
U N I W E R S Y T E T S Z C Z E C I Ń S K I

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI



K W A R T A L N I K

SZCZECIN 2019 – ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) – ZESZYT 4

Komitet Redakcyjny
Radosław Skrycki (redaktor naczelny), Eryk Krasucki (zastępca redaktora naczelnego),
Tomasz Ślepowroński (sekretarz redakcji), Monika Ogiewa-Sejnota (sekretarz redakcji)

Rada Naukowa
Tadeusz Białecki (Szczecin), przewodniczący,
Ihor Cependa (Iwano-Frankiwsk), Radosław Gaziński (Szczecin), Stanisław Jankowiak (Poznań),
Maciej Kowalewski (Szczecin), Kazimierz Kozłowski (Szczecin),
Jens E. Olesen (Greifswald), Czesław Osękowski (Zielona Góra),
Martin Schoebel (Greifswald), Wojciech Skóra (Słupsk)

Lista recenzentów znajduje się na stronie www.wnus.edu.pl

Redaktor naukowy
Radosław Skrycki

Redaktor językowy
Michał Gierke

Tłumaczenie
Arkadiusz Kasprzak

Korekta
Kerry O'Mahoney

Redakcja techniczna
Paulina Kaczyńska-Domagalska

Skład komputerowy
Wiesława Mazurkiewicz

Projekt okładki
Ludwik Piosicki

Adres redakcji:
Instytut Historii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych
ul. Krakowska 71–79, 71-017 Szczecin
e-mail: redakcja@przegladzachodniopomorski.pl
www.przegladzachodniopomorski.pl
www.wnus.edu.pl/pzp

Wersja papierowa jest wersją pierwotną

Artykuły dostępne są w bazach indeksacyjnych:
CEJSH (http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl), CEEOL (www.ceeol.com) oraz BazHum (bazhum.muzhp.pl)

© Copyright by Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Szczecin 2019

ISSN 0552-4245

WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU SZCZECIŃSKIEGO

Ark. wyd. 16,5. Ark. druk. 17,8. Format B5
Cena 25,0 zł (w tym 8% VAT)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Radek Fukala – The Danish War in Lower Saxony and Mansfeld's Invasion to Silesia 1625–1629 5

Jan Kilián – A soldier and a townsman during the Thirty Years' War. Coexistence – Confrontation – Cooperation 41

Andrzej Kamieński – Congress of Westphalia. Participants in the negotiations, main provisions and consequences of decisions taken 61

Mirosław Nagielski – Emperor's recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635 83

Lukáš Sláma – Military Role of the Ore Mountains in Thirty Years' War 101

Daniel Wojtucki – Criminal activity in Silesia during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). Contribution to the research 125

Radosław Gaziński – "Preparations" of Western Pomerania for the Thirty Years' War 153

Radosław Skrycki – Swedish military cartography of the Thirty Years' War. The example of Pomerania and the New March (Neumark) 173

Grzegorz Podruczny – Siege activities during the Thirty Years' War and their impact on the construction of modern fortresses in Pommern, Neumark and Schlesien 189

Monika Ogiewa-Sejnota – A picture of the Duchy of Szczecin during the Thirty Years' War in light of the chronicle by Peter Rudolphy between 1627 and 1637 223

Karol Łopatecki – The influence of maps and plans created in the 1620s in the Netherlands on the development of military concepts in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 253

SPIS TREŚCI

Radek Fukala – Duński okres wojny w Dolnej Saksonii i atak Mansfelda na Śląsk 1625–1629 5

Jan Kilián – Żołnierz i mieszczanin w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej. Koegzystencja – konfrontacja – kooperacja 41

Andrzej Kamieński – Kongres westfalski. Uczestnicy rokowań, najważniejsze postanowienia i skutki podjętych decyzji 61

Mirosław Nagielski – Zaciągi cesarskie w Rzeczypospolitej Macieja Arnoldina von Clarsteina w 1635 roku 83

Lukáš Sláma – Rola militarna Rudaw podczas wojny trzydziestoletniej 101

Daniel Wojtucki – Przestępczość kryminalna na Śląsku w czasie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648). Przyczynek do badań 125

Radosław Gaziński – „Przygotowania" Pomorza Zachodniego do wojny trzydziestoletniej 153

Radosław Skrycki – Szwedzka kartografia wojskowa okresu wojny trzydziestoletniej. Przykład pomorski i nowomarchijski 173

Grzegorz Podruczny – Działania oblężnicze w trakcie wojny trzydziestoletniej i ich wpływ na budowę nowożytnych twierdz na terenie Pomorza, Nowej Marchii i Śląska 189

Monika Ogiewa-Sejnota – Obraz wojny trzydziestoletniej w Księstwie Szczecińskim w kronice Petera Rudolphiego w latach 1627–1637 223

Karol Łopatecki – Wpływ map i planów powstałych w latach 20. XVII wieku w Niderlandach na rozwój koncepcji wojskowych w Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej 253

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-01

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Radek Fukala
ORCID: 0000-0002-9313-1856
Univerzita Jana Evangelisty Purkyně v Ústí nad Labem, Czechy
e-mail: radek.fukala@ujep.cz

The Danish War in Lower Saxony and Mansfeld's Invasion to Silesia 1625–1629

Keywords: The Danish War, Lower Saxony, Silesia, The Hague aliance, The Peace of Lübeck, Christian IV King of Denmark and Norway, Jean Tserclaes count of Tilly, Albert of Wallenstein, Ernest count of Mansfeld, the battle at Lutter am Barenberg, the battle at Dessau Bridge

Słowa kluczowe: duński okres wojny trzydziestoletniej, Dolna Saksonia, Śląsk, koalicja haska, pokój w Lubece, król Danii i Norwegii Krystian IV, Jean Tserclaes, hrabia Tilly, Albert Wallenstein, Ernest, hrabia Mansfeld, bitwa pod Lutter am Barenberg, bitwa przy moście Desau

On 28 July 1625, General Jean Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, crossed the Weser River and soon after seized the poorly defended Brunswick Duchy in Lower Saxony. It was nothing but an arbitrary act committed by the Imperial-Catholic military forces who, ignoring reason and justice, resolved to attack one more helpless imperial city. Although Lower Saxony had not "committed" anything and had not threatened anybody, the Catholic League simply viewed the region as a source of opulent loot available at the Protestant manors as well as the reformed dioceses and monasteries.[1] Being the Duke of Holstein and the elected *Kreisoberst*

[1] Far too many scholars have viewed the Thirty Years' War as an instantly rewarding and attractive topic, since it seems to offer all imaginable features of drama and abounds in plots and

of Lower Saxony, the Danish and Norwegian King Christian IV could not let the region in the cold for prestigious reasons. He readily realized the imminent danger and took an immediate action, promptly mustering an army in order to sustain religious peace and the existing proprietary conditions in the land, and liberate its population from both the imperial forces and the armies of the Catholic League. This actually opened the third stage of the Thirty Years' War, sometimes called the Lower Saxony-Denmark War or, in Danish, *Kejserkrig* (Denmark's War against the Emperor), which also spilled over to the Czech lands and brought Albert of Wallenstein to ultimate power.[2]

---

unexpected denouements. Those who crave deeper understanding of the described events can rely on several comprehensive and unique writings, which also contain references to more literature and sources. See the following, still relevant works: M. Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*: 1555–1648, 1–3, Stuttgart 1889–1895, reprint Darmstadt 1974; A. Gindely, *Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, I–III, Leipzig 1882; C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years' War*, London 1938; idem, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg*, München 1999. – An overall and brilliant summary is provided by G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, New York 1993. – For updated syntheses and studies, which gradually replaced earlier writings and surveys, see S.H. Steinberg, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg und der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Europa 1600–1660*, Göttingen 1967; originally idem: *The "Thirty Years' War" and the Conflict for European Hegemony 1600–1660*, London 1966; K. Repgen, *Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven* (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, 8), München 1988; G. Barudio, *Der Teutsche Krieg 1618–1648*, Frankfurt am Main 1998; R.G. Asch, *The Thirty Years' War. The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618–1648*, London–New York 1997. A brief but inspiring interpretation was, most recently, provided by G. Schmidt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, München 1999; H. Bogdan, *La Guerre de Trente Ans 1618–1648*, Paris 2006. – In this respect, also comp. the French view of the conflict: G. Livet, *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, Paris 1991; on the overall situation at the related battlefields and in the contemporary diplomacy, see G. Pagès, *La Guerre de Trente Ans 1618–1648*, Paris 1972 (re-edition); idem, *The Thirty Years' War*, London 1970; V.L. Tapié, *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, Paris 1989; an utmost interesting work is the monumental H. Sacchi, *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, I–III, Paris 1991. – One of the most outstanding and, at the same time, most difficult views of the vast power and political fight is P. Englund, *Nepokojná léta. Historie třicetileté války*, Praha 2000, originally *Ofredsår. Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt*; the respective 1st, 2nd and 3rd editions of 1993, 1994, 1997. The work still ranks among the most exciting historical books on the Thirty Years' War. – The synopses from the hitherto historiography published in the Czech lands, which keep inspiring and providing innovative and immensely informed interpretations, are J. Polišenský, *Třicetiletá válka a evropské krize 17. století*, Praha 1970; idem, *The Thirty Years' War and the Crises and Revolutions of Seventeenth Century Europe*, "Past and Present" 1968, no. 20 (39), pp. 34–43; another useful Czech-written publication is A. Klíma, *Dlouhá válka, 1618–1648*, Praha 1996. – The Thirty Years' War was most recently explored from various aspects by Ch. Kampmann, *Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, Stuttgart 2008.

[2] The most comprehensive classic synthesis on the Lower-Saxon and Danish stage of the War, abounding in historical material and facts, is J.O. Opel, *Der niedersächsisch-dänische Krieg*, I–III, Halle–Magdeburg 1872–1894.

Contemporary power and political conditions and the establishment of the Hague Coalition

The Battle of Stadtlohn, which took place on 6 August 1623, clearly betrayed the superiority of the Catholic-League forces on the imperial battlefield, since they had already taken control of the southern, central and western parts of the German territory.[3] The uncompromising Emperor Ferdinand II of Austria and his allies triumphed and craved total decimation of their Protestant opponents. It was their fault that the conflict began endlessly protracting and eventually turned into an all-European war. The military tempest, transferred from the Czech lands to the north-west of Germany, was hence unstoppable.[4]

Even if the Catholic world may have seemed solidary, united and successful, there indeed were power disputes smoldering under the surface. Spanish diplomats came forth with a project of a coalition designed to cut off the Dutch Republic from north-European states, which were the source of strategically significant materials for the Netherlandish merchants. The Spaniards tried to let the Hanseatic Cities, Poland, the Catholic League, the Spanish Netherlands and, mainly, Ferdinand II on the plan. The head of the "Spanish side" in Vienna was Don Iñigo Vélez de Guevara y Tassis, Count of Oñate, who was, similar to his predecessors, engaged in Central-European politics and allocated all his financial means to the military forces recruited in Flanders, Friaul, Naples and Sicily. Only these mercenaries, organized after the Spanish model, remained in Central Europe until 1624. Some also fought for Kłodzko (G. Glatz) and were subsequently redeployed to the front in the Spanish Netherlands.[5]

---

[3] Information on the entire prelude to the war between Lower Saxony and Denmark mainly became widespread thanks to E.H. Flieger, *Die Schlacht bei Stadtlohn am 6. August 1623*: *Ereignisse, Persönlichkeiten und Kriegswessen im geschichtichen Zusammenhang*, Aachen 1998; in Polish: W. Biernacki, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia (2). Powstanie czeskie i wojna o Palatynat 1618–1623*, Zabrze 2010. As to the main protagonists of the Protestant army, comp. H. Wertheim, *Der tolle Halberstädter. Herzog Christian von Braunschweig im Pfälzischen Kriege 1621–1622*, I–II, Berlin 1929.

[4] On the beginnings of the entire conflict in Lower Saxony, see J. Kollmann, *Pokus o zastavení třicetileté války: mírová jednání v Brunšviku 1625–1626*, Praha 1989.

[5] The publications shedding light on the situation at the Netherlandish front and on the significance of the Spanish-French relations in the framework of the power politics are, especially, the following: G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1657. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*, Cambridge 1972; idem, *Spain and the Netherlands 1559–1659. Ten studies*, London 1979; J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606–1661*, Oxford 1982; P. Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555–1609*, London 1980; idem, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 1609–1648*, London 1989. – The authors

The Spaniards moreover temporarily managed to gain control over crucial mountain crossings in the Alpine military corridor of Valtelline. However, they thus endangered the hitherto passive France where the reins of foreign policy were in 1624 taken over by the Chief Minister, Armand Jean du Plessis Richelieu. France seized the day and soon pushed the Spanish troops from the strategic point.[6] Maximilian I, Elector of Bavaria, did not feel comfortable in the imperial matters, either, since as far as the division of power spheres was concerned, his cabinet often had to face the inflexibility of Vienna in a situation when even the Bavarian diplomacy (along with the Polish Catholic circles) seemed to be increasingly inclined towards the French court. The differing interests among the Habsburg allies as well as the fears of the rising imperial power resulted in the

pursuing the Spanish politician Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares, on a continuous basis are G. Marañón, *Olivares*, München 2006 and J.H. Elliot, *Richelieu and Olivares*, Cambridge 1984; idem, *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline*, New Haven 1986. – On the syntheses still topical in capturing the Spanish share in the given war conflict, see H. Kamen, *Spain 1469–1714. A Society of Conflict*, London–New York 1991; idem, *Imperium Hiszpańskie. Dzieje rozkwitu i upadku*, Warszawa 2008 (originally *Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power*, London–New York 2002); J.H. Elliot, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716*, London 1965 (Harmondsworth 1970); idem, *Spain and Its World, 1500–1700*, New Haven–London 1989; the more recent writings of especial significance are H. Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire…*; idem, *Imperio. La forja de España como potencia mundial*, Madrid 2003. – On the events in Kłodzko, see most recently, R. Fukala, *Falcká válka a hrdinná obrana Kladska*, in: *550 let Hrabství Kladského 1459–2009. 550 lat Hrabstwa Kłodzkiego 1459–2009* (miscellany), ed. V. Wolf, Trutnov 2009, pp. 171–197.

[6] D.A. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army. War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642*, Cambridge 2001. The list of French works discussing the entire conflict is rather extensive. As to the syntheses on the general issues of the 17th-century French history, see e.g. Y.-M. Bercé, *La naissance dramatique de l´absolutisme, 1598–1661* (Nouvelle histoire de la France moderne – 3), Éditions de Seuil, 1992 (Paris 2001), where also see for more bibliography. – Biographers focusing on Cardinal Richelieu are countless, and they quite vary in the quality of their outcomes. The most inspiring French editions worth mentioning are J.V. Blanchard, *Richelieu. Le premier cardinal minister*, Paris 2012; F. Bluche, *Richelieu*, Paris 2003; G. Bordonove, *Richelieu tel qu´en lui-même*, Paris 1997; M. Carmona, *Richelieu. L´ambition et le pouvoir*, Paris 1983, reprint 2013; Ph. Erlanger, *Richelieu*. I–III, Paris 1967–1970; R. Mousnier, *L´homme rouge ou la vie du cardinal Richelieu 1585–1642*, Paris 1992, reprint Paris 2009; V.L. Tapié, *La France de Louis XIII. et de Richelieu*, Paris 1967, reprint 2014 (epilogue by Françoise Hildesheimer). The most outstanding from among the recent biographies is the popular survey A. Teyssier, *Richelieu. L´aigle et la colombe*, Perrin, Paris 2015. One of the most trustworthy Polish biographers in this sense is J. Baszkiewicz, *Richelieu*, Warszawa 1984. There is also the German comprehensive, albeit wordy and sometimes labyrinthine, three-volume monograph C.J. Burckhardt, *Richelieu. 1. Der Aufstieg zur Macht*, München 1935; *2. Behauptung der Macht und kalter Krieg*, München 1965; *3. Großmachtpolitik und Tod des Kardinals*, München 1966. – The Cardinal's understanding of the state interests was discussed by E. Thuau, *Raison d´Etat et pensée politique à l´époque de Richelieu*, Paris 1966, re-edition Albin Michel, Paris 2000 (epilogue by Gérard Mairet); J. Wollenberg, *Richelieu: Staatsräson und Kircheninteresse*, Berlin 1977.

incapability of fully coordinating the military issues. From this perspective, the Catholic camp in the German Empire suffered from numerous flaws and did not favor the Spanish hegemonic plans.[7]

Representatives of the Protestant countries knew perfectly how dangerous the Habsburg power visions were and, between 1623 and 1623, initiated intensive diplomatic negotiations. Those behind the scenes whispered rumors about plans at establishing a large Protestant coalition, which would not only count on the return of Frederick V, Elector Palatine, to his lands, but would also guarantee religious freedom and, in addition, suppress the Habsburg superiority in Europe. The Netherlandish diplomacy did not remain idle this time, taking the helm, and its perseverance finally began bearing desirable fruit. In July 1624, the Hague politicians managed to form an expedient alliance with England and France, and the Netherlandish policy could thus even rely on the favor of the Pope-elect, Urban VIII, whose new political course had not always been in accord with the Spanish goals. The given events resulted in the Convention at Hague, signed on 19 December 1625 by the Netherlands, England, Denmark and several imperial dukes with Frederick V in the lead.[8]

Catholic France, headed by Richelieu, could enter The Hague alliance as well, for the cardinal strenuously worked towards minimizing the power of the Spanish branch of the Habsburgs and taking hold of the maritime trade. Some of those involved in the complex mesh of diplomacy calculated with the successes of the Netherlandish fleet in Peru and alongside the Brazil coastline, but also with the problems in the Spanish colonies, Cuba and Puerto Rico.[9] The an-

[7] The publications rich in facts are the biographies of the imperial protagonists as well as the crucial analyses employing extensive literature sources and newly discovered archive materials; see e.g. A. Kraus, *Maxmilian I. Bayerns. Grosser Kurfürst*, Regensburg 1990; D. Albrecht, *Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573–1651*, München–Wien 1998; G. Franz, *Die Politik Maxmilians I. von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618–1651*, I/1, München–Wien 1966; M. Kaiser, *Politik und Kriegführung. Maxmilian von Bayern, Tilly und die Katholische Liga im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Münster 1999; R. Saller, *Reichsgraf Johann Tserclaes von Tilly. Chronik über Leben und Laufbahn*, Altötting 2007.

[8] J. Polišenský, *Třicetiletá válka a evropské krize 17. století*, Praha 1970, pp. 168–178; Th. Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe. State, Conflict and the Social Order in Europe 1598–1700*, Macmillan Press Ltd. 1990; Polish edition: idem, *Europa XVII wieku*, *1598–1700. Państwo, konflikty i porządek społeczny. Dzieje Europy*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 23–30; most recently and very elaborately, P.H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy. A New History of the Thirty Years' War*, London–New York 2010, pp. 385–409; Polish edition: idem, *Wojna Trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648. Tragedia Europy*, Oświęcim 2017, pp. 377–401.

[9] Spanish, Portuguese and Netherlandish maritime interests were synoptically pursued by, e.g. C.R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686*, London 1952;

ti-Habsburg bloc moreover wanted to include Savoy and Veneto, which would hence gain control over the Spanish forces on the Apennine Peninsula. The plans also counted on the sympathies of Transylvania and, hypothetically, Ottoman Empire. However, the overall plan at the division of power spheres and cooperation suffered from too serious flaws to surface in such a generous form: it simply was not realistic to bridge the fundamental variances between England and the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, and Brandenburg and Saxony, let alone the rivalry among other Lutheran and Calvinist German dukes. Sober assessment of the international situation had not offered many hopes already during the Palatine War and brought some skeptical conclusions within the ranks of experienced diplomats and politicians.[10]

The Hague alliance mainly aimed at pushing the Imperial-Catholic army out of the north-German territory. The future actions of the allies were to be carefully coordinated: the Danish King Christian IV was to launch offensive in Lower Saxony, while Christian, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the Protestant administrator of the Halberstadt diocese, was supposed to strike at Rhine, General Ernest Mansfeld in the Czech lands, and Gabriel Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania, in Lower Austria. The leading position within the anti-Habsburg front fell upon Christian IV, who indulged in war preparations as soon as January 1625, having hired an array of members of the Bohemian-Moravian emigration as well as John Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, who had fought on the Bohemian battlefield with the Netherlandish support in 1620.[11]

---

idem, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–54*, London 1957; idem, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825*, London 1969, and J.C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain 1626–1650*, New Brunswick 1983, and, from among Czech scholars, by J. Polišenský et al., *Dějiny Latinské Ameriky*, Praha 1979, pp. 214–224.

[10] J. Polišenský, J. Kollmann, *Valdštejn. Ani císař, ani král*, Praha 1995, esp. pp. 90–96.

[11] The rendition of the atmosphere of the war and the factual account of the related events was excellently aided by the correspondence left behind by several members of the Bohemian exile and significant actors of the Bohemian and Moravian Estates' society: *Moravské korespondence a akta z let 1620–1636,* I–II, ed. F. Hrubý, Brno 1934–1937; *Z korespondence pobělohorské emigrace z let 1621–1624*, in: *Věstník královské české společnosti naučné, třída filosoficko-historická*, ed. O. Odložilík, Praha 1932. The studies immensely significant for the sake of comparions are F. Hrubý, *Z vídeňských papírů Jindřicha Matyáše hr. z Thurnu*, "Český časopis historický" 1928, no. 34, pp. 473–573; O. Odložilík, *Ze zápasů pobělohorské emigrace*, "Časopis Matice moravské" 1932, no. 56, pp. 1–58; 57, 1933, pp. 369–388; idem, *Povstalec a emigrant. Kapitoly z dějin třicetileté války*, Londýn (London) 1944. – On the editions of sources from Czech and Moravian archives, which are also immensely important, see *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale ilustrantia*, IV: *Der Dänisch-Niederdeutsche Krieg und der Aufstieg Wallensteins. Quellen zur Geschichte der Kriegsereignisse der Jahre 1625–1630*, ed. J. Kollmann, Praha 1974; *Regesta Fondu Militare*

Christian IV and his lands

The Danish and Norwegian king Christian IV, of the Oldenburg dynasty, was born on 12 April 1577 in Frederiksborg to the Danish and Norwegian King Frederick II, and still ranks among the most significant Danish monarchs if solely by the duration of his reign. His mother, Sophie, was the Princess of Mecklenburg and his first wife, Anna Catharina of Brandenburg, was the daughter of the Brandenburg Elector Joachim Frederick of Hohenzollern, and hence the sister of the Silesian John George, Duke of Jägerndorf, as well as of the Protestant administrator of the archbishop of Magdeburg, Christian William of Brandenburg. Christian's sister, Anne of Denmark, married the English King James I, and the Danish king was therefore the uncle of the so-called Winter Queen, Elisabeth Stuart. He could moreover pride on close family ties to the Wettin dynasty of Saxony. Affiliation with many ruling houses on the Euroepan dynastic "chessboard" was naturally of crucial significance during the given period.[12]

Christian became the head of the state after the 1588 death of his father, but ruled independently only after being crowned in 1596. The first half of his long reign was the prime period of the Danish history, since it went hand in hand with countless political and economic successes. Trade in his lands thrived and their population enjoyed relative prosperity. His youth, ambition and erudition also gave him strength to establish Danish colonies in the East Indies and fundamentally reform the country's judicature and administration. He would also see to utmost details in order to be perfectly familiar with the current state of affairs. An authoritative politician and proficient warrior, he commanded an effective army and excellent maritime fleet, and prided on his power representation. In addition, he initiated the construction of many extensive architectures and the establishment

Archivu Ministerstva vnitra ČSR v Praze. Prameny k dějinám třicetileté války, III: 1618–1625, ed. V. Líva, Praha 1951; IV: 1626–1635, ed. V. Líva, Praha 1953.

[12] For invaluable and basic biographical information on the Danish ruler Christian IV, see the today already classical monographs: J.A. Gade, *Christian IV. King of Denmark and Norway*, London 1927; Th. Christiansen, *Die Stellung König Christians IV. von Dänemark zu den Krigsereignissen im Deutschen Reich und zu den Plänen einer evangelischen Allianz 1618–1628*, Kiel 1937 (diss.). – A more recent contribution on the royal power aspirations is P.D. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War 1618–1648. King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State*, Selingsgrove (Susquehanna University Press), London 1996; and, most recently, J.-P. Findeisein, *Christian IV. – Zwischen Mythos und Wahrheit*, (Ludwig) Kiel 2014.

of many new cities, held countless court festivities, and Copenhagen under his rule became one of the centers of science and arts in Northern Europe.[13]

The vigorous and smart Christian IV forged his power aspirations even despite the fact that he had come to reign in rather restless times. He declared war on Sweden when it was fighting the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The so-called Kalmar War of 1611–1613 resulted from the traditional Swedish-Danish trade rivalry at the East-European market. Denmark managed to win and conquer crucial Swedish strongholds of the towns of Kalmar and Älvsborg. Christian moreover acquired considerable financial contribution from his irreconcilable enemy. Denmark thus temporarily became the winner in the fight for *dominium maris Baltici* (i.e., for the dominance over the entire Baltic Sea). All merchandise transported from the European East to the West was liable to clearances in the then-Danish strait of Øresund. Prior to the Thirty Years' War, the Kingdom of Denmark was perceived as the most significant country of Northern Europe and the Danish king as one of the richest European rulers, whose treasury was completely independent of his political and military decisions.[14]

Christian IV ruled Norway and Denmark and, simultaneously, was the Duke of Holstein and Schleswick, which made for his rather ambiguous position: he not only controlled his own kingdom but also could influence the interior policy of the Holy Roman Empire. At the Lauenburg assembly, held in late 1625, mainly the Protestant dukes of Meklenburg and the administrator of the Magdeburg archbishopric promoted him to the post of the Lower-Saxon *Kreisoberst*, i.e. the commander of the regional army. He was also appointed the general of the Lower-Saxon regional army (regional defense), planned to number 10,000 infantry- and 3,000 cavalrymen. The Danish king was to form an army designed to defend the country and maintain both religious and secular peace, German freedom and overall well-being. From his arrival to the position on 24 May, he represented

[13] The characteristics of Christian IV's political activity and reign was judged and explained in an array of Danish professional publications: S. Heiberg, *Christian IV, monarken, mennesket og myten*, København 1988; F. Askgaard, *Christian IV "Rigets vaebnede Arm"*, Töjhusmuseet, København 1988; N.M. Probst, *Christian's flåde*, København 1996; most recently, H. Bjerg, *Christian och Ole Frantzen. Danmark i krig*, København 2006.

[14] See the recent monographs most aptly summarizing the given epoch from the Scandinavian point of view: P.D. Lockhart, *Denmark 1513–1660: The Rise and Decline of a Renaissance Monarchy*, Oxford University Press, New York 2007; also see other innovative contributions, such as H. Lunde, *A Warrior Dynasty. The Rise and Fall of Sweden as a Military Superpower 1611–1721*, Havertown–Oxford 2014; Polish edition: idem, *Dynastia wojowników. Wojny Szwecji 1611–1721*, Poznań 2015, pp. 83–90.

the Lower-Saxon region and its dukes as well as its high aristocracy, clergy and burghers on the outside, hence being in control of the entire communication with the Emperor, the imperial assembly and other regions throughout the Holy Roman Empire.[15]

The participation of Denmark in the Thirty Years' War during the given period could seem surprising, since the king had stubbornly avoided this power and political conflict. When the revolting Bohemian Estates asked Christian for help in March 1619, he merely dispatched his agent to the Czech lands to inform him on the real conditions in the lands of the Bohemian Crown. The subsequent report from Prague made him conclude that the local matters were nothing but a risky business and a precarious rebellion. No wonder, then, that he advised Frederick V of the Palatinate to remain on peaceful terms in negotiations with the Emperor. He nevertheless promised him the support of 200,000 imperial thalers on 20 August 1620.[16]

As far as trading with colonies was concerned, it was most profitable to introduce Central-European merchandise to the global markets. However, this required gaining control over the mouths of rivers Elbe and Weser as well as over the existing Hanseatic cities. Christian IV moreover craved some territories in Northern Germany for his heirs and relatives. The edict issued by the Danish imperial assembly in 1621 thus declared the sea strip stretching from Bornholm to the Gotland Island and, finally, the Baltic province of Kurlandia Danish territorial waters. This not only concerned Mecklenburg and Pomerania, but also East Prussia, which definitely resulted in the clash between the economic interests of Denmark, Sweden and Poland.[17]

---

[15] Comp. L.E. Petersen, *The Danish intermezzo*, in: *The Thirty Years' War*, ed. G. Parker, New York 1993, pp. 71–81.

[16] For the explanation of the Danish foreign policy and the ruler's relations to the Palatine diplomacy in the Bohemian milieu, see M. Hroch, *Česká otázka v dánské politice 1619–1625*, "Studie Muzea Kroměřížska" 1990, no. 90, pp. 67–75.

[17] Comp. the Polish translation of the Swedish work L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Wojna Trzydziestoletnia. Europa i świat 1618–1648*, Warszawa 2010 (*Trettioåriga kriget. Europa i brand 1618–1648*, Lund 2006). – Modern writings on the Swedish plans in Livonia and Prussia worth attention are, especially, P.D. Lockhart, *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004. – The crucial monograph on Polish foreign policy during the Thirty Years' War is M. Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)*, Poznań 1986; the author who most recently drew attention to the Eastern-European context in relation to the Thirty Years' War is the Polish scholar R. Lolo, *Rozejm w Sztumdorfie a Habsburgowie. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad zaangażowaniem Rzeczypospolitej w wojnę trzydziestoletnią*, in: *Z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII wieku*, ed. M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2007,

At the time of ratifying The Hague Coalition, Christian IV assumed that a victorious military campaign in Northern Germany could earn him exceptional position in the Empire and that Denmark would thus become one of European powers. The country would acquire the Protestant bishoprics of Bremen, Verden, Minden and Halberstadt and, no less importantly, would gain control over the big trade towns of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. This would make Denmark an absolute winner over Sweden in the fight for *dominium maris Baltici*, i.e. Baltic dominance, and Christian's eternal rival, the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus, would be sidelined.[18] The Danish ruler concluded that this was the most opportune moment to come out against the Habsburgs and to change the power, political and trade conditions in Northern Europe. The subsequent developments, unfortunately, showed how fatally wrong Christian IV was in his reckonings and how much he failed in the second half of his reign. When he died in Copenhagen on 28 February 1648, he left behind an impoverished country, heavily exhausted with the wartime events.

War developments in North-West Germany in spring 1626

The military operations broke out in spring 1626, i.e. in a year that represented a decisive turning point in this stage of war. The supreme commander of the anti-Habsburg coalition, Christian IV, tried to gain control of the coastal areas between the mouths of the rivers Weser and Elbe; however, when he crossed the Elbe west of Hamburg to Weser, it had no significant military effect. The king

pp. 57–65; idem, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618–1635)*, Pułtusk 2004. The power and political plans of Poland concerning the Baltic Sea have been most recently discussed by several Polish military historians; see e.g. J.W. Dyskant, *Oliwa 1627*, Warszawa 1993; P. Skowroda, *Hammerstein 1627*, Warszawa 2006. However, many remarkable insights can be found in the monograph J. Wimmer, *Polska – Szwecja. Konflikty zbrojne w XVI–XVIII wieku*, Oświęcim 2013.

[18] The extremely vast bibliography on King Gustavus Adolphus would make for a separate volume, and therefore only see the following either recent or fundamental works in which observant and informed readers can find references to more professional literature. The author most competent to depict the fates of the Swedish ruler was the English expert M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus. A History of Sweden 1611–1632.* I–II, London 1953–1958; idem, *Essays in Swedish History*, London 1967; idem, *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden*, London 1973; idem, *Gustavus Adolphus: Profiles in Power*, London 1992. Also see other representative biographies worth recommending: G. Barudio, *Gustav Adolf der Grosse. Eine politische Biographie*, Frankfurt am Main 1982; M. Junkelmann, *Gustav Adolf (1594–1632). Schwedens Aufstieg zur Grossmacht*, Regensburg 1993; Z. Anusik, *Gustaw II Adolf*, Wrocław 1996; J.P. Findeisen, *Gustav Adolf von Schweden. Der Eroberer aus dem Norden*, Gernsbach 2005.

thus recklessly threw away the chance exactly when the powers of the Catholic League were weakened and, moreover, when General Tilly did not intend to support Waldstein and denied the liaison between the imperial and the Catholic League armies.[19]

Waldstein's imperial army pitched in north east, being scattered throughout the Halberstadt and Magdeburg regions, and Tilly's Catholic-League troops camped west of it. The two armies were separated by the mountain chain of Harz, while the main Protestant forces concentrated against them in the north. Christian's military consisted of five independently operating units. The forces of Duke John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar were close to the main army, between Elbe and Weser, and General John Philipp Fuchs of Bimbach camped east from the king's headquarters. Christian, Duke of Brunswick-Wonfenbüttel, the Protestant administrator of the Halberstadt diocese, ordered his men to take the position in Brunswick, i.e. in the duchies in North-West Germany, and General Mansfeld was in the lower Elbe since mid-February. However, the chances of the Protestant forces in the following months slowly faded. The Danish king realized how costly the military campaign actually was and how indebted he had become; in addition, the promised financial support from England and France was not arriving. It was because England alone was preoccupied with serious conflicts in its domestic policy and France had to face the outbreak of the Hugenot uprising, supported by George Villiers, Duke of Buckhingham. The Protestant Brandenburg and Saxony did not want to get involved in the new war, either.[20]

Mansfeld, subordinated to the orders of the Netherlandish General Estates, planned to join the army of Duke Christian of Halberstadt against the flow of Elbe and to push the Catholic League out of Lower Saxony. Eventually, the offensive came from General Fuchs who managed to reach Tangermünde on Elbe by 17 February 1626. He was supposed to support the operations of General Mansfeld who, from early March, progressed east to Brandenburg via Boizenburg, Dömitz and Perleberg to Havelberg. Duke John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, too, resolved to thrust in the Osnabrück direction, being soon followed by Christian of Halberstadt who tried to occupy the town of Goslar. However, he met with a stout resistance and

[19] J. Kollmann, *Valdštejn a evropská politika 1625–1630. Historie 1. Generalátu*, Praha 1999, pp. 100–111.

[20] As to the French context, comp. H. Bogdan, *La Guerre de Trente Ans 1618–1648*, Paris 2006, pp. 106–120; H. Sacchi, *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, II, Paris 1991, pp. 82–147; Y.-M. Bercé, *La naissance dramatique de l´absolutisme*…, pp. 125–134.

his endeavor failed; he withdrew right on time before the arriving Waldstein and his 15,000 soldiers. As soon as General Fuchs found out that the main body of the Waldstein's army with its commander in the lead was on the Harz territory, he set off south, to Wolmirstedt, the second largest urban settlement of the Magdeburg archbishopric. On the way, he besieged and seized the Rogätz castle, mercilessly slaughtering the local imperial garrison. Waldstein, receiving the bad news, immediately turned his regiments against Fuchs's troops. By 10 April 1626, his units reached Wolmirstedt after a strenuous march, but Fuchs would not face the enemy and quickly backed off. The imperial squad pursued him as far as to Tangermünde, but his corps tactically crossed the Elbe at night and proceeded north. Waldstein's strategy, nevertheless, managed to drive Fuchs far away from Mansfeld's position and halt any joint operations of the two commanders prior to the Battle of Dessau Bridge.[21]

Mansfeld's arrangements and the Battle of Dessau

The figure who re-assumed prime position within the coalition armies was the illustrious and experienced military leader, Mansfeld. The English and French kings agreed to promote him to the rank of general, which earned him an independent position and decision-making sovereignty in the framework of the Danish invasion army. The Netherlandish generals wanted him to shift the war onto the Habsburg Central-European territory, where he would encounter the army of the rather fidget Transylvanian Prince, Bethlen Gábor of Iktár. However, the spectacular plan was quite detached from the current situation as well as from its sober assessment: the conflict desperately lacked both sufficient funding and coordination among the allied commanders at the individual fronts.[22]

Mansfeld and his new recruits came over from England in early 1625. The small army could at that time number about 4,000 men, and it again was

[21] The vast literature on Waldstein's military operations and the failed performance of the Danish and Protestant alliance can only be presented selectively: J. Janáček, *Valdštejn a jeho doba*, Praha 1978; J. Francek, *Navzdory závisti. Životní příběh Albrechta z Valdštejna*, Praha 2007. The publication of utterly fundamental significance is J. Kollmann, *Valdštejn a evropská politika 1625–1630…* Foreign opinion on the Waldstein's personality was synoptically surveyed by H. Diwald, *Wallenstein. Eine Biographie*, Esslingen–München 1969 (next edition: Esslingen 1984; or Frankfurt am Main–Berlin 1987).

[22] J. Polišenský, *Slezsko a válka třicetiletá. Pokus o nový výklad a program práce*, in: *Česko-polský sborník vědeckých prací*, ed. M. Kudělka, Praha 1955, pp. 311–332; on the whole campaign, see esp. idem, *The Thirty Years' War*, University of California Press, London–Berkeley–Batsford 1971, pp. 114–121.

a variegated international mixture of Englishmen, Scotsmen, Germans, Dutchmen and, certainly, few Bohemians. Mansfeld held an English patent and was formally accountable to Frederick, Elector Palatine, and his Netherlandish protectors. This became a sticking point for the further developments – for the quarrelsome and unscrupulous Mansfeld saw himself as a military entrepreneur and solely commanded his troops as if they were his own business. He did not feel bound by and responsible to the Danish royal headquarters and had always been reserved to and distanced from the Danish army during various operations and campaigns. The officers and soldiers of his expedition forces would in no way conform to the Danish orders.[23]

Mansfeld reappeared on the stage in November 1625, this time on the north-German battlefield. His soldiers attracted considerable attention in Upper Saxony and mainly elicited fears of the local population who viewed his presence as undesirable. The count, as the general of The Hague alliance, also incorporated part of the Danish army under his commandment at the turn of the 1625 and 1626. This formally made him the superior of General Fuchs who conformed himself to the new commander unwillingly. In April 1626, Mansfeld's army campaigned south in order to occupy crucial Elbe crossings from where it could advantageously proceed to the lands of the Bohemian Crown. The next planned step was contacting the Transylvanian prince to prepare a joint sabotage in the Emperor's hereditary lands. The strategic and tactical initiative of the most dangerous opponent of the Habsburgs brought tension to Waldstein's staff, and the imperial generalissimo was firmly resolved to put Mansfeld's courageous attempts to an end.[24]

The imperial commander sent his powerful army out to the territory northeast of Leipzig in two divisions. He secured the Dessau Bridge at the Elbe crossings and built field fortification on both banks of the river. The strategic position facilitated an open access to supplies for the imperial troops. In addition, the defense of the bridgehead not only blocked Mansfeld's progress to the lands of the Bohemian Crown, but also represented an advantageous platform for the imperial army to launch its own endeavors in North Germany. On 25 April 1626, an

[23] The most modern and crucial biography on General Mansfeld, which should serve as an ultimate point of departure – although it, unfortunately, totally omits literature and sources of Czech and even Silesian provenance into account – is W. Krüssmann, *Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626). Grafensohn, Söldnerführer, Kriegsunternehmer gegen Habsburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, Berlin 2010.

[24] J. Janáček, *Valdštejn a jeho…*, pp. 303–336; J. Polišenský, J. Kollmann, *Valdštejn. Ani císař…*, pp. 96–101.

unexpected spontaneous fray near the Elbe crossing between Rosslau and Dessau resulted in a field battle. The Protestant forces attempted a blockade of the bridge and seizing its forefront on the right riverbank, but he tragically lost in both attacks. Mansfeld lost some 3,000 soldiers and tactically ordered his decimated troops, the remaining 5,000 men, to withdraw to the Electorate of Brandenburg. However, Waldstein was too slow to take advantage of his victory and consistently pursue his enemy: he underestimated Mansfeld this time, since the latter general made full use of the unexpected rest and managed to form a new army of about 20,000 mercenaries in a mere six weeks.[25]

Mansfeld's campaign to Silesia

None of the involved sides envisaged that these Mansfeld's forces, based on English, French and Netherlandish financial support, would in just a few months launch an extremely crucial operation in the lands of the Bohemian Crown; an operation which would immediately become a central focus of a major part of Europe. For the tireless general did not linger, reformed his dispersed troops and, on 10 July, opened "one of the most animated episodes of the Thirty Years' War".[26] The army was, on Christian IV's order, joined by the Danish contingent in the lead with Duke John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar. The two generals made sure to procure sufficient supplies to avoid wasting time by eventual plunders and sieges during the forthcoming fast march. They proceeded to the set destination in two divisions, heading from Havelberg, and on 21 July smoothly crossed the Lower-Silesian border, the front-gate to the Habsburg lands. Mansfeld initially wanted to campaign to Westphalia and Alsace, but eventually yielded to the pressing circumstances and replaced it with a risky and unusual expedition to Silesia and Upper Hungary.[27]

---

[25] *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale ilustrantia*, IV: *Der Dänisch-Niederdeutsche Krieg und der Aufstieg Wallensteins. Quellen zur Geschichte der Kriegsereignisse der Jahre 1625–1630*, ed. J. Kollmann, Praha 1974, pp. 125–214.

[26] F. Roubík, *Valdštejnovo tažení na Slovensko roku 1626*, "Sborník Archivu ministerstva vnitra ČSR" 1935, no. VIII, pp. 145–232, esp. p. 149.

[27] One of the publications on the Danish progress and the Central-European events, held by the rich Silesian archive funds, is J. Krebs, *Schlesien in den Jahren 1626 und 1627*, Teile 1–3, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Alterthum Schlesiens" 1886, no. 20, pp. 1–32, 21, 1887, pp. 116–148; 25, 1891, pp. 124–184; idem, *Das Verhalten der Schlesier beim Einfalle Mansfelds und der Dänen (1626)*, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Alterthum Schlesiens" 1897, no. 31, pp. 165–194; on the Silesian military operations, comp. J. Maroń, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Śląsku. Aspekty militarne*, Wrocław–Racibórz 2008; R. Fukala, *Třicetiletá válka ve*

Mansfeld and his contingent of 12,000 men progressed from Frankfurt an der Oder via Krosno Odrzańskie (G. Crossen) and Zielona Góra (G. Grünberg) as far as to Głogów (G. Glogau), which they did not bother besieging. The skilled strategist – disrespected by the Waldstein's staff since the April days – went on to Oleśnica (G. Oels), encountering there the 8,000 soldiers of John Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, which headed southeast. Mansfeld separated from them behind Namysłów (G. Namslau) and his unimpeded progress continued near the Silesian-Polish border, via Kluczbork (G. Kreuzburg), Pszczyna (G. Pleß) and Bytom (G. Beuthen) to the Cieszyn (G. Teschen, Cz. Těšín) Duchy, where he planned to meet with the Transylvanian prince in secret for the first time. He soon not only seized Cieszyn (G. Teschen, Cz. Těšín), but also the Jablunkov Pass (P. Przełęcz Jabłonkowska), the crucial gate to Upper Hungary (today Slovakia).[28]

The army of Saxe-Weimar meanwhile progressed along the Oder. It bypassed Wrocław (G. Breslau, Cz. Vratislav) and headed towards Opole (G. Oppeln), where it crushed the imperial units – jointly commanded by Colonel Gabriel Pechmann von der Schönau, Charles Hannibal, the Baron of Dohna, and Daniel Hebron – on 6 August 1626. The Danish troops kept following the strategic plan and, undisturbed, continued via Koźle (G. Cosel), Racibórz (G. Ratibor) and Wodzisław Śląski (G. Loslau) to the Moravian-Silesian border. On 10 August, Duke John Ernest reached Bohumín (G. Oderberg, P. Bogumin), fortifying it and tearing down the bridge over Oder in order to halt his pursuers. His soldiers were in good temper and the hitherto losses seemed proportionate to the situation. The two coalition commanders reached the Moravian and Hungarian border on time and could relax and wait for Bethlen's arrival. The only thing left was to outline the further strategy and form of the campaign.[29]

Slezsku, in: *Slezsko v dějinách českého státu*, II: 1490–1763, ed. Z. Jirásek, Praha 2012, pp. 105–113; idem, *Dramat Europy. Wojna trzydziestoletnia (1618–1648) a kraje Korony czeskiej*, Wrocław 2015, pp. 189–209.

[28] One of the most important sources on the Danish intervention in Silesia and the lands of the Habsburg monarchy is *Acta Publica*. *Verhandlungen und Correspondenzen der schlesischen Fürsten und Stände*, VI: *Die Jahre 1626–1627*, ed. H. Palm, J. Krebs, Breslau 1885.

[29] The material which can be viewed as very important as concerns the Danish invasion to Central Europe is the following partial contributions: F. Roubík, *Itinerář Albrechta z Valdštejna z let 1625–1634*, in: *Přátelé čes. starožitností svému učiteli. K šedesátinám univ. prof. Dr. J.V. Šimáka*, "Časopis Společnosti přátel starožitností" 1930, No 38, pp. 124–130; V. Mišaga, *Dánský vpád do Slezska a na Moravu. Souvislosti a průběh roku 1626*, "Časopis Národního muzea – řada historická" 2008, no. 1–2 (177), pp. 55–103, while the latter author synoptically analyzes the current state of research and its tasks esp. on pp. 55–59.

The imperial response to the enemy's offensive was nothing but sluggish. Not even the Silesian Estates were clear about the overall situation, and they totally underestimated the imminent danger resulting from Waldstein's victories in Northern Germany. They imprudently dissolved the Estates' county militia and failed sufficiently defending the Jablunkov Pass. Many Silesian towns hoped for the support from the imperial army, but their hopes were vain; no wonder, then, that their subsequent resistance against Mansfeld's and Danish soldiers was weak and inadequate. The same case was Opava (G. Troppau), which turned into the main base of the Protestant military forces of The Hague Coalition and the Bohemian post-White-Mountain exile on 20 August 1626.[30]

Mansfeld succeeded in occupying Frýdek (G. Friedeck, P. Frydek) in the Cieszyn (G. Teschen, Cz. Těšín) region and the duke of Saxe-Weimar managed to consolidate his power in Opava (G. Troppau) but, as far the Danish king was concerned, the war in Lower Saxony ended to his major disadvantage. On the day of his defeat at the Brunswick village of Lutter am Barenberg, 27 August 1626, the duke was in Bílovec, from where he soon joined Mansfeld near Fulnek. The two commanders could not have be informed about the crushing defeat of the main forces in Northern Germany yet, but had troubles with their Transylvanian ally, who failed to deliver the required military contingent. The allies were in discord and there was neither was any agreement in opinion between Mansfeld and Duke John Ernest.[31]

The situation in Moravia did not look favorable for the imperial side, either. It faced yet another Valachian uprising in the Beskids and the united Mansfeld-Weimar army speeding up via Starý Jičín, Hranice na Moravě and Lipník nad Bečvou where it split again, with the two parts separately heading to the Hungarian border. Mansfeld progressed through Přerov, Holešov, Kroměříž and Uherský Brod to the Váh river basin, while the duke's troops took the direction via Lukov

[30] The author who probably best explains the dramatic events in Upper Silesia is J. Zukal, *Slezské konfiskace, 1620–1630. Pokutování provinilé šlechty v Krnovsku, Opavsku a Osoblažsku po bitvě bělohorské a po vpádu Mansfeldově*, Praha 1916; idem, *Die Liechtensteinsche Inquisition in den Fürstentümern Troppau und Jägerndorf aus Anlaß des Mansfeldschen Einfalls 1626–1627*, Sonderabdruck aus "Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kulturgeschichte Österreichisch-Schlesiens", Jahrgang VII, Troppau 1912, pp. 1–33; also see the monograph R. Fukala, *Stavovská politika na Opavsku v letech 1490–1631*, Opava 2004, pp. 86–96.

