly intensified the arms race between India and Pakistan, culminating in both becoming nuclear powers in the South Asian region. As is the case, the tension caused by the Kashmir issue has been shaping the foreign policies of India and Pakistan throughout the past 73 years.

Since gaining independence, both countries have been applying various strategies to resolve the conflict and build permanent peace in Kashmir. For instance, Pakistan first believed in a military solution and then welcomed UN involvement to resolve the conflict in the early decades. In addition, the bilateral approach had also been adopted several times over the last 73 years to seek a permanent solution.

All those strategies had been applied from time to time during the cold war period from 1947 to 1990 and then during the post-cold war period from 1990 to date. The military solution had been attempted by Pakistan twice during the cold war period, in 1947 and 1965. The wars in 1947 and 1965 were directly connected to the conflict as Pakistan tried to annex Jammu & Kashmir to its own territory (Barnds, 1972). The third war between India and Pakistan in 1971 was mainly connected to the secession of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh. During

this war too Kashmir was one of the areas where both parties engaged in armed confrontations during their military operations (Bindra, 1981). The fourth India-Pakistan war was reported when a militant group backed by Pakistani troops surreptitiously infiltrated the Indian controlled Kargil mountain area in Kashmir in 1999. Indian forces launched a counterattack to drive them away. However, fewer disturbances were reported during the fourth war than during the earlier ones. Thus, military conflicts could not deliver a final solution for the Kashmir conflict and only served to develop deeper suspicions between both countries.

## The United Nations peacebuilding process and the elusive goal

The United Nations (UN) became involved in the Kashmir conflict soon after the war began in 1948 and India made a complaint to the Security Council. The UN involvement in the issue lasted over 23 years (from 1948 to 1971), during which period the UN passed several resolutions that were aimed at mediation and the resolution of the conflict. The UN played a positive role in preventing the escalation of hostilities and in tempering the antagonistic behavior of the two countries, but it did not play a crucial role in its capacity as an international body to reach a permanent solution (Hilali, 1997). Between 1948 and 1971, the UN Security Council passed 23 resolutions on the Kashmir conflict. The UN debate on Kashmir commenced when India lodged a complaint under Art. 35 (Chapter VI) of the UN Charter in the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948, charging Pakistan with “aiding and abetting” the Pakistan-based tribal invasion in Kashmir. In the United Nations, India claimed that the entire territory of Kashmir legally belonged to her by virtue of the treaty of accession signed by the Hindu Maharajah of the Kashmir Kingdom who thus ceded it to the Indian Union (Pir, Shiekh, 2013). The Indian Government’s complaint was considered in the UN Security Council, which then passed its first resolution (Resolution No. 38) on 17 January 1948 calling upon India and Pakistan to observe a ceasefire from the 1 January 1949. Another resolution, No. 39, was passed by the UN on 20 January 1948, calling for the creation of a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to inquire into the dispute and mediate between the two countries. In April 1948, Art. 49 was passed. It focused on the cessation of hostilities and made an important decision to hold a UN monitored plebiscite as a means of arriving at a permanent solution to the dispute. However, both countries agreed, as a temporary measure, to divide the Kashmir Kingdom according to the territories occupied by their respective troops on the battlefield when the ceasefire came into effect in 1949.






Figure 1: Map of Kashmir after dividing in 1949. Source: BBC.com

The two countries accepted the ceasefire plan and allowed the UN to monitor the ceasefire from 1 January 1949. The ceasefire line “went through the western part of Jammu and the eastern part of Poonch, leaving the capital city of Poonch on the Indian side of the line, then crossed the Jhelum River at a point west of Uri and made a large sweep following the valley of the Kishin-ganga River. From there, it proceeded to Kargil, which also remained on the Indian side, and then north-west to the Chinese border. Hunza, Gilgit, Baltistan, Chilas, the greater part of Poonch, and the smaller part of Jammu remained under the control of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir” (Bazaz, 1951, p. 326).

In December 1949, the UN Security Council President, General A.G.L. McNaughton, intervened to mediate between India and Pakistan at the UN, but failed to persuade the parties to come to an agreement. Later, the UN appointed a single representative, Owen Dixon, to mediate the issue, who then held discussions with the representatives of both countries. Owen Dixon submitted his proposal to resolve the dispute. His idea was to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, which included the following proposals: (1) Holding a plebiscite covering the whole State of Jammu & Kashmir, region by region, and (2) Holding a plebiscite only in regions where the outcome would be “doubtful”. The rest would constitute those regions that were expected to vote for a merger with either India or Pakistan. One “doubtful” region was the valley of Kashmir. However, the responses of both India and Pakistan were not favorable towards the proposal. After Owen Dixon failed to make any headway, the UN appointed Frank Graham as the UN representative to mediate between India and Pakistan to get them to agree on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. Frank Graham was followed by Gunnar Jarring in 1957, but all the UN representatives failed to make any progress on the Kashmir issue (Lamb, 1992). The UN Security Council then established the UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) to monitor the ceasefire line under Resolution 91, which was passed in 1951.

On the one hand, the UN role in the Kashmir conflict failed repeatedly to find a permanent solution to the conflict. On the other hand, the Indian government adopted a constitutional process to solve the Jammu-Kashmir issue by granting it the status of a state in the Indian Union in the 1950s. In terms of that, the Indian Government ratified Art. 370 of the Indian Constitution so that it would apply to Jammu & Kashmir. Further, in November 1956, Jammu & Kashmir introduced its own constitution as part of the Indian Federal Government. When the issue was raised by Pakistan in the Security Council, the UN passed a resolution in 1957 that reiterated the earlier UN resolutions on Kashmir. In the 1960s, the UN involvement in Kashmir was strongly discouraged by Soviet Russia, which made use of its veto power in the Security Council to enforce its stance. This was because Soviet Russia was reluctant to point to India as the aggressor. The last UN Security Council resolution (307) that dealt with Kashmir was passed in the wake of the India-Pakistan war of 1971. Thereafter, the role of the UN in the Kashmir conflict gradually faded in the Security Council.

### Bilateral negotiations as a peacebuilding process in Kashmir

Bilateral negotiations had also been conducted by the leaders of both countries to resolve the dispute during the early period of the cold war. After the end of hostilities in the second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union invited the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the Pakistani President Ayub Khan to engage in bilateral negotiations to end the hostilities between them. Both leaders met in Tashkent in January 1966 with the facilitation of the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and held bilateral talks that continued over six days. At the end of the bilateral talks both leaders signed the “Tashkent Declaration”, which mainly focused on restarting diplomatic relations between both countries and giving mutual assurances not to intervene in each other’s internal affairs. It also reiterated the importance of implementing the earlier agreements that had been signed by both countries. The Tashkent Declaration was based on the premise that holding bilateral talks was the best method for resolving disputes between the two countries (Bindra, 1981).

The Shimla Peace Agreement was another attempt to resolve the Kashmir conflict through bilateral negotiations (Grover, Arora, 1995). The bilateral talks were held between the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from 28 June to 2 July 1972 at Shimla in Himachal Pradesh, India, in the wake of Pakistan’s defeat in the third war between the two countries in 1971. Pakistan had lost its Eastern Wing due to the forceful intervention of New Delhi in the war and the lack of international support. The Shimla agreement proposed a moderated definition of “ceasefire line,” which was originally established in 1949, after the IndoPakistan ceasefire in Kashmir. The Shimla agreement included the following provisions:

In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both

sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line (Shimla Agreement, 1972).

The agreement defined the “ceasefire line,” which was originally established in 1949, after India and Pakistan agreed to the ceasefire in Jammu & Kashmir. It was then converted into a Line of Control (LOC), which from an Indian perspective turned the temporary border in the disputed territory of Kashmir into a de facto “permanent border between India and Pakistan”. Pakistan was forced to accept the change in the “status quo” in the wake of its defeat in the 1971 war.

Between 1989-1990, trouble started in Jammu & Kashmir due to the uprising of militant separatist movements that were fighting for the selfdetermination of Jammu & Kashmir (Singh, 1995). This civil war in Jammu & Kashmir fizzled out by the end of 1990.

The two countries again entered into an agreement, which was known as the “Lahore Declaration” in February 1999, when the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan in a move to strengthen the bilateral relations and reduce the tension built up by the nuclear testing conducted by both India and Pakistan. The leaders agreed to foster peace and ensure security in the region by working together to resolve all their outstanding issues, including the Kashmir problem, by engaging in bilateral negotiations. Although the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had stepped up cooperation to continue the peace process between the two countries through the Lahore Declaration, the cross-border guerrilla movements recommenced their activities in May 1999. A group of militants had surreptitiously crossed the border and entered Kargil in Jammu & Kashmir, following which the Indian Government sent its troops to Kargil to flush them out. Although the military operation was not spread out broadly, several air strikes were made by India in and around Kargil. This limited war in Kargil was recorded as the fourth India-Pakistan war.

Later, in January 2004, India and Pakistan carried the peace process further during the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit held in Islamabad. An announcement of a joint dialogue to discuss outstanding issues between the two countries was made a month later, in February 2004. This process of peacebuilding was continued by the Manmohan Singh-led government that succeeded the Vajpayee’s government in May that year. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met in New York in September 2004 and reaffirmed that they would “continue the bilateral dialogue to restore normalcy and cooperation between India and Pakistan”. Again, in April 2005, Musharraf visited New Delhi and the two leaders watched an India-Pakistan cricket match. After that there were many meetings between the official delegations of the two countries to work out an acceptable solution to the Kashmir conflict. The gradual development of the peace process that began in 2004 broke down in 2008 after the dismissal of the Pakistani Prime Minister by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Jacob, 2011).

## Developing cross-border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir

Tensions between India and Pakistan increased in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the context of acts of cross-border terrorism perpetrated in Jammu & Kashmir by militants who were allegedly sponsored by Pakistan (Jacob, 2011). Following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, there was a tenmonth military mobilization along the India-Pakistan border. There were many other incidents too, connected to the Kashmir conflict that led to tensions between the two countries since 2008. Tension in the border areas along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir and cross-border terrorism backed by Pakistan did much to affect the bilateral relations and the peace process on Kashmir. Many terrorist attacks were reported from mid-2008, among which were a suicide car bomb attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed 57 people, terrorist attacks in Bangalore and Ahmedabad, and the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. All these incidents seriously hurt the relations between the two countries (Ministry of External Affairs). Between November 2008 and February 2009, the world witnessed the imminent danger of a military confrontation between the two countries. Among those militant attacks, the last major incident in Kashmir occurred in 2016 when Islamic militants raided an Indian army camp in Uri, killing 20 soldiers. However, a formal peace process on Kashmir was not being pursued during that period. The New Delhi government alleged that Islamabad supported the terrorism in Kashmir. The latest terrorist attack was on a convoy of the Indian security forces in Pulvama, Jammu & Kashmir, that killed 46 soldiers in February 2019. The Indian Government believed that a suicide bombing had been carried out by Pakistanbacked terrorist groups. However, Pakistan vehemently denied the Indian charge. A few days later, India carried out a retaliatory strike in Pakistani territory on targets that India believed to be terrorist hideouts. Pakistan, too, hit back on some targets in India.

## Scrapping Articles 370 and 35A on Jammu and Kashmir: An analysis

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was re-elected with a huge mandate in May 2019. It suggests that the nationalist policy of Narendra Modi has been accepted by the majority of Indian voters. The main thrust of the election campaign of the ruling party centered on the terror attack that was believed to have been orchestrated by Pakistan. Soon after the re-election, the Indian Government headed by the Prime Minister Modi carried out the long-awaited ambitious project it had in mind for Kashmir: scrapping Arts. 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, which gave a special status to Kashmir. Due to this amendment, the special status accorded to this territory earlier was withdrawn. By revoking Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, the autonomy of Jammu & Kashmir was cancelled. In effect, the state of Jammu & Kashmir will be replaced by two new union territories known as Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh (*The Hindu*, 2019b). This was the first time in Indian constitutional history that a “state” was converted into a union territory. In conjunction with this, Art. 35A empowers the Jammu & Kashmir legislature to define the permanent residents of the state, and their special rights and privileges. According to the reports from Jammu and Kashmir, this amendment brought changes to the land ownership rights and

gave preferential treatment to the people of the state in respect of jobs and education. Now Jammu & Kashmir lost its special status under the Indian Constitution and has been reduced to two union territories. The Jammu & Kashmir's status, is now lower than that of the other states. Instead of 29 states, India will now have 28 states. Kashmir will no longer have a Governor, rather a Lieutenant Governor, like in Delhi or Puducherry. According to the amendment, the Ladakh territory has been separated from the Jammu & Kashmir territory. (In the Ladakh area Hindus and Buddhists are in the majority). It is clear that the aim of these amendments is to strengthen the authority of the Central Government over Jammu & Kashmir by avoiding the legal obstacles in the Constitution that would have to be overcome in the case of a federal state. On the one hand, India has confirmed its policy on Kashmir again by stressing that it was legally annexed as an Indian territory in 1947, while on the other hand, the New Delhi government has used this as an opportunity to express to Islamabad its displeasure with the cross-border terrorism backed by Pakistan. However, in the context of longterm peace in Jammu & Kashmir, New Delhi's policy would be rather harmful to the internal politics of the new union territory. Deprived of its political status, the territory of Jammu & Kashmir could suffer a reversal of the democratic politics that has been practiced in the territory in the past. There is also a possibility that the Kashmiris may stop being part of the Indian political mainstream. Although crossborder terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism do take a terrible toll in Jammu & Kashmir, it is very important to maintain the trust the Kashmiris place in the Central Government of India. This is because the national political parties such as the Indian Congress still play a significant role in the local politics of Jammu & Kashmir. Following this amendment, huge mass protest movements were organized in Jammu & Kashmir, but the Indian Government managed to suppress those by imposing a long curfew and disconnecting the telecommunication and Internet services to Kashmir. The Indian Government never reversed its decision on the constitutional amendment.

Soon after the constitutional intervention in Kashmir, Pakistan showed its anger over this to the New Delhi government. The Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan mostly exercised a neutral policy on the Kashmir issue during the early period of his tenure. His approach to solve the Kashmir dispute was to conduct bilateral talks between both countries to arrive at a peaceful solution. In short, the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan extended a peaceful hand towards New Delhi to develop bilateral relations between the two countries. For example, the Prime Minister Khan notched a diplomatic achievement with the inauguration of the Kartarpur corridor, thereby allowing Indian Sikh pilgrims to visit Kartarpur, a holy place in Pakistan. However, after the decision to scrap the special status granted through Art. 370, Pakistan's position on the Kashmir conflict has reverted to what it was in the 1950s. The Pakistani leader addressed the General Assembly on the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations Organization and called for Peace in the South Asian region (Suhasini, 2019). He pointed out that if there is to be a durable peace in the South Asian region, the Jammu & Kashmir dispute should be resolved, and on the basis of international intervention. The call for international intervention to solve the Kashmir dispute was heard loudly during the coldwar period and that was the main slogan of Pakistan at the UN in the 1950s. Further, Pakistan enrolled as a member state in SEATO and CENTO, which

were established by the United States. Pakistan then expected these organizations to get involved in the Kashmir war in 1965 (Bindra, 1981). Imran Khan, however, is not the first Prime Minister to call for international intervention in the postcoldwar period. His predecessor, Nawaz Sharif, too raised the issue in the UN General Assembly in 2013 and 2015, while in 2017, the issue was raised by a Pakistani envoy, Maleeha Lodhi. China supported Pakistan by mentioning that the new situation with respect to the status of Kashmir should be raised in the Security Council of the United Nations. The notion of UN involvement in the Kashmir conflict is rather outdated now in the context of the new global order. This position has been endorsed by four of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, which have all rejected the Chinese proposal that the Security Council should take up the Kashmir issue. Many countries, including the USA, believe that the scrapping of Art. 370 was India's internal matter. The USA has understood the strategic importance of India in the South Asian region in the context of the role that China is attempting to assume in the South Asian region, as well as globally (see Jacob, 2011). The close relations between Pakistan and China on the Belt and Road initiative have resulted in India replacing Pakistan as the United States' main strategic partner in the subcontinent. The US President Donald Trump even stated that he was willing to mediate between the two countries if they wished it. But India's stance was that there is no need for the USA to get involved in the issue. India believes there should not be any external intervention with respect to the Kashmir issue as it is an internal matter of the country. The Indian stance has now received greater support due to the new developments in the Indian Ocean region. The Western global powers have never underestimated the rising power of India and its importance to the global political balance, as well as the global economy. In other words, the Western powers expect India to stand as a bulwark against the growing influence of China in the Asian Region and Indian Ocean belt. In this context, peacebuilding in Kashmir will be handled by New Delhi according to India's interests.

## Conclusion

The peacebuilding process that has been going on for seventy-three years in Kashmir has not made much progress in resolving the issues. The UN was involved from the early stages when the issues surfaced, and it made several attempts to arrive at a permanent solution to the dispute. Since Pakistan views Kashmir as an integral part of its territory, owing to its strategic location and the valley's Islamic identity, the territory has been claimed by it, leading to the dispute with India. Sometimes, the peace process is carried forward by holding bilateral talks but at other times a militaristic approach is adopted to resolve the issue. Although bilateral talks were making some progress, the crossborder terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism have jeopardized the gains made. Eventually, India lost all trust in bilateral talks because of Islamabad's hybrid policy (talk, talk, fight, fight) on the issue. New Delhi has always charged that the crossborder terrorism has been sponsored by Islamabad through Azad Kashmir. In recent times, devastating terrorist attacks on Indian soil have seriously called into question the internal security measures not only



in Jammu & Kashmir but across the whole of India. The terror attacks have spread out from the line of control to cover the entire country in the postcoldwar period. On the other hand, Chinese influence in the Indian subcontinent has been developing day by day. In the light of these happenings, India is now paying more attention to the national security of the country, while also being ready to take a stand as a regional power and with the intention of becoming a world power in the future. It is worth repeating that the peacebuilding process in Kashmir has been undermined by the cross-border terrorism as well as religious fundamentalism. Unless these disruptive and obstructionist tendencies are strictly eliminated, there will be no point in New Delhi and Islamabad engaging in any more bilateral negotiations.

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# Communal tracking approach to insecurity in Nigeria: A prognostic contemplation on *Amotekun*, the Nigerian Southwest Security Outfit

**ELIJAH BABASOLA AFOLABI AGBAJE**  
PROFESSOR

ORCID: 0000-0002-9247-5809

Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: elijah.agbaje@uniosun.edu.ng

**ADEBOWALE IDOWU ADEYEYE**  
PH.D.

ORCID: 0000-0001-6865-0163

Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: adebowale.adeyeye@uniosun.edu.ng

**OLUMIDE OMODUNBI**  
B.SC., M.SC.

ORCID: 0000-0003-3432-2940

Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: olumide.omodunbi@uniosun.edu.ng

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## **Abstract**

Crime proliferation and insecurity represent a multidirectional broadband in social analysis. Crimes generally are outcome of carefully planned and diligently executed mischief of a belligerent group against a target. Crimes are rarely capable of sudden self-propagation. Indexes of insecurity and interest-based assaults of one group against another in the form of terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and communal/ethnic attacks scarcely manifest as entirely externally inflicted social ills without insiders' collaboration. Terrorism, banditry and kidnapping as crimes, are at the same time living social organisms that are birthed, nurtured and resourced for attainment of some strategic social objectives. The advanced phase of armed attack manifests only at their maturity. Based on available primary and secondary data on security challenges, aside from arguing that increasing incidence of insecurity in Nigeria results more from economic and ideological roots: political, economic, cultural, religion and ethnic, this paper insists that crimes have both latent and manifest gestational traits. Therefore, it is here conjectured that before crimes attain maturity, Communal Tracking

Approach (CTA) to security stands the best strategy for early detection, avoidance and/or prevention of crimes. This paper recommends that if the objective of the new complementary security organization in the Nigerian Southwest, codenamed *Amotekun*, is to be realized, it must be built more on CTA. Given that *Amotekun* is not likely to be as resourced as the Nigerian military, and particularly with the everincreasing proliferation of arms among the belligerent elements, CTA, with its communal stance, above all alternate measures, offers a less costly strategy to securing the citizens and the nation.

## Introduction

Nigeria faces complex and mounting challenges of insecurity and increasing underdevelopment arising from a growing spate of unchecked crimes. However, this challenge could not have been so intimidating if negative socioeconomic, political and technological forces have also not combined to ensure the demise of her once bolstering communal and national flora (Agbaje, 2017). One basic prerequisite for good communal existence, steady and sustainable development is security and order. Where this is lacking people get curtailed in the magnitude of dreams and work they can embark on. For where no security exists, nothing is given. Anything can happen to anyone, anywhere, and at any time. Right from the onset of human community, concern for security of life and property has been the basis of society and a *sine-qua-non* for its continued existence. Where this is threatened by any means, a society returns to Hobbesian savagery. As society plan to progress developmentally, crime rates serve as serious impediment to realization of development dreams. And judging from African existence, almost all types of crimes pose a threat to human life and his social interests. Crimes of all types – stealing, theft, armed robbery, kidnapping, banditry, communal/ethnic feuds and attacks – are outcome of carefully planned and diligently executed mischief of a belligerent group against a target. Crimes are rarely capable of sudden self-propagation. All forms of crime are often well conceived and hatched by individual persons acting alone for themselves or in group for group, which could be an association, a society, and even a nation. Hence, it is here argued that terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal/ethnic feuds, herdsmen/farmers attacks, religious and political attacks that have become major threats to human life in Nigeria, are nothing more than interestbased attacks of one group against another.

While the forms of crimes and their interests are most times diverse, they are also sometimes intertwined. Equally, scarcely do they manifest as entirely externally inflicted social ills without insiders' collaboration. But, seeing all forms of crimes as tractable, terrorism, banditry, cultism, kidnapping, communal/ethnic clashes, herdsmen/farmers attacks and oil-induced economic sabotage are also living social organisms that are birthed, nurtured and resourced by some groups for the attainment of some strategic perfidious social, economic, political, religious or ethnic objectives. A proper capture of historical antecedents to contemporary insecurity in Nigeria will reveal all of the above forms of crimes and social threats. It is believed that the advanced phase of armed attack manifests only at their maturity. Because the reality has become such that these crimes are planned, executed, and yet, the perpetrators effortlessly escape justice, particularly in

Nigeria, this study argues that early detection by prospective crimetargeted victims could serve as a potent strategy to mitigate crime execution success rate in Nigeria. And, based on available primary and secondary data on security challenges, aside arguing that increasing incidence of insecurity in Nigeria results from two main roots, ideological and economic interests, this paper insists that crimes have both latent and manifest gestational traits that are discernible. But, owing to intertwined logic of crime, insecurity and the complexity of particularist interests in Nigeria, it has always been difficult for the central state agencies to stop certain forms of crimes that have continuously been perpetrated by some groups against others in Nigeria. The state is generally seen to be active in crime prevention and detection only when the political interests and economic stakes of the transient occupants of state functionaries are involved. From Nigerian history we can infer that very little attention is given to crimes that threaten the communal life of the people. Even when they are detected and reported, getting justice is mostly a torturous journey for an average citizen. Since every life is lived in and within community, it is only reasonable, as it is now becoming the reality in Nigeria, that the communities begin to demand for measures that will guarantee better security of their lives and properties. Arising from the discussion above, this article will seek to provide answer to the following questions: (1) How threatening has the widespread insecurity become in Nigeria? (2) Can the formation of either state or regional security outfit be a strategy towards the mitigation of rising insecurity in Nigeria? (3) To what extent should security organization like *Amotekun* be communal in orientation and strategy?

It is, therefore, here conjectured that before attaining maturity, Communal Tracking Approach (CTA) to security stands the best strategy for early detection, avoidance and/or prevention of crimes. One guess, this is the reason for the resurgence of citizens' demand for establishment of new forms of security organization that will either work with, or alongside the existing state security agencies. Citizens nationwide are of the view that the time has come for such communal-oriented security initiatives as *Amotekun* in the Southwest, *Hasbollah* in the North, and other similar moves undertaken to curtail crimes and criminal attacks in Nigeria. This paper recommends that if the objective of the new complement security organization in Nigerian southwest, codenamed *Amotekun*, is to be realized, it must be built more on Communal Tracking Approach (CTA). This optimism is anchored in the conviction that, given the fact that *Amotekun* is not likely to be as resourced as the Nigerian military, and particularly with the everincreasing proliferation of arms among the belligerent elements, CTA, with its communal stance, above all alternate measures, offers a less costly strategy to securing the economic interest and livelihood of the citizens and the nation – Nigeria as a whole.

## Communal tracking approach to insecurity: Literature review and theoretical insight

In this brief theoretical consideration, our first attempt is to have a brief discussion on the concept of *insecurity*. The traditional African society was one in which the idea of “main door to the main house”, not to talk of adjoining rooms, was considered unnecessary, since there was no

fear of anybody coming to behead the fastsleeping men, women, children, native and strangers, either for a ritual or other obnoxious reason (Agbaje, 2010). To the contrary, one major problem facing nations and people across the world today is rising level of insecurity, depicting “the absence of protection or safety” (Achumba et al. 2013). The concept of security and insecurity are two sides of the same coin. When one is visible, the other is rarely known. The absence of security gives prominence to the manifestation of insecurity; because insecurity reigns in an environment where security is void. Traditionally, most concerns on security have been those that emphasized the need for the state, its institutions and operators to be safe and free from external aggression and internal insurrection. Least was it previously realized that, mostly, insecurity is most threatening when it seeks to annihilate man and his interests. Equally surprising is the fact that almost all of the indices of insecurity borne out of the social milieu are human-inflicted and human-affecting. Hence, so much emphasis is now placed on human security as the centerpiece of security concerns and analysis. According to the United Nations Developing Programme Commission on Human Security (UNDP CHS, 2003), the need for a new paradigm of security is associated with two sets of dynamics. First, human security is needed in response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, crossborder terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. These forms of threats are usually transnational dimensions, thereby moving beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone. Secondly, human security represents a comprehensive approach that utilizes the wide range of new opportunities to tackle such threats in an integrated manner.

It is realized lately that human security threats cannot be tackled relying exclusively on conventional mechanisms. In the opinion of the UNDP CSH, it requires a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and the interdependencies between development, human rights, and national security. Along the same line, Vornanen, Törrönen, Niemelä and Miettinen (2012) have also pointed out that security and insecurity are broad concepts that include a variety of contexts (from close relationships to global issues). Studies have also shown that insecurity may be either context-dependent or universal (Taimalu et al., 2006, 72), localeveryday or global (Pain et al., 2010), or a somehow polarized phenomenon where some perceive either close issues or global and distant issues positively while others view them negatively

UNDP CHS x-rayed areas of human-affecting security concerns to include: economic security (persistent poverty, unemployment), food security (hunger, famine), health security (deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care), environmental security (environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution), personal security, (physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labor), community security (inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions), and political security, (political repression, human rights abuses). Whichever way it comes or manifests, it is man that bears the brunt of all forms of insecurity most. This is the reason that UNDP CHS (2003) placed maximum importance on the attainment of human security. UNDP CHS argued that, whereas state

security hitherto concentrates on threats directed against the state, mainly in the form of military attacks, human security draws attention to a wide scope of threats faced by individuals and communities. It focuses on the root causes of insecurities and advances peoplecentered solutions that are locally driven, comprehensive and sustainable. Hence, human security is seen as all that is needed “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (UNDP CHS, 2003). Aside poverty and hunger, terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, armed robbery and murder are currently the foremost challenges in Nigeria. Due to the prevalence of the acts of terrorism and other incidences of insecurity in Nigeria, numerous people lose their lives on daily basis. Despite the fact that government and the security agents claim to be on top of the matter, insecurity still persists. From all indications, the government as well as the security agencies, as presently constituted, seem to be incapable of effectively guaranteeing the security of the lives and properties of the citizenry from terrorists and other criminal incidences (see Obayori, Osai, Ahmodu, Maeba, 2018). Since it is human that is most affected by insecurity, the emphasis on human security brings together the “human elements” of security, rights and development. Growing from the CHS analysis, security is reconceptualized as “moving away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment” (UNDP CHS, 2003). Since all forms of insecurity affects man the most, and man lives in community, any attempt to sideline community dimension of security will mean absence of any security at all. This has been the tragedy of security rationalization in Nigeria.

## Communal Tracking Approach

Africa is currently ridden with diverse socioeconomic problems that appear not so pronounced in the traditional society. Hitherto, social welfare, social security, individual piety, productive living or hard work and communal integrity, communal vigilance and sanction were common denominators of communal life. These are values wellinternalized and taken for granted in almost every traditional African setting. In their place now, Africa is embattled with challenges of indecent living, individual greed, corruption, social insecurity, and mass poverty and underdevelopment caused by perverted cosmopolitan citizens and selfacclaimed members of emergent African social communities. Arising from undue perversion of some valuable traditional norms, no nation in Africa is spared of evils of the prevalent social ambiguities. With the rising spate of insecurity, there is no better time to reappraise the option of African communal life than now. Communal Tracking Approach (CTA) represents a framework of governance that prides itself of all the attributes of communal life. It advocates such attributes that make the traditional society

a transparent, responsible and accountable setting. CTA represents a potent strategy to create workable interface between the state and the society. Its analytic variables include: itemization, identification, information and investigation necessary to avail effective governance and social sanction for wrong doing. Itemization captures what needs to be done, identification reveals who does what, information relates to letting critical stakeholders know what is to be done and who is responsible for doing what under what circumstances. The last relates to verifying whether or not there has been strict compliance with the laid down provisions and certainty of apportionment of sanction for observed breach (Agbaje, 2013). Where this framework is properly applied in conjunction with the society, cases of official and social dereliction and abuse will be minimized. This preposition is well supported by the structural functionalist approach to social analysis adopted by August Comte (1798-1857), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Talcott Parson (1902-1979), and Robert Merton (1920-2003). The theory was later refined by Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) (Merton, 1938). The theory identified the consummate structures of the society – politics, economy, religion, education, industry, technology, social order and social control with all working together in an interrelated and interdependent manner to promote solidarity and stability. Historically, functionalists compare society with a living organism and draw analogy between them (Omonijo et al., 2017). From the analysis of this theory it follows that a flux in one part of the society causes a flux in another part. As regards social organism with its interrelatedness and interdependence of parts, communal approach to security best facilitates the interaction, interdependence and inter-subjectivity of community and security.

### Rising incidence of insecurity in Nigeria and the desirability of alternative security paradigm: The case of *Amotekun*

Against expectation, insecurity has become a denominating factor of Nigerian life. Following the civil war, Nigeria started witnessing increasing waves of arms-related social insecurity. The most often observed then were armed robbery attacks and murders in the West. The attacks by the likes of Oredein, Oyenusi, started the race. These become more widespread as unemployment and poverty increased in the 1980s, giving birth to the Anini's group, and later the notorious Benin Republicbased gang led by Tijani (allafrica/com, 2003). The onset of democratic dispensation, starting with Babangida's transition, without ends birthed the waves of kidnapping for ritual killings with Otokoto saga (Uchenna, 2018). Kidnapping became widespread particularly in the eastern region of the country, initially for ritual but later for financial extortion, and from there spread to the rest of Nigeria. The emergence of pronounced political disunity and unmitigated individual ambition led to the formation of the political warboys who later metamorphosed into an insurgent group which greatly contributed to Nigeria having to temporarily lose a sizeable portion of her territory to the terrorists. Several thousands of people were abducted and seized by the terrorists since 14 April 2014, including Chibok schoolgirls. According to the BBC account, the gunmen arrived in the town late at night in a blaze of gunfire and headed for the school where they raided the dormitories and loaded 276 girls onto lorries (BBC Africa, 2017). This,

according to BBC, sparked one of the biggest global social media campaigns, with tweeters using the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. Some of the girls managed to escape shortly after they were seized, while about 100 have been freed in exchange for Boko Haram militants, in negotiations brokered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) while the rest remain in Boko Haram custody to date, after six years of their abduction. As a result of the dastard acts of these terrorists, unimaginable thousands of people have died and are still dying, while millions were displaced from their land of birth to become refugees across the nation. Still to compound the security problem of the Nigeria came the sudden emergence of herdsmen onslaughts on communities and farmers (Alindogan, 2018; TVC News, 2016; Channels TV, 2018; Sahara Reports, 2020) which coincidentally started gaining prominence and grew up so rapidly and strongly from the same time the present administration came into power. These attacks started first in the middle belt, but gradually spread to the southern part of the country, thus completing the endangerment of the lives, money, farms, land, houses, and other properties, and consequently the livelihood of ordinary Nigeria.