[31] This fact is also referred to by J. Polišenský, *Morava a vztahy mezi evropským Východem a Západem 1626–1627*, in: *K šedesátinám profesora Josefa Macůrka*, "Sborník prací filosofické fakulty brněnské university" 1961, no. 10, C – 8, pp. 251–265, esp. p. 255.

to the Vlára Pass.[32] The military experts in Vienna must have been aware that this was not merely the enemy's tactical success but, instead, an extensive strategic operation. On top of that, there were the alarming news from Helfštejn and Hukvaldy, arriving from the Dietrichstein's officials. The situation resulted in "a dramatic manhunt for Mansfeld and his army", which attracted wide attention of the contemporaries "both due to the unorthodox military marches of the two armies and the figures of the main commanders…"[33]

The end of hopes in Hungary

At the very moment when Mansfeld and Duke John Ernest had their victory and the support of the Moravian population within their grasp, the hitherto smoothly running mechanism of their campaign in the Central-European Habsburg monarchy suffered the first blow. Having crossed the Moravian-Hungarian border in September, the coalition units vainly waited near Trenčín to welcome the main troops of the Transylvanian ally. However, Bethlen was idle in Transylvania and his auxiliary Turkish troops preferred besieging Nógrád and indulging in minor clashes at Nové Zámky. This unpredictable conduct of Bethlen has been a mystery for many historians. Some discuss his decisions and motives with understanding while others are, on the contrary, skeptical. The Transylvanian duke has been criticized for being unqualified to partake in major military operations and, mainly, for his poor political purview. It actually does not matter what was behind his behavior; it is just clear that he totally wrecked the Mansfeld's offensive.[34]

---

[32] The works discussing Moravia under the presence of the Danish coalition army and Waldstein's troops are V. Fialová, *Jan Adam z Víckova, moravský emigrant a vůdce Valachů 1620–1628*, Brno 1935; B. Indra, *Odboj města Hranic 1620–1627 a jeho potrestání*, "Časopis Vlasteneckého spolku muzejního v Olomouci" 1940, no. 53, pp. 15–56; idem, *Město a panství Hranice za třicetileté války*, "Sborník Státního okresního archivu Přerov", Přerov 1996, pp. 32–44; F. Dostál, *Valašská povstání za třicetileté války (1621–1644)*, Praha 1956. For more recent views, see F. Matějek, *Morava za třicetileté války*, Praha 1992, pp. 137–152, and the brief and synoptic J. Válka, *Morava reformace, renesance a baroka. Dějiny Moravy, 2. Vlastivěda moravská. Země a lid*, Brno 1996, pp. 103–107; and J. Janáček, *Valdštejnova pomsta*. *List z dějin bělohorské Moravy*, Praha 1992.

[33] Comp. sources on the military events in Moravia: *Kronika Holešovská (1615–1645)*, ed. V. Fialová, Holešov 1967; *Kniha o bolesti a smutku. Výbor z moravských kronik XVII. století*, ed. J. Polišenský, Praha 1948, with the following edition being especially significant: *Moravské korespondence a akta z let 1620–1636. Listy Karla st. z Žerotína 1628–1636*, II, ed. F. Hrubý, Brno 1937. On this, comp. F. Roubík, *Valdštejnovo tažení na Slovensko roku 1626*…, p. 147.

[34] On the politics and the power aspirations of the Transylvanian prince, comp. V. Dangl, *Bethlen proti Habsburkům (Slovo k historii 37)*, Praha 1992; M. Tárnóc, *Erdély müvelödése Bethlen Gábor és a két Rákoczy György korában*, Budapest 1978; T. Oborni, *Bethlen Gábor*, (Kossuth kiadó), Budapest 2017.

John Ernest re-separated from the main body of Mansfeld's army and campaigned north along River Hron. This was when Bethlen broke through to Fiľakovo and when the Turks waited out near Nógrád. Waldstein immediately utilized his enemies' hesitation to his own benefit, mercilessly pursuing them from the Silesian Nysa (G. Neisse) via Dvorce, Olomouc, Kroměříž and Uherský Brod to Nitra. He finished his hunt in the latter town, where he settled to rest and waited for the expected reinforcement. More operations followed in no time. On 25 September 1626, he gathered his forces at Nové Zámky in order to halt the progressing enemy. The town, initially designed for a decisive strike, instead became a place of playing at "hide and seek", with the two sides waiting to see which one would get exhausted first.

Waldstein's army eventually encountered the Transylvanian and Turkish forces at Drégelypalánka on 1 October. Following several minor fights, Bethlen chose the strategy of avoiding conflict and, instead, tactically abandoned the military camp. The devastation caused by epidemics and the lack of supplies on both sides was so vast that even the supreme imperial commander refused to pursue the enemy face to face the approaching winter. The adversaries thus decided to back off, which earned Waldstein harsh criticism from Vienna, mainly.[35]

After the battle non-fought, the Transylvanian and Mansfeld-Weimar armies finally met at Szécsény. The commanders had their respective reasons for criticism, and judged the overall situation from their respective views. They also were already aware of the unfavorable result of the battle of Lutter am Barenberg. Mansfeld realized that the Hungarian matter was over for him and that he had become a serious obstacle for Bethlen's separate peace negotiations with the court in Vienna. He sold his canons along with the remaining weaponry to the Transylvanian duke, and simultaneously as in autumn 1623, left for the Republic of Venice in order to fight the Spanish power in Northern Italy in its service. Duke John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar vainly discouraged him and proposed that he fight in Silesia instead, with the entreats from the officers headed by Colonel John George Peblis being equally vain: the general, embittered and exhausted by tuberculosis, set off from the dangerous Upper-Hungarian territory via Dubrovnik to Italy in the company of a group of cavalrymen. However, he became seriously ill whilst in Bosnian territory and died in the village of Rakovica near Sarajevo on the night from 29 to 30 November 1626. The place of his last rest is the Dalmatian Split or,

[35] J. Polišenský, *Třicetiletá válka a český národ*, Praha 1960, pp. 148–153; F. Roubík, *Valdštejnovo tažení na Slovensko roku 1626…*, where see esp. pp. 219–224.

the Venetian Spalat at that time.[36] Supreme command over the remaining units fell onto Duke John Ernest, who planned to continue fighting in the following year – but he, too, unexpectedly died in the winter residence near Martin on 14 December 1626. Eight days later, the Treaty of Pressburg (Cz. Bratislava), signed by the Emperor and Bethlen, definitely served to seal the failure of the Danish campaign.[37]

The withdrawal to Silesia

The beginning of 1627 evolved in the sign of the Mansfeld–Weimar army withdrawing from, what is today, the Slovak territory. The Danish contingent had lost its strategic initiative and Bethlen's conduct forced it to move off to its Opava (G. Troppau) base. The given maneuver followed the original instructions of the late John Ernest and was realized by the Danish commandant Joachim of Mitzlaff. The figure who assumed the lion's share in rescuing the soldiers was the Opava aristocrat, Mikuláš Rohr of Kamen and Mezibor, who helped the Danish commandant cross the Jablunkov Pass in winter. During the winter season, Mitzlaff and Ladislav Velen of Žerotín managed to replenish the sparse troops with new recruits and, with the support of the Valachians, occupied more towns in Moravia and Silesia. Gaining several strategically significant points – especially Cieszyn (G. Teschen, Cz. Těšín), Bytom, Koźle (G. Cosel), Bruntál, Osoblaha, Hlučín,

[36] Mansfeld died of spitting blood in the Bosnian village of Rakovac, also given in the sources as *"Racaw, Urakovica, Urakowitz, Ratona"*. He had already suffered from tuberculosis in the course of the campaign. – On the fates of the famous condottieri, comp. J. Grossmann, *Des Grafen Ernst von Mansfeld letzte Pläne und Thaten*, Breslau 1870, esp. pp. 137–141. – Last but not least, see the analysis of the Mansfeld's testament and the evaluation of his personality, in: W. Krüssmann, *Ernst von Mansfeld…*, pp. 623–635. – As to the fates of the Protestant commander, also see the following old prints which have retained considerable significance: *Apologie pour le très illustre Seigneur, Erneste Comte de Mansfeld, Marquis de Castel Novo & Boutigliere, Segneur de Heldrungen, Mareschal de Camp General du Royaume de Boheme &pais incorporez &c.; par S.W. (Samuel Weiss), Amsterdam MDCXXI*; entitled *Mansfeldische Apologie* in German. The latter old print of 54 pages is today part of the Herzog-August Bibliothek ve Wolfenbüttelu, while a similar print was originally in the possession of Prussian State Library, sign. Flugschr. 1621–1699, G 7153.12. – On this, also comp. *Acta Mansfeldica. Gründtlicher Bericht von Mansfelders Ritterthaten und allemdem, was er vor Anfang des Böhmischen Kriegs bissauf jetzt angehende Jahr 1623 gethan. – Apologie pour… Mansfeld*, 1621, p. 52: *Des Obrist Hermann Fräncken kurtze Deduction und Entschuldigung*, IV, n. 19–24; *Copia etlicher merckwürdigen Schriften, Jan Jeník z Bratřic*, Bohemica 1620, p. 17.

[37] On the overall events in Hungary, see most recently, V. Dangl, *Slovensko vo víre stavovský povstaní*, Bratislava 1986; L. Nagy, *Hajduci, 1591–1699*, Brno 2002. Also comp. the very recent P. Fedorčák, *Uhorsko na začátku Tridsaďročnej vojny. Protihabsburská povstania Štefana Bočkaja a Gabriela Bethlena*, "Historická revue" 2/XXV, Bratislava 2014, pp. 22–27.

Odry, Nový Jičín, Šternberk, Sovinec and Hranice na Moravě – allowed the Danish and emigration units to maintain contact with Brandenburg in the north and Hungary and Moravia in the south. The very center of the Habsburg statehood thus witnessed the origination of a dangerous, hostile enclave with Opava as its administration center.[38]

Commandant Mitzlaff was determined to defend Opava as a crucial stronghold serving future operations of the Danish and Protestant emigration armies. The noblemen considerably engaged in his service included many aristocrats previously known from the Bohemian Estates' uprising – not only Ladislav Velen of Žerotín but also Jan of Buben the Younger, Jan Skrbenský of Hříště the Elder, Václav Bítovský of Bítov, Jan Adam of Víckov, Ondřej Kochtický of Kochtice, Jiří Soběhrd of Kozlov, Ehrnfried Berbisdorf of Berbisdorf and Jan Jakub Thurn.[39] One of the sources of the Danish occupation army's income was the introduction of fake coins into circulation.[40] In addition, the soldiers did not resist indulging in dangerous raids aimed at both close and distant territories, stealing cattle and plundering farms; all in all, the countryside suffered from widespread robberies and slaughtering even despite the countless Mitzlaff's bans. People preferred fleeing to Opava and Krnov (G. Jägerndorf), where they felt safer under the administration of the Danish commandant or, respectively, Ladislav Velen of Žerotín and his suite of exiles. Everybody who would stand the mercenaries in their way walked into almost certain death. The only asylums available for the

[38] On the entire action, the withdrawal of Danish troops and the remains of Mansfeld's units, comp. *Relation von dem Zustandt der Städte Troppa und Jägerndorff in Oberschlesien un was alda pashiret absg dato (1627)*, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet København, Rantzau–Rigsarkiven Kopenhagen Fasc. 87 (Reg.: 9.1233). – Also see Z. Orlita, *Dánský vpád na Opavsko a jeho odraz na městské politické scéně. Příspěvek ke konfesijnímu soužití opavského měšťanstva*, in: *Opava. Sborník k dějinám města 2*, ed. D. Gawrecki, Opava 2000, pp. 31–37; briefly, I. Korbelářová, *Opava za třicetileté války a v pobělohorském období*, in: *Opava*, eds. K. Müller, R. Žáček, Praha 2006, pp. 165–206, esp. pp. 169–174; the publication discussing the history of the region, which has retained a factual account, is the earlier German monograph G. Biermann, *Geschichte der Herzogthümer Troppau und Jägerndorf*, Teschen 1874, pp. 528–532.

[39] On the plans of Bohemian exile in Mansfeld's campaign and punishing the anti-Habsburg resistance in Silesia, comp. J. Zukal, *Paměti opavské. Črty kulturní a místopisné*, Opava 1912, pp. 57–65; R. Fukala, *Konec zimního království a poslední ohniska odporu*, České Budějovice 2016, pp. 92–120, 217–222.

[40] On minting fake coins, see in detail, F. Papoušek, *Dánské (Zwirnerovo) falešné mincování na Hradci u Opavy v letech 1626 a 1627*, "Slezský sborník" 1936, no. 3–4 (XLI), pp. 151–159; also see Z. Orlita, *Dánské mince ve světle lichtenštejnských protokolů. Zhodnocení dosavadního stavu znalostí*, in: *Peníze v proměnách času*, II, "Acta numismatica Bohemiae, Moraviae et Silesiae" 2000, no. 4, pp. 17–22.

imperial Catholic side became the towns of Racibórz (G. Ratibor) and Nysa and the Hukvaldy castle, fortified in the Beskid Mountains (Cz. Beskydy).[41]

The imperial military forces did not dare to take any more energetic action strike against the Danish base in Silesia during the winter season; Waldstein opined that his regiments required some rest after the Hungarian campaign and that the overall operation had to be prepared to utmost detail. The preparatory steps aimed at arranging it culminated in spring and involved 40,000 soldiers. The supreme imperial commander left nothing to chance and personally controlled the entire invasion to Silesia, being well aware that court politicians and military experts were heavily disturbed by the critical situation in the Opole, Racibórz (G. Ratibor), Cieszyn, Krnov and, last but not least, Opava regions. Waldstein desired to repair his bruised reputation in Vienna, and therefore did not hesitate to vigorously strike against the Danes. He closed all channels of retreat, thus speedily plunging Mitzlaff's and Žerotín's units into desperate situation. Bethlen, then, did not re-launch the promised military operations in Upper Hungary, and the Danish troops of 13,000 men in Silesia turned helpless against the imperial army. In result, June saw Waldstein's units liquidating one Danish garrison after another on the Moravian-Silesian borderline, while the core of Mitzlaff's army tried to survive by swiftly withdrawing from the country. This was not any tactic of big victories, but it was sure-fire, and was very characteristic of Waldstein.

The imperial regiments and their commander set off from the episcopal Nysa on 19 June 1627 and, after a short besiege on 21 June, eventually forced the Głubczyce (G. Leobschütz) defenders to unconditionally capitulate. Głubczyce was merely a short stop for Waldstein; he soon proceeded to the princely Krnov where the garrison resolved to a several-day defense. Before everybody could pull together, Krnov fell into the imperial hands on 2 July. Following these successes, Waldstein focused on Koźle (G. Cosel) to where Mitzlaff and Žerotín had moved their corps of seven thousand men. Nobody felt like standing up against the superior enemy, and the situation thus copied the previous case. Colonel Joachim of Carpzow, an officer priding on considerable experience gained at Bohemian and Palatine battlefields, preferred to surrender under advantageous conditions on 10 June. Many Danish mercenaries, held captive in Upper Silesia, subsequently

[41] V. Mišaga, *Přichází přítel, nebo nepřítel? Venkovské obyvatelstvo za dánského vpádu v letech 1626 až 1627*, "Historie, otázky, problémy" 2011, no. 3 (1), pp. 47–55.

and without delay became members of Waldstein's army, where they received higher pay.[42]

Ladislav Velen of Žerotín and Joachim of Mitzlaff meanwhile tried to withdraw to Hungary to the Transylvanian prince, but Waldstein got ahead of them by, among other things, ordering to occupy the Jablunkov Pass.[43] And yet, the two commanders of the dispersed units of exiled Danes turned towards Cieszyn, the defense of which was entrusted to Mikuláš Rohr of Kamen. Although he still kept resisting the pressure of the imperial troops in early July, he closed a separate secret agreement with Waldstein on 17 June 1627, further unwilling to participate in the desperate operations of the Estates' emigration and better pragmatically handing Cieszyn over to the imperial army.[44] However, this thwarted the intents of Žerotín and his companions who planned to flee to Transylvania with the torso of the Danish army. Its miserable remains stood at bay – and this marked the end of the hopes of the anti-Habsburg forces in the lands of the Bohemian Crown. The emigration had no other choice than to immediately follow the Danish commandant along the Silesian-Polish border towards North Germany. An undisciplined part of the Danish cavalry was subsequently chased down by the imperial troops in New Mark on the border with the Pomerania Duchy, where it was almost scattered in the battle of Granowo (G. Granow) of 24 July 1627.[45] The only ones escaping the grip were Colonel Wolfgang Henry of Baudissin and Mitzlaff, who subsequently provided detailed report on the entire campaign and the religious and political situation in the Opava region to the Danish king.[46]

[42] R. Fukala, *Dánský vpád do Slezska a rozklad opavské stavovské společnosti. Památce univerzitního profesora PhDr. Josefa Polišenského, DrSc.*, "Slezský sborník" 2001, no. 99, pp. 81–94.

[43] J. Kollmann, *Valdštejn a evropská politika 1625–1630*..., pp. 177–178.

[44] R. Fukala, *Povstalci a rebelové*, "Acta historica et museologica Universitatis Silesianae Opaviensis", coll. C 3, 1997, pp. 90–109.

[45] Contrary to earlier literature, today's scholars can precisely determine the site of the battle of Granowo (G. Granow), participated in by many actors of the Bohemian Estates' rebellion as well as countless soldiers from the White Mountain. The conflict spanned from Bolewice (G. Bärfelde) and Przekolna (G. Ehrenberg) to Krzęcin (G. Kranzin), i.e. encompassed the area of 50 km^2, the center of which is today the Polish village of Granowo. The Battle of Granowo, of 24 June 1627, was the most extensive conflict of the Thirty Years' War on the New March (Neumark) territory and in the border area of the Pomerania Duchy. On this, comp. the fundamental monograph G.J. Brzustowicz, *Bitwa pod Granowem 1627. Studium historyczne z dziejów Nowej Marchii i Księstwa Zachodniopomorskiego w czasach Wojny Trzydziestoletniej*, Choszczno 2007, esp. pp. 370–377, where the author corrects his earlier mistakes.

[46] *Joachim v. Mitzlaff an die Reichsräte der Krone Dänemarks, Copia Schreibens an die Herren Reichs Räthe der Cron DenneMarck*, Sveriges Riksarkivet Stockholm, Biographica M 13 a; *Joachim v. Mitzlaff an die Reichsräte der Krone Dänemarks, Kurtzes Memorial und Erinnerung,*

By coincidence, Ladislav Velen of Žerotín left for Košice (G. Kaschau, H. Kassa) to procure Bethlen's support to the future activities of the Bohemian-Moravian Estates' emigration.[47]

Waldstein's army swept forward through the Opava region like a hurricane. The defeated towns in Moravia and Silesia had to pay contributions and extortion money, and the local settlements again languished under merciless plundering. The only town, which courageously resisted, was Opava, the front-gate to Silesia and north Moravia, and the imperial army began marching to this last Danish stronghold. The camp at Koźle served Waldstein as a starting point for yet another vigorous step towards ending the entire campaign, which he commented as follows: *I believe I will be done and over with the enemy this month, too... for I already have about half-dozen pennons and cornets available*.[48] The prognosis outlined by the supreme imperial commander indeed came true: from the south, he seized Hranice, Odry and Fulnek, and the general of the auxiliary imperial corps, Count Balthasar Marradas y Vique, managed to pacify the entire north-Moravian territory and the Jeseník region (Cz. Jeseníky, G. Gesenk), thus completely cutting the Opava defenders off from the environs.[49] Headed by the Holstein aristocrat, Count Markwart Rantzau, they boldly resisted the attacks of Waldstein's men for two weeks, but the lack of ammunition eventually forced Opava to capitulate on 29 June 1627. And although Ranzau and his brave soldiers could leave proudly, the Opava residents faced severe punishment in the form of forced re-Catholization, financial penalties and property confiscations.[50]

---

waß bey gnedigst verordneter Revision Meiner Sachen die Herren Revisoren ohnbeschweret wollen in Acht nehmen, Sveriges Riksarkivet Stockholm, Biographica M 13 a.

[47] On the figure of the former Moravian rebellion leader, see esp. F. Hrubý, *Ladislav Velen z Žerotína*, Praha 1930.

[48] *Albrecht z Valdštejna a jeho doba. Na základě korespondence opata strahovského Kašpara z Questenberka*, ed. C.A. Straka, Praha 1911, p. 15.

[49] One of the imperial commanders and the Spanish policy are discussed in J. Forbelský, *Španělé, Říše a Čechy v 16. a 17. století. Osudy generála Baltasara Marradase*, Praha 2006, esp. pp. 422–423.

[50] Comp. e.g. the edition immensely rich in facts, *Acta Publica*, VI: *Die Jahre 1626–1627*, eds. H. Palm, J. Krebs, Breslau 1885, pp. 132–144. – Extensive and utmost significant archive materials on Opava regional history are available in Zemský archiv Opava, personal collection: *Josef Zukal*, noble families; collection: *Hejtmanský úřad*, Inv. no. 70 (seizure commission, the Opava Estates punished for their participation in the Danish invasion of 1629–1644). – On the events concerning Waldstein's blockade of the duchy residential city, see the colored plan of the Opava siege, dating to 1627; it is a pen drawing featuring the position of the military units and providing an overall view of the urban fortification and some significant objects; see Österreichische Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv Wien, Kartensammlung, sign. H IIIb 66/1639.

The disastrous failure of Danish military forces and the triumph of the imperial side

After the clash at Dessau, the officers of the Catholic League resolved to seize the Brunswick Duchy and the local towns of Münden, Göttingen and Northeim, which would also mean defeating Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Kassel. Tilly besieged Münden, captured it on 10 June 1626 and subsequently had its residents and the local garrison massacred. This was the most brutal bloodshed of the entire Thirty Years' War next to the later slaughter in Magdeburg. Tilly then turned to the Hessen territory and forced Maurice to attack his own land. Duke Christian of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (the Protestant administrator of the Halberstadt diocese) was seriously ill at that time and died on 16 June 1626. The military scene of the Thirty Years' War thus lost a dauntless Protestant commander who had always eagerly advocated the issue of the "Winter King" Friedrich and his wife, Elisabeth. The Danish king, then, mourned a competent, albeit sometimes hasty commander, while the passing of the enemy on the other hand eased Tilly's military operations in Hesse. The situation in north-west Germany considerably worsened for the Protestant alliance; moreover, the Danish soldiers were starving, sick and poorly paid.[51]

Tilly kept rejecting Waldstein's proposals at the offense and better focused on besieging Göttingen. Christian IV did not help it in any way and was actually so idle that the town had to surrender on 12 August. The army of the Catholic League later turned towards Northeim and began endangering the settlement town of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. This finally made the royal general staff wake up from their inertia and launch the progress of Christian's forces to the territory between Goslar and Wolfenbüttel, from where it could help the endangered Northeim. Tilly and his troops, inferior in number, withdrew south on time and waited for Waldstein's reinforcement. The Danish general staff at that time again missed the chance and failed to halt the union between the adversary units. This fatal mistake of the Danish ruler in fact determined the result of the war in Lower Saxony and had similar consequences for Denmark as had the lost Battle of White Mountain and the disaster at Stadlohn for Friedrich Palatine.[52]

---

[51] P.H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*..., pp. 409–423; Polish edition: idem, *Wojna Trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648. Tragedia Europy*, Oświęcim 2017, pp. 401–414; on Duke Christian of Halberstandt, comp. H. Wertheim, *Der tolle Halberstädter…*

[52] G. Mann, *Wallenstein*. *Sein Leben erzählt von Golo Mann*, Frankfurt am Main 1971, pp. 458–495.

King Christian initially wanted to avoid a field battle, and therefore hurriedly backed off along the western slopes of Harz to Wolfenbüttel where, however, his stronger enemy readily began pursuing his men. In the subsequent two-hour clash at Lutter am Baremberge of 27 August 1626, the main Danish army and its allies had to face a crushing defeat from the troops of the Catholic League, headed by the skilled General Tilly. It was a bloody conflict; the horse under King Christian IV fell, General Fuchs was killed, the Danish infantry was butchered and the entire artillery was done. Only the cavalry resisted and courageously fought back below the local château and its major part including the king broke through the enemy's line as far as to Wolfenbüttel, from where it marched to lower Elbe along with the remaining soldiers. This is how the Danish ruler lost almost half of his army; the sources state 2,500 captives and 6,000 dead. The lost Battle of Lutter not only determined the Danish War but also enclosed the era of the power position of the Danish monarchy at the Baltic coast.[53]

While the troops of the Catholic League operated in Lower Saxony, Waldstein's army kept pursuing the enemy to the north. By autumn 1627, the Danish units had to withdraw from North Germany. August 1628, however, saw Waldstein's army, besieging the Pomeranian Stralsund, experience the first troubles. Europe also soon received reports on the destruction of the Spanish silver fleet, which had fallen to the Netherlandish admiral Piet Heyn at the Cuban seashore nearby Matanzas. In addition, the units of Frederick Henry of Nassau gradually pushed the Spanish troops out from the east of the Netherlands. These unfavorable circumstances and the eventual diplomatic wooing between Sweden and Denmark made Waldstein realize that it was unconditional to sign a peace treaty with the latter country. In addition, he did not have an appropriate navy available and his army was incapable of disembarking on the rest of the Danish seashore. In September 1628, Waldstein's men again crushed Danes on the Baltic coast near the Usedom Island, this time in the Battle of Wolgast of 2 September 1628, and soon began to control the major part of Jutland. The remaining Danish units backed off to the adjacent islands and waited out for the denouement of the conflict.[54]

---

[53] The Battle of Lutter am Barenberge was described in detail by, e.g. W.P. Guthire, *Battles of the Thirty Years' War. From White Mountain to Nordlingen 1618–1635*, London 2002, pp. 128–145; and L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Wojna Trzydziestoletnia. Europa i świat 1618–1648*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 70–72.

[54] On the given events, comp. L. Höbelt, *Ferdinand III. (1608–1657). Mírový císař proti své vůli*, České Budějovice 2015, pp. 63–70; originally idem, *Ferdinand III. (1608–1657). Friedenskaiser*

Denmark concluded its engagement in the war by signing the Peace of Lübeck on 7 July 1629. The Danish-Norwegian King Christian IV could only benefit from his ratification, for he thus regained all hitherto lost domains in exchange of promising neutrality. He simultaneously completely surrendered the Church possessions on the imperial territory, subordinated to the executive of the Danish royal family, i.e. Bremen, Verden and Schwerin. And although the treaty equaled giving up power and trade interests in North Germany, Denmark neither had to pay any reparations nor suffer from major territorial losses. On the other hand, the given step terminated the Danish control over Øresund, which in result threatened the Netherlandish trade with Eastern Europe, mainly as far as the export of vitally important commodities – grain and wood – were concerned. Apart from the Atlantic, there moreover again surfaced the power of other strategic points, such as the Baltic and the occupied ports in North Germany. Forging Spanish maritime plans in the latter region stirred concordant consternation of the remaining maritime powers. The potential heart of a new conflict became Stralsund whose population had persisted in their anti-Habsburg resistance and closed an alliance with Sweden.[55]

As said above, the 1629 Peace of Lübeck officially enclosed the Danish stage of the Thirty Years' War. Emperor Ferdinand II became the factual "lord" of Germany and could enforce one of his dream goals – the Edict of Restitution, which was eventually issued on 6 March 1629. It was a time when the career of the triumphant Waldstein climaxed and when he again carried the burden of realizing the Spanish northern maritime plans. As early as in April 1628, his loyal service earned him Mecklenburg and promotion to the posts of general of the entire maritime army and "Captain General of the Oceanic [today North] and Baltic Seas" (i.e. admiral of the imperial navy). The power of Albrecht of Waldstein was on incredible social, political and military rise.[56]

---

wider Willen, Graz 2008. From among Polish syntheses, see e.g. Z. Wójcik, *Historia powszechna: wiek XVI–XVII*, Warszawa 1995, pp. 367–368, and L. Bazylow, *Historia powszechna 1492–1648*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 458–476.

[55] On the Peace of Lübeck, see I.T. Budil, *Dějiny Skandinávie*, Praha 2017, pp. 237–238; P.D. Lockhart, *Denmark 1513–1660: The Rise and Decline*..., esp. p. 171.

[56] J. Polišenský, J. Kollmann, *Valdštejn. Ani císař*…, esp. pp. 141–151; Z. Kalista, *Valdštejn. Historie odcizení a snu*, Praha 2002, pp. 149–170; on Waldstein's military and maritime plans, comp. M. Hroch, *Valdštejnova politika v severním Německu v letech 1629–1630*, "Sborník historický" 1957, no. 5, pp. 203–229; idem, *Handel und Politik im Ostseeraum während des dreissigjährige Krieges. Zur Rolle des Kaufmannskapitals in der aufkommenden allgemeinen Krise der Feudalgesellschaft in Europa*, Univerzita Karlova, Praha 1976 (Prague 1977).

The Peace of Lübeck moreover signaled the first serious dissention between the emperor and his supreme commander. However, with regard to the complex international situation, the hostility between the two still merely smoldered under the surface. Waldstein disapproved the War of Mantua and the support of the Polish power aspirations as well as some Spanish interventions in the Baltic, and met the emperor's wishes to dispatch part of his regiments to the Netherlandish and Italian fronts utmost unwillingly. Equally, he was rather open as to his negative standpoint to the Edit of Restitution of March 1629, which in his view would drive major part of German Protestants to the arms of the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus. It is indisputable today that the court in Vienna tragically underestimated both the Swedish military preparations and the Protestant religious propaganda, and that the imperial generalissimo was again correct.[57]

The preparatory moves of Sweden, aimed at involving the country in the so-called German War, were rather cold-blooded and carefully planned, and the arguments favoring the Swedish debarkation were numerous. The Swedish Council's participants could hear the following words: "It is better to tie our horses in the enemy's yard than letting the enemy tie them in ours."[58] The given circumstances gradually transformed minor local disputes into a vast and prolonged continental power and political conflict, when the hitherto fight was almost stealthily turning into a new, even more intensively conducted military conflict. As King Gustavus Adolphus aptly noted, "things have gone so far that all the wars fought in Europe today interconnected with one another and rolled into one".[59] Another apocalyptic storm on the European battlefield could commence, since the ambitious French diplomacy was slowly taking the reins of power and the Swedish king would hardly find better chance at crowning his military plans.[60]

Translation Lucie Vidmar

[57] On Waldstein's peace plans, see R. Reibitsch, *Valdštejn. Životopis mocnáře*, České Budějovice 2014, pp. 140–150; originally idem, *Wallenstein. Biografie eines Machtmenschen*, Böhlau Verlag, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2010.

[58] P. Englund, *Nepokojná léta…*, p. 67; L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Wojna Trzydziestoletnia*…, pp. 91–92.

[59] P. Englund, *Nepokojná léta…*, pp. 60–61.

[60] The presented study was made possible by the financial support of the 2018 institutional research of the Faculty of Philosophy, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem.

Bibliography

Albrecht D., *Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573–1651*, München–Wien 1998.

Anusik Z., *Gustaw II Adolf*, Wrocław 1996.

Asch R.G., *The Thirty Years' War. The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618–1648*, London–New York 1997.

Askgaard F., *Christian IV "Rigets vaebnede Arm"*, Töjhusmuseet, København 1988.

Barudio G., *Der Teutsche Krieg 1618–1648*, Frankfurt am Main 1998.

Barudio G., *Gustav Adolf der Grosse. Eine politische Biographie*, Frankfurt am Main 1982.

Baszkiewicz J., *Richelieu*, Warszawa 1984.

Bazylow L., *Historia powszechna 1492–1648*, Warszawa 1996.

Bercé Y.-M., *La Naissance Dramatique de l´absolutisme, 1598–1661*, Nouvelle histoire de la France moderne – 3. Éditions de Seuil, 1992.

Biermann G., *Geschichte der Herzogthümer Troppau und Jägerndorf*, Teschen 1874.

Biernacki W., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia (2). Powstanie czeskie i wojna o Palatynat 1618–1623*, Zabrze 2010.

Bjerg H., *Christian och Ole Frantzen. Danmark i krig*, København 2006.

Blanchard J.-V., *Richelieu. Le premier cardinal minister*, Paris 2012.

Bluche F., *Richelieu*, Paris 2003.

Bogdan H., *La Guerre de Trente Ans 1618–1648*, Paris 2006.

Bordonove G., *Richelieu tel qu´en lui-même*, Paris 1997.

Boxer C.R., *Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686*, London 1952.

Boxer C.R., *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–54*, London 1957.

Boxer C.R., *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825*, London 1969.

Boyajian J.C., *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain 1626–1650*, New Brunswick 1983.

Brzustowicz G.J., *Bitwa pod Granowem 1627. Studium historyczne z dziejów Nowej Marchii i Księstwa Zachodniopomorskiego w czasach Wojny Trzydziestoletniej*, Choszczno 2007.

Budil I.T., *Dějiny Skandinávie*, Praha 2017.

Burckhardt C.J., *Richelieu. 1. Der Aufstieg zur Macht*, München 1935; *2. Behauptung der Macht und kalter Krieg*, München 1965; *3. Großmachtpolitik und Tod des Kardinals*, München 1966.

Carmona M., *Richelieu. L´ambition et le pouvoir*, Paris 1983.

Christiansen T., *Die Stellung König Christians IV. von Dänemark zu den Krigsereignissen im Deutschen Reich und zu den Plänen einer evangelischen Allianz 1618–1628*, Kiel 1937.

Dangl V., *Bethlen proti Habsburkům (Slovo k historii 37)*, Praha 1992.

Dangl V., *Slovensko vo víre stavovský povstaní*, Bratislava 1986.

Diwald H., *Wallenstein*. *Eine Biographie*, Esslingen–München 1969.

Dostál F., *Valašská povstání za třicetileté války (1621–1644)*, Praha 1956.

Dyskant J.W., *Oliwa 1627*, Warszawa 1993.

Elliot J.H., *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716*, London 1965.

Elliot J.H., *Richelieu and Olivares*, Cambridge 1984.

Elliot J.H., *Spain and Its World, 1500–1700*, New Haven–London 1989.

Elliot J.H., *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline*, New Haven 1986.

Englund P., *Nepokojná léta. Historie třicetileté války*, Praha 2000.

Erlanger P., *Richelieu*. I–III, Paris 1967–1970.

Fedorčák P., *Uhorsko na začátku Tridsaťročnej vojny, Protihabsburská povstania Štefana Bočkaja a Gabriela Bethlena*,"Historická revua" 2014, no. 2 (XXV), pp. 22–27.

Fialová V., *Jan Adam z Víckova, moravský emigrant a vůdce Valachů 1620–1628*, Brno 1935.

Findeisein J.-P., *Christian IV. – Zwischen Mythos und Wahrheit*, (Ludwig) Kiel 2014.

Findeisein J.-P., *Gustav Adolf von Schweden. Der Eroberer aus dem Norden*, Gernsbach 2005.

Flieger E.H., *Die Schlacht bei Stadtlohn am 6. August 1623: Ereignisse, Persönlichkeiten und Kriegswessen im geschichtichen Zusammenhang*, Aachen 1998.

Forbelský J., *Španělé, Říše a Čechy v 16. a 17. století. Osudy generála Baltasara Marradase*, Praha 2006.

Francek J., *Navzdory závisti. Životní příběh Albrechta z Valdštejna*, Praha 2007.

Franz G., *Die Politik Maxmilians I. von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618–1651*, I/1, München–Wien 1966.

Fukala R., *Dánský vpád do Slezska a rozklad opavské stavovské společnosti. Památce univerzitního profesora PhDr. Josefa Polišenského, DrSc.*, "Slezský sborník" 2001, no. 99, pp. 81–94.

Fukala R., *Dramat Europy. Wojna trzydziestoletnia (1618–1648) a kraje Korony czeskiej*, Wrocław 2015.

Fukala R., *Falcká válka a hrdinná obrana Kladska*, in: *550 let Hrabství Kladského 1459–2009. 550 lat Hrabstwa Kłodzkiego 1459–2009* (miscellany), Trutnov 2009, pp. 171–197.

Fukala R., *Konec zimního království a poslední ohniska odporu*, České Budějovice 2016.

Fukala R., *Povstalci a rebelové*, "Acta historica et museologica Universitatis Silesianae Opaviensis", coll. C 3, 1997, pp. 90–109.

Fukala R., *Stavovská politika na Opavsku v letech 1490–1631*, Opava 2004.

Fukala R., *Třicetiletá válka ve Slezsku*, in: *Slezsko v dějinách českého státu*, II: 1490–1763, ed. Z. Jirásek, Praha 2012, pp. 105–113.

Gade J.A., *Christian IV. King of Denmark and Norway*, London 1927.

Geyl P., *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 1609–1648*, London 1989

Geyl P., *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555–1609*, London 1980.

Gindely A., *Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, I–III, Leipzig 1882.

Grossmann J., *Des Grafen Ernst von Mansfeld letzte Pläne und Thaten*, Breslau 1870.

Guthire W.P., *Battles of the Thirty Years' War. From White Mountain to Nordlingen 1618–1635*, London 2002.

Heiberg S., *Christian IV, monarken, mennesket og myten*, København 1988.

Höbelt L., *Ferdinand III. (1608–1657). Mírový císař proti své vůli*, České Budějovice 2015.

Hroch M., *Česká otázka v dánské politice 1619–1625*, "Studie Muzea Kroměřížska" 1990, no. 90, pp. 67–75.

Hroch M., *Handel und Politik im Ostseeraum während des dreissigjährige Krieges. Zur Rolle des Kaufmannskapitals in der aufkommenden allgemeinen Krise der Feudalgesellschaft in Europa*, Univerzita Karlova, Praha 1976.

Hroch M., *Valdštejnova politika v severním Německu v letech 1629–1630*, "Sborník historický" 1957, no. 5, pp. 203–229.

Hrubý F., *Ladislav Velen z Žerotína*, Praha 1930.

Hrubý F., *Z vídeňských papírů Jindřicha Matyáše hr. z Thurnu*, "Český časopis historický" 1928, no. 34, pp. 473–573.

Indra B., *Město a panství Hranice za třicetileté války*, "Sborník Státního okresního archivu Přerov", Přerov 1996, pp. 32–44.

Indra B., *Odboj města Hranic 1620–1627 a jeho potrestání*, "Časopis Vlasteneckého spolku muzejního v Olomouci" 1940, no. 53, pp. 15–56.

Janáček J., *Valdštejn a jeho doba*, Praha 1978.

Janáček J., *Valdštejnova pomsta. List z dějin bělohorské Moravy*, Praha 1992.

Junkelmann M., *Gustav Adolf (1594–1632). Schwedens Aufstieg zur Grossmacht*, Regensburg 1993.

Kaiser M., *Politik und Kriegführung. Maxmilian von Bayern, Tilly und die Katholische Liga im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Münster 1999.

Kalista Z., *Valdštejn. Historie odcizení a snu*, Praha 2002.

Kamen H., *Imperio. La forja de España como potencia mundial*, Madrid 2003.

Kamen H., *Spain 1469–1714. A Society of Conflict*, London–New York 1991.

Kamen H., *Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power*, London–New York 2002.

Kamen H., *Imperium Hiszpańskie. Dzieje rozkwitu i upadku*, Warszawa 2008.

Kampmann Ch., *Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, Stuttgart 2008.

Klíma A., *Dlouhá válka, 1618–1648*, Praha 1996.

Kollmann J., *Pokus o zastavení třicetileté války: mírová jednání v Brunšviku 1625–1626*, Praha 1989.

Kollmann J., *Valdštejn a evropská politika 1625–1630. Historie 1. Generalátu*, Praha 1999.

Korbelářová I., *Opava za třicetileté války a v pobělohorském období*, in: *Opava*, eds. K. Müller, R. Žáček, Praha 2006, pp. 165–206.

Kraus A., *Maxmilian I. Bayerns. Grosser Kurfürst*, Regensburg 1990.

Krebs J., *Das Verhalten der Schlesier beim Einfalle Mansfelds und der Dänen (1626)*, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Alterthum Schlesiens" 1897, no. 31, pp. 165–194.

Krebs J., *Schlesien in den Jahren 1626 und 1627*, Teile 1–3, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Alterthum Schlesiens" 1886, no. 20, pp. 1–32; 21, 1887, pp. 116–148; 25, 1891, pp. 124–184.

Krüssmann W., *Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626). Grafensohn, Söldnerführer, Kriegsunternehmer gegen Habsburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, Berlin 2010.

Livet G., *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, Paris 1991.

Lockhart P.D., *Denmark 1513–1660: The Rise and Decline of a Renaissance Monarchy*, Oxford University Press, New York 2007.

Lockhart P.D., *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War 1618–1648*. *King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State*, Selingsgrove (Susquehanna University Press), London 1996.

Lockhart P.D., *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004.

Lolo R., *Rozejm w Sztumdorfie a Habsburgowie. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad zaangażowaniem Rzeczypospolitej w wojnę trzydziestoletnią*, in: *Z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII wieku*, ed. M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2007, pp. 57–65.

Lolo R., *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618–1635)*, Pułtusk 2004.

Lunde H.O., *A Warrior Dynasty. The Rise and Fall of Sweden as a Military Superpower 1611–1721*, Havertown–Oxford 2014.

Mann G., *Wallenstein. Sein Leben erzählt von Golo Mann*, Frankfurt am Main 1971.

Marañón G., *Olivares*, München 2006.

Maroń J., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Śląsku. Aspekty militarne*, Wrocław–Racibórz 2008.

Matějek F., *Morava za třicetileté války*, Praha 1992.

Mišaga V., *Dánský vpád do Slezska a na Moravu. Souvislosti a průběh roku 1626*, "Časopis Národního muzea – řada historická" 2008, no. 1–2 (177), pp. 55–103.

Mišaga V., *Přichází přítel, nebo nepřítel? Venkovské obyvatelstvo za dánského vpádu v letech 1626 až 1627*, "Historie, otázky, problémy" 2011, no. 3 (1), pp. 47–55.

Mousnier R., *L´homme rouge ou la vie du cardinal Richelieu 1585–1642*, Paris 1992.

Munck T., *Seventeenth Century Europe. State, Conflict and the Social Order in Europe 1598–1700*, Macmillan Press Ltd. 1990.

Nagy L., *Hajduci, 1591–1699*, Brno 2002.

Oborni T., *Bethlen Gábor*, (Kossuth kiadó), Budapest 2017.

Odložilík O., *Ze zápasů pobělohorské emigrace*, "Časopis Matice moravské" 1932, no. 56, pp. 1–58.

Odložilík O., *Povstalec a emigrant. Kapitoly z dějin třicetileté války*, Londýn 1944.

Opel J.O., *Der niedersächsisch-dänische Krieg*, I–III, Halle–Magdeburg 1872–1894.

Orlita Z., *Dánské mince ve světle lichtenštejnských protokolů. Zhodnocení dosavadního stavu znalostí*, in: *Peníze v proměnách času*, II, "Acta numismatica Bohemiae, Moraviae et Silesiae" 2000, no. 4, pp. 17–22.

Orlita Z., *Dánský vpád na Opavsko a jeho odraz na městské politické scéně. Příspěvek ke konfesijnímu soužití opavského měšťanstva*, in: *Opava. Sborník k dějinám města 2*, Opava 2000, pp. 31–37.

Pagès G., *La Guerre de Trente Ans 1618–1648*, Paris 1972.

Pagès G., *The Thirty Years' War*, London 1970.

Papoušek F., *Dánské (Zwirnerovo) falešné mincování na Hradci u Opavy v letech 1626 a 1627*, "Slezský sborník" 1936, no. 3–4 (XLI), pp. 151–159.

Parker G., *Spain and the Netherlands 1559–1659. Ten studies*, London 1979.

Parker G., *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1657. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*, Cambridge 1972.

Parrott D.A., *Richelieu's Army. War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642*, Cambridge 2001.

Petersen L.E., *The Danish intermezzo*, in: *The Thirty Years' War*, ed. G. Parker, New York 1993, pp. 71–81.

Polišenský J., Kollmann J.,*Valdštejn. Ani císař, ani král*, Praha 1995.

Polišenský J., et al., *Dějiny Latinské Ameriky*, Praha 1979.

Polišenský J., *Morava a vztahy mezi evropským Východem a Západem 1626–1627*, in: *K šedesátinám profesora Josefa Macůrka*, "Sborník prací filosofické fakulty brněnské university" 1961, no. 10, C – 8, pp. 251–265.

Polišenský J., *Slezsko a válka třicetiletá. Pokus o nový výklad a program práce*, in: *Česko-polský sborník vědeckých prací*, ed. M. Kudělka, Praha 1955, pp. 311–332.

Polišenský J., *The Thirty Years' War*, University of California Press, London–Berkeley–Batsford 1971.

Polišenský J., *Třicetiletá válka a český národ*, Praha 1960.

Polišenský J., *Třicetiletá válka a evropské krize 17. století*, 1970.

Polišenský J., *The Thirty Years' War and the Crises and Revolutions of Seventeenth Century Europe*, "Past and Present" 1968, no. 20 (39), pp. 34–43.

Probst N.M., *Christian's flåde*, København 1996.

Reibitsch R., *Valdštejn. Životopis mocnáře*, České Budějovice 2014.

Repgen K., *Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven* (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, 8), München 1988.

Ritter M., *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*: 1555–1648, 1–3, Stuttgart 1889–1895, reprint Darmstadt 1974.

Roberts M., *Essays in Swedish History*, London 1967.

Roberts M., *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden*, London 1973.

Roberts M., *Gustavus Adolphus. A History of Sweden 1611–1632*, I–II, London 1953–1958.

Roberts M., *Gustavus Adolphus: Profiles in Power*, London 1992.

Roubík F., *Itinerář Albrechta z Valdštejna z let 1625–1634*, in: *Přátelé čes. starožitností svému učiteli. K šedesátinám univ. prof. Dr. J. V. Šimáka*, "Časopis Společnosti přátel starožitností" 1930, no. 38, pp. 124–130.

Roubík F., *Valdštejnovo tažení na Slovensko roku 1626*, "Sborník Archivu ministerstva vnitra ČSR" 1935, no. VIII, pp. 145–232.

Sacchi H., *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, I–III, Paris 1991.

Saller R., *Reichsgraf Johann Tserclaes von Tilly. Chronik über Leben und Laufbahn*, Altötting 2007.

Schmidt G., *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, München 1999.

Serwański M., *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)*, Poznań 1986.

Skowroda P., *Hammerstein 1627*, Warszawa 2006.

Steinberg S.H., *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg und der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Europa 1600–1660*, Göttingen 1967.

Steinberg S.H., *The "Thirty Years' War" and the Conflict for European Hegemony 1600–1660*, London 1966.

Tapié V.-L., *La France de Louis XIII. et de Richelieu*, Paris 1967.