Interestingly, the central security agencies were able to bring culprits to book in all previous incidences of insecurity as can be ascertained with the arrest and judicial sanction imposed on Oredein, Oyenusi, Anini, the Otokoto actors (The Port City News, 2018), Tidjani, Baddoo boys in Lagos, and the rest. But the cases of herdsmen almost defied all logic as the state appears helpless in curtailing their activities or bringing them to book. Later, to join the queue of attacks on the hapless citizens and their livelihood, came the surge of banditry which operates with the same logic as the herdsmen. Every region in Nigeria became restless as a combined result of rising insecurity. The nation called for state, community or regional policing and security outfits, that would not necessarily take anything away from the central security outfits but be more proactive in addressing the security challenges in each region, state and community. It was on this basis the Nigerian nation saw the emergence of the *Amotekun* in the Southwest, when *Hisbah* and a few other such organisations were already in place in all the regions of the core North.

Since the new regional/state security organisations were meant to address the rising security problems of each of the regions, it became indispensable to make them, unlike the present structures, as close to the society as possible. Hence the formation of the state security organisation *Amotekun*. While similar move for state police failed in the past, the rising incidence of insecurity across the nation has made it compelling to do no other than head for the direction of state security outfit/police. To properly contextualize the emergence of such organization, most of the states in the Southwest have had their State Assemblies consider and pass relevant bills of law establishing the new security organization *Amotekun*. Only Lagos is yet to pass its own *Amotekun* Bill. This may be due to the need to see how to rationalize this with the Neighbourhood Watch that is already in place in Lagos.

The Establishment Bill passed into law by the Osun State House of Assembly, which is more or less similar to those in other states in the region – Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo – provided in Part I, Section 3, Sub-Section 1-3, among others, that:



1. There is established the Osun State Security Network Agency.
2. The Osun State Security Network Agency shall:
  - a) be a body corporate with perpetual succession and common seal;
  - b) have power to sue and be sued in its corporate name; and
  - c) be capable of acquiring, holding, managing and disposing of properties movable or immovable, for the purpose of exercising the objectives and functions specified in this Law.
3. The Agency shall work with similar Security Network Agencies in other States of the Federation and in particular, shall collaborate with other Security Network Agencies in Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States.

To determine further the logics that will guide the operations of *Amotekun* to become an effective organization, the Bill also in its Part I, Section 4, Sub-Section (a)-(e), and Part I, Section 5, Sub-Section 1 and 2, respectively, set the following objectives and functions for the organization:

The objectives of the Agency are to:

- a) gather information and share intelligence about crime, crime in progress, suspicious activities, criminal suspects and other criminal activities;
- b) collaborate with similar security network agencies, particularly in Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States to deter kidnapping, terrorism, cattle rustling, cultism, highway robbery and other offences and to assist the Police in apprehending such criminals;
- c) protect lives and property within the State;
- d) ensure that all persons travelling along the highways, major roads, remote areas, hinterland, forest and inland waterways are free to participate in their normal social and economic life without fear or hindrance; and
- e) assist the Police to carry out any other lawful activity for maintaining law and order in the State.

The functions of the Agency are to:

- a) collaborate with and assist the Police and other Security Network Agencies in gathering information about crime, crime investigation, arrest and prosecution of persons suspected or involved in kidnapping, terrorism, cattle rustling, cultism, highway robbery and other criminal activities;
- b) collaborate with and assist the Police and other security agencies in maintaining law and order within the state by:
  - making available relevant information on crime, crime in progress, crime related activities, suspicious activities and criminal suspects;
  - undertaking routine day and night patrol on major roads, remote areas, hinterland, forests and inland waterways;
  - ensuring that offenders are identified, arrested, registered and promptly handed over to the nearest Police station or post;



- giving timely report of suspicious activities and crimes in progress to aid in the effective policing of the State;
- providing the Police and other security agencies with relevant information to aid in the effective policing of the State;
- c) disarm unauthorized persons in possession of arms and other dangerous weapons;
- d) render prompt assistance to crime and accident victims;
- e) undertake routine day and night patrols on interconnected roads and surveillance on highways, major roads, remote areas, hinterland, forests and inland waterways;
- f) undertake joint operations with the Police and other security agencies in furtherance of the objects of the Agency;
- g) react and respond promptly and strategically to distress calls;
- h) prevent highway crimes and any other criminal activities by way of local intelligence gathering and use of technology;
- i) collaborate with the So-Safe Corps or other security agencies in carrying out its duties; and
- j) carry out such other directives as the Governor may expressly give to the Osun State *Amotekun* Corps in relation to security and the maintenance of public order and safety.

The Agency shall in the course of carrying out its duties safeguard the human rights of every person as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999 (as amended) and other relevant human rights instruments.

This paper, therefore, seeks to ascertain the extent to which communal orientation can contribute to effectiveness of *Amotekun* in southwest Nigeria. The conclusions from the analysis show that effective interface between *Amotekun* and its operating communities will go a long way towards realization of the organisation's objective, i.e. security in the region.

## Methodology

In this micro study, data were collected for the research using structured questionnaire. Giving the incidence of the lockdown and the need to be as neutral as possible, online distribution was adopted. Platforms used for distribution were a mix of interest, professional, associational, organisational outlets with the freedom of recipient to distribute to other channels. The questionnaire was on for about one month and had a total of 175 responses. The spread of the responses reflects the geographical affinity and regional concerns of the case (*Amotekun*) at hand. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics which includes the use of simple frequencies, score counts, and percentages.

## Data collection, analysis, results and implications

**Table 1.** Distribution of socio-demographic data of questionnaire respondents

S/N	Variables		Frequency	Percentage
1	2		3	4
1	Gender	Male	119	68.00
		Female	56	32.00
		Total	175	100
2	Age	15-20 years	6	3.43
		21-30 years	85	48.57
		31-40 years	52	29.71
		41-50 years	21	12.00
		51-60 years	9	5.14
		60 years and above	2	1.14
		Total	175	100
3	Education	Primary	0	0.00
		Secondary	1	0.57
		University	157	86.71
		Other	17	9.71
		Total	175	100
4	Region	North Central	17	9.71
		North East	0	0.00
		North West	2	1.14
		South East	2	1.14
		South West	150	85.71
		South-South	3	1.71
		Unanswered	1	0.57
		Total	175	100
5	Occupation	Public servant	55	31.43
		Private sector Employee	33	18.36
		Self-employee	46	26.29
		Unemployed	40	22.86
		Retired	1	0.57
		Military personnel	0	0.00
		Total	175	100
6	Tribe	Hausa	0	0.00
		Fulani	0	0.00

1	2	3	4
	Igbo	3	1.71
	Yoruba	166	94.86
	Tiv	1	0.00
	Ibiobio	0	0.00
	Ijaw	0	0.00
	Edo	0	0.00
	Unanswered	5	2.86
	Total	175	100

Source: Authors' fieldwork, 2020.

Table 1 displays the demographic information concerning the respondents. 119 respondents (68.00%) were male while 56 (32.00%) were female. Regarding age, 6 respondents (3.43%) were between 15-20 years, 85 (48.57%) were between 21-30 years, 52 (29.71%) were between 31-40 years, 21 (12.00%) were between 41-50 years, 9 (5.14%) were between 51-60 years, while the remaining 2 (1.14%) of the respondents were 60 years old and above. This implies that the majority of the respondents were aged between 31-40 years. The majority of the respondents, i.e. were also the university graduates.

17 respondents (9.71%) were from North Central, none was from the North East, 2 (1.14%) were from the North West and the South East. 150 respondents (85.71%) were from the South West, 3 (1.71%) were from the South South, while 1 respondent opted not to disclose his/her region. The dimensions of occupation of the respondents revealed that 55 (31.43%) were public servants, 33(18.36%) were private sector employees, 46 (26.29%) were selfemployed, 1 respondent was retired. No respondent was from military personnel. Regarding the tribe of the respondents, the majority, i.e. 166 respondents, were Yoruba (94.86%). Also, 22 respondents (16%) claimed to belong to a political party, the rest, i.e. 147 (84%) had no political party affiliation.

Based on the analysis of the research question 1, Table 2 revealed the respondents' answers to the question. Out of 175 respondents, 95 (54.29%) considered the threat of widespread insecurity as "worrisome", while 63 (36.00%) saw the situation of security in Nigeria as being very poor. From these responses it was clear that all the respondents had a clear idea of the threatening security situation in the country.


The respondents were asked to describe the level of security in their state of residence. 72 (41.14%) described it as bad, 43 (24.57%) said it was threatening, 42 (24.57%) observed that it was alarming, while 8 (4.57%) described it as extremely dangerous. According to the opinion of respondents across the country, the security situation in Nigeria is extremely bad.

However, 131 respondents (74.86%) agreed that improved security awareness by members of the public will enhance the possibility of early detection of crimes. The analysis revealed that incidences of insecurity have become a major concern across Nigeria. Hence, the people realize that there is no going back on the need to urgently improve the security system in Nigeria.

**Table 2.** Analysis of the research questions

Research question 1: How threatening has the widespread insecurity become in Nigeria?

S/N	How threatening has the widespread insecurity become in Nigeria?		Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	What is your view of security situation in Nigeria?	Poor	63	36.00
		Worrisome	95	54.29
		Dangerous	17	9.71
		No idea	0	0.00
		Total	175	100.00
2.	How will you describe the security in your state of residence?	Extremely bad	72	41.14
		Threatening	43	24.57
		Alarming	42	24.00
		Dangerous	8	4.57
		Unanswered	10	5.71
		Total	175	100.00
3.	If there is improved security awareness by members of the public, there is always the possibility of early detection of crimes.	Strongly disagree	25	14.29
		Disagree	7	4.00
		Neutral	11	6.29
		Agree	61	34.86
		Strongly agree	70	40.00
		Unanswered	1	0.57
		Total	175	100.00



**Figure 1.** Preferences of the respondents concerning the level of security organization in Nigeria

**Table 3.** Research question 2: Can the formation of either state or regional security outfit be a strategy towards the mitigation of rising insecurity in Nigeria?

	Can the formation of either state or regional security outfit be a strategy towards the mitigation of rising insecurity in Nigeria?		Frequency	Percentage (%)
1.	What level of security organization will you prefer to be introduced?	State level	47	26.85
		Regional level	26	14.86
		Community level	78	44.57
		Federal level	23	13.14
		Unanswered	1	0.57
		Total	175	100.0
2.	How do you think security can be improved in Nigeria?	Increase equipment and improve training of the security personnel	100	57.14
		Improvement in the welfare of the security personnel	52	29.71
		Decentralize the control and command structure	15	8.57
		Introduction of state and regional police for better security	8	4.57
		Total	175	100
3.	Do you think there is urgent need for improvement of security situation in Nigeria?	No	0	0.00
		Yes	175	100.00
		Total	175	100.00

The table above reveals which level of security organization to be introduced is preferred by the respondents. The majority of the respondents, i.e. 78 (44.57%), agreed that the organization should be at the community level. This explains the level at which people will want to see security improved in Nigeria. To another question relating to measures for improvement of security in Nigeria 100 respondents (57.14%) answered that better equipment and improved training of security personnel could make for a great change. Other measures considered important in order of significance are: (1) improvement in the welfare of the security personnel, and (2) decentralization of the control and command structure of the security forces. Only 8 respondents (4.57%) opted for the state/regional level. This response, compared with the preference for the community level, shows that people think security would be better felt at the closest possible level. In any case, all the respondents (100%) believed there is an urgent need for improvement of the security situation in Nigeria. Therefore, it was concluded that the formation of either state or regional security outfit is a strategy towards the mitigation of rising insecurity in Nigeria.




Figure 2. Respondents' preferred ways of improving the security situation in Nigeria

Table 4. Research question 3: To what extent should security organization like *Amotekun* be communal in orientation and strategy?

	To what extent should security organization like <i>Amotekun</i> be communal in orientation and strategy?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Have you ever heard of <i>Amotekun</i> or any other state or regional security outfit in Nigeria?	Yes	165
		No	7
		Maybe	3
		Total	175
2	In your own view, is creation of regional or state security outfit a welcome development in Nigeria?	Yes	132
		No	12
		Maybe	31
		Total	175
3	<i>Amotekun</i> personnel should have good knowledge of the community in which they are to serve.	Yes	163
		No	1
		Maybe	7
		Unanswered	4
		Total	175
4.	Majority of the personnel of <i>Amotekun</i> should be recruited from the members of immediate community.	Yes	123
		No	5
		Not necessarily	47
		Total	175
5.	Being members of the community will enhance better performance by members of the security outfit like <i>Amotekun</i> .	Yes	133
		Not all	21.71
		Unanswered	2.29
		Total	175

The table above revealed that 165 respondents (94.29%) have heard of *Amotekun* or some other state or regional security outfit in Nigeria, leaving less than 6 percent with no clear idea. The majority of the respondents supported the creation of a security outfit that will be as close as possible to the people. As much as 163 of the 175 respondents (93.14%) supported the view that *Amotekun* personnel should have good knowledge of the community in which they are to serve. Quite a large part of the respondents, i.e. 123 (70.29%), also were of the view that the majority of the personnel of *Amotekun* should be recruited from the members of the immediate community, because being members of the community will enhance their performance. A whole 161 (92.00%) of the respondents agreed that the time has come for establishment of security outfit that will be better embedded in the community life of the people.

## Conclusion and recommendations

1. More than anytime before, incidences of insecurity have become a major concern across Nigeria.
2. People have realized that there is no going back on the need to urgently improve on security system in Nigeria.
3. The present security network has failed and may not be able to sufficiently guarantee the security of lives and properties of Nigerians.
4. To ensure security, the establishment of state/regional security outfits has become a must.
5. Such security outfits which must be communal in orientation must work to complement the existing security organizations in the country.
6. There is no other way to stop the gradual descent into reign of anarchy across the country than to bring policing and security closer to the people for their active participation and involvement.
7. Organisations such as *Amotekun*, that will be properly regulated by law, have become a necessary addition to the Nigerian security network.

From the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that the security network in Nigeria needs a drastic and comprehensive overhauling. This, by necessity, will entail forming other state or regional outfit to complement the roles of the existing agencies. More important, however, is the fact that the operational modalities of the newly established security outfits, in this case *Amotekun*, must be communal. It is expected, therefore, that both the security corps members must be conversant with the community of their primary deployment. It is even preferred that the bulk of such personnel should come from willing, qualified and wellprofiled members of the community. The synergy between the members of the outfit and the community must be built on mutual trust, honesty, respect, and assistance. It has become clear that only credible and identifiable members of the community with good track of integrity should play crucial security roles. The outfit must also seek to work in synergy with the existing military, police and security agencies. Above all,

moving away from the traditional notion of state security, the orientation of the new corps must be built on the principle of human and total security.

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## Cytowanie

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## Urban realities and politics of *Owanbe* in Nigeria

**MUSEDIQ OLUFEMI LAWAL**  
PH.D., SENIOR LECTURER

ORCID: 0000-0002-3667-2533  
Department of Sociology, Osun State University, Nigeria  
e-mail: flawal2005@gmail.com

**TEMITOPE SADE AKINTUNDE**  
PH.D., SENIOR LECTURER

ORCID: 0000-0002-4713-7560  
Department of Economics, Osun State University, Nigeria  
e-mail: temitope.akintunde@uniosun.edu.ng

**NKECHI LATIFAT ALIU**

ORCID: 0000-0001-9234-5302  
Federal College of Wildlife Management, New Bussa, Nigeria  
e-mail: flawal2005@gmail.com

**YOUNG KENNETH IRHUE**  
PH.D., LECTURER

ORCID: 0000-0003-4608-1304  
Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria  
e-mail: young.irhue@uniosun.edu.ng

**OLAWALE OLUFEMI AKINRINDE**  
PH.D., LECTURER

ORCID: 0000-0001-7350-2376  
Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Nigeria  
e-mail: olawale.akinrinde@uniosun.edu.ng

## OLUWAGBEMIGA OLUWASEUN AJAYI

PH.D., LECTURER

ORCID: 000-0002-7839-4041

Department of Sociology, Osun State University, Nigeria

e-mail: oluwagbemiga.ajayi@uniosun.edu.ng

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### Abstract

This study has been motivated by the diverse and stimulating dimension of urban life, most especially by the unending flair for social festivities, popularly known as *Owanbe*. While giving its attention to Lagos City in Nigeria, this study strove to contribute to the existing discourse on urban life and its realities. It documents the pattern and dimension of social festivities, the socio-demographic characteristics of the conveners/organizers, the ideological motives behind the unending spate of lavish ceremonies, the factors sustaining these ceremonies, the sources of financing the ceremonies in the face of prevailing precarious economic condition, as well as the developmental implications and the emerging manifestations of these ceremonies. As a participatory research that took place in 5 randomly sampled Local Government Areas in Lagos State between March 2020 and January 2021, the study sourced data using the In-Depth Interview (IDI), Key Informant Interview (KII), and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The participants were the stakeholders and opinion leaders within the study areas. The collected data were content analyzed and reported with humanistic approach. The study has discovered that urban dynamics created inequalities and harsh economic conditions. The reality of the inevitability of this situation gave prominence to unconventional leisure and recreation events called *Owanbe* gatherings. The pattern and dimension of such festivities ranged from birthdays, child naming, burial rites, to chieftaincy ceremonies, and so on. The study concludes that ostentatious spending involved in *Owanbe* ceremonies encourages disinvestment through the diversion of funds that would have stimulated sustainable economic growth.

## Introduction

Urban centre generally constitutes the heart, the lifeblood of various civilizations and epicentre of economic, political, and artistic activities (Onibokun, 2004). Historically, urbanisation occurs due to unending attraction of the people to the cities with the hope of increasing their standard of living (African Development Bank, 2017). However, rapid growth of urban centres in developing countries has brought to the fore various problems that manifested not only in the physical forms of the city but also in the ways they function (Mabogunje, 1980). Urbanisation, therefore, remains one of the greatest socio-economic changes in contemporary era. In view of its peculiar nature, urban centre reveals cauldrons of excitement where human joy and terror often intermingle (Spates, Macionis, 1987). It constitutes an increasingly important stage on which all aspects of the human drama are performed. It equally encompasses the highest learning and the grossest ignorance, unimaginable levels of wealth with the most abject poverty existing side by side (Buker, Hewson, 2020).

In Africa, urbanisation shows one of the worst faces of the population problem.

The major cities of West Africa, including Accra, Lagos, Ibadan, and Conakry, thus remain a development and management nightmare (Sai, 1995; Olajide et al., 2018; Turok, Visagie, 2020). Moving along with this process at the same pace is the social change, which has been equated to urban development. The end result of this is the development of new behavioural patterns that affect the social arrangement and institutions like marriage, family, as well as virtually all aspects of social life of which leisure and entertainment are central (Collier, Venables, 2017; Kanbur, Norman, Stiglitz, 2019). What could not be taken away from the entire activities and processes is myriad of problems such as overcrowding and congestion, housing, water supply, transportation and traffic problem, crime, delinquency and its related problems. While these problems are assuming annoying dimensions in certain climes, the major cities in the country have never ceased to receive immigrants from the hinterlands almost on daily basis (World Bank, 2017; United Nations, 2018).

Urban life in Nigeria and, indeed, urban experience, like those of most of the urban centres in the world, provides a contrasting image (Ademiluyi, Solanke, 2007). The problems and challenges posed by the rapid urban growth in Nigeria, just like in any other of the world's developing countries, are immense. The characteristics feature of Nigerian urban scene thus is manifested in a host of environmental, economic, political, and social problems. Coupled with this is the explosive rate of growth, which has progressively complicated and aggravated the inter-related problems of human settlements and the environment. These have been responsible as well for the general problem of human and environmental poverty, the declining quality of life and the under-utilized as well as untapped wealth of human resources. Presently, more than 70 million Nigerians live in poverty (World Bank, 2017; United Nations, 2018). The demand for infrastructure, basic services and housing in expanding urban centres in the country is on the increase. Housing and associated facilities such as pipe borne water, electricity, waste disposal, etc. are grossly inadequate. Millions of the citizenry live in substandard environments called slums which are plagued by squalor and lack of basic amenities of life such as shortage of schools, poor health facilities, as well as lack of recreational facilities, among others (Ayedun et al., 2011).

In spite of these problems, Nigerians, mostly the urban dwellers, are always in the habit of throwing lavish social parties. This non-conventional mode of leisure and recreational activities of the urban dwellers (which usually come in the form of ceremonies and daily/weekly entertainments, popularly known as *Owanbe*) made the appreciation of gory picture of urban life in Nigeria a herculean task. *Owanbe* thus becomes a reflection of the dynamism of culture and of the telling manner in which economic conditions affect sociocultural expressions. It has become one of the established patterns of social life, particularly among the Yorùbá speaking people of Nigeria. Abati (2009) captured this situation with observation that numerous social occasions happen among Nigerians and people get invited according to the extent of their social networks. Nigerians are noted for organizing, arranging, and throwing parties (Abati, 2011) anywhere they find themselves.

Typical *Owanbe* parties are usually laced with magnificent display of wealth and opulence, at least for the rich, in order to make a statement that the conveners are people of means. *Owanbe*

parties are so frequent that the partakers often become vulnerable to armed robbery attacks, and high rate of vehicle accidents. Parties held during the daytime were just as robust and showy as those held in the night. The Yorùbá were the most notorious promoters of this culture. Very visible during these events are men's expansive, parachute-like *agbada*, and the women's headgears of different designs, shapes, and sizes – all creatively embroidered and worn with accustomed grace. On a typical weekend, an average couple could be invited to about five parties, with five different *aso ebi*s, changing from one attire to the other, rushing from one end of the city to another (Nwafor, 2011). This culture of ostentation was traced to certain “madness” in society, an inversion of values where even the poor felt compelled to lavish borrowed money on such big parties just so they could meet public expectations. Funerals, in particular, provided special excuse for indebtedness or bankruptcy. Driven by folk's beliefs that it is compulsory to give one's parents a befitting burial, persons who could not afford to feed themselves are found taking loans to feed their guests. Among the local people, the cow and the drinks could be purchased on credit, with the understanding that the guests will donate money to the celebrant. After the party, careful accounting is done to settle all outstanding debts. Where the guests fail to be generous, the result could be the gnashing of teeth and embarrassment by creditors. In view of the foregoing, the following questions were generated to guide this study: What is the pattern and dimension of these ceremonies? What are the socio-demographic characteristics of the conveners/organizers? What are the ideological motives behind the unending spate of lavish ceremonies? What are the factors sustaining these ceremonies? How are these ceremonies financed in spite of the prevailing economic condition? Does this spate of ceremonies have implication on developmental processes? What are the emerging manifestations of these ceremonies in the urban centre like Lagos?

## Methodology

Data for this research were gathered and obtained from both primary and secondary sources in Lagos. There are 20 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Lagos State out of which 6 LGAs were randomly sampled. The primary sources of data were drawn from 6 randomly sampled LGAs between March 2020 and January 2021. The sampled LGAs included Alimosho, Ifako-Ijaye, Kosofe, Ojo, Lagos Mainland and Lagos Island. The partakers in this study were grouped into two categories. The first category comprised people in formal setting of the economy, while the second category included those in the informal setting. The first category was composed of the elites that are working in the Lagos State Ministries of Finance, Home Affairs, Economic Planning and Budget, Housing, Finance, Physical Planning and Urban Development, scholars in Economics, Urban Studies from Lagos State University and University of Lagos. The second category comprised the stakeholders in social event activities (organizers, event service providers, patrons of most of the events), previous conveners/organizers of lavish ceremonies, the opinion leaders in the communities such as the clergies, retired civil servants, and community leaders. Instant interviews were sought and conducted where possible with people who possessed relevant information about the issue being studied but were “met by chance” away from

their place of abode. Where it was not possible to get immediate responses from the prospective respondents met in this instance, appointments were booked with them for interview in their respective places of residence. Participant observation method was also adopted to collect data at every available opportunity. Secondary sources for the research include the published and some unpublished materials that gave historical and background information. These includes books, journals, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet sources. The data collected were fully transcribed, analyzed, and interpreted for discussion.

## Results and discussion

### Urban economics and social menace of urbanisation in Lagos State

Nigeria continues to maintain her status as one of the countries with the lowest income levels. The country equally has an insufficient fiscal space for critical social and infrastructural spending that can cushion an economic downturn (Aisen et al., 2021). This further intensifies the need for migration to urban centres as the best option open for improved life chances among those that could not cope with attendant harsh economic situation. Using Lagos as an example, Morakinyo et al. (2012) and Ilesanmi (2010) were of the view that rapid population growth and urban expansion that usually exert heavy burden on urban facilities have made expected conducive life in the cities unattainable over time. In this situation, provisions of housing, serviced land, infrastructure and urban services, and livelihood opportunities remain incomparable to the pace of population growth. The consequence of this is constantly an acute poverty, proliferation of informal settlements, overcrowding, and inadequate physical and social infrastructure thereby creating challenges on the viability of many major urban areas (Mallach, Scorsone, 2011; Lall et al., 2017; Turok, 2017; Rodrik, 2018). Using this as a springboard for understanding the situation in urban centres of Lagos, this study explored the economics and the social menace of urban centres in Lagos.

In the words of one of the participants, Lagos State is composed of many cities and many settlements that could be classified as sub-urban. All of these have been transformed on a daily basis due to influx of people from all over the country. People from the neighbouring countries like the Benin Republic, Togo, Ghana, etc. are equally pouring into Lagos State. As a result of this, the city increasingly faces difficulties to find resources necessary to provide public services of adequate quality to the populace (In-Depth Interview/Female/Lecturer/Economics Department, Lagos State University, Nigeria). Stressing further on this, it was noted that several employable individuals could not secure employment in public service and the majority of those under private employment are not well paid. Many of them could be effectively classified as operating under disguised unemployment (In-Depth Interview/Male/Civil Servant/Lagos State Ministry of Home Affairs, Nigeria). Another submission revealed that loss of jobs, combined with the increasing poverty of vast majority of the populace and the declining value of their property base, have severely reduced the ability of the populace to find the needed revenues to pay for

services (like health, good education for children, and decent accommodation) that would make their life worthwhile (In-Depth Interview/Female/Lecturer/Urban and Regional Department, University of Lagos, Nigeria). Further exploration of urban sufferings was made from physical environmental perspective. According to one of the participants, dwindling economic base with ever-expanding population has made the maintenance of available infrastructure unattainable. Most of the infrastructure in the city has therefore deteriorated with potholed roads, missing street signs, neglected parks and playgrounds, and shuttered recreation centres (In-Depth Interview/Male/Lecturer/Economics Department, University of Lagos, Nigeria).

Many of the urban dwellers were noted to be living traumatic lifestyle as a result of unmet expectations. Several of them have met untimely death thereby leading to drastic reduction in number of people that could have meaningfully contributed to developmental process. By this, the government could not deliver adequate public services, could not maintain its infrastructure and physical plant nor offer its citizens a decent quality of life (In-Depth Interview/Female/Lecturer/Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Lagos State University, Nigeria). The quality of urban infrastructural services is deteriorating, thereby discouraging both domestic and foreign business investment (In-Depth Interview/Male/Civil Servant/Lagos State Ministry of Finance, Nigeria). Another submission revealed that people spend primarily on essential goods and services without room for savings and investment which results in low expectations of future income as well as erosion of existing wealth and expected wealth (In-Depth Interview/Male/Civil Servant/Lagos State Ministry of Housing, Nigeria). Economically, things are getting worse according to the participants: unabated job loss, impoverishment and declining property values as well as high tax burdens thus make healthful living almost impossible (In-Depth Interview/Female/Civil Servant/Lagos State Physical Planning and Urban Development, Nigeria). In the midst of the myriad of challenges, households and individuals in urban Lagos further bear the burden of a dysfunctional and inequitable health system. A participant noted that people delay or refuse to seek health care since they have to pay out of pocket for health care services that are not affordable. The quality of available health care services delivered remains poor and remains a huge source of concern (In-Depth Interview/Male/Civil Servant/Lagos State Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, Nigeria). Despite all these challenges faced by the urban dwellers, especially in Lagos, they still engage in some forms of socialization, particularly in organizing and attending ceremonies. The next section presents more on this.

## Issues and events in *Owanbe* gatherings

Ceremonies are very important for the West African societies, especially in Nigeria, as they strengthen social structures. From the observation of events across the social functions studied, it was noted that the conveners and organizers of these activities cut across male and female genders. Age structure could be fixed within 21 years of age and above. The elites as well as non-elites were involved in these events. In most of the events, both the elites and non-elites were found to be involved as conveners and organizers of *Owanbe* social parties. People across



religious divides (Christian, Islam and the Traditional religions) were found to be involved as either the conveners/organizers or patrons of these *Owanbe* events. *Owanbe* was noted as not limited to the Yorùbá ethnic group alone – virtually all ethnic groups from the southern part of Nigeria were equally involved. Ethnic composition of an area usually determines where such events hold or which ethnic groups are organizing and participating in them.

*Owanbe* events studied were held as naming ceremonies of a newborn child or birthday ceremonies for the old, underage or middle aged people. Other events that snowballed into *Owanbe* were burial ceremonies. Such burial ceremonies were held both as final burial rites for the departed aged persons, often referred to as “fresh deaths”, and as remembrance ceremonies for those that departed years back, otherwise known as “stale deaths”. The remaining events put into focus in this study included opening ceremonies of houses, also known as “house warming”, graduation ceremonies for people that have completed vocational skills training, higher educational institutions graduation ceremonies, and the youth carnivals. The dimension of these events can be best appreciated through the extent of crowd being taken care of during the ceremonies.

Most of the participants of this study revealed that some events were “house parties”, also referred to as “parlour ceremonies”. Other events took place within the confines of the celebrants’ dwellings. There were also “street parties”, held in the neighbourhood streets. Some ceremonies took place at “event centres”. Public schools were often colonized as the venues for such events. In virtually all these events it is common to see several siblings and members of extended families having their separate stands where their guests are hosted for entertainment. In some situations, food and drinks are prepared communally and served according to the needs of the guests of every sibling. In such cases the siblings and family members contribute apportioned amount of money for the joint preparation of food and drinks. These events usually require the supports of service providers such as the caterers, ushers, rental service providers that supply canopies, serve plates, cups and cutleries, tables and chairs, and other things that make social events functional and memorable. Events that are limited to the confines of the house or dwelling may not require the services of professionals, like caterers and ushers, but a sizeable number of canopies corresponding to the number of guests. Where professional caterers and ushers are not sourced, unpaid services of the wives of the siblings within the families are secured instead.

Where the conveners and organizers of *Owanbe* are hugely endowed financially, their own events are always unique. They organize the events in venues well-protected by the security operatives and specially trained social event security managers, popularly called in Nigeria “the bouncers”. Through this, the miscreants and uninvited guests are usually not given opportunity to partake in the events because the guests are admitted strictly by invitation. On the other hand, the people of average economic status do not put up security barricade to prevent people from gracing their events. They usually prepare for uninvited guests that will partake in such events as a matter of circumstance. During the event, the celebrants or celebrating group dress to stand out. Music is provided by the invited band stand or the local music providers. Uninvited singers and drummers troop in to complement the entertainment of everybody. People wear uniforms (*aso ebi*) suited for the occasion. Eating, drinking, and dancing to the music become passionate

as event progresses. Spraying with money the dancers, as a mark of appreciating their dancing steps and entertainment, as well as people drunk to a state of stupor, became noticeable.

## Motives behind the unending spate of lavish ceremonies

Spiritual reason was cited as one of the motives behind unending spate of the lavish ceremonies popularly referred to as *Owanbe*. This was made more explicit by Bello (2021, pers. comm.) who explained that people organized social parties in compliance with prescription of the spiritualists for spiritual breakthrough. According to him, spiritualists (who may be Christian clerics, Islamic clerics or Diviners) will ask them to feed many people for spiritual cleansing. Williams (2021, pers. comm.) corroborated this stating that people organize social events in order to prevent unnecessary interrogation that may occur where such feast is given without reasonable justification. But when it is done in the name of one ceremony or the other, people don't probe into it but accept it the way it is being presented. Ojengbede (2021, pers. comm.) revealed that economic recession and other social disappointments in Nigeria have created psychological disturbances that orthodox medicine cannot cure. Alternative therapies, like consultation of spiritualists, thus become the available option. Most of the time, voluntary alms given to the needy are common prescription from such spiritual option. The alms could be in the form of money, simple items like sugar, salt or feasting the multitude. People hardly accept food items especially when it is prepared for a large number of people for the sake of it.

Another perspective of rationale behind high spate of *Owanbe* events was traced to efforts at establishing and sustaining social networks. In the words of Abubakar (2021, pers. comm.), the expectation is that a typical lavish party organized in Nigeria will attract multiple acquaintances. One or two acquaintances thus invited may come along with their friends, thereby enlarging the crowd. From this process, connection is being created. Through this people get to know one another better. The network created this way often serves as a social capital, which people often fall upon when in need in the nearest future, especially where the networks are of high quality. Ajao (2021, pers. comm.) expatiated on this with assertion that throwing a party of this nature is not always the ultimate goal but having people of high pedigree in attendance is what really matters in order to shore up the image of the conveners. It is therefore a common scenario to see people organizing social events for this purpose. To Ajewole (2021, pers. comm.), people that have left the country for considerable number of years often need lavish ceremony in order to reestablish themselves upon returning back to the country. While such ceremony provides them the necessary social connections, it equally serves as an avenue to boost their social image.

People who have participated in other people's social events and have provided necessary assistance in one way or the other, usually organize their own event in order to recoup what was sown after a time (Bamidele, 2021, pers. comm.). While supporting this position, Akinkunmi (2021, pers. comm.) noted that female gender forms the bulk of people that organize lavish ceremonies in order to recoup what has been given to others in the past. In her words, the intention may go beyond monetary rewards attached to it. At times, it serves as an avenue for boosting

one's social standing. In a different situation, such events may be targeted as making financial gain as well as boosting one's social image.

It was equally noted that social events are organized by people just for the sake of them. People doing this were classified by Adebayo (2021, pers. comm.) as those without spectacular priority. Their sole aim is to gain social recognition. Commonly found in such situations are the fraudsters and people without social standing who made sudden financial breakthrough and were itching to have it burnt for people to look in their direction. *Owanbe* at times is equally organized by those who see it as an avenue to appreciate God for the goodies that have come their way or to appreciate people for social support received from them in the past (Adesoji, 2021, pers. comm.). The political class, according to Oparinde (2021, pers. comm.), use the occasion like this to bring their followers together. At this point, new loyalty is courted and differences are ironed out. A political leader who doesn't employ this avenue at least periodically, in the words of Akinkunmi (2021, pers. comm.), will lose relevance.

According to Bello (2021, pers. comm.) the practice of organizing and hosting people in lavish ceremonies has become a culture from which people cannot abstain. There is nothing they won't do to create an event. It is this category of people who organize birthday parties for their girlfriends, boyfriends or the underage kids of their family members. Adisa (2021, pers. comm.) pointed to the cultural expectation that not organizing a befitting burial ceremony for the deceased parents is a failure. To him, this reason equally motivates constant occurrence of *Owanbe*. Adebayo (2021, pers. comm.) corroborated this with his classification of street carnivals among the youth as another way of taking *Owanbe* to different level. In his words, every street has the youth that are eagerly waiting for an opportunity to organize the carnival.

### Sustaining factors and sources of finance for *Owanbe* events

It is emphasized that these events are sustained by a series of factors, which include availability of finance and a sponsor. According to Okunola (2021, pers. comm.), these events are money gulping, its weekly occurrence is an affirmation of the existence of their sponsors in spite of the prevailing economic condition. As these parties come up on a weekly basis, it is undeniable that the source of finance is steady and that the sponsors are faithful to the sustenance of the events. The availability of partakers in these events is another factor sustaining them. There is hardly any event where people are not full to capacity. Nwagbara (2021, pers. comm.), however, revealed the rationale behind this. According to him, people who have lost their means of livelihood as a result of economic downturn in the cities have turned these events to avenue to at least one meal per day. Ajao (2021, pers. comm.) highlighted further that many people throng *Owanbe* events in order to keep their body and soul together. Most of the conveners and organizers have come to realize this and prepared in earnest for this. As a result of adequate food supply, *Owanbe* was never short of heavy patronage, thereby assisting in its sustenance in this peculiar way. An opportunity provided by the *Owanbe* events to interact with others, to enjoy free food and drinks,

as well as to listen or dance to the music from a bandstand makes possible regular heavy patronage every week (Adebayo, 2021, pers. comm.).

Using the Yorùbá dictum “a business that is not fruitful will not have patrons”, Bello (2021, pers. comm.) averred that the positive spiritual outcome of the previous *Owanbe* events, organized based on prescription of the spiritualists, is another veritable factor that is sustaining them. In another submission it was revealed that those unending chaotic situations that keep on traumatizing the populace encourage regular consultation of experts in spiritual therapy. These experts thus become a lender of last resort for people seeking emotional stability. Where their spiritual matters have been handled through spiritual means successfully, people organize social events for appreciating them. In another instance, people organize the events as a way out to solving their problems. With these constantly recurring, there is no way *Owanbe* events will not regularly come up (Adisa, 2021, pers. comm.). The existence of the event organizers, caterers, ushers, providers of rental services, etc. makes packaging of *Owanbe* easier, successful and cost-effective. This also serves as motivation for the would-be conveners of another spate of these social events (Oyerinde, 2021, pers. comm.). This also explains why the events are always organized with ease and dispensed with promptly.

The *Owanbe* events can be financed through borrowing, long time savings and pooling of resources together. The financially endowed, for instance, do not always have problem with financing *Owanbe* before and after the events. This, in the words of Okunola (2021, pers. comm.), is because the rich people always end up not recording financial deficit compared to what they realized through donation from friends and acquaintances at the end of the event. Raheem (2021, pers. comm.) highlighted that those barely above or under the average financial standing usually source money for social events from borrowings or from their siblings when the event has to do with the entire family. Oparinde (2021, pers. comm.) also spoke about sourcing money for social events through contribution. In his words, people source money from the contribution made by their peers. Talking from experience, Nwagbara (2021, pers. comm.) revealed the common practice of the organizer of social event shouldering the major financial responsibilities with different forms of assistance by the other members of the family who usually come in to lessen his burden. Sijuwola (2021, pers. comm.) also revealed that the youth, organizing the street carnivals as their own brand of *Owanbe*, mostly seek for donations from the financially well-to-do within their neighbourhood.

In another instance, availability of willing sponsors for these events was noted. These sponsors, according to Williams (2021, pers. comm.), could be divided into two groups, namely (a) those who do it by lending out money with or without interests, and (b) those that do that because of intimacy that existed between them and the person organizing social events. Adesoji (2021, pers. comm.) noted that some people sponsor social events for the persons they develop intimacy with. This, according to him, is highly noticeable among the youth, most especially those in tertiary educational institutions. Ajao (2021, pers. comm.) cited instances where undergraduate students used their school fees and money for the upkeep to organize birthday ceremony for their lovers. Economic dividend accrued from entrepreneurial strategy adopted into the preparation

for such events served as source of finance. What the conveners do, according to Oyerinde (2021, pers. comm.), is to purchase “ankara” fabric as *aso ebi*. The fabric is sold at a price slightly above the normal market price. It is from the sale of this fabric that the organizers make their profits and buy souvenirs to be given to those that purchase the fabric on the day the event is taking place.

## General realities and developmental implications of *Owanbe* ceremonies

From experience, people have noted that exposure to chaotic situations obtainable in Nigeria translate into stress and depression, subsequent degeneration, and then to aggressive behaviour or victimization. Provision of avenue for social parties was devised as a way of escaping these traumatic social and economic situations. The fact that the effects of these difficulties have not made significant reduction in spite of social parties affirmed the perceived efficacy of this device. The parties continue to serve as ways of giving social respite to people. People also organize it for spiritual reasons. Such reasons were noted as not aimed at endangering the life of the participants, but as a modest way of providing foods and drinks to the horde of people without creating unnecessary attention and questioning.

It is people’s ingenuity that allows them to recognize the economic value of *Owanbe*, which shows dynamism in their problem solving approaches. It was observed that every partaker in these events has one or another economic benefit to gain. First, the organizers are likely to make financial gain from the guests who will give out some tokens as supports when they are leaving the events. In this situation, the quality of associates of the organizers will determine whether the events being organized will be economically rewarding or not. Second, on the list of the beneficiary of economic value of the social parties are the stakeholders, such as the event organizers, caterers, ushers, rental service providers or electrical technicians that handle power supply and public address system. Musicians/entertainers etc., who are regularly contracted to handle certain aspects of the parties, are not left out of this category. These classes of people have developed career paths from regular occurrence of these events and have staff members that are on their payroll. Reduction in the spite of social parties will inevitably translate to dwindling income and job loss for those under their payroll. The last category consists of beggars and the socioeconomically-created destitute that seek for financial assistance from the gathering. Where available, possible food and drinks are sought from the organizers of the events, to keep body and souls together. Very prominent within this category are the wandering entertainers who despite not being contracted for the occasion have their own unique ways of being significant, by adding pep to such events.

Political alignment and realignment is common in the gatherings of this nature. As such events cement relationships, they usually provide occasion for reunion of lost friends who may meet accidentally. Not only this, they provide occasions for the organizers to make new acquaintances, shore up their social base and recognition in the peculiar manner they want it to be. The event most often provide means to demonstrate how far people have gone in terms of material acquisition and ranking in society. *Owanbe* social events likewise serve as a means of uniting

people with common ancestral bases. Family members interact freely, settle conflicts among themselves and take impromptu or final solutions of looming crises within the family. In urban centres, however, family is not strictly limited to those who are related by blood but includes those who have like minds. This brand of family system often entails those who are united and being maintained as a result of their resolve to provide assistance to the needy among them. Therefore this explains the essence of family system as the best option for cushioning in every human gathering. The harsh effects of urban challenges and their centrality in social parties equally become obvious in this situation.

## Conclusion

Urban reality is about difficulties occasioned by economic conditions. It was obvious that these difficulties have awakened the creative zeal in the urban dwellers. High spate of festivities was discovered to be a novelty for weathering the harsh socioeconomic conditions the people found themselves. Some of them equally make efforts to add to the existing ideas that are currently sustaining people living in urban harsh conditions. It is such creativity that led to transformation of social parties from simple “get-togethers” for merriment into what has currently become a career path. Similarly, the situation has motivated people to innovate on how to turn economic adversity into advantage. It is within this perspective that *Owanbe* as a social phenomenon becomes a subject academic attention could not resist. As a result of its advancing prominence, everybody begins to catch the bug of partaking in social occasions. Organization, arrangement and execution of these social ceremonies continue to assume different patterns and dimensions based on the social connections and imagination of the conveners/organizers. Such variation in patterns and dimensions of these ceremonies is a product of social networks of the stakeholders. The socio-demographic characteristics of the conveners/organizers of these ceremonies (such as gender status, educational attainment, income, affiliation of socio-cultural organizations) influence the magnitude of the events.

In most of the *Owanbe* parties, especially those organized by rich people, it is a common scenario to see some invitees trying to outshine one another. Individuals’ dressing determines how they are treated and given recognition at the events. As a result, all sorts of fabrics are put on by the invitees, ranging from *aso-oke* (traditional hand-woven material), cotton, damask, lace guinea brocade even to wax fabric (“ankara”). Those that could not afford this clothes competition usually ensure they bought the *aso-ebi* selected for the occasion by the organizers. For the ladies, the dress only becomes completed with face dressing by the professional makeup artist. This unending competition for relevance in another person’s social parties becomes a routine. Some guests do this by coming with their own entourage in order to command attention. To others, finding a strategic position in order to attract attention of the host and have a good view of every event, as well as to know where important dignitaries are seated, is their antics.

People have different motives for organizing and participating in these ceremonies. The motives behind these ceremonies and efforts put into attaining successful outcome are a product

of environmental peculiarities of the stakeholders. It was therefore established that these ceremonies are being convened for economic, spiritual and others reasons. Factors sustaining the regularities of these ceremonies also vary along environmental peculiarities of the organizers. Financial support from the significant others (such as family members, acquaintances, members of association/organization the conveners belong) play a prominent role in sustaining these ceremonies. Other factors include financial capability of the stakeholders and existence of certain cultural stands or norms that encourage these forms of social occasions. From the economic point of view, excess money that should have been invested in further production and sustainable development is being squandered on the *Owanbe* parties. The expectation is that Nigeria is not likely to attain sustainable development in the real sense of this term in view of this “culture of ostentatious living”. When considered from a positive angle, it cannot be ignored that *Owanbe* has become a social phenomenon and an industry through which several lives are being sustained, thereby suggesting that it has come to stay.

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## Interviewees' personal communication

- Abubakar, A.O., Community Leader/Caterer, Female (2021).
- Adebayo, F.F., Community Leader, Female (2021).
- Adesoji, R.B., Retired Civil Servant/Community Leader, Male (2021).
- Adisa, M.O., Clergy/Islamic Faith, Male (2021).
- Ajao, A.A., Community Leader/Rental Service Provider, Male (2021).
- Ajewole, T.S., Clergy/Christianity, Male (2021).
- Akinkunmi, A.A.B., Logistic Service Provider/Ushering, Female (2021).
- Bamidele, W.O., Community Leader/Water Supplier, Male (2021).
- Bello, A.Y., Community Leader/Nurse, Female (2021).
- Nwagbara, C.B., Retired Immigration Officer/Community Leader, Male (2021).
- Ojengbede, D.C., Medical Practitioner/Community Leader, Male (2021).
- Okunola, R.A. Social Worker/Community Leader, Male (2021).
- Oparinde, Security Service Provider/Community Leader, Male (2021).
- Oyerinde, S.O., Healthcare Provider/Community Leader, Female (2021).
- Sijuwola, M.A., Social Security Service Provider, Male (2021).



Williams, H.A., Community Leader/Caterer, Female (2021).

## Cytowanie

Lawal, M.O., Akintunde, T.S., Aliu, N.L., Irhue, Y.K., Akinrinde, O.O., Ajayi, O.O. (2022). Proliferation of illicit arms and control mechanisms in Nigeria: A critical socioeconomic analysis. *Acta Politica Polonica*, 1 (53), 59–73. DOI: 10.18276/ap.2022.53-05.



# Wpływ internetu na sposób komunikowania polityków z elektoratem

**DOMINIKA BOROWSKA**

Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Wydział Nauk Społecznych  
email: dominika00borowska@gmail.com

**NIKOLA ROZWORSKA**

Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Wydział Nauk Społecznych  
e-mail: rozworska.n@gmail.com

**Słowa kluczowe:** internet, media społecznościowe, polityka, komunikacja, debata publiczna

## **Abstrakt**

Media społecznościowe pełnią ważną rolę w życiu społecznym i politycznym, co przekłada się na zmiany zachodzące w komunikacji między politykami, a społeczeństwem. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest wykazanie wpływu internetu i mediów społecznościowych na sposób przeprowadzania współczesnych kampanii politycznych oraz na sam wizerunek polityka. Zwrócono także uwagę na wpływ internetu na jakość komunikacji, a także sposób funkcjonowania polityków w wybranych social mediach (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter). W artykule postawiono tezę, że media społecznościowe wpływają na zmiany dostrzegalne w sposobie prowadzenia kampanii wyborczych, a także politycznych.

## **The Internet's influence on the way of communication between politicians and their electorate**

**Keywords:** Internet, social media, politics, communication, public debate

## **Abstract**

Social media play an important role both in social and political life, which translates into changes in communication between politicians and society. The basic objective of this article is to demonstrate the impact of Internet and social media on the way contemporary political campaigns are conducted and the very image of politicians. Moreover, attention is paid to the influence of the Internet on the quality of communication and on the way politicians function in selected social media: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter. A thesis is put forward that social media affect the changes which are noticeable in the way election and political campaigns are run.

## Wprowadzenie

Internet od początku odgrywał znaczącą rolę dla funkcjonowania społeczeństw, przyczynił się także do zaistnienia zmian w modelu komunikacji. Dla polityka komunikowanie stanowi jeden z kluczowych elementów prowadzenia aktywnej debaty publicznej. Niezaprzeczalnie media społecznościowe oraz internet ułatwiają pozyskiwanie informacji od obywateli, co pozwala poznać nastroje społeczne. Odpowiednia interpretacja tych informacji niejednokrotnie przyczynia się do wygranej w wyborach. Nieumiejętne stosowanie zasobów sieci może przynieść odwrotny do zamierzonego efekt, dlatego jest skuteczne tylko w rękach tych, którzy potrafią nimi operować.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie wpływu internetu i mediów społecznościowych na zmiany zachodzące w komunikacji między politykami a społeczeństwem. Analizie poddano sposób funkcjonowania polityków w wybranych social mediach: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter. W artykule postawiono tezę, że media społecznościowe wpływają na zmiany dostrzegalne w sposobie prowadzenia kampanii wyborczych, a także politycznych, w związku z czym zasadne jest postawienie niniejszych pytań badawczych:

1. Jaki wpływ ma internet na komunikację między politykiem a elektoratem?
2. Czy wykorzystanie mediów społecznościowych przyczynia się do uzewnętrznienia przejawów wadliwej komunikacji?
3. Czy internet wpływa na jakość prowadzenia kampanii politycznych?

Interdyscyplinarne podejście łączące zagadnienia z obszaru medioznawstwa i politologii wpłynęło na uwzględnienie następujących metod badawczych: analizy tekstów publicystycznych (*case study*), porównawczej (komparatystycznej) oraz ilościowej. Zastosowanie metody krytycznej pozwoliło na wykazanie wadliwości obecnie przyjętego modelu komunikacji, stosowanego przez niektórych polityków w mediach społecznościowych. Metoda porównawcza umożliwiła z kolei przedstawienie różnic między sposobami prowadzenia debaty w mediach w czasie rozwoju internetu na przełomie pierwszej i drugiej dekady XXI wieku.

W pierwszej części artykułu ukazano główne aspekty komunikacji w przestrzeni internetowej, stosowanej podczas interakcji ze społeczeństwem na tle politycznym. Następnie przedstawiono zjawiska występujące w internecie podczas prowadzenia debaty publicznej. W trzeciej części dokonano analizy praktyk podejmowanych przez polityków w podziale na wybrane media społecznościowe.

## Komunikowanie internetowe w procesach politycznych

Pewnym truizmem jest stwierdzenie, że internet od przeszło 30 lat wywiera ogromny wpływ na sposób komunikowania, czy patrząc szerzej, funkcjonowania społeczeństw. Powstanie internetu datuje się już na lata 60. XX wieku, jednak dopiero po trzech dekadach – dzięki prywatyzacji sieci – stał się coraz powszechniejszym zjawiskiem (Juza, 2016, s. 199–221). Szacuje się, że współcześnie z jego zasobów korzysta około 4,66 mld ludzi na całym świecie (Digital 2021, 2021). Należy podkreślić również, że rozwój technologii komunikacyjno-informacyjnych (information and communications technology – ICT) w istotny sposób przyczynia

się do tworzenia ram społeczeństwa opartego na wiedzy (Fettweis, Zimmermann, 2008). Za prawdziwie przełomową możemy uznać jednak pierwszą dekadę XXI wieku, kiedy to zaczęły powstawać komunikatory internetowe, a w późniejszym okresie media społecznościowe (social media). Termin ten „odnosi się do społecznych środków przekazu, opartych na łatwo dostępnych technologiach informatycznych” (Krok, 2011, s. 49).

Pojawienie się internetu oraz mediów społecznościowych nieodwracalnie zmieniło codzienne funkcjonowanie. Współcześnie sieć stanowi szeroki, funkcjonalny obszar, z którego korzystają także politycy. Głównymi przyczynami, dla których zaaktywizowali się w tej sferze, jest możliwość bezpośredniej wymiany zdań z elektoratem bez konieczności przemieszczania się. Niezmiernie ważne jest również budowanie wspólnej przestrzeni użytkowej, zrzeszającej zwolenników, których jednoczy wspólna idea, hasła czy też głoszony program. Warto jednak pamiętać, że „to nie Internet – jako medium – tworzy nową arenę polityczną, ale ludzie posługujący się tym narzędziem” (Stefanowicz, 2011, s. 57). W związku z tym politycy w dalszym ciągu będą poszukiwać nowych rodzajów wykorzystania przestrzeni internetowej.

Jednym z najnowszych rozwiązań zastosowanych przez polityków do komunikacji z wyborcami jest aplikacja mobilna „Jaśmina” ruchu Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni. Założenie tej aplikacji umożliwia przygotowanie za pomocą tworzonych ankiet, sondaży, mini referendów, programu partii. Prawo do brania udziału w głosowaniach mają wyłącznie członkowie stowarzyszenia (*Pierwsze głosowanie*, 2021). Dyskusje prowadzone na portalu mogą być wsparciem dla polityków, jako element ułatwiający podejmowanie decyzji. Z założenia sama idea może wydawać się słuszna, gdyż tworzy narzędzia umożliwiające społeczeństwu prawo do aktywnego współdecydowania w kluczowych kwestiach. Ze względu na pewną innowacyjność, a także dostrzegalny „powiew świeżości”, zdobyła uznanie wśród użytkowników. Należy przypuszczać, że dopóki stowarzyszenie nie zostanie przekształcone w pełnoprawną partię, efekty podejmowanych decyzji będą nieznaczne w kontekście dążenia do podjęcia zmian.

Wykorzystanie mediów społecznościowych w procesach politycznych dostarcza politykom szerokiego spektrum nowych rozwiązań, co przyczynia się do odejścia od tradycyjnych kampanii. Od dawna agitacja wyborcza bazowała na bezpośrednim pozyskiwaniu elektoratu i zwolenników. Warto przywołać popularną kampanię *door-to-door* (od drzwi do drzwi), którą często stosowano, zanim rozpowszechniły się środki masowego przekazu. Bazowała ona na bezpośrednim kontakcie polityka z wyborcą w jego domu, co dawało sposobność do przybliżenia zarówno programu wyborczego, jak i sylwetki kandydata (Łukasik-Turecka, 2016, s. 181–182). Trudno jednoznacznie ocenić tę formę kampanii, gdyż z jednej strony pozwala ona na wykształcenie się silniejszej więzi między kandydatem, a potencjalnym wyborcą. Co więcej, umożliwiała społeczeństwu informowanie polityka o występujących bieżących problemach oraz nastrojach. Dzięki zdobytej w ten sposób wiedzy kandydat bądź przedstawiciel władz mógł podjąć odpowiednie działania niwelujące trudności. Z drugiej zaś strony metoda *door-to-door* była czasochłonna i wymagała znacznego zaangażowania, a jej używanie uwarunkowane było zbliżającymi się wyborami. Obecnie nie można jednoznacznie wskazać na całkowite zaprzestanie wykorzystywania opisywanej metody *door-to-door*. Współczesne kampanie, szczególnie

lokalne, samorządowym, zdają się mieć wymiar hybrydowy, co polega na podejmowaniu działań w przestrzeni wirtualnej oraz rzeczywistej.

W związku z wynikającymi zmianami w rozwoju komunikacji, badacze zjawiska wyodrębnili pojęcie „elektronicznej demokracji”, na którą znaczny wpływ mają wszelkie nowe rozwiązania technologiczne. „«Nowe technologie» mają moc demokratyzacji – zmniejszają nierówności w relacjach między władzą a obywatelem, rządem a grupami społecznymi oraz grupami a ich członkami” (Tomaszewski, Mościcka, Jurkun, 2015, s. 22). Patrząc zatem holistycznie, nowe rozwiązania wpływają nie tylko na zmianę sposobu komunikowania czy prowadzenia kampanii, ale także na system demokracji jako taki, potęgując zarazem zjawisko partycypacji politycznej (Porębski, 2010, s. 164). Można zaryzykować stwierdzenie, że w świecie mediatyzacji polityk musi być medialny. Słusznie zauważa Krzysztof Marcinkiewicz, że „media mają możliwość odgrywania niezwykle istotnej roli w procesie rekrutacji i selekcji elity politycznej” (Górka, 2019, s. 41). Rzecz jasna, sama bezrefleksyjna obecność w mediach nie sprawi, że polityk czy ugrupowanie odniesie sukces. Współcześnie konieczna jest ściśle opracowana strategia PR-owo-marketingowa, która pozwoli spreparować odpowiedni przekaz transmitowany do użytkowników internetu czy social mediów (Matwiejczyk, 2020, s. 171–176).

Gwarantem udanej kampanii wyborczej jest skuteczna komunikacja zachodząca pomiędzy politykami reprezentującymi ugrupowania polityczne a elektoratem. Warto jednak zaznaczyć, że komunikowaniu sprzyjają określone warunki. Sytuacja polityczna oraz geopolityczna niejako determinuje występowanie debaty zachodzącej na linii rządzący–rządzeni. Reżim totalitarny czy autorytarny w sposób skuteczny uniemożliwiają proces komunikowania. Możemy zatem skonstatować, że warunkiem *sine qua non* komunikowania na płaszczyźnie politycznej jest zdolność i wola prowadzenia rozmowy oraz słuchania opinii, także tych nieprzychylnych (Frączek, 2010, s. 204–205).

Pojęcie „komunikacja” z łaciny *communicatio* tożsame jest z takimi określeniami jak „rozmowa” czy też „wymiana” (Frączek, 2012, s. 118). W rzeczy samej, w prawidłowo przebiegającym procesie komunikacji dochodzi do wymiany zarówno poglądów, myśli jak i stanowisk czy opinii. Taka fluktuacja poglądów między podmiotami, które uczestniczą w rzeczonym procesie, w dalszej perspektywie czasowej powinna wpływać na końcowy czy też pośredni efekt debaty. Debata, także ta polityczna, stanowi pewną formę procesu komunikacyjnego, ponieważ stymulują je i tworzą te same elementy. Należą do nich: nadawca, przekaz, kodowanie, kanał komunikatu, szum, odbiorca, dekodowanie, interpretacja i sprzężenie zwrotne (Kudra, 2014, s. 10–11). Stopniowe przenoszenie się debaty do świata wirtualnego, przy zastosowaniu nowych kanałów komunikacyjnych, wymusiło konieczność zaadaptowania się do nowych realiów powyższego schematu komunikacji.

Niewątpliwym atutem takiej formy komunikowania jest to, że nadawca przed wystosowaniem komunikatu ma możliwość przemyśleć jego treść, a także wielokrotnie i dowolnie ją modyfikować. Nadawca uzyskał zaś możliwość dostosowania przekazu do potrzeb zdefiniowanej grupy odbiorców. Social media umożliwiają twórcom profilu polityka bieżące monitorowanie statystyk i zasięgów przekazywanych informacji. Metodami, pozwalającymi na poznanie

preferencji czy profilowanie odbiorcy są segmentacja oraz mikrotargeting (Cichosz, Skrzypiński, 2014, s. 6–20), których wykorzystanie umożliwia analizowanie reakcji odbiorców treści i dostosowywanie przekazu tak, aby osiągać zamierzone cele. Powyższe działania stosuje się powszechnie podczas prowadzenia kampanii wyborczych, w celu skierowania jej do wcześniej targetowanej grupy nieprzekonanych. Odbiorcami treści mogą być osoby w różnym wieku czy z odmiennym poziomem wykształcenia.

Nasuwa się przykład zachowania Rafała Trzaskowskiego podczas kampanii prezydenckiej z 2020 roku. Na podstawie obserwacji zauważa się, że mimo pozytywnego odbioru kampanii, nie korespondowała ona w pełni z oczekiwaniami elektoratu z mniejszych miast i wsi. Wizerunek wyżej wspomnianego polityka tworzony był dzięki ukazywaniu osoby światowej, wykształconego poliglota. Sprawilo to jednak, że niektórzy potencjalni wyborcy zrezygnowali z oddania głosu na Trzaskowskiego, ponieważ nie mogli się z nim utożsamiać. Znajduje to odzwierciedlenie w uzyskanych wynikach, które przedstawiają, że Andrzej Duda pokonał swego rywala na wsiach, uzyskując wśród tego elektoratu 54,7% głosów (Michalak, 2020). Jak zauważa Łukasz Lipiński:

Trzaskowski zwyciężał wśród uczniów i studentów (70,3 proc.), przedsiębiorców (66,9 proc.), menedżerów i specjalistów (68,1 proc.), wygrał też u urzędników i pracowników usług (56,2 proc.). Duda zgarnął ponad cztery piąte głosów rolników (81 proc.), zwyciężył wśród robotników (65,9 proc.), bezrobotnych (65 proc.), emerytów i rencistów (63,4 proc.) (Lipiński, 2020).

Niepodważalną zaletą internetu, w tym mediów społecznościowych, jest umożliwienie przekazu informacji w czasie rzeczywistym, z dowolnego miejsca. Dzięki temu politycy są w stanie przekazywać aktualne i bieżące treści, informować o swoich poczynaniach, a także komentować na bieżąco zachowania innych aktorów sceny politycznej. Przestrzeń internetu umożliwia skonfrontowanie własnych opinii na określone tematy, agitowanie czy pozyskiwanie coraz to nowych odbiorców, zwolenników, a przede wszystkim poznawanie nastrojów społecznych. Warto zauważyć, że wielu polityków aktywizuje się w przestrzeni wirtualnej jedynie w trakcie prowadzenia kampanii politycznej. Wszelkie wydarzenia, w których uczestniczy polityk, np. wiece poparcia, lokalne święta, stanowią w pewnym stopniu idealny moment dla korzystnego przedstawienia swojego wizerunku. Zaplanowane funkcjonowanie w internecie diametralnie różni się od aktywności związanych z organizowaniem wieców poparcia. Podczas bezpośrednich interakcji, wielu zdarzeń nie sposób przewidzieć, gdyż sytuacja jest dynamiczna i wiele dzieje się *ad hoc*. Często to właśnie kontakt bezpośredni weryfikuje obycie, erudycję i wszechstronne podejście polityka, ponieważ w sytuacji stresowej musi on odpowiadać na kierowane do niego, nieznane wcześniej pytania (Górka, 2019, s. 85–97). Mimo powyższych niewątpliwych możliwości, niektórzy politycy nie wykazują wystarczającego zaangażowania lub zrozumienia dla funkcjonowania mediów społecznościowych. Przykładem niekompetencji w działaniach podejmowanych w mediach społecznościowych może być brak systematyczności publikowania treści przez niektórych polityków (Diec, 2015, s. 82). Można zaobserwować, że większą aktywnością i skutecznością wykazują się młodszy politycy, którzy zdaje się lepiej rozumieją funkcjonowanie social

mediów. Innym argumentem jest nawiązywanie interakcji przez polityka ze swoimi odbiorcami, do czego zwykle dochodzi w sekcji komentarzy. Jeśli więc założymy, że celem aktywności polityka w mediach jest udoskonalenie procesu komunikacji z odbiorcą, a nie podejmowanie przez niego wymaganej interakcji, możemy odczytywać to jako fiasko takiej formy aktywności.

Warto zwrócić uwagę, że coraz częstszym zjawiskiem jest powierzanie prowadzenia profili polityków wyspecjalizowanym podmiotom. Wynika to często z braku umiejętności wyżej wspomnianych do prowadzenia własnych profili, a także z pojawiania się coraz nowszych rozwiązań stosowanych w planowanej kampanii PR-owej. Każda aktywność polityka, również ta w mediach społecznościowych, podlega ocenie zarówno ze strony internautów, jak i innych polityków, którzy wykorzystują wpadki oponentów dla własnych korzyści (zob. szerz. Borowicz, 2010, s. 125–137). Powyższe rozważania prowadzą do jednoznacznej konstatacji – internet nie wybacza błędów, a także ich nie zapomina, dlatego istotne jest podejmowanie roztropnych i przemyślanych działań (Leszczuk-Fiedziukiewicz, 2011, s. 42–44). Jednym z kluczowych elementów, który umożliwia skuteczniejszą komunikację jest szybkość nawiązywania interakcji. Internet daje ponadto swoim użytkownikom złudne poczucie anonimowości, przez co można dostrzec, że chętniej wchodzi się w polemikę i interakcję na różnych forach (Marczyk, 2018, s. 59–62). Często miejscem takich dysput stają się media społecznościowe, na których zwolennicy lub przeciwni danego polityka czy ugrupowania mogą wyrażać i konfrontować swoje opinie.