Tapié V.-L., *La Guerre de Trente Ans*, Paris 1989.

Tárnóc M., *Erdély müvelödése Bethlen Gábor és a két Rákoczy György korában*, Budapest 1978.

Teyssier A., *Richelieu. L'aigle et la colombe*, Perrin, Paris 2015.

The Thirty Years' War, ed. G. Parker, New York 1993.

Thuau E., *Raison d'Etat et pensée politique à l'époque de Richelieu*, Paris 1966.

Válka J., *Morava reformace, renesance a baroka. Dějiny Moravy, 2. Vlastivěda moravská. Země a lid*, Brno 1996.

Wedgwood C.V., *The Thirty Years' War*, London 1938.

Wedgwood C.V., *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg*, München 1999.

Wertheim H., *Der tolle Halberstädter. Herzog Christian von Braunschweig im Pfälzischen Kriege 1621–1622*, I–II. Berlin 1929.

Wilson P.H., *Europe's Tragedy. A New History of the Thirty Years' War*, London–New York 2010.

Wimmer J., *Polska – Szwecja. Konflikty zbrojne w XVI–XVIII wieku*, Oświęcim 2013.

Wójcik Z., *Historia powszechna: wiek XVI–XVII*, Warszawa 1995.

Wolke L.E., Larsson G., Villstrand N.E., *Wojna Trzydziestoletnia. Europa i świat 1618–1648*, Warszawa 2010.

Zukal J., *Die Liechtensteinsche Inquisition in den Fürstentümern Troppau und Jägerndorf aus Anlaß des Mansfeldschen Einfalls 1626–1627.* Sonderabdruck aus "Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kulturgeschichte Österreichisch-Schlesiens", Jahrgang VII, Troppau 1912, pp. 1–33.

Zukal J., *Paměti opavské. Črty kulturní a místopisné*, Opava 1912.

Zukal J., *Slezské konfiskace, 1620–1630. Pokutování provinilé šlechty v Krnovsku, Opavsku a Osoblažsku po bitvě bělohorské a po vpádu Mansfeldově*, Praha 1916.

Duński okres wojny w Dolnej Saksonii i atak Mansfelda na Śląsk 1625–1629

Abstrakt

W maju 1625 król Krystian IV rozpoczął działania wojenne przeciewko wojskom Ligi Katolickiej w Dolnej Saksonii. Sprzymierzeńcy jednak, nie zdołali dostarczyć mu żądanego wsparcia finansowego i główne siły duńskie zostały pokonane przez katolickiego generała Jeana Tserclaesa Tilly'ego w bitwie pod Lutter am Barenberg 27 sierpnia 1626 roku. Sytuacja na innym froncie duńskiej wojny nie była ani trochę lepsza. W bitwie przy ważnym strategicznie moście w Dessau 25 kwietnia 1626, Peter Ernest Mansfeld i jego korpus ponieśli ciężką porażkę zadaną przez cesarskiego dowódcę Albrechta Wallensteina. Następnie Mansfeld wycofał się na terytorium Brandenburgii skąd prowadził działania dywersyjne na Śląsk i Morawy. Do jesieni 1627 Duńczycy zostali usunięci z północnych Niemiec. W dodatku wojsko Wallensteina zajęło Jutlandię. Pozostałe duńskie pułki cofnęły się na wyspy i po pokoju w Lubece, podpisanym 22 maja 1629, Dania oficjalnie skończyła udział w wojnie.

The Danish War in Lower Saxony and Mansfeld's Invasion to Silesia 1625–1629

Abstract

In May 1625, King Christian IV launched operations against the army of the Catholic League in Lower Saxony. The allies, however, failed to provide him the desired financial support, and the main Danish forces were defeated by the Catholic general Jean Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, in the battle at Lutter am Barenberg on 27 August 1626. The situation on another front of the Danish War was not any better. In the battle at the strategically important Dessau Bridge on 25 April 1616, Peter Ernest of Mansfeld and his corps took a heavy trimming from the imperial commander Albert of Wallenstein. Subsequently, Mansfeld tactically withdrew to the Brandenburg territory from where he continued in a diversionary campaign to Silesia and Moravia. By autumn 1627, the Danish troops were forced from northern Germany. In addition, the Wallenstein troops occupied Jutland. The remaining Danish regiments withdrew to the islands, and by the Treaty of Lübeck signed on 22 May 1629, Denmark officially terminated its participation in the war.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-02

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Jan Kilián
ORCID: 0000-0002-9501-6560
Department of Auxiliary Historical Sciences and Archival Sciences,
FF UHK, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic
e-mail: jankilian@email.cz

A soldier and a townsman during the Thirty Years' War. Coexistence – Confrontation – Cooperation

Keywords: 17th Century, Thirty Years´ War, Military History, Urban History, Soldiers, Violence
Słowa kluczowe: XVII wiek, wojna trzydziestoletnia, historia wojskowości, historia miast, żołnierze, przemoc

The Thirty Years' War is a term that attracts the attention of historians, as well as a wide range of readers. Through analysis, it is possible, alongside significant events and personalities, to study war campaigns and battles or sieges of strategic fortresses, as well as to study the everyday life during the war and the effects of struggle on ordinary people living in cities and villages. Different social groups were challenged by the war disaster to an extent not yet recognized and had to develop a *modus vivendi*, often also *a modus cooperandi*. It is common knowledge that the main burden of the army's accommodation was borne by fortified towns. However, questions arise as to how exactly did the coexistence of these two strongly antagonized parties in a relatively small space at first glance proceed? Has the presence of soldiers in the city always brought its devastation, or maybe some centres were able to benefit from it? Were there any regional differences

in this respect, or were some cities destroyed by the military more than others? What was a normal day for a warrior accommodated in the city? How did he deal with this new environment? How did he entertain himself? What could he allow himself to do?

State and prospects of research

Learning how the population of towns and villages endured a long war, also due to the now fashionable historical and anthropological trend, is an attractive area of many researches. However, these are mainly concentrated in Germany, while in the Czech Republic and Poland they find little resonance. It should be noted, however, that also in Germany, no monograph on the relations between townsmen and soldiers in a given town centre during the Thirty Years' War was written. The absence is partly compensated for by post-conference volumes, which are most often the result of actions taken by the military and social research community in the early modern period (Arbeitskreis Militär und Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit), represented mainly by Ralf Pröve, Bernhard Kroener and Michael Kaiser. The most successful, growing to be the foundation of further actions, are the volumes about the relations between the army and the early modern society,[1] or the army and the rural population of that period.[2] One of their editors, Bernhard Kroener, raised these issues in a further collective study.[3] Even more, the publications by Michael Kaiser and Ralf Pröve, contained in the collective works, should be considered fundamental. Michael Kaiser described his article as a remark about the rise of and levelling of antagonisms between soldiers and inhabitants, focusing on a different view of the value system of both groups[4]. Otherwise, Ralf Pröve, who took the circumstances of the military/soldiers' stay in the city as the aim of his deliberations, thus coming closest to the issue addressed in the following paragraphs of this article, although the time frame he adopted was wider and covered all early modern period. However, he proposed a basic

[1] *Krieg und Frieden. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. B.R. Kroener, R. Pröve, Paderborn 1996.

[2] *Militär und ländliche Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit*, eds. S. Kroll, K. Krüger, Münster–Hamburg–London 2000.

[3] B.R. Kroener, *Militär in der Gesellschaft. Aspekte einer neuen Militärgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: *Was ist Militärgeschichte*, eds. T. Kühne, B. Ziemann, Paderborn 2000, pp. 283–299.

[4] M. Kaiser, *Die Söldner und die Bevölkerung. Überlegungen zu Konstituierung und Überwindung eines lebensweltlichen Antagonismus*, in: *Militär und ländliche Gesellschaft*…, pp. 79–120.

research questionnaire.[5] The release of the volume on existence during the Thirty Years' War was also a very important step as it was seen "close to reality", containing many studies on the city and its destruction by soldiers.[6]

Of course, the role of the townspeople and soldiers could not be omitted from any of the more recent monographs on towns during the Thirty Years' War. In the second half of the eighties and the early nineties of the last century, several Bernd Roeck's works on Augsburg were published, in which the most valuable are the chapters on the spirit of people affected by the war and on the declining economy of cities. Bernd Roeck, who makes full use of micro history and historical anthropology, was interested in a simple man, but not necessarily in relation to the army, therefore, for the issues undertaken here, they are of a rather marginal importance.[7] A similar character is the insightful analysis of the situation in many southern free German cities by Thomas Wolf – mainly demographic and economic conditions.[8] The inspiration for Wolf's works can be seen in Kathrin Werner's dissertation, which focuses on the triad of North German cities of Demmin, Loitz, Anklam and Wolgast, but also includes other urban centres on the Peene River in Pomerania.[9] The next dissertation, this time by Christian Plath, on religious conflicts and occupation based on the example of Hildesheim, covering a broader period than the Thirty Years' War, i.e. 1580–1660, is very impressive in its size. Much attention has been paid here to the presence of the military.[10] An absolutely unique case was Ingolstadt, the main and unconquerable Bavarian fortress during the Thirty Years' War, where Tobias Schönauer could afford to describe the accompanying war phenomena, such as the overpopulation of the city by fugitives

[5] R. Pröve, *Der Soldat in der „guten Bürgerstube". Das frühneuzetliche Einquartierungssystem und die sozioökonomischen Folgen*, in: *Krieg und Frieden*…, pp. 191–219.

[6] *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe*, eds. H. Medick, B. von Krusenstjern, Göttingen 1999.

[7] B. Roeck, *„Als wollt die Welt schier brechen". Eine Stadt im Zeitalter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, München 1991 and: idem, *Eine Stadt in Krieg und Frieden. Studien zur Geschichte der Reichstadt Augsburg zwischen Kalenderstreit und Parität*, vol. I–II, Göttingen 1989.

[8] T. Wolf, *Reichsstädte in Kriegszeiten. Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte von Isny, Lindau, Memmingen und Ravensburg im 17. Jahrhundert*, Memmingen 1991.

[9] K. Werner, *Vorpommersche Städte entlang der Peene im Dreissigjährigen Krieg. Die Auswirkungen dieses Krieges auf das ökonomische, soziale und kulturelle Leben der Bewohner von Demmin, Loitz, Anklam, Wolgast und anderer Peenestädte*, vol. I–II, Greifswald 1996.

[10] Ch. Plath, *Konfessionskampf und fremde Besatzung. Stadt und Hochstift Hildesheim im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (ca. 1580–1660)*, Münster 2005.

and soldiers.[11] Martin Wildgruber, who analysed a very short period between 1632 and 1634 in his work on Wasserburg, came closest to the reality of contacts between the townspeople and the army. These were the years of the greatest threat to the city centre from foreign troops, which, due to its military importance, was full of soldiers.[12] Numerous details about the circumstances of the accommodation can also be found in the works of Anja Rieck (about Frankfurt am Main)[13] and Philipp Tober (about Wismar).[14] In addition to the above, a number of further publications of a similar nature have been produced, but their level is sometimes varied and the relationship with the subject matter addressed here is minimal.[15]

Czech historiography in the sphere of towns and cities still prefers the 'pre-weissenberg' period, although studies of later decades are also quite lacking. The author of these words prepared a monographic picture of Mělník during the war,[16] a Central Bohemian centre belonging to the towns that are widow's pensions for queens, similar to mining areas of Kašperské Hory.[17] An impressive book on art history devoted to Prague during the Thirty Years' War, but its aim was completely different from describing the wartime existence of the townspeople.[18] Nothing important has been added to the issue of the relations between the townspeople and the army, except for the works Kortus[19] and Marek Ďurčanský.[20] In 2010, a conference was organized in Teplice in cooperation with Charles University and the Technical University of Liberec to inspire our research and

[11] T. Schönauer, *Ingolstadt in der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Soziale und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der Stadtgeschichte*, Ingolstadt 2007.

[12] M. Wildgruber, *Die feste Stadt Wasserburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1632–1634*, Wasserburg am Inn 1986.

[13] A. Rieck, *Frankfurt am Main unter schwedischer Besatzung 1631–1635. Reichsstadt – Repräsentationsort – Bündnisfestungs*, Frankfurt am Main 2005.

[14] P. Tober, *Wismar im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1627–1648. Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts-, Bau- und Sozialgeschichte*, Berlin 2007.

[15] E.g. *Wien im Dreissigjährigen Krieg. Bevölkerung – Gesellschaft – Kultur – Konfession*, ed. A.Weigl, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2001.

[16] J. Kilián, *Město ve válce, válka ve městě. Mělník 1618–1648*, České Budějovice 2008.

[17] J. Kilián, *Kašperské Hory za třicetileté války*, Plzeň 2015.

[18] M. Šroněk, J. Hausenblasová, *Gloria et Miseria 1618–1648. Praha v době třicetileté války*, Praha 1998.

[19] O. Kortus, *Praha za saského vpádu v letech 1631 a 1632*, "Pražský sborník historický" 2008, no. 36, pp. 105–184 and idem, *Cheb a okolí za saského vpádu v letech 1631 a 1632*, "Sborník Muzea Karlovarského kraje" 2008, no. 16, pp. 95–122.

[20] M. Ďurčanský, *Zkušenosti Nymburských s vojáky za třicetileté války. Sonda do problematiky obrazu vojáka v českém prostředí*, Kuděj 1999/1, p. 22–38.

discussion on soldiers in the cities and villages of the early modern era.[21] Soldiers and villages have recently received the attention of Jaroslav Šulc, and the results of his research are used in the analysis of the situation in cities.[22]

These scientific studies should be supplemented by often very subjective narrative and yearbook sources, created by townspeople themselves. The tragic Thirty Years' War made them reach for their pen and write down their observations more than any earlier. Editions of such sources are numerous as in the Czech Republic, as well as in Germany, where even a list of them was created[23] and where valuable anthologies were published.[24] Similar ones were created in the Czech Republic thanks to Josef Polišenský[25] and Tichá.[26] Especially rich is the Saxony's chronicle tradition in the mining towns of the Czech Ore Mountains,[27] which influenced the achievements on the Czech side of the mountains. These very interesting chronicles of the Czech borderland written in German, however, do not enjoy the attention they deserve. Recently, the Chronicles of Michel Stüeler,[28] burgher and tanner from Krupka, the Chronicle of Hans Kriesche[29] from Česká Lípa and partly extracts from the Chronicle of Chomutov by Andreas Augustin Fiedler[30] were made. Interestingly, all Czech language chronicles had been published much earlier.

---

[21] *Turek, Švéd a Prajz. Vojenský živel versus město a venkov českého raného novověku*, eds. J. Kilián, M. Koldinská, M. Svoboda, "Historie – otázky – problémy" 2011, no. 3 (1).

[22] E.J. Šulc, *Třicetiletá válka a všední den venkovské společnosti (se zřetelem k situaci na komorních panstvích a ve středním Polabí)*, "Časopis Národního muzea" 2006, no. 175 (1–2), pp. 41–78.

[23] B. von Krusenstjern, *Selbstzeugnisse der Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Beschreibendes Verzeichnis*, Berlin 1997.

[24] *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in Augenzeugenberichten*, ed. H. Jessen, Düsseldorf 1963; *Experiencing the Thirty Years War. A Brief History with Documents*, eds. H. Medick, B. Marschke, Boston–New York 2013.

[25] *Kniha o bolesti a smutku*, ed. J. Polišenský, Praha 1948.

[26] *Kroniky válečných dob*, ed. Z. Tichá, Praha 1975.

[27] Comp. H. Bräuer, *Stadtchronistik und städtische Gesellschaft. Über die Widerspiegelung sozialer Strukturen in der obersächsisch-lausitzischen Stadtchronistik der frühen Neuzeit*, Leipzig 2009.

[28] *Paměti krupského měšťana Michela Stüelera (1629–1649)*, ed. J. Kilián, Praha–Teplice 2013.

[29] *Chronicle of the Town of České Lípa by Maestro Hanse Kriesche*, ed. J. Panáček, Litoměřice–Praha 2016.

[30] J. Wolf, *Chomutov v letech 1630–1679 v Chronicle (=v kronice) Andrease Augustina Fiedlera*, in: *Comotovia 2007: sborník příspěvků z konference věnované výročí 550 let udělení znaku města Chomutova (1457–2007)*, Chomutov 2008, pp. 106–141.

Unfortunately, comparable examples of relations from the military side are beyond our reach. If the soldiers kept their diaries and chronicles at all, these did not survive or were not discovered. A unique source is the diary of the German warrior Peter Hagendorf,[31] son of a miller or malt-gardenener, born around 1600 in Zerbst. However, he also does not favour his view of the urban environment, despite the fact that he came from it, and he probably also studied in a good urban school, where he gained the ability to read, write and count. However, his notes show the motivation to join the army – it was a desire to travel, to learn, to have adventures. The robbery and rape in the cities was so common to him that he didn't even write about it. It was similar with the living standards in cities, where he mentioned only once that he got a good accommodation. The pity is even bigger because in this case we have an above-average soldier who exchanged his jacket for an Italian-German dictionary and who was interested in natural beauty or agricultural and technical curiosities. However, he was not as resistant towards the townspeople as he was towards peasants – enemies of soldiers in life and death.[32]

Soldier in town

Obviously, soldiers were not an unknown problem in Central European cities even before the outbreak of the Czech State Uprising. So far, however, these were rather one-off stays or raids, which did not cover larger areas of the country and which were followed by quite a long recovery period. The Thirty Years' War, with its pernament-like warfare and exhausting character, changed everything. Armies have occupied the vast majority of Holy Empire cities. There were many reasons for the presence of troops in the cities.

In the case of important strongholds, capital or residential cities, there could be no shortage of permanent military crews (garrisons), at the time of the threat of attack reinforced even more strictly. Tobias Schönauer, who was stationed in Bavarian Inglostadt, described everyday life there, with growing number of soldiers who were added to the permanent ones since the 1630s. They were accommodated

[31] For a later alternative option see: *Söldnerleben am Vorabend des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Lebenslauf und Kriegstagebuch 1617 des hessischen Obristen Caspar von Widmarckter*, ed. H.T. Gräf, Marburg an der Lahn 2000, but in this case, it's not about an ordinary soldier „from peasants".

[32] *Peter Hagendorf – Tagebuch eines Söldners aus dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, ed. J. Peters, Göttingen 2012.

in bourgeois houses, of course, and their living conditions depended mainly on the wealth of the owner. Local councillors were spared, the same was true of professors from the University of Ingolstadt, Jesuits and others. In the most difficult war period, however, between 1631 and 1634, there were no longer any exceptions, although the middle class continued to bear the greatest burden. Not only the military, but also the workers working at the city fortifications were to be accommodated. If somebody managed to bypass accommodation, he had to put up with the army costs, which in the times of the greatest burden of the city were expensive.[33] However, Ingolstadt was lucky not to have enemy troops accommodated, which cannot be said of many other cities.

For the city a very painful manifestation of the presence of the army, which was preparing for the enemy attack, was often the liquidation or at least partial demolition of the suburbs and buildings in the immediate vicinity. It didn't just happen in connection with the fighting. The removal of buildings that could have been used during the siege by the enemy was a preventive measure before the expected attack. The victims of such activities were houses with farming facilities in suburban areas belonging to townspeople, facilities such as forges, and especially mills, so important for providing food. Granaries, barns and vineyard buildings were demolished, trees, including entire orchards were cut down.[34] After the war the suburbs were the most affected parts of the cities: they were burnt out, depopulated, in some cases they disappeared at all and it took many years, or even decades for them to be rebuilt at least partially, although in general they did not reach the state before the battle of Bílá (1620).

For civilians, the siege was associated with a lack of food and all kinds of everyday objects, hunger and disease were spreading, and sometimes cannibalism was taking place. The tightly closed city, which also had to feed the army, and not only its inhabitants, was quickly running out of supplies and if the incidents outside the walls or the help could not improve the situation, a catastrophe of apocalyptic proportions could occur. Determined people cooked paper and leather from shoes or thongs, ate rodent meat and carrion, and in the worst cases anthropophagia and cannibalism occurred. Bernd Roeck gave a very vivid

[33] T. Schönauer, *Ingolstadt…*

[34] A contemporary account of these events in Bautzen is given by J. Zeidler, *Tabeera Budissinae. Budissinische Brandstelle. Das ist: Was vor, in und nach der erbärmlichen ruin und einäscherung der Alten Volckreichen und Nahrhafftigen Budissin vorgangen*, Dresden 1634, pp. 20–35.

description of the famine and the resulting death on the example of Augsburg, besieged by the Imperial army after the battle of Nördlingen (Autumn 1634).[35]

Apart from hunger, soldiers brought a whole range of infectious diseases to cities, especially plague. The army, which was characterized by considerable fluctuation, stationing here and there without quarantine and a low level of hygiene, was a perfect spreader right away. Their outbreaks and years of occurrence have changed, which we can trace in the metrics and other sources recording increased mortality. These sources are varied, for example, in the Czech Republic a marked increase in deaths can be observed in the mid-1620s, around 1631–1632 and 1634, as in the 1640s. These years coincide with periods of increased military activity, with dragonnades, Saxony's invasions and finally with Swedish voyages. The same examples could be given for German cities, in addition to the already mentioned Augsburg, for example Wismar, which suffered a plague due to the great concentration of troops and a dense plague in 1628 and lasted another 3 years.[36] There is no data on further diseases brought by soldiers (syphilis, whooping cough, typhus, various fevers[37]), however, it is certain that those incapabilities also afflicted the population. What is more, the soldiers actively contributed to the spread of disease in the cities. In the conquered Landshut, they threw corpses and carrion into the well in order to poison the inhabitants, destroyed pharmacies and murdered doctors so as to prevent help for the infected and wounded.[38]

The prolonged occupation mainly affected strategic and well-established cities, the others were often burnt out and abandoned. Sometimes the commanders formed the so-called 'salva guardia', i.e. a guard to protect the townspeople from robbery by the armies under their command. In some cases, however, it was not about the guard as such, but about the guarantee of protection. The Salva guardia was not as anonymous as the larger military crew and generally established better contacts with the townspeople.

In less strategically significant centres, the longest stays of troops were connected with their winter accomodation, sometimes lasting from late Autumn to

[35] B. Roeck, *„Als will die Welt schier brechen"...*, pp. 271–279.

[36] P. Tober, *Wismar im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1627–1648...*, p. 104.

[37] In the Bavarian Wasserburg in August 1633, due to the great military build-up, a „Hungarian disease" appeared, probably typhus or hemorrhagic fever (syphilis can also be found under this term). M. Wildgruber, *Die feste Stadt Wasserburg...*, p. 96.

[38] W. Ebermeier, *Landshut im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Landshut 2000, p. 106.

advanced Spring. The soldiers were then to rest and gain strength for the Summer campaign, but for the townspeople it was extremely burdensome. Due to the lack of barracks, there was no other possibility than to provide the army with an accommodation under one's own roof with a fireplace during the period of frosts, rains and generally a bad aura. If the army was not provided with such winter accommodation, it was in danger of a complete moral decay. Suffice it to mention the famous case of the imperial army of Matthias Gallas, who after retreating from northern Germany stood under the walls of Magdeburg in the winter of 1644, whose commander refused to let the army into the town, even though both the imperial lieutenant general and over a thousand of his soldiers were ill. That's how the Gallas Army disaster happened.[39]

A specific reason for locating the army in the town, especially in the Czech state in the mid-1620s, was the deliberate, imposed re-catholicisation of the inhabitants, i.e. the so-called Dragonnades. It was similar in the Upper Palatinate. Soldiers in large numbers were placed in the houses of non-Catholic owners and stayed there until the family decided to convert.[40]

Especially in the late phase of the war, the inhabitants of towns and villages had to deal with deprived soldiers, the so-called marauders, who deserted from their units, merged into groups and made their living out of robbery on the roads, in villages or in unfortified towns. At the end of the war, some such gangs were strong enough to threaten regular military operations (for example, the famous "Petrovští" in Bohemia).

Accommodation and victualling

Because of the accommodation in the town, the soldiers appeared either in a patrician or bourgeois house. The properties of the richest and most affluent neighbours, usually standing by the market square, were mostly occupied by officers, while simple soldiers had to come to terms with a more modest accommodation. A soldier found himself in the middle of the economic and intimate life of a family; often with his own family, with his wife and children, therefore obviously found it difficult to establish a common language with those whose everyday lives they entered. A rough picture of such a situation is given by the accounts of

[39] For more details see: R. Rebitsch, *Matthias Gallas. Generalleutnant des Kaisers zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Eine militärische Biographie*, Münster 2006, pp. 288–294.

[40] Comp. B. Roedl, *Huertova mise v Lounech*, in: *Rekatolizace v českých zemích*, ed. J. Francek, Pardubice 1995, pp. 111–117.

Bavarian Wasserburg, which in the first half of the 1630s hosted 647 soldiers, and next to them another 373 people: their wives, children and servants.[41]

On the one hand, if an officer moved into spacious and accessible rooms, which a landlord had to offer him, a simple soldier had to settle for an attic or a chamber, and in individual cases – a barn or a stable. On the other hand, one didn't have to complain about the cold that one would have had to deal with in a cold chamber without a stove. In the cold season it was, of course, the law to live in a heated room,[42] which often meant sleeping among the four walls with the host family. This in turn became one of the main reasons for the spread of the epidemic. It was the infected who should have been kept warm. Such a soldier also had the right to his own bed, a few candles to light his room and access to a kitchen where he could cook for himself, unless his companion (wife) did so,[43] or unless he received food from his household members. In practice, it looked more or less like a soldier had unlimited access to the whole house and invited to it, as if it were his own, his companions. There have been cases where soldiers slept on the beds of their hosts and the house owners were forced to spend nights on the floor, and even cases when the household members were driven out and soldiers tried to sell the house.[44] The martyrdom of the townspeople began when they had to accommodate many soldiers. Pröve also noted that the soldiers were most often housed in houses of two or three and shared a bed there.[45] But sometimes there were many more.

According to official orders, a soldier was entitled to a standardised daily ration in the form of bread, meat (usually 4 livres) and beer (about 7 pints), the horsemen were also to receive hay and food for their horses. The problem arose in the time of crop failure or when the butchers were unable to obtain meat from local peasants. They were punished for such inadequacies. The army was obliged to obtain the bread, meat and beer from specific neighbours, and the army was not to burden its hosts with this. Unfortunately, the reality was different. Soldiers wanted to have more than necessary basics, and their expectations sometimes reached the absurd. The imperial military commissioner in 1635 created a big

[41] M. Wildgruber, *Die feste Stadt Wasserburg*..., p. 140.

[42] R. Pröve, *Der Soldat in der „guten Bürgerstube"*..., p. 199.

[43] Comp. *Peter Hagendorf*…

[44] Both cases are recalled by A. Rieck, *Frankfurt am Main unter schwedischer Besatzung 1631–1635*…, p. 193.

[45] R. Pröve, *Der Soldat in der „guten Bürgerstube"*..., p. 199.

problem for one of the Polish warriors, who demanded plums and rice during his lodging in Mladá Boleslav.[46] In other cases, it was mostly fruit, vegetables and spices, especially salt and pepper, and sometimes vinegar, the most popular preservatives at the time. In Prague, the army demanded fruit and other southern delicacies,[47] and in Frankfurt am Main, tobacco was demanded many times.[48] Officers usually expected money. Everybody wanted alcohol, mostly wine[49] or more beer. If they did not receive the liquor immediately, they threatened to damage the ovens, smash the windows and break the tables.[50] There were also times when the army was not satisfied with the food and sold it in the city.[51]

Social inclusion and cooperation

Instead of first sentence have something like this: There were some soldiers who did not experience these problems in the city. There were also those who made money from it, as well as former soldiers who found acceptance, sometimes also got involved with a woman or even settled down or returned to the town after the war with their wife. Sexual contact between soldiers and women was normal. After all, they were often young and attractive men, familiar with the world and sometimes also wealthy. Sometimes they were also educated craftsmen and there was always a possibility of benefiting from having someone skilful settled for longer. If not, the woman who tied herself to such a man was leaving with him for a new life visiting European battlefields. Examples include the wife of educated Peter Hagendorf, who gave birth to his children almost one after another and was still able to take care of the whole family,[52] or Susanna Hüebel from Krupka, who left her hometown after the wedding, widowed during the war and returned to her town after some time with another husband-soldier, who settled there with her and worked as a craftsman.[53] Soldiers, especially officers, were the godparents of townspeople's children, for which they were paid as well. Mostly, the bonds

[46] *Prameny k dějinám třicetileté války IV*, ed. V. Líva, Praha 1953, p. 385.

[47] According to Dr. Oldřich Kortus, not yet published.

[48] A. Rieck, *Frankfurt am Main unter schwedischer Besatzung 1631–1635*…, pp. 192 a 193.

[49] Ibidem; possibly also M. Wildgruber, *Die feste Stadt Wasserburg*, p. 94.

[50] Státní okresní archiv Mělník, Archiv města Mělník, Spisy, Inv. Nr. 1663 (D. Nedvědová to the council of Mělník, probably in 1621).

[51] M. Ďurčanský, *Zkušenosti Nymburských s vojáky za třicetileté války*…, p. 31.

[52] *Peter Hagendorf*…

[53] *Paměti krupského měšťana Michela Stüelera*…

with the army were strengthened in cases of longer lasting arrangements and in the case of smaller units, where anonymity was more difficult. There were some who simply became friends with the soldiers.[54] Also, the townspeople were much closer and showed sympathy to the soldiers or members of the salva guardia, who were humiliated by other soldiers during some combat.

Cooperation was mainly manifested in the sphere of trade and exchanges. Cities were an ideal place for the army to dispose of their loot and trophies gained in other cities or villages. They willingly traded with the Jews although they did not get the equivalent of their loot. After the capitulation of Frankfurt am Main, the Swedes did not expel the Jews from the city, because their commercial competence was a big advantage. One rabbi there even realized that the fate of his nation was far better than that of Christians in this war.[55] However, there was also a lively exchange between soldiers and Christian city dwellers. There were also those who got very rich on this, following the Jews. The soldiers however, were satisfied with small sums of money for their booty. Munich's townspeople were buying from them almost everything that was stolen around the city and on their way to it, even whole peasant carts.[56] There was a demand for horses, for livestock, for food, but also for craft products (skins, brewing tools and similar) or everyday objects. They were generally aware that they were buying stolen goods, but they did not shy away from buying them. This is another manifestation of the moral decline caused by an exhausting war. Purchasers were threatened by the fact that goods identified as stolen would have to give back to the rightful owner without compensation. However, the risk was low and mainly related to larger animals or objects that the new holder publicly displayed.

Some of the townspeople joined the army. The motives for this are usually not known,[57] but we can assume that one of them was the attractiveness of an adventurous life, travel and the chance to get rich easily. Others wanted to get out of a difficult situation, such as prison. The rule was that mainly representatives of the lower social stratum applied for the army, which of course does not exclude exceptions. Similar motifs played a role in case of collaboration with or joining the enemy army. Among the Saxony's soldiers at the time of their invasion on the

[54] M. Ďurčanský, *Zkušenosti Nymburských s vojáky za třicetileté války…*, p. 31.

[55] A. Rieck, *Frankfurt am Main unter schwedischer Besatzung 1631–1635…*, pp. 215–217.

[56] W. Ebermeier, *Landshut im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, p. 50

[57] Which basically also applies to the above quoted – Peter Hagendorf. See *Peter Hagendorf…*

Czech state there were many townsmen next to the nobility, others could be found under Danish or Swedish flags.

Thefts and rapes

Thefts and robberies carried out by the warriors were 'everyday bread' in the Central European city during the Thirty Years' War and together with rape were the main source of conflict between civilians and the army. What was being robbed has already been mentioned, and one of the most desired goods were horses, which in addition were easily exchangeable for money.[58] The members of the 'salva guardia' also stole a lot. The robberies were not only carried out at night, in narrow streets, on abandoned roads, but also during the daytime in the centre of a town, as one burgher Martin Burian Polický testified in a letter of May 1634 to his friend Šadimský, mentioning that soldiers in Prague take people's hats and coats away.[59]

The frequency of rape was noticeable in a conquered town. According to the law of war, a soldier was then entitled to loot in the form of anything he managed to get.[60] Most often the most desirable goods available were in the hands of commanders. With the exception of churches and ecclesiastical institutions, it was often about co-religionists.[61] The destruction of largely populated Magdeburg by Tilly's army in 1631 was so severe that the news about it was spread all over the world. The town was violently looted; the population was murdered, and majority of the houses burned down. The victims were counted in tens of thousands.[62] This event is sometimes written about as a "Magdeburg wedding", and for similar activities concerning other cities, even a term: "Magdeburgisation" was coined. The fate of Landshut, which was entered by the Swedes under Bernard of Sax-

[58] Thomas Just came to the same conclusion but with regard to a completely different place. *Söldner vor Gericht. Verfahren gegen Landsknechte im Landgericht Grafenegg zur Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, "Opera historica" 2006, no. 11, p. 550.

[59] Stání okresní archiv Náchod, Archiv města Náchod, Inv. Nr. 1568, without sign., carton 35 – Lukáš Šadimský z Šadimi, private records – the townsman Martin Burian Polický 3. May 1634 to Šadimský.

[60] Por. Ralf Pröve, *Violentia und Potestas. Perzeptionsprobleme von Gewalt in Söldnertagebücher des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Ein Schauplatz herber Angst. Wahrnehmung und Darstellung von Gewalt im 17. Jahrhundert*, eds. M. Meumann, D.Niefanger, Göttingen 1997, pp. 4–42.

[61] When Mantua was conquered, church institutions were protected by both imperial commanders. R. Rebitsch, *Matthias Gallas*…, p. 53.

[62] H. Medick, *Historisches Ereignis und zeitgenössische Erfahrung: Die Eroberung und Zerstörung Magdeburgs*, in: *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe*..., pp. 377–407.

ony-Weimar command in 1634 after heavy fighting, was not much better – as a bloody massacre was set up in the city. Everyone found in the street was killed, the murders lasted for eight long days. Churches and monasteries were not spared, on the contrary, they were plundered in the first place and many Catholic clergy were killed or severely mutilated. Residents were forced to drink the so-called Swedish liquor, their ears and noses were cut off, and they were tortured (among other things, by putting ropes around their necks) so that they would tell where their valuables were hidden.[63] The "Magdeburgisation" became a part of life of yet another town – the Central Bohemian Nymburk, which fell into the hands of the Saxony's army after a three-day siege in 1634 during the Saxo-Swedish invasion. The outraged army began to share the destruction, mainly as a response to the town's resistance but also their own loses, without saving women, children and the elderly seeking refuge in the local parish church.[64]

Part of the violence against civilians included the rape of women, which, of course, the sources are not silent about, but for understandable reasons do not generally provide more details. In the conquered city, women and girls (including nuns) could hardly avoid being raped, brutal soldiers with primitive sexual needs did not ask any questions. Sexual violence was a typical feature of the Thirty Years' War.[65] Mayor Christoph Brandis described the rape of a 17-year-old girl by a soldier from Ruthen in a very detailed way emphasizing the whole brutality of that act.[66] In Landshut many women were taken to a Swedish camp and raped there. When the soldiers satisfied their violent needs, many of the women were drowned in the river Isar, although other women, feeling disgraced sought death there for themselves. There were also those who spread blood on their intimate places, pretending to menstruate and therefore discourage rape.[67]

Violence and rape against civilians were also not foreign to their own troops, although to a lesser extent and not so drastically (although there will be exceptions here too). The aggression could have reached such an extent that it endangered the lives of the townspeople. In the sources, we can find many cases of murders committed among townsmen by the Habsburg or allied armies during

[63] W. Ebermeier, *Landshut im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, pp. 83–130.

[64] Otakar Odložilík, *Zkáza Nymburka za třicetileté války*, Nymburk 1934.

[65] About this phenomenon – comp. K. Jansson, *Soldaten und Vergewaltigung im Schweden des 17. Jahrhunderts*..., in: *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe*…, pp. 195–225.

[66] *Experiencing the Thirty Years War*…, eds. H. Medick, B. Marschke, pp. 80–81.

[67] W. Ebermeier, *Landshut im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, p. 48.

the Thirty Years' War. On the other hand, we also know such situations, when the townspeople, having some experience in armed combat, grabbed their weapons and confronted the army. However, this also did not guarantee that they would avoid later problems.

Termination and recapitulation

During the Thirty Years' War there were no barracks where soldiers could be accommodated safely, apart from just a few exceptions.[68] This affected not only their health, but also the damage to their expensive equipment and armaments, as well as the scale of desertion. The Emperor and commanders found it difficult to find an alternative. The army in the city was also a convenient solution for them as a means of pressure to achieve political, religious and economic goals. Placing soldiers in the homes of non-Catholic townsmen with the intention of forcing their conversion was a very familiar phenomenon, just as the threat of a forceful execution worked well for forcing contributions and supplies of provisions. In addition, it was possible to control two spheres: a soldier controlled a townsman and his family, a townsman could inform his superiors about the inappropriate behaviour of a soldier who was staying with him.

The free and forcible accommodation of troops meant relations were always on a 'knife's edge' it could explode at any time. Most of the reasons for that were thefts, alcohol and also the belief of the townspeople that the soldiers demanded too much, while the latter believed that they received too little. Other aspects were also important, such as incurring higher costs associated with heating more rooms in the house, and mainly – entering the intimate sphere of life of the host family. The conflicts were so common that we could hardly find a city that did not know them. They differed in their intensity, starting. Starting with verbal abuse, injury, through handcuffs to mutilation and death in fights leading to tragic consequences plus passivity towards the army's swagger. Many townspeople were able to deal with the enemy in a direct confrontation, but facing the threat other soldiers joining in were on shaky ground. Therefore, it usually ended up with formal complaints. If the town resisted the troops but were conquered, not only greater losses had to be reckoned with, but also their future fate would be entirely at the mercy of their invaders.

[68] An exception was, for example, Luxembourg during the Governorate of Baron Jan Beck, who ordered the construction of spacial "barracks" for the warriors accommodated in the capital city.

The duties of the cities in relation to their own and hostile armies did not differ in principle. In both cases they were asked for money, material support and human potential. The alien army didn't have to be more burdensome. Threats of seizures and counterattacks were directed against the cities by the armies of both sides. Nevertheless, foreign troops were more afraid of and generally more concerned about meeting their expectations.

However, we should not give in to the impression that the typical town from the first half of the 17th century did not have any possibilities of effective resistance against the army. The local community could secure themselves, and sometimes they did so very effectively. The cooperation between individual centres deepened, especially in the sphere of information, and stretches of self-defence were developed. Interestingly, it was considered an extreme solution to fight with a gun in hand or to escape. Typical town was aware of its economic importance and the fact that it was an integral part of the state's economic system. The complaints and demands from city representatives did not always fall on fertile soil, but were examples of pressure on the authorities and the monarch. Letters sent from cities were in standard form. The towns definitely presented themselves as worthy of mercy: extremely poor, plundered, and burnt out. The town appealed to the principles of Christian morality and inhabitants very often allowed themselves to threaten the noblemen with the possibility of leaving the place, which would result in economic regress in the area. It couldn't have left the authorities indifferent. Also within the town's community, there were many different ways found how to survive the war during the time of the imperial army's lodging or during the occupation. Among them was collaboration, purchase of stolen goods, solidarity, but variety of tricks as well. The overriding aim was to survive, which concerned the townspeople as well as the soldiers.

Bibliography

Bräuer H., *Stadtchronistik und städtische Gesellschaft. Über die Widerspiegelung sozialer Strukturen in der obersächsisch-lausitzischen Stadtchronistik der frühen Neuzeit*, Leipzig 2009.

Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in Augenzeugenberichten, ed. H. Jessen, Düsseldorf 1963.

Ďurčanský M., *Zkušenosti Nymburských s vojáky za třicetileté války. Sonda do problematiky obrazu vojáka v českém prostředí*, Kuděj 1999, no. 1, pp. 22–38.

Ebermeier W., *Landshut im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Landshut 2000.

Experiencing the Thirty Years War. A Brief History with Documents, eds. H. Medick, B. Marschke, Boston–New York 2013.

Jansson K., *Soldaten und Vergewaltigung im Schweden des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe*, eds. H. Medick, B. von Krusenstjern, Göttingen 1999, pp. 195–225.

Just T., *Söldner vor Gericht. Verfahren gegen Landsknechte im Landgericht Grafenegg zur Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, "Opera historica" 2006, no. 11, pp. 541–554.

Kaiser M., *Die Söldner und die Bevölkerung. Überlegungen zu Konstituierung und Überwindung eines lebensweltlichen Antagonismus*, in: *Militär und ländliche Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit*, eds. S. Kroll, K. Krüger, Münster–Hamburg–London 2000, pp. 79–120.

Kilián J., *Kašperské Hory za třicetileté války*, Plzeň 2015.

Kilián J., *Město ve válce, válka ve městě. Mělník 1618–1648*, České Budějovice 2008.

Turek, Švéd a Prajz. Vojenský živel versus město a venkov českého raného novověku, eds. J. Kilián, M. Koldinská, M. Svoboda, "Historie – otázky – problémy" 2011, no. 3 (1).

Kortus O., *Cheb a okolí za saského vpádu v letech 1631 a 1632*, "Sborník Muzea Karlovarského kraje" 2008, no. 16, pp. 95–122.

Kniha o bolesti a smutku, ed. J. Polišenský, Praha 1948.

Kortus O., *Praha za saského vpádu v letech 1631 a 1632*, "Pražský sborník historický" 2008, no. 36, pp. 105–184.

Krieg und Frieden. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit, eds. B.R. Kroener, R. Pröve, Paderborn 1996.

Kroener B.R., *Militär in der Gesellschaft. Aspekte einer neuen Militärgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: *Was ist Militärgeschichte*, eds. T. Kühne, B. Ziemann, Paderborn 2000, pp. 283–299.

Kronika města České Lípy mistra Hanse Kriescheho, ed. J. Panáček, Litoměřice – Praha 2016.

Kroniky válečných dob, ed. Z. Tichá, Praha 1975.

Krusenstjern von B., *Selbstzeugnisse der Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Beschreibendes Verzeichnis*, Berlin 1997.

Medick H., *Historisches Ereignis und zeitgenössische Erfahrung: Die Eroberung und Zerstörung Magdeburgs*, in: *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe*, eds. H. Medick, B. von Krusenstjern, Göttingen 1999, pp. 377–407.

Militär und ländliche Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit, eds. S. Kroll, K. Krüger, Münster–Hamburg–London 2000.

Odložilík O., *Zkáza Nymburka za třicetileté války*, Nymburk 1934.

Paměti krupského měšťana Michela Stüelera (1629–1649), ed. J. Kilián, Praha–Teplice 2013.

Peter Hagendorf – Tagebucb eines Söldners aus dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg, ed. J. Peters, Göttingen 2012.

Plath Ch., *Konfessionskampf und fremde Besatzung. Stadt und Hochstift Hildesheim im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (ca. 1580–1660)*, Münster 2005.

Prameny k dějinám třicetileté války IV, ed. V. Líva, Praha 1953.

Pröve R., *Der Soldat in der „guten Bürgerstube". Das frühneuzetliche Einquartierungssystem und die sozioökonomischen Folgen*, in: *Krieg und Frieden. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. B.R. Kroener, R. Pröve, Paderborn 1996, pp. 191–219.

Pröve R., *Violentia und Potestas. Perzeptionsprobleme von Gewalt in Söldnertagebücher des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Ein Schauplatz herber Angst. Wahrnehmung und Darstellung von Gewalt im 17. Jahrhundert*, eds. M. Meumann, D.Niefanger, Göttingen 1997, pp. 4–42.

Rebitsch R., *Matthias Gallas. Generalleutnant des Kaisers zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Eine militärische Biographie*, Münster 2006.

Rieck A., *Frankfurt am Main unter schwedischer Besatzung 1631–1635. Reichsstadt – Repräsentationsort – Bündnisfestungs*, Frankfurt am Main 2005.

Roeck B., *„Als wollt die Welt schier brechen". Eine Stadt im Zeitalter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, München 1991.

Roeck B., *Eine Stadt in Krieg und Frieden. Studien zur Geschichte der Reichstadt Augsburg zwischen Kalenderstreit und Parität*, vol. I–II, Göttingen 1989.

Roedl B., *Huertova mise v Lounech*, in: *Rekatolizace v českých zemích*, ed. J. Francek, Pardubice 1995, pp. 111–117.

Schönauer T., *Ingolstadt in der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Soziale und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der Stadtgeschichte*, Ingolstadt 2007.

Söldnerleben am Vorabend des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Lebenslauf und Kriegstagebuch 1617 des hessischen Obristen Caspar von Widmarckter, ed. H.T. Gräf, Marburg an der Lahn 2000.

Šroněk M., Hausenblasová J., *Gloria et Miseria 1618–1648. Praha v době třicetileté války*, Praha 1998.

Šulc J., *Třicetiletá válka a všední den venkovské společnosti (se zřetelem k situaci na komorních panstvích a ve středním Polabí)*, "Časopis Národního muzea" 2006, no. 175 (1–2), pp. 41–78.

Tober P., *Wismar im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1627–1648. Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts-, Bau- und Sozialgeschichte*, Berlin 2007.

Wien im Dreissigjährigen Krieg. Bevölkerung – Gesellschaft – Kultur – Konfession, ed. A. Weigl, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2001.

Werner K., *Vorpommersche Städte entlang der Peene im Dreissigjährigen Krieg. Die Auswirkungen dieses Krieges auf das ökonomische, soziale und kulturelle Leben der Bewohner von Demmin, Loitz, Anklam, Wolgast und anderer Peenestädte*, vol. I–II, Greifswald 1996.

Wildgruber M., *Die feste Stadt Wasserburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1632–1634*, Wasserburg am Inn 1986.

Wolf J., *Chomutov v letech 1630–1679 v kronice Andrease Augustina Fiedlera*, in: *Comotovia 2007: sborník příspěvků z konference věnované výročí 550 let udělení znaku města Chomutova (1457–2007)*, Chomutov 2008, pp. 106–141.

Wolf T., *Reichsstädte in Kriegszeiten. Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte von Isny, Lindau, Memmingen und Ravensburg im 17. Jahrhundert*, Memmingen 1991.

Zeidler J., *Tabeera Budissinae. Budissinische Brandstelle. Das ist: Was vor, in und nach der erbärmlichen ruin und einäscherung der Alten Volckreichen und Nahrhafftigen Budissin vorgangen*, Dresden 1634.

Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe, eds. H. Medick, B. von Krusenstjern, Göttingen 1999.

Żołnierz i mieszczanin w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej. Koegzystencja – konfrontacja – kooperacja

Abstrakt

Artykuł poświęcony jest wzajemnym powiązaniom między żołnierzami a populacją miasta podczas wojny trzydziestoletniej, głównie na podstawie niemieckiej literatury przedmiotu, która potwierdza i uzupełnia własne badania autora. Chociaż zazwyczaj funkcjonuje obraz wrogości obu tych grup społecznych, potwierdzony przez rozliczne raporty morderstw, rozbojów, gwałtów, przemocy fizycznej i psychicznej, to jednak rzeczywistość była dużo bardziej barwna, a doświadczenie miasta z wojskiem nie zawsze musiało być negatywne. Mogła to być wzajemna współpraca, szczególnie na niwie handlowej, a nawet stosunki przyjazne i rodzinne.

A soldier and a townsman during the Thirty Years' War. Coexistence – Confrontation – Cooperation

Abstract

The article deals with the basic issues of the relationships between soldiers and the city population during the Thirty Years' War, primarily on the basis of German special literature, which is still authoritative in this respect and at the same time confirms and complements the author's own research. Although the notion of the insurmountable ambivalence of both these social components, generally supported by countless reports of murders, robberies, rapes, physical and psychological attacks, the reality was much more colourful, and city experience with soldiers may not always have been negative. Whether it was mutual cooperation, especially on a commercial basis, or establishing friendly and family relations.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-03

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Andrzej Kamieński
ORCID: 0000-0002-5117-2537
Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Poznań
e-mail: kamienski1934@onet.pl

Congress of Westphalia. Participants in the negotiations, main provisions and consequences of decisions taken

Keywords: German Reich, Peace of Westphalia, diplomacy
Słowa kluczowe: Rzesza Niemiecka, pokój westfalski, dyplomacja

The procedures aiming at ending the Thirty Years' War started in the early 1730s. However, it was not until 25 December 1641 that an agreement was concluded in Hamburg between Sweden, France and the Emperor to organise an international peace congress in two cities in Westphalia: Münster and Osnabrück.[1] From 1643 onwards, the Westphalian cities, which were proclaimed to be neutral, began to receive messages from all over Europe. At the end of July 1643, the Emperor's deputation arrived in Münster, although the Grand Mayor of the Court of Ferdinand III, Count Maximilan von Trauttmansdorff, who was the main and most skilful diplomatic representative of the Hofburg did not arrive there until

[1] M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede*, Münster 1948, p. 10; K. Repgen, *Dreißigjähriger Krieg und Westfälische Friede. Studien und Quellen*, pub. F. Bosbach i Ch. Kampmann, Paderborn–München–Wien 1998, p. 329; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, München 2015, pp. 33–35.

November 1645. In the[2] meantime, the negotiations were conducted by a talented politician, Count Johann Ludwig von Nassau-Hadamar, assisted by the Counts Johann Weikhart von Auersperg and Johann Maximilian von Lamberg, who were co-opted into the lectures because of their social position and the skills they acquired during their many years of work for the Imperial Council of the Court (*Reichshofrat*) in Vienna. Their collaborators of aristocratic origin were the brilliant and revolving diplomat Johann Krane and doctor of law Isaak Volmar, who had the great confidence of the Emperor, as well as Countess Claudia Medici of Tyrol, widow of the Austrian Archduke Leopold V Habsburg. Volmar, considered by his colleagues to be mainly a career-focused representative, was an extremely valuable negotiator for the Habsburgs. He held the office of Chancellor of Alsace since 1621 and because of his many years of administrative experience, he knew best of all the complicated legal and political situation of the region. Volmar's advice proved invaluable in negotiations with France. Therefore, his position was not even shaken by the message given to Emperor Ferdinand III that he had accepted a generous bribe from a French spy.[3] Interestingly, the list of defenders of imperial interests did not end with Volmar. The Court of Vienna was additionally supported by representatives of the Emperor such as the King of Bohemia and Archduke of Austria and also delegates of Ferdinand's younger brother, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, who performed at the congress on behalf of his numerous church territories. Leopold William was not only the grand master of the remains of the Teutonic Order that survived the Prussian secularization of 1525, but he also held the position of a bishop of Pasava, Strasbourg and Halberstadt.[4]

The Westphalia Congress was attended by 194 official political entities. As many as 178 of them came from the German Reich. The largest group was made up of representatives of the Reich states (*Reichsstände*), among which were 8 members of the electoral college, 75 clerical and secular princes and 57 Reich cities (*Reichstädte*). In addition, there were 38 other political entities from the

[2] F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, Münster 1972, p. 195; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, p. 63.

[3] M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede…*, pp. 22–24; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, pp. 195–196; H. von und zu Egloffstein, *Volmar Isaak*, in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (later: *ADB*), vol. 40, Leipzig 1896, pp. 263–269; R. Fukala, *Dramat Europy. Wojna trzydziestoletnia (1618–1648) a kraje Korony Czeskiej*, Wrocław 2015, p. 384; K. Repgen, *Dreißigjähriger Krieg…*, pp. 653–655; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, pp. 45–46; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648. Tragedia Europy*, Oświęcim 2017, pp. 650–651, 683.

[4] F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses. Eine strukturgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Münster 1984, p. 16; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia…*, s. 651.

territory of the Reich that did not take place in any of the three curias of the assembly states. Worth mentioning is the presence of the Abbots, Imperial Knights (*Reichsritterschaft*), cities under the territorial sovereignty (*Mediatstädte*), such as Osnabrück and Minden, as well as individuals of aristocratic origin interested in the outcome of the proceedings. The latter category included Count Lodewijk von Egmond, a contender to the Principality of Gelderland, represented at the Congress of Westphalia by Pellegrino Carleni – abbot of the Italian Lugnano in Taverin. Apart from him, there were also representatives of the nephew of the Pomeranian Duke Bogusław XIII, Ernest Bogusław, the Duke of Croy and Aerschot (Balthasar Magnus von Wedel) and the Brandenburg Margrave Christian William (Johann Häffer).[5]

Among the other 16 participants in the negotiations there were some European countries: The Holy See, The Venice, the Kingdom of Denmark and Norway, France, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, the Republic of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Genoa, Mantua, Sabaudia, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Catalonia, the Republic of Poland and Transylvania. The last, sixteenth member of this committee was the Emperor himself. It is significant that Switzerland, represented at the congress by the Mayor of Basel Johann Rudolf Wettstein, was purely ignored. He was considered a person of the German Reich's origin.[6]

At first glance, it can be said that there were diplomats from all European countries except England, Russia and Turkey. However, their level of participation in the negotiations varied significantly. The role of other representitives looking after their own interests was assigned to representatives of Genoa (Niccolo Promontorio), Mantua (Francesco Nerli), Sabaudia (Claude Jérôme Chabot, Marquis di San Maurizio) and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (Atanasio Ridolfi). The Transylvanian delegate Ferenc Jármi stayed in Münster for only 23 days in late spring 1646. Prince George I Rakosi of Transylvania saw no particular need to engage in Westphalia's negotiations, especially as he withdrew from the war with the Habsburgs on 16 December 1645, concluding a peace treaty with them in Linz on

[5] *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* (later: *APW*), Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1: *Stadtmünsterische Akten und Vermischtes*, ed. H. Lahrkamp, Münster 1964, pp. 352–354; F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten…*, pp. 14–16, 248, 250. See also: R. Endres, *Die Friedensziele der Ritterschaft*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 565–578; H. Neuhaus, *Das Reich in der frühen Neuzeit*, "Enzyklöpedie deutsche Geschichte" 1997, 42, pp. 34–36.

[6] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, p. 353; F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten…*, pp. 14–15, 226–227.

favourable terms. Polish delegates (Heinrich Christoph von Griesheim and Matthias von Krockow) also did not make good impressions. They did not negotiate their own problems with Sweden, but tried to harm the Scandinavian superpower as much as possible. Matthias von Krockow, a very well educated lawyer, was particularly active in these actions. Interestingly, before entering the service of King Władysław IV Vasa, he held the position of court advisor to the Pomeranian Duke Bogusław XIV. He discovered secret Swedish actions in Osnabrück which were meant to undermine the rights of the Brandenburg elector Frederick William to the Griffin legacy. He, then, provided Hohenzollern's diplomats Matthaüs Wesenbeck and Johann Fromhold with secret information extracted from the French embassy on the matter.[7]

On the other hand, the objectives of the Catalan and Portuguese delegations in Westphalia were completely different. The creation of these countries came about as a result of the uprisings against the Spanish governments in 1640 in Barcelona and Lisbon. Therefore, the independence of Catalonia and Portugal was still being challenged internationally. The Catalan delegate, Josep Fontanella, confined himself to advising French diplomats in Münster on Catalan matters and protecting the interests of his country. The representatives of King John IV of Portugal, acting in Münster (Luis Pereira de Castro and Francisco de Andrade Leitão) and Osnabrück (Rodrigo Botelho de Morais and Cristóvão Soares de Abreu) were also associated with French diplomacy. However, they could not achieve their goals, as France's pressure for the full participation of Portuguese and Catalan MPs in the congress, and for recognition of their credentials, was effectively blocked by the Viennese and Madrid courts. The decisive strike was inflicted by the emissaries of King Philip IV of Spain, who convinced the mediators, especially the papal nuncio Fabio Chigi, to their right.[8]

From the very beginning, King Christian IV of Denmark had been claiming the function of a mediator in peace negotiations in Osnabrück. For this reason, his

[7] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, p. 347; H. Saring, *Matthias von Krockow*, "Baltische Studien" NF 1940, 42, pp. 198–202; K.M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, Philadelphia 1991, pp. 80–82.

[8] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, p. 346; H. Steiger, *Der Westfälische Frieden – Grundgesetz für Europa?* in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 46–47; F. Sánchez-Marcos, *The Future of Catalonia. A sujet brûlant at the Münster Negotiations*, in: ibidem, pp. 273–291; P. Cardim, *"Portuguese Rebels" at Münster. The Diplomatic Self – Fashioning in mid-17th Century European Politics*, in: ibidem, pp. 292–333.

representative, court councillor Christoph von der Lippe, appeared at the venue as early as 10 July 1643. He was followed a few weeks later by the high Danish dignitaries of Osnabrück, Chancellor Just Høg, a member of the Kingdom Council Gregor Krabbe and Hamburg Cathedral Dean Lorenz Langermann. However, the Danish peace brokering did not last very long due to the reluctance of Sweden. Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierny's fears of a biased – in his opinion – mediator were justified. The Danish delegation was to force Sweden to dissolve its army in Germany and to give up its territorial acquisitions in the Baltic Basin, including Pomerania. The Swedish attack on Denmark in December 1643 excluded any possibility of Christian IV mediation once and for all. After the signing of the Brömsebro Peace Treaty (13 August 1645) and the end of the Danish-Swedish war, there was no more talks about Christian IV's arbitration.[9]

In this situation, the main armistice negotiations were entrusted to the representative of the Holy See, Fabio Chigi, and the Venetian MP Alvise Contarini as he had even more experience than Chigi. Arriving in Münster on 20 November 1643, he already had 20 years of diplomatic service. He was previously the ambassador of Venice in the Netherlands, England, France, the Church State and Turkey and, importantly, he had a good reputation at the French court. His colleague, Fabio Chigi, a long-time official of the Roman Curia, inquisitor of Malta (1634–1639), has been involved in diplomacy for a much shorter time. He did not come to the first high-ranking diplomatic post until 1639, taking up the post of Apostolic Nuncio in Cologne. This was mainly achieved due to his good knowledge of German affairs but it was not fully used at the time. Eventually it was Contarini who played an irreplaceable role of a mediator between Protestants and Catholics. This was due to the attitude of the Holy See's envoy, who refused to participate in direct negotiations on behalf of the Pope with the Evangelicals. This radical but loyal attitude together with his determined defence of the interests of the Catholic Church at the Westphalian Congress were hugely rewarded. In 1655. Fabio Chigi sat on the papal throne as Alexander VII.[10]

---

[9] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, p. 345; M. Bregnsbo, *Denmark and the Westphalian Peace*, w: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie...*, pp. 361–367; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, p. 199; G. Lorenz, *Die dänische Friedensvermittlung beim Westfälischen Friedenskongreß*, in: *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, ed. K. Repgen, Münster 1981, pp. 31–61; K. Repgen, *Dreissigjährigen Krieg…*, pp. 697–698.

[10] M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede…*, pp. 20–21; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, pp. 193–194; K. Repgen, *Dreissigjährige Krieg…*, pp. 699–719; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, pp. 44–47, 52.

The negotiating parties have decided not to hold plenary sessions and to negotiate in bilateral talks. The mediators were in charge of mediating negotiations between France and the Habsburgs. The latter refused to conduct formal direct talks. The application of this manoeuvre was intended to enable the Vienna and Spanish courts to maintain a common interest in front of their interlocutor. The Madrid court negotiated directly only with one country – the Dutch. The Habsburg-French and Dutch-Spanish negotiations took place in Münster, while talks with the Swedes took place in Osnabrück. After the admission of the Reich states to the congress, the main burden of negotiations shifted to the latter city. It was in Osnabrück that most of the confusing problems of the Empire began to be solved. The most important participants of the congress kept their missions in both cities, while their representatives still met at informal congresses in Lengerich, Ladbergen and other settlements between Osnabrück and Münster. The organisation of such conferences was in the interest of France and Sweden, which agreed on a common position for the remainder of the proceedings.[11]

A short presentation of the most important political players should start with Spain. Of all the powers, it had the weakest team of negotiators. The leader of the Spanish people for the first two years was Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, an eminent erudite and leading thinker of Spain, who arrived in Münster on 6 November 1643. He was assisted by two delegates from the county of Burgundy – Jean Cuyermans and Antoine Brun and Lope Zapata de Valtierra, Count de Walter. Despite the depletion of the delegation after Zapata's death (2 April 1644), the Madrid government delayed completing the mission. The new chairman of the Spanish delegation finally became Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán, Count de Peñaranda, who did not arrive in Münster until 5 July 1645. Peñaranda was the protégé of the all-powerful First Minister of King Philip IV, Gaspar de Guzmán, Duke of Olivares, and because of his employment in the financial administration he was not prepared for his new role. In addition, the diplomat's work was hampered by his poor knowledge of French and constant illness caused by the humid Westphalian climate. To top it all off, Peñaranda had a crush on his main colleague Saavedra, who was not satisfied with the fact that he was subject to a not very competent Count. When the men finally reconciled, and started working together in April 1646, Saavedra was dismissed. This decision led to an even

[11] G. Teske, *Verhandlungen zum Westfälischen Frieden außerhalb der Kongreßstädte Münster und Osnabrück*, "Westfälische Zeitschrift" 1997, no. 147, pp. 63–92; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia…*, pp. 649–650.

greater isolation of the Peñaranda, increasingly replaced at the negotiating table by a new assistant, Bishop 's-Hertogenbosch Joseph de Bergaigne. However, the biggest problem of the Spanish delegation was that none of its members actually negotiated. The Spaniards limited themselves to submitting their government's wishes, which were often outdated by war events before the letters from Madrid to Westphalia arrived.[12]

The Swedish delegation was also not a monolith, although it included diplomats and lawyers of the same measure as Baron Johan Adler Salvius, Schering Rosenhane and Mathias Biörenclou. The main 'helmsman' of the Swedish matter, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, who, unwilling to return to Germany, entrusted the post of chief MP to his son Johan. The young Oxenstierna did not enjoy the sympathy of the other members of the Swedish parliament. He simply was an arrogant, harsh and unpleasant man, aimed at confirming Sweden's authority and discounting at all costs his country's long-standing, costly involvement in Germany. The presence of Oxenstierna was never accepted by Salvius, 21 years older than him, who represented Sweden in the Empire since the Chancellor's return to Stockholm in 1636. He was active in Swedish diplomacy since 1622. He was distinguished in 1629 during the peace negotiations in Lübeck, and later, from 1630, he held the post of General Commissioner of War in Germany in Hamburg. The political experience gained in Germany suggested to Salvius that peace can only be achieved through compromising solutions. For these reasons, he maintained a private correspondence with Queen Christine of Sweden, who had similar views to him and promoted the conciliation course in Paris through the eminent international law theorist Hugo Grotius as his private agent.[13]

---

[12] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, pp. 345–346; S. Boadas Cabarrocas, *Camino a la Paz: el viaje de Saavedra Fajardo a Münster*, in: *Del verbo al espejo. Reflejos y mirandas de la literatura hispánica*, eds. P. Caballero-Alías, F.E. Chávez, B. Rippol Sintes, Barcelona 2011, pp. 75–76; M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede*..., pp. 11, 35–37; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*…, pp. 194, 198; M. Rohrschneider, *Terrible es este Congreso: Perceptions of the Stranger and Negotiation Dispositions as Reflected in the Reports of the Spanish Envoys at the Peace Congress of Westphalia*, in: *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden. Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, eds. M. Rohrschneider, A. Strohmeyer, Münster 2007, pp. 245–264; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*…, p. 45.

[13] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, pp. 346–347; M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede*, pp. 33–35; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*…, pp. 197–198; H. Droste, *Ein Diplomat zwischen Familieninteressen und Königsdienst. Johan Adler Salvius in Hamburg (1630–1650)*, in: *Nähe in der Ferne. Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. H. von Thiessen, Ch. Windler, Berlin 2005, pp. 87–104; S. Lundkvist, *Die schwedischen Friedenskonzeptionen und ihre Umsetzung in Osnabrück*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie*…, pp. 349–359; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 45, 48.

The frictions in the French parliament resulted more from personal animosity than from political differences. The two leaders, Claude de Mesmes, Count d'Avaux and Abel Servien, Count de la Roche des Aubiers, who came to Münster for the negotiations on 18 March and 5 April 1644 respectively, were among the top administrative nobility.[14] The d'Avaux had more experience in foreign diplomacy. He made himself known to the best of his ability by carrying out negotiating missions in Italy (Venice, Mantua, Florence, Turin, Rome) between 1627 and 1632, negotiating a Polish-Swedish truce in Sztumska Wieś in 1635 and a Franco-Swedish agreement in Hamburg in 1638. Being definitely more affluent and confident d'Avaux sought to marginalise Servien. However, he had the support of the first French minister, Cardinal Mazarini, and did not intend to submit to his colleague. Servien wanted to make the most of the benefits for France, while d'Avaux represented a more compliant and flexible position. After all, they both did not want France to be associated with any concessions to Protestants. The constant clashes between the two diplomats were finally decided to discontinue. For this purpose, the Duke of Longueville, Henry II of Orléans, who appeared in Münster on 30 June 1645, was appointed the leader of the whole embassy.[15]

The Dutch negotiators' team of 8 people stood out from the rest of the Members of Parliament. His chairman, Barthold van Gent, had no great authority. He was overtaken by the experience of Adriaan Pauw, a former large Dutch resident (1631–1636), known for his numerous diplomatic missions on the Seine and the Thames, and negotiator of the augmentation and defence alliance with France concluded in Paris in 1635. However, some of his colleagues were of the opposite opinion, especially Godard van Reede, a representative of Utrecht, who accepted a bribe of 100,000 florins from France to oppose the ratification of the agreement with the Spanish.[16]

The number of participants in the Westphalian Congress was much higher than it was officially announced. All diplomats were accompanied by additional

[14] *APW*, Serie II, Abteilung B: *Die französischen Korrespondenzen*, Band 1:*1644*, eds. U. Irsigler, K. Goronzy, Münster 1979, pp. LV–LVI; M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede*…, p. 11.

[15] M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede*…, p. 28–31; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 196–197; M. Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)*, Poznań 1986, pp. 94–97, 113–131; P. Sonnino, *Prelude to the Fronde. The French Delegation at the Peace of Westphalia*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie*…, pp. 217–233; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*…, p. 48; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*..., p. 651.

[16] *APW*, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1, p. 347; M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede*…, pp. 38–39; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*…, p. 198; P.L. Muller, *Pauw Adriaen*, in: *ADB*, vol. 25, Leipzig 1887, pp. 301–302; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*..., p. 704.

staff. The French arrived in a record companionship. The company of Count d'Avaux was 200 people and 119 people were added to Servien and his wife's group. Finally, the Duke of Longueville's arrived together with 186-person procession. These delegations included not only the groups of page boys, guardsmen and noble-born ladies. The French had own maids and washerwomen as well as cooks, priests, surgeons, medical students, stablemen, coachmen, postmen, lackeys, tailors, bakers, pastry makers, confectioners and messengers also responsible for local shopping.[17]

The delegation of the main Swedish MP, Johan Oxenstierna, who brought 144 people with him, was not far from the French in numbers. Against this background, the 22-person retreat of his colleague, Salvius, looked exceptionally modest. A large number of employees were employed by representatives of the Emperor – Trauttmansdorff (100 people), Count Nassau-Hadamar (72 people), Auersperg (9 people) and Lamberg (27 people). Other countries' missions were also impressive in size. The head of the Spanish delegation, Count Peñaranda, appeared in Münster with 112 people, and his assistant Saavedra with 35 people. They were kept in step by the Danes, who brought 106 staff to the meeting place. On the opposite side, there were 5 delegations from the cities of the Reich: Augsburg, Bremen and Lübeck and 4 delegates from the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Alsatian city of Colmar and the Swiss city of Basel.[18] The hosts in Münster and Osnabrück were not able to serve such a large number of people properly. 29 members of the Bavarian parliament had to share 18 beds. The Swiss representative, in turn, having no better choice, agreed to live in a stinking of sausage and whale-oil room located above the weaving workshop.[19]

Despite the high cost of maintaining diplomatic representations, negotiations between the conflicted parties lasted relatively long. The Spaniards were the first to communicate with the Dutch by signing a peace treaty on 30 January 1648. In this agreement, ratified in Münster on 15 May 1648, the Court of Madrid recognised the independence of the Netherlands and agreed to close the Scheldt for trade. The Dutch also kept in their hands the lands conquered south

[17] *APW*, Serie II, Abteilung B, Band 1, pp. LXIV–LXV; F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten*..., p. 22.

[18] F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten*..., p. 22–24, 91.

[19] P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*..., p. 649.

of the Rhine, including Maastricht, without having to honour the privileges of the Catholic population in this area.[20]

It was not until 24 October 1648 that peace agreements ending the Thirty Years' War were sworn in. The Emperor and the Empire resolved their own disputes, as well as those with Sweden, as part of the Osnabrück Peace (*Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense*), which at the same time imposed new political and religious provisions on German countries. At the same time, the arrangements made at Münster (*Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriense*) – meaning a peace between the Emperor and France – were signed.[21] It is worth noting that the Treaties of Westphalia did not cover the entire territory of the German Reich. This is because the Burgundian district (i.e. Spanish estates in the Empire) and the Principality of Lorraine, which was still occupied by the French army, were excluded. In this situation, it is hardly surprising that Spain and Lorraine protested about their exclusion from the room in Münster. Another type of objection was raised by Bishop Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, Bishop of Osnabrück, rejecting all religious concessions made in the Westphalian peace. The Lutheran elector of Saxony, John George I, also protested against the inclusion of Calvinists in the room in Osnabrück. However, all the States participating in the Westphalian Congress and the German territorial rulers accepted the general validity of the Treaties. The exception was Pope Innocent X, who rejected the whole of Westphalia's peace in his breve "Zelo domus dei" issued on August 20, 1650. The Pope changed the date in this letter to the earlier one: November 26, 1648, in order to support the earlier oral protests of his MP Chigi.[22]

A negative assessment of the Westphalian peace is justified by the facts. The Treaties have confirmed the territorial decline of the Empire and the weakening of its international position. Moreover, the negotiations in Westphalia revealed the ambitious plans of German dynastic families, especially the Wettins, Hohenzollern and Wittelsbach families, which were dangerous for the Habsburgs.

[20] Text of the Peace Agreement of 30 January 1648, in: C. Jenkinson, *A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers from the Treaty signed at Munster in 1648 to the Treaties signed at Paris in 1783*, vol. 1: *From 1648 to 1713*, London 1785, pp. 10–44.

[21] Texts of both agreements of 24 October 1648, in: S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher der Schwedisch – und Deutschen Kriegs – Geschichte von König Gustav Adolfs Feldzuge in Deutschland an, biß zur Abdanckung der Königin Christina*, Frankfurt am Main–Leipzig 1688, book 20, pp. 525–545 (Osnabrück) and pp. 545–555 (Münster).

[22] K. Repgen, *Dreißigjährige Krieg...*, pp. 539–561, 597–642; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia...*, pp. 715–716, 720–721.

The Bavarian ruler Maximilian I, for example, joined in the dangerous game against the Viennese court by actively supporting Cardinal Mazarini's demands for Alsace and providing French negotiators with detailed information on the property relations there.[23]

The Empire was saved from the loss of most of the land west of the Rhine by the tactics used by the leader of the Habsburg diplomatic team, Count Trauttmansdorff and his advisor Dr. Volmar. However, the territorial losses suffered by the Empire were significant. The King of France seized a large rag of land in the south-western part of the German Reich – the Upper and Lower Alsace Landgraves and the Sundgau district. In addition, the strategically located fortresses in Breisach and Philippsburg on the right bank of the Rhine, as well as the three Lorraine dioceses, Metz, Toul and Verdun, have also been given authority.[24] The status of the other Alsatian lands including Strasbourg and the 10 cities of the Reich: Hagenau, Colmar, Schlettstadt, Weißenburg, Landau, Oberehnheim, Rosheim, Kaysersberg, Türkheim and Münster im Gregoriental remained deliberately unclear. This has opened the way for new armed conflicts in the near future. The undoubted success of Habsburg diplomacy, on the other hand, was to persuade the King of France to resign from Brigde, together with its main cities of Freiburg and Waldkirch and the four Forest Cities (*Waldstädte*) located on the Upper Rhine: Rheinfelden, Laufenburg, Waldshut and Säckingen.[25]

Unlike France, Sweden sanctioned its territorial acquisitions in the Reich as fully-fledged states of the Empire, which gave it representation in the Reich Parliament (Reichstag) as well as in the assemblies of Lower and Upper Saxony. Thanks to this procedure, the Swedish ruler followed in the footsteps of the Danish king, who was represented in the institutions of the Empire as the Duke of Holstein. The power of the Swedes was limited by imperial law. They received immunity from imperial courts equal to that of the electorate, but at the same time they were obliged to establish their own tribunal in Wismar in order to uphold imperial law.[26] As a result of Westphalia, the Swedish hegemony was

[23] D. Albrecht, *Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573–1651*, München 1998, pp. 979–1020; G. Mecenseffy, *Habsburger im 17. Jahrhundert. Die Beziehungen der Höfe von Wien und Madrid während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, in: *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, vol. 121, 1955, p. 83.

[24] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, Abschnitt 20, p. 551.

[25] Ibidem, p. 552.

[26] Ibidem, p. 537. See also: S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden...*, p. 102; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia…*, p. 724.

established in the Baltic Sea and the northern part of Germany. The most serious achievement of Sweden was the whole western part of the Pomeranian Principality with Szczecin, Dąbie, Goleniow, Wolgast, Stralsund and Greifswald and the islands of Rügen, Uznam and Wolin. In addition to this there were also parts of Mecklenburg that were granted under the same conditions – the port town of Wismar, the nearby Neukloster and the island of Poel in the Gulf of Mecklenburg, as well as the Archdiocese of Bremen, the Bishopric of Verden and the district of Wildeshausen in Lower Saxony to the southwest of Bremen.[27]

German territorial rulers have also benefited a great deal from the Westphalian peace agreements. The Hohenzollern family, who ruled in Brandenburg and Ducal Prussia, gained most of them. Elector Frederick William put forward his claims to the Swedish-occupied Duchy of Pomerania, citing the old agreements concluded by the Hohenzollern family with the Pomeranian Griffin dynasty. Already in March 1493, the Elector of Brandenburg, John Cicero, in the Pyritz (Pyrzyce) system, obtained the right of inheritance of the Principality of Pomerania for the Hohenzollerns in case the Griffin dynasty expired. The death of the Pomeranian Duke Boguslaw XIV in 1637 should then automatically put Hohenzollern in the role of his rightful heir. However, the Brandenburg electorate was not able to raise anything in the face of Swedish power.[28] Friedrich Wilhelm, represented in both, Münster (a team led by Count Johann von Sayn-Wittgenstein and Dr. Johann Fromhold) and in Osnabrück (by a team led by Johann Friedrich von Löben and Dr. Matthaus Wesenbeck), demanded a generous compensation in the form of the Halberstadt bishoprics, Minden, Hildesheim, Osnabrück, Münster and Bremen, the right for official future perspective of ownership for the Archbishopric of Magdeburg and a large part of Habsburg Silesia, namely the Duchies of Głogów, Żagań, Jaworsko-świdnicki and Karniów, taken away from the Hohenzollern by the Habsburgs at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. Eventually, he dropped out of opposition, contenting himself with smaller acquisitions, that were impressive anyway. The Brandenburg Elector obtained the eastern part of Pomerania, the so-called Rear Pomerania (Eastern Hinterpommern) with Kolobrzeg and Stargard, and as compensation for the bishopric of Halberstadt and Minden and the archbishopric of Magdeburg, which, however, was not to be taken over until after the death of the current administrator, the

[27] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, pp. 536–537.

[28] B. Wachowiak with A. Kamieński, *Dzieje Brandenburgii-Prus u progu czasów nowożytnych (1500–1701)*, Poznań 2001, pp. 37, 347–349.

Saxon Prince Augustus. As a result, Magdeburg did not come into the hands of the Hohenzollerns until 1680.[29]

The Wettins also came out of the Thirty Years' War strengthened. Saxony maintained its previous allocation based on the Prague Peace of 1635 to Upper and Lower Lusatia. So did come the Wittelsbachs. Charles Louis, son of the "Winter King" Frederick V, was restored to the rank of Reich elector and the Lower Palatinate, while Maximilian I of Bavaria was granted the right to the Upper Palatinate and retained the title of elector. Earlier, since 1623, Maximilian I, was given the position of elector of the Palatinate of Rhine, which the Emperor took away from the "Winter King". Since the Peace of Westphalia, the electoral dignity of Maximilian I has been associated with Bavaria, elevated to the rank of electorate.[30] As a consequence, there was one more elector in the German Reich from that moment onwards. Thus, the number of members of the electoral curia increased to eight.

Karol Ludwik Wittelsbach was not the only territorial German ruler who returned to his property thanks to the Treaties of Westphalia. In the second, third and fourth articles of the Peace of Osnabrück a general amnesty was proclaimed for all German dukes, the wine accounts were waived and the estates were returned to numerous representatives of the ruling families, including the Duke of Württemberg Eberhard III, the Baden Margrave at Durlach Frederick V and the children of the Count Nassau-Saarbrücken Wilhelm Ludwig, who died in 1640.[31]

In the treaty of Osnabrück, the loss of the rulers of Mecklenburg was not forgotten too. In Article XII of this agreement, Adolf Frederick I, Duke of Mecklenburg in Schwerin, was given the land lost to the bishoprics of Schwerin and Ratzeburg as well as the Saint John Commandery of Mirow in exchange for the land lost to Sweden. His nephew, Gustav Adolf, the representative of the Mecklenburg Dukes' line at Güstrow, received a more modest compensation – the Joanine

[29] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, pp. 537–538; M. Braubach, *Der Westfälische Friede…*, pp. 45–46; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden...*, pp. 306–319; B. Wachowiak with A. Kamieński, *Dzieje Brandenburgii-Prus...*, pp. 351–352; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden...*, pp. 73–74, 102.

[30] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, pp. 537–538; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden...*, pp. 377–379, 398–400; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden…*, pp. 76–77, 104.

[31] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, pp. 525–529.

Nemerow commandery.[32] In the article XV of the Osnabrück Room, the reward of the most loyal German allies of Sweden and France – the Hessian landgraves on Kassel – is dealt with. Wilhelm V's widow, Amelia Elizabeth, who is the regency on behalf of Wilhelm VI's minor son, received compensation in the amount of 600 000 Reichstalers and territorial acquisitions – Hersfeld Abbey and part of the former county of Schaumburg. The agreement concluded on 14 April 1648 between the Hebrew rulers of Kassel and Darmstadt, which provided for the transfer of Amelia Elizabeth and her son in the Marburg district, was also confirmed.[33]

The independence of the states formerly belonging to the German Reich – the Netherlands and Switzerland – deserves a separate discussion. In article number 1 of the Münster Peace Treaty signed on 30 January 1648, the King of Spain relinquished power over the Netherlands, which resulted in the Republic of the United Province of the Netherlands becoming a fully sovereign and independent state. The German side could not get used to the idea of the final exit of the Dutch from the Empire, although practically the Netherlands had enjoyed independence much earlier. In 1653, the Emperor acknowledged that the Dutch would not contribute to the defence of the Empire, but neither he nor the Reich Parliament until 1728 accepted that the Netherlands would leave the German Reich.[34]

It was a bit different with Switzerland. The country's separation from the Empire can be attributed to the unparalleled activity and operability of Basel's mayor Johann Rudolf Wettstein, who arrived in Münster on 28 December 1646. Basel joined the Swiss Confederation only in June 1501, as the eleventh canton, and was more dependent on imperial institutions than the oldest members of the union. However, Wettstein, as an official representative of Zurich, Bern, Glarus, Schaffhausen, Appenzell, Biel, Sankt Gallen and Basel, did not focus on achieving particular benefits. Competently benefiting from the differences of interests between France and the Habsburgs, he led to the liberation of Basel and the rest of Switzerland from imperial jurisdiction. He also made an effort to include his country in the Westphalian Treaties. In this way, Switzerland has become

[32] Ibidem, p. 539; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 320–321, 384, 402; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 102–103.

[33] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher*..., book 20, pp. 540–541; K.E. Demandt, *Geschichte des Landes Hessen*, Kassel 1959, pp. 197–199.

[34] C. Jenkinson, *A Collection*..., p. 12; S. Groenveld, *Der Friede von Münster. Die niederländische Seite des Westfälischen Friedens*, Bonn 1998, p. 57; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*..., p. 722.

a European sovereign state, widely recognised by the international community.[35] However, this did not involve the immediate removal of Swiss imperial eagles from public buildings. Some Swiss people still imagined the Empire as the embodiment of the ideal of a single European political community. This is the only explanation for the fact that Zurich did not remove the imperial emblem from his town hall until 1698.[36]

Article VIII of the Osnabrück Agreement regulated the regime of the German Reich. It guarantees "territorial sovereignty" to the electors, princes and magistrates of free cities of the Reich (*Landeshoheit*). The territorial authorities were not, however, to be independent states, but rather components of an Empire which, on the one hand, legitimised the power of privileged groups and, on the other, protected their position and assets.[37] The German territorial rulers were then equipped with the right to form alliances with foreign countries themselves. This right, however, was limited as alliances could not be directed against the German Reich and the Emperor. However, this objection began to be violated quickly. The electors and the more important princes treated the law we are interested in as a tool to strengthen their position within the German Reich, as well as on the international scene, and to pursue their own dynastic ambitions, even at the expense of the German community. It is enough to refer at this point to the policy of the Brandenburg elector Frederick William, who firstly, has repeatedly bound himself with alliances with France, hostile to the Emperor, and finally, unwilling to give up Parisian grants, decided to withdraw his troops from the famous relief of Vienna in 1683.[38]

Moreover, Article VIII of the Osnabrück Agreement strengthens the role of collective power, i.e. the Reichstag. Among other things, the exclusive right of the Reich Parliament to declare war and make peace on behalf of the entire Reich, to

---

[35] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, p. 535; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden...*, pp. 432–439; J. Gauss, *Die Westfälische Mission Wettstein im Widerstreit zwischen Reichstradition und Souveränitätslehre*, "Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte" 1948, no. 28, pp. 177–190; F. Gallati, *Die formelle Exemtion der Schweiz vom Deutschen Reich im Westfälischen Frieden*, in: ibidem, pp. 453–478.

[36] P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia...*, p. 722.

[37] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, p. 535; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden...*, pp. 332, 495; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia...*, pp. 742–743.

[38] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, p. 535; A. Kamieński, *Rola francuskich subsydiów w polityce zagranicznej Brandenburgii-Prus w latach 1679–1685/86*, in: *Pecunia nervus belli. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV–XVIII wieku*, eds. M. Markiewicz, R. Skowron, F. Wolański, Katowice 2016, pp. 74–78.

create and interpret legal acts, to build new fortresses, to manage conscription to the Reich army and to enact taxes was confirmed. The cities of the Reich obtained in this assembly equal voting rights with the princes (*votum decisivum*).[39]

In addition to political and systemic issues, the Westphalian peace agreements have also regulated religious issues. The religious wars in Germany were ended and Calvinism was recognised as the third legal religion in the German Reich, alongside Catholicism and Lutheranism. The Augsburg Peace of 1555 was approved, remedying its weaknesses under a permanent peace treaty. Article V of the Osnabrück Agreement prohibits any attempt to question the religious peace and to create interpretations contrary to the letter of the law. The controversies that might arise in future in religious matters were to be resolved through amicable discussions. The date of 1 January 1624 has been adopted as the normative date. The Protestants were granted all the lands in their possession on that very day. The prerogatives of the princes have been limited. They maintained the Reformation right granted to them in 1555, but it was now understood only as sovereignty over the territorial churches. They also could not impose their own theological views on their subjects. The subsequent conversions were to remain a private matter. The territorial rulers were granted personal freedom of conscience, which was to be exercised in 1697 by Saxony's elector Frederick August I.[40] The full right of the Reformation in its former form was preserved only by the Catholic Habsburgs, although they too were subject to certain restrictions. The Treaty of Osnabrück obliged Emperor Ferdinand III to honour the Protestant faith of the nobility of Lower Austria and defined in detail his relations with the Evangelicals from Silesia. The Habsburgs granted full religious freedom to the city of Wrocław and the Evangelical princes from Brzeg, Legnica, Oleśnica and Ziębice. Moreover, they guaranteed freedom of religion, but not worship, to Protestants living in the lands directly under the rule of Czech Crown. This provision therefore protected Silesian Protestants from repression and forcing them to accept Catholicism under the threat of expulsion from the country. As a sign of good will, the Emperor also agreed to build three Protestant churches in Głogów, Jawor and Świdnica, but outside the city walls, in the place he indicated. Supervision of

[39] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher*..., book 20, p. 535; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 331–332; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 105–106.

[40] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher*..., book 20, pp. 529–532, 534–535; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 367–376; S. Westphal, *Der Westfälische Frieden*..., pp. 84–85, 106–107; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*..., pp. 725–726.

the agreement was entrusted to the Swedish rulers and Evangelical states of the German Reich, who were granted the right to intervene for the benefit of Silesian Protestants in case the Habsburgs violated the provisions of religious peace.[41]

In all other estates, the Viennese court could continue to persecute the dissenters, regardless of whether they lived there before the contractual date of 1 January 1624. The emperor was also supported by certain decisions of the peace treaty in Osnabrück, including the confirmation of the confiscation of the rebel estates in Bohemia and Austria and the exclusion of the Habsburg estates from the control imposed on the rulers of the other territories.[42] In this way, the hopes of Czech emigrants with Jan Amos Comenius at the forefront of the country's return to the homeland and the restoration of old relations fell. These treaty provisions enabled Emperor Ferdinand III and his successors to extend the power over their subjects by supporting the counter-reformation and obedient aristocrats.

The Habsburgs came out of the Thirty Years' War seriously weakened. However, they managed to rebuild their importance and return to the role of a European power in a slightly different political system than before. The Catholic majority in the Reich electoral curia guaranteed the Habsburgs the succession of the German and Imperial thrones. However, the main source of the Habsburgs' strength was their hereditary lands. The prevention of religious wars that have plagued the German Reich since the 16th century should be regarded as a positive effect of the Peace of Westphalia, while the consolidation of German political particularism should be regarded as negative. The treaty provisions, which were not fully specified, enabled France to interpret the agreements concluded and to seize the rest of Alsace with Colmar (1673) and Strasbourg (1681) within the "reunions". In 1678. France also took over the county of Burgundy (Franche – Comté), which was excluded from the Westphalia Agreements, and finally took over Lorraine in 1766.

The far-reaching consequences were that the negotiators focused on the problems of the German Reich and the recognition at the peace congress of the independence of two of the four aspiring states – the Netherlands and Switzerland. Portugal had to fight for independence for many more years. Despite the great victory over the Spaniards on 17 June 1665 at the Battle of Montes Claros,

[41] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, pp. 532–533; J. Leszczyński, K. Piwarski, *Dzieje polityczne (od końca XVI wieku do 1675)*, in: *Historia Śląska*, vol. 1: *do roku 1763*, part 3: *od końca XVI wieku do r. 1763*, ed. K. Maleczyński, Wrocław 1963, pp. 364–365; G. Wąs, *Dzieje Śląska od 1526 do 1806 roku*, in: *Historia Śląska*, ed. M. Czapliński, Wrocław 2007, pp. 182–183.

[42] S. Pufendorf, *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher...*, book 20, pp. 528–529; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia...*, p. 726.

the Court of Madrid recognised Portugal's independence and the immutability of its borders only in 1668.[43] Catalan aspirations for independence have remained valid until today.

The Holy Roman Empire, in the order established in 1648, survived until its dissolution in 1806, which was carried out by Emperor Francis II under pressure from Napoleonic France. The occupation of the lands captured by the Swedes in 1648 lasted longer than these decisions. They finally left Pomerania only in 1815. France's control of Alsace and Lorraine also had serious consequences. These lands were a hotspot in Franco-German relations until 1945.

Bibliography

Printed sources

Acta Pacis Westphalicae, Serie II, Abteilung B: *Die französischen Korrespondenzen*, Band 1: *1644*, eds. U. Irsigler, K. Goronzy, Münster 1979.

Acta Pacis Westphalicae, Serie III, Abteilung D: *Varia*, Band 1: *Stadtmünsterische Akten und Vermischtes*, ed. H. Lahrkamp, Münster 1964.

Jenkinson C., *A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers from the Treaty signed at Munster in 1648 to the Treaties signed at Paris in 1783*, vol. 1: *From 1648 to 1713*, London 1785.

Pufendorf S., *Sechs und Zwantzig Bücher der Schwedisch – und Deutschen Kriegs – Geschichte von König Gustav Adolfs Feldzuge in Deutschland an, biß zur Abdanckung der Königin Christina*, Frankfurt am Main–Leipzig 1688.

Literature

Albrecht D., *Maximilian I. von Bayern 1573–1651*, München 1998.

Boadas Cabarrocas S., *Camino a la Paz: el viaje de Saavedra Fajardo a Münster*, in: *Del verbo al espejo. Reflejos y miradas de la literatura hispánica*, eds. P. Caballero-Alías, F.E. Chávez, B. Rippol Sintes, Barcelona 2011, pp. 67–78.

Bosbach F., *Die Kosten des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses. Eine strukturgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Münster 1984.

Braubach M., *Der Westfälische Friede*, Münster 1948.

Bregnsbo M., *Denmark and the Westphalian Peace*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 361–367.

[43] A.H. de Oliveira Marques, *Historia Portugalii*, vol. 1: *do XVII w.*, Warszawa 1987, pp. 309–310; M. Tuñon de Lara, J. Valdeón Baruque, A. Domínguez Ortiz, *Historia Hiszpanii*, Kraków 1997, p. 303.

Cardim P., *„Portuguese Rebels" at Münster. The Diplomatic Self – Fashioning in mid-17th Century European Politics*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 292–333.

Demandt K.E., *Geschichte des Landes Hessen*, Kassel 1959.

Dickmann F., *Der Westfälische Frieden*, Münster 1972.

Droste H., *Ein Diplomat zwischen Familieninteressen und Königsdienst. Johan Adler Salvius in Hamburg (1630–1650)*, in *Nähe in der Ferne. Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, eds. H. von Thiessen, Ch. Windler, Berlin 2005, pp. 87–104.

Egloffstein H. von und zu, *Volmar Isaak*, in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 40, Leipzig 1896, pp. 263–269.

Endres R., *Die Friedensziele der Ritterschaft*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 565–578.

Fukala R., *Dramat Europy. Wojna trzydziestoletnia (1618–1648) a kraje Korony Czeskiej*, Wrocław 2015.

Gallati F., *Die formelle Exemtion der Schweiz vom Deutschen Reich im Westfälischen Frieden*, "Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte" 1948, no. 28, pp. 453–478.

Gauss J., *Die Westfälische Mission Wettsteins im Widerstreit zwischen Reichstradition und Souveränitätslehre*, "Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte" 1948, no. 28, pp. 177–190.

Groenveld S., *Der Friede von Münster. Die niederländische Seite des Westfälischen Friedens*, Bonn 1998.

Historia Hiszpanii, ed. M. Tuñon de Lara, J. Valdeón Baruque, A. Domínguez Ortiz, Kraków 1997.

Kamieński A., *Rola francuskich subsydiów w polityce zagranicznej Brandenburgii-Prus w latach 1679–1685/86*, in: *Pecunia nervus belli. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV–XVIII wieku*, eds. M. Markiewicz, R. Skowron, F. Wolański Katowice 2016, pp. 66–82.

Leszczyński J., Piwarski K., *Dzieje polityczne (od końca XVI w. do 1675)*, in: *Historia Śląska*, vol. 1: *do roku 1763*, part 3: *od końca XVI w. do r. 1763*, ed. K. Maleczyński, Wrocław 1963, pp. 303–403.

Lorenz G., *Die dänische Friedensvermittlung beim Westfälischen Friedenskongreß*, in: *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, ed. K. Repgen, Münster 1981, pp. 31–61.

Lundkvist S., *Die schwedischen Friedenskonzeptionen und ihre Umsetzung in Osnabrück*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 349–359.

Mecenseffy G., *Habsburger im 17. Jahrhundert. Die Beziehungen der Höfe von Wien und Madrid während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, in: *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, vol. 121, 1955, pp. 1–91.

Muller P.L., *Pauw Adriaen*, in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 25, Leipzig 1887, pp. 301–302.

Neuhaus H., *Das Reich in der frühen Neuzeit*, "Enzyklöpedie deutsche Geschichte" 1997, 42.

Oliveira Marques de A.H., *Historia Portugalii*, vol. 1: *do XVII w.*, Warszawa 1987.

Repgen K., *Dreißigjähriger Krieg und Westfälische Friede. Studien und Quellen*, pub. F. Bosbach and Ch. Kampmann, Paderborn–München–Wien 1998.

Rohrschneider M., *Terrible es este Congreso: Wahrnehmungen der Fremde und Verhandlungsdispositionen im Spiegel der Berichte der spanischen Gesandten auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress*, in: *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden. Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, eds. M. Rohrschneider, A. Strohmeyer, Münster 2007, pp. 245–264.

Saring H., *Matthias von Krockow*, "Baltische Studien" NF 1940, 42.

Sánchez-Marcos F., *The Future of Catalonia. A sujet brûlant at the Münster Negotiations*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998.

Serwański M., *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)*, Poznań 1986.

Setton K.M., *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, Philadelphia 1991, pp. 80–82.

Sonnino P., *Prelude to the Fronde. The French Delegation at the Peace of Westphalia*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 217–233.

Steiger H., *Der Westfälische Frieden – Grundgesetz für Europa?*, in: *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. H. Duchhardt, München 1998, pp. 33–80.

Teske G., *Verhandlungen zum Westfälischen Frieden außerhalb der Kongreßstädte Münster und Osnabrück*, "Westfälische Zeitschrift" vol. 147, 1997, pp. 63–92.

Wachowiak B. with A. Kamieński, *Dzieje Brandenburgii-Prus u progu czasów nowożytnych (1500–1701)*, Poznań 2001.

Wąs G., *Dzieje Śląska od 1526 do 1806 roku*, in: *Historia Śląska*, ed. M. Czapliński, Wrocław 2007, pp. 122–275.

Westphal S., *Der Westfälische Frieden*, München 2015.

Wilson P.H., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648. Tragedia Europy*, Oświęcim 2017.