## Internet a występowanie nowych zjawisk w debacie publicznej

Kluczowym elementem efektywnej i jakościowej debaty inicjowanej przez polityków powinna być argumentacja. „W trakcie dyskursu dochodzi do uznania racjonalnej argumentacji, gdyż wysuwając roszczenie ważnościowe, podmiot wygłasza twierdzenia prawdziwe, formułowane szczerze i właściwie w danej sytuacji” (Grzelka, 2010, s. 44). Zasady funkcjonowania i komunikowania w przestrzeni wirtualnej sprawiają, że często zapomina się o znaczeniu argumentacji dla jakości narracji. Wielość pojawiających się w internecie treści, a także łatwość interakcji skłania do tworzenia komunikatów pod wpływem konkretnego stymulanta – bodźca czy silnego impulsu, stąd tak istotne jest konfrontowanie internetowych treści oraz sprawdzanie ich wiarygodności (Martens, 2012, s. 20–21).

W ostatnich kilku latach zwraca się szczególną uwagę na szerzące się zjawisko propagowania fałszywych informacji, co określa się angielskim zwrotem *fake news*. Zgodnie z definicją Słownika Języka Polskiego PWN jest to neologizm określający „nieprawdziwe, fałszywe wiadomości, najczęściej rozpowszechniane przez tabloidy w celu wywołania sensacji bądź zniesławienia kogoś (najczęściej polityka)” ([sjp.pwn.pl](http://sjp.pwn.pl)). Istotą pojęcia stanowi szeroko rozumiana dezinformacja oraz stosowana półprawda, gdyż *fake news* nie jest całkowicie nieprawdziwym komunikatem (Bąkiewicz, 2020, s. 75–79). Cele tworzenia fałszywych informacji mogą być zróżnicowane. Część z nich jest motywowana żartem bądź satyrą. Z kolei inne mogą wynikać z chęci manipulacji czy szerzenia propagandy, co w konsekwencji może przyczynić się do niszczenia



procesów demokratycznych. W opracowaniu Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji zwracana jest uwaga, że termin:

służy do określania treści „niewygodnych”, rozpowszechnianych przez oponentów w sporze politycznym. Wydaje się więc, że termin ten jest mylący i nieadekwatny do prawidłowego opisu sytuacji manipulowania informacją w nowym środowisku mediów (Fake News, 2020, s. 7).

Fenomen dezinformacji oraz zakłamywania rzeczywistości na znacznej sile przybrał wraz z rozwojem internetu i social mediów, gdzie zakorzenił się jako ich permanentny element (Łódzki, 2017, s. 21). Nie da się zaprzeczyć, że prędkość rozprzestrzeniania się fake newsów rośnie w zawrotnym tempie. Związane jest to często z pojawiającą się nadinterpretacją, brakiem weryfikacji dostępnych źródeł i podanych treści, powodując przy tym wprowadzenie opinii publicznej w błąd (Fake News, 2017, s. 3–8). Jak zwraca uwagę Katarzyna Bąkowicz: „wiara w treści przekazywane przez media może także być oparta na autorytecie autora przekazu” (Bąkowicz, 2019, s. 9). Świadczy to o tym, że odbiorcy wierzą w wiarygodność podawanych komunikatów oraz profesjonalność i rzetelność nadawców. W związku z czym, treść zasadniczo wydaje się autentyczna dla odbiorców. Na podstawie raportu Krytyczny Umysł można jednocześnie zauważyć, że występujące fake newsy w 76% dotyczyły tematyki politycznej. Respondenci dostrzegali, że to politycy najczęściej rozprzestrzeczali fałszywe informacje (56%), w następnej kolejności media (42%) oraz dziennikarze (39%) (Krytyczny Umysł, 2019, s. 12). Kolejnym niepożądanym zjawiskiem, pośrednio stanowiącym zagrożenie dla jakości komunikacji między politykiem a społeczeństwem jest mowa nienawiści. Zgodnie z definicją Komitetu Ministrów Rady Europy mowa nienawiści (*hate speech*) to:

obejmujący wszelkie formy wypowiedzi, które szerzą, podżegają, promują lub usprawiedliwiają nienawiść rasową, ksenofobię, antysemityzm lub inne formy nienawiści opartej na nietolerancji, w tym: nietolerancja wyrażająca się agresywnym nacjonalizmem i etnocentryzmem, dyskryminacją i wrogością wobec mniejszości, imigrantów i osób pochodzenia imigracyjnego (Rekomendacja, 1997).

To niekorzystne zjawisko stało się na tyle powszechne, że zakorzeniło się także w internecie oraz w mediach społecznościowych. Mowę nienawiści często utożsamia się z hejtem (*hate* – nienawidzić), choć niektórzy badacze zjawiska zwracają uwagę, że hejt występuje głównie w przestrzeni internetowej (Garwol, 2016, s. 305). Co więcej Monika Mazur-Rafał zaznacza, że „jedno zdanie może zawierać jednocześnie hejt i mowę nienawiści, dlatego czasami ciężko je rozróżnić” (Górski, Mazur, 2019). Kluczowym czynnikiem wpływającym na tworzenie hejtu są niewątpliwie emocje. Polityk, jak każdy użytkownik sieci, jest narażony na stały przypływ skrajnych odczuć, zarówno pozytywnych, jak i negatywnych. Niestety nieunikniony jest ciągły rozwój i potęgowanie występowania tego fenomenu, czego jedną z przyczyn jest stale utrzymujące się ciche przyzwolenie ze strony polityków oraz społeczeństwa. Politycy, których zwykło się określać mianem elity bądź autorytetu powinni stanowić przykład dla społeczeństwa. Łamanie przez nich pewnych norm etycznych oraz przyjętych konwenansów daje niepisane przyzwolenie

obywatelom na podobne, niepożądane zachowania. W związku z tym występowanie opisywanych zjawisk wpływa na znaczne obniżenie poziomu debaty publicznej.

Warto zwrócić uwagę na przykład zachowania Krystyny Pawłowicz – obecnej sędzi Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ówczesnej polityk, posłanki Prawa i Sprawiedliwości w latach 2011–2019. Niezaprzeczalnie K. Pawłowicz jest kontrowersyjną postacią w mediach społecznościowych. Mimo jednak często nieprofesjonalnych zachowań, wciąż można zauważyć niemalejącą grupę ją obserwujących (Twitter 70,9 tys.). W związku z często wykorzystywanym, nieodpowiednim językiem wypowiedzi, stosowanym hejtem, w latach 2012–2018 była posłanka wielokrotnie otrzymywała nagany oraz upomnienia od Komisji Etyki Poselskiej (wprost.pl). W swoich uzasadnieniach Komisja powoływała się m.in. na art. 6. uchwały Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 17 lipca 1998 roku – Zasady Etyki Poselskiej (M.P. z 1998 r., nr 24 poz. 338), na podstawie którego stwierdzono, że Krystyna Pawłowicz „naruszała dbałość o dobre imię Sejmu” (Uchwała nr 41/VIII Komisji Etyki Poselskiej z 3.10.2018 r.). Krystyna Pawłowicz jest aktywna w mediach społecznościowych, jednak sposób prowadzonych rozmów nosi znamiona propagowania mowy nienawiści. Gdy Pawłowicz nie zgadza się z internautami niejednokrotnie usuwa komentarze lub blokuje rozmówców. Warto zwrócić uwagę, że przeciętny internauta, próbujący zachować neutralne podejście, przez powyższe zachowania może utracić zaufanie zarówno do przekazywanych treści, jak i postawy i motywacji polityka. W powyższym przykładzie można zauważyć ponadto zjawisko budowania stale napędzającej się „machiny hejtu”, mowy nienawiści, gdyż zazwyczaj odbiorca komunikatu przyjmuje zachowania tożsame z postępowaniem nadawcy treści (Osiński, 2018, s. 59–74). Implikuje to pejoratywne bodźce do ludzkiej podświadomości odnośnie do polityki jak i polityków.

## Charakterystyka działań polityków w mediach internetowych

Jak już wspomniano, media społecznościowe zrewolucjonizowały komunikację polityczną, dzięki której została ona wyniesiona na inny poziom. Do najpowszechniejszych social mediów występujących w Polsce zaliczyć można: Facebook, Instagram, Tik Tok, Twitter. Wraz z upływem czasu, politycy przystąpili do coraz głębszej i szerszej eksploracji tych mediów, a użytkownicy stają się bardziej świadomi w ich obsłudze (whysosocial.pl). Należy zaznaczyć, że każde z nich ze względu na swą specyfikę, daje użytkownikom zróżnicowane narzędzia. Zauważa się, że politycy, którzy zamieszczają treści na Facebooku kładą nacisk na merytoryczne posty. Zamieszczony komunikat pozostaje zwykle neutralny, a jego głównym celem jest przekazanie skonkretyzowanych informacji. Posty tego typu często zamieszczane są w związku z jakimś szczególnym wydarzeniem (np. sprawozdanie z dodanymi nagraniami, zdjęciami) z aktywności polityka (Haława, 2013, s. 121–122). Jeśli zaś chodzi o Instagram, jest to aplikacja, w której polityk także ma możliwość relacjonowania swoich działań, lecz w innej formie – umieszczając fotografie i krótkie formy opisowe. Warto zwrócić uwagę, że Instagram daje niekiedy więcej funkcji umożliwiających politykowi nawiązywanie interakcji z odbiorcami, co dotyczy tworzenia angażujących użytkowników ankiet, sond oraz zamieszczania możliwości zadawania pytań

i wpisywania odpowiedzi (Frier, 2020, s. 13–18). Tik Tok to stosunkowo nowa forma komunikacji ze społeczeństwem, ale wciąż nie jest na tyle popularną aplikacją wśród polityków jak wcześniej wymienione. Jedną z możliwych przyczyn takiego stanu rzeczy może być pozornie młodsza grupa odbiorców, jednak wciąż brakuje konkretnych i rzetelnych statystyk. Należy zaznaczyć, że Tik Tok wciąż zyskuje coraz szersze grono zwolenników w każdej grupie wiekowej. Za pomocą aplikacji stworzono miejsce pozbawione sztywnych, instytucjonalnych ram, poza które niektórzy politycy nie chcą wychodzić. Funkcjonowanie Twittera bazuje na krótkich, bieżących treściach opartych na mikroblogu. Taka skondensowana forma sprawia, że niektórzy politycy często umieszczają kontrowersyjne treści po to, by przyciągnąć uwagę odbiorców. Jak komentuje Lidia Rudzińska:

tweety osób publicznych bywają niecenzuralne, osobiste lub niezgodne z ich oficjalnymi, publikowanymi w mediach stanowiskami. Intymna atmosfera i wolność wypowiedzi panująca na mikroblogu jest jednak jedynie pozorem, publikujący są bowiem pod ciągłą obserwacją innych mediów (swps.pl Rudzińska).

Raport z ogólnoeuropejskiego badania firmy analitycznej Grayling dostarcza wielu informacji na temat specyfiki korzystania z social mediów przez polityków. W części raportu poświęconej Polsce zauważa się, że to politycy Koalicji Obywatelskiej, wedle danych na rok 2020, wykazali się największą aktywnością na wszystkich platformach. Aczkolwiek:

na samym Facebooku, pomimo nieco wyższej liczby postów polityków Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (37 342) niż Koalicji Obywatelskiej (33 894), posty KO wygenerowały aż o 70% więcej wyświetleń i prawie 2,5 razy więcej zaangażowania ze strony śledzących (Grayling.com).

Przyglądając się wskaźnikowi zaangażowania, na Facebooku, należy zwrócić uwagę, że liderem w tym aspekcie pozostawała Lewica, z kolei na Twitterze – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. Jeśli chodzi o Instagram, PiS wykazał się najniższym zaangażowaniem spośród wymienionych.

Przeprowadzona analiza liczby polubień i obserwacji profili na Facebooku polityków kandydujących na urząd Prezydenta RP w 2020 roku, pozwala zauważyć pewne trendy wpływające na sympatie elektoratu (Facebook.com). Zgodnie z danymi na grudzień 2021 roku najwięcej obserwujących zgromadził Szymon Hołownia (1 051 964). Na drugim miejscu uplasował się Andrzej Duda (784 685), a na trzecim Rafał Trzaskowski (743 228). Robert Biedroń z kolei pozyskał 636 303 obserwujących, wyprzedzając Krzysztofa Bosaka z 356 046 followersami. Znacznie mniejsze grono uzyskali Marek Jakubiak (167 329), Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz (115 022), Paweł Tanajno (56 264), Stanisław Żółtek (33 392), Mirosław Piotrowski (5800), Waldemar Witkowski (2410).

Analiza kont wybranych polityków na Twitterze z grudnia 2021 roku pozwala dostrzec, że najwięcej followersów zgromadził Andrzej Duda (1,3 mln). Na drugim miejscu uplasował się Rafał Trzaskowski z 582,9 tys. obserwującymi. Następne pozycje zajmowali kolejno: Robert Biedroń (387,6 tys.), Krzysztof Bosak (271,5 tys.), Szymon Hołownia (203,7 tys.), Władysław

Kosiniak-Kamysz (163,7 tys.), Marek Jakubiak (79,3 tys.), Stanisław Żółtek (11,1 tys.), Mirosław Piotrowski (5354), Paweł Tanajno (3312), Waldemar Witkowski (864) (Twitter.com).

Przechodząc do Instagrama, wybrane konta na grudzień 2021 roku prezentują się następująco: Rafał Trzaskowski (379 tys.), Robert Biedroń (364 tys.), Szymon Hołownia (311 tys.), Krzysztof Bosak (135 tys.), Andrzej Duda (105 tys.), Marek Jakubiak (15 tys.), Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz (10,8 tys.), Stanisław Żółtek (5633), Paweł Tanajno (4885), Waldemar Witkowski (1100) (Instagram.com).

Powyższe zestawienie uwypukla, że funkcjonowanie polityka na różnych platformach nie jest równomierne, a samo zainteresowanie generowanymi treściami nie rozkłada się proporcjonalnie. Może wynikać to z odmiennej specyfiki prowadzenia kont na wybranych social mediach. Politycy, którzy zgromadzili znacznie mniejsze grono odbiorców (tj. Jakubiak, Żółtek, Piotrowski, Tanajno, Witkowski) nie reprezentują kluczowych, ugruntowanych partii politycznych z silną reprezentacją w polskim parlamencie. Niezaprzeczalnie więc liczba obserwujących profile w social mediach przekłada się na popularność samych polityków w świecie rzeczywistym. Przykład Szymona Hołowni ukazuje, że zgromadzenie szerokiego grona obserwatorów jest wykonalne w relatywnie krótkim czasie. Co więcej, można przypuszczać, że wynika to zarówno ciekawości wobec nowej sylwetki polityka, jak i odmiennego charakteru kreowania narracji na scenie politycznej.

## Podsumowanie

Internet wpływa na jakość debaty publicznej, przebieg i skuteczność kampanii wyborczej czy politycznej oraz sposób funkcjonowania polityka. Nowe media w istotnym stopniu kształtują scenę polityczną. Są potężnym narzędziem w rękach polityków, a wykorzystywane w odpowiedni sposób mogą przynieść zamierzone, pozytywne skutki. Nieumiejętne budowanie wizerunku polityka na portalach społecznościowych może przysporzyć więcej szkód niż pożytku.

Spójna strategia, ciągły kontakt z wyborcami w internecie przyczynia się do utrwalenia w odbiorcach pozytywnego wizerunku. Szeroko zakrojona działalność polityczno-marketingowa – PR-owa w mediach sprawia, że dany polityk (bądź ugrupowanie) staje się bardziej wiarygodny dla odbiorcy tych komunikatów.

Największą dostrzegalną wadą wykorzystywania social mediów jest coraz częściej występująca wadliwa komunikacja. Nieuchronnie prowadzi to do obniżenia poziomu i jakości debaty publicznej, czego efektem jest to, że adresat komunikatów odbiera nieodpowiednie wzorce zachowań otrzymywane od polityków, a także staje się coraz bardziej zniechęcony i zobojętniały na kwestie polityczne.

Nie da się zaprzeczyć, że przez wielość pojawiających się treści, coraz częściej odbiorcy, a także sami politycy powinni weryfikować otrzymywane informacje. Pomimo wielu możliwości jakie daje internet, można zwrócić uwagę na coraz liczniejsze zagrożenia, jakimi są fake newsy czy inne próby manipulacji odbiorcą. Należy pamiętać, że politycy chcący jak najlepiej

wypaść w oczach potencjalnego elektoratu, będą skłonni częściej posługiwać się kłamstwem lub półprawdą.

W celu poprawy jakości debaty, konieczne zdaje się być podjęcie próby silniejszego kontrolowania treści publikowanych w internecie. Niezwykle istotną rolę powinna odgrywać selekcja informacji, co przyczyniłoby się do zminimalizowania ryzyka rozszerzania zjawiska fake newsów. Równie ważne powinno być budowanie autentyczności przekazów stosowanych przez polityków, co w dalszej perspektywie mogłoby zaowocować poprawą zachowań prezentowanych w internecie. Co więcej, rozważny dobór treści może przyczynić się do zwalczania przypadków mowy nienawiści.

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# Wpływ ograniczeń sanitarnych COVID-19 na funkcjonowanie instytucji kultury w Polsce

JAROSŁAW JURKIEWICZ

MGR

ORCID: 0000-0001-8343-774x

Biurowie Komunikacji Społecznej Politechniki Koszalińskiej

e-mail: jaroslaw.jurkiewicz@tu.koszalin.pl

**Słowa kluczowe:** sektor kultury, instytucje kultury, pandemia COVID-19, ograniczenia działalności kulturalnej, działania pomocowe

## Abstrakt

Wprowadzone w I kwartale 2020 roku działania zapobiegawcze, których celem było zminimalizowanie skutków pandemii COVID-19, spowodowały ograniczenia w funkcjonowaniu sektora kultury w wielu rejonach świata. Obostrzenia sanitarne negatywnie wpłynęły również na kondycję sektora kultury w Polsce.

Celem artykułu jest próba ustalenia, jaki wpływ na funkcjonowanie sektora kultury w Polsce miały ograniczenia związane z pandemią COVID-19 w okresie od marca 2020 roku do końca pierwszej połowy 2021 roku. Temat ma istotne znaczenie ze względu na wciąż trwającą pandemię, konieczność dostosowania zasad funkcjonowania sektora kultury do zmienionej rzeczywistości, konieczność zbudowania nowych relacji z odbiorcą oferty kulturalnej. Pytanie badawcze brzmi – w jaki sposób sektor kultury przystosował się do warunków zmienionych przez COVID-19?

Autor skoncentrował się na wpływie obostrzeń na funkcjonowanie instytucji kultury, których działalność jest finansowana z budżetu państwa oraz z funduszy samorządów lokalnych. W artykule przedstawiono przegląd inicjatyw podjętych na szczeblu rządowym i samorządowym.

Realizując przyjęty cel, autor artykułu zastosował metodę krytycznej analizy literatury, wykorzystując dane wtórne Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego dotyczące działalności kulturalnej w Polsce. Wykorzystał też raporty przygotowane przez instytucje rządowe i analizy popularnonaukowe dotyczące wpływu pandemii na sytuację sektora kultury.

Z zaprezentowanych danych wynika, że większość instytucji kultury nie była przygotowana do funkcjonowania w trudnych, zmienionych przez pandemię warunkach. Część z nich – nie bez trudności – podjęła próbę dotarcia z ofertą do odbiorców poprzez przekaz online. Działania podjęte przez Ministerstwo Kultury, Dziedzictwa Narodowego i Sportu oraz przez samorządy lokalne zmierzały do zagwarantowania bezpieczeństwa finansowego instytucjom. Potrzebna jest jednak długofalowa polityka i zmiana formuły działania tych instytucji, tak by stały się bardziej efektywne i szybciej reagowały na zmiany otoczenia.

## Impact of the COVID-19 sanitary restrictions on the operation of the cultural institutions in Poland

**Keywords:** cultural sector, cultural institutions, COVID-19 pandemic, restrictions on cultural activities, relief efforts

**Abstract** Preventive measures introduced in 2020 in order to minimize the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in constraints put on the cultural sector in many parts of the world. Sanitary restrictions have also negatively affected the condition of the cultural sector in Poland.

The purpose of this article is an attempt to determine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on the operation of the cultural sector in Poland between March 2020 and the first half of 2021. The topic is important because of the continuity of the pandemic, the need to adapt the rules of the cultural sector to the changed reality, and the need to build a new relationship with the recipient of the cultural offer. The research question is how the cultural sector has adapted to the conditions changed by the COVID-19.

The author focused on the impact of restrictions on the functioning of cultural institutions whose activities are financed from the state budget and local government funds. The article provides an overview of initiatives undertaken at the state and local government level.

A method of critical analysis of literature was adopted, using the secondary data of the Central Statistical Office concerning cultural activity in Poland, reports of the government agencies, and popular scientific analyses of the impact of the pandemic on the cultural sector.

The results show that most cultural institutions were not prepared to function in the difficult conditions changed by the pandemic. Some of them – not without difficulties – have attempted to reach their audiences with their offer through an online message. The measures taken by the Ministry of Culture, National Heritage and Sports and by the local governments were aimed at guaranteeing the financial security of the institutions. What is needed, however, is a long-term policy and reformulation of these institutions to make them more effective and responsive to the changes in the environment.

## Wprowadzenie

Celem artykułu jest próba identyfikacji wpływu ograniczeń związanych z pandemią COVID-19 na funkcjonowanie sektora kultury. Autor skoncentrował się na sytuacji instytucji kultury w Polsce – jednej z form organizacji działalności kulturalnej. Powołując się na raporty międzynarodowe, uwzględnił też sytuację sektora kultury w krajach Unii Europejskiej.

Prezentując wpływ ograniczeń epidemicznych na sytuację instytucji kultury, autor wykorzystał publikowane w internecie raporty przygotowane przez instytucje rządowe i organy samorządu lokalnego. Przywołał akty prawne określające zasady organizowania i prowadzenia działalności kulturalnej, a także te, które dotyczyły wprowadzenia ograniczeń w organizacji przedsięwzięć kulturalnych. W celu prezentacji uregulowań dotyczących prowadzenia działalności kulturalnej dokonał analizy aktów normatywnych tworzonych przez organy prawne (posłużył się przy tym metodą analizy instytucjonalno-prawnej).

Autor wykorzystał dane wtórne Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego dotyczące sytuacji sektora kultury w okresie od 12 marca 2020 roku do końca czerwca 2021 roku, a także publikowane przez GUS informacje sygnałowe, które opracowano na podstawie sprawozdań przygotowywanych

przez podmioty zajmujące się działalnością kulturalną. Zaprezentował wdrożone w Polsce działania, których celem była pomoc instytucjom kultury: udzielanie dotacji, odroczenie zobowiązań czy rozwiązania o charakterze ochrony socjalnej. Przedstawił działania wdrożone zarówno przez instytucje państwowe (Ministerstwo Kultury, Dziedzictwa Narodowego i Sportu i jego agendy), jak i przez samorządy, a także organizacje i stowarzyszenia środowiskowe. Autor wskazał na potrzebę dyskusji na temat zmian w sektorze kultury, które wzmocnią ten sektor i uodpornią go na ewentualne kolejne sytuacje kryzysowe.

## Kultura – wspólna przestrzeń wartości i symboli

Kultura ma niewymierne społeczne znaczenie. Dostarcza emocji, wzruszeń, jest spoiwem, które łączy ludzi w krąg wspólnoty i nadaje wspólnocie sens. Dla jednych działalność kulturalna to obszar twórczości i pracy zawodowej, dla innych – odbiorców tej działalności – to sposób na poszerzenie horyzontów, przeżycie estetyczne, ale także sposób spędzania wolnego czasu.

Kultura pozwala społeczeństwu twórczo adaptować się do zmieniających się warunków (np. cyfryzacji). Ma też konkretny wymiar ekonomiczny i społeczny.

Według danych Eurostatu, w 2019 roku w krajach Unii Europejskiej sektor kultury zatrudniał 7,4 mln osób, co stanowiło 3,8% ogólnego zatrudnienia (Eurostat, 2019).

Sektor kultury w całej Europie boleśnie odczuł konsekwencje środków podjętych celem ograniczenia rozprzestrzeniania się pandemii COVID-19. Przekładano lub anulowano wydarzenia kulturalne i związane z nimi działania marketingowe i dystrybucyjne oraz trasy objazdowe. W samej tylko Francji kryzys dotknął 2 tys. kin, 3 tys. księgarń, 1,2 tys. muzeów, 1 tys. teatrów, wielu galerii sztuki, cyklicznych imprez, w tym festiwali i targów branżowych.

W raporcie instytucji niemieckiego rządu federalnego Kompetenzzentrum und Kreativwirtschaft zaprezentowano wpływ pandemii na różne sektory kultury Niemiec. Spadek obrotów w sektorze sztuk wizualnych oszacowano na 2 mld euro, w sektorze filmowym – na 3,4 mld euro, a w muzycznym na 2,5 mld euro. W raporcie podkreślono, że w niemieckim sektorze kultury zatrudnionych jest 1,7 mln osób, tylko 940 tys. osób korzystało z ochrony socjalnej (*Covid Impact*).

W pierwszym półroczu 2020 roku w porównaniu do podobnego okresu 2019 roku wydatki na rekreację i kulturę w gospodarkach krajów G7 znacznie się zmniejszyły – o 10% w Wielkiej Brytanii, o 7% w Niemczech, o 6% we Francji i o 5% we Włoszech (Wpływ pandemii).

Z raportu KEA European Affairs (międzynarodowy ośrodek badawczy zajmujący się monitorowaniem zjawisk w kulturze, sporcie, edukacji i zdrowiu) wynika, że kraje UE najczęściej oferowały następujące rodzaje wsparcia: udzielanie dotacji, odroczenie zobowiązań prawnych (podatków, czynszów), rozwiązania dotyczące ochrony socjalnej. Pomoc dotyczyła także osób działających w warunkach samozatrudnienia (w krajach UE 33% pracowników tego sektora działało na zasadzie samozatrudnienia, podczas gdy średnia dla całej gospodarki wynosi 14%) (*The impact*).

## Ograniczenia w działalności instytucji kultury w Polsce

W Polsce w tym czasie, w różnego rodzaju instytucjach kultury, organizacjach pozarządowych oraz przemyśle związanym z kulturą oraz kreatywnością pracowało ponad 300 tys. osób, czyli 2,5% wszystkich pracujących. Wkład kultury do PKB stanowi 3,5%, a więc niewiele mniej niż wnoszą sektory hotelarski i gastronomiczny, a wytwarzana wartość dodana to około 30 mld zł, czyli około 2% wartości dodanej w całej gospodarce (Życie regionów).

Rozwój sektora kultury stanowi siłę napędową dla rozwoju innych sektorów, w tym turystyki, hotelarstwa i gastronomii. Wpływa też na rozwój i upowszechnianie nowych technologii (gromadzenie, przesyłanie, udostępnianie i odtwarzanie filmów, utworów muzycznych, koncertów i spektakli). Tym większe znaczenie ma to, w jakim położeniu – wskutek pandemii COVID-19 – znalazła się branża kultury.

Działania zapobiegawcze, których celem było zminimalizowanie skutków zagrożenia epidemicznego spowodowały konieczność czasowego zawieszenia funkcjonowania działalności kultury. 12 marca 2020 roku w Polsce czasowo zamknięto instytucje kultury: filharmonie, opery, operetki, teatry, muzea, kina, domy kultury, biblioteki i galerie sztuki, ale też szkoły, uczelnie wyższe i placówki szkolnictwa artystycznego. Oznaczało to zawieszenie organizacji wydarzeń kulturalnych z udziałem publiczności, w tym koncertów, spektakli, wernisaży oraz wydarzeń specjalnych; zamknięcie muzeów dla zwiedzających, ograniczenie dostępności instytucji dla interesantów zewnętrznych oraz zawieszenie zajęć w placówkach szkolnictwa artystycznego wszystkich stopni (Komunikaty i zarządzenia).

W czerwcu 2020 roku ograniczenia zostały złagodzone. Na mocy Rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów z 19 czerwca 2020 roku ustalono wówczas m.in., że w salach koncertowych, kinach i amfiteatrach może być zajętych 50% miejsc (przy zachowaniu innych wymogów sanitarnych). Ale jesienią instytucje kultury znowu zamknięto (Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z 9.10.2020 r.). Taka sytuacja – z przerwą od 12 lutego do 20 marca 2021 roku, kiedy zniesiono część obostrzeń (Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z 11.02.2021 r.) – trwała do połowy maja 2021 roku.

Ograniczenia możliwości prowadzenia działalności i wiążąca się z tym niepewność co do warunków pracy, spowodowały negatywne skutki ekonomiczne zarówno dla instytucji kultury, jak i artystów, a także pracowników zaplecza scenicznego. Ze wstępnych informacji wynika, że bardziej dotkliwie niż branża kultury, skutki pandemii odczuła w Polsce tylko gastronomia i branża turystyczna. Wskazują na to m.in. wyniki badań dotyczących skutków ogłoszenia stanu epidemii i podjętych w jego ramach działań dla gospodarki gmin i powiatów województwa mazowieckiego, a także samorządów tego województwa (Mazovia 2.0).

## Wpływ pandemii na sytuację ekonomiczną instytucji kultury w Polsce

Od początku pandemii jej wpływ na funkcjonowanie sektora kultury badał Główny Urząd Statystyczny. GUS koncentrował swoją uwagę głównie na sytuacji instytucji kultury. W ustawie z 25 października 1991 roku o organizowaniu i prowadzeniu działalności kulturalnej pod tym

pojęciem wymienia się muzea, biblioteki, domy kultury, ale też teatry, opery, operetki, filharmonie, orkiestry, kina, instytucje filmowe oraz ośrodki badań i dokumentacji w różnych dziedzinach kultury (t.j. Dz.U. z 2020 r., poz. 194).

Instytucje kultury stanowią ważną część sektora kultury – według stanu na koniec 2020 roku pracowało w nich blisko 85 tys. osób, przy czym 88,3% z nich zatrudniały samorządowe instytucje kultury (pozostałe osoby pracowały w instytucjach państwowych). Ponad połowa instytucji kultury to podmioty niewielkie, zatrudniające mniej niż 10 osób.

Z informacji sygnalnych GUS wynika, że już pod koniec pierwszego kwartału 2020 roku ponad połowa samorządowych i państwowych instytucji kultury w Polsce odczuła skutki pandemii. Co czwarta z nich oszacowała, że przychody z działalności podstawowej spadły o 50–90%, a część oceniła spadek na więcej niż 90%. Następne fale pandemii i związane z tym obostrzenia powodowały pogłębianie się trudności.

W II kwartale 2020 roku z 4691 instytucji kultury zbadanych przez GUS 3047 (65%) doświadczyło negatywnych skutków pandemii. Negatywne skutki tylko niewiele częściej określane były przez instytucje kultury jako nieznaczne niż znaczne (odpowiednio 1554 i 1493). 59,1% szacowało skalę spadku przychodów z działalności gospodarczej w porównaniu z I kwartałem 2020 roku na poziomie poniżej 50%, ale 416 instytucji (przede wszystkim gminne samorządowe instytucje kultury) oceniło, że w ich przypadku spadek przekroczył 90% (Informacja sygnalna Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego „Wpływ pandemii COVID-19 na podmioty działające w obszarze kultury w II kwartale 2020 r.”).