Kongres westfalski. Uczestnicy rokowań, najważniejsze postanowienia i skutki podjętych decyzji

Abstrakt

W kongresie westfalskim kończącym wojnę trzydziestoletnią uczestniczyli przedstawiciele 178 bytów politycznych z Rzeszy Niemieckiej oraz 16 państw europejskich. Nie stawili się tylko reprezentanci Anglii, Rosji i Turcji. Udział państw europejskich i niemieckich władztw terytorialnych w rokowaniach dyplomatycznych prowadzonych w Osnabrück i Münster nie był taki sam. Prym wiodły poselstwa cesarza, Francji, Szwecji i Hiszpanii. Westfalskie porozumienia pokojowe uregulowały sprawy polityczne, ustrojowe i wyznaniowe Rzeszy Niemieckiej. Usankcjonowano zdobycze terytorialne Francji, poczynione kosztem Cesarstwa oraz niepodległość Niderlandów i Szwajcarii. Zapewniono korzyści elektorom Saksonii, Brandenburgii i Bawarii oraz ugruntowano hegemonię Szwecji w basenie bałtyckim i w północnej części Niemiec, oddając jej zachodnią część Księstwa Pomorskiego, fragmenty Meklemburgii, a także arcybiskupstwo Bremy i biskupstwo Verden w Dolnej Saksonii. Ogłoszono powszechną amnestię dla wszystkich książąt niemieckich, zrezygnowano z rozliczenia win i zwrócono majątki przedstawicielom rodzin panujących. Wprowadzono przepisy utrwalające niemiecki partykularyzm polityczny i położono kres wojnom religijnym w Niemczech. Uznano kalwinizm trzecim, obok katolicyzmu i luteranizmu, legalnym wyznaniem w Rzeszy Niemieckiej. Osłabieni Habsburgowie skoncentrowali się na budowie scentralizowanego państwa absolutnego i walce z reformacją w Austrii, Czechach i na Węgrzech, powracając szybko do roli potęgi europejskiej i groźnego rywala Francji.

Congress of Westphalia. Participants in the negotiations, main provisions and consequences of decisions taken

Abstract

The congress of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War was attended by representatives of 178 political entities from the German Reich and 16 European countries. Only representatives of England, Russia and Turkey did not show up. The participation of European countries and German territorial authorities in diplomatic negotiations in Osnabrück and Münster was not the same. The first was the Emperor, France, Sweden and Spain. Westphalia's peace agreements have regulated the political, constitutional and religious affairs of the German Reich. The territorial achievements of France, made at the expense of the Empire and the independence of the Netherlands and Switzerland were

sanctioned. The electors of Saxony, Brandenburg and Bavaria were given an advantage and the hegemony of Sweden in the Baltic Sea and the northern part of Germany was established, giving it the western part of the Pomeranian Principality, parts of Mecklenburg as well as the Archbishopric of Bremen and the Bishopric of Verden in Lower Saxony. A general amnesty was declared for all German princes; the guilt settlement, as a threat of additional argument, was simply abandoned and the property was returned to the representatives of the ruling families. Provisions were introduced to consolidate German political particularism and put an end to religious wars in Germany. Calvinism was recognised as the third legal confession in the German Reich, alongside Catholicism and Lutheranism. The weakened Habsburgs, focused on building a centralised absolute state and fighting the Reformation in Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary, quickly returning to the role of a European power and a dangerous rival of France.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-04

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Mirosław Nagielski
ORCID: 0000-0003-4873-4313
University of Warsaw, Faculty of History
e-mail: nagielski@wp.pl

Emperor's recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635

Keywords: dragons, Arnoldin, Thirty Years' War, the Habsburgs, Władysław IV
Słowa kluczowe: zaciągi, Arnoldin, wojna trzydziestoletnia, Habsburgowie, Władysław IV

The mission of the Imperial Diplomat Arnoldin von Clarstein[1] to the Republic of Poland in 1635, in the context of the talks between Władysław IV and Sweden, was discussed by, among others, R. Lolo in his work on the position of the nobility in the face of the ongoing Thirty Years' War.[2] A. Szelągowski[3] and recently

[1] A. Sedláček, *Českomoravské heraldiky*, Praha 1925, p. 361 or P. Mašek, *Šlechtickè rody v Čechach, na Moravě a v Slezsku*, Praha 2008, p. 33. His mission to the Republic of Poland in 1632 was described by W. Leitsch, *Das Leben am Hof König Sigismunds III. Von Polen*, vol. IV, Wien 2009, pp. 1526, 1917 and R. Skowron, *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hiszpańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632–1648*, Kraków 2013, pp. 33–34.

[2] R. Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618–1635)*, Pułtusk 2004, pp. 357–366; comp. idem, *Rozejm w Sztumdorfie a Habsburgowie. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad zaangażowaniem Rzeczypospolitej w wojnę trzydziestoletnią*; in: *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII wieku*, ed. M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2007, pp.59–62.

[3] A. Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV*, Kraków 1907, pp. 77–119.

R. Skowron[4] and L. Höbelt[5] wrote about his mission related to the efforts of the Habsburgs of Vienna to resume the war of the Republic of Poland with the Swedes and permissions for further recruitment to the Imperial Army. Because of the imperial and Spanish diplomacy activities, the aim of which was to take over the soldiers recruited by Władysław IV for the war with Sweden, we have full documentation of the surviving records in the archives in Vienna, Simancas and Madrid.[6] A number of documents related to these engagements in the context of the participation of Zaporozhian Cossacks in the activities of the Thirty Years' War were published in the annexes by G. Gajecky and A. Baran.[7] On the other hand, the unsuccessful recruitment of the crown's guard Samuel Łaszcza for the Imperial delegate Arnoldin was well described by M. Nagielski.[8] The instruction given from the Viennese court to Arnoldin on 27 January 1635 even 'expected' Władysław IV to help the Empire plunged into war with the Protestant camp in the Reich and thus pointed to the necessity of war with Sweden, not to enter into peace talks with it in the face of the ending of the Truce of Altmark.[9] Arnoldin's speech at the Warsaw General Assembly was preceded by the correspondence between Emperor Ferdinand II and Władysław IV, where the Emperor asked the Polish monarch to welcome his delegate[10]. Arnoldin carried an embassy himself, reporting to the King and the Senate on the 28 February 1635. The Lesser Lithuanian Chancellor A.S. Radziwiłł spoke very succinctly about this event in his diary: "The emperor's deputy Arnoldini, just before returning to the Emperor, was

[4] R. Skowron, *Pax i Mars*…; idem, *W służbie Filipa IV. Finansowanie i zaciągi żołnierzy z Rzeczypospolitej przez Hiszpanię w latach 1635–1636*, in: *Hortus bellicus. Studia z dziejów wojskowości nowożytnej. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Mirosławowi Nagielskiemu*, eds. K. Bobiatyński, P. Gawron, K. Kossarzecki, P. Kroll, D. Milewski, Warszawa 2016, pp. 266–267.

[5] L. Höbelt, *Barocke Bomberflotten? Die „polnischen Völcker" als habsburgische „Vergeltungswaffe" 1635/1636*, in: *Von Söldnerheeren zu UN-Truppen. Heerwesen und Kriege in österreich und Polen vom 17. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien 2011, p. 29–43.

[6] R. Skowron, *Pax i Mars*…, pp. 93–105.

[7] G. Gajecky, A. Baran, *The Cossacks in the thirty Years War*, vol. 2, Romae 1969, pp. 93–106.

[8] M. Nagielski, *Wpływ wojny trzydziestoletniej na przemiany w sztuce wojennej państw Europy środkowo-wschodniej (na przykładzie Rzeczypospolitej i Państwa Moskiewskiego)*, in: *Prace komisji historii wojen i wojskowości PAU*, vol. X, eds. W. Rojek, A. Kastory, Kraków 2016, pp. 31–33.

[9] R. Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, pp. 357–358.

[10] Ferdynand II to Władysław IV from Vienna, 2 III 1635; Haus Hof.u.Staatsarchiv w Wiedniu (hereinafter only HHu.St.A.), Polen I, karton 57, k.10.

graciously dismissed by the King".[11] The official legacy was to be received from the Polish monarch on March 20, which was confirmed by a personal letter from Władysław IV to Emperor Ferdinand II.[12] According to R. Lolo, during the official legation , Arnoldin did not obtain permission to conduct official military recruitment on the territory of the Republic of Poland, and such permission was to be given by the monarch during a private farewell audience for the Imperial Member. This was in line with the nature and the way in which Władysław IV conducted his diplomacy, which was bound by the laws of the Republic of Poland in this respect. The conduct of the enlistments required the approval of the General Assembly, and Claude de Mesme, Count d'Avaux, the French MP, as the official mediator in the negotiations in Sztumska Wieś between Poland and Sweden, also sought to do so[13]. Probably Arnoldini also consulted the issue of the enlistments from the beginning with the Russian voivode Stanislaw Lubomirski, as evidenced by the correspondence between them preserved in the Vienna archives.[14] The participation of the Russian voivode in negotiations with potential recruits to help the Imperial Delegate with capturing volunteers for imperial service is indisputable. R. Lolo was right to point out that the resolution passed by the Warsaw Assembly, entitled "Supporting the war with the Swedes"[15], gave Polish commissioners another argument that the Republic would not withdraw from the war without significant concessions from the Swedes, i.e. unblocking the Vistula trade[16]. However, the matter of enlistments for the Emperor was not as positive as the Emperor's delegate Arnoldin would have wished. Lubomirski himself, fearing the loss of popularity of the nobility of Lesser Poland, who re-

[11] A.S. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, vol. II, eds. A.S. Radziwiłł. A. Przyboś, R. Żelewski, Warszawa 1980, p. 442; comp. R. Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 358.

[12] Władysław IV to Ferdynand II from Warsaw, 20 III 1635; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 129.

[13] R. Skowron, *W służbie Filipa IV*…, p. 269; por. M. Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej 1618–1648*, Poznań 1986, pp. 142–147.

[14] See S. Lubomirski to Maciej Arnoldin Clarsteina from Kolbuszowa 7 III 1635 i 19 III tr. From Warsaw and from Łańcut 23 III tr., HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 37, 125–128, 144. Ferdinand II himself wrote to the Ruthenian voivode about the aid to Arnoldin in Vienna 2 III 1635; see G. Gajecky, A. Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*…, p. 93.

[15] See *Volumina Legum*, vol. III, Petersburg 1859, pp. 402–403.

[16] See the constitutions of the Crown General Sejm of Warsaw on the 6th of Sunday, 1635, commenced on the 31st of January, which can be found among Arnoldin's reports addressed to Vienna; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 74–103; comp. R. Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 359.

peatedly spoke out against the recruitment in the area of the Republic of Poland for both sides of the conflict, advised the delegate not to respond with just a letter but to go personally to Łańcut and discuss all matters related to the enlistments.[17] Paweł Dworzański was the person who organized the enlistments, as he had the imperial patent for recruitment, which was reported to S. Lubomirski himself. The matters related to the recruitment of cavalry were handed over by Arnoldini to his successor Alexander Greiffenclau[18], who, using the Great Chancellor of the Crown S. Koniecpolski, held talks with the Crown Guard Samuel Łaszcz and the Rittmeister Mikołaj Moczarski.[19] According to A. Baran–Łaszcz was supposed to take part in the preparations for the war with the Swedes in Royal Prussia, and Mikołaj Moczarski resigned from taking command over the recruits.[20] However, the fact that several thousand horsemen were taken abroad, out of the Republic of Poland is clearly evidenced by the settlements of accounts with the individual rittmeisters who accepted the imperial service. According to the specifications enlisted for the Emperor's service, from 24 May to the end of July, the following troops set off for Silesia: – Aleksander Sieradzki (Sieracki) – 500 Cossacks – Władysław Zaremba (28 May) – 300 Cossacks – Stanisław Czarniecki (13 June) – 300 Cossacks – Paweł Noskowski (16 June) – 600 and 200 Cossacks – Marcin Jedlicki (26 June) – 400 Cossacks[21] – Aleksander Zakrzewski (4 July) – 300 and 400 Cossacks – Mikołaj Broniewski (5 July) – 600 Cossacks – Polnischer Edelman Scibiński (6 July) – 200 Cossacks – Erasmus Dembiński (7 July) – 500 horses – Lawrence Feketi (10 July) – 300 Cossacks.[22] According to the second specification, where we also have the advance payments collected by the rotational masters, the composition of the body taken was as follows: – Aleksander Sieracki – 500 horses – Mikołaj Karaś – 100 horses – Marcin Aleksander Zaremba – 300 horses – Stanisław Czarniecki – 300 horses – Paweł Noskowski – 2000 horses (given in three groups on 16 June and 13 and 27 July) – Marcin Aleksander

[17] S. Lubomirski to M. Arnoldin from Łańcut 23 III 1635; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 144.

[18] See the correspondence between Arnoldin and A. Greiffenklau concerning the recruitment, which was used by L. Höbelt, *Barocke Bomberflotten?*, pp. 36–37.

[19] See S. Koniecpolski's correspondence with A. Greiffenclau and M. Arnoldini on 20 and 23 May 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 57, poszyt 3, pp. 76, 81–83.

[20] A. Baran, *Kozaki na imperaratorskij służbi w rokach 1635–1636*, "Ukrainski Istoryk" 1974, vol. 41–43, pp.7–8.

[21] Notes at the bottom of the list show that 2800 Cossacks were entered when the calculations show that 2600 were actually enlisted; see HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 58, k. 9 r-v.

[22] End of page annotation; 2300 Cossacks; 5100 Cossacks in total, in fact, only 4900.

Zakrzewski – 400 horses – Mikołaj Broniewski – 600 horses – Marcin Jedlicki – 200 horses – Erazm Dembiński – 600 horses (12th showcase, 19th, 20th and 29th July) – Wawrzyniec Fekiety – 300 horses – Jan Achacy Rodaczki on Sieracki's recommendation accepted for service gave 150 horses. A total of 5450 horses, for which the Imperial Commissioners paid 8,029 reichstalers.[23] Of course, the recruitment was not without the incidents related to the movements to Silesia of such a big number of cavalry divisions simply raiding the neighbouring villages. S. Lubomirski himself, responsible for these troops, had to reprimand officers about their poor leadership over their soldiers being carried abroad.[24] There is a letter to the rittmeister Aleksander Sieracki from Cracow on 10 July 1635, in which the Russian voivode, in the face of the news coming to him from Silesia about the robberies of the soldiers he recruited, threatens Sieracki that if it affects his relationship with the Emperor, he will be waiting for him after his return from abroad:[25]

> Please, Your Honour with your reputation, according to my recommendation, and my personal protection of honour, and not only don't be a reason for such a shame, but if You were, between the company, would You try as a matter of urgency to calm them down for good fame and not for dishonour.

The Russian voivode admonished the rittmeister to behave correctly at the places of rest without oppressing the emperor's subjects, as it is not only about the "honour of the nation" but his own as well. He continued to write:[26]

> And this is Your Honour about the situations you can hear about from the locals, which are far beyond the commissar's regulation, you cut more for yourself, the more you go by as a reckless soldier, as the subjects you oppress, constantly bring complaints to the commissars of the Emperor.

The troops could not go unnoticed by the Cracow nobility because soldiers were led out by whole subunits and not individually, as Władysław IV himself had been

---

[23] Specyfikacja II; ibidem, k. 7-v; comp. R. Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 365 (the author mentions Jan Rodaczewski as the last of the rotational masters). Document issued in the work G. Gajecky, A. Baran, *The Cossacks un the Thirty Years War*…, doc. 9, pp. 98–100.

[24] See "Information was fűr Puncta dem Herrn Palatino Russiae der Zeitzuhalten", 9 july 1635; HHu.St.A., Poland I, karton 58, k. 75–76v.

[25] S. Lubomirski to A. Sieracki from Kraków 10 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 79.

[26] Ibidem.

striving for. In the royal ordinance addressed to the citizens of the Republic of Poland, we read about the consent given to an imperial MP to enlist several thousand people for a war service with the consent of the Senate and Ferdinand II's request. The monarch emphasized that no one should be afraid to go to this service but "with a warning not to go under the flags or in the pile abroad, but separately or a few at the time and without any harm or nuisance".[27]

With majority of the matters related to the recruitment and, most of all, to the fact that the recruits were leading the troops through Silesia, the recruiters contacted Arnoldini directly; Władysław Zaręba from Kalinowy wrote to him on 13 July. He complained about the imperial commissioners as they burned down his own pantry: "I have a great obstacle and difficulty in adopting more company, because let the Magnificence of Your Honour imagine, none of our guests, in the house of their Lords are content with that meat and bread" and further emphasized that "neither did we Poles learn to sit behind the table without seasonings on it, even this parable has grown in our house that who does not eat pepper and does not know the king, will not live to war".[28] Arnoldin received similar letters from other Polish recruiters, such as Aleksander Sieracki from Tarnowskie Góry on 22 July. The rittmeister did not decide to visit the delegate personally because, as he wrote, he had to watch over the company when leaving Tarnowskie Góry as the commissioner general changed his quarters and directed him to Oleszyn. He sends a sergeant to him with the task of recruiting soldiers to the company and asking "that your honour give him there, in good memory of our distinctions, all the money which he will need following my letter.[29] In the set of correspondence for the Polish Assets we also have other letters addressed to Arnoldin from Paweł Noskowski's enlistment record[30] as well as Samuel Stanislaw on Czarniecki's Chernica[31]. Marcin Jedlicki[32] or the rittmeister Sebastian Suliński[33]. The fact that Władysław IV was accurately informed about the enlisting is evidenced by a letter from the monarch to his courtier, the starost of Łomża, Kolno and Zambrów,

[27] Batman of Władysław IV from Warsaw, 10 VI 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 57, teczka II, k. 68.

[28] W. Zaręba to the delegate Arnoldin from Rybnik, 13 VII 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 110r-v. He also asked the delegate for a loan of 130 thalers for his further service to redeem the pledged items.

[29] A. Sieracki to Arnoldin from Tarnowskie Góry 22 VII 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 185v.

[30] P. Noskowski to Arnoldin from Łomża 14 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k .118r.

[31] S. Czarniecki to Arnoldin from Gliwice on August 2, 1635; HHu.St.A., poszyt II, k. 3r.

[32] M. Jedlicki to Arnoldin from Radzikowo (?) 24 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 193r.

[33] S. Suliński to Arnoldin of Swibin (?) 18 August 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, poszyt II, k. 41r.

marked by Arnoldin as a senior recruiter – Paweł of Szreńsk Noskowski, dated 30 August 1635. The monarch wrote in it that:[34]

> the iuditio of His Majesty the King advises you to respond and do your duty in everything that is knightly and obedient, and you should do your utmost to make sure that you, as a keeper of more entrenched order of war discipline and obedience, would keep the knights' matters in your hands as a glorious and victorious company.

Before the units recruited for imperial service in Brzeg, negotiations between the soldiers and imperial commissioners took place on the question of the recruitment and the remuneration due for the service. The answers to the requests made by Mr Arnoldin and his Commissioners have been preserved. The delegate said that the recruited had committed themselves to accept a person delegated by the emperor and the king of Poland as the commander of the enlistments. After the capitulation, after taking the money for 3 months, they were to go to the emperor's service, including the pay, the commissioners proposed that not more than 6 thalers could be proposed to pay, because:[35]

> for the six thalers, many famous colonels and the people of Emperor served faithfully; we have no more money ready above the six thalers for three months; even more, you were also in the position of five thalers, which the noble people of his Emperor Majesty earned when the Polish army served before; that His Majesty the king of Poland and honourable senators judged the pay to be right; and when eight thalers were given, they were only for one month, not three, as now.

The commissioners responded to the other soldiers' desideratums in points – gratefully accepting the election of Paweł Noskowski, recruited as the senior district governor of Łomża; – they confirmed that the relevant letters would be given; – Losses during service may be considered as well as an increase in salary, but for faithful service and merit during the campaign; The emperor will make the General's lodging as well as the Rittmeisters appropriate, "with the old ordinary horses here, the old customs will be preserved"; – The following proposal was made: Colonel for a month of thalers 200, rittmeister 100, lieutenant 50,

[34] Władysław IV to P. Noskowski from the camp near Kwidzyn on 30 August 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 59, item 33.

[35] "Transactio litterarum super quibus se Poloni resolvere debent" 19 augusti 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, poszyt III, k. 103–104v.

ensigner 30, regiment guard each 80, state 50 and each companion of thalers 6. The Commissioners also undertook to add 30 thalers for each flag, as secretaries and chaplains were not included in the posts.[36] This did not mean that the conditions were already agreed upon, because in 18 points to surrender between commissioners (M. Arnoldin and John Winss) and soldiers under P. Noskowski's regiment we find much better conditions for the recruited. Due to the specificity of this document I decided to give it 'in extenso':[37]

> 1. Enough doing towards His Majesty's will and reproach, having appeared in His Majesty's service under the regiment of Paweł in Srzeńsk Noskowski, Łomża, Zambrów, and Koło, as Starost, as well as the Emperor of His Majesty the General, to our army all the military given to us, whose army, having all the goods in good order, promises to be in military discipline and to show all obedience.
>
> 2. The appropriate letters (enlistment letters) for His Majesty's service to the General as Lords Colonels and Lords Rittmeister of the Imperial Chancellery are so given.
>
> 3. Since the army has suffered great losses when going to the borders in His Majesty's service, we ask for letters of recommendation to the Emperor and to the King of Hungary, so that we may receive not only the pay, but also an additional reward, with this pay for these three months and given 6 hard thalers each, and then increased by what we send our Messengers so to His Majesty [Ferdinand II] as well as to His Majesty King of Hungary [Ferdinand III].
>
> 4. The payment of 20,000 hard thalers to the General for every month for the kitchen to be given, for the mace-every month 2,000 red zloty. Colonels – for every month as many hard kitchen thalers as many horses in the regiment. As for the colour parties of Rittmeisters it is customary in Poland to have each one per 100 horses – 12 horses should have, and at the same time to give the General a fair reward in connection with the costs incurred by each soldier in the company recruitment as well as to Rittmeisters, who also commented on each companion. To every rittmeister as many thalers as they have horses under their flags. The lieutenants for each month also – 80. To the ensign – 60. To the Guard – 200, to the Quartermaster – 100, to the Secretary for three months – 90 and to the Chaplain – 40. For the flag of each of the thalers – 100. 5. It appears to the army that not only the General, but with all the officers of the army, no treaty has been received before, even though it was due to him; with this, the General has made a great deal of money in advance, and everyone is to take into account the present time of surrender (agreement) and the

[36] Ibidem, karton 59, k. 67–69v.

[37] 'Spisane w Brzegu w dniu 23 september 1635' HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 59, k. 68–69v. Latin version, which contained 21 points, was published by G. Gajecky i A. Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War…*, doc. 12, pp. 103–106. HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 127–131.

general circle of the army. We ask that to this extent these expenses forward so to the General as other gentlemen will be rewarded.

6. The freedoms of our nation and the ordinary courts are to remain with us.

7. The honourable Lord General, in the office of nobility, as well as in his life, with ordinary provisions and all the hospitality to be sheltered; also the other Lords of officers and the Knighthood, so that the army will not be led by empty (not destroyed) countries.

8. After the initial battle for a month to be granted as a custom if shot and wounded after every victorious battle to rest being allowed so that the reward may be made from His Imperial Majesty's treasure and from the quarters of his office for service in the cities shown, or food (victuals) of any kind.

9. Prisoners from the enemy's army of His Imperial Majesty, who would get into our army, would be left with those who look after them, from whom they are captured, and if justice should be done for them so be it.

10. God have mercy and protect from death our great commander, which if the unfortunate case occurs, that we may select a new general from among us ourselves.

11. That our army should not be torn between any different commands, and that our General should not obey any orders except the King of Hungary himself or his deputy in his place.

12. That our army should walk ahead in front of other troops, and that the quarters should be prepared, because we are walking without the carts.[38]

13. The dismissal of our army from service is to be announced before the end of the month, and after the month has passed and the full payment has been received, our army as a free nation of Poland, without any engagement from His Imperial Majesty, but a favour for the commissioners being given to carry out their duties, and please God protect us from any dangers on the Polish Crown or the pacts against it which, when received from our Republic and King [Ladislaus IV] so that the army, having taken a month's time and payment, would have a free passage to rescue our country instead, and for the further desire of His Imperial Majesty to use the Polish army, that at the dissolution of a month's time, a gift (additional) month would be given and given with thalers of good silver or gold pay to be paid always from now.

14. That the army, after the show of the good quarters, may have two Sundays of rest for the adaptation of the war equipment.

15. Our Polish Army, which has been in the service of His Imperial Majesty since the old days, to be joined to us for the General's service, and to leave under His command all others who come to His Imperial Majesty's service.

[38] The troops were passing to Silesia without all the necessary food supplies, simply hoping to be supplied with everything later by imperial commissioners.

16. If any of our troops, by any means, gets to the foreign troops under no conditions to be released without any difficulty.

17. Ordinary soldier's pay for 500 dragoons to be given to the General, according to his permission, which dragoons he should have and always have with the Polish army.

18. The Commissioners to give support to the army and with the signature of His Imperial Majesty and the King of Hungary and the war council for all these points above and for our further merits, so that we may stay with them effectively (realistically) all the time".

Of course, none of the above-mentioned points could be accepted by the commissioners; hence the negotiations with the units led by P. Noskowski and S. Lubomirski, the Russian Voivode himself, were still in progress. Despite difficulties in convincing the soldiers to serve there were often conflicts with the imperial troops present in Silesia. An example was the protest of Polish army deputies from Brzeg on 10 October 1635 by W. Sulmirski and Lawrence Feketi for the imperial infantry officer Funck. They accused him of killing his comrade Mr. Prakowski by his soldiers, raiding Marcin Jedlicki's inn and killing the deputies of this company, robbing them and taking 1442 thalers paid for this company.[39] Both signed in protest handed over the hijacked goods to Colonel Funck, complaining about "the shame on the Emperor as well as the Polish army" and promising to seek justice from both the Emperor and the Hungarian King.[40] A very interesting is the list of flags of all those enlisted on the Emperor's payroll and shown by Commissioner Well, who at each company marked the actual number of horses brought in and the so-called 'blind horses' which meant funds intended to pay for the command staff, to which the Imperial Commissioners did not agree. In the flipchart, we give in brackets the states of individual rotations including blind horses.

Red Company of Noskowski	226 horses (291)
Black Company of the same	101 horses (131)
Company of Makowiecki	177 horses (205)
Company of Czarnecki (Stanisław)	214 horses (257)
Company of Suliński	112 horses (123)

[39] Protestacja deputatów wojska polskiego na płka Funcka w Brzegu 10 X 1635 r.; HHu.St.A., karton 58/III,k. 41-v.

[40] Ibidem. They signed a protest: W. Sulmirski "locotens Illustrissimi Days Generalis Noskowski nomine tocius Exercitus Polonici" and Laurentius Fekete Rottman J.Ces.Mci.

Company of Moszczewski	107 horses (142)
Company of Zaremba (Marcin Aleksander)	253 horses (277)
Company of Ciekliński	220 horses (238)
Company of Wesla	231 horses (268)
Company of Gołkowski	173 horses (183)
Company of Sieracki (Aleksander)	251 horses (296)
Company of Kempiński	145 horses (163)
Company of Woykowski	60 horses (87)
Company of Bylicki	221 horses (235)
Company of of the Rodacki (Jan Achacy)	154 horses (169)
Company of Fekiety (Lorenzo)	207 horses (221)
Company of Broniewski	230 horses (265)
Company of Zagurski	117 horses (134)
Company of Strzałkowski	257 horses (292)
Company of Zakrzewski(Marcin Aleksander)	158 horses (322)[41]
Company of Jedlicki(Marcin)	125 horses (153)
Company of Grzywy (Mikołaj)[42]	133 horses (145)
Company of Bervinsky (?)	131 horses (161)
Company of Prakowski	128 horses (154)
Company of Chrząstowski	95 horses (120)
Company of Waskiewicz	114 horses (168)
Company of Kwiatkowski[43]	

In this census carried out by Mr Welli we can see as many as 9 out of 11 rittmeisters appearing in the census of August 1635; only Mikołaj Karaś and Erazm Dembiński are missing. Also, the number of their soldiers is much smaller and results from the actual census carried out in Brzeg before the march to the Reich. In total, there were 26 rittmeisters, who had 4,340 horses, not including the 'blind horses', on which they also demanded payment and to which the commissioners were strongly against. Their number is consistent with the census made earlier, as it amounts to 5,200 horses, not counting Mr. Kwiatkowski's rotation.

[41] Note: Contrary to Mr. Wężyk K. 322.

[42] See the letter of Commissioner L. Pixius probably to Arnoldin from Lviv on 16 July 1635, informing that rtm. Mikołaj Grzywa took a thousand thalers for the recruitment of 300 people; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 58, k. 141.

[43] No data.

A separate issue is the contract signed with the consent of Władysław IV and through the intermediary of the Russian Voivode S. Lubomirski – the Guardian of the Royal Crown. Samuel Łaszcz was associated with the person of the hetman S. Koniecpolski, whose correspondence can also be found in Arnoldin's papers.[44] The fact that the enlistment led by S. Łaszcz was accepted by the King is evidenced by his letter to Arnoldin of August 23, 1635, when he writes that "to serve the Emperor's Majesty, I am even more willing to do when the Lord's Majesty's permission and command opened the way for me to do so".[45] The Crown Guard informed the deputy that he was waiting for an answer to his desiderata in relation to the recruitment of those willing to take up the Imperial banners, and now he was to be "hauled away, which would be a considerable inconvenience for me, as there were already many people here who would listen to this message of Your Majesty's service."[46] Talks with S. Łaszcz were conducted by a courtier of S. Lubomirski – Paweł Dworzański[47]. However, the conditions that S. Łaszcz set in terms of recruitment were very exorbitant. We get to know their content from the declaration given to the deputy; in particular points, the guard emphasized: – his willingness to join the service of the emperor; – that he does it on the order of his majesty and the will of the Russian voivode S. Lubomirski; – that all the trains that have already gone to Silesia as well as those that are presently under his command; – that he be subject only to the King of Hungary [Ferdinand III] or those delegated by him; – that it is necessary to leave 100 thousand zloty for the recruitment in Krakow; – to get 15,000 thalers for every quarter that Colonel Winss was to promise him; – that he wants to take 4,000 troops "except the ones that are already at the borders there," and that the Emperor will pay at least 1/3 of his wages for their service; – that colonels, rittmeisters, lieutenants, and enlisted men should be immediately paid out of the payroll, and 20 rittmeisters should have no more than 200 men under the flags "for a better government and faster company assembly"; – that the imperial side should pay 24 thalers per horse as soon as it crosses the border, and the service to the flags should be granted as soon

[44] See letters from S. Koniecpolski to Aleksander Greiffenclau, MP, concerning the soldiers contracted by S. Łaszcza and rtm Moczarski from Brodow on 20 May 1635 and to Arnoldin from Brody on 23 May 1635; HHuSt.A., Polen I, karton 57/IV, k. 76-v, 81–83.

[45] S. Łaszcz do Arnoldina z Jarosławia 23 VIII 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 111r.

[46] Ibidem. At the same time, he asked for a quick decision whether or not to be in the imperial service and for the letters to be sent to Zamość or Rachanie.

[47] See "Memoriale pro Generoso Domino Paulo Dworański" of 31 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 54-v.

as it is "on the Silesian border". At the same time S. Łaszcz demanded that the remuneration for the staff to be paid according to the following rule:[48]

> Colonels, that wants to have warrior-quality men, I'm right to give the content to a quarter of two thousand thalers over the payroll. Rittmeister on a quarter of a thousand thalers. Lieutenants – a half of what rittmeisters have. The Ensign – third of a quarter of what Rittmeisters, the prefect – a quarter and five hundred thalers for the kitchen on the payroll.

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the recruitment finally did not take place and those troops which had been recruited earlier by S. Lubomirski were moved abroad. The same one, as his correspondence with commanders proves, had great problems with maintaining proper discipline among soldiers during the march through Silesia in the face of repeated requests for better consistency for these units. After Władysław IV entered into a truce with the Swedes in Sztumska Wieś (12 September 1635), delegates and their recruits competed for the soldiers from the dissolved troops against the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs as well as Louis XIII (deputy Claud de Mesmes, Count d'Avaux). R. Skowron wrote in detail about the Spanish recruitment, emphasizing that the first attempts to enlist Polish soldiers on behalf of Philip IV were made by the Spanish ambassadors in Vienna, Inigo Vélez de Guevara y Tassis, Count de Onate and Sancho de Monroy Zuniga Marquis Castaneda.[49] Philip IV was supposed to try to enlist as many as 10,000 Cossacks and 8,000 Hungarians, for which he allocated 300,000 thalers. The list of funds transferred by the Vienna embassy to Emperor Ferdinand II shows that from 19 May to 15 September, 207,000 florins were transferred to Maximilian Greiffenbach, Georg Heinrich Reitenspiess, Balthasar Walderody, with Arnoldin himself receiving 3,000 florins from B. Walderody in Cracow for the organisation of the recruitment on 13 July. The documents talk about the enlistment of Polish Cossacks, but of course it's not about the Zaporozhian Cossacks as G. Gajecky and A. Baran want to see it, but about Polish soldiers recruited in the Lesser

[48] "Declaratia JM. Pana strażnika koronnego taka jest"; HHu.St.A., karton 57, k. 23-v. At the end of his declaration, S. Łaszcz wrote that "these conditioners are so determined that nothing can be changed in them"; see M. Nagielski, *Wpływ wojny trzydziestoletniej na przemiany w sztuce wojennej*…, pp. 31–33.

[49] R. Skowron discusses extensively the negotiations between Philippe IV and the Viennese court and the attitude of his ambassadors, who were cautious about the transfer of funds to Władysław IV for the trains in relation to the Polish-Swedish talks in Sztumska Wieś and the French diplomacy contract; see R. Skowron, *Pax and Mars*…, pp. 138–141.

Poland as well as in the Russian province. This does not mean that there were no Orthodox Cossacks who were part of such a court troops or returned to their homeland from the Smoleńsk and Kamieniec campaigns in 1634. According to R. Skowron, the cost of recruiting one Polish Cossack was approximately 20 thalers (i.e. 30 florins), and taking into account the amount paid for the trains by the Spaniards (207,000 florins) there could be even 6 thousand recruited.[50] The recruitment concerned mainly the cavalry in view of the need to move quickly to the theatre of the war in the Reich. According to R. Skowron's findings, at the beginning of X 1635 the Polish corps set off from Silesia to Nuremberg and was incorporated into the imperial forces of Matthias Gallas.[51] In December 1635 the Rhine was crossed and Polish soldiers fought in Lorraine, Champagne, Picardy, Burgundy, Hanau, Artois and Luxembourg[52]. The successful enlistment on behalf of Emperor Ferdinand II and King Ferdinand III of Hungary, as well as the shortage of personnel in the Spanish army, resulted in the issue of the next enlistments in the Republic being entrusted to the next Spanish ambassadors – Alonso Vazquez and the Count de Solre.[53] R. Skowron also presented their mission in 1635. The new recruitment of about 10–12 thousand Cossacks did not manage to be completed because the diplomats did not arrive in Krakow until mid-June 1636, while in the autumn, after signing the truce with Sweden, the masses of enlisted soldiers were already dismissed and some of them started their service elsewhere. As I have already pointed out, Count d' Avaux made efforts to take over well-trained soldiers from some foreign enlistments. Louis XIII intended to grant as many as 300,000 livres for enlisting dissolved soldiers so that they would not find themselves in the ranks of the imperial army fighting on the Rhine on the Habsburg side.[54] Only a small fraction of the forces dissolved after the treaty was concluded in Sztumska Wieś; however, it is clear that Frenchmen as well as the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, in view of the shrinking recruitment possibilities in the Reich, were trying to enlist these soldiers. Again, the Spaniards proved to be quicker and sent the Colonel Johann Mörder to Prussia. There, he

[50] R. Skowron, *W służbie Filipa IV*…, pp. 266–267.

[51] L. Höbelt, *Barocke Bomberflotten?*…, pp. 40–42, wrote about the actions of these forces under the command of Gen. leutnant Matias Gallas.

[52] R. Skowron, *W służbie Filipa IV*…, p. 267; comp. M. Dzieduszycki, *Krótki rys dziejów i spraw lisowskich*, vol. II, Lwów 1843–1844, pp. 500–573.

[53] R. Skowron, *Pax and Mars*…, pp. 73–84.

[54] M. Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)*…, p. 144.

encouraged many troops to accept the imperial service. R. Skowron presented the composition of 10 enlisted regiments, whose staff was paid in Wroclaw, where the headquarters of the recruitment commission headed by Georg Gottfried Reitenspiess were located. Jakub Butler was put at the head of this company, as he had previously served in the Imperial Army. The individual regiments were led by: Jakub Butler, Johan Mörder, Hungarian, Matthison, Ludovick Lindsay, Adam Gordon, Thomas Lyon, Cochrum (Kochrane), Edmund Butler and Warłowski.[55] In total, over 10 thousand soldiers were enlisted and led out into the Republic. Almost 8 thousand soldiers set off in September 1636 from Silesia to Burgundy and the second group of about 3 thousand soldiers headed for Italy.[56] In the competition for the Polish recruiter, French diplomacy was clearly distanced by the Spanish Habsburg diplomacy, and the main reason for this was the slowness of Louis XIII in transferring the funds for the trains to Count d'Avaux. The deputy of King Louis XIII –Claude de Salles, Baron de Rorté, sent from the Reich to the Republic of Poland, was meant to negotiate with Władysław IV on the issue of the recruitment of 4,000 Polish or Cossack rides (the so-called "Cossacks") for French service. In the war archives in Vincennes preserved is the capitulation for the enlistment of this company, signed in Moissy on 20 December 1636, entitled:[57]

> Articles de la capitulation que le Roy a commandéau Sieur Baron de Rorté envoyé par Sa Majestatéen Allemagne, de passe rent son nom pour la levée de quatre mil hommes à cheval Polonois ou Cosaques pour son service, avec telz chefz et capitaines de la dite nation qu'il verra estre àpropos.

The mission of Baron de Rorté, who arrived in Gdansk only in the second half of 1637, was presented by M. Serwański, and all efforts to enlist Polish soldiers failed due to, among other things, the attitude of the Swedes, who did not see the possibility of locating the enlistments in Pomerania for fear of its devastation.[58] So we see that the competition for the Polish recruits between the

[55] R. Skowron, *W służbie Filipa IV…*, p. 270.

[56] H. Ernst, *Madrid und Wien 1632–1637. Politik und Finanzen in der Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II*, Műnster 1991, pp. 217–219; following: R. Skowron, *W służbie Filipa IV…*, pp. 270–272.

[57] Published by G. Gajecky, A. Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War…*, pp. 107–108. The original in Archives du service historique de l'Armèe, Vincennes, France, sygn. A.1, no. 32, k. 235–236.

[58] M. Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)…*, pp. 199–200, 207, 210.

Habsburgs and the Bourbons in 1635–1637 ended with the victory of the former, who twice in autumn 1635 and one year later altogether managed to enlist over 15 thousands soldiers. The whole recruitment army, prepared for the war against Sweden, which was a tremendous effort made by Władysław IV[59] ceased to exist, passing to a peaceful position of only 3300 paid soldiers.[60]

Bibliography

Handwritten sources

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv w Wiedniu; Polen I, karton 57, 58, 59.

Archives du service historique de l'Armèe, Vincennes, France, sygn. A 1, no. 32.

Printed Sources

Domagała K., *Komput wojska koronnego w 1635 roku*, "Słupeckie Studia Historyczne" 2011, no. 17.

Dzieduszycki M., *Krótki rys dziejów i spraw lisowskich*, vol. II, Lwów 1843–1844.

Radziwiłł A.S., *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, vol. II, eds. A. Przyboś, R. Żelewski, Warszawa 1980.

Volumina Legum, vol. III, Petersburg 1859.

Analysis

Baran A., *Kozaki na imperatorskij służbi w rokach 1635–1636*, "Ukrainskij Istoryk" 1974, no. 41–43.

Ernst H., *Madrid und Wien 1632–1637. Politik und Finanzen in der Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II*, Münster 1991.

Gajecky G., Baran A., *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, vol. 2, Romae 1969.

Höbelt L., *Barocke Bomberflotten? Die "Polnischen Völcker" als habsburgische "Vergeltungswaffe" 1635/36*, in: *Von Söldnerheeren zu UN-Truppen. Heerwesen und Kriege in Ósterreich und Polen vom 17. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Wien 2011.

Leitsch W., *Das Leben am Hof König Sigismunds III. von Polen*, vol. IV, Wien 2009.

Lolo R., *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618–1635)*, Pułtusk 2004.

[59] See K. Domagała, *Komput wojska koronnego w 1635 roku*, "Słupeckie Studia Historyczne" 2011, no. 17, pp. 71–92; comp. M.A. Pieńkowski, *Dyplomacja i wojna. Niedoszły konflikt zbrojny Rzeczypospolitej ze Szwecją w 1635 roku*, in: *Studia nad staropolską sztuką wojenną*, vol. II, ed. Z. Hundert, Oświęcim 2013, pp. 87–128.

[60] J. Wimmer, *Wojsko i skarb Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, Warszawa 1968, p. 65.

Lolo R., *Rozejm w Sztumdorfie a Habsburgowie. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad zaangażowaniem Rzeczypospolitej w wojnę trzydziestoletnią*, in: *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII wieku*, ed. M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2007.

Mašek P., *Šlechtickè rody v Čechach, na Moravě a v Slezsku*, Praha 2008.

Nagielski M., *Wpływ wojny trzydziestoletniej na przemiany w sztuce wojennej państw Europy środkowo-wschodniej (na przykładzie Rzeczypospolitej i Państwa Moskiewskiego)*, in: *Prace komisji historii wojen i wojskowości PAU*, vol. X, eds. W. Rojek, A. Kastory, Kraków 2016.

Pieńkowski M.A., *Dyplomacja i wojna. Niedoszły konflikt zbrojny Rzeczypospolitej ze Szwecją w 1635 roku*, in: *Studia nad staropolską sztuką wojenną*, vol. II, ed. Z. Hundert, Oświęcim 2013.

Sedláček A., *Českomoravské heraldiky*, Praha 1925.

Serwański M., *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)*, Poznań 1986.

Skowron R., *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hiszpańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632–1648*, Kraków 2013.

Skowron R., *W służbie Filipa IV. Finansowanie i zaciągi żołnierzy z Rzeczypospolitej przez Hiszpanię w latach 1635–1636*, in: *Hortus bellicus. Studia z dziejów wojskowości nowożytnej*, eds. K. Bobiatyński, P. Gawron, K. Kossarzecki, P. Kroll, D. Milewski, Warszawa 2016.

Szelągowski A., *Rozkład Rzeszy a Polska za panowania Władysława IV*, Kraków 1907.

Wimmer J., *Wojsko i skarb Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, Warszawa 1968.

Zaciągi cesarskie w Rzeczypospolitej Macieja Arnoldina von Clarsteina w 1635 roku

Abstrakt

Podpisany przez Władysława IV rozejm ze Szwedami w Sztumskiej Wsi w 1635 roku spowodował konieczność rozpuszczenia zaciągów wojskowych złożonych z wyborowych oddziałów piechoty i jazdy. O te oddziały zabiegali tak Habsburgowie, jak Francuzi wobec trwających działań wojny trzydziestoletniej. Do Rzeczypospolitej wysłano posła cesarskiego Arnoldina, który uzyskał od Władysława IV zgodę na werbunek żołnierzy. Udało mu się zwerbować ponad 5 tysięcy ludzi, którzy wzięli udział w walkach w Rzeszy nad Renem w służbie cesarza Ferdynanda II. Natomiast rozmowy komisarzy cesarskich z Samuelem Łaszczem nie powiodły się wobec wygórowanych żądań finansowych stawianych przez strażnika koronnego. Korpus polski walczył na terenie Lotaryngii, Szampanii, Pikardii i Burgundii pod komendą gen. Matthiasa Gallasa, oddając

duże usługi Habsburgom. Drugi zaciąg na terenie Rzeczypospolitej przeprowadzono we wrześniu 1636 roku i był on dziełem dyplomacji hiszpańskiej. W sumie wyprowadzono ponad 15 tysięcy żołnierzy z granic Rzeczypospolitej, a dyplomacja Habsburgów zdystansowała w tej kwestii dyplomację francuską Ludwika XIII.

Emperor's recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635

Abstract

Emperor's Ties in the Republic of Poland by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635. The truce signed by Wladyslaw IV with the Swedes in Sztumska Wieś in 1635 made it necessary to dissolve the military enlistments consisting of selected infantry and driving units. The Habsburgs as well as the French were striving for these troops in the face of the ongoing Thirty Years' War. An imperial deputy, Arnoldin, was sent to the Republic of Poland. He received permission from Władysław IV to recruit soldiers. He succeeded in recruiting more than 5,000 men who took part in the Rhine War in the service of Emperor Ferdinand II. On the other hand, talks with Samuel Łaszcz of the Imperial Commissioners failed in the face of excessive financial demands made by the Crown Guard. The Polish Corps fought in Lorraine, Champagne, Picardy and Burgundy under the command of Gen. Matthias Gallas, giving a large service to the Habsburgs. The second enlistment on the territory of the Republic was carried out in September 1636 and was the work of Spanish diplomacy. In total, more than 15 thousand soldiers were led out of the borders of the Republic of Poland and the Habsburg diplomacy distanced the French diplomacy of Louis XIII.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-05

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Lukáš Sláma
ORCID: 0000-0003-0298-2653
Univerzita Jana Evangelisty Purkyně v Ústí nad Labem, Czechy
e-mail: lukanius.slama@seznam.cz

Military Role of the Ore Mountains in Thirty Years' War*

Keywords: Ore mountains, Thirty Years' war, military aspect, town's, northwestern Bohemia
Słowa kluczowe: Rudawy, wojna trzydziestoletnia, aspekty militarne, miasta, północno-zachodnie Czechy

The Ore Mountains, forming a massive natural border between Bohemia and Saxony was, is and will always be regarded only as a barrier between these two state formations. Only taking into consideration the period realia acquired in the regional history research of the Krušné hory (Ore Mountains in English, Erzgebirge in German) area called Podkrušnohoří and their integration into the general history of the lands belonging to the Bohemian Crown and afterwards also to Central European history, is it possible to get a completely new perspective of the period in which the mountain range undoubtedly became an internationally renowned point of interest, i.e. the period of the conflict, now known as the Thirty Years' War.

* The study was supported by a grant from the Faculty of Arts of UJEP: SGS: "Landscape belongs to the winners. Enviromental History of Northwest Bohemia" and UJEP-IGA-TC-2019-63-2: The Ore Mountains from the Hussite wars to the end of the Thirty Years' War. The role and changes of the region in key conflicts between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age.

The enormous interest on the part of commanders or other military leaders of that time in the controlled area used to appear, as a rule, only at the moments when the frontiers were threatened, or even as late as the moments of the invasion of the enemy armies. In this respect, it concerns mainly the second half of the Thirty Years' War. These are in particular the interventions on the part of both the Saxon and Swedish Armies in the years 1631–1632, 1634, 1639–1640, 1641, 1643, etc., i.e. the campaigns that were to threaten either only Praha (in English Prague), or those carrying more ambitious plans in the form of threats to Vienna itself. In these campaigns, the Ore Mountains with their local towns and fortresses created the only well-defended system (apart from the Silesian or Lusatian system) along the along the Eger (Eger in German, Ohře in Czech) and Elbe (Labe in Czech) rivers.

This specific feature has not yet been examined through any of the local military studies. In spite of this, the tracking of roads, rivers or mountain ranges offers a more pliable view of the military logistics of that historical period, and herewith also the assessment of the war-management process found in the Early Modern Period. Unfortunately, we lack the complex processing of the military aspects relevant to the countries of the Bohemian Crown. Nevertheless, in the past, a few works have emerged, which at first glance were dealing with the invisible agents of war disasters. The well-known Czech historian Josef Pekař, in addition to the micro-historical view of the Černín Demesne in the Early Modern Period, also examined, in his work titled *Kniha o Kosti* (Book of the Kost Demesne), various examples of the mutual co-existence between the Army and the local people during the Swedish occupation.[1] The financial burden falling upon cities at differing levels of intensity, relative to the development of the conflict, has been exmained recently by Tomáš Sterneck, Marek Ďurčanský and Jan Kilián.[2] Nevertheless, it is basically to be regarded as literature depicting the history of the city within the context of the Early Modern Age. A truly groundbreaking work concerning the Czech environment is the book entitled *A Picture of Battle Landscape*,[3] written

[1] J. Pekař, *Kniha o Kosti*, Praha 1970. However, the work was focused on the internal economic affairs of the estate. The army acted here as one of the agents of the economic burden.

[2] T. Sterneck, *Město, válka, daně. Brno v moravském berním systému za dlouhé války s Vysokou Portou (1593–1606)*, Praha 2008; M. Ďurčanský, *Česká města a jejich správa za třicetileté války. Zemský a lokální kontext*, Praha 2014; J. Kilián, *Město ve válce, válka ve městě. Mělník 1618–1648*, České Budějovice 2008.

[3] V. Matoušek, *Třebel. Obraz krajiny s bitvou*, Praha 2006 (Adapted edition: *Třebel 1647: A Battlefield of the Thirty Years' War from the Perspective of History, Archeology, Art-history,*

by the archaeologist Václav Matoušek in the Book Třebel, in which the emphasis is placed on all aspects that influenced the battle itself. The development of the surrounding countryside, the system of roads, as well as the military culture and the course of the battle itself, are devoted the same attention as the political course of events. Similarly, the Polish historian Jerzy Maroń carried forth in a similar direction when he wrote *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Śląsku. Aspekty militarne*, in which he places the logistics of the army, its financing and organization, the network of roads or fortifications, in the uppermost interest. Only then does he devote his attention to military operations.[4] On the other hand, German or Swedish historiography deals with the financing of the armies themselves in greater depth and applies it to the general history of the Thirty Years' War.[5]

Fernand Braudel in the *History of the Mediterranean Sea* wrote the following passage: "... it took many months to assemble (group together) mercenaries and troops in Lyon just to enable the King of France 'to unexpectedly cross the mountains' on one beautiful day".[6] Thus, he figuratively described Raimond Montecuccoli's saying about 'the need for money, money, and again money for conducting a war conflict'. The intentions of this work probably correspond best with the claims of historian Geza Perjes who says/claims the following in the methodological part of *Upadek średniowiecznego królestwa Węgier*: *Mohacz 1526–Buda 1541*: "If we have a sufficient number of sources, we can create a model of war with great precision for each period and set the parameters of warfare

---

Geoinformatics, and Ethnology, Prague 2017); V. Matoušek, P. Hrnčiřík, Z. Šámal, *Rozvadov 1621. Výzkum bojiště třicetileté války/Research of a Battlefield of the Thirty Years' War*, České Budějovice 2018.

[4] J. Maroń, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Śląsku. Aspekty militarne*, Wrocław–Racibórz 2008. His pupil Ł. Tekiela proceeded in the same way in his work *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Górnych Łużycach. Aspekty Militarne*, Racibórz 2010. What role for instance rivers may have in a military campaign is demonstrated on the example of the Odra River by G. Podruczny, *Militarna rola rzeki Odry w okresie nowożytnym, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem odcinka między Głogowem a Wrocławiem*, in: *Odra – warunki naturalne rzeki i jej kształtowanie przez człowieka*, Prochowice 2015, pp. 33–44. A basic book is obvious G. Parker, *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road 1567–1659*, Cambridge 1972.

[5] H. Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650*, Münster 1990; K.-R. Böhme, *Geld für die schwedischen Armeen nach 1640*, "Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning" 1967, no. 33/1, pp. 54–95; P. Sörensson, *Ekonomi och krigförig under Gustaf II. Adolfs tyska fältåg 1630–1632*, "Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning" 1932, no. 5/2, pp. 295–320.

[6] F. Braudel, *Morze Śródziemne i świat śródziemnomorski w epoce Filipa II*, vol. II, Gdańsk 1977 (*La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II*, vol. 2, Paris 1949), p. 196.

… If we know the pace of displacement of infantry, cavalry and artillery, we can indicate the distance the troop can overcome in one or more days…"[7] In this spirit, it is necessary to examine the existence of the border mountain range of the Ore Mountains, which forms the natural border between Bohemia and Saxony.

During the course of the last years of the Thirty Years' War a monumental topographic work by Matthew Merian Topographia Germaniae was created, containing a total number of 16 volumes published between 1642–1659.[8] The eleventh volume, focused on Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, which describes in a narrow or more comprehensible manner 370 places in the Czech Kingdom, is crucial for the work in question. Martin Zeiller, the author of the texts, was the protestant and Merian's court supplier of topographic material. In the introductory chapter devoted to the general description of Bohemia, the author points out that "This country has a ring of mountains with a forest [...] which gives it a border wall." As for the waters, the reader of the period would have certainly known the following rivers from among the Czech waters – the Elbe River, the Ohře River, then the Vltava River (Moldau in German) or the Lužnice River (Lainsitz in German). It is said that in their waters, one could also find a snail's shell in which a pearl was residing. According to Merian, the rivers were also a source of various kinds of excellent fish, however, they were also an important link in trading salt. For example, to describe mountains and roads, it only shows that it is possible "to travel across the entire Czech land in the space of three days from one border to the other."[9]

If temporarily we lose sight of the military-logistic significance of the mountain ranges, we must not miss one fact importsnt for the understanding of the Early Modern Period of history, that the territory between the royal towns of Ústí nad Labem, Louny and Žatec and the upper towns of Jáchymov and Přísečnice is a territory with significant political, commercial and cultural ties with the Electorate of Saxony. Therefore, the outbreak of the anti-Habsburg uprising in 1618,

[7] G. Perjés, *Upadek średniowiecznego królestwa Węgier: Mohacz 1526–Buda 1541*, Oświęcim 2014 (The fall of the medieval kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526–Buda 1541, Columbia 1989), pp. 25–26. For the period of the Thirty Years' War, the sources are more accessible than in the case of studying Hungary in the mid-16th century. Comp. ibidem, p. 22.

[8] M. Merian, *Topographia Bohemiae, Moraviae et Silesiae. Das ist Beschreibung und eigentliche Abbildung der Vornehmsten und bekandtisten Stäaten und Plätze*, Franckfurt am Mein 1650 (2nd edition, 1660). In the digital form *Topographia Bohemiae, Moraviae et Silesiae*, https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Topographia_Bohemiae,_Moraviae_et_Silesiae (22.10.2017) (hereinafter only *Topographia Bohemiae*).

[9] *Topographia Bohemiae*, pp. 3–4.

shrouded under the guise of defending religious freedom, met with a wide reaction in this non-Catholic part of the country.[10] The defeat of the Bohemian resistance and subsequent confiscations also resulted in extensive property changes together with the arrival of the so-called foreign nobility, which was more dependent on the Emperor.

Specifically, in the case of some towns or cities, these foreign elements in the relations go even further since the Elbe River is one of Europe's major waterways. The port city of Hamburg enabled goods from Western and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Scandinavia. In principle, the Elbe allowed the North and Baltic Sea connections to the centre of the continent and Ústí nad Labem to be ranked among the largest ports on this river. The area of the Elbe River Basin, made of more than 48,000 km^2, occupies more than one half of the territory of today's Czech Republic. Its length is divided into two parts: the so-called small Elbe from Krkonoše (The Giant Mountains in English, Risengebirge in German) where the river springs) to the confluence with the Vltava River in Mělník; in certain places it continues as a 320-meter wide river. The Elbe gathers its real power and mightiness at the confluence with the Saal and Havola Rivers in Saxony-Anhalt. If the flow of the river at the borders of Bohemia and Saxony is 308 m^3/s, it flows into the North Sea with a flowing rate of 870 m^3/s. This European major river, with a length of more than 1,000 km, has thus formed a central point of Central European history and events in the cities and countries through which it was flowing and it influenced and still influences the politics, economy and culture of other places. Boat transport on the Elbe connected the Czech lands with a Hansa-controlled North Sea trade since the Middle Ages. This also ensured the economic growth of cities such as Magdeburg or Hamburg, since the goods transported down the Elbe stream were imported not only from Northern Europe, but also from Baltic countries, England and Russia.[11]

Early modern man could well encounter a dense network of terrestrial long-distance trails, as well as regional trails or paths. Maximum development

[10] In the Žatec area, more than 90% of the aristocracy settled there joined the resistance. Comp., *Prominentní emigrant Vilém Vchynský (Kinský) a jeho majetek v severozápadních Čechách*, in: *Víra nebo Vlast? Faith or Homeland? Exile in the Czech History of Early Modern Times*, ed. M. Hrubá, Ústí nad Labem 2001, pp. 210–221. In the Žatec area, more than 90% of tthe nobility settled down there, were involved in the resistance.

[11] P. Dollinger, *Dzieje Hanzy (XII–XVII wiek)*, Gdańsk 1975 (*La Hanse (XII–XVII siècles)*, Paris 1988), pp. 217–218. Trade in these areas, for example, was the result of imports of high-quality Russian honey (e.g., 60,000 kilograms of this honey was exported from Tallinn in 1427) or wood.

has come with new urban agglomerations, which in the case of north-west Bohemia is related to the royal towns of the Podkrušnohoří (the whole territory at the foothills of the Ore Mountains). This, for example, confirms the route of the so-called White Trail along the river of the same name from Ústí nad Labem, via Most to Kadaň. In principle, it has served as a link between the above-mentioned Serbian and Erfurt paths. It passed through Kadaň, going in one direction across Žatec, Rakovník and Beroun to Praha, and in the other via Karlovy Vary and Sokolov through the Kraslice Pass to Erfurt.

From Žatec, the real crossroads of the supra-regional trails, also some other routes/trails of a regional character were emerging. Among these are the so-called "The Eger Trail" along the Ohře river to the confluence of these rivers in Litoměřice.[12] As a result of the availability of reports of Fynes Moryson, we can make conclusions, for instance, about the difficulties associated with the crossing of the mountains. From Dresden he could have used the river, but at the last minute he decided to hire a cab near Bad Gottleuba. The road to Ústí (nad Labem) through Petrovice led first *through the fertile lowland of the Elbe River*, followed by rocky hills with marshy forests; on the very top of the hill they found *rocky hills without any stands and a wooden milestone*.[13] Also the second of the English travellers, whose name was James Taylor, had "some experience with the crossing of the land border in the Marienberg and Brandenburg area". *The Bohemian forest* had according to his measurements approximately about 10 English miles at its depth and was hardly accessible.[14] As he remarked, "Of all my journeys, the journey through the dark wood was the hardest for me, because the trees here grow so thickly and are so high that they are obscuring the sun, so the day seems to be a night. In some places, two miles long together, the ridge runs along floating trunks and I, having slipped, fell into the middle of the swamp."[15]

The Ore Mountains area experienced the greatest colonization activity at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, when miners were brought to this area from Saxony. The process culminated in the thirties of the 16th century (1530s) by the

[12] R. Květ, *Atlas starých stezek*, Brno 2017, p. 92. This Atlas of old trails/paths showed that rather than Litoměřice, The Eger/Ohře Trail crossed the Serbian Path to Doksany; J. Klápště, *Raně středověké Mostecko a síť dálkových tras*, "Archeologické rozhledy" 1985, no. 37, p. 505 ff.

[13] *Fynes Moryson, John Tayler. Cesta do Čech*, ed. A. Bejblík, Praha 1977 (hereinafter only *Cesta do Čech*), p. 29.

[14] *Cesta do Čech*, p. 188.

[15] *Cesta do Čech*, pp. 188–189.

great boom of cities such as Krupka, Nejdek, Hrob or Přísečnice. There were also new big "upper cities", such as Vejprty, Boží Dar, Jáchymov or Hora sv. Kateřiny. Among the smaller ones we can rank Vysluni or Mikulov. It was only at that time that the boundary line that had settled on the summits of the Ore Mountains was refined.[16] Today's northwestern Bohemia is also very much affected by the area of the former Žatec region. Here the most important words were the names of the four royal cities, i.e. Most, Louny, Kadaň and Žatec. The Jesuit Bohuslav Balbín also sees the town of Přísečnice as a vital centre and compares it to Thormopylae, protecting Bohemia against Meißen and Vogtland.[17] The question of the strategic location of the city situated directly on the land border will be elaborated upon in the next part of the submitted thesis, nevertheless Balbín draws attention in particular to the discovery of silver stocks. A great advantage, especially in the vicinity of Žatec, is the rich supply of hops and the beer called "Male", which is brewed here. The period topographer Master Pavel Stránský sees the potential of this area predominantly in agriculture, which, according to the author, might be able to compensate for any damage caused by possible crop failure.[18]

Communication took place not only across the mountains, but, of course, even between the towns located at the foothills of the mountains. As has already been said, there were two categories of towns – royal and liege. But that was not a hindrance when important reports appeared about the progress of the enemy army that could do harm to its *neighbours*. On April 12, 1639, a military unit (perhaps the entire regiment) of Colonel Buchheimb appeared in Krupka on the route between Komáří hůrka and the former Archbishop's castle of Kyšperk (in German Geyersberg). The report arrived in Most as early as the second day. The inhabitants of Teplice, who sent the letter containing the information, reopned with the further advancement of soldiers perhaps in the direction of Ústí nad Labem. The purpose of this correspondence was to alert our inhabitants to an unexpected

[16] P. Jančárek, *Česko-saská hranice v Krušných horách do třicetileté války*, in: *Čechy a Sasko v proměnách dějiny*, ed. K. Kaiserová, Ústí nad Labem 1993, pp. 133–138. The most recent source dealing with the refinement of borders and research of this this issue is V. Zábranský's paper called *Česko-saská hranice a její mapování v raném novověku*, in: eds. T. Velímský, K. Kaiserová, *Region na hranici*, "Acta Universitatis Purkynianae Facultatis Philosophicae. Studia Historica" 2015, no. XVI, pp. 61–74.

[17] *Bohuslav Balbín. Krásy a bohatství české země*, ed. Z. Tichá, H. Businská, Praha 1986, p. 231.

[18] *Mistra Pavla Stránského ze Zápské Stránky popravené a rozmnožené vypsání vší obce Království českého. Respublica Bojema*, ed. E. Tonner, Praha 1893, p. 42.

border movement that could mean some trouble.[19] As it turned out later, it was the Swedish army of Jan Banér that was approaching, which resulted in a siege of the town of Most, which was subsequently conquered.[20]

During the course of the Thirty Years' War, the towns constituted major economic entities, and the resulting revenues then formed a substantial part of the wartime contributions. The towns were also made use of for the winter deposition of troops and in addition to that they functioned as fortresses. That is why they carried a substantial part of the material burden and were frequent targets of destructive invasions on the part of enemy armies.[21] In the following few examples we will introduce the issue of winter accommodation of troops in selected cities in northwestern Bohemia at the foot of the Ore Mountains. Winter was a critical time for municipal cash desks, but also for warehouses where summer crops were stored. In this chapter, no emphasis will be placed on the origin of the occupied sections, as the differences between the imperial army and *the enemy* became minimal in the light of the advancing conflict.

Let's first introduce the most important source of information about the manner of paying the contributions. Towns or manors created, as a rule, special registers in the form of clear tables that enabled them to register their expenditure and the sums withdrawn. Certain forms of the Contributory Register have invariably appeared in the investigated municipal archives, e.g. in the case of the Teplice country estate fund deposited in the Děčín branch of the State District Archive in Litoměřice, in which case it is a comprehensive set of registers. Admittedly,

[19] SOkA Most, the Archive of the City of Most (hereinafter only SOka Most), AM Most, Inv. no. 1536, Ch. 11.

[20] To the mutual contradiction of Swedish and local urban literary sources – J. Hofman, *Banérova korespondence jako pramen k válečným událostem let 1639 a 1640*, in: V. Prchal, *Mezi Martem a Memorií. Sources of a personal nature to military history, 16th–19th centuries*, Pardubice 2011, pp. 61–62. Comp. SOkA Most, AM Most, Inv. no. 1538, Ch. 11. *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas. Skrifter och brefvexling VI. Johan Baners bref 1624–1641*, ed. P. Sondén, Stockholm 1883 (hereinafter only AOSOB VI.), p. 652 ff.

[21] Especially Václav Ledvinka contributed to the role of Czech cities in the early modern era, see the collected works *Města a šlechta ve středověku a raném novověku. Výbor statí Václava Ledvinky*, ed. K. Jíšová, "Documenta Pragensia" 2016, Supplementa VII. Further also the collected works of J. Kilián, *Města, třicetiletá válka a středoevropská historiografie uplynulého čtvrtstoletí*, "Documenta Pragensia" 2013, no. XXXII/2, pp. 125–138. On the example of Mělník, see J. Kilián, *Město ve válce, válka ve městě…* For the contribution to some of the towns located in the Labe River valley see M. Ďurčanský, *Česká města a jejich správa za třicetileté války…* The city management is shown on the example of the city of Göttingen, see N. Winnige, *Wirtschaften im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Das Beispiel Göttingen*, in: *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrope. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe*, eds. B. von Krusenstjern, H. Medick, Göttingen 1999, pp. 273–306.

it is not the most popular type of source, but we can consider it to be substantial by virtue of detail. Not only does it contain references to the residence of a given unit in the city and its surroundings, but above all it gives reasons for the amount paid. From this, we can discern the final assessment of the stay, because we can compare the individual prices with other cities or periods. Although it is not the most popular type of source, we can still consider it to be essential in terms of its detail. Not only does it contain references to the residence of a given unit in the city and its surroundings, but above all it gives reasons for paying the amount. From this, we can afterwards proceed (though not completely), while preparing the final assessment of the stay of the relevant military unit in the town, as we can can compare individual prices with other cities or periods. But still, expenditures can be compared with (the) Imperial War Council regulations regarding recommended allowances for individuals in the form of differently defined *portions.* In modern terminology, we would call this *a food package*, in which it is also necessary to include services in the form of, for example, candles or wood for heating. The research possibilities of this type of source differ. In the examples below, some will be examined more closely.

The Swedish invasion of Bohemia led by Johann Gustafsson Banér at the turn of 1639 and 1640 has already been dealt with many times in literature. However, fewer references are made to the role of the towns lying on the Ohře River, which provided for the connection between the troops inland (at the so-called Elbe Fortress) and the troops in Saxony. This was also the reason for establishing a special staff (headquarters) inside these agglomerations. For the following paragraphs, the town of Kadaň is important, since a comprehensive register of expediture withdrawals has been preserved there for the functioning of the office of Hans Christoff Königsmarck and later for that of Johann Banér.[22] The Second Register, containing also the costs resulting from involuntary expenditures incurred for the otherwise unknown Swedish Colonel, later Freedman, Hans Wachtmeister of Björkö, is dated between December 26, 1639, and January 26, 1640.[23]

We are only made aware of Hans Wachtmeister from the Czech environment of this period, but his influence in Central Europe was definitely much longer.[24] He most probably set out on a journey to the shores of northern Germany in the

[22] The State District Archive in Chomutov, based in Kadaň (hereinafter only SOkA Chomutov), The Archive of the Town of Kadaň (MA Kadaň), Inv. no. 1037/C4, Ch. 18.

[23] Ibidem, A III 57. The register without pagination.

[24] At least it is not mentioned in different editions of the resources.

summer of 1634, when the replacement of military units was under way. Probably he came here as the Colonel, or the "supreme" commander of the cavalry regiment, with whom he participated in the battle of Nördlingen the same year, and apparently also two years later at the Battle of Wittstock. In 1634, Axel Oxenstierna refers to him as General-Major of the Infantry.[25] This remarkable military career, which earned him the title of *free lord from Björkö* later, in 1651, continued even into the 1640s. At that time he was already fighting the Danes in the Lund territory. In Hallestat, in 1644, he even took vigorous (and unscrupulous) action against a group of about 300 peasants who were fortified in the city. Wachtmeister had the entire village burned, and this action was followed by the massacre of the locals, from whom only some of the elders survived and several children.[26]

Also, during the sudden Swedish attack of Bohemia he was not afraid to turn against the local inhabitants relentlessly, although his action turned only against financial benefits. Kadaň became the place where the contributions from many of the surrounding areas were made throughout the the whole winter period. Certainly the Ostrov Demesme, located in the then Loket region, contributed to the cost of the maintenance of the head-quarters.[27] The wealthy town of Jáchymov, which *had to follow an example of surrounding towns*, since it had to transfer minimal payments of 330 Imperial thalers, which amounted to the sum of 60 thalers per week.[28] The writers of those records were undoubtedly thinking of Přísečnice ot Výsluní when mentioning the surrounding towns. However, Kadaň had suffered severe damage as early as the spring of the previous year and therefore it was very complicated for this town to hunt for financial funds for the maintenance of the sections (military units).[29]

Nevertheless Kadan itself (along with its inhabitants) had to carry the entire burden of all the needs, which is confirmed by the quoted Register, serving

[25] *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas. Skrifter och brefvexling*, *Bd. 12: juni–december 1634*, ed. E. Blumfeldt, Stockholm 1977, p. 329.

[26] P. Englund, *Nepokojná léta*, Praha 1993, p. 328.

[27] Prameny k dějinám třicetiletá války VI., (Ed. V. Líva), Praha 1955, p. 26. Dated 24.01.1640.

[28] Ibidem, p. 27. Dated 31.01.1640.

[29] Prameny k dějinám třicetileté války V., (Ed. V. Líva), Praha 1954 (hereinafter only Prameny V.), p. 231. The destruction is related to the lightning attack carried out in March 1639 towards Chomutov and Jirkov. A certain Swedish *lieutenant*, who lived in Annaberg, *bothered* those places as late as November of that year, even during the ongoing invasion. Nevertheless, it is difficult to judge whether i tis the case of the above mentioned commander Hans Wachtmeister. Comp. Prameny V., p. 339. In addition, the town of Přísečnice was damaged by the battle in the spring of 1641.

originally as a an inventory of the damage caused by the monthly residence of some 1,500 riders and 12 infantry companies under the command of Jan Wachtmeister. Above all, it was a violent penetration into the barges and barns in the city and the suburbs. The population had often been prepared for such situations, and the habitation of valuables in forests or fortified sites had become common practice. It has traditionally been expensive valuables, tools needed for livelihood, and so on.[30] It was only after the ravaging and calming of the situation that the time came for the regular fees and the contribution of the beaten grain that the soldiers used to infuse themselves and the horses. In addition to this loss, the townsfolk had to observe further non specific property damage.[31] The total sum of the damage at the end of the inventory reveals the sum of 60, 267 zl. (i.e. In German Rheinischer Gulden – the currency of the Rhineland; in Bohemia called Rýnský zlatý, hence the abbreviation "zl.") and 53 kreutzers.[32] However, a total of 6,490 zl. and 30 kreutzers was allocated to the highest commander Hans Wachtmeister and his staff.[33]

By the same token of interest, the numbers of bushels of grain allotted to army are taken into consideration.[34] Assuming that one bushel is a unit of approximately 94 litres (but there are various conversions where the value varies between 90–120 litres), then 12,920 bushels levied/raised by burghers had undoubtedly a considerable impact upon the entire urban management.[35] Although a large part of the population in the early modern city was engaged in agriculture, the villages still remained the most important source of foodstuffs. Not to mention the possibility of better storage of grain (corn) in villages, prior to its grinding.[36] And it was from the surrounding villages that most of the bushels of

[30] In connection with this matter a number of examples can be found in *Paměti krupského měšťana Michela Stüelera (1629–1649)*, ed. J. Kilián, Teplice–Dolní Břežany 2013 [*Michel Stüeler Gedenkbuch (1629–1649). Alltagsleben in Böhmen zur Zeit des Dreißigjährign Krieges*, Göttingen 2014] (hereinafter only *Paměti*) or in *Martina Škvoreckého, úředníka na Pacově, hospodářská korespondence z dob války třicetileté*, ed. F. Teplý, Praha 1928.

[31] SOkA Chomutov, AM Kadaň, Inv. no. 1037/C4, Ch. 18, A III 57, fol. 1r.

[32] Ibidem, fol. 11r.

[33] Ibidem, fol. 10v. Without specification of costs.

[34] The German equivalent is used in the register, i.e. *strich.*

[35] SOkA Chomutov, AM Kadaň, Inv. no. 1037/C4, Ch. 18, A III 57, fol. 11r.

[36] J. Honc, *Problémy studia mezd a cen chlebového obilí v 17. a 18. století*, "Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Studia Historica" 1997, no. XVII, pp. 51–90. For more facts about Kadaň in the 18th century see J. Křivka, *Ceny obilí a luštěnin v Kadani, Lounech, Úštěku a Podbořanech v letech 1712–1792*, "Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Studia Historica" 1997, no. XVII, pp. 91–108.

corn emanated. By means of such a list of villages falling under the category of royal city, we are able to find out the real extent of the settlement system needed to ensure that the located military units were fed. Due to the fact that it was one of the larger mounted details/battalions, we can also assume the division of their horses and riders into the nearest yards and stables.

On account of its significant position within important international trails, Kadaň became one of the nerve centres of Baner's campaign in Bohemia for the winter and spring period between 1639 and 1640. Hans Wachtmeister was to control from there the supplies delivered to the main army stationed at Brandýs nad Labem and was also to arrange for the military protection of the side of this military body by covering a great portion of the then Litoměřice region. He also worked with Field Marshal Gustav Horn and Arvid Wittenberg.[37] In addition to this, Kadaň later helped the Swedish troops to retreat to Saxony.

If Kadaň was an important centre for terrestrial international traffic, the same applies to shipping in Ústí nad Labem. By the end of the Thirty Years' War, like most other cities, Ústí nad Labem had also been financially and materially exhausted by several protracted stays of troops and their very demanding support for those military units.[38] As in other cases, even in Ústí nad Labem it does not mean that the whole military unit was staying in one place. As has already been mentioned, a member of each staff of the regiment was a Quarterrmeister (in German Furier) who decided on a particular layout of soldiers in villages and houses. Sometime in the mid-1630s, the part of the Infantry Regiment of the Earl (Ernst Georg?) Sparr was in the vicinity of Ústí.[39] The entire record captures the layout and the number of portions designated for individual ranks and ordinary soldiers.

[37] AOSOB VI., pp. 728–729. Such trust from Baneer testofies, among other things, to the púosition of the mentioned Wachtmeister.

[38] Especially K. Jahnel contributes to older history of the city in his book *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg in Aussig und Umgebung*, Prag 1903; F.J. Umlauft, *Geschichte der Deutschen Stadt Aussig*, Bayreuth 1960; idem, *Vom Dreißigjährigen kriege bis zum Jahre 1850*, "Heimatkunde des Bezirkes Aussig" 1931, no. 3. Most recently, M. Veselý contributes to military history in his work *Vojenské dějiny Ústecka*, Ústí nad Labem 2003. In June 1647, even the burghers received a Certificate of Protection from the commander of the Swedish Army Karel Gustav Wrangle. Comp. The Archive of the town of Ústí nad Labem (AM Ústí nad Labem), Inv. no. 3523, Ch. 93.

[39] The Archive of the City of Ústí nad Labem, abbreviated as AM Ústí nad Labem, Inv. no. 3521, Ch. 93. The archivists set the date of the document for the years 1634–1636, for the submitted work, however, this is not a substantial element. Unfortunately, we do not even know whether the author is Arnost Jiří Sparr or Otto Kryštof Sparr. In the period of time mentioned above, none of them were present there according to the available data. As the first one Arnošt Jiří appeared as early as August 40. Comp. DBBTI IV, p. 369, n. 1072.

Inside the city, the company remained with a portion of 60 servings, with most of them (15) being consumed used by Seargent (Obrister Wachmeister) Johann Werner. The ordinary soldier was entitled to only one serving, Sergeant for 5 servings and Corporal for 2.[40] As it appears from the list of places, parts of the regiment were deployed over much of today's district of Ústí nad Labem, for example in Petrovice or Přestanov. Of the total number of 200 men, the city and 5 villages averaged 33 soldiers per place. According to the size of the portions, it was undoubtedly just a short-term stay and comparatively unpretentious compared to the heavy quarters of the Swedish and Imperial troops in the 1640s.

The town of Chomutov became a symbol of war rampage in Northwest Bohemia. Thus, within a few years, one of the largest Czech towns became a settlement with only a few families and huge/large debts.[41] Local officials wrote a moratorium several times to the Emperor, asking for a cutback from paying taxes and installing sections, referring to the few burghers living inside the city, and very poor living conditions.[42] The turn of the 1634 and 1635 turned into a heavy blow, although it may seem that in general this period was quite peaceful. The year 1634, however, was marked by confusion associated with the fundamental reorganization of the Imperial army after the Wallenstein removal. In addition, Northwest Bohemia was attacked by the joint Swedish-Saxon-Brandenburg army in the late summer of the same year. Krupka chronicler wrote about this summer: "… it was a disconsolate, dejected, sad and miserable year ... also a very dry year".[43] Poor crops in the toughest times of the "little ice age" have failed to feed the farmer with his farm, let alone hundreds and thousands of soldiers.[44]

[40] Ibidem, fol. 1r. For more details about the sizes of servings, see the text below.

[41] Chomutov in the period of time before the Battle of White Mountain belonged among 10–12 Bohemian and Moravian towns with a poplation ranging from 5 to 8 thousand. These numbers ranked this town among the largest in the countries of the Bohemian Crown. Comp. E. Maur, *Obyvatelstvo českých zemí v raném novověku. Třicetiletá válka*, p. 99.

[42] SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Moratoria. For the Moratorium see Otto Dictionary 17, p. 599.

[43] *Paměti*, p. 243, fol. 101.

[44] G. Parker, *Global Crisis. War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeeth Century*, Yale 2013.

Table 1. Monthly Expenditure of the City of Ústí nad Labem for Infantry and Cavalry in the year 1648

What the Staff of the highest Colonel of the Cavalry required per month	zl. (Czech abbreviation for German currency)	Horses
Colonel (Obrister)	450	12
Lieutenant-Colonel (Obrister Leutenant)	120	8
Seargent (Obrister Wachtmeister)	50	6
Quartermater (Quartiermeister)	40	3
Chaplain (Caplan)	20	2
Secretary (Secretario)	20	2
Wagon Master (Wagenmeister)	18	2
Purser (Proviantmeister)	18	2
Profous with his people (Profous sambt seines Leuthen)	40	5
The Emperor's Commissary of Regiment (Item des Kays. Regiment Comisario)	150	4
Total Sum	956	48
For Infantry Company (Battalion) per month (auf ein Compagnia zu fuß Monatlicher)		Kreutzers
Captain (Hauptman)	140	3
Lieutenant (Leutenant)	45	2
Colour Bearer/Standard Bearer (Fendrich)	38	2
Seargent (Feldwebel)	20	
Führer*	13	
Quartermaster (Fourhrir)	13	
Corporal (Corporal)	12	
Company Clerk (Musterschreiber)	12	
Commander (Feldherr)	12	
Musicians (Spielleleuthe)	7	30
Privats (Knechten)	6	30
Contributions to the Staff and Company cash desk (Item vor die Regiment Casa auf und Comp. Monathlich)	150	
Total	464	7

* "Führer" can be translated as "Leader" or "Guide". In general, he is taken as the Ancient Colour Bearer representative. For problematic translation, the original German term was left in the table. Comp. T. Koch, *Vojenské hodnosti za Třicetileté války*, http://www.mortaigne.com/vojenske-hodnosti-za-tricetilete-valky.a178.html (9.03.2018).

Source: according to the Archive of the City of Ústí nad Labem, Inv. no. 3520.

The insertion of one half of the regiment of the General Field Officer Rudolf Morzin of the size of four companies apparently directly into the city and the remainder to the surrounding places undoubtedly took place after the New Year of

1635.[45] Their stay captured in the below quoted Register provides important information applicable to the logistics of the Army smaller sections/troops. It offers an insight into the economy of the military body in the mid-1630's in Bohemia, but it also allows assessment of the impact of regulations issued by the Imperial Army's Supreme Command on the supply and maintenance of these units. The Regiment at the time of the mercenary armies resembled more an organizational unit than a combat group.[46] Therefore, the inner structure was formed rather by individuals carrying out non-combat functions. According to the amount of financial rewards referred to/quoted in the Register, the field officer with 12 zl. had the best position immediately after the Colonel as the supreme commander of the entire regiment with a salary of 30 zl. per week.[47] The staff also consisted of officials, among whom we can include a Quarter Master (7 zl. per week), a Secretary (4 zl.) or a Profous (8 zl.) with his Commissioner (5 zl.). Quite apart from any struggle, the Chaplain stood in the regiment hierarchy between the Secretary and the Quarter Master.[48] The whole staff remained/stayed in Chomutov for a period of 22 weeks and accounts for approximately one tenth of the total money withdrawn for the army contributions, i.e. the expenditure referred to in the Register

Similar conditions were in companies (e.g. in battalions). These were often defined according to the name of their Captains and that's why we often meet Ullersdorf or Müller's Company in the register. Naturally, it was them who received the highest sums, for example, the Governor mentioned by Müller's Company lost a total of 136 zl. between 29 January and 16 June. After these followed the ranks falling in the officer corps, i.e. the Lieutenant and the Colonel, who received 60 and 50 zl. In addition, non-commissioned officers, such as the Feldwöbel (21 zl.) or the hardly identifiable rank of Führer (12 zl.).[49] The sums mentioned in the

[45] Prameny V., p. 356. Distribution of winter quarters. Comp. Ibidem, p. 369, which shows the situation at the end of May. For the period from January to June, the record of expenditure was preserved. SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231. Specifikation und Verzeichnis … Anno 1635.

[46] At this point it is possible to use a more modern Czech term "pluk" in the original text instead of the older term "regiment".

[47] SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Index, fol. 1r.

[48] Ibidem, fol. 1r. For more details about the forming of regiments see H. Langer, *Hortus Bellicus. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg. Eine Kulturgeschichte*, Leipzig 1978, pp. 92–102.

[49] SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Index, fol. 3v. For a more detailed description of military ranks in the Thirty Years' War see T. Koch, *Vojenské hodnosti za Třicetileté války I–II*, http://www.mortaigne.com/vojenske-hodnosti-za-tricetilete-valky.a178.html, http://www.mortaigne.com/vojenske-hodnosti-za-tricetilete-valky-ii.a179.html (5.09.2017).

Register, kept according to their to the settled amounts, are apparently referred to in the Colonel's patent and therefore their level in the Register of records is essentially unaltered. In contrast to this, however, are the amounts issued per weeks although they are also subject to a steady coefficient. For example, the lieutenant was entitled to 5 and 1/2 zl. every week, which after the 19th week amounted to a total sum of 104 zl. and 30 kr.[50]

The number of ordinary soldiers present was diverse. Because of the very frequent reporting of totally unrealistic numbers, their records were requested by the supreme command of the imperial army.[51] Therefore, we can assume that the figures are at least reasonable. Most soldiers stayed in Chomutov in the period between January and February, and there should have been approximately 977 men who were enrolled between 3rd January and 12th February. By the departure of approximately 340 men from three battalions and another less-known reduction in the number of enlisted men the city crew dropped to 565 soldiers. Next month, however, 80 men at arms arrived, and the status rose to 646. The least mercenaries in the city were in the spring months of April and May, when it was already possible to send soldiers, who were retreating there in order to protect themselves from cold winter weather, to smaller villages and war camps. In terms of finance, 1 zl. and 30 kr. was left per one soldier a week, without any further claims for food, beer or wine. The question remains whether these costs were tallied with the subsequent purchase of needs or whether they were already included in this amount. The second option is more likely, since, according to some reports, the town issued to this regiment, among other things, 300 pieces of bread before the Register was introduced.[52]

According to the prescribed nutritional rations of May 1635, it included one daily serving of 1,5 pounds of bread, the Maß (German term) of wine (or possibly even 2 Mäzen of beer) and, in case meat was not available, it should be replaced

[50] SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Index, fol. 3.

[51] This proposal was presented by Don Baltazar Marradas. Comp. Prameny V., p. 354. 29 XII 1634.

[52] The North Bohemian District Archive Chomutov (SOkA Chomutov), i.e. MA Chomutov, Inv. no. 1574, Ch. 232, 1634 Militär Verpflegung und Unkosten. A report of supplies at the order of Jakub Rentner, captain of one of the accommodated batallions. This report was attached as a single document. Comp. SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Index, fol. 2v. Chomutov and even in the preceeding regiments were supplied with hundreds of pieces of bread. The definitive layout of the Quarters occurred only after the New Year of 1635.

Table 2. Expenditure of the Town of Chomutov for the Staff of the Moorzin Regiment (from 3.01 to 16.06.1635)

Organizational unit of the regiment:	Expenditure (zl.)
To the highest Obrister for a period of 19 weeks with an amount of 30 zl. per each week	570
For one month according to the patent	120
To the Obrister Wachtmeiter for a period of 19 weeks with an amount of 3 zl. per each week	228
For one month according to the patent	40
To Quartiermeister for 19 weeks with an amount of 7 zl. per each week	133
To the regimental Caplan for 23 weeks, i.e. an amount of 6 zl. per each week	138
To the regimental Secretario for a period of 19 weeks with an amount of 4 zl. per each week	76
For one whole month	24
To Profous and his staff for a period of 19 weeks with an amount of 8 zl. per each week	152
For one whole month	60
To the Proviantmaster for 19 weeks, i. e. 5 zl. per each week	95
For one whole month	40
For the Staff Wagon Master for a period of 19 weeks, i. e. 4 zl. per each week	76
For one whole month	24
In 19 weeks a lieutenant-officer received, i. e. 7 zl. per each week	158
For one whole month	60
To Stabhalter* in 23 weeks. Each week 3 zl.	69
To the judge and his assistants from 18th April until 16th June, i. e. an amount of 3 zl. per each week	51
For 19 weeks the regiment *consumed* 851 acres**	
1 zl. per each acre	851
The total sum for a half regiment	3228

* The function related to law Unspecified function has not been spcified in greater detail.

** They have not specified in greater detail what has been consumend. Most frequently they referred to food for horses (fodder).

Source: SOkA Chomutov/Kadaň, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, fol. 1y.

by 20 kreutzers per week.[53] After that date, in Chomutov, money was collected for the battalion of Count Michna (i.e. at the strength of 87 men) residing in this town between 25th April and 16th June.[54] According to the annex to this Reg-

[53] Prameny V., p. 369. Dated 28.05.1635. Regulation issued by Ferdinand III.

[54] SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, kt. 231, Index, fol. 9r. It is unfortunately not specified whether Paul Michna of Vacínov (Inspector of troops reserves) or Gerog Wilhelm Michna of Vacínov (Chief Captain over royal estates in Bohemia).

ister, 106 portions totalling 888 zl. So, if the company was present for a total of 17 weeks, then one serving would go up to 1 zl. and 12 kreutzers (and a total of 1,412 zl).[55] However, other amounts are listed in the abovementioned Register and thus a total of 1,278 zl. were disbursed, according to this source, for the whole military unit (batallion).[56] There are some discrepancies in the resulting sums, probably due to a two-year delay in writing this report of 1637 on debts concerning the debts left over to this city.[57] The final report sent by the Czech governor to Prague reported total loss of 34,102 zl. without services, which corresponds to the total sum in the traced/monitored register.

In total, Chomutov was badly affected by this stay. Nevertheless, some other factors had contributed to this situation as well. It was especially the presence of a large number of different regiments throughout the border zone in the case of defense against sudden raids or invasions. A great number of towns had crews which controlled a considerable part of the city's walls. In the summer of 1635, for example, the town of Most had to ask the Emperor to save this town from paying contributions temporarily sonce the town was *totally exhaused and completely ruined*,[58] or Teplice, which during the first half of the 1630s turned into *a wrong quarter*.[59] According to a report sent from the office of Emperor Ferdinand III, the Czech Governor (or Vice-Regent) of March 1635, many cities fought against the uneven distribution of the army in Bohemia. The strongest regiments were said to be sent to the most affected areas, while the regions less damaged by the war had to feed weaker military units.[60] And even though the town of Chomutov appeared on the list of towns and estates that had been freed from the duty to provide quarters for the army, even as early as April several hundred soldiers were located there.[61] It had become almost the rule that even though cities – such as Louny – were completely impoverished and deserted, soldiers used to collect wood for heating and take it away from the remnants of burgher houses. Thus

[55] Rounded. According to SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Index, Appendix no. 2.

[56] SOkA Chomutov, AM Chomutov, Inv. no. 1573, Ch. 231, Index, fol. 9r.

[57] Ibidem, Index, Appendix no. 2.

[58] Comp. SOkA Most, Inv. no. 1533, Ch. 11. The Borri regiment was located in Most until the end of March.

[59] Prameny V., p. 356. The Division of Quarters (Apartments). Apparently, this is an allusion of the destruction of the city by the Lamboy regime after the Cheb events in February 1634.

[60] Prameny V., p. 364.

[61] Ibidem, pp. 364–365. From northwestern Bohemia, this town became probably the only one.

the town of Louny could continue to offer comfortable accommodation to senior officers or support their diplomatic negotiations. Economically, however, these cities were completely at rock bottom.[62]

War contributions as a means of solving the material and financial security of the armies influenced, to a great extent, the life of the whole city and its surroundings. Obtaining requisitions could take place on the basis of the Commander's orders under the threat of sanctions, or the worst scenario, in the form of looting. The financial demands were a decisive part of the city budget, which frequently led to impoverishment and indebtedness. After all, even after the end of the war, an astronomical sum of 500,000 zl. per year was returned to the army.[63] In 1651, Ulrich Sezim Skuhrovsky of Skuhrov, Vice-Chamberlain, refers to 19 free cities, whose total debt was 11,603,435 zl. The most indebted town was Most, which was expected to pay 2,292,906 zl. The town of Litomeřice receivables came to almost 865,000 zl.[64]

Nevertheless, the High Command/Headquarters may have hardly relieved the cities in northwestern Bohemia due to the constant threat from Saxony. Especially if, like Kadaň[65] or Teplice, they held strategically important points for international trails. The need to secure the northwest border of the Habsburg hereditary lands fell only after the signing of the so-called Prague Peace Treaty in May 1635, when Saxony returned to the side of the Emperor.[66] At the same time, however, in April of the same year, a co-operative agreement between France, Sweden and the Protestant princes in the Empire was signed in Compiègne, making the Thirty Years' War a definitive affair for the whole of Europe.[67]

---

[62] *Louny*, ed. B. Roedl, Prague 2005, pp. 133–149. Louny k Louny, specifically at the beginning of the war, were made use of by Albrecht of Wallenstein as a deterrent when pacifying Northwest Bohemia. At the same time, he took away a rich supply of high quality wine, which he then sold advantageously. Comp. SOkA Louny, the Archives of the Town of Louny (AM Louny), sign. I E 19 (1608–1621), pp. 287–288.

[63] J. Polišenský, *Třicetiletá válka a český národ*, Praha 1960, p. 203. However, we must bear in mind the participation of the Habsburg forces, for example in the Swedish-Polish War (1655–1660).

[64] Idem, *Třicetiletá válka a evropské krize 17. stol.*, p. 223.

[65] Commander Filip had his headquarters there.

[66] For the text of the so called Prague Peace of 1635 see Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschichte Mainz http://www.ieg-friedensvertraege.de/treaty/1635%20V%2030% 20Friedensvertrag%20von%20Prag%20(Dresden)/t-325-1-de.html?h=6 (9.09.2017).

[67] C.V. Wedgwood, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, Hamburg 2011, p. 343. The heavy defeat at Nördlingen (September 6, 1634) meant a threat to their superhuman policy for the Swedes, and this treaty meant "the journey to Canosa" for A. Oxenstiern J.-P. Findeisen, *Axel Oxenstierna. Architekt der schwedischen Grossmacht-Ära und Sieger des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Gernsbach

To assess the importance of this area in the whirl of the Thirty Years' War, we have to say that it assumes an exceptional place within the Habsburg states in Central Europe. Apart from its natural border with Saxony, it was one of the well-defendable positions before the enemy invasion the the countries of the Bohemian Crown, or subsequently before the campaign to Vienna. The local network of royal towns was an advantageous location for the retention of armies. When talking about the role of cities and large estates at that time, both of them became the economic base of the army's retention. We would hardly find a city that was not affected by the Thirty Years' War. However, only after comparing several entities – in this case, the cities of Chomutov, Kadaň and Teplice, we can attain an overview of the urban burden within the region. The cities were selected according to their location on the country trails, the course of which was subjected to a characteristic climb (gradient) on the peaks of the Ore Mountains. By interpreting the sources of urban origin, every city was completely destroyed or uninhabitable and impossible to provide the army with more 'quarters', and the like. Only after comparing the supra-regional interpretation, do we come to the conclusion that only Chomutov was in a situation of total disintegration and was for a few years waived the duty to carry out war obligations.

The result of the submitted thesis is a view of the area of northwestern Bohemia during the second half of the Thirty Years' War through individual characteristics of this. It is far from being a comprehensive and exhaustive description of the events in the defined space and time. On the contrary, places, people, and events have been chosen to illustrate the uniqueness or exclusivity of the Ore Mountains and the whole area of Podkrušnohoří (the territory at the foot of the the Ore Mountains) at that time. This examination of military history was not only aimed at the the spiritless description of warlike actions, but to study and examine everything that was in the background. It is possible to say, making use of the words of Fernando Braudel: it is necessary… "to investigate the few years of preparation, all the economic, scientific, technical, and social process of progress, so that an unexpected attack against the enemy might happen".[68]

2007, p. 323. To learn more about the course of the Battle of Nördlingen see H.O. Lund, *Dynastia wojowników. Wojny Szwecji 1611–1721*, Poznań 2015 [*Warrior dynasty: the rise and fall of Sweden as a military superpower (1611–1721)*, Philadelphia 2014], pp. 178–179; P. Englund, *Nepokojná léta…*, pp. 134–139.

[68] F. Braudel, *Morze Śródziemne*…, p. 196.

Bibliography

Böhme K.-R., *Geld für die schwedischen Armeen nach 1640*, "Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning" 1967, no. 33/1, pp. 54–95.

Braudel F., *Morze Śródziemne i świat śródziemnomorski w epoce Filipa II. Tom II.*, Gdańsk 1977 (*La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II. Vol. 2*, Paris 1949).

Dollinger P., *Dzieje Hanzy (XII–XVII wiek)*, Gdańsk 1975 *(La Hanse (XII.– XVII. siècles)*, Paris 1988).

Ďurčanský M., *Česká města a jejich správa za třicetileté války. Zemský a lokální kontext*, Praha 2014.

Englund P., *Nepokojná léta*, Praha 2000.

Findeisen J.-P., *Axel Oxenstierna. Architekt der schwedischen Grossmacht-Ära und Sieger des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Gernsbach 2007.