W kolejnych kwartałach 2020 roku sytuacja nie uległa radykalnej zmianie. W III kwartale większość instytucji kultury (61,6%) wskazała, że doświadczyły negatywnych skutków pandemii COVID-19, przez m.in. spadek przychodów z działalności gospodarczej (Informacja sygnalna Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego „Wpływ pandemii COVID-19 na podmioty działające w obszarze kultury w III kwartale 2020 r.”).

W IV kwartale odsetek takich instytucji był wyższy i wyniósł niemal 65% (Informacja sygnalna Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego „Wpływ pandemii COVID-19 na podmioty działające w obszarze kultury w IV kwartale 2020 r.”).

W 2021 roku sytuacja uległa nieznacznej poprawie. W ciągu trzech pierwszych kwartałów 2021 roku przychody instytucji kultury wzrosły o 5,3% (w porównaniu z analogicznym okresem 2020 r.). W tym samym czasie jednak o 8,7% zmalały nakłady inwestycyjne.

## Działalność instytucji kultury w okresie pandemii

Pandemia COVID-19 skomplikowała system tworzenia i korzystania z kultury w Polsce. Naruszona została złożona struktura przychodów, wydatków, prowadzenia inwestycji, rozliczeń z kooperantami. Z zamknięcia wynikły negatywne skutki zarówno dla instytucji kultury, jak i dla artystów, twórców, pracowników zaplecza i osób współpracujących.

Przesunięcie czy odwołanie wydarzeń, brak możliwości udostępniania oferty kulturalnej (wystawy, księgozbiory) uniemożliwił kontakt z odbiorcą (widzem). Instytucje kultury

– w zależności od formatu działalności – w różny sposób odczuwały skutki kryzysu. W różny sposób także próbowały przystosować się do nowej sytuacji. Część z nich skupiła się na pracy wewnątrz organizacji. Część – nie bez trudności – podjęła próbę dotarcia z ofertą poprzez przekaz online. Opisuje to, przygotowany przez Narodowy Instytut Muzealnictwa i Ochrony Zbiorów, raport „Kultura w pandemii. Doświadczenie polskich instytucji kultury”, który oparto na badaniach ankietowych i fokusowych przeprowadzonych wśród przedstawicieli instytucji kultury. 59% ankietowanych wyraziło opinię o potrzebie inwestycji w płatne narzędzia pracy zdalnej, a 62% potwierdziło, że w ich instytucjach nie zainwestowano w taki sprzęt i narzędzia. Brakowało też odpowiednio przygotowanych kadr.

Skutki kryzysu odczuły m.in. biblioteki publiczne, które z dnia na dzień musiały zamknąć swoje obiekty dla czytelników. W pierwszym okresie część jednostek obsługiwała jedynie zwroty i wydawała rezerwacje w wyznaczonych punktach, a część świadczyła usługi, wykorzystując m.in. możliwości internetu (ograniczenia były uzależnione od aktualnej sytuacji epidemicznej). Z danych GUS wynika, że pod koniec 2020 roku biblioteki miały prawie 5 mln czytelników. W porównaniu do 2019 roku liczba czytelników spadła o 17,8%, a wypożyczeń o 24,5% (Informacja sygnałna Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego „Biblioteki publiczne w 2020 roku”).

Pandemia utrudniła funkcjonowanie muzeów. Jak podał GUS, najwięcej jednostek (47%) ograniczyło działalność w marcu 2020 roku, czyli w pierwszym miesiącu obowiązywania restrykcji.

W grudniu 2020 roku we współpracy z Narodowym Instytutem Muzealnictwa i Ochrony Zbiorów przeprowadzono badania ankietowe na grupie 53 instytucji muzealnych. Z badania wynika, że większość muzeów (75%) nie była przygotowana do realizacji zadań w okresie pandemii. Instytucje biorące udział w badaniu szacowały, że w 2020 roku liczba zwiedzających spadła w stosunku do poprzedniego roku średnio o 44%. Co drugie ankietowane muzeum rozwiązało umowy cywilnoprawne z edukatorami, dając im jednocześnie możliwość prowadzenia zajęć edukacyjnych online.

Muzea uruchomiły nowe kanały docierania do widzów, głównie na podstawie popularnych serwisów internetowych, dzięki czemu 40% z nich realizowało zajęcia online. Nie zmieniło to postaci rzeczy – ponad 90% muzeów biorących udział w badaniu uznało, że niezbędne jest opracowanie i wdrożenie planu pomocy dla instytucji kultury (Pasternak-Zabielska).

Trudności nie ominęły instytucji artystycznych prowadzących działalność kulturalną w ramach sezonów artystycznych: teatrów, oper, operetek, filharmonii. Spośród 194 takich placówek ponad połowa wprowadziła ograniczenia już w marcu 2020 roku.

Blisko 89% podmiotów udostępniło w trakcie pandemii przedstawienia przez internet. W 2020 roku widzowie mogli uczestniczyć online w 3943 koncertach i przedstawieniach. (Informacja sygnałna Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego „Działalność teatrów i instytucji muzycznych w 2020 roku”).

O ile warunki płacowe pracowników bibliotek czy muzeów nie uległy gwałtownemu pogorszeniu, o tyle zatrudnieni w instytucjach artystycznych przedstawiciele zawodów związanych ze sztukami scenicznymi (aktorzy, muzycy, tancerze, choreografowie, reżyserzy) znaleźli się

w bardzo trudnym położeniu. Wynagrodzenie większości z nich ma charakter honoraryjny (jest uzależnione od liczby spektakli, koncertów). Część osób pracujących w tych instytucjach (reżyserzy, dyrygenci) jest zatrudniana na podstawie umów cywilnoprawnych tylko na potrzeby przygotowania określonych wydarzeń artystycznych. Odwołanie tych wydarzeń pozbawiło te osoby dochodu.

W realizowanym na przełomie października i listopada 2020 roku badaniu, które zlecił Instytut Teatralny im. Zbigniewa Raszewskiego wzięło udział 749 artystów teatru z całej Polski. Aż 92% z nich wskazało, że pandemia wpłynęła negatywnie na poziom ich zarobków. Największa grupa badanych (32%) przyznała, że aby się utrzymać, musi korzystać ze wsparcia finansowego bliskich. Niemal co trzecia osoba (30%) zadeklarowała, że nie ma jakichkolwiek oszczędności, mniej więcej tyle samo badanych zadeklarowało, że ich oszczędności pozwoliłyby na przeżycie maksymalnie trzech miesięcy.

Pracownicy instytucji teatralnych w Polsce pod koniec 2020 roku ocenili swoją sytuację zawodową jako złą lub bardzo złą (ok. 70%). „Bardzo dobrze” postrzegało ją zaledwie 3–4% badanych w młodszych grupach wiekowych. W grupie powyżej 54. roku życia takiej odpowiedzi nie wskazała ani jedna osoba. Dodatkowo autorzy raportu zauważyli „wyraźny spadek liczby zawieranych umów”, co dotknęło przede wszystkim freelancerów – największa liczba rozwiązanych umów to właśnie umowy zlecenie (56%), umowy o dzieło (39%) oraz umowy kontraktowe (23%) (*Artyści w pandemii*).

## Pomoc z budżetu państwa dla instytucji kultury w Polsce

Od marca 2020 roku w Polsce wdrażane były różnorodne rozwiązania, które miały rekompensować straty poniesione w związku z zawieszeniem działalności sektora kultury. Działania miały różną formę – od programów wsparcia na szczeblu państwowym, przez projekty wdrażane na szczeblu samorządowym, po przedsięwzięcia zainicjowane przez organizacje branżowe i środowiskowe.

Minister kultury, dziedzictwa narodowego i sportu zadeklarował, że prowadzone lub współprowadzone przez resort instytucje kultury otrzymają dotacje na niezmiennym poziomie, a straty zostaną zrekompensowane. Ta deklaracja zagwarantowała instytucjom i zatrudnionym w nim osobom poczucie bezpieczeństwa. Zdaniem części ekspertów była to jednak decyzja demotywująca – nie skłaniała do inwencji i podjęcia wysiłku, odrywała instytucje od otaczającej rzeczywistości. Obnażyła przy tym słabości zarządzania instytucjami kultury (nieefektywność, brak powiązania nakładów z efektami działań).

Najważniejsze narzędzia wsparcia wdrożone na szczeblu państwowym to: Tarcza Antykryzysowa 4.0, Voucher dla Kultury, Fundusz Wsparcia Kultury, dotychczasowe programy dotacyjne ministra kultury oraz program „Kultura w sieci”.

Na szczeblu centralnym największym, z uwagi na budżet, programem był Fundusz Wsparcia Kultury. Budżet funduszu wyniósł 400 mln zł, pomoc trafiła do samorządowych instytucji kultury, organizacji pozarządowych i prywatnych przedsiębiorców prowadzących działalność



kulturalną w dziedzinie teatru, muzyki i tańca jako rekompensata przychodów utraconych w okresie od 12 marca do końca 2020 roku. Ponieważ minister kultury zadeklarował, że państwowe instytucje kultury otrzymają dotacje na niezmiennym poziomie, instytucje te nie mogły już ubiegać się o środki w ramach Funduszu Wsparcia Kultury. Realizacja tego programu wzbudziła wiele kontrowersji. Dyskusję wywołały kwoty wsparcia przyznane poszczególnym instytucjom i osobom. Po ogłoszeniu wyników naboru minister kultury, dziedzictwa narodowego i sportu wstrzymał wypłaty przyznanych środków. Operatorzy programu – Instytut Muzyki i Tańca oraz Instytut Teatralny – zweryfikowali wysokość dotacji (Sejm o rekompensatach).

Tarcza Antykryzysowa 4.0, jako drugie narzędzie wsparcia, pozwoliła instytucjom kultury – zarówno prowadzonym i współprowadzonym przez ministra kultury, dziedzictwa narodowego i sportu, jak i samorządowym – uzyskać wsparcie z Funduszu Gwarantowanych Świadczeń Pracowniczych na dofinansowanie wynagrodzenia pracowników objętych przestojem ekonomicznym albo obniżonym wymiarem czasu pracy w następstwie wystąpienia epidemii.

W kwietniu 2020 roku Ministerstwo Kultury, Dziedzictwa Narodowego i Sportu uruchomiło jednorazowy program o charakterze interwencyjnym „Kultura w sieci” przeznaczony dla działających online. Łączny budżet programu wyniósł 80 mln zł. Program był podzielony na dwie części. Pierwsza z nich, dotacyjna, była adresowana do instytucji kultury i podmiotów prywatnych (administrował nią Narodowy Instytut Kultury). Druga część, funkcjonująca jako program stypendialny, skierowana była do osób fizycznych (jej realizatorem było Ministerstwo Kultury, Dziedzictwa Narodowego i Sportu). Stypendia w wysokości 9 tys. zł otrzymało ponad 2200 twórców, artystów i teoretyków sztuki („Kultura w sieci”).

Wsparciem były też zmiany w dotychczasowych programach dotacyjnych ministra kultury, dziedzictwa narodowego i sportu. Budżet programów wzrósł o 55 mln zł. Modyfikacje polegały na dostosowaniu realizacji projektów do sytuacji wynikającej z ograniczeń sanitarnych (dofinansowanie działań realizowanych w pełni w przestrzeni wirtualnej oraz wiążąca się z tym zmiana regulacji dotyczących uznawania kosztów za koszty kwalifikowane). Okazało się jednak, że wiele instytucji kultury miało kłopot ze skorzystaniem z tego rodzaju wsparcia. Barięą była konieczność wniesienia wkładu własnego. Samorządy lokalne, które zazwyczaj finansowały wkład własny, wprowadziły bowiem oszczędności.

## Wsparcie udzielane przez samorządy lokalne

Trudności wynikające z pandemii COVID-19, z jakimi musiały zmierzyć się jednostki samorządu lokalnego, stały się powodem ograniczeń ponoszonych przez nie wydatków na działalność kulturalną. To ważne, tym bardziej, że większość wydatków publicznych przeznaczanych w Polsce na kulturę i ochronę dziedzictwa narodowego przypada właśnie na jednostki samorządu lokalnego.

Z informacji udostępnionych przez GUS wynika, że w 2020 roku wydatki z budżetów samorządu na kulturę i ochronę dziedzictwa narodowego wyniosły 8 mld 663 mln zł i zmniejszyły się w stosunku do poprzedniego roku o 6% (w 2019 r. wyniosły 9 mld 538 mln zł). Wobec



powyższego ich udział w wydatkach publicznych na kulturę i ochronę dziedzictwa narodowego wyniósł w 2020 roku 76,7% (w 2019 r. – 80%).

Dla porównania w tym samym czasie wydatki z budżetu państwa na ten sam cel wzrosły o 14,1% i wyniosły 2 mld 716 mln zł (w 2019 r. – 2 mld 380 mln zł), a ich udział w wydatkach publicznych na kulturę i ochronę dziedzictwa narodowego stanowił 23,3% (w 2019 r. – 20%).

Mimo trudności, samorządy lokalne reagowały na kryzys, który wywołała konieczność ograniczenia działalności sektora kultury. Część samorządów, wzorem władz rządowych, zadeklarowała utrzymanie poziomu finansowania instytucji kultury. Władze samorządowe Poznania, który jest organizatorem 15 instytucji kultury, zadeklarowały na przykład, że priorytetem działań wobec tych instytucji stanie się przede wszystkim zachowanie miejsc pracy (#poznanwspiera ludzi kultury).

Niektóre samorządy, chcąc lepiej poznać potrzeby sektora kultury, w tym działających w jego obrębie instytucji, przeprowadziły badania ankietowe. Już pod koniec marca 2020 roku badania przeprowadzono w Krakowie. Ponad połowa instytucji, organizacji i firm biorących udział w badaniu szacowała, że spadek przychodów przekroczył 75%. Jako najbardziej dotkliwą wskazywano konieczność odwołania wydarzeń kulturalnych, ale też trudności w kontynuacji działalności edukacyjnej oraz przerwanie współpracy sponsorskiej.

Podobne wyniki przyniósł raport z badań przeprowadzonych w kwietniu 2020 roku w Małopolsce przez Małopolski Instytut Kultury. 55% podmiotów obawiało się znaczącego lub całkowitego spadku przychodów z działalności, co dotyczyło głównie instytucji, organizacji i firm, dla których istotną częścią przychodów były opłaty od odbiorców i wpływy z biletów. W tej grupie znalazły się instytucje artystyczne, m.in. teatry i orkiestry stałe (filharmonie) (Ilczuk, 2020, s. 37).

Samorządy lokalne, głównie w dużych ośrodkach miejskich, stworzyły programy stypendialne, rezydencjalne, czy działań w sieci. Część samorządów zdecydowała się na zmniejszenie dotacji dla festiwali i dużych wydarzeń cyklicznych, wspierając elastyczne rozliczanie dotacji wieloletnich. Na szczeblu samorządowym wsparcie instytucji kultury było realizowane przez zintegrowaną promocję wydarzeń online w obrębie danej miejscowości. W Gdyni władze miasta uruchomiły program „Gdynska kultura łączy siły”. Urząd Miasta w Krakowie wraz z operatorem – Krakowskim Biurem Festiwalowym zainwestował w powstanie platformy VOD playkrakow.com. To jedna z pierwszych miejskich platform. Prezentowano na niej spektakle, festiwale i koncerty (Ilczuk, 2020, s. 37).

## Jaka przyszłość sektora kultury?

W obliczu kryzysu spowodowanego pandemią większość instytucji sprawujących funkcję organizatora działalności kulturalnej – państwo i samorządy lokalne – uznało instytucje kultury za strategiczny obszar, który powinien podlegać ochronie. Pandemia uruchomiła jednak dyskusję na temat potrzeby zmian instytucjonalnych i misji sektora kultury.

Dyskusję o tym, jakie mechanizmy trzeba zbudować, by wesprzeć proces budowania odporności sektora kultury, toczą przedstawiciele największych polskich miast. Od kwietnia 2021 roku, w ramach sieci Koalicja Miast, instytucje z siedmiu dużych polskich ośrodków miejskich realizują przedsięwzięcie pod nazwą *Badanie kryzysu i zmian w kulturze w czasie pandemii COVID-19, czyli kondycja kultury miejskiej w Gdańsku, Krakowie, Lublinie, Łodzi, Szczecinie, Warszawie i Wrocławiu, na przestrzeni lat 2020–2021*. Badanie podzielono na trzy etapy. Efektem będzie przygotowanie raportu „Koalicja miast. Kryzys i zmiana w kulturze. Studium porównawcze kultury ośrodków miejskich w dobie pandemii COVID-19”. Planowane jest udostępnienie zainteresowanym bazy danych powstałych w trakcie przedsięwzięcia (*Badanie kryzysu*).

Dyskusja o przyszłości kultury toczy się nie tylko w Polsce. Jak mówi prof. Andrew Thompson z Uniwersytetu w Oxfordzie – historyk i badacz procesów dotyczących globalizmu – życie w pandemii oznaczało taki niepokój, jaki znamy z filmów science-fiction, których zakończenia nikt nie umie przewidzieć. Ludzie pokonali jednak strach dzięki kulturze, w której można było uczestniczyć dzięki przekazowi online.

Naukowiec uważa, że niezwykle zapotrzebowanie na produkty kultury, które można było zaobserwować podczas pandemii, wskazuje na to, że to właśnie różnego rodzaju przemysł kreatywny, wsparty nowymi technologiami, może w przyszłości być motorem rozwoju. „Nauki biomedyczne zajmują się pierwotnymi, fizycznymi skutkami wirusa. Sektor kultury może pomóc w zwalczaniu jego skutków społecznych i ekonomicznych” – mówi naukowiec. I przewiduje, że kultura szybciej pokona kryzys niż inne dziedziny życia. Stanie się tak właśnie dlatego, że jej podstawą jest kreatywność. Decyzje dotyczące wydatków publicznych powinny, jego zdaniem, odzwierciedlać innowacyjny potencjał sektorów kreatywnych (Thompson).

## Podsumowanie

Pandemia COVID-19 uświadomiła rosnącą rolę ekonomiczną i społeczną sektora kultury, w tym działających w jego obrębie instytucji kultury. Unaoczniała równocześnie, jak wrażliwy jest ten sektor na zmiany warunków otoczenia społeczno-gospodarczego. Uświadomiła, że podstawą działalności związanej z upowszechnianiem kultury jest utrzymywanie relacji z odbiorcą (widzem, czytelnikiem, słuchaczem). Zaburzenie tych relacji utrudniło, a w niektórych sytuacjach uniemożliwiło prowadzenie działalności, stąd konieczność rozwoju alternatywnych form pracy – głównie udostępniania oferty w formule online, która znosi bariery i umożliwia szerszy kontakt z odbiorcą. Dodatkowo niezbędne są jednak inwestycje w sprzęt i szkolenia kadr.

Konieczne jest wprowadzenie rozwiązań organizacyjno-prawnych, które pozwolą ograniczyć wpływ nieoczekiwanych zmian na kondycję sektora i zatrudnionych w nim osób (wprowadzenie zabezpieczeń finansowych, ustanowienie zachęt do rozszerzania działalności kulturalnej w przestrzeni wirtualnej). Niezbędne jest także wprowadzenie regulacji socjalnych, szczególnie w przypadku tych osób, które pracują w systemie honoraryjnym lub są zatrudnione na podstawie umów cywilnoprawnych.

Pandemia uświadomiła równocześnie potrzebę dyskusji o finansowaniu państwowych i samorządowych instytucji kultury. Gospodarka finansowa oparta wyłącznie na dotacjach od organizatora daje duże poczucie bezpieczeństwa. Może jednak prowadzić do biurokratyzacji instytucji, a w konsekwencji – do obniżenia efektywności działania i braku kreatywności. W przypadku instytucji kultury zasadne wydaje się więc rozważanie wprowadzenia zmian organizacyjnych, chodzi m.in. o rozwiązania zachęcające do bardziej aktywnego poszukiwania źródeł finansowania działalności programowej i prowadzonych inwestycji. Skłoni to do urozmaicenia oferty programowej i zwiększenia efektywności działania instytucji, ale też do szukania alternatywnych sposobów dotarcia do odbiorcy.

Autor zamierza kontynuować badania dotyczące wpływu COVID-19 na kondycję instytucji kultury, koncentrując się na trwałych zmianach w tym sektorze, których wprowadzenie wymusiła pandemia. W tym celu zamierza wykorzystać badania ankietowe, które pozwolą ustalić, czy pandemia wywarła trwały wpływ na sytuację instytucji i zatrudnionych w nich osób i jakie zmiany wprowadzono, by instytucje kultury były w przyszłości przygotowane na wystąpienie takich utrudnień.

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## Cytowanie

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# Assessment of China's foreign aid for Cameroon in 2009-2020

POLYCAP MUDOH

M.A.

ORCID: 0000-0003-4643-4712

University of Szczecin

Institute of Political and Security Sciences

e-mail: polycap.mudoh@phd.usz.edu.pl

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## Abstract

The visit of Jia Quinglin from China to Cameroon in 1971 and the formal President's Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon return visit to China in 1973 started paving the way for Sino-Cameroon relations. Huge progress has been made towards advancing the cooperation of these two nations. This cooperation has had significant impact on both economies. China's relations with Cameroon have been more or less like an economic livewire to Cameroon, although it cannot be ruled out that it has also some drawbacks. Chinese presence in Cameroon has been growing and is concentrated in the private sector. Areas of Chinese presence include construction, agriculture, and medium size businesses. Cameroon has not only witnessed enormous increase of Chinese investment and presence, but also of Chinese foreign aid. China's foreign aid to Cameroon in the past years has been very much consistent and enormous. The main question here is what impact has this aid on Cameroon and Cameroonians? Cameroon is one of China's major partners in Africa and also a beneficiary of China's benevolent activities in Africa. China's foreign assistance has been gearing towards the development of the local economy. This paper, therefore, seeks to explore the contribution and impact of China's foreign aid on Cameroon in the period of 2009-2020.

## Introduction

The African continent is fast becoming a subject of global politics. This has manifested itself in the form of competition for natural resources and the establishment of military bases by the interested partners such as the European Union (EU), United States of America (USA), and People's Republic of China in the last decade. Competition between the US and the EU on the one hand and China on the other has become a source of conflict reflected in many civil wars visible on the continent. Snow (1988, cited in Stahl, 2018), stated that the European apprehension of China's presence and influence in Africa is a threat to Western supremacy and global

hegemony. A gooutandbuy policy, initiated by the Chinese policy makers, has its primary focus on the approach which has witnessed a Chinese oil resource corporation migrating to Africa, Central Asia, and South America to secure raw material supplies (IDE-JETRO, 2021). China this far has been able to establish itself as a major Official Development Assistance (ODA), due to its rapid economic growth. This role did not only bring China to a centre stage, but also has evoked fears in the minds of major donors. Some opinions have greatly criticised China's role in Africa which has been perceived as the new scramble for Africa (Stahl, 2018). Nevertheless, the western traditional donors might have decided to change their strategies and develop their ODA departments' foreign policies. The alarm which accompanies China's entry into Africa mirrors the Western countries' fears of China's position as a challenger in the world economy (Lönnqvist, 2008). However, this is contrary to what most leaders in presentday Africa thinks. Just as many African governments have consciously turn to China as a potential partner in national development and regime legitimacy, African citizens have increasingly reached out to China for useful resources for personal and business progression (Mohan, Lampert, 2013). Chief Mukuni, the Head of Leya tribe, believes that Zambia now have 73 tribes, with the addition of the Chinese. He went further to insist on removing visas for Chinese tourists during the dry season, concluding that "We don't care about the color of the money, we just want to boost our tourist industry" (Yoneva, 2017). Some areas of China's influence in Africa include development projects, technical cooperation, medical assistance, and debt relief, loans and financial aid. China's footprints in Africa are very glaring and cut across almost all the 54 states that make up the continent. China's Assistant foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong in 2018 stressed that "China's cooperation with Africa has no political strings attached. It is a boost to local economic and social development and economically viable and winwin in nature" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2018). The Beijing forum on China-Africa cooperation, held from 3<sup>rd</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> September 2018, produced two major outcomes: the Beijing Declaration, which is building an even closer and stronger China-Africa community with shared future, and the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) Beijing Action Plan for 2019-2021. The keynote address of President Xi Jinping of China, highlighted China's "Five-no" policies to Africa: 1) No interference in African pursuit of development paths that fit their national conditions, 2) no interference in their internal affairs, 3) no imposition of China's will on them, 4) no attachment of political strings to assistance, 5) and no seeking of selfish political gains in the investment and financing cooperation (Xinhuanet, 2018). In recent years, China has become one of Africa's biggest, if not the strongest, partner. This relationship has led to China pumping billions of dollars into the continent. African states have benefited hugely from China's funded development project. During the 2018 China-Africa Forum for Cooperation Summit, China announced it set aside US\$60 billion for the development of Africa, this as a means to strengthen the China-Africa relations (Tubel, 2018).

There are huge differences between Cameroon and China, ranging from geographical location, population size, language, and GDP. China is located in the Asian continent, while Cameroon in the Central Part of Africa. According to the 2019 World Bank Report, the total Chinese population is estimated at over 1.3 billion people, while the Cameroon's total population



at over 25 million. The same World Bank report put China's GDP at US\$14.28 trillion, while Cameroon was US\$39.67 billion (World Bank Report, 2019). Mandarin is the main language in China, Cameroon has English and French as official languages. However, these differences in sociopolitical, economic, and cultural structure did not in any way prohibit these nations to find a common ground of cooperation. Their cooperation dates as far back as March 1971, when the then Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference Jia Quinglin arrived in Yaounde, Cameroon, for a threeday official visit (People's Daily Online, 2010). In 1973, the former president of Cameroon Ahmadou Ahidjo visited China to meet with Mao Zedong, thus becoming the first African president to have ever visited China after the period of the most violent Cultural Revolution. Four years after this period, President Ahidjo returned to China to meet with Mao's successor Hua Guofeng (Bone, 2020). Between the 1970s and 1980s, several accords were signed between Cameroon and China which helped to solidify their cooperation in trade and cultural exchanges (Bone, 2020). The cooperation of these nations did not end even after the resignation of President Ahidjo in 1982. It has been extended and further strengthens under the the current President Paul Biya. In January 2007, the then Chinese President Hu Jintao paid an official visit to Cameroon during which bilateral cooperation was signed covering such areas as economy and technology, health, education, and telecommunications. Many fallouts have been recorded after he visited Cameroon, for example, during Hu visits the two nations concluded a 40 million Yuan (US\$5.15million) grant agreement and 30 million Yuan (US\$3.86 million) interest-free loan agreement for economic and technical cooperation. Furthermore, two concessional loans of Yuan 350 million (approx. US\$45.02 million) were granted to Cameroon (Musa, 2007). In 2008, the then China Minister of Culture Cai Wu's visited Cameroon and signed a cooperation agreement. The fallouts of his visit included in 2008 and 2010 the extension of planned implementation of the agreement with complementary items in the areas of culture, education, journalism, and other areas of possible exchange.

The aim of this study is to investigate the overall impact of China's foreign aid on Cameroon within a specific period from 2009-2020. According to Williams (2021), foreign aid is defined here as that international transfer of capital, goods or services that goes from one country or from one international organisation to the other for the benefits of the receiving country or its population. Williams went further to add that the aid can be military, economic or emergency humanitarian. In line with the foregoing overview of Cameroon and China relations that span over the years, this study is designed to:

- Examine perception of China's aid to Cameroon by the citizens,
- Assess whether China's foreign aid to Cameroon encourages local development in Cameroon.

These objectives lead to the following questions: 1) what are the effects of foreign relations with China, particularly in the domains of foreign aid to Cameroon? 2) What is the cost of the Chinese aid to Cameroon? 3) What conditions favour China's foreign aid to Cameroon? 4) How is this foreign aid implemented? 5) Does Chinese foreign aid encourage local development in Cameroon?

Even though the debate on China's influence in Africa has recently gained more attention, much is still to be done. Especially so, as little or no media and research attention has been paid to the impact of the China's foreign aid on Cameroon. The study of Sino-African cooperation has attracted some attention in Cameroon in recent years. Researchers studied its various aspects, for example, the economic cooperation between Cameroon and China, its infrastructure and investment projects in 2007-2018 (Mbajon, 2019), and impact of Chinese investment on Cameroon (Asongne, 2017). This topic is considered important and worth exploring due to its relevance for the development of Cameroon.

This paper is divided into six sections: Section one is the general introduction, it discusses China's interest in Cameroon, the scope and justification of the study. Section two offers review of selected literature and establishes the theoretical framework. Section three focuses on the sources and distribution of China's assistance to Cameroon. Section four examines the effect of China's foreign aid to Cameroon. Section five explains the methodology and, finally, Section six discusses research findings and conclusion.

## China's interest in Cameroon

Over the past years, China has developed interest in Cameroon. The question that keeps one wondering are the reasons of this interest in Cameroon. Cameroon-China relations are somehow similar to the relations China has with other African countries. China's interest in establishing strong relations with African nations can be attributed to the need of or the quest for natural resources, expansion of exports market, and achieving economic growth. According to Khan and Baye (2008), in spite of great differences in economic structure compared to China, Cameroon has a great deal to offer to China as far as natural resources and market for manufacturing products are concerned. Encouraged by the efforts Cameroon has been undertaking in the past years to improve on its business atmosphere, China urges its firms to take the advantage of the country's investments potential. Furthermore, China wants its impacts on Cameroon is felt there, taking into consideration the huge natural resources deposits that is present in this country. It has urged its investors also to get involved in areas like mining or petrochemical and energy development. China's Director for African and West Asian Affairs in the Ministry of Commerce, Dong Wand, stated that, even the experiences gathered from other parts of the world, his country is also very much interested in lowcost housing development in Cameroon (Cameroon Tribune, 2017). Cameroon's political atmosphere has proven to be relatively stable and therefore good for business. The International Monetary Fund had projected a 5.5% growth in Cameroon GDP in 2017. Cameroon has been working very hard to achieve this vision until 2035, setting the following particular goals: to reduce poverty to a minimal level, become a middleincome country, become a newly industrialised country, consolidate democracy and enhance national unity (Paper, n.d.).The challenges are immense and meeting them requires total and unwavering commitment and support from not only Cameroonians as a people, but also from external partners. Economic emergence, therefore, requires opening up to partners that are willing to support,



among which China has proven to be one of Cameroon's major partners. In order to invite more Chinese support to Cameroon, the Cameroonian authorities consider it their duty to provide comprehensive information on Cameroon's potential areas that need China's intervention. Also, the geopolitical location of Cameroon is seen as a major force to reckon with. It is located at the heart of the Gulf Guinea, through which access is granted to the other landlocked countries like Chad and the Central African Republic, facilitating the trade into the interior. During the Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis of 1995, when there was a leadup vote against China at the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR), this vote would have condemned China for the human rights abuse. A visit was made to Cameroon by a member of the Commission, the then Premier of China Li Lanqing, who influenced Cameroon to vote against this resolution. As a result, the resolution went through without holding China accountable for any violations of human rights (Bone, 2020). This favour is said to have well returned to Cameroon, with regard to Cameroon's ongoing Anglophone crisis<sup>1</sup> since 2016. Opinions hold it that China has strongly been on the defence wall, preventing the matter brought up in the UN Security Council.

## The scope and justification of the study

This study aims to investigate the overall impact of China's foreign aid on Cameroon. The researcher attempts to describe the compliance of the public to China's foreign aid to Cameroon, according to the needs and benefit of the population. This study was conducted specifically in Cameroon. Public opinion was sampled on the impact of China's foreign aid to Cameroon. The time period of 2009-2020 was chosen so as to achieve a balanced view on how successful China's foreign aid on Cameroon has been. This time period provides the respondents with an appropriate time to well understand any objectives the foreign aid was intended to serve. It also gives the respondents a very fresh recollection of their experiences with regard to any China's foreign assistance Cameroon had received this far.