Hofman J., *Banérova korespondence jako pramen k válečným událostem let 1639 a 1640*, in: V. Prchal, *Mezi Martem a Memorií. Sources of a personal nature to military history*, 16th–19th centuries, Pardubice 2011.

Honc J., *Problémy studia mezd a cen chlebového obilí v 17. a 18. století*, "Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Studia Historica" 1997, no. XVII.

Hrubá M., *Prominentní emigrant Vilém Vchynský (Kinský) a jeho majetek v severozápadních Čechách*, in: *Víra nebo Vlast? Faith or Homeland? Exile in the Czech History of Early*

Jahnel K., *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg in Aussig und Umgebung*, Prag 1903.

Jančárek P., *Česko-saská hranice v Krušných horách do třicetileté války*, in: *Čechy a Sasko v proměnách dějiny*, ed. K. Kaiserová, Ústí nad Labem 1993.

Kilián J., *Města, třicetiletá válka a středoevropská historiografie uplynulého čtvrtstoletí*, "Documenta Pragensia" 2013, no. XXXII/2, pp. 125–138.

Kilián J., *Město ve válce, válka ve městě. Mělník 1618–1648*, České Budějovice 2008

Klápště J., *Raně středověké Mostecko a síť dálkových tras*, "Archeologické rozhledy" 1985, no. 37.

Křivka J., *Ceny obilí a luštěnin v Kadani, Lounech, Úštěku a Podbořanech v letech 1712–1792*, "Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Studia Historica" 1997, no. XVII.

Květ R., *Atlas starých stezek*, Brno 2017.

Langer H., *Hortus Bellicus. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg. Eine Kulturgeschichte*, Leipzig 1978.

Louny, ed. B. Roedl, Prague 2005.

Lund H.O., *Dynastia wojowników. Wojny Szwecji 1611–1721*, Poznań 2015 [*Warrior dynasty: the rise and fall of Sweden as a military superpower (1611–1721)*, Philadelphia 2014].

Maroń J., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Śląsku. Aspekty militarne*, Wrocław–Racibórz 2008.

Matoušek V., Hrnčiřík P., Šámal Z., *Rozvadov 1621. Výzkum bojiště třicetileté války/Research of a Battlefield of the Thirty Years' War*, České Budějovice 2018.

Matoušek V., *Třebel. Obraz krajiny s bitvou*, Praha 2006.

Matoušek V., *Třebel 1647: A Battlefield of the Thirty Years' War from the Perspective of History, Archeology, Art-history, Geoinformatics, and Ethnology*, Prague 2017.

Města a šlechta ve středověku a raném novověku. Výbor statí Václava Ledvinky, ed. K. Jíšová, "Documenta Pragensia" 2016, Supplementa VII.

Mistra Pavla Stránského ze Zápské Stránky popravené a rozmnožené vypsání vší obce Království českého. Respublica Bojema, ed. E. Tonner, Praha 1893.

Modern Times, ed. M. Hrubá, Ústí nad Labem 2001.

Parker G., *Global Crisis. War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeeth Century*, Yale 2013.

Parker G., *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road 1567–1659*, Cambridge 1972.

Pekař J., *Kniha o Kosti*, Praha 1970.

Perjés G., *Upadek średniowiecznego królestwa Węgier: Mohacz 1526 – Buda 1541*, Oświęcim 2014 (*The fall of the medieval kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526 – Buda 1541*, Columbia 1989).

Podruczny G., *Militarna rola rzeki Odry w okresie nowożytnym, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem odcinka między Głogowem a Wrocławiem*, in: *Odra – warunki naturalne rzeki i jej kształtowanie przez człowieka*, Prochowice 2015, pp. 33–44.

Polišenský J., *Třicetiletá válka a český národ*, Praha 1960.

Prameny k dějinám třicetileté války V., (Ed. V. Líva), Praha 1954.

Prameny k dějinám třicetiletá války VI., (Ed. V. Líva), Praha 1955.

Salm H., *Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650*, Münster 1990.

Sterneck T., *Město, válka, daně. Brno v moravském berním systému za dlouhé války s Vysokou Portou (1593–1606)*, Praha 2008.

Sörensson P., *Ekonomi och krigförig under Gustaf II. Adolfs tyska fältåg 1630–1632*, "Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning" 1932, no. 5/2.

Tekiela Ł., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Górnych Łużycach. Aspekty Militarne*, Racibórz 2010.

Umlauft F.J., *Geschichte der Deutschen Stadt Aussig*, Bayreuth 1960.

Umlauft F.J., *Vom Dreißigjährigen kriege bis zum Jahre 1850*, "Heimatkunde des Bezirkes Aussig" 1931, no. 3.

Veselý M., *Vojenské dějiny Ústecka*, Ústí nad Labem 2003.

Wedgwood C.V., *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, Hamburg 2011.

Winnige N., *Wirtschaften im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Das Beispiel Göttingen*, in: *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrope. Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe*, eds. B. von Krusenstjern, H. Medick, Göttingen 1999.

Zábranský V., *Česko-saská hranice a její mapování v raném novověku*, "Acta Universitatis Purkynianae Facultatis Philosophicae. Studia Historica" 2015, no. XVI.

Rola militarna Rudaw podczas wojny trzydziestoletniej

Abstrakt

Rudawy Czeskie były obszarem, na którym w pełni zastosowano wczesną nowoczesną logistykę wojenną. Zebrane składki podlegały ścisłemu nadzorowi i inwentaryzacjom ze strony miasta lub urzędników państwowych, na co istnieją dowody w postaci dokumentów wytwarzanych przez rozbudowywaną biurokrację wczesnego nowoczesnego państwa. W tym czasie Rudawy, jako łącznik między Saksonią a Czechami, ponosiły obciążenie wojenne w znacznym stopniu.

Military Role of the Ore Mountains in Thirty Years' War

Abstract

Therefore, the Czech Ore Mountains, represented an area where means of early modern wartime logistics had been fully applied. The collected contributions were subject to strict supervision and inventory on the side of the city or state officials, for which the documentary evidence is provided by the increasing bureaucratization of the early modern state. At that time the Ore Mountains as a link between Saxony and Bohemia were carrying a considerable (definitely not negligeable) degree of the war load.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-06

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Daniel Wojtucki
ORCID: 0000-0002-8539-4410
University of Wrocław, Faculty of Historical and Pedagogical Sciences
e-mail: daniel.wojtucki@uwr.edu.pl

Criminal activity in Silesia during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). Contribution to the research

Keywords: crime, Silesia, Thirty Years' War, executioner, theft, murder, homicide, soldiers, looting, conflict, 17th century, serial killers, witchcraft, posthumous magic, gallows, execution

Słowa kluczowe: przestępczość, Śląsk, wojna trzydziestoletnia, kat, kradzież, zabójstwo, morderstwo, żołnierze, grabież, konflikt, wiek XVII, seryjni mordercy, czary, magia posthuma, szubienica, egzekucja

The conflict, which was the Thirty Years' War, is not only about campaigns, battles, sieges, or commanders – the leading figures in those military activities. It is also human maltreatment: poverty, hunger, death, and thus simply everyday life of the inhabitants of the cities, towns and villages affected by military actions. For them any soldiers, mercenaries or ordinary bandits were just sorrow and a big threat. We have very realistic descriptions of these events, written down by eyewitnesses. The Baroque novelist Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen describes one of the attacks on a village as such: "Here they started first, taking out flints from guns, peasants' fingers to screw them in, and torture such unfortunate guys as if they were burning witches. That's how they put one of the captured peasants into the bread oven and set the fire, although he hasn't testified anything

yet. Another person on his head was stabbed, they clenched him so tightly that the blood was gushing out of his mouth, nose and ears. In summary, each peasant was tortured with their own invention and also each peasant had an individual unique torture". Another time: "They treated our girl in such a way that she could not leave the stable on her own anymore, which is a shame to mention. The farmhand, having him tied up on the ground, was put a peg in his mouth and they poured a cow-milking bucket full of liquid manure into his belly. They called it a 'Swedish drink', but he didn't like it at all and made strange grimaces".[1]

It can be assumed that every war created people from the society's bottom, and demobilization meant no future for the people who were used to fighting and robbing. They were inclined to continue the activities they have been engaged in so far, but already outside the ranks of the military units. During the wars, masses of various marauders and mercenaries 'shadowed' the armies and sometimes they were absorbed into the ranks of the army they were following. People of the margin as well as organized groups were used in more or less open civil and private wars.[2] Consequently, their members undoubtedly knew their combat profession inside out, often changing the formations in which they served during various conflicts.[3] In time of peace, they became mostly unnecessary human beings, often unable to find themselves in the post-war reality. A good example could be the Landsknechts who, after leaving the army, fell to the level of a dependent social class, often without a source of subsistence allowing them to live, wandering around looking for any kind of occupation, often illegal.[4]

Only based on the example of large cities in Silesia at that time, i.e. Legnica or partially Wrocław and Świdnica, can we learn about the scale of the phenomenon of common crime at that time, committed by both soldiers and civilians. For the first of the centres, criminal records have been preserved to this day, and

[1] R. Fukala, *Dramat Europy. Wojna trzydziestoletnia (1618–1648) a kraje korony czeskiej*, Wrocław 2015, p. 375.

[2] J. Maroń, *Wojsko jako grupa przestępcza w XVII w.*, in*: Przestępczość kryminalna w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, ed. P. Klint, D. Wojtucki, Łódź–Wrocław 2017, pp. 108–109.

[3] M. Kamler, *Złoczyńcy. Przestępczość w Koronie w drugiej połowie XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku (w świetle ksiąg sądowych miejskich)*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 102–103.

[4] E. Kizik, *Kolorowy ubiór kata. Przyczynek do ikonografii odzieży na przełomie XV i XVI w.*, "Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza" 2008, no. 14, p. 202.

cover the period of history we are interested in.[5] In the case of Wrocław, we have a copy of the book of proscribed persons for the years 1609–1634, therefore we only have data from several years for the discussed armed conflict.[6] In turn, an interesting work of the then historian survived for Świdnica, one of whose chapters was devoted to crime in the town and its surroundings. However, it does not cover the entire period of the Thirty Years' War, but only a period between its outbreak in 1618 and the year 1632.[7] We still have data from the "black book" of the city of Opava, but the preserved volume covers the period only since 1643 until the conflict ended in 1648.[8] For comparison, we can also refer to the research for Leipzig[9] and the neighbouring Moravian cities.[10] Even more, the available source base there covers the whole period of the Thirty Years' War, which allows accurate conclusions and findings to be made. In Leipzig, according to research by Bernd Rüdiger, crime involving soldiers during the war increased to 50% between 1618 and 1648, and significantly in 1631.[11] Therefore, in the case of the murders, the typical profile of the perpetrator was primarily a soldier.[12] Criminals from this professional group were also accused of the majority of rapes in the city, which resulted in the victims becoming pregnant.[13] As a result, women decided to remove (to procure an abortion) the foetus or even commit infanticide, immediately after the birth of the offspring. Both acts were treated as murder and punished with all

[5] Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu (hereinafter only APWr.), Oddział w Legnicy, Akta miasta Legnicy (okres przedpruski), sygn. 466–468, *Criminalia*.

[6] APWr., Zbiór Klosego (hereinafter only ZK), ref. 58, *Auszüge aus dem liber proscriptorum 1609–1634*; D. Wojtucki, *Przestępczość kryminalna we Wrocławiu na podstawie liber proscriptorum z lat 1609–1634*, in: *Przestępczość kryminalna w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, eds. P. Klint, D. Wojtucki, Łódź–Wrocław 2017, pp. 74–93.

[7] Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie, Oddział Rękopisów, sygn. Akc. 7234, *Annales ex libro cujusdam Lutherani Manuscripto, qui et in Collegio Schwidnicensi asservat excerpta a Tobia Kliman socio Procuratonis ao. 1683*, pp. 899–908.

[8] Státní okresní archiv Opava, Archiv města Opava, sygn. 225, *Smolná kniha opavská (Gut und peinliche Aussagen sambt den Urtheillen).*

[9] B. Rüdiger, *Kriminalität während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in Leipzig. Ein Sonderfall innerstädtischer Kommunikation*, in: *Die Stadt als Kommunikationsraum. Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. H. Bräuer, E. Schlenkrich, Leipzig 2001, pp. 609–632.

[10] F. Matějek, *Škoda způsobené na Moravě řáděním vojáků za třicetileté války*, "Časopis Matice moravské" 1994, no. 113, pp. 83–94.

[11] B. Rüdiger, *Kriminalität während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in Leipzig…*, p. 623.

[12] Ibidem, p. 625.

[13] Ibidem, p. 627.

the severity of the law of the time. Women were mostly buried alive, sometimes after previous decapitation or drowned in a river or another reservoir. The scale of this type of crime is difficult to estimate due to the lack of sources. Here you can use a list drawn up on the basis of the chronicles of the city of Lwówek Śląski. If we assume that their evidence is credible, then infant mortality at the hands of their mothers indeed increased. The historians of this centre noted as many as six cases of such crimes in 20 years (1619 – two cases, 1620, 1623, 1629, 1639).[14]

In the discussed period, the act of murder was distinguished from conscious and premeditated murder, hence the term *Todschlag* was used in the criminal codes of the time. *Murder*, on the other hand, was considered a premeditated act, for which no excuse should be sought. Illegal deprivation of another person's life is quite commonly referred to as *homicide*. Due to guilt, there was a difference between intentional murder (*homicidium voluntarium et ex proposito*) and unintentional (accidental), committed against the will of the perpetrator (*homicidium causale*).[15] However, committing an offence unintentionally, by accident, did not release the offender from criminal responsibility before the competent judicial authority, but only reduced it. The Criminal Code of Emperor Charles V, then in force but adopted earlier at the Reich Parliament in Regensburg in 1532, stated, among other things, in Article 137, that: 'Any murderer or man-slaughterer who can't legally apologize for that has ruined a life'.[16]

The unrest during the period of the armed conflict in the years 1618–1648 also brought about the people's actions against their authorities, as it happened at the end of 1620 in Chełmsk Śląski. At that time the abbot from Krzeszów, Martin Clave, was killed, which was due to the culmination of the tension between the inhabitants and the monastery.[17] During other riots, executioners were also killed, such as master Andreas Thienel in Wrocław in autumn 1626.[18] Also in Glogow in

[14] J.G. Bergemann, *Historisch-Topographische Beschreibung der Kreis-Stadt Löwenberg und Umgegend. Aus Urkunden, Acten, Chroniken und Handschriften gesammelt*, Hirschberg 1824. For a table showing the convicted person's personal details and dates of execution, see: D. Wojtucki, *Publiczne miejsca straceń na Dolnym Śląsku od XV do połowy XIX wieku*, Katowice 2009, p. 358.

[15] W. Uruszczak, *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego. Tom I (966–1795)*, Warszawa 2010, p. 381.

[16] *Die Peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V und des Heiligen Römischen Reiches von 1532 (Carolina)*, ed. F.Ch. Schroeder, Stuttgart 2000, p. 85.

[17] N. von Lutterotti, *Die Ermordung des Abtes Martin Clave von Grüssau nach gerichtlichen Akten*, "Schlesisches Pastoralblatt" 1922, no. 5/6, Jg. 43, pp. 37–40; P. Wiszewski, *Świat na pograniczu. Dzieje Lubawki i okolic do 1810 r.*, Wrocław 2015, pp. 150–155.

[18] D. Wojtucki, *Przestępczość kryminalna we Wrocławiu…*, pp. 77–78.

June 1629, during the riots in this town, executioner Heinrich Thienel, son of Legnica's master Martin Thienel, lost his life. His funeral took place in Legnica, and a record of these events can be found in the metric books.[19] In Opava, on the other hand, in 1634, the participants of the Freiberger rebellion were punished. For this purpose, wooden gallows were erected in the Upper Square. The Innkeeper was the first to hang on it and acted as a forewarning. At the end of March another execution was planned, this time the convicts were four townsmen. They were to play cards or dice for their fate under the gallows where the innkeeper's corpse was still hanging.[20]



Figure 1. Playing cards the gallows
The author's own collection.

Theft was the most common crime in modern penal systems, for which criminal sanctions were imposed from the most serious ones – the death penalty, corporal punishment, release, to financial compensation and working in chains for the local community. This is also confirmed by research in other European

[19] APWr., Oddział in Legnica, Kościół Mariacki w Legnicy, no. 47, p. 691.

[20] R. Fukala, *Dramat Europy…*, pp. 281–282.

cities, e.g. in the Republic of Poland, such as Kraków, Lublin, Lviv and Poznań.[21] *Carolina's* Criminal Code of 1532 differentiated in its paragraphs between the so-called "hidden, undisclosed and open theft" when, as we read – [a thief] *ehe und er an sein gewarsam kompt, betretten würd, oder eyn geschrey oder nacheyl machte*[22] (realised before and he would come to his senses, or he would enter, or he would make a cry, or he would make a posthumous cry).

In addition, if the seizure of someone else's property was carried out using weapons or direct coercion (violence), then this tort was treated as a robbery. The use of a weapon could already bear the hallmarks of an attempted murder, an act particularly predominant in its nature than simple theft. Therefore, the use of a dangerous tool required that the deed was qualified differently to a mere appropriation of someone else's property.[23] The legislation of that time also knew the division of theft into so-called large and small. The size of the resulting damage was determined by the value of the stolen item.

The thieves' spoils, which can be deduced from their testimonies, were all that had any material value and were left without proper supervision. The real scourge was the small, often accidental, theft that occurred on the occasion. For instance, the disappearance of everyday objects such as: agricultural tools and removable home furnishings, money and valuables, textiles, clothing elements and animals of all kinds. The latter were often killed on the spot and consumed or sold for small amounts of meat and hides. Individual thieves or specialized criminal gangs were mainly interested in property belonging to private individuals, but they did not despise public or church property either. Theft was classified as a breach of public order and prosecuted 'ex officio' because it undermined fundamental cultural norms, acting against the fundamental principle of public trust and respect for others' property.[24]

Thanks to the testimonies recorded, for example, in a copy of Wrocław's *liber proscriptorum* from the years 1609–1634, we can trace the techniques and objects that were used in the course of criminal activity. The seizure of someone

[21] M. Kamler, *Złoczyńcy. Przestępczość w Koronie*, p. 57; A. Karpiński, *Przestępczość we Lwowie w końcu XVI i w XVII wieku*, "Przegląd Historyczny" 1996, no. 4 (87), p. 758.

[22] E. Lindgen, *Die Breslauer Strafrechtspflege unter der Carolina und der Gemeinen Strafrechtswissenschaft bis zum Inkrafttreten der Josephina von 1708*, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Breslau" 1939, no. 8, p. 149.

[23] D. Kaczor, *Przestępczość kryminalna i wymiar sprawiedliwości w Gdańsku w XVI–XVIII wieku*, Gdańsk 2005, pp. 37–38.

[24] Ibidem, p. 38.

else's property required appropriate, often sophisticated procedures. In the case of houses made in the form of chessboard, the defects in their fragile structural elements were used, making holes in the walls, breaking doors or windows. Interesting was the case of an amateur with an axe who "drei Jahr lang" (for three years) was doing this – he would make a hole in the wall to seize people's treasures, and it was only in 1626 that the noose stopped this activity forever. He actually specialized in making holes in walls or roofs of robbed houses. The list of his disgraceful accomplishments is very impressive and several pages long.[25] This criminal, born in Proszkowice near Kąty Wrocławskie, stole grain, tools, animals, money, practically everything that had some value and found in robbed houses.[26] The jurors assessed his activity as extremely harmful and therefore he was sentenced to be hanged *Obristen Galgen*, on 29 January of the aforementioned year, on the upper beam of the gallows in Wrocław.[27] Occasional thieves usually treated their profession as an opportunity to temporarily get rich or satisfy their current needs, including their difficult financial situation. Therefore, most often, shortly after the crime was committed, they liquidated, sometimes for nothing, all the stolen items, and the money thus obtained was quickly consumed by them or lost in various games. Nevertheless, according to the analysis of *liber proscriptorum* in the thieving trade, there were people who treated their 'living' professionally, trying to obliterate the traces of the crime or to remove the suspicion of the exact origin of the items or animals offered for sale. The first of them, a man named Martin Nickische, a former soldier who was executed in the capital of Lower Silesia in 1621, testified that in order to cover up the origin of the offered animals, he exchanged the stolen horses for other, worse ones and only then sold them.[28] He performed his activities in various towns in Silesia or Kłodzko region, often far away from each other, in order to confuse the justice system officers. For example, this thief, who stole two mares from the field two years earlier in the night, exchanged them for one by collecting an additional seven thalers. He exchanged the obtained animal for a horse again in some village, and it was only near Strzegom that he decided to sell it for 12 thalers.[29] Analyzing his testimony we can point out some more examples of this type of practice. Similarly, Martin Zobel,

[25] APWr., ZK, ref. 58, pp. 102–105.

[26] Ibidem.

[27] Ibidem, p. 105.

[28] Ibidem, p. 85.

[29] Ibidem.

a specialist in horse theft, who was hung from the higher bar of the Wrocław gallows on 18 June 1626, was active together with his companions.[30] It should be noted that the theft of horses or cattle was considered a serious crime, especially considering their significant value, which qualified it to punish a given offender more severely, according to the so-called large theft as discussed above.[31] Among the people who are involved in the thieving facade, we will find real professionals who have been doing this for several years. For example, a thief hung in August 1624 has been stealing for six years.[32] Another captured and judged a year later, he testified that he had been involved in thefts for four years.[33] In November 1631, a thief was hanged, as it was publicly announced, on the newly renovated gallows in Wrocław, as he was "stealing and playing with the justice system for too long".[34] It is not uncommon for thieves to join forces and form multi-person gangs in a given area, sometimes not satisfied with the "hidden" theft itself, and even practicing vicious violence against the victims. Thus, one was dealing there with organized crime, treating gangs as criminal associations, stating that the responsibility of the leader as well as other members of the gang was the same.[35] Surprisingly, often women played their roles in these criminal relationships.

Particularly negatively perceived in legal terms were all those types of thefts committed by employed servants or journeymen to their employers and also thefts in churches. Condemned especially in both cases, because it was about the significance of the place they were done. Although in the second case the church robbery was not qualified as sacrilege. On 27 April 1623 *Johann* Regius *was cut down on a stone scaffold in front of the Świdnica Gate in Wrocław* for stealing a case in the Salwator church in Wygon Świdnicki Street five years before. He also robbed the temple of Mary Magdalene three times making a lot of damage last time. In addition, a woman and a man were wounded by stones in the back and head.[36]

[30] Ibidem, p. 109.

[31] Ibidem, p. 48.

[32] Ibidem, p. 96.

[33] Ibidem, p. 98.

[34] Ibidem, pp. 134–135.

[35] D. Janicka, *Prawo karne w trzech rewizjach prawa chełmińskiego z XVI wieku*, Toruń 1992, p. 115.

[36] APWr., ZK, ref. 58, pp. 91–92.

During or just after the Thirty Years' War, we also observe an increase in persecution of people who were accused of harmful magic, i.e. witches and sorcerers.[37] This applied to both the living as well as to those who were not exposed during their lifetime, and their sinister activity only revealed itself after their death (the so-called posthumous magic). During the conflict, the main centres where witchcraft trials took place were Nysa and surrounding towns such as Jeseník and Zlaté Hory. The scale of the trials in Nysa required the authorities of this important bishop's centre to employ a special person who was to execute these sentences. Exclusive in this respect was the Nysa executioner Georg Hilldebrand, who entered into monopoly contracts with the authorities of the surrounding towns. The scale of persecution was large, so the usual stakes that were built on the execution site were no longer sufficient. The Nysa's authorities went further and ordered a special furnace (*Hexenoffen* or *Feuerofen*) to be built to burn people accused of witchcraft alive on a massive scale. In a preserved document from 1639, which is actually the only reliable trace of this sinister investment, we read about the need to erect such a device.[38] It was to stand on the execution site between the gallows and the scaffold (Rabenstein, Köpfhaus) in front of the Customs Gate on the road to Prudnik.

Apart from the living, accusations of sinister, posthumous activity were also made against the dead (*magia posthuma*). Already before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, concerns about the deceased in Silesia, e.g. Podgórzyn (1614) and neighbouring areas (especially Moravia) intensified.[39] In 1617/18 in the towns of Ivančice (German: Eibenschütz) and Česká Lípa (German: Böhmisch Leipa), chroniclers noted the activity of the so-called *Nachzehrer*, which in free translation means "devourer". He was the type of the deceased who did not have to leave the grave to draw energy from the living. In the case of the latter, a woman was

[37] An increase in persecution can also be observed in neighbouring Moravia, where between 1618 and 1648 more than 20 trials of people accused of harmful magic and witchcraft took place in various centres, see K. Rojčíková, *Čarodějnické processions na Moravě do 1648*, "Časopis Matice Moravské" 2001, no. 120, pp. 187–207 (especially the table on pages 202–204).

[38] The State Archive in Wrocław keeps documents showing the attitude of craftsmen who were forced to build a witch burning furnace, APWr., Akta księstwa nyskiego, sygn. 375, *Acta miscell. Concerning the punishment of witchcraft and of dealing with the evil enemy, different persons of both sexes, also children in different places, as well as the proceedings against them and finally, execution of some of them by the furnace of fire 1639–1715*, pp. 9–10, 17–18.

[39] On the subject of "posthumous magic" in Silesia and Moravia during the Thirty Years' War see D. Wojtucki, *Der Glaube an die "magic posthuma" in Schlesien und Mähren zur Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges (1618–1648)*, "Bohemiae Occidentalis Historica", no. 2, 2019, pp. 189–201.

accused of *magia posthuma*, who had already been lying in her grave for three quarters. The woman devoured all the clothes in which she was buried and her own body. This case is unique in that, usually, after digging up the grave and opening the lid of the coffin, the representatives of the local court set the corpse up without any signs of decomposition, which was to be the crowning evidence of the posthumous activity of such a deceased and the transformation into a 'living corpse'. (harmful deceased). Most often this gruesome consumption in the grave was described as "schamtzende Tod", and some chroniclers were even more precise about the noises made by the deceased from the grave – "smacking like a sow" (*wie eine Sau geschmatzet*).[40] This specific group of the dead was considered particularly dangerous. On the other hand, it is closest to the contemporary image of a "vampire" who has not yet specialized in sucking the blood of the living. According to the beliefs of the time, the dead did not have to leave their graves to harm the living. Their activity was extremely dangerous because it was thought that by smacking or devouring parts of their wardrobe in the grave they could lead to the death of other living people.

In neighbouring Moravia, mainly in the centres north of Olomouc, this phenomenon intensified already on the eve of the conflict and was not solved during the conflict. Precise information about these events is mainly provided by accounting books and public registers. We are particularly interested in the chronology of the expenditure and revenue records of the town of Moravský Beroun from 1629 and 1635. In the first case, it is known that in 1629 more than 44 thalers were spent on the disposal (combustion) of three 'phantoms' – *Von beseitschaffung der 3 alter gespenst*. Of which more than 30 thalers were used for executioner's services, his boarding and tip[41]. The record is interesting because the purpose of "execution" by cremation of these three corpses, previously dragged out of the cemetery through a hole in the wall, made especially for this purpose, was to put up some special wooden gallows on which they were hung, and then the whole construction itself was covered with wood and burned with them. The cost of its erection was also given and amounted to over 5 thalers.[42]

[40] M. Ranft, *Tractat von dem Kauen und Schmatzen der Todten in Gräbern, Worin die wahre Beschaffenheit derer Hungarischen Vampyrs und Blut-Sauger gezeigt, auch alle von dieser Materie bißher zum Vorschein gekommene Schrifften recensiret werden*, Leipzig 1734.

[41] Státní okresní archiv Bruntál se sídlem v Krnově, Archiv města Moravský Beroun, sygn. 490, *Kniha ročních účtů města 1620–1632*, no page numbers.

[42] Of erection of a new gallows, so well burning 3 old ones etc. Ibidem.

In Silesia, the number of legal instructions to Wrocław jurors concerning *magia posthuma* also increased. The increased activity of the Wrocław Court of Appeal in cases rising from the grave of the deceased was noted in years: 1632, 1641 (two cases), 1644.[43] The Wrocław jurors considered several cases of the "revivers". The preserved entries in the court books only describe the content of a given case, its dating, but unfortunately no information about the town that asked for legal advice in this specific case was included. The documents stress that the deceased were good Christians, as confirmed by witnesses of *Christenthum leben undt wandel verhalten*. It was all the more difficult to understand why, after their death, they turned into evil spirits, damaging the community in which they had lived so far. This was explained by the case of witchcraft (Zauberei), which they were supposed to be involved in, and this was not discovered during their lifetime, but only after their death. This was confirmed by some signs found on the bodies and in the behaviour of those who rose from the graves of the dead – *heimbliches Zeichen oder Marckmahl der Zauberey* and we don't know what happened to the suspect's corpse. Usually, on the basis of a court ruling, they were removed from the local cemetery, handed over to the executioner, who would quarter them at the border of the village and bury them there or burn them to ashes to spread them across.[44]

In Silesia, epidemics also broke out, which were often brought by soldiers from the army, for whom the area became a place of accommodation or march. Witches or gravediggers from Silesian cities (e.g. Świdnica, Góra, Lwówek Śląski) were also accused of causing some of them. Already before, the responsibility for the spread of pestilence in these areas had been shifted to this professional group. A good example could be the set of events from Ząbkowice Śląskie from 1606–1607, when trials and executions of whole families of local gravediggers took place, in total almost 20 people.[45] In Lwówek Śląski, on the other hand, in 1632 this professional group even gained a special designation as "Pestilentzischen Todten-Gräber".[46]

The Thirty Years' War "created" different kinds of criminals. The worst of them were all those who committed crimes against human life. We are not talking

[43] APWr., Akta miasta Wrocławia (Księgi), sygn. E 2.6, pp. 472r–485v.

[44] Ibidem.

[45] K. Lambrecht, *Hexenverfolgung und Zaubereiprozesse in den slesischen Territorien*, Köln–Weimar–Wien 1995, p. 372.

[46] Ibidem, p. 363.

here about an unintentional murder, mostly during emotional agitation or after drinking alcohol, but about deliberate actions aimed at profit in the form of stolen money, valuables, material goods or livestock. Apart from the above, the motives which guided the actions of such criminals were also those conditioned by beliefs and superstitions of that time. In Silesia, there were big gangs specializing in murdering pregnant women and then cutting out their hearts and their unborn children. In this way, limbs were also obtained which were to be used in further criminal activities and to ensure that their holders would have impunity in contact with officers of the justice system of the time.[47] These beliefs were already firmly established during the Thirty Years' War, and it is absolutely not uncommon that those responsible for such beastly crimes were brought to justice. An example is the process that took place in Kowary in 1644. At that time, the Wrocław jurors, who were asked for legal advice in this case, indicated in their conviction that a certain Wentzel Pode, 21-year-old son of a former prison supervisor, together with Hans Simon and Baller Simon committed *a grausamer Verbrechen*.[48] In addition to road robbery, theft and adultery, they committed 16 murders, including three pregnant women whose stomachs were ripped and foetuses cut out. Then they cut off the right hands of their unborn children, which they inundated with wax at the abandoned Silberstein Castle (now Břecštejn near Trutnov), perhaps their hiding shelter, which they were then to use for their evil purposes (crimes) – *and zur ihren Unthaten gebrauchet*.[49] The brutality of these crimes may be astonishing today, but as evidenced by chroniclers' records, they were a daily occurrence. Here we can use an example from 1643 in Prague, where an old man was executed for murdering many people, interestingly, among them there were five pregnant women.[50]

Undoubtedly, the "product" of the Thirty Years' War was Melchior Hedloff, well known in its final phase and just after it, serial killer. Captured in November 1653 and imprisoned in Oleśnica he was supposed to confess to 251 murders on

[47] D. Wojtucki, *„Pożeracze serc". Magiczne wierzenia wśród przestępców na Śląsku w XVII wieku*, "Czasy Nowożytne" 2017, no. 30, pp. 53–86.

[48] APWr., Odział w Jeleniej Górze, Akta miasta Kowar, sygn. 16, *Sprawy karne dotyczące sądu gardłowego 1644–1724*, pp. 22–23.

[49] Ibidem, p. 22.

[50] M. Zeiller, *Handbuch Von allerley useflichen Erinnerungen, anmüentigen und lustigen, eraufbaulichen, Denckwürdigen, und meistentheils Neüen Exempeln oder Beyspielen; auch viele verwunderlichen der Natur- und Kunst-Sachen, [et]c.: zu täglichem Gebrauch und unterdrache in gewiese Titel und Stellen eingetheilt*, Ulm 1655, p. 508.

torture. He was born in Kuźnica Kącka near Międzybórz in 1606. When he was less than 16 years old, he worked for his father burning charcoal, which he used to drive to Wrocław.[51] However, his new job did not bring him much satisfaction, or above all, a satisfactory income. Also, the severity of the father, as well as his debts, undoubtedly caused frustration for the future multiple murderer who decided to leave the family home. He took up poaching as well as found his place on one side of the army in the ongoing conflict of the Thirty Years' War. We don't know much about the military service of this murderer. It is said that already in the so-called Swedish period of the Thirty Years' War, Hedloff murdered an unknown scout and reiter, taking a horse, some pistol and clothes.[52] The chroniclers provide general information in this respect, focusing only on the cruel crimes of Hedloff and his gang.[53] Among them, he is known under the term "Shooter Melchior" (German: 'Melchior der Schütz', 'Melchior den Schützen' or 'Schütze Melcher'). Activities aimed at capturing Hedloff were also undertaken by Duke Sylwiusz Wirtemberski (1622–1664), the first master in Oleśnica from this dynasty. He ordered his subordinates to organize armed patrols to track down and capture the killer and his comrades. However, the felon and his gang knew the surrounding forests perfectly well, which provided them with very effective shelter, and for this reason the task the patrols were entrusted with proved difficult to accomplish.[54] Melchior Hedloff was not captured until 2 November 1653, probably in the

[51] T. Ratsch, *Geschichte des Dorfes Luzine im Kreis Trebnitz mit Aufzeichnungen über die Luziner Mordgrube und die Nachbarorte Lückerwitz, Zantkau, Mankerwitz und Probotschütz ferner etwas über Juliusburg, Strehlitz, Gutwohne und Oels*, Trebnitz 1910, pp. 37–38.

[52] E.W. Happel, *Grösseste Denkwürdigkeiten der Welt oder so genandte Relationes curiosae: worinne fürgestellt u. angeführet werden d. merckwürdigste Historien u. Geschichte d. vorigen u. jetzigen Zeiten welche sich auff diesem grossen Schau-Platze d. Welt zugetragen*, Hamburg 1691, p. 92.

[53] A structured criminal group should be composed of at least three persons united by a common objective, which is the occasional or continuous commission of offences. The purpose of committing a crime may be permanent or depend on the occasion. No permanent group membership is required; its members can commit crimes in different personal arrangements. They must only be united by a common willingness to commit a crime, as well as a willingness to act for the benefit of the group in such a way as to facilitate the commission of a crime, while the higher form is "a relationship aimed at committing a crime", as "the features" of a "relationship" in the criminal law context are permanent organisational forms, recognised management and specific discipline of the members", see Z. Ćwiąkalski, *Komentarz do art. 258 i 239 Kodeksu karnego*, in: *Kodeks karny – część szczególna. Komentarz do art. 117–277 Kodeksu karnego*, ed. A. Zoll, Kraków 1999, p. 929.

[54] R. Schück, *Ein schlesischer Räuber aus dem 17. Jahrhundert*, "Schlesische Provinzialblätter N.F." 1867, no. 6, p. 39.

village of Łąkta, located between Rawicz and Sułów, on the border of Silesia and Wielkopolska.[55] However, his wife Anna and his eldest daughter had previously been arrested, the latter allegedly surrendered voluntarily to the judiciary for fear of her unpredictable father.[56] The criminal was transported to Olesnica, where he was subjected to intensive torture. On the ordeals that followed, on 20 November 1653, he confessed to 27 murders, 21 and 22 November to 50, 24 November to another 36, 1 December mentioned another 37, 2 December to another 7 and later still 89 murders. Even more, he was also to kill three more of his comrades and his own child. In total, he took the lives of over 251 people including: 100 Poles, six Jews, ten women (probably all of them pregnant), five noblemen, craftsmen, peasants, merchants, traders, and others. It is said that within 1.5 years only until he was captured in 1653 he was supposed to murder 89 people.[57]



Figure 2. Melchior Hedloff – printed copy

From the collection of the University Library in Wrocław, Graphic Collections Division.

[55] E.W. Happel, *Everh. Gv. Happelii Historia Moderna Europae, Oder eine Historische Beschreibung Deß Heutigen Europae: Welche zum Anfang und Fundament hat den Münsterischen Frieden-Schluß, und von dar an fortfähret, Unpartheyisch zu beschreiben, dieses Letztere Semi-Seculum Mirabile*, Ulm 1692, p. 266; T. Ratsch, *Geschichte des Dorfes Luzine*…, p. 37; R. Schück, *Ein schlesischer Räuber.*…, p. 39.

[56] R. Schück, *Ein schlesischer Räuber.*…, p. 39.

[57] J. Sinapius, *Olsnographiae, Oder Beschreibung Des Oelßnischen Fürstenthums In Nieder-Schlesien. Andrer Theil*, Leipzig 1706, pp. 351–352.

According to the figures given above, Hedloff usually murdered random travellers and then robbed the money, goods or any valuables found with them. Horses prevailed among the stolen property. Due to their market value, quick sales, even a relatively low amount, yielded considerable income. Of course, he searched his victims to find cash with them. However, it usually found small sums, in actual amounts not exceeding a few thalers, although there were also higher sums of several or several dozen thalers each. Then all kinds of weapons – rapiers, pistols, muskets – were in his circle of interest. Melchior Hedloff also appreciated any type of clothing, appropriating everything the victims had on or with them. It is not known what exactly and what quality these clothes were, because only in one case during the interrogation he was to testify that after the murder of two people he did not find any money but only good clothes (*gute Kleider*).[58] He usually shared the property he had acquired through robbery, as well as the money he had obtained from sales, among his companions. The part of the loot was probably below its real value, and the money received was spent mainly on food and alcohol. Melchior Hedloff's criminal activity was mainly focused on areas between the villages situated to the north and east of Oleśnica, areas with high forest cover. Based on his testimony from torture, he was very mobile. In his testimony, there are a number of places, mainly villages, and rarely towns, from which he mentioned Syców, whereby he admitted to shoot down a Pole.[59]

Some of the crimes of "Melchior's Rifleman" had a magical background and had its roots in the beliefs of the time. Once he attacked and took the life of a pregnant woman who came from Gdańsk, which he cut through and ripped the heart out of her unborn child, which he devoured immediately after.[60] The beliefs of that time, whose intensity we observe especially in the 17th century, gave the belief for all kinds of criminals of the magical properties the objects made of parts of the bodies of executed convicts had, and to add up, also of living people.[61] In addition to killing about 251 people, Melchior Hedloff allegedly robbed 45 horses and over 793 thalers, which was not a dizzying amount of money and indicates that he found rather small amounts with his victims.[62] However, it is difficult to expect

[58] E.W. Happel, *Grösseste...*, p. 93.

[59] Ibidem, p. 94 (Between pages 93–97 there is a list of people who were killed by this murderer, in what circumstances and what goods and money he found with his victims).

[60] R. Schück, *Ein schlesischer Räuber.*…, p. 40.

[61] D. Wojtucki, *„Pożeracze serc"*…, pp. 53–86.

[62] R. Schück, *Ein schlesischer Räuber.*…, p. 40.

Hedloff to remember all his crimes in detail, especially the amount and type of things he found on his victims. Nevertheless, the chroniclers, listing his cruel achievements, scrupulously stated where and who he deprived of his/her life, as well as what and in what amount he found with the people he killed. It is difficult to expect that "Shooter Melchior" would keep any detailed records, and the data on which the historians based their calculations came directly from the records from the interrogations of this criminal, which were carried out using tortures, therefore their accuracy may vary.



Eine warhafftige vnd erschreckliche
Newe Zeitung von dem grossen
Mörder
Melcher Hedloff/
Sonst Schütze-Melcher genannt/von
Käntnchen auß Medzibortischer Herrschafft
bürtig/ welcher 251. Mordthaten begangen.
Auch wie er in der Fürstlichen Stadt Oelse den 19.
Jan. dieses 1654 Jahrs seiner Arbeit nach/
den Lohn empfangen.
A D
BIBL. UNIV.
MONAC.

Figure 3. The title page of an ephemeral print published in 1654 showing Melchior Hedloff and his criminal activities
From the collection of the University Library in Wrocław, Old Printing Department.

The execution of the offender was planned for January 1654 in order to bring the tired criminal to a stable physical condition on the one hand, and on the other hand to have time to prepare meticulously for the so awaited execution, which was

to take place in Oleśnica. It is said that Melchior Hedloff only asked for new pants and a deadly shirt (*Sterbe Kittel*)[63] before executing him.



Figure 4. The title page of an ephemeral print issued in 1654, showing Hedloff's death in Oleśnica in January 1654 and documenting his criminal activity

From the collection of the University Library in Wrocław, Old Printing Department.

A remembrance of Hedloff's criminal activity, which has survived to this day, is the arquebus from the mid-17th century, currently stored in the collection of the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw. The weapon is carefully crafted, bears the traces of intensive use and numerous repairs. It is characteristic for her that a metal badge has been attached to it with an inscription commemorating Melchior's crimes, as well as his silhouette. Additionally, there are incisions on this weapon, which are to indicate the number of victims of this murderer deprived of

[63] Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu (hereinafter only BUWr.), Oddział Rękopisów, sygn. Akc. 1948/577, A. Frencelius, *Annalium Urbis Lusatiae Super Gorlicii 1717*, p. 621.

their lives by this very weapon.[64] It is known that Hedloff used two arquebuses and a Turkish sabre at different times.[65]

Hedloff's terrifying, even for those times, activities made this character known in various European countries. There were a few leaflets in connection with the murder of the criminal and members of his gang.[66] In addition, a painting depicting this multiple murderer was made, which was kept in the collection of the library of the parish of St. Bernard of Siena in Wrocław.[67] The chroniclers, who were reached by these elusive prints, willingly and meticulously quoted their content, listing the criminal achievements of Hedloff, whom they called "an abominable or cruel murderer".[68] Descriptions of Hedloff's and his people's criminal activities can also be found on the pages of the works of many Silesian chroniclers, living both in his modern times and shortly after him. Perhaps the best known of them was Johann Sinapius (1667–1725), known mainly for his two-volume chronicle, which he prepared and published in Oleśnica, concerning the history of this town and its surroundings.[69] Of course, the pages were full

[64] W. Głębowicz, *Wielkie wyobrażenie wielkiego rozbójnika Melchiora Gedlofa*, "Militaria i Fakty" 2000, no. 3, p. 49; M. Mencfel, *Książęce divertissements. Kunstkammera na zamku w Oleśnicy u schyłku XVII i w pierwszej połowie XVIII wieku*, in: *Czeska historia Śląska*, ed. W. Mrozowicz, Katowice–Oleśnica 2017, p. 334. However, the author gives an incorrect annual date of the execution of Melchior Hedloff in 1659.

[65] J. Sinapius, *Olsnographiae, Oder Beschreibung…*, p. 353.

[66] E.g. *Eine warhafftige und erschleckliche Newe Zeitung von dem grossen Mörder Melcher Hedloff / Sonst Schütze=Melcher genannt / von Käntichen auß Medziborischer Herrschafft bürtig / welcher 251. Morthaten begangen. Auch wie er in der Fürstlichen Stadt Oelse den 19. Jan.*[uar] *dieses 1654 Jahrs seiner Arbeit nach / den Lohn empfangen*, Augsburg 1654. For more on this see: P. Oszczanowski, *Śmierć w służbie ikonografii*, "Człowiek i środowisko w Sudetach. I Międzynarodowa Konferencja", ed. M. Boguszewicz, A. Boguszewicz, D. Wiśniewska, Wrocław 2000, pp. 410–414.

[67] Underneath this performance there was the signature "Der berüchtigte Rauber Hedlof hingerichtet in Oels im Jahr 1654", a reproduction of which was included by T. Ratsch, *Geschichte des Dorfes Luzine…*, p. 39. Another printed copy showing this criminal is in the collection of the BUWr., Oddział Zbiorów Graficznych (Inw. Graf. 581). It's a bust of a man in an oval, with an inscription under it: *Melchior Hedloff.*

[68] E.W. Happel, *Grösseste Denkwürdigkeiten…*, p. 92 ("Der abscheuliche Mörder" – this is the original title of the chapter which fully describes Melchior Hedloff's crimes.); F. Lucae, *Schlesiens curiose Denckwürdigkeiten oder vollkommene Chronica Von Ober- und Nieder-Schlesien: welche in Sieben Haupt-Theilen vorstellet Alle Fürstenthümer und Herrschafften mit ihren Ober-Regenten, Landes-Fürsten, Hofhaltungen, Stamm-Registern, Verwandtschafften, Herren- und Adelichen Geschlechtern, Tituln, Wappen... Sowol auch Deren Verfassungen, Regierungs-Arten, Staats- und Justiz-Wesen, Reichthümer, Regalien, Kriegs- und Friedens-Händel*, Frankfurt am Main 1689, p. 2234.

[69] J. Sinapius, *Olsnographiae, Oder Beschreibung…*, pp. 351–352.

of news about the activities of Melchior Hedloff and his gang. Another Silesian chronicler, Heinrich Roch, in his work published in 1687 and devoted to various tragic events in Silesia and Lusatia, unfortunately brought nothing new to the current state of knowledge about Hedloff's criminal activities, quoting only the number of people who were deprived of their lives (together with three companions) and a description of the brutal and at the same time instructive executioner.[70] Hedloff was also often a "hero" in the works of other historians. On the one hand, those who lived at that time were observing the events connected with the activities of Hedloff and his gang, but also followed the effects of the actions taken by the authorities, commenting on them in their works.

Moreover, the triumph of justice over a cruel criminal was commemorated in yet another way. Namely, from the moment Hedloff was captured, that is in 1653, at the castle in Oleśnica, the above-mentioned weapon, which he used in his criminal activity, was kept as a kind of "trophy". The collection also included a skull, which is said to have belonged to the horrible killer himself. This means that after a certain exposition of fragments of the lost body the remaining remains (or at least parts of them) were not buried by the executioner or his people in the pit at the place of the execution, but they were put into the collections of the then owners of the principality. Christian Weiss mentions this fact in the description of his eighteenth-century journey through Saxony, Silesia, Kłodzko County and the Czech Republic.[71]

The security, prosecution and fight against crime in a given centre were mostly handled by the guards, as well as city cones and executioners. The latter, because of its profession, was easier to infiltrate criminal structures and "extract" information that would serve in the investigation and detention of the perpetrators, of course for appropriate, often exorbitant remuneration. It was called "criminal hunting" (*Verbrecherjagdt*).[72] In turn, the basic tool in searching for criminals was their descriptions. During their preparation, in addition to the general appearance, i.e. height, eye colour, hair colour, as far as possible, the defects

[70] H. Roch, *Neue Laußnitz-, böhm-, und schlesische Chronica, oder allerhand denck- und merckwürdiger Unglücks- und Trauer-Fälle, so sich in dem Marggraffthum Lausitz, dessen angräntzenden, benachbartem Königreiche Böhmen und Fürstenthümern Schlesien, in den nechsten dreyhundert und sechs und achtzig Jahren*, Torgau 1687, pp. 310–311.