## Literature review

In order to have an empirical understanding of China-Cameroon relations, this paper makes reference to some academic literature on China's foreign policy. Among the emerging donors, China is by far the most important provider of aid. Although the amount of development assistance provided by other rising powers is not yet very significant, they are starting to establish specific development cooperation structure (Stahl, 2018). The rise of China is indeed one of the many significant geopolitical realities in the world today. With its non-interference policy, it is also sending waves of influence in the developing world through cooperation in economy and infrastructure development and it is considered to be an alternative to the US hegemony

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<sup>1</sup> The conflict, referred to as the Cameroon Anglophone crisis, began in October 2016, when the lawyers and teachers in the English speaking regions (the Anglophone regions) of North-West and South took to the streets. This was the protest against the alleged government's intentions and efforts to systemically assimilate the two Anglophone regions, their legal and educational systems. The government responded to the protest with military force.

(Sultan & Sultan, 2018). African leaders have come to believe in the values of their cooperation with China which, according to them, will further promote China-Africa cooperation and will accelerate the realisation of sustainable development in African countries. They also believe that the belt and road initiative is closely linking Asia and Africa together, injecting new vitality to China-Africa cooperation and offering innovative solutions for global governance (Sike, 2018). As Africa is undergoing a new round of awakening, the emerging countries represented by China can serve as a key driving force. Also, China and Africa should jointly fight back against the discourse hegemony and ideological attacks from western countries. When it comes to the influence and effects of Africa-China cooperation on Africa development, no one knows them better than the African countries themselves (Li, 2014).

Despite China's growing presence in Africa, Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) into Africa account for only a small share both of China's total outward investment and of most African countries inward investment. Thus, in recent years, Chinese FDIs have been diversified towards manufacturing and other nonresource sector in order to enhance Africa's high-economic growth (Brautigam et al., 2018). The relationship between China and African countries is bilaterally consensual, economically motivated, and globally based on free market dictum. Thus, every significant power or economic force is dealing with China (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011) the debate on these relations has just begun within a global context. The discussion on the nature of South-South relations, especially between a newly emerging industrial country, located in Asia, and the African countries, which represent the least industrialized area of the world, has more recently brought the subject of the unequal balance of power between the two regions under intellectual scrutiny. Several intellectual debates on China-Africa relations have been mostly reactive in the sense that many analyses have focused on Africa's past relations with the Global North. The existing literature on these relations has, to a large extent, not sufficiently located the discourse within the existing dominant ideologies, namely neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism. It is also important to localize these relations within the World Trade Organization's dogmas and practices, the United Nations Charter, and African Union Charter in order to assess whether or not they can be characterized as either neo-imperialist or neo-liberal. Furthermore, it is important to identify on which specific areas these economic relations have generally focused and in which specific African countries they have been dominant. How do the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party perceive and define them? How do the African Union and specific African countries perceive and define these relations? And what are the policy implications in China and in the African public sectors? The main objective of this paper is, using the data and figures from Chinese sectoral investments and export-import of China and specific African countries to make a critical evaluative analysis of these relations and determine if they are qualified to be called neo-imperialist or neo-liberal. The article is both an empirically-based analysis and a reflection.

© 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.”;”author”:[{„dropping-particle”：“”,”family”：“Lumumba-Kasongo”,”given”：“Tukumbi”,”non-dropping-particle”：“”,”parse-names”：false,”suffix”：“-”}],”container-title”：“African and Asian Studies”,”id”：“ITEM-1”,”issue”：“2-3”,”issued”：{„date-parts”：[[„2011”]]},”number-of-pages”：“234-266”,”title”：“China-Africa relations:

A neo-imperialism or a neo-colonialism? A reflection”,”type”:”book”,”volume”:”10”},”uris”:[,http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=b896c109-8acf-4dca-986f-295aca4dc8d3”]],”mendeley”:{,formattedCitation”:”(Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011. The impact of BRI (Brazil, Russia, India) and China’s foreign aid should not be understated. Although often viewed as an initiative to simply promote economic prosperity, the BRI is also a vehicle for China to enhance people-to-people bonds, “win-win cooperation” and cultural exchange, all of which are financed and interlinked directly with China’s development cooperation (Lynch et al., 2020). Chinese finance has become an increasingly important source of capital for infrastructure projects in Africa. Despite decreasing over the past years, and falling below US\$9 billion in 2019 for the first time since 2010, Chinese finance will continue to be an important source of infrastructure finance for African countries (Acker, Brautigam, 2021). In a broader range of fields and on a deeper level, China-Africa cooperation has expanded with even richer connotation and delivered comprehensive economic and social benefits (Huang, 2018). China-Africa relations hold a lot of promises and benefits for both, for example Africa has to offer huge market and abundant mineral resources, while China brings in development assistance for critical infrastructure sectors, technology transfer, scholarships and cultural exchange (Zwanbin, 2020).

## Theoretical framework

In the course of this study, the researcher made use of two different theories deemed necessary for understanding the analysis of foreign policy between China and Cameroon. These include the theory of bilateralism and realism. Agreements signed between two countries are usually within specificities so that each party goes home equally satisfied. Over the years, there has been growing debate on the merit of bilateralism. The theory of bilateralism concerns relations between two nations. This theory is different from other theories, like multilateralism which concerns more than two nations, and unilateralism which concerns just one nation or party that acts on its own. Over the years, nations have been relating to each other through bilateral relations. The agreement between states recognises that each party has to send an ambassador, who establishes oneself in the capital city. For example, there is Chinese Embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon capital city, and Cameroon’s embassy established in Beijing, China’s capital city. These establishments help in facilitating communication and relations between both countries. Economic bilateralism is common between nations, whereby both parties may agree mutually to lower their tariff. Security bilateralism is also established between nations for the purpose of defence in case of external attack. Bilateralism is very well relevant in today’s economy – all countries need the support of one another if they are to achieve economic growth protection. The theory of bilateralism offers the possibility of mutual gains. It also offers greater freedom and efficiency of action because fewer actors are involved. However, the other school of thought criticised it of being too costly and insufficient to deal with some world problems (Legro, 2008).

Another theory used to support the present study is the theory of realism, of which a classical proponent was Hans J. Morgenthau (1940-1980), a classical and comprehensive realist, who

developed it in the aftermath of World War II. His preoccupation was to address the relationship between interest and morality in international politics (Antunes, Camisao, 2018). The basis of realism in international relations implies that all nations are working to increase their own power or are working for their common interest. Those that manage to hold the most power thrive well and can easily engulf the achievements of smaller or less powerful nation. The theory, therefore, implies that the maximal goal of a nation can hardly be attained and can only be achieved either by deceit or violence. In recent time, evidence of the realism can be seen in China's foreign policy with it growing might. China has been extending its diplomatic and economic relation not only to Africa, but also to the rest of the world. The first assumption of realism is that nationstate is the principal actor in international relations. The second is that of a unitary actor, the third is that decisionmakers are rational actors in the sense that rational decisionmaking leads to the pursuit of the national interest. Finally, states live in a context of anarchy, that is, in the absence of anyone being in charge internationally. The classical realism provides a theoretical tool that enables a more realistic analysis of the future of world order. When perceived from Morgenthau's point of view, the world will perhaps be less chaotic than the Liberals argue (Zhang, 2017). The realism theory was later modified by Kenneth Waltz (1979), with the introduction of the neorealism or the structural realism theory. The neorealism sees power as the most important factor in international relations. Waltz emphasis put on neorealism implies that all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system, and furthermore, that any path of development or any objective pursued is therefore based on their relative strength in comparison against other states (Antunes, Camisao, 2018).

## Sectoral distribution of China's aid on Cameroon

### Cash loan

China's growing presence in the global scene as a major donor to oversea nations did not leave Cameroon aside. Since the cooperation of these two nations, Cameroon has secured various aid from China. Assistance to Cameroon has been realized through grant or donation, interest free loan, and concessional loan. It is no doubt that such aid has huge impact on the nation's GDP. Compared with other donor institutions, Cameroon finds dealing with China very much convenient and comfortable based on some of its policy advantages that it has over others, like the World Bank. The World Bank and China share two different patterns. While the World Bank's stated goals are to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity at a global scale (WBG, 2015), China's goal, on the contrary, is based on mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity of both the lender and borrower (The People's Republic of China, 2011). Unlike the World Bank, the Chinese government is not a single creditor with a unified and coherent policy framework guiding all its official lending activities. There are many Chinese government lending institutions, including stateowned policy banks, stateowned commercial banks, and state-owned enterprises engaged in official lending activities, and each lender has its own policies. Also, the World Bank seeks to manage credit risk in its overall portfolio. Unlike commercial lenders, the

Bank does not set prices for its sovereign borrowers based on their risk profile, which is why the International Development Association (IDA) lending terms to low income countries and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lending terms to middle and upper income countries do not demonstrate much differences (Morris et al., 2020).

Sources of China's cash loan to Cameroon includes the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the People's Bank of China representing the Central Bank of China, other Chinese privately owned and commercial banks like the China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BoC), the Eximbank and the China Development Bank. China's financial donation to Cameroon is a strong element to reckon with. In the past years, Cameroon has had some difficulties in repaying its debt. These nonrepayments of debts the International Development Association usually are either postponed or cancelled, Cameroon have had some of it debts cancelled by China. For example, China made an announcement of forgiving Cameroon's US\$78 million out of a total of US\$5.7 billion debt. This was China's move to support the economic hardship of the Central African countries. The said loan was due to be repaid in 2018 with a total burden of \$5.7 billion (Shaban, 2019). Table 1 shows the sectoral source of China's cash loan to Cameroon from the period of 2009-2019, where the data was made available. It shows the various loan IDs, status, year, lender, amount in US dollars (USD), interest rate, libor rate, grace period, and terms.

**Table 1:** Sectoral source of China's loan to Cameroon in 2009-2020

Loan ID	Status	Year	Lender	USD (M)	Interest rate	Libor rate	Grace period	Term
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
CM.028	Implementation	2009	Eximbank	97	2		5	21
CM.068	Completed	2009	Eximbank	44				
CM.005	Completed	2009	Eximbank	28	2		5.5	20
CM.008	Completed	2009	Eximbank	52	1		11.5	32
CM.084	Completed	2010	Eximbank	32				
CM.010	Completed	2010	Eximbank	51	2		4	19.5
CM.011	Completed	2010	Eximbank	14				
CM.012	Signed	2010	CIDCA	8	0			
CM.013	Completed	2011	Eximbank	69	2		8	34
CM.014	Completed	2011	Eximbank	423	2		7	20.5
CM.015	Signed	2011	CIDCA	16	0			
CM.016	Completed	2011	Eximbank	71	2		2	19.5
CM.018	Implementation	2011	Eximbank	541		Euribor 6 months+310 bps	6	16
CM.017	Implementation	2012	Eximbank	483	2		7	21
CM.033	Implementation	2012	Eximbank	333		Euribor 6 months + 300 bps	2	11

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
CM.036	Implementation	2012	Eximbank	168	2		5.5	21
CM.027	Completed	2013	Eximbank	71	2		5	21
CM.035	Implementation	2013	Eximbank	156	2		5	21
CM.080	Signed	2013	CIDCA	12				
CM.081	Signed	2013	CIDCA	17				
CM.034	Completed	2013	Eximbank	175	2		5	20.5
CM.058	Implementation	2014	Eximbank	389				
CM.083	Completed	2015	Eximbank	90				
CM.020	Implementation	2015	Eximbank	82				
CM.038	Implementation	2015	Eximbank	337				
CM.062	Implementation	2015	Eximbank	678				
CM.026	Completed	2016	Eximbank	135	2		5	20
CM.049	Implementation	2016	ICBC	303				
CM.078	Implementation	2016	Eximbank	62				
CM.069	Implementation	2017	Eximbank	142		6M Libor + 3.2%	3	15
CM.070	Implementation	2017	BoC	123			2	10
CM.046	Implementation	2017	Eximbank	525	2		5	20
CM.054	Implementation	2017	Eximbank	150	2		5	20
CM.065	Signed	2018	Eximbank	86				
CM.071	Implementation	2018	BoC	42				
CM.077	Signed	2019	BoC	56				
CM.082	Signed	2019	BoC	42				
-	-	2020	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Brautigam, Hwang, 2021.

The analysis of the data in Table 1 clearly indicates that Cameroon has not only been receiving from the main government of China. Greater contribution has been made by private financial institutions from China. Important to note here is that some of these loans have been granted with no interest rate. Maximum of the interest rate received is 2% only, except in 2009 with the loan ID number CM.008 that had 1% interest rate. The term period varies, usually with Eximbank, there are four period components of the terms of the loan. The interest rate, the grace period, the repayment period and the total term period or maturity and tenure also vary. The grace period falls between the signing date and the first disbursement, this period requires no payment. While the grace period, which is usually 5-years with Eximbank of China is over, repayment begins with a life span of 15 years. The analysis shows that the longest term is in 2011 with the loan ID number CM.013 worth US\$69m that has a term of 34 years plus a grace period of 8 years. The least term is in 2012 with the loan ID number CM.033 of a total amount of US\$333m with zero interest rate and a grace period of 2 years. So far the highest loan was recorded in 2015 with an open loan ID number CM.083 from Eximbank with an open amount of US\$678m. The least

signed loan was in 2010 with ID number CM.012 and a sum of US\$8m. It is worth to mention here that according to the John Hopkins SAIS, China-Africa Research Initiative (2021), apart from the government of China, Cameroon had received in total loan sum from other Chinese financiers. For example, in the period of 2000-2019, Cameroon had received a total of US\$5557m from the Eximbank of China, US\$303m from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (ICBC), US\$263m from Bank of China (BoC) and US\$79m from others.

## Funded projects in Cameroon

China's assistance to Cameroon is very glaring in the numerous infrastructural projects that are carried out through Chinese funded projects. This is so, as most of the loan obtained from China are geared towards infrastructural and development projects. For example, way back in 1982, with a supported amount of US\$75 million loan from China, Cameroon had the Lagdo Dam constructed (Bone, 2020). In 2017, a Chinese businessman Lu Fuqing announced a plan to build an auto plant in an industrial zone near the Chinesebuilt deep seaport in Cameroon. This plant is said to be the first car plant in Central Africa (Sixtus, 2017). Motivated by favourable business climate in Cameroon, China has been urging its local firms to invest in Cameroon. Speaking at a press conference on 28 March 2017, the official of the Ministry of Commerce noted that Cameroon's economy has been very resilient in spite of falling oil prices that have affected many economies (*Cameroon Tribune*, 2017). The construction of the Memve'le Dam in 2003 at a cost of FCFA 420 billion, estimated at US\$673m, a project jointly financed by the Eximbank of China and Cameroon. With a loan solely for the construction of the dam, this project was implemented by China International Water and Electrical Corporation on the one hand and Cameroon government on the other hand, as well as the African Development Bank (*AidData*, 2003). Like in the other years, financial aid from China has been project oriented. It is evidenced that China's loans to Cameroon are exclusively project based which has led to the realisation of some major outstanding projects in Cameroon. Table 2 shows the Information and Telecommunication Technology (ICT) consistently received and benefited substantially since 2009 to 2020 with varied amounts. Also the water and energy sector ha over these years been funded enormously in different years. This is in line with the government policy to develop the energy sector – evidenced by the construction of various dams in the Cameroon, e.g. the Memve'le dam. The least beneficiary to this aid has been the educational sector that received very little. This sector has been left in the hands of the scholarship, for instance, in 2013, 31 Chinese volunteer teachers dispatched from China to Cameroon to deliver Chinese language courses (Cameroon-China Embassy,Yaounde, 2013).

Other construction projects include e.g. the Kribi deep Sea Port Project – Phase I, financed through a loan at a cost of \$US423 in 2011 by Eximbank of China. China financed 85% of the project, while Cameroon was to complete the remaining 15%. However, this project was later renegotiated and Cameroon did not pay anything in the course of the project. China National Electric Equipment Corporation and the China Engineering Company Ltd. were in charge of



implementing the project (*AidData*, 2011). China donated also the Malaria Research Centre, housed by the Yaounde's Gynaecology-Obstetrics and Paediatrics Hospital. The project was raised at a cost of US\$400,000 (*AidData*, 2009).

Other projects include: the ongoing construction of the Cameroon National Assembly through Chinese assistance. The deputy speaker of the Cameroon National Assembly Theodore Datoua, upon visiting the site, stated that the project is a result of the positive cooperation that ties Cameroon and China. The project has a duration of 46 months and is estimated to cost FCFA 55 billion. It is constructed by a Chinese company China Urban Construction Group (BUCG) (Amabo, 2021). Other projects carried out by Chinese cooperation include the construction of Yaounde multipurpose sport complex, that was inaugurated in 2009, financed by China at a cost of US\$30m (Khan, Baye, 2008). China has also been involved in the construction of the major stadia in Cameroon, especially as Cameroon hosted the African Cup of Nations in 2021. For example, in 2014, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation handed over the Limbe Municipal stadium with 20,000 seats to the Cameroon government. At the same time in the Western region of Cameroon, the Chinese firm completed the construction of the Bafoussam Omnisport Stadium containing 20,000 seats on the different spectator stands. Table 2 below exhibits the sectoral distribution of China's aid to Cameroon from the period of 2009-2019, where the data was made available. It shows the loan ID number, year, lender, amount in USD, and the purpose for which the loan is intended.

**Table 2:** Sectoral distribution of China's funded projects in Cameroon in 2009-2020

Loan ID	Status	Year	Lender	USD (M)	Purpose
1	2	3	4	5	6
CM.028	Implementation	2009	Eximbank	97	Douala Water Supply Project - Phase II
CM.068	Completed	2009	Eximbank	44	Limbe Stadium
CM.005	Completed	2009	Eximbank	28	Bafoussam Omnisports Stadium (Kouekong Stadium) Construction
CM.008	Completed	2009	Eximbank	52	Optic Fiber Backbone Network (Construction of CTPhone)
CM.084	Completed	2010	Eximbank	32	350,000 CDMA Lines
CM.010	Completed	2010	Eximbank	51	Mekin Hydropower Project 15MW
CM.011	Completed	2010	Eximbank	14	Engineering Machinery; Included in Rehabilitation Process of the State-owned Civil Engineering Equipment Pool (MATGENIE)
CM.012	Signed	2010	CIDCA	8	Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement
CM.013	Completed	2011	Eximbank	69	Electronic Postal Program
CM.014	Completed	2011	Eximbank	423	Kribi Port Project - Phase I
CM.015	Signed	2011	CIDCA	16	Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement
CM.016	Completed	2011	Eximbank	71	Low Cost Social Housing (1500 Units)
CM.018	Implementation	2011	Eximbank	541	Memve'ele Hydropower Project 211 MW



1	2	3	4	5	6
CM.017	Implementation	2012	Eximbank	483	Yaounde-Douala Highway - Phase I
CM.033	Implementation	2012	Eximbank	333	Military Equipment to MINDEF
CM.036	Implementation	2012	Eximbank	168	National Telecom Broadband Network Project - Phase I
CM.027	Completed	2013	Eximbank	71	MA60 Chinese Aircrafts Purchase; Two Units
CM.035	Implementation	2013	Eximbank	156	Emergency Telecommunication Network
CM.080	Signed	2013	CIDCA	12	Various Projects (Loan 2013/01)
CM.081	Signed	2013	CIDCA	17	Various Projects (Loan 2013/02)
CM.034	Completed	2013	Eximbank	175	Potable Water Supply Projects in 9 Towns: Bafoussam; Bamenda; Kribi and Sangmelima - Phase I
CM.058	Implementation	2014	Eximbank	389	Kribi-Lolabe Highway; Kribi-Edoua Section - Phase I (100km)
CM.083	Completed	2015	Eximbank	90	Photovoltaic System; Electrification of 350 Communities - Phase I (166 Communities)
CM.020	Implementation	2015	Eximbank	82	National Fiber-Optic Backbone Expansion
CM.038	Implementation	2015	Eximbank	337	National Broadband Telecommunication Network - Phase II (including South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL) undersea cable and Zamengoe data center)
CM.062	Implementation	2015	Eximbank	678	Yaounde Potable Water Supply from Sanaga River (PAEPYS)
CM.026	Completed	2016	Eximbank	135	E-National Higher Education Network
CM.049	Implementation	2016	ICBC	303	Warak Hydropower Project on Bini River; Adamaoua 75MW
CM.069	Implementation	2017	Eximbank	142	Memve'ele to Ebolowa Hydropower Transmission Lines ; 225kV
CM.070	Implementation	2017	BoC	123	Photovoltaic System; Electrification of 350 Communities - Phase II (184 Communities)
CM.046	Implementation	2017	Eximbank	525	Kribi Port Project - Phase II (EBC Part; total US\$675million)
CM.054	Implementation	2017	Eximbank	150	Kribi Port Project - Phase II (CL Part; total US\$675million)
CM.065	Signed	2018	Eximbank	86	Potable Water Supply Projects in 9 Towns: Dschang; Yabassi; Maroua; Garoua; Garoua-Boulai - Phase II
CM.071	Implementation	2018	BoC	42	National Extension of Intelligent Urban Video Surveillance System - Phase I
CM.077	Signed	2019	BoC	56	Ebolowa-Kribi; 225 KV and Mbalmayo-Mekin; 90 KV Transmission Lines
CM.078	Implementation	2016	Eximbank	62	Project for the Rehabilitation of the CRTV
CM.082	Signed	2019	BoC	42	National Extension of Intelligent Urban Video Surveillance System - Phase II
-	-	2020	-	-	-

Source: Brautigam, Hwang, 2021.

From the analysis of the data displayed in Table 2 it is evident that Cameroon has been striving towards achieving economic development. This is so, as the loans obtained have been development and project oriented. These loans are intended for a wide variety of purposes in different sectors. From the list, one can conclude that with realisation of these projects Cameroon is truly on the right way towards achieving by 2035 its vision of development. Some purposes of the loans from 2009-2019, according to Brautigam and Hwang (2021), include: the Douala water Supply Project – Phase II financed with an amount of US\$97m from Eximbank of China. The realisation of the Limbe Stadium project with a loan signed in 2009, the Baffoussam Stadium with a loan signed still in 2009, and recently, the National Extension of Intelligent Urban Video Surveillance System – Phase II project financed with a loan signed in 2019 worth US\$42m. So far, the Eximbank of China has been the main private financier and has exhibited high trust and confidence in terms of credit to Cameroon. Other projects realised by other financiers include: Phase I of the National Extension of Intelligent Urban Video Surveillance System financed with a loan from the Bank of China (BoC), the Ebolowa-Kribi 225KV and the Mbalmayo-Merkin 90KV transmission lines financed with a loan from the BoC signed in 2019, the Warak Hydro-power Project on Bini River, Adamaoua 75MW Project to be funded with a loan from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) worth US\$303m, signed in 2016. Various Projects were financed with the Loan 2013/1 and 2, worth US\$12m and US\$17m, by the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2013. The highest amount was recorded in 2015 – US\$678m for the Yaounde Potable Water Supply from Sanaga River (PAEPYS) project obtained from the Eximbank, and the least is recorded in 2010 – US\$8m gotten from CIDCA. From every indication one is tempted to conclude that if Cameroon is to realise its vision until 2035, then it will be thanks to the People's Republic of China, taking into consideration the number of loans and the purposes for which they are destined.

## Humanitarian assistance to Cameroon

Cameroon is not only receiving assistance from the central government of China. The aid also comes from other institutions and individuals. For example, in the fight against COVID-19 in 2020, one of the China's richest men, Jack Ma, co-founder of the Alibaba, single handedly donated to Cameroon medical supplies, such as 20,000 COVID-19 testing kits, 1000 medical protective suits, and 100,000 masks that were specifically destined to fight COVID-19 (Agbor-togo, 2020).

With the continuous increase in the cases of COVID-19, on 5 March 2021 the Yaounde Central Hospital representing the Minister of Public Health, Hassan Ben Bachir, received a batch of medical equipment donated for the fight against the coronavirus. Some of the items received included ventilators, oxygenators, and electrocardiographs from China, represented by Guo Jian-jun, the Economic and Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Cameroon (CGTN, 2021).

Still in the fight against COVID-19, on 12 June 2020 a donation worth FCFA164.5m was handed over to Cameroon by the Chinese Ambassador to Cameroon Wan Yingwu and received for Cameroon by the Minister Delegate for Defence at the presidency of Joseph Beti Assomo. The gift included COVID-19 testing kits worth approximately 2m Yuans. In a break down, the items includes 50,000 individual protective masks, 6000 surgical masks, and 4,200 protective glasses. Materials were aimed at following up patients. Beti Assomo, the Cameroon Minister of Defence, in emphasizing the cooperation between China and Cameroon, mentioned that although China is also hit with coronavirus, yet it did not prevent China from supporting Cameroon. He went further to conclude that this is why China is today one of Cameroon major partner (Hilton, 2020).

Also on 7 April 2015, China represented by its ambassador to Cameroon, Wei Wenhua, attended a delivery ceremony of two Xinzhou 60 aircraft, that took place at the Younded Nsimalen International Airport. Representing the Cameroon government was the Cameroon Minister of Transport Enkiri Robert. The two aircraft delivered were manufactured and designed by China Aviation Technology International Holding Co., Ltd. The aircraft were in all handed over to Cameroon Airlines for civil aviation flights. This donation follows other similar donation that was made in 2012 to the Cameroon Air Force, when another Xinzhou 60 aircraft was delivered to the Cameroon Air Forces (China Embassy in Cameroon, n.d.). According to Bone (2020), Cameroon and China have signed a good number of military accords thanks to which China is supplying to Cameroon small arms, military patrol boats, radio equipment and is providing to Cameroon military training.

Also, on 17 November 2015, in the Cameroon economic capital Douala the Cameroon's formal Prime Minister inaugurated the Douala Gynaecology-Obstetrics and Paediatrics Hospital. This ultra-modern hospital complex is said to be worth approximately FCA15billion and was financed through a loan agreement signed between Cameroon and the People's Republic of China during the visit of President Hu Jintao to Cameroon. This project was launched in 2009 and the construction works were performed by the China Shanxi Construction Engineering Group Corp. The Gynaecology-Obstetrics and Paediatrics Hospital in Douala came as second after a similar project carried out in Cameroon capital city, Yaounde (*Business in Cameroon*, 2015).

The Cameroon's political crisis, an uprising of the Anglophone Problem that started in 2016, led to untold destruction of property and loss of lives of citizens from the South and North West Regions of the country. The Cameroon government launched the plan of reconstruction and development of these regions, and the Chinese government committed itself to support the government of Cameroon in this project through humanitarian assistance. The project was estimated to cost FCFA12.7 billion and was destined for a population of close to 80000 people. In an announcement made by the Cameroon Head of State, President Biya, the government of China did commit itself to provide 20 million Yuan, estimated about FCFA1.7 billion, to support the project (Andzongo, 2018).

## Human resource assistance

Away from politics, other domain of China's assistance to Cameroon is the Chinese personnel that are presently in Cameroon providing different specialised services in the areas of health, construction, processing, and trading. Chinese presence in Cameroon has been growing steadily over the years. According to the John Hopkins SAIS (2021), as of 2019, a total of 2515 Chinese workers were present in Cameroon, cutting across different sectors in the Cameroon's economy. They can be found in the sectors of health, construction, agriculture, education, and trading. For example, August 2019 saw a batch of Chinese medical personnel of doctors and nurses in Mbalmayo providing medical assistance to the population in that community at no cost (Xinhua 2018). Nevertheless, it is important to mention here that evidence on the ground shows that most of the labour force provided in Chinese funded projects are very often provided by the Chinese themselves, Cameroonians are left to provide minor services. Table three shows the trend of Chinese population over time in Cameroon from 2009-2020, where the data was made available.

**Table 3.** Chinese workers in Cameroon in 2009-2020

No.	Year	Number of workers
1	2	3
1	2009	716
2	2010	607
1	2	3
3	2011	1063
4	2012	2309
5	2013	2450
6	2014	3636
7	2015	4303
8	2016	3775
9	2017	2677
10	2018	2783
11	2019	2515
12	2020	-

Source: China Africa Research Initiative, 2021.

It should be noted that the Chinese workers sent to work in Cameroon under the Chinese contracts are providing labour services in areas like construction, factory works, health, and education. Apart from these areas, a good number of Chinese are also seen in the areas of trading. The table therefore shows that as the years are going by, the number of Chinese present in Cameroon is increasing. For example, in 2009 the Chinese population in Cameroon numbered 716 persons scattered in different sectors. In 2019 it attained 2515. The increasing number can be justified with the warm cooperation between Cameroon and China. Chinese population in Cameroon have also boosted the country's economy as a good number of them are involved in

petty and wholesale trading. A good number of Chinese population are very well established in major cities like Douala and Yaounde. For this reason, Chinese products have been flourishing in the Cameroonian market. At a time they were far less expensive and therefore quite affordable, especially for the low income earners, than some products imported from different countries. For instance, in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the Cameroonian market there were commonly available old fashioned analogue telephones. This significantly affected the internet accessibility, as very few could afford sophisticated smart android phones. Now, unlike in the last 10 years, the local markets are filled up with major Chinese brands of smartphones, e.g. Huawei, Techno and ZTE, that are not only available, but quite affordable. The availability of these phones contributed to the increasing number of internet access in Cameroon and, consequently, enhanced access to information. Other products include Chinese shoes, toys and dresses that predominate on the Cameroonian local markets.

## Effects of China's foreign aid to Cameroon

As part of the diversification of its partnership, the Government of Cameroon is committed to its bilateral relations with Emerging Countries for the development of its economy. Its relations with China have been very fruitful, in particular through the implemented financial instruments (Eximbank of China, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China). Over time, China has become a strategic partner of Cameroon, financing large-scale projects in the infrastructure sector. Relations with China have left huge impact and evoked mixed feelings in the Cameroonian population.

Foreign aid poses a great challenge to advancing democracy and the rule of law. This is evident when the aid is provided to autocratic governments – it creates a larger pool of resources for the government officials and political elites to fight over for their own selfish and personal gains, which can have a detrimental effect on the reform policies (Khan, Baye 2008). It is, therefore, tempting to believe that the majority of conflicts, political instability, civil wars and coups d'état, that have been happening especially in Africa in the past decades, may be well attributed to the large foreign aid generously granted to these demanding countries. Measuring the impact of China's foreign aid to Cameroon may seem somewhat challenging and difficult. To some, the impact of this aid is still to be felt. However, because most of this aid is gearing towards developmental projects, opinions gathered indicated that much of these projects have only been realised after signing but have also been abandoned before completion. For example, the Kribi deep seaport for which the loan agreement was signed in 2011, with the goal of reducing poverty and increasing economic growth, cannot still be boasting of completion. To some, the projects still remains a vague dream, with no visible link to their daily lives. Another case here is the 196km phase one of the major highway linking Douala, the country's economic capital, and Yaoundé, its political capital. A project, for which a loan was acquired in 2012, started in 2014 with completion date 48 months later. This project had witnessed several postponements from October 2018 to December 2020, and most recently to October 2021. Opinion holds that this delay in the realisation of this

project can be attributed to bureaucracy in bills payments. To some Cameroonians, the new date set for its completion still seems to be far from real. Another project that has benefited from the Chinese aid is the 15mw Memve'ele Hydropower, for which a loan worth US\$541 was acquired in 2011 from the Eximbank of China and which was to be co-financed by the African Development Bank and the Government of Cameroon. This project was set to be completed in 2017. The results of this projects are still far from being felt due to delays in its completion and the unavailability of the transportation lines. Such delays and incompleteness have affected the locals negatively. Easterly (2006) contends that the aid has done more harm than good, pointing to substantial evidence that foreign aid programs hold back countries and make them dependent. Several African countries are unable to carry out any of their fundamental functions, such as the institution of newly established structures, the maintenance of basic systems and services or the provision of necessary public services and infrastructures, without foreign aid administered in the form of projects or technical assistance (Brautigam, Knack, 2004).

On the positive note, foreign aid is commended for its constructive impact on economic growth, noticeable in diverse measures, such as: 1) increase in investments, 2) rising capacity to import capital goods or technology, 3) less or no adverse effect on investment and savings, and 4) increase in the capital productivity and promotion of endogenous technical change (Mursheed, Khanaum, 2013). Izobo (2020) mentioned that foreign aid is undeniably a crucial source of financial possessions with a potential to promote the rule of law, democratic governance and, in turn, economic development. Brautigam and Knack (2004) further stated that foreign aid helps governments to strengthen their institutions by providing more of educational and technical support with the intention of building strong legislative, executive, and judicial systems to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of governance. Foreign aid can further improve governance and respect for the rule of law by reducing corruption through the management of a country's expenditure and revenue creation in a legitimate manner.

According to some opinions, Chinese aid to Cameroon has gone a long way to improve the livelihood of Cameroonians. Cameroon and China established diplomatic relations in 1971, that is more than 50 years ago. Chinese aid to Cameroon has continued to expand over the years. China has provided grants and concessional loans, military aid, trade aid, and humanitarian aid. This aid is multifaceted and enables Cameroon to resolve its infrastructure deficit. In addition, China's interventions have multiplied over the years and they cover areas such as security, agriculture, health, telecommunications, trade, education, water supply, and sports and recreation. Cameroon has seen its stadia constructed by Chinese, such as the Baffoussam and Limbe Omnisport stadia with 20,000 spectators' seats each, financed by the Eximbank of China in 2009, the construction of the Gynaecology-Obstetrics and Paediatrics Hospital in the cities of Douala and Yaoundé, the construction of the Yaoundé multipurpose sport complex, the construction of the Memve'ele hydropower plant financed by the Eximbank of China in 2011, the realisation of the National Extension of Intelligent Urban Video Surveillance Systems financed by the Bank of China in 2018, the expansion of the National Fiber Optic Backbone financed by the Eximbank of China in 2015, and a host of other projects that have been realised through China's grants. The Cameroon

population have also benefited from the availability of affordable Chinese products, especially electronics, that are flourishing in the local market. All these have gone a long way to improve the living standard of Cameroonians.

From the onset, the Sino-Cameroonian relationship has proven to be very fruitful and is still promising. This is confirmed by senior staff at the Cameroon's Ministry of External Relations, the Ministry of Planning and regional Development, and the Ministry of Finance. At the international level, the respective policies of the Heads of States, for example the war against Boko Haram, managing the crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon, received reciprocal support in the form of Chinese donations for humanitarian purposes. The two countries share common views on the essential principles, namely the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the states in the international bodies and the reciprocal support for the candidacies of their nationals in the international civil organisations. On a national plan, as a friendly partner nation, China has been supportive to Cameroon's economic and social development, especially to Cameroon's attaining by 2035 its development goals. China regularly responds to the Cameroonian appeals. The cooperation in terms of financing links the two partners. Several structural and strategic projects are implemented, important for the Cameroonian economy and contributing to the well-being of the population. Cameroonians have witnessed increase in their wellbeing through the Chinese assistance in different projects. In fact, according to the officials from the Ministry of External Relations, over the last years Chinese foreign aid to Cameroon have had tremendous positive impact on the lives of the Cameroon's population.

## Methodology

This paper employs both primary and secondary sources of data, gathered with the use of questionnaires designed to capture the views of Cameroonians. Other secondary sources, such as the academic literature related to the topic, were used. A review of literature, the research papers, works of recognized scholars, standard publications issued by institutions, reports, documents, and internet sources, as well as other minor references were used. 100 structured questionnaires were administered, both online and using a traditional method, to randomly selected participants. Workers in the Chinese funded projects in Cameroon were also sampled. Additionally, some detailed interviews were carried out using well-structured questionnaires that were very flexible. They were directed to some selected state officials that are concerned with the implementation and follow up of China's foreign aid and interested in maintaining relations with China. Among these were officials drawn from the Cameroon's Ministries of External Relation (MINREX), Ministry of Planning and Regional Development (MINIPAT), and the Ministry of Finance (MINFI). During selecting respondents, preference was given to state officials in the capital city Yaounde, as these officials are directly involved in policy making and follow up of direct implementation of foreign aid. Any input obtained from these interviews was considered relevant, as it allowed to investigate practical views regarding the impact of China's foreign aid to Cameroon.



## Research findings and discussion

Table 4 exhibits the results obtained from the survey. It shows various responses, ranging from description of the sampled questions to the responses that include: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), and strongly Disagree (SD). The responses also portray the mean and standard deviation of the various variables, as well as the global mean.

**Table 4:** Participants' assessment of China's foreign aid to Cameroon within the last 10 years

Description	SA	A	D	SD	Mean	SD
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Satisfaction with Chinese aid to Cameroon	19 (19.0%)	50 (50.0%)	4 (4.0%)	27 (27.0%)	2.04	.52
Level of satisfaction with the management of China's foreign aid	4 (4.0%)	19 (19.0%)	50 (50.0%)	27.0 (27.0%)	2.07	.511
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
China's foreign aid has been helpful to Cameroon over the last 10 years.	12 (12.0%)	49 (49.0%)	22 (22.0%)	17 (17.0%)	2.40	.949
Direct or indirect impact of China's aid to Cameroonians felt individually	13 (13.0%)	42 (42.0%)	25 (25.0%)	20 (20.0%)	2.95	.886
Foreign aid from China encourages local development in Cameroon	19 (19.0%)	27 (27.0%)	23 (23.0%)	31 (31.0)	2.34	.911
Ratings of the costly nature of foreign aid from China to Cameroonians	35 (35.0%)	34 (34.0%)	18 (18.0%)	8 (8.0%)	2.99	.811
Whether Cameroon can develop without foreign aid	28 (28.0%)	42 (42.0%)	12 (12.0%)	18 (18.0%)	3.35	.164
Mutuality of China-Cameroon cooperation as a result of aid	10 (10.0%)	20 (20.0%)	31 (31.0%)	20 (20.0%)	2.20	1.013
Desire that Cameroon should receive more foreign aid from China	9 (9.0%)	25 (25.0%)	37 (37.0%)	29 (29.0%)	3.01	1.04
Global mean					2.44	

Source: Author's own work.

Demographically, the sample contained more male participants (60.0%). Almost all (97.2%) participants belonged to the working age group (18 years and above). This indicates an active workforce with adequate gender representation. The study recorded more than three quarter of the responses which confirmed that Cameroon has received aid from China within the last 10 years – (88.0%) against (12.0%) who thought otherwise.

### Perception of China's foreign aid for Cameroon over the last 10 years

Table 4 shows a substantial (23.0%) level of satisfaction with the aid Cameroon government receives from China. Most of the participants (77.0%) are disappointed with the way the government of Cameroon managed this aid within the time frame. Specific domains of aid are:



construction projects, (the dam in the East region of the country, water supply projects in the Center Region, building of the Bonaberi Bridge in the Littoral region). Other development projects include, among others, the construction of schools, education and technological transfer, scholarships to Cameroonians and donating to schools, military and other supplies (donation of military equipment by China to the government of Cameroon, donation of hospital kits and other health-related equipment by China to Cameroon, e.g. COVID-19 vaccine or the face masks). Considered were also: recent cancellation of some Cameroon's debts by the government of China, the recent computer loans, the financial aid to fight terrorism and COVID-19 pandemic. Future aid was expected in the domains of infrastructure, health, agriculture, and education.

This is consistent with the opinion voiced in the existing publications, e.g. in the CGTN News webpage which announced that with the increase in the cases of COVID-19 the Yaounde Central Hospital, representing the Minister of Public Health, Hassan Ben Bachir, received a batch of medical equipment donated by China for the fight against coronavirus. Some of the items received included ventilators, oxygenators, and electrocardiographs from China, represented by Guo Jianjun, the economic and Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Cameroon (CGTN, 2021). In addition, on 22 July 2018 Cameroon received US\$7.3 million worth of military equipment from the People's Republic of China to help fight insecurity and preserve the peace and security of the country. This, actually, constitutes an enormous support to the Cameroon government during a global pandemic.

## Chinese aid and the economic development of Cameroon

There was great acknowledgement of the influence of this aid on the Cameroon's economy, especially on improvement of the economic and infrastructural development of the country. Specifically, a great proportion of participants (61.0%) believed the aid have been a great source of help to the entire country, such that some could actually boast of benefiting directly or indirectly from the aid in infrastructural development in the domains of construction of hospitals, schools, roads, water projects, among others. Also, the aid has impacted the educational sector and employment rate, as well as the trading/commerce in the country, among others. This is confirmed by Khan and Baye (2008) who stated that undoubtedly Chinese private investors have brought some benefits to the Cameroonian economy. The stock of capital goods has increased through the importation of cheap capital from China. The Chinese have equally increased the production of goods and services at a very low cost. The construction of national roads has facilitated and improved circulation in major cities. Local workers also benefited from some of the employment opportunities created by the Chinese firms, especially the assistants in Chinese shops, clinics, construction sites, and Chinese restaurants. However, Khan and Baye (2008) confirmed that these are jobs requiring no professional skills, poorly remunerated, of short duration, sometimes laid off as soon as the Chinese can easily speak and communicate with nationals in local languages (English, French and

Pidgin). In some cases local workers even go without any employment contracts from their Chinese employers.

In line with this, Ngang (2008) mentioned in his study the impact of foreign aid on the economic development and growth of Cameroon in the period of 1997-2006 and found out that foreign aid contributes significantly to economic growth but makes no significant contribution to economic development. He went further to conclude that Cameroon could have enhanced its economic development by effectively and efficiently managing its funds received in the form of aid, as well as strategically strengthening anti-corruption measures. On the other hand, Charles (2017) obtained contradictory results from a series of data gathered in 1960-2013 in a study on the impact of foreign aid on the economic growth of Cameroon, using a multivariate integration technique. The study found a negative relationship between foreign aid and Cameroon's economic growth in the given period under investigation. It also found that gross domestic investment has positively affected its growth.

The results equally demonstrated that a proportion of 34% respondents supported the demand that the government of Cameroon should request more aid, although the majority (70.0%) believed the development of Cameroon can be well enhanced without such aid. This, perhaps, is contradictory to the abovementioned benefits of foreign aid to the economy, although such controversy could have stemmed from the grievous mismanagement mentioned by 77.0% of the respondents, embezzlement, and corruption. The respondents advocated for a joint supervision and management of the funds in order to promote and inspire desirable level of local development in Cameroon. This is in conformity with the position of Egbeyong (2018) who studied public opinion on corruption and the role of anti-corruption agencies in Cameroon and found that corruption was a major problem of the country. The existence of this endemic problem was due to lack of transparency, accountability, greed, and inadequate awareness of its consequences. Also, on 22 October 2018, a BBC profiling report regretted that although the Central African country is seen as Africa in miniature, its "economic progress has been hampered by corruption and decades of authoritarian rule" (BBC News, 2018). Consistently, Izobo (2020) found that despite donors' original intentions when distributing aid, a high level of corruption within the recipient governments, poor democratic institutions, onerous conditionality and fiscal imprudence hampered the effective attainment of the assumed purpose. All that has made the foreign aid to be seen more as a curse than a blessing in most African countries. All in all, the trade between Cameroon and China has increased significantly in the past years and the foreign aid from China has also increased. Cameroonians have a fairly divergent view on the effects of foreign aid to Cameroon, they also doubt if the trade is mutual.

## Conclusion

This paper sought to examine the impact of the Chinese aid has to Cameroon. Using both primary and empirical evidence, it was concluded that Cameroon has received enormous aid from China over the period of 2009-2020. This aid has holistic effects on the country in diverse

ways. Despite the original intention of every aid, which is to alleviate poverty in a recipient country, its importance is not regarded homogeneously by all as mixed feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction arise due to the management system and the obtained results. The high level of corruption, embezzlement, and mismanagement within the government circles have made foreign aid a curse rather than a blessing on Cameroon. However, progress is being made by the Cameroon's government to stamp out corruption by the creation of anti-corruption commissions and the arrest and imprisonment of the top corrupt officials. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index report of 2020, Cameroon is ranked 149/180 on a score of 25/100. This is contrary to the 2019 report on corruption perception index in which Cameroon ranked 153/180, indicating progress towards the fight against corruption. Nevertheless, there is evidence of inevitability, as the development of the Cameroon's economy hinges most on the aid – the road infrastructure, ICT, water and energy, employment, education, and other sectors have benefited immensely from the aid from China. The relationship between Cameroon and China is based on sincerity, solidarity, and mutual respect. Despite the shortcomings, it is no doubt that the aid from China has greatly enhanced the economic development of Cameroon, thus making Cameroon and China steadfast in supporting each other.

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## Cytowanie

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# Concepts of security from a perspective of political science

OZAN SABRI TUNCER

ORCID: 0000-0002-1379-6648

Selçuk University, Turkey

tuncerozansabri@gmail.com

**Keywords:** security, traditional security perception, cold war, critical theory, Copenhagen school, post-modern theory, Galler school

**Abstract** Security is one of the most basic needs of human beings and has become one of the fundamental issues not only for people but also for the states. Security has emerged within the human history and it is one of the fundamental concepts of the discipline of international relations. Many studies have been carried out into the concept of security in the discipline of international relations and many definitions of this concept have been offered in the conceptual and theoretical framework of these studies. However, in the literature there is no one, commonly accepted definition of security. Since security has a dynamic structure, the concept of security has also changed cyclically and maintained its existence. Unique opportunities for the concept of security emerged particularly during and after the cold war, arousing interest of many disciplines and theorists. The concept of security, which continues its existence today, has changed and deepened, confronted with different threats. In our study, firstly, the concept of security will be defined and its analysis will be performed by associating it with humanity and its history. Afterwards, it will be explained how the change in the system transformed the concept of security as conceived in terms of the critical theories developed in the cold war period and later.

## Introduction

People have wanted to live in a safe and peaceful environment from historical times to the present. However, many concepts threaten human life. One of these concepts is that of a human being. Especially, until the Middle Ages wars, famines, epidemics, and wild animals posed major threats to the secure environment. However, people have constantly tried to cope with these threats via new security measures. The modern states, that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648, were given some authority to ensure the security of their citizens. Afterwards, states also took some measures to protect their sovereignty. With the development of technology and industry, the use of conventional weapons has become the biggest threat to these



states. In the following years, with the nationalist movements that emerged especially in France during the French Revolution, multinational states entered the process of disintegration and took new measures against this disintegration process. Especially, the world wars of the early and mid-1900s can be explained as the turning point of the concept of security.

After the 1950s, during and after the cold war, the threat to use the nuclear weapons created enormous perceptual changes. In this period, the concept of security became subject of study in various disciplines. In those years, when the traditional understanding of security lost its importance, the biggest criticism was about the events that the theory of realism could not predict. The traditional perception of security has left its place to a critical perception. The perception of security, which has a dynamic status, has gained more depth as a result of the conjuncture and the existence of different threats that have emerged. For the first time, new security concepts such as environment, law, food resources and human rights have entered the literature. The previously existing state-centered security approach has left its place to other issues that are effective in the individual and social sphere. The concept of differentiated security is still developing and maintains its dynamic character.

The main focus of this study is how the concept of security is shaped and what perceptual changes it is undergoing. Another important problem in our study is how the concept of military security has changed and whether it will lose its importance in the future. The hypothesis put out in our study is that the hard power (military power), which states see as indispensable for survival, has undergone some changes today. In addition, we will seek answer to the question whether the states will give up military power in the future? Our study will be completed by reviewing the literature and presenting current developments. Evaluation of all other security approaches presented in the literature would be too much for our article. For this reason, a ranking has been made according to the level of their importance. Only certain studies are covered. Purposes of perceptions that replace traditional perceptions of security will be included in our study by analyzing the framework of the investigations into security. In order to answer these questions, in the first part of the article the epistemology of the concept of security is examined and the concept is defined. Afterwards, it was investigated whether the concept of security was affected by the events in the historical process. This analysis was undertaken through the main dimensions of security perception. In the second part of the article the perception of security in the course of time has been investigated in more detail. This study has been handled dynamically and evolutionarily so as to shed light on the historical process from the first humans to the present day regarding the concept of security. For this purpose, the epistemology of the concept of security was conceptually added to the analyses as well.

## Security case and traditional security approach

### The concept of security

In order to better analyze the historical development of security, it is necessary to focus on the concept of security first. The concept of security has developed in the historical process



according to the conditions and dynamics of the time. The concept of security is defined in the Dictionary of the Turkish Language Institution as “the execution of the legal order in social life without interruption, the ability of people to live without fear, safety” (Turkish Language Society, 2021). Many theorists explain in the literature this state of safety by referring to the security problem that has existed since the first humans. For example, in the Abraham H. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, safety is mentioned immediately after the physical needs (Ozcan, 2004, p. 447). Ter-riff, in the work *Security studies tgo day*, defined the concept of security as “the feeling of being safe from harm and danger” (Acıkmese, 2011, p. 44). Dedeoğlu has defined it as “the activities of states, societies, groups, and individuals to protect and maintain their existence, to eliminate the elements that threaten them and to reshape them each time according to the dynamics of the conjuncture” (Dedeoglu, 2004, p. 5). The concept of security has been defined in many different ways in the literature. This is an indication of how important this concept is and that it is a dynamic phenomenon. The fact that it has survived to the present day is an indication that it is intertwined with life.

As can be understood from the definition of the concept of security, it is a difficult concept. According to Mc Sweeney, “security is an elusive concept”. Morgan also argues that this concept is not easy to define (Acıkmese, 2011, p. 44). Another reason why this concept is difficult to define is that it is a fundamental fact related to many disciplines. For example, it was put forward by the Scottish psychiatrist Laing and developed by Giddens, a British sociologist. The common definition of security by these two theorists is as follows: “It arises from the individual’s need for a stable and sustained self” (Rumelili, Adisonmez, 2020, p. 24). These explanations show that it is connected with the discipline of sociology and psychology. In addition, the explanation of the concept of security offered in these disciplines points to a process that takes us back to the first human being. Basically, human beings have had some needs since beginning of their existence. The feeling of being safe and feeling safe is also related to this concept.

Waltz observes that security involves actions undrtaken to “keep away from the dangers that may arise outside the borders of the state” and defines it as “the recognition of the internal and external sovereignty of the state by other states” (Oguzlu, 2007, p. 6). Waltz’s definition is more concerned with the emergence of modern states after 1648. The concept of security is vital not only for people but also for the states. Wolfers is the first who scientifically studied the concept of security in the field of international relations studies. Wolfers argued that it would be correct to define it by answering the questions “which values should be protected from which threats, with which tools and at what cost” (Sancak, 2013, p. 124). Baldwin, who added new questions to these already asked by A. Wolfers, defines the concept of security in seven questions. Security for whom and for what values, against what threats, by what means, at what cost, in how long, and to what extent? He argues that it would be more accurate to define it with these questions (Acıkmese, 2011, p. 45). Some theorists such as Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, on the other hand, set out from the dilemma of the individual and the state while defining the concept of security. These theorists argue in their work entitled *Security: A framework for analysis* that states which are close to each other can come together for security purposes and agree on mutual cooperation

(Goksu, 2019, p. 5). These theorists have argued that the economy, as well as security, will develop if states are interdependent. In the literature, between 1947 and 1989, some theorists explained the concept of security as deterrence (Alkan, 2014, p. 25). If we take into account the conditions of the time, it can be said that the concept of security at the moment is defined in accordance with the conditions of the time. The most important result of this date range is the world wars that took place on a global scale. Nye defined it for this time period as follows: “7 nations put more than 100 million soldiers into the war. 45 million people lost their lives in conflicts that took the form of all-out war and most of a continent is in ruins” (Nye, 2011, pp. 15-16). Subsequently, the states entered a rapid arms race. This armament and the desire to have militarily advanced technology activated mutual deterrence. In short, it is possible to say that the concept of security began to take shape with the concept of military security in this century.

Epistemologically, the concept of security is of Latin origin. Latin words “secura” (se+cura) and English “careless” and “security” are related to freedom (Guner, 2008, p. 5). In sum, it can be said that the concept of security has become integrated with human life. Today, the view of states on the concept of security is discussed in a wide variety of frameworks, not only in a military sense but also in economic, that of environmental disasters, climate change, nuclear reactions and human rights violation (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 6). The 21<sup>st</sup> century is a complete technology age in terms of communication and informatics. For this reason, some negative aspects of technology have also become a high-risk problem, recognized by the states and non-state actors, even the individuals and companies. This problem is generally defined as cyber attacks. It is possible to define them as malicious attacks against vital areas such as bank accounts, internet-information networks, education, power transmission lines, infrastructure services, and health systems (Korhan, 2016, p. 148). In addition, the COVID-19 epidemic, which has lasted until the moment this study was conducted and whose duration time cannot be exactly predicted, is also included in the epidemic diseases group which is strictly connected to the perception of security by the states.

As it can be understood from the definition of the concept of security, it is related to many disciplines. Although the definition of the concept is difficult, it is necessary to mention some terms. The concepts that will be mentioned together with the security phenomenon will be examined in the main dimensions of the security phenomenon.

## Major dimensions of the security phenomenon

The concept of security is associated with human history and is at least as old as human history. As can be understood from the definitions of the concept of security, it is related to many different disciplines. In this section, the focus will be on how the security phenomenon is defined within the basic approaches in the literature. In addition, power, law, and international organization, which are used to explain the concept of security, will be emphasized. The security-related connections of these approaches will be explained as well. The concept of security is also of great importance, especially in terms of the discipline of international relations. The perspectives of

states on the concept of security are of vital importance. States, like people belonging to the realist tradition, look at the concept of security from a power-oriented perspective. In early times, states brought military power to the fore in their power-oriented approaches (Sancak, 2013, p. 125).

In the literature, there are also opposing views on those who do not accept the power to make the other party do their own will. Lukes is cited as an example. According to Lukes, security is expressed as the situation of being compelled to act in a way that is incompatible with one's own interests when the other party acts (Goksu, 2019, p. 10). States, at first, considered the concept of security as a military power. Under the influence of the historical conjuncture, with the increase of mutual threats, the concept of security was then handled with the concept of defense. Considering temporal motion, the theorists have tried to explain the concept of power by attributing different facts to it. Nye, on the other hand, divided the concept of power into two: soft power and hard power (Nye, 2011, p. 28). According to Nye, states should analyze the phenomenon of power by dividing it into two. It is understood that states should understand the hard power, that is, military power, which is of vital importance for security in the face of a threat, and the soft power which should be used in matters of lower-level importance for the states.

Some theorists explain the power issue which has caused great controversy in the economic literature. Some of the theorists emphasizing this issue are Keohane and Nye. These theorists, on the other hand, oppose the realist theory and define economic power as opposed to military power (Alagoz, 2016, p. 37). In the literature, it has been seen that the theorists who explain the concept of security with the phenomenon of power, especially consider it as military, economic, hard, and soft power. Apart from these theorists, there are theorists who argue that the concept of security can be provided by law and social organization (cooperation) in order to provide the concept of security in the international arena. First of all, theorists trying to explain security with the concept of law have used the concept of international law. According to Hobbes, people are inherently evil depending on the state of nature.

These essentials force people to follow certain rules. It can be argued that if people do not obey the rules, they should be punished in return (Kırıs, 2018, p. 8). According to Hobbes, people will only become compatible with the state of nature when they obey these rules of law. Hobbes also argues that these legal rules can be applied in the interstate relations. However, the first person to use the concept of International Law was Grotius. In his analysis, Grotius agrees with the realist theorists' understanding that human nature is bad. In response to these realist theorists, while defending the rules of law like these formulated by Hobbes to prevent people from conflict, states also attacked the anarchic environment so that that it had to abide by the rules of international law in order to avoid wars (Kırıs, 2018, pp. 8-9). In short, it is possible to say that organization is a new phenomenon. Kant, in his work *Essay on perpetual peace*, argues that security can be achieved through international organizations (Oran, Cemre, 2017, pp. 8-9). In this essay, Kant advocates the international course as the best solution to avoid any problems between states and to lay the groundwork in a positive sense (Kırıs, 2018, p. 10). They have reached an agreement so that this international war should not be waged within the states, which was exhibited e.g. in

World War I as an example. Wilson debuted here with fourteen principles. Based on these principles, Wilson also included disarmament, open diplomacy, and international organizations (Calis, Ozluk, 2007, pp. 227-228).

It is clear that many factors are effective, especially in the case of security. It is possible to address these factors by expanding them. This can be explained by the depth and breadth of the concept of security. It can be seen that there are many different evaluations in the literature. From this point of view, it would be more useful to examine the security phenomenon in two parts in order to analyze it in more detail. These two parts will be discussed as security perception before and after the cold war. It will be useful to begin the analysis by examining the perception of security before the cold war in order to better understand the historical development of the concept of security.

### Traditional perception of security before the cold war

States have become the most important players of the international system since the 1648 Westphalia agreement to the present day. With this peace treaty, the Middle Ages understanding of feudal administration was abandoned. Instead of this system, the understanding of the modern national state has emerged. It is possible to define the national state as a community of people living in it, having certain borders, and being in a dominant position within these borders (Haser, 2018, p. 12). Along with the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern national state system, there has been a change of both political and administrative nature (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 14). With this administrative and political change, modern states, whose borders are clear and regionally dominant, have begun to consolidate their power in the central position. According to Burzan, the sovereign and centralized states did not want any external influence on their political affairs, thus, the principle of not interfering in their internal affairs has emerged in order to protect the power of the sovereign (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 15). In this case, the security of states was also perceived as the security of people and other institutions that make up the state. Thus, states began to look at security from the perspective of national security and become very interested in security because they needed security both to survive and to ensure continuity.

The traditionalist theory, which interprets national security, explained it as territorial integrity, political independence, and military interventions (Torun, 2012, p. 45). According to this view, non-military threats were not perceived as a security problem. It is possible to say that two different concepts emerged with this approach. They dealt with military and direct threats to the state (high politics), economy, and other problems of secondary importance (low politics) (Karabulut, 2009, pp. 67-68). Thus, when the traditional understanding of security is mentioned and when the state is mentioned, security comes to mind (Bilgin, 2002, p. 103).

According to Miller, the biggest factors that threaten national security in the traditional security approach are the states in the international system. He summarizes these states as states that are not content with the current situation or extremely nationalistic and aggressive states (Haser, 2018, p. 13). Baldwin, on the other hand, defines the traditionalist approach by

considering only the military dimension of national security (Torun, 2012, p. 46). The theorists such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau have argued that strong military power ensures the state sovereignty, and therefore theoretically ensures national security (Baylis, 2008, p. 71).

In this context, the traditionalist approach tried to explain the state administration based on the understanding of “human nature is bad” of the realist theorists, who looked at national security as a military power (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 17). From the point of view of the realist understanding, it is clear that national security is connected with the realist theory. It would be appropriate to say that it is basically shaped by concepts such as war, peace, and power (Karabulut, 2019, p. 56).

From this point of view, it is argued that in the traditionalist security understanding, security can be provided with military power and capacity. The military force is constantly increasing the capacity and reinforces the understanding of defense with new weapons. This is of great importance for the states’ ability to respond and deter threats. As a result, Baldwin explains that the security perception of the traditionalist approach, which claims that national security can only be achieved with military capacity, has not changed as show the examples from during and after the cold war (Torun, 2012, p. 46). Baldwin argues that the traditionalist approach’s understanding of security did not change with the increasing weapon technology in this period and the desire of states to have these weapons for deterrence. He only argues that some new issues have entered the field of security. In the section up to this point, what the traditional security understanding covers have been analyzed.

Now, how they will provide security and the necessary arguments will be explained. From this point of view, we will draw attention to the development of the security phenomenon in the historical process and deepen our research. We will try to analyze what kind of differences there are in the concept of security in its historical development, and what these differences cover if anything.

## Historical development of the security phenomenon

In order to analyze the historical development of security more accurately, it is necessary to go back to the first humans. Such a long process prevents us from making an accurate analysis. The concept of security is explained in the first chapter. The facts that there are many different approaches and that the concept changed during its development according to the conjuncture, makes Ward’s analysis difficult. The concept of security is not a concrete concept. It cannot be seen with the naked eye. But with some equipment and tools, it becomes concrete and gains meaning. The phenomenon of security has always been the subject of research in the social sciences. Besides, the concept of security has undergone changes, just like the state phenomenon, and has survived through different phases of development until today. Thus, it is possible to say that there is a parallelism between the need for security and the emergence of modern states in 1648.

People have blamed the states for their security vulnerabilities and concerns. Thus, there has been a transition from human security to state security. In this process, the concept of security

has included many different concepts. While talking about the concept of security, Dedeoğlu argues that there should be internal-external threats in order to protect and maintain the existence (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 5). It can be said that the prevention of these external and internal threats falls under the responsibility of the state. There are many different themes in the literature on the historical change and development of security. These differences are used to explain the security phenomenon. According to the most commonly accepted view in the literature, the development of the security phenomenon is examined by dividing it into two groups. These two groups are based on system and religion (Karabulut, 2009, p. 46).

When we look at the analysis as a system, it is primarily based on the wars between these countries which we call Greek city-states (*polis*), when there were no nation-states in the modern sense. It is not correct to talk about a full international relationships between these states. However, the fact that these states fought with each other in the process revealed a security problem (Donmez, 2010, pp. 5-7). The vulnerability that emerged here also introduced us to the Latin word “se+cura”. The establishment of the Roman Empire brought about great changes in the political structure. It has been a large conglomerate of states with a central government.

Ariboğan, on the other hand, stated that the size and central structure of the Roman Empire was taken as an example of the unipolar world system (Donmez, 2010, p. 8). The wars over the system eventually introduced us to the process we know as the Peace of Rome (*Pax Romana*). From the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, the Romans began to provide private and public security under the protection of their empire (Haser, 2018, p. 9). Theorists who analyze the historical development of security through the phenomenon of religion, on the other hand, explain their thesis with the fact that the phenomenon of religion triggered wars until the period of monotheistic religions. Along with monotheistic religions, they examined the wars with other religions according to the understanding of the religion that people believed in. Over time, religion-based and sectarian wars emerged in Europe and created a perception of security problems (Haser, 2018, p. 10). It is possible to take the issue of security, examined in terms of religion, back to the past few years. In 2011, the Syrian state came to the point of collapse with the civil war. During this civil war, some illegal organizations emerged in its own territory. This structure, which recruited soldiers especially by perverting the religion of Islam, has become a security problem. As a matter of fact, this problem has been a threat to our borders due to the fact that we are neighbors of the Syrian state. The deceived people, belonging to the illegal ISIS organization, who identified themselves as Muslims, caused the death of hundreds of our people when suicide bombers detonated themselves in public areas within our borders. In short, the phenomenon of religion continues to be important today. In this example, it is a problem of terrorism originating from religion.

Some perceptions of the phenomenon of religion have also shown that religion is important in many issues, including terrorism (Karabulut, 2009, p. 46). In order to deepen and improve our analysis, it would be more appropriate to make some additions to the studies on the system and religion. In order to better analyze how the perception of security has changed during the historical process, we will emphasize some important turning points in the this process. These include expansionist and invasive aggressive attitudes that increased with the development of



civilizations. These civilizations have historically been Mongols, Persians, Romans, and Chinese (Karabulut, 2009, p. 47). Especially with the discovery of gunpowder by the Chinese, the security problem in these wars increased. Another important factor in the historical development of security were the geographical discoveries (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 137). In this way, gunpowder and other tools used in wars in the Far East were transported to Western societies. When it was understood that strong castles would be destroyed by these gunpowders, even the high castles that were safe became useless. The best example of this is the conquest of Constantinople by Fatih Sultan Mehmet (Mehmet the Conqueror) in 1453. It would be correct to add the industrial revolution to this article as well.

The introduction of steam engines and heavy weapons also caused heavy losses to the enemy state on the battlefields. This has led to a change in the perception of security. While arrows, bows, and swords were used before, the security problem has changed and deepened with gunpowder and heavy artillery (Gudek, 2012, p. 92). The 18<sup>th</sup> century industrial revolution and ideological ideas have produced irreversible results in terms of security perception. The Napoleonic wars, which reveal this destruction, are an important ideological example, both as a whole and in terms of nationalist ideas as there is a complete security problem gap (Karabulut, 2009, p. 47). There are many theorists who oppose this idea. According to Locke, one of these theorists, idealistic tendencies developed in this century. He argues, however, that current views against the war situation are developing (Donmez, 2010, p. 10). Yet, there are many empires and great states in history that were destroyed as a result of the nationalist movements. Many nations living under the roof of these states have faced various negative factors due to the increasing nationalism-based security problem.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, due to the increasing wars and changing systematic transformations in the capital, the flow of capital to the West, and the development of the high level of prosperity created here, misery has occurred in other regions, and this has revealed the center-periphery problem (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 138). Foster argues that these problems, which emerged in the field of energy, urbanization, and industrialization as a result of capitalism, create a security deficit on a global scale. Buzan, on the other hand, argues that in this century, the hegemonic powers carried out global resource controls and used these resources in line with the interests of their own countries (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 138). After the source control, security strategies have diversified and transformed in important areas such as economy, oil and coal. This source control has started to become a security problem all over the world.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as a result of the desire to dominate strategic resources and geopolitically important geographies, we faced two major wars on a global scale. World War I and II were the most devastating ones and resulted in severe consequences that history has ever seen. Especially in the period which we call the cold war, the world experienced a balance of terror with increasing nuclear weapons. These events have shown us that with industrial and technological developments weapons of more striking power have emerged. Countries that do not have these weapons, on the other hand, have found shelter under the roof of the countries that do. This process introduced us to the bipolar system as Morton Kaplan put it (Kantarci, 2008, p. 49).