[71] M.Ch. Weiss, *Wanderungen in Sachsen, Schlesien, Glatz und Böhmen*, vol. 1, Leipzig 1796, p. 195.

[72] For more on this see D. Wojtucki, *Kat i jego warsztat pracy na Śląsku, Górnych Łużycach i w hrabstwie kłodzkim od początku XVI do połowy XIX wieku*, Warszawa 2014, p. 194.

in appearance were described. The absence of a hand, foot, eye, nose or ears, all kinds of scars were a valuable source of information for patrols or other groups looking for perpetrators to identify, apprehend and bring to justice.

In Silesia, but also in the whole Reich, with the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, many new penitentiary facilities appeared. They were mostly exhibited by municipal authorities (not military) and built on the markets or directly in front of city gates. Among them, new gallows were built, less often brigands, but also devices that were rarely found in the landscape of Silesian villages. They were wooden donkeys with triangular backs used for penal "riding". Their appearance in the centres was undoubtedly connected with numerous crowds of soldiers who had to be disciplined. The frequency of the gallows in the heart of any centres was perfectly illustrated by the example of Świdnica. Wooden gallows were erected in the market square there at the beginning of March 1621 in order to execute the sentence of hanging on a certain man.[73] But as early as March 16th, 1621, it was removed by the town's executioner.[74] Another one was erected on 22 December 1623 in a knee type device, together with an execution ladder. As early as on 28 December, a certain Georg Kutze, an enforcer from Świdnica, was attached to its pole, and then the regiment's executioner gave him thirty strokes with three rods.[75] The gallows themselves were removed on January 21, 1624.[76] Soon another object was erected in this place, because on June 21, 1627 Franz Albrecht was hanged from the gallows, his corpse was left hanging until June 23, then it was removed and transported to the city gallows and buried there.[77] A similar object in this town was located in front of the Lower Gate, now near Plac Wolności. In April 1621, wooden gallows were to stand near the house of a draper.[78] It was presented on the view of Świdnica in 1623. It was a knee gallows, with an execution ladder attached to it. It was carried out in April 1621, by order of the Świdnica councillors, in order to prevent, as it was called – *des großen Unwillens, so die Stadt Soldaten getrieben.* It is then referred to as *Schwenckgalgen*.[79] It was also

[73] BUWr., ref. 1950/1055, *Excerpta aus Balthas. Usleri Svidnic. and Balthas. Seiler Pistoris Svid. Geschiebenen Chronicis, meist Svidnicensia betreffend Ab Anno 1216–1633*, p. 143v.

[74] Ibidem.

[75] BUWr., ref. IV. F. 140, *Schweidnitze Cronica*, vol. II, p. 311.

[76] Ibidem.

[77] Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie, Oddział Rękopisów, Acc. to 7234, p. 902.

[78] BUWr., ref. IV. F. 140, *Schweidnitze Cronica*, vol. I, p. 239.

[79] Ibidem, Acc. 1950/1055, p. 144.

intended to punish the rebels who see *Frederick as the king and not Ferdinand*.[80] The beams of this gallows were also nailed to the bars with plates containing details of the escaped soldiers, which was done for example on May 25, 1621.[81] This kind of procedure was called hanging *in effigie* (in the picture). The form of such execution 'in absentia' became widespread mainly in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was most often used in the military penal system against deserters, although it was not alien to the city courts. It was practiced by placing on the gallows instead of the convict his portrait or a plaque with his name, together with a description of the crime for which he was convicted. This punishment was a disgrace to the fugitive or elusive accused and allowed for the confiscation of all his assets.

Sometimes, random trees were also used to punish the soldiers, standing by the roads leading to other important centres. On 22 October 1631 in Wrocław it was recorded that: *zu je zweien aufgehängt, alß zwo zu zwo zusammen gehenkt, andern zur Abscheu in der Justifizierung blieben zwo bey Pöpelwitz, zwo auf dem Leuselberg, zwo auf Born auf der Neumarktschen Straße hangend*.[82] (hung in twos, two by two hanged together, others to the disgust of the justification remained two by Pöpelwitz, two on the Leuselberg, and two on Born on the Neumarktschen Straße). In turn, in Świdnica in 1632, 6 riders from the "Spanish Regiment" were hanged for thefts and robberies.[83] They were transported to the area around the village of Jagodnik and hanged on three willow trees. The executioner stabbed an iron skeleton into each of the branches of the tree, suitable for handing out the gallows' beam, and the convict had to stand on a bench, which was then pulled out from under his feet. The lost were hanging on the trees for three days and three nights, and in addition, on one of the trees, there was a plate which, as indicated – *grosse Taffel (large plaque)*, contained the personalities of the lost and the name of the place from which they came. All of them were buried in the same grave at the execution site.[84]

As can be seen from the above examples, in Silesian cities, the crime of soldiers of different authorship did not differ much from the above cited in Leipzig. In Upper Lusatia, neighbouring Silesia, the situation of the local population was equally dramatic. In the period discussed here, the robberies were an integral part

[80] Ibidem.

[81] Ibidem, p. 144v.

[82] E. Lindgen, *Die Breslauer Strafrechtspflege*…, p. 71.

[83] Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie, Oddział Rękopisów, Acc. to 7234, p. 907.

[84] Ibidem.

of the maintenance of the army. If we add to this the low morale of the soldiers, it will not be an exaggeration that peasants had taken away almost everything, from everyday objects, work tools, to their main source of income – cattle. Usually the robberies also affected the church property and the temples themselves. The army's robbery activity found a particularly wide outlet in cavalry unit raids. Already in 1626, some forms of resistance against robbery were organized in this area. The landowners formed self-defence troops, which at the sound of a bell announcing a threat should come to the aid of the threatened person (similar to hue and cry) under arms. The severe bans on robbery of the local population, issued in 1632, were only a dead law, and the robbery expeditions did not stop until the end of the war.[85]

In the light of contemporary reflections, it seems that the main perpetrators of criminal acts in Silesia during the Thirty Years' War were soldiers, which should not be surprising. Both those who have served in different armies, or those who have served in the army so far, and after being released from the ranks of the army, have taken up common crime. An example can be the figure of Melchior Hedloff described above, hailed as an "super-murderer" by the people living in the mid-17th century.

Finally, one more type of crime should be mentioned, namely suicide (*Selbstmord*). The hardships of war, the uncertain life situation, and finally the so-called "small ice age" which fell on that period contributed to another act which, in the light of legal codes in force at that time, was treated almost equally to murder.[86] It's a conscious taking of life – suicide. The scale of this phenomenon, although not covering the whole problem due to incomplete source material, was presented partly for Wrocław, also taking into account the period of the Thirty Years' War.[87] The above-mentioned chronicler also helps describe this problem in the town of Świdnica. However, as in the case of criminal offences, we have information here that ends chronologically in the early 1730s. The last entry in this work comes from July 1631.[88] By coincidence, it was its tragic implication that best reflected

[85] Ł. Tekiela, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Górnych Łużycach. Aspekty militarne*, Racibórz 2010, pp. 198–201.

[86] On the cases of suicide during the so-called 'Little Ice Age', see D. Lederer, *Verzweiflung im Alten Reich. Selbstmord während der „Kleinen Eiszeit"*, in: *Kulturelle Konsequenzen der „Kleinen Eiszeit"*, eds. W. Behringer, H. Lehmann, Ch. Pfister, Göttingen 2005, pp. 255–280.

[87] P. Duma, *Śmierć samobójcza w mieście przedindustrialnym na przykładzie Wrocławia*, "Roczniki Historyczne" 2011, no. 77, pp. 149–168.

[88] Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie, Oddział Rękopisów, Acc. to 7234, p. 865.

on the tragedy of the times of the war between 1618 and 1648. On the basis of the account by the Świdnica historian on July 8th, in the evening, a 9-year-old boy hanged himself at the (then) Fleischer Gasse (now Spółdzielcza). His body was taken by the executioner and buried by the church wall from the outside, at one of the local temples.[89]

Bibliography

Archival sources

Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu

Akta księstwa nyskiego, sygn. 375, *Acta miscell. betr. die Bezüchtigung der Hexerei und des Umgangs mit dem bösen Feinde verschiedene Personen beiderlei Geschlechts auch Kinder an verschiedenen Orten, sowie das Verfahren gegen dieselben und zuletzt, Hinrichtung etlicher derselben durch den Feuerofen 1639–1715.*

Akta miasta Wrocławia (Księgi), sygn. E 2.6.

Zbiór Klosego, sygn. 58, *Auszüge aus dem liber proscriptorum 1609–1634.*

Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, Oddział w Jeleniej Górze

Akta miasta Kowar, sygn. 16, *Sprawy karne dotyczące sądu gardłowego 1644–1724.*

Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, Oddział w Legnicy

Akta miasta Legnicy (okres przedpruski), sygn. 466–468, *Criminalia*.

Kościół Mariacki w Legnicy, sygn. 47.

Státní okresní archiv Bruntál se sídlem v Krnově

Archiv města Moravský Beroun, sygn. 490, *Kniha ročních účtů města 1620–1632.*

Státní okresní archiv Opava

Archiv města Opava, sygn. 225, *Smolná kniha opavská (Gut und peinliche Aussagen sambt den Urtheillen).*

Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie

Oddział Rękopisów, sygn. Akc. 7234, *Annales ex libro cujusdam Lutherani Manuscripto, qui et in Collegio Schwidnicensi asservat excerpta a Tobia Kliman socio Procuratonis ao. 1683.*

[89] Ibidem.

Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu

Oddział Rękopisów, sygn. Akc. 1948/577, A. Frencelius, *Annalium Urbis Lusatiae Super Gorlicii 1717.*

sygn. Akc. 1950/1055, *Excerpta aus Balthas. Usleri Svidnic. und Balthas. Seiler Pistoris Svid. Geschiebenen Chronicis, meist Svidnicensia betreffend Ab Anno 1216–1633.*

sygn. IV. F. 140, *Schweidnitze Cronica*, vol. I and II.

Oddział Zbiorów Graficznych (Inw. Graf. 581).

Old Prints

Eine warhafftige und erschleckliche Newe Zeitung von dem grossen Mörder Melcher Hedloff / Sonst Schütze=Melcher genannt / von Käntichen auß Medziborischer Herrschafft bürtig / welcher 251. Morthaten begangen. Auch wie er in der Fürstlichen Stadt Oelse den 19. Jan.[uar] *dieses 1654 Jahrs seiner Arbeit nach / den Lohn empfangen*, Augsburg 1654.

Happel E.W., *Grösseste Denkwürdigkeiten der Welt oder so genandte Relationes curiosae: worinne fürgestellt u. angeführet werden d. merckwürdigste Historien u. Geschichte d. vorigen u. jetzigen Zeiten welche sich auff diesem grossen Schau-Platze d. Welt zugetragen*, Hamburg 1691.

Happel E.W., *Everh. Gv. Happelii Historia Moderna Europae, Oder eine Historische Beschreibung Deß Heutigen Europae: Welche zum Anfang und Fundament hat den Münsterischen Frieden-Schluß, und von dar an fortfähret, Unpartheyisch zu beschreiben, dieses Letztere Semi-Seculum Mirabile*, Ulm 1692.

Lucae F., *Schlesiens curiose Denckwürdigkeiten oder vollkommene Chronica Von Ober- und Nieder-Schlesien: welche in Sieben Haupt-Theilen vorstellet Alle Fürstenthümer und Herrschafften mit ihren Ober-Regenten, Landes-Fürsten, Hofhaltungen, Stamm-Registern, Verwandtschafften, Herren- und Adelichen Geschlechtern, Tituln, Wappen... Sowol auch Deren Verfassungen, Regierungs-Arten, Staats- und Justiz-Wesen, Reichthümer, Regalien, Kriegs- und Friedens-Händel*, Frankfurt am Main 1689.

Ranft M., *Tractat von dem Kauen und Schmatzen der Todten in Gräbern, Worin die wahre Beschaffenheit derer Hungarischen Vampyrs und Blut-Sauger gezeigt, auch alle von dieser Materie bißher zum Vorschein gekommene Schrifften recensiret werden*, Leipzig 1734.

Roch H., *Neue Laußnitz-, böhm-, und schlesische Chronica, oder allerhand denck- und merckwürdiger Unglücks- und Trauer-Fälle, so sich in dem Marggrafthum Lausitz, dessen angräntzenden, benachbartem Königreiche Böhmen und Fürstenthümern Schlesien, in den nechsten dreyhundert und sechs und achtzig Jahren*, Torgau 1687.

Sinapius J., *Olsnographiae*, *Oder Beschreibung Des Oelßnischen Fürstenthums In Nieder-Schlesien. Andrer Theil*, Leipzig 1706.

Weiss M.Ch., *Wanderungen in Sachsen, Schlesien, Glatz und Böhmen*, vol. 1, Leipzig 1796.

Zeiller M., *Handbuch Von allerley nutzlichen Erinnerungen, anmüetigen und lustigen, erbaulichen, Denckwürdigen, und meistentheils Neüen Exempeln oder Beyspielen; auch vielen verwunderlichen der Natur- und Kunst-Sachen, [et]c.: zu täglichem gebrauch und unterredung in gewiese Titel und Stellen eingetheilt*, Ulm 1655.

Literature

Bergemann J.G., *Historisch-Topographische Beschreibung der Kreis-Stadt Löwenberg und Umgegend. Aus Urkunden, Acten, Chroniken und Handschriften gesammelt*, Hirschberg 1824.

Ćwiąkalski Z., *Komentarz do art. 258 i 239 Kodeksu karnego*, in: *Kodeks karny – część szczególna. Komentarz do art. 117–277 Kodeksu karnego*, ed. A. Zoll, Kraków 1999.

Duma P., *Śmierć samobójcza w mieście przedindustrialnym na przykładzie Wrocławia*, "Roczniki Historyczne" 2011, no. 77, pp. 149–168.

Fukala R., *Dramat Europy. Wojna trzydziestoletnia (1618–1648) a kraje korony czeskiej*, Wrocław 2015.

Głębowicz W., *Wielkie wyobrażenie wielkiego rozbójnika Melchiora Gedlofa*, "Militaria i Fakty" 2000, no. 3, pp. 48–49.

Janicka D., *Prawo karne w trzech rewizjach prawa chełmińskiego z XVI wieku*, Toruń 1992.

Kaczor D., *Przestępczość kryminalna i wymiar sprawiedliwości w Gdańsku w XVI–XVII wieku*, Gdańsk 2005.

Kamler M., *Złoczyńcy. Przestępczość w Koronie w drugiej połowie XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku (w świetle ksiąg sądowych miejskich)*, Warszawa 2010.

Karpiński A., *Przestępczość we Lwowie w końcu XVI i w XVII wieku*, "Przegląd Historyczny" 1996, no. 4 (87), pp. 753–768.

Kizik E., *Kolorowy ubiór kata. Przyczynek do ikonografii odzieży na przełomie XV i XVI w.*, "Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza" 2008, no. 14.

Lambrecht K., *Hexenverfolgung und Zaubereiprozesse in den schlesischen Territorien*, Köln–Weimar–Wien 1995.

Lederer D., *Verzweiflung im Alten Reich. Selbstmord während der „Kleinen Eiszeit"*, in: *Kulturelle Konsequenzen der „Kleinen Eiszeit"*, eds. W. Behringer, H. Lehmann, Ch. Pfister, Göttingen 2005, pp. 255–280.

Lindgen E., *Die Breslauer Strafrechtspflege unter der Carolina und der Gemeinen Strafrechtswissenschaft bis zum Inkrafttreten der Josephina von 1708*, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Breslau" 1939, no. 8.

Lutterotti N., *Die Ermordung des Abtes Martin Clave von Grüssau nach gerichtlichen Akten*, "Schlesisches Pastoralblatt" 1922, no. 5/6, Jg. 43, pp. 37–40.

Maroń J., *Wojsko jako grupa przestępcza w XVII w.*, in*: Przestępczość kryminalna w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, eds. P. Klint, D. Wojtucki, Łódź–Wrocław 2017, pp. 105–119.

Matějek F., *Škody způsobené na Moravě řáděním vojáků za třicetileté války*, "Časopis Matice moravské" 1994, no. 113, pp. 83–94.

Mencfel M., *Książęce divertissements. Kunstkammera na zamku w Oleśnicy u schyłku XVII i w pierwszej połowie XVIII wieku*, in: *Czeska historia Śląska*, ed. W. Mrozowicz, Katowice–Oleśnica 2017, pp. 323–336.

Oszczanowski P., *Śmierć w służbie ikonografii*, "Człowiek i środowisko w Sudetach. I Międzynarodowa Konferencja", eds. M. Boguszewicz, A. Boguszewicz, D. Wiśniewska, Wrocław 2000, pp. 401–424.

Ratsch T., *Geschichte des Dorfes Luzine im Kreise Trebnitz nebst Aufzeichnungen über die Luziner Mordgrube und die Nachbarorte Lückerwitz, Zantkau, Mankerwitz und Probotschütz ferner einiges über Juliusburg, Strehlitz, Gutwohne und Oels*, Trebnitz 1910.

Rojčíková K., *Čarodějnické procesy na Moravě do roku 1648*, "Časopis Matice moravské" 2001, no. 120, pp. 187–207.

Rüdiger B., *Kriminalität während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in Leipzig. Ein Sonderfall innerstädtischer Kommunikation*, in: *Die Stadt als Kommunikationsraum. Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte vom Mittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. H. Bräuer, E. Schlenkrich, Leipzig 2001, pp. 609–632.

Die Peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V und des Heiligen Römischen Reichs von 1532 (Carolina), ed. F.Ch. Schroeder, Stuttgart 2000.

Schück R., *Ein schlesischer Räuber aus dem 17. Jahrhundert*, "Schlesische Provinzialblätter N.F." 1867, no. 6, pp. 38–39.

Tekiela Ł., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia na Górnych Łużycach. Aspekty militarne*, Racibórz 2010.

Uruszczak W., *Historia państwa i prawa polskiego. Tom I (966–1795)*, Warszawa 2010.

Wiszewski P., *Świat na pograniczu. Dzieje Lubawki i okolic do 1810 r.*, Wrocław 2015.

Wojtucki D., *Kat i jego warsztat pracy na Śląsku, Górnych Łużycach i w hrabstwie kłodzkim od początku XVI do połowy XIX wieku*, Warszawa 2014.

Wojtucki D., *Przestępczość kryminalna we Wrocławiu na podstawie liber proscriptorum z lat 1609–1634*, in: *Przestępczość kryminalna w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, eds. P. Klint, D. Wojtucki, Łódź–Wrocław 2017, pp. 74–93.

Wojtucki D., *Publiczne miejsca straceń na Dolnym Śląsku od XV do połowy XIX wieku*, Katowice 2009.

Wojtucki D., *„Pożeracze serc". Magiczne wierzenia wśród przestępców na Śląsku w XVII wieku*, "Czasy Nowożytne" 2017, no. 30, pp. 53–86.

Wojtucki D., *Der Glaube an die „magia posthuma" in Schlesien und Mähren zur Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges /1618–1648/*, "Bohemiae Occidentalis Historica" 2019, no. 2, pp. 189–201.

Przestępczość kryminalna na Śląsku w czasie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648). Przyczynek do badań

Abstrakt

Należy przyjąć, iż każda wojna tworzyła ludzi marginesu, a demobilizacja sprawiała, że pozostali po niej ludzie byli przywykli do walki i rozboju. Skłonni do kontynuowania dotychczasowych zajęć, którymi się trudnili, ale już poza szeregami oddziałów wojskowych. W trakcie wojen za armiami ciągnęły masy przeróżnych maruderów i hultajów, którzy czasem zostawali wchłonięci do szeregów armii, za którymi podążali. Jedynie na przykładzie dużych miast ówczesnego Śląska, tj. Legnicy czy częściowo Wrocławia i Świdnicy możemy poznać skalę zjawiska ówczesnej przestępczości pospolitej, zarówno tej popełnianej przez żołnierzy, ale też cywilów. Niepokoje w okresie konfliktu zbrojnego w latach 1618–1648 przyniosły też wystąpienia ludności przeciwko ówczesnym władzom. Jednak to kradzieże stanowiły w nowożytnych systemach karnych najpowszechniejszy delikt, za który orzekano sankcje karne od tych najpoważniejszych – kary śmierci, cielesnych, czy relegacji. Łupem złodziei padało wszystko, co miało jakąkolwiek wartość materialną i pozostawione zostało bez stosownego nadzoru. Do szczególnie negatywnie postrzeganych w świetle prawa były kradzieże dokonane przez zatrudnioną służbę lub czeladź względem swoich pracodawców oraz rabunek kościoła. W okresie wojny trzydziestoletniej lub tuż po niej obserwujemy również wzrost prześladowań osób, które oskarżano o magię szkodliwą, a więc czarownice i czarowników. Oprócz żywych, oskarżenia o złowrogą, pośmiertną aktywność wysuwano również wobec zmarłych (*magia posthuma*). Na Śląsku wybuchły również epidemie, które nierzadko przywlekli ze sobą żołnierze armii, dla których tereny te stały się miejscem kwaterunku lub przemarszu. O wywołanie części z nich oskarżono czarownice lub grabarzy ze śląskich miast. Wojna trzydziestoletnia „stworzyła" też różnej maści przestępców. Niewątpliwie „produktem" konfliktu 1618–1648 był znany w jej końcowej fazie i tuż po niej były żołnierz, seryjny morderca Melchior Hedloff, który przyznał się na torturach do 251 morderstw. Stracono go w Oleśnicy w styczniu 1654 roku. Na Śląsku, ale też w całej Rzeszy wraz z wybuchem wojny trzydziestoletniej pojawiło się wiele nowych urządzeń penitencjarnych. Na ich wystawienie decydowały się przeważnie władze miejskie (nie wojskowe), a obiekty wznoszono na rynkach lub bezpośrednio przed bramami miejskimi. Wśród nich powstały nowe drewniane szubienice, rzadziej pręgierze.

Criminal crime in Silesia during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). Contribution to the research

Abstract

It must be assumed that every war created people of the criminal margins and demobilization made the people, used to fighting and robbing, left with no prospects. They were inclined to continue the activities they had been engaged in so far, but at the time, outside the ranks of the military units. During the wars, masses of various marauders and mercenaries followed the armies and sometimes they were absorbed into the ranks of the army they were shadowing. Only on the example of large cities in Silesia at that time, i.e. Legnica or partially Wrocław and Świdnica, can we learn about the scale of the phenomenon of common crime at that time, both that committed by soldiers and civilians. The unrest during the period of armed conflict in the years 1618–1648 also brought about protests of the population against the then authorities. However, theft was the most common crime in modern penal systems, for which criminal sanctions were imposed on the most serious ones – the death penalty, corporal punishment, or discharge. The thieves' plunders were all that had any material value and were left without proper supervision. Particularly negatively perceived in the eyes of the law was the theft by an employed service or journeyman to their employers or a church robbery. During or just after the Thirty Years' War, we also observe an increase in persecution of people who were accused of harmful magic, i.e. witches and sorcerers. Apart from the living, accusations of sinister, posthumous activity were also made against the dead (*posthumous magic*). In Silesia, epidemics also broke out, which were often brought with them by soldiers of the army, for whom the area became a place of accommodation or march. Witches or gravediggers from Silesian towns were accused of calling some of them. The Thirty Years' War "created" various kinds of criminals. Undoubtedly, the "product" of the 1618–1648 conflict was a well-known, serial killer Melchior Hedloff, who being tortured, confessed to 251 murders. He was executed in Oleśnica in January 1654. Many new penitentiary facilities appeared both in Silesia and also in the whole Reich as a result of the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. They were mostly exhibited by municipal authorities (not military) and built on the markets or directly in front of city gates. Among them, new wooden gallows were built, less often pillories.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-07

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Radosław Gaziński
ORCID: 0000-0002-6734-9309
Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Wydział Humanistyczny
e-mail: r.gazinski@bg.szczecin.pl

"Preparations" of Western Pomerania for the Thirty Years' War

Keywords: Thirty Years' War, Pomerania, the Griffins
Słowa kluczowe: wojna trzydziestoletnia, Pomorze, Gryfici

When dramatic events took place in Bohemia (May 1618), which in consequence led to the outbreak of a great European conflict later called the Thirty Years' War, Duke Francis I ascended the throne in Szczecin. He had a 'condottiere's mentality', shaped by his numerous journeys around Europe. The new ruler was quite poorly educated, had no love for art, and preferred wine, horses and hunting over books. No wonder, that one of the main goals he set himself was the military reinforcement of Pomerania. He did so because the situation in the Empire was becoming less and less stable.[1] He started his energetic actions in this matter on two fields. Firstly, he tried to initiate the construction of modern fortifications surrounding the medieval walls of Szczecin and secondly to create a small permanent army maintained by the Pomeranian estates. In the spring of 1619, Francis I organised a commission from some of the most experienced duke's councillors to determine the necessary size of the Pomeranian army. After discussions, the councillors decided that a permanent army that would fully secure the

[1] Z. Boras, *Książęta Pomorza Zachodniego*, Poznań 1996, p. 331.

Pomeranian borders should have 8,000 infantry soldiers and 1,500 cavalrymen. These troops would have to be well supplied with weapons and ammunition for which a separate duke's arsenal was needed in Szczecin.

The decision to establish a commission and the attempt to create a permanent army were also dictated by the threats to Pomerania, especially towards the land of Lębork and Bytów from Royal Prussia. In May 1619, Francis I received information from Gdańsk about a large number of marauders who were raiding the province and could cross the Pomeranian border.[2] Additionally, the Elector of Brandenburg John Sigismund informed his neighbour about the possibility of invading Pomerania from the side of Greater Poland about 6,000 of light Cossacks cavalry.[3] According to the information received, Polish cavalry had already crossed the Polish-Brandenburg border and were robbing the border areas of Brandenburg. At the Szczecin's court, various possible decisions taken to protect Pomerania from robbery were considered. At the same time, it was hoped that the Polish troops located on the Greater Poland-Brandenburg border would be placed at the disposal of Emperor Ferdinand II by Sigismund III Vasa and eventually directed to suppress the uprising in rebellious Bohemia. The first decision made by the Duke in May 1619 was to call for a levy in mass from the land of Słupsk, and then to set up a 200-person unit to occupy the castle in Bytów and protect the land from foreign troops. Additionally, the Pomeranian forces were to support a 50-person squad with the task of patrolling the Pomeranian-Polish border.[4] The duke, making the above-mentioned decisions very quickly, presumed that the funds for the enlisted troops would be agreed by the next meeting of Pomeranian assembly. At the beginning of June, the duke changed his mind. In the face of incoming information, he called for a levy in mass for the whole endangered Duchy of Stettin.[5]

This was the result of contradictory news that reached Szczecin in June 1619. It was reported from Königsberg that there was a 1,000-person unit of the Polish light cavalry enlisted by Ferdinand II for the Czech War at the Brandenburg border. However, it was also believed that this unit was soon to leave the

[2] Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie (later: APS), Archiwum Książąt Szczecińskich (later: AKS), I/4742, pp. 14–16.

[3] APS, AKS, I/4742, pp. 28–29, 33–35.

[4] Ibidem, pp. 5–8, 14–15.

[5] It was supposed to gather on 30 June 1619: APS, AKS, I/4742, pp. 48–49.

Wielkopolska-Brandenburg border and the danger would end.[6] Unfortunately, on the other hand, the Elector of Brandenburg John Sigismund (June 14th) informed Francis I that Pomerania is under serious threat, especially from the side of Royal Prussia, by about 10,000 unpanished and unpaid Polish soldiers, veterans of The Polish-Muscovite War.[7] In this situation, Duke Francis I informed his subjects about the growing threat and ordered the strengthening of city walls and castles. It is known that Sławno called up 50 and Słupsk 90 shooters.[8] However, the main force of Pomerania was meant to be the levy in mass spread around Polanów to cover the eastern part of the country. Due to the slow gathering of the levy in mass, the Duke postponed the final date of its concentration from 30 June to 13 July, and then to 19 August. Finally, at the end of August 1,300 infantry and 200 cavalry led by Thomas Stucken concentrated near Polanów.[9] The largest contingent of 500 infantry and 60 cavalry commanded by Captain Herman Giese was delivered by Szczecin.[10] So, at the end of August 1619 the cities of the endangered area (Sławno, Słupsk) established and maintained their own troops which constituted the last line of defence (about 140 infantry). The main defence was to be based on the levy in mass (about 1,300 infantry and 200 horsemen) gathered near Polanów, while in the extended positions there were heavy units (about 200 infantry and 50 horsemen). In this situation, the whole Pomeranian army consisted of about 1,640 infantry and 250 horsemen units, including just few professional draftees. These numbers were far from the suggested figures considered in terms of the permanent army and proposed a little earlier by the duke's councillors (8,000 infantry and 1,500 horsemen).

It should be clearly stressed that it was impossible to maintain a permanent Pomeranian army by Francis I, in the reality of Pomerania at the time he simply could not afford it. The basic problem, not only of this Pomeranian ruler, was the constant lack of funds.[11] In fact, the Gryffins' state was financially inefficient since the end of the 16th century. The beginning of unfavourable changes was the

[6] This unit was to be commanded by Colonel Józef Lisowski: APS, AKS, I/4742, pp. 50–51.

[7] APS, AKS, I/4742, pp. 52–54.

[8] Ibidem, pp. 61–64, 77–78.

[9] Ibidem, pp. 85, 116, 150–151, 168–169.

[10] Ibidem, pp. 215–235.

[11] Z. Boras, *Książęta*…, pp. 336–337.

bankruptcy of the Loitz bank house (1572),[12] which led to many bankruptcies in Pomerania (mainly among the nobility) and significantly weakened ducal finances. Since the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries the income from the domains, customs chambers and fixed taxes earned by the Pomeranian rulers did not suffice to maintain the ducal courts, officials, numerous residences and, above all, did not fully satisfy the needs of all members of the ducal family.[13] In this situation, under pressure from the Pomeranian estates, the dukes agreed to establish separate treasures for the Duchies of Wolgast and Szczecin, which, controlled by the representatives of the estates, were to guarantee ducal loans and their regular repayments.[14] The financial inefficiency of the Pomeranian rulers was more and more noticeably accompanied by the weakening of their position in the state.

Facing this situation, Francis I did not have much choice but to obtain the consent of the estates. Unfortunately, they were not very interested in putting money into his plans to strengthen Pomerania militarily. The main reason for this was a long period of peace with no actual external threat.[15] Therefore, both the Pomeranian nobility and the cities saw no need to spend significant resources on maintaining a permanent army or building modern fortifications.[16] Hence, the establishment of the Pomeranian army by Francis I did not go beyond the general plans, and Pomerania still did not have permanent military units, except for a few dozen regularly armed and uniformed Trabants safeguarding the castles in Szczecin and Wolgast. The small mercenary troops established in the summer of 1619 were dismissed when the "Polish threat" ended. The main armed force of Pomerania was still (similarly to the Middle Ages) based on the levy in mass consisting of noble cavalry and bourgeoisie infantry. Actually, the whole conscription was created on the basis of an old order issued at the end of Bogislaw X's reign (d. 1523), which specified the number of troops distributed by in-

[12] B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie w początkach czasów nowożytnych (1464–1648). Odrodzenie się i upadek państwa pomorskiego*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 2/1, eds. G. Labuda, M. Biskup, M. Bogucka, A. Mączak, B. Wachowiak, Poznań 1976, pp. 754–755, where on pp. 796–797 additionally about a loan to Zygmunt August in the amount of 100,000 talars.

[13] For example, the College of Land Counsellors: B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie*..., pp. 835, 850, had a decisive vote on the adoption of extraordinary taxes, and on the influence of the Land Sejmiks there on pp. 847–848.

[14] B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie*..., pp. 966–968, 970–971.

[15] Actually, the last hard struggles to maintain the independence of Pomerania were fought at the end of the 15 century with the Brandenburgers Bogislaw X.

[16] K. Olejnik, *System obronny Pomorza Zachodniego do połowy XVII wieku*, in: *Z dziejów wojennych Pomorza Zachodniego*, ed. B. Miśkiewicz, Poznań 1972, pp. 84–85.

dividual cities and which was a general list of vassals obliged to serve the prince on horseback.[17] The condition of this armed force was checked through musters, which were announced quite regularly. At a certain place and time, at the duke's order, a common movement of entire duchies or individual lands was gathered. During the demonstration, the lists of those obliged to perform the armed service were updated, the quality of armaments was checked and simple exercises were conducted. There is no doubt, however, that such irregular and untrained armed forces were not able to cope with the demands of a typical battlefield at that time.

The Pomeranian fortifications similarly looked pretty bad. Since the late Middle Ages, the defensive system of the Pomeranian lands was formed by city centres surrounded by stone and brick walls, and fights (e.g. Bogislaw X against Brandenburg) were concentrated around the cities themselves (Gartz, Pyrzyce).[18] It should be clearly emphasized that the mentioned city fortifications were the property of the cities themselves and were maintained at the expense of city treasures. The government authorities had nothing to say in this matter.[19] The described situation did not change until the early 17th century. Pomeranian cities were still the main points of resistance, and their fortifications, although partly adapted at the turn of the 15th and 16th century to use firearms, would not have been able to withstand longer artillery fire. The only urban area with modern Dutch-style fortifications meeting the criteria of a modern fortress was Stralsund. It is worth mentioning here that the city, the most powerful in Pomerania, built these fortifications at its own expense. The Pomeranian artillery was similarly weak. Only Stralsund had a sufficient number of modern cannons at that time. Other cities, including Szczecin, had just few and mostly outdated cannons.

Ambitious plans of Duke Francis I to create a permanent military force in Pomerania were interrupted by his unexpected death in November 1620. His younger brother Bogislaw XIV ascended the throne of Szczecin. The last duke of Szczecin and then Pomerania was in quite poor health, had very little understanding of military matters, but he was very religious and his religiousness was quite often too close to bigotry. Together with the duchy, he inherited from Francis

[17] The Pomeranian common movement at the beginning of the 17th century, calculated according to the decree of Bogislaw X from 1523, consisted of a noble ride of about 644 horses and the city infantry (about 1549 people) and riding (about 264 horses). Thus, the Pomeranian forces of that time could count about 1500 infantry and 900 horses: APS, AKS, I/4742, pp. 265–266.

[18] Of course, not counting the dandruff-like rallies into the depths of Pomerania.

[19] K. Olejnik, *System*..., pp. 82–83.

I a large debt of 150,000 guilders, which he tried to repay unsuccessfully. Without financial resources, he abandoned his plans to strengthen Pomerania's military base.[20] Meanwhile, the situation in the Empire continued to complicate. Eventually, the Imperial Army of Ferdinand II beat its rebellious Czech subjects in the Battle of White Mountain (November 1620). The King of Bohemia and at the same time the elector of the Palatinate, Frederick V (the so-called Winter King) had to rush out of Prague. After the situation in Bohemia had been controlled and his return was secured (peace with Transylvania), the imperial army moved to combat the Protestant Electorate of the Palatinate and to eventually occupy its territory. This provoked serious concerns among the Protestant rulers of the north-eastern part of the Empire against a growing emperor who could introduce a centralised power and Catholicism throughout the empire. Duke Bogislaw XIV was also concerned about this development and tried to strengthen Pomerania militarily on his own.[21] Nevertheless, the Duke was lucky, as the congress of representatives of the Saxon Quartet of the Reich in Jüteborg (spring 1623) made decision to issue a joint permanent army of 6,000 infantry and 2,000 horsemen. In these plans, Pomerania was to appoint 1,000 infantry and 800 horsemen to arms. These armies were eventually recruited by Bogislaw XIV, unfortunately due to lack of money to support them he had to demilitarise them soon.[22]

The attempt to strengthen Pomerania in 1623 was ultimately unsuccessful and the country was completely unprepared for any military action. In this situation dukes Philippe Julius and Bogislaw XIV had nothing but to stick to the policy of neutrality, which they considered to be the cheapest way to save Pomerania from the possible war turmoil. Pure neutrality not supported by any significant military force meant pure vulnerability in the reality of the time. At the end of May 1623, news of the concentration of about 3,000 Polish soldiers at the Pomeranian border, who could cross it at any time,[23] reached the court in Szczecin. In this situation, on 23rd May 1623 Bogislaw XIV informed his subjects about the threat

[20] Z. Boras, *Książęta*..., p. 335.

[21] H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie w latach wojny trzydziestoletniej*, in: *Z dziejów wojennych Pomorza Zachodniego*, ed. B. Miśkiewicz, Poznań 1972, pp. 174–175 and B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie*..., p. 988.

[22] E. Rymar, *Książęta Zachodniopomorscy wobec obronności swego państwa w XII–XVII wieku*, in: *Pomorze Militarne XII–XXI wiek*, eds. K. Kozłowski, E. Rymar, Szczecin 2004, pp. 37–38; comp. also: Z. Boras, *Książęta*..., p. 340.

[23] APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 1–3, these troops, according to the informants, spread out about 2 miles from the border, and the most endangered were the lands of amt Szczecinek.

to the state and ordered the strengthening of castles and city walls and announced the establishment of levy in mass throughout the Duchy of Szczecin. At the same time, in the duke's surroundings, the costs of issuing mercenary troops that would protect the Pomeranian border started to be analysed. Eventually, the monthly accommodation of the 200-person company was estimated at about 2,320 guilders,[24] the 300-person company at 2,847 guilders, while the issue of a 100-person rota was to cost about 2,950 guilders per month.[25] Of course, it was clearly realised that full safety of Pomerania would be given by the army consisting of at least several thousand infantry and cavalry.[26] In reality the duke was not able to afford such an army for financial reasons. Moreover, the Pomeranian states did not feel like spending so much in order to offer support. So again, an intermediate route was chosen (as in 1619). The levy in mass was to be strengthened by just few mercenary troops.

In June 1623, a significant number of Cossack troops (light horsemen) was reported, which soon after appearing near the Pomeranian borders, finally entered Brandenburg. They were spread out on quarters near Sulechów.[27] This, immediately caused great concern in Berlin, and the Elector of Brandenburg George William informed all his neighbours, including the Duke of Szczecin Bogislaw XIV, about the Cossack threat. The latter, being seriously afraid of this assault within the Pomeranian borders, ordered (30th June 1623) the introduction of a state of full marital emergency. In all of the border towns, the gates were to be guarded day and night, the permanent guards were also put on the city walls. In addition, they were to gather enough gunpowder, ammunition and weapons. In July 1623, the levy in mass of the Duchy of Szczecin, which was called in May,

[24] It was then assumed that the captain would receive 250 guilders a month, the lieutenants 70 guilders each. The core of the company forces was to be 169 musketeers receiving 7 guilders each month, which gave the amount of 1183 guilders. If we add to this the costs of maintenance of sergeants, corporals and other functional companies, the total costs increased to 2320 guilders per month: APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 36–42, 56–57. Possible savings and negotiation of lower pay for the company's staff were also taken into account.

[25] In the case of a ride rota, the Rittmeister himself took 400 guilders for his own maintenance and 6 horses, the lieutenant took 180 guilders for himself and 4 horses. The rota consisted of 81 private horsemen, which in total consumed 2950 guilders per month: APS, AKS, I/4747, p. 43.

[26] APS, AKS, I/4747, p. 51.

[27] The number of Cossacks accommodated in Brandenburg has been exaggeratedly estimated at about 10,000 people: G. Bülow, *Ein drohender Kosakeneinfall in 1625*, "Baltische Studien" AF 1880, 30, pp. 219–220.

finally gathered.[28] At the same time, on the initiative of Bogislaw XIV, in June 1623, professional soldiers and officers were enlisted, the costs of their accommodation and maintenance were calculated. Eventually it was decided to enlist two large infantry companies of 591 men each. The officer and non-commissioned officer cadre of each of them was meant to contain, among others, a captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 45 corporals and a provost. Such a large squad also incorporated a few drummers, a surgeon, a quartermaster with helpers and quite a large number of servants. Also, there were 484 musketeers in each of the units. Monthly maintenance costs of the described unit amounted to 5,822 florins.[29] In fact, the personnel status of both established companies was much lower than originally assumed as 300 soldiers (600 soldiers in total) were enlisted. This was mainly due to the fact that in the Szczecin's court it was considered necessary to create an expensive cavalry unit (about 150 horses), whose task was to stop any possible direct attacks from Cossacks. In this situation, since the end of June 1623, the Duchy of Szczecin accommodated a recruitment of about 750 soldiers to cover the state borders.[30] In spite of quite regular soldier's pay in money[31] and partly in the natural goods, information about abuses and robberies committed by the soldiers enlisted by the duke (most often no money was paid for the food and horse feed taken)[32] was coming in from various places. In total, the states of the Duchy of Szczecin paid 16,185 florins a month to maintain the heavy forces protecting the country. The total cost of maintaining the army for 6 months (from the end of June to the beginning of December 1623) was 97,110 florins. Add to

[28] The common start was collected on July 10, 1623: APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 209–221, 223–270, there are also lists of people who came forward.

[29] APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 285–292, 332–335.

[30] Heavy companies were divided into small units stationed in different villagebss not far from the borders. For example, 37 soldiers were stationed in Pyrzyce, commanded by Sergeant Jurgen Zivermann, 53 soldiers and several non-commissioned officers commanded by Captain Reinhold v. Krokowa were stationed in Gartz near the Oder River: APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 667–671.

[31] The list of payments for the maintenance of the 2 companies is quite long. Among others, Szczecin paid 1,000 florins, Słupsk 448 florins, Darłowo 858 florins, Sławno 723 florins, Trzebiatów n. Rega 373 florins, Gartz 1,794 florins, Białogard 600 florins, Goleniów 222 florins, Płoty 83 florins, Lębork 834 florins, Dąbie 626 florins: total 7,561 florins. The kołbacka domain paid 527 florins, the szczecińska 800 florins, the szadzka 220 florins, the pyrzycka 200 florins, the trzebiatowska 757 florins, the bytowska 1,123 florins, the karlińska 1,738 florins, the szczecińska 1,251 florins, the lęborska 426 florins, and finally the Słupsk and Sławieński Province Governor allocated 4,400 florins: altogether 11,442 florins, which in total gave 19,003 florins: APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 676–677.

[32] Such complaints were submitted by the cities of Szczecinek, Stargard and Pyrzyce and the Kamień Pomorski Chapter: APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 350–351.

this the extraordinary expenses, which were calculated at 4,400 florins, and the amount finally mentioned above increased to 102,510 florins.[33] After all of the above-mentioned forces were made demilitarised in December 1623, Pomerania became again completely defenceless in the face of growing external threats.

Another threat approached the people of Pomerania in Spring 1625. This time the Duchy of Szczecin was threatened by attacks of rebellious 'Lost Men' (Lisowski's soldiers) plundering Royal Prussia. At the end of May 1625, Bogisław XIV, fearing that the Pomeranian borders would be violated by robbing gangs, once again ordered a state of military emergency.[34] He did so because at the end of May (on 28th May 1625) he received a letter from the Chełmno voivode Jan Wejher, who wrote about the robberies of the marauders in his province and the fight against those rebellious troops from the royal army. Therefore, there were serious fears those who survived and regrouped may invade Pomerania.[35] As before, the state ordered that border towns were to be kept guarded at the gates and walls both day and night. Moreover, the duke ordered the repair and reinforcement of the walls themselves and the collection of weapons, bullets and gunpowder.[36] On 30th June 1625, Bogislaw XIV announced the concentration of the common movement of both Wolgast and Szczecin duchies. In the end, 1,986 infantry and 266 horsemen users were gathered near Wolgast and about 1,500 infantries and 200 horsemen users near Bobolice.[37] Szczecin, totally in fear of the growing threat, decided to put up additional 20 horsemen and 100 infantry. The levy in mass was to be led by the Szczecin bourgeois Daniel Schreiber and captain Michael Hennicke. The owner of each house in the city and its suburbs had to pay 1 florin for the army, the kennels' owners paid 1/2 florin and whoever owned a cellar paid 1/4 florin. Additionally, the contribution covered Szczecin's estate and the town of Police.

The already critical situation worsened by an unexpected death (February 1625) of Philipp Julius, from whom Bogislaw XIV inherited not only the Duchy of Wolgast, but also considerable debts. The reunification of Pomerania did not

[33] APS, AKS, I/4747, pp. 523–534, 614–615, 622–636, 720–722, 755–757.

[34] The Ducal Order was issued on 30 May 1625: APS, AKS, I/4746, pp. 1–4.

[35] The news spread around Pomerania even spoke of 18,000 'Lost Men' ready to rob Pomerania: G. Bülow, *Ein drohender*..., p. 226; comp. also: Z. Boras, *Książęta*..., p. 341 and B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie*..., pp. 988–989.

[36] G. Bülow, *Ein drohender*…, pp. 221–225, 227–229, comp. also: *Pomorze Zachodnie poprzez wieki*, ed. J.M. Piskorski, Szczecin 1999, pp. 142–143.

[37] APS, AKS, I/4746, pp. 5, 20–21, 23.

strengthen the last surviving Griffin at all, on the contrary, financially it was completely dependent on the states that did not intend to cover the costs of maintaining large military recruitments. The duke was clearly advised not to get involved on either side of the conflict. Meanwhile, in 1626, the political and military situation in the Empire became much worse due to the involvement of the Protestants from King Christian IV of Denmark. However, the Danish intervention ended in total defeat (Battles of Dessau – April 1626 and Lutter am Barenberge – August 1626), which significantly increased the threat from the victorious Habsburgs towards any Protestant estates of the Empire including Pomerania. Additionally, quite unexpectedly for Bogislaw XIV in the summer of 1626, the Polish-Swedish conflict moved to the area of Royal Prussia closely bordering the Pomeranian state. Pomerania seemed to be surrounded by areas where the war was taking place.

Following the new situation, in the spring of 1626 Bogislaw XIV appointed a commission of his councillors to examine the state of defence of the country. Castles, city fortifications and the state of borders were subject to assessment. In May 1626, at the Pomeranian Sejmik in Uckermünde, under the influence of a report on the poor condition of the fortifications and the lack of security around the borders, critical measures were adopted for the new recruits. The troops gathered in this way were to protect selected ports and some border crossings and bridges.[38] In June 1626, a separate tax (contribution) was collected by the above-mentioned Sejmik for the maintenance of permanent troops. The whole collection was to be supervised by a specially appointed War Council coordinating defence activities in Pomerania. At the same time, it was intended to create the War Fund, to which any funds intended for the maintenance of the army were to be transferred.[39] Special attention was paid to the professionalism of the commanding staff enlisted. At that time two colonels (Asmus v. Glasenapp and Matthias v. Borck)[40] and several junior officers were employed (June 1626). Also, soldiers were enlisted to two companies of infantry commanded by the above-mentioned colonels.[41] Moreover, a contract was signed with the artillery captain Matthias v. Osten,

[38] This concerned, among others, the ports in Wolgast and Kołobrzeg, bridges over the Oder River in Gartz and Gryfino and in the vicinity of Pasewalk, Demmin and Altentreptow (until 1939 Treptow an der Tollense): H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie…*, pp. 174–175.

[39] APS, AKS, I