Finally, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the increase in idealistic tendencies in Turkey regarding human rights, law, international cooperation, free trade, democratic governments and social developments to provide security and eliminate war has introduced us to different dimensions of security (Calis, Ozluk, 2007, p. 228). In addition to these, the technological developments based on the Internet, such as increasing communication, can be considered the most important developments of this century. Despite many positive effects, these developments have revealed both state and individual problems in terms of cyber security (Akyesilmen, 2018, pp. 118-119).

As a result, the perception of security that has existed since the first humans continues to exist today. The concept which has undergone a cyclical change, has continued its changes and gained diversity depending on the era. The problem of perception of security has developed and encompassed many different areas. I tried to explain these areas by giving examples from today. The period during and after the cold war, in which security gained a completely different dimension, will be discussed. Thus, our analysis will gain a deeper framework with an advanced literature review. The cold war period is important because it is directly related to many fields such as military, economy and politics, and the security phenomenon will be analyzed within this framework in the next section.

## Change and transformation of security perception

### The post-cold war modern approach to security

In order to better analyze the change and transformation of security perception, in this section the conditions of the cold war and the post-cold war period will be examined and analyzed. In this way, the transformation of the perception of security brought by the cold war will contribute to our analysis. Before moving on to the modern security approach adopted after the cold war, it will be useful for our analysis to look at the conditions of this period. The increase in nuclear/conventional weapons during and after the cold war and the world's shaping of a balance of terror have revealed very important results for the perception of security. This period, and especially the early 1900s and the period up to 1990s, will be included in the analysis.

Let's have a brief look at the 1900s: At the beginning of the 1900s, several large states had a desire to become a hegemonic power. Smaller states wanted to complete their development as soon as possible. In this period, many states, especially Mussolini's Italy, which wanted to complete their development with revisionist and ideological approaches, adopted an aggressive stance as a policy. There was an ideological conflict which spreaded all over the world. These ideological and aggressive attitudes soon gave way to wars. These wars, over time, appeared as World War I and II. Before these wars there was an increase in the military power and capacities of the states, especially in terms of security. In accordance with the conditions of the period, tanks, aircraft and effective cannons were produced depending on the level of development of the industries. This developing and growing arms industry soon turned into war. Between 1914



and 1918, the greatest war in history took place. This war, which we call World War I, caused the death of millions of soldiers and the change of many lands (Nye, 2011, pp. 15-16).

Woodrow Wilson, one of the former presidents of the USA, published 14 principles so that such a great war would not happen again in this period. These principles indicated briefly that they would advocate establishing international peace and that some measures should be taken against such negative situations (Boztas, 2014, pp. 165-166). The Wilson Principles were received favorably by the defeated states that emerged from the war. However, it has been ignored that some principles can be used for profit (Boztas, 2014, p. 166). The League of Nations was established within the framework of the Wilson Principles and its main goal is to prevent states from fighting again and to ensure world stability (Boztas, 2014, p. 168). However, the victorious states did not accept the Wilson's principles, and the increase in fascist attacks evoked the heaviest and most wearing war that history has seen, which we call World War II (Elmas, 2010, pp. 32-33).

World War II is of great importance in many respects. First of all, the victorious and defeated states in World War I greatly increased their military equipment and weapons in a very short time and entered a kind of arms race (Yıldız, 2019, p. 1). Although Germany was defeated in the war, it had a very large military capacity. Due to the continuing ideological conflicts, World War II took place with the use of the most advanced weapons, even nuclear weapons that had not been tested before. These nuclear weapons have replaced conventional weapons used in previous wars (Donmez, 2010, p. 102). These nuclear weapons were of such great importance that the concept of nuclear deterrence also entered the literature at that time and some states started a race to gain nuclear weapons. After World War II, studies were initiated to ban the use of these weapons which left their mark on the period (Sancak, 2013, p. 128).

These weapons were also very effective in the post-war period. In the period we call the cold war, a bipolar structure emerged (Birdıslı, 2020, p. 246). This bipolar structure is NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Donmez, 2010, p. 259). Here the main states are the USA and the Soviet Union. According to Waever and Buzan, security studies have emerged as a separate field in the USA since the 1940s. In this period, they emphasized two main factors: nuclear weapons and the state of being ready for war at any moment against the Soviet Union (Donmez, 2010, p. 21). These two states experienced an ideological conflict. The main purpose of their ideologies was to become a hegemonic power in the world and rule alone (Guner, 2008, p. 17). These ideological-based policies could turn into a hot conflict even following very small incidents.

However, the general military aim of the period was to destroy the war weapons and equipment of the opposing side rather than a mass slaughter (Oguzlu, 2007, p. 8). With the concept of deterrence used in this period, states ensured their security in a sense. Accordingly, when a state tried to reshape the system with revisionist aims, other powers would come together to form a counter-balancing bloc, in accordance with the principle of "balance of power" (Oguzlu, 2007, p. 7). Here, states are based on a balance of nuclear armament, not the conventional weapons (Birdıslı, 2020, p. 246). This period has shown that the economy, military and technology are interlinked for deterrence. There were no large-scale conflicts during the cold war period. In the literature, this period is called the balance of terror, the arms race or the system of alliances

(Celikpala, 2019, p. 1). At the end of this process, a new concept, the perception of the security dilemma, has emerged. The redefinition of this concept was carried out by Booth and Wheeler (Bilgic, 2011, p. 128).

Mc Sweeney, on the other hand, named this period the second period 1950s-1980s. He argued that this period was under the influence of the realist movements and was called the golden period by realist writers (Donmez, 2010, p. 22). During this process, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union broke up. The changing borders, minority problems and regional instability problems caused the concept of security to deepen (Baylis, 2008, p. 74). In addition, in the post-cold war period many theorists turned to the field of security studies because of the epistemological richness this kind of studies offered (Bırdışlı, 2020, p. 36). Furthermore, the broadening approach to the security concept allowed to conceive security beyond military threats in 1983 with Buzan's two works entitled *People, states and fear*, and Ullman's article *Redefining security* (Acikmese, 2011, p. 48). One of these theorists is Deutsch (Dedeoglu, 2004, p. 3). Clark, on the other hand, argues that after this period, the territorial characteristic of security weakened with globalization (Torun, 2012, p. 96).

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff also argue that the concept of globalization gained importance in this period (Polat, 2020, p. 494). Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that there are greater opportunities for states to work together in the post-cold war era (Baylis, 2008, p. 74). In addition, Buzan defended the view that states are threatened by military, political, social, economic, and ecological problems (Cavas, 2008, p. 6). As a result, the perception of security has changed, especially after the cold war. Different from military power and regional defense, multidimensional security issues have emerged (Cavas, 2008, p. 6). With the end of the cold war, the security threats from hunger to women's problems, from environmental pollution to economic instability and even the epidemic diseases have increasingly entered the literature (Acikmese, 2011, p. 48). In addition to traditional security studies, security threats were approached from different perspectives as in the classification example of Buzan and Hansen: peace studies, critical security studies, feminist security studies, Copenhagen school, post-structuralism, which are known as major security theories and constructive security studies.

For example, the Third World security school emphasizes that security is affected by problems such as food, health, money, trade, as well as nuclear weapons (Acikmese, 2011, p. 49). Boot, on the other hand, divides the technological developments in the battlefield into four categories and argues that the perception of security has changed due to these concepts. There are also Gunpowder Revolution in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Industrial Revolution in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to Boot, history is full of examples of superpowers missing these revolutions (Nye, 2011, p. 17).

It is clear that the weapon systems have changed with technological developments and industrial revolutions. This change, in its simplest form, triggers the change of the concept of security. As in the cold war era, deterrence and containment policies no longer provide absolute security. The best example here are the terrorist attacks (Oguzlu, 2007, p. 13). Nye, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, stated that most of the wars are not in the form of states fighting each other, but in the form of conflicts within themselves, and those who fight usually do not wear uniforms. In the

era we live in there are wars between small groups that do not have the status of states with a very high destructive and threatening power achieved thanks to modern technologies, he says, and argues that the perception of security has changed (Nye, 2011, p. 13). It can be said that the use of military force has decreased over time, but it has not completely disappeared. Obama, the former president of the United States of America, in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize speech said that "(...) the norms that military power brings with it, albeit at the lowest level, are necessary for the continuation of the world order". He argues that no matter how much the environment and time change, military power will never disappear (Nye, 2011, p. 20).

It can be said that the perception of security has changed in the historical process and gained importance in terms of matters that will cause security problems. Many critical theories have emerged about the perception of security, especially after the cold war. In this section we examined the historical development of security perception and we have seen that there are many new approaches to the perception of security. In the following sections, the theories that emerged with the change in the perception of security will be discussed. Thus, our analysis will deepen with theories created from different perspectives upon security.

## Copenhagen school

The general structure formed in 1990 and later has been deeply influenced by social sciences. In the field of social sciences, the most affected was the field of international relations. While there was a state-centered approach in international relations until the 1990s, the situation that emerged after the 1990s was reanalyzed (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 59). These analyses have led to the formation of security theories that will make important contributions to the international relations literature. The structure we define as the Copenhagen school was developed in the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 59).

The Copenhagen school, which emerged in 1985 within the framework of the ideas of thinkers such as Buzan and Waever, took its name as a result of the security-centered studies carried out at the University of Copenhagen (Ermis, 2015, p. 14). In this center, they worked on the concept of security under the scientific direction of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde. The work of the school began with the establishment of the Peace and Conflict Research Center (COPRI) at the University of Copenhagen in 1985. The school, which focused on European security during its establishment, continued its studies on the security of other non-military areas as well as the understanding of military security (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 146).

The school was born in the late 1980s, during the theorizing period in the field of security studies, as a critique of the actorthreatpolicy triad of the traditional/realistic security understanding (Acıkmese, 2011, p. 46). This school has an important place in the literature with its securitization theory, sectoral security approach, regional security complex theory, and international security studies (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 146). A significant portion of the discussion of security change has been devoted to enlargement. The widening of the security agenda to focus on non-military issues was criticized in Walt's article *The renaissance of security studies*, which is the

most cited article on traditional security understanding (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 23). The discourse of expanding the perception of security actually emphasizes that the concept of security should be removed from the traditional point of view. Buzan, who advocated expanding the scope of security in his book *People, states and fear*, published in 1983, emphasized that objects other than the state should also be a subject of security (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 24). The expanded perception of security by Buzan is as follows:

- Military sector,
- Political sector,
- Environmental sector,
- Economic sector,
- Social Sector (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 59).

In addition, the Copenhagen School tried to change the traditional understanding of security and develop a new understanding of security, especially through three concepts. The first of these concepts is the concept of “securitization” put forward by Waever, the second is that of “social security” introduced by Buzan. The third and most current concept is “regional security” (Karabulut, 2009, p. 75). The work of Buzan and Walt under the name of expanding security is of great importance. An important contribution of the securitization theory enabled to provide a new and more convincing explanation of the transformation of Europe after World War II (Bilgin, 2000, p. 81). From this point of view, it has been criticized for the Copenhagen school by including non-military issues in security, and at the same time it has tried to explain the approach of the Copenhagen school. In the book *Security: A new framework for analysis* written by Copenhagen school thinkers Weaver and de Wilde, it is mentioned that the actors other than the state are brought to the fore (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 24).

Another criticism of the Copenhagen school towards the traditional understanding of security is that it is too Western. In this context, the critics objected to the fact that security definitions are always Western-centered definitions with the effect of the Westphalian System (Karabulut, 2009, p. 74). The most important reason why Buzan’s ideas found support in the 1990 and later structure is that the realist (traditional) security arguments that dominated the discipline in 1945 and later did not interpret well the anti-Communist movement in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, the collapse of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the USSR and couldn’t predict the process (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 60). In addition, the Copenhagen school’s opposition to a Western security perception approach included security studies in other regions in the analysis. In the new understanding of security, the contributions of the Copenhagen school to the transformation of the post-cold war security understanding have been accepted, but some criticisms have also emerged. The first of those criticisms is that the categories Buzan put forward for the purpose of expanding security have a political purpose and make the state the main actor. Second, it is about perspective. Since securitization is discourse-centered and the state dominates the discourse, it is the case of ensuring that states continue as the main actor (Akmanlar, 2019, pp. 25-26).

In conclusion, it can be said that the Copenhagen school represents the transition process from the traditional security understanding to the new security understanding.

## The Welsh/Aberystwyth school

The end of the cold war paved the way for unconventional approaches to reconceptualize security. Another group that contributed to the development of critical security studies in the 1990s and beyond is the Aberystwyth school. The Aberystwyth school was influenced by the post-Marxist tradition compared to the Copenhagen school and especially benefited from the influence of the Frankfurt school on social sciences (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 62). Because of their influence from the Frankfurt school, the work of the Welsh school is also critically evaluated in the perspective of security studies. Various studies have been carried out under the name of the critical theory in order to create alternatives and find different ways against the limited and monotonous understanding of this traditional understanding.

The most important representative of the Welsh school is Booth. Booth's article entitled *Security and emancipation* published in the *Review of International Studies* in 1991, constitutes the intellectual background within the critical security studies of the Welsh school (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 63). Other important theorists are Krause and Williams. The book *Critical security studies: Concepts and cases* compiled by Krause and Williams in 1996 provided guidance. In this study, it is discussed how to move away from traditional assumptions about security in the face of changing threat and risk perceptions after the cold war (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 29). They have also deepened our understanding of security (deepening security). This move reveals the relationship between academic concepts and political agendas. The second move is broadening security to address the range of insecurities faced by these actors (Bilgin, 2000, p. 84).

Critical security studies carried out under the name of the Welsh/Aberystwyth school by academics such as Booth, Wyn Jones, Linklater, Krause and Williams at Aberystwyth University in England have come to the fore within the scope of these new assessments of security (Akmanlar, 2019, pp. 29-30). According to the Welsh school, ethnic groups, nations and the whole world community constitute alternative actors of security problems. Due to the fact that security is so multidimensional, in addition to military threats other security problems can also be the subject of security studies. Booth opposes the purely realistic understanding of security in his article.

Booth connects security and emancipation in his article, and according to him, the concept of security means a situation without threats while the concept of emancipation means getting rid of the physical and human barriers that prevent people from doing what they choose to do freely as individuals or as a group (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 62). K. Booth associated security and emancipation with the phrase "two sides of the same coin" (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 32). The real security for Booth is the security that brings liberation (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 63). As a result, Booth's statement "my freedom depends on your freedom" facilitates the inference that othering and threats will be eliminated with the unity provided between freedom and security (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 32). This creates a new perception of security by criticizing the traditional understanding of security. This perception, on the other hand, says that they are dependent on each other.

## Critical theory

Mc Sweeney from the very beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century divided the understanding of security into certain periods. Mc Sweeney defines the current period as the fourth period. The fourth period is the period we are in after the end of the cold war. This period is the era of the critical theory, feminist theory, postmodernism, structuralism, and critical security studies. It defines the period as the period that has no connection with the second period, when the realist movement was active (Donmez, 2010, p. 22). The origins of the critical theory go back to the Frankfurt school, which stemmed from the work of writers such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, who gathered around the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in the 1920s and 1930s, initially in Germany and then in the USA (Karabulut, 2009, p. 87). The critical theory was developed in Germany in the 1920s and later in the USA. It was put forward by the thinkers of the Frankfurt School (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 144).

The critical theory was first introduced in 1937 in the Frankfurt school thinker Max Horkheimer's article *Traditional and critical theory*. The critical theory developed from the Frankfurt school studies has a wide range of disciplines such as sociology, ethics, psychoanalysis, philosophy and social anthropology (Akmanlar, 2019, p. 26). The critical theory became a theory that entered the discipline of international relations at the end of the 1980s, when the cold war period began to end, and questioned the questions and answers asked until then. It started to gain acceptance in the 1990s (Haser, 2018, p. 48).

Although the pioneers of the critical theory are Horkheimer, Pollock, Adorno, Habermas and Marcuse, it is originally based on the Western Marxism or Neo-Marxist philosophy (Bakan, Sahin, 2018, p. 144). According to the critical theory, security is based on the state, not on the individual. In addition, the critical theory has made great criticisms of realism because the individuals claimed to ignore their needs. In addition, according to the critical theory, security is a field of study which adopts a bottom up perspective – from the individual to the highest human community – and is evaluated in terms of theory and practice (Karabulut, 2009, p. 87).

Another criticism of the traditional security theory is that security concerns only the states and people. However, a healthy analysis should include not only the states but also the internal dynamics of the states (Kiris, 2018, p. 20). Realism, they claim, neglects this area. According to the critical approach, security begins with the individual, and freedom and security are like two halves of an apple (Haser, 2018, pp. 48-49). According to the critical security theorists, the most important security barrier in front of societies are existing rules, norms and institutions (Karabulut, 2009, p. 88). In this respect, the critical theory opposes the analysis of security of the state in the traditional theory and adopts a critical attitude on the basis of the individual, justice and freedom. According to Mark Neufeld, "security = liberation" (Karabulut, 2009, p. 89). Another contribution to the critical security studies was the approach to this issue from a human-based perspective for the first time (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 58). After this period, non-traditional security threats emerged. These threats are also of human origin. For this reason, the concept of humanitarian intervention came to the fore for the first time at the Toronto conference, where the meaning of



this phenomenon was discussed. A few years after the Toronto summit, the UN International Commission on Foreign Intervention and State Sovereignty was established (Kıyıcı, 2012, p. 58).

As a result, the critical theory basically opposes the perception of the state and sovereignty in the traditional approach to security, while defending the liberation of the individual. It emphasizes the need to consider the individual as the basis of security. It is argued that security threats have also changed in the post-cold war era. By avoiding ideological conflicts, this theory advocates the creation of a more humane order and a livable, free environment.

## Postmodern theory

The perception of security is one of the most discussed issues in the post-cold war period. The postmodern theory dates back to the 1960s. The theory that emerged later in France became influential in the USA. It was interested in art and literature in its early years. In the following years, especially in the 1980s, it started to enter the discipline of the international relations (Karabulut, 2009, p. 96). The postmodern theory has criticized the realist theory the most. Here, too, realism argues that the state is not an indispensable institution (Haser, 2018, p. 51). According to the postmodern theory, individuals, cultures and ethnic-religious groups should be protected.

The important representatives of postmodernism in the discipline of international relations are Ashley, Der Derian, Walker, Connolly, and Campbell (Coskun, 2007, p. 193). The postmodern theory criticizes the state-centered perception and instead just emphasizes the importance of new approaches based on individuals. However, the postmodern theory has approached the global phenomena critically and defended locality. It is possible to define the postmodern theory as anti-universality (Karabulut, 2009, p. 98). According to the postmodern theorists, states sometimes give some security vulnerabilities in order to make artificial agenda. They claim that the most important reason for this is to protect national identity and territorial integrity by creating an artificial threat perception on a small scale (Karabulut, 2009, p. 100). As a result, it can be said that many theories that emerged after the cold war show similarities. Their basic perceptions are security theories which are handled through humans and freedom. These theories argue that the sources of threats for security change and therefore the concepts that will provide security are also equalized.

## Conclusion

The concept of security continues to change today. The most important example of this change is the COVID-19 epidemic disease. The concept of security, which has been developing from the first humans to the present, continues to exist by deepening and expanding according to the conditions of the age. The 21<sup>st</sup> century has achievements that will go down in history in terms of technological and scientific development. Such advanced technologies as unmanned aerial vehicles, robots, quantum computers or smartphones have also caused negative consequences. The negative consequences of these positive developments are at a level that will affect the human, state, and non-state actors. We met the concepts that emerged with this advanced

technology, which we call cyber attacks or cyber espionage. This has also deeply affected people, states, companies, and supranational actors.

When we consider the historical development of security, there are threats according to the conditions of the period and tools to combat these threats in order to provide security in accordance with the characteristics of the period. World War II was a turning point in the perception of security. Especially, the historical time period, which we call the cold war and which emerged after this war, is important in terms of carrying out many studies on security. In our study, we generally divided them into two groups. As a conclusion, for these two parts, it can be said that the threats that posed a security problem in the pre-cold war period are generally similar. However, the second group of our study assumes that the threats that will create a security problem have developed further in the period until today. We encountered many new and different threats. Although these elements change and develop, it will be possible to say that the perception of security provided by military force will never disappear, but its importance will decrease. On the other hand, human rights, democracy, animal rights, and ecosystem will gain importance in the future.

In particular, I would like to point out that in today's world, which is the most technological age the world has ever seen, many important developments will occur in the cyber field that we have mentioned above. I think that some preventive concepts that have started to be effective in this cyber field, or the new theories, will be developed to prevent the possible threats. In this field, which is gaining importance day by day, states will want to have some preventive equipment because they do not want to lose their sovereignty. The best example of this are some measures taken by the states against cryptocurrencies. Smart objects, which come into our lives more and more with Industry 4.0, will cause security problems in many respects, especially they will create a need of protection of private life.

The technological developments in the 21<sup>st</sup> century have created some changes in the characteristics and nature of power for the states. In addition to all these developments, the world order is not only in line with the military forces of the great powers. Moreover, the world order is far beyond a system based only on the brute force of these powers (Ozluk, 2017, p. 255). Cyber attacks on the critical infrastructures of states in recent years have proven this claim. The states do not compromise their security to survive. However, the perception of power before the cold war has left its place to more specific components today. States have not completely abandoned their military forces, but in addition to their military forces, they have included smart power components with some new deterrent features into their security mechanisms.

It is certain that the concept of internalization of objects, which plays an important role today, will bring many different dimensions to the changing perception of security. It has been evident from some events which occur today that these objects will bring with them in the coming years many different security problems and violations. In addition to these problems, the dizzying developments in the cyber field have eliminated the internal-external distinction, which is considered a threat. With the disappearance of this distinction, it is certain that there will be security problems anytime, anywhere, and with any object. The problems that arise here again,



coincide with the security problems brought by the age. Just as the Chinese people discovered gunpowder, the changing perception of security today has created multidimensional security vulnerabilities with the internalization of objects.

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## Cytowanie

- Tuncer, O.S. (2022). Concepts of security from a perspective of political science. *Acta Politica Polonica*, 1 (53), 127–146. DOI: 10.18276/ap. 2022.53-09.

## Recenzja

Janusz Józef Węc, *Germany's Position on the System Reform of the European Union in 2002–2016* (Stanowisko Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2002–2016), Peter Lang, Berlin 2018, ss. 325

MARTA SZULC

DR

ORCID: 0000-0002-9928-305X

Uniwersytet Szczeciński

Instytut Nauk o Polityce i Bezpieczeństwie

e-mail: marta.szulc@usz.edu.pl

Kształt obecnego systemu politycznego Unii Europejskiej (UE) to niewątpliwie efekt wielu konsultacji, reform, traktatów i negocjacji wszystkich państw UE. Nie wszystkie kraje miały jednak identyczny wpływ na przebieg procesów konsultacyjnych czy negocjacyjnych, co wynika z różnej siły poszczególnych podmiotów. Niezaprzeczalnym faktem jest, że Niemcy miały istotny wpływ na obecny kształt UE oraz na proces prowadzenia najważniejszych negocjacji w ostatnich latach.

Rola Niemiec w systemie reform UE została poddana analizie w monografii prof. Janusza Józefa Węca *Germany's Position on the System Reform of the European Union in 2002–2016* [Stanowisko Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2002–2016]. Wybrana cezura czasowa obejmuje dość długi okres, tj. od momentu przed rozszerzeniem UE w 2004 roku do roku 2016, co pokazuje biegłość autora w zaproponowanej tematyce i czyni tym samym publikację niezwykle cenną pozycją przy rozmaitych analizach dotyczących systemów politycznych i procesów konsultacyjnych.

Monografia przedstawiona czytelnikom to szczegółowa analiza systemu reform UE w latach 2002–2016 z punktu widzenia udziału i znaczenia Niemiec w procesie kształtowania się Unii. Spojrzenie na zagadnienie z perspektywy tylko jednego z uczestników pozwala uchwycić niedostrzegalne przy opisywaniu zagadnienia w szerszym kontekście szczegóły, co jest

niezwykle istotne poznawczo. Jednocześnie dzięki wnikliwej analizie pozycja może wspomóc innych badaczy w dalszych badaniach nad zagadnieniem pozycji poszczególnych państw europejskich w procesie kształtowania się systemu politycznego UE, a także samej pozycji Niemiec po 2016 roku.

Autor analizując zmianę postawy Niemiec dotyczącą reformowania UE, postawił sobie trzy hipotezy badawcze. Pierwsza zakłada, że rząd federalny Niemiec odegrał przywódczą rolę w reformowaniu UE w latach 2002–2005 i 2005–2009. Druga hipoteza badawcza zakłada, że rząd federalny miał realny wpływ nie tylko na dynamikę kryzysu zadłużeniowego strefy euro, ale także na kształt reformy ustrojowej tego obszaru w latach 2012–2016. W trzeciej hipotezie autor założył, że złe decyzje rządu niemieckiego wobec europejskiego kryzysu migracyjnego, zwłaszcza nieudana próba zaradzenia temu kryzysowi, a także postępowanie wobec innych państw członkowskich w zakresie reformy unijnej polityki imigracyjnej, kontroli granic zewnętrznych i polityki azylowej, konsekwentnie kompromitują pozycję Niemiec w tej międzynarodowej organizacji.

Publikacja składa się z pięciu rozdziałów oraz obszernej, bardzo szczegółowej bibliografii, która w głównej mierze składa się z dokumentów i aktów prawnych. W poszczególnych rozdziałach poddane są analizie kolejno: stanowisko Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemowej UE, pozycja Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemu UE w latach 2002–2005, stanowisko Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemowej w latach 2005–2009, stanowisko Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemu UE oraz unii gospodarczej i walutowej (2011–2016), stanowisko Niemiec wobec europejskiego kryzysu migracyjnego w latach 2015–2016.

W rozdziale pierwszym z niezwykle dokładnością i starannością opisano historię kształtowania się ustroju Unii Europejskiej przed rokiem 2002. Szczególne miejsce poświęcono Konferencji Międzyrządowej w sprawie Unii Politycznej (1990–1991) i Konferencji Międzyrządowej na temat Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej (1990–1991) oraz ocenie stanowiska Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemu UE w latach 1996–2001. Ważnym punktem rozdziału jest także omówienie traktatu amsterdamskiego i traktatu nicejskiego. W rozdziale zawarto znaczącą liczbę przykładów wpływu strony niemieckiej na proces powstawania tych traktatów. Rozdział ten ma charakter wprowadzający do omawianego zagadnienia i zawiera bardzo szczegółowy rys historyczny wykorzystany do dalszych rozważań.

Rozdział drugi zawiera analizę pierwszego okresu mieszczącego się w wybranej przez autora cezurze czasowej. Ciekawym elementem rozdziału jest zestawienie propozycji programowych niemieckich partii politycznych (SPD, Zieloni, CDU, CSU, FDP, PDS) dotyczących zmian w systemie politycznym UE omawianych podczas Konwentu w sprawie przyszłości Europy. Ciekawe jest także omówienie współpracy niemiecko-francuskiej. W dalszej części rozdziału autor omówił rolę Niemiec podczas Konferencji Międzyrządowej w latach 2003–2004 i powstawaniu Traktatu Konstytucyjnego.

W kolejnym rozdziale monografii autor omawia rolę Niemiec podczas kryzysu konstytucyjnego, związanego m.in. z odrzuceniem w referendum traktatu przez Francję i Holandię. Szczegółowo omówiono także niemiecką prezydencję w UE, która rozpoczęła się 1 stycznia 2007 roku.

Kolejny poddany analizie proces konsultacyjny dotyczył powstawania traktatu lizbońskiego, który przez stronę niemiecką został określony jako sukces niemieckiej prezydencji, na co autor przedstawia w monografii dowody.

W rozdziale czwartym zaprezentowano pozycję Niemiec we wprowadzaniu reform związanych z kryzysem ekonomicznym i monetarnym (2011–2016). Jak wskazał sam autor, globalny kryzys finansowy nie miał wpływu tylko na poszczególne państwa UE, ale także ukazał systemową słabość całej strefy euro. Reformowanie systemu finansowego i monetarnego UE ukazano w dwóch fazach – pierwsza w latach 2012–2015, a druga od 2015 roku. Istotne miejsce w rozdziale poświęcono także debacie publicznej w Niemczech, która dotyczyła tego problemu. Omówiono zarówno postawę Rządu Federalnego, jak i poszczególnych partii politycznych. Wartością dodaną jest zaprezentowanie w tabeli propozycji programowych niemieckich partii politycznych w latach 2011–2012. Autor monografii słusznie zauważa, że rząd niemiecki miał znaczący wpływ na reformę finansową strefy euro.

Ostatni rozdział autor poświęcił postawie Niemiec w trakcie kryzysu migracyjnego w latach 2015–2016. Kryzys ten był konsekwencją „arabskiej wiosny”, proklamowaniem tzw. państwa islamskiego i zbrojnych konfliktów w państwach afrykańskich i azjatyckich. Niezwykle interesującym elementem rozdziału są tabele dotyczące liczby migrantów i ich relokacji pomiędzy poszczególnymi państwami UE. Uzupełnieniem tych szczegółowych danych ogółouropejskich jest omówienie postawy rządu federalnego Niemiec i niemieckich partii politycznych. Porównywanie postawy rządu federalnego ze stanowiskami partii politycznych jest niewątpliwie niezwykle ciekawym poznawczo elementem przedstawionej monografii.

Oprócz bardzo szczegółowego omówienia wskazanej tematyki, niewątpliwym walorem publikacji jest zgromadzona przez autora imponująca bibliografia zawierająca dużą liczbę pozycji, w szczególności dokumentów wewnętrznych UE, artykułów naukowych, monografii czy statystyk. Dzięki temu przedstawiona przez autora monografia jest niezwykle cennym źródłem poznawania mechanizmów funkcjonowania Unii Europejskiej.

Autor w ciągu rozważań i analiz wykazał słuszność postawionych hipotez. Przedstawione analizy pozwalają zauważyć, że reformy, które się dokonały do roku 2009 utrwaliły pozycję Niemiec, a późniejszy kryzys zadłużenia i strefy euro pozwoliły Niemcom wysunąć się na pozycję lidera. Niestety, autor wyraził obawę, która jest jednocześnie potwierdzeniem trzeciej hipotezy, że rola lidera jest zagrożona w przyszłości. Autor wykazał bowiem, że w trakcie kryzysu migracyjnego w latach 2015–2016 przez błędne decyzje rządu federalnego pozycja Niemiec w UE osłabła.

Monografia jest niezwykle wartościową pozycją, szczególnie z powodu bardzo szczegółowej analizy zaproponowanego zagadnienia. Może być przydatna zarówno dla praktyków, którzy chcieliby zdobyć wiedzę dotyczącą zawiłych systemów decyzyjnych państw UE, jak i dla studentów politologii i europeistyki oraz dla badaczy zajmującymi się UE.

## Cytowanie

Szulc, M. (2022). System Reform of the European Union in 2002–2016 (Stanowisko Niemiec w sprawie reformy systemowej Unii Europejskiej w latach 2002–2016), Peter Lang, Berlin 2018. *Acta Politica Polonica*, 1 (53), 147–150. DOI: 10.18276/ap.2022.53-10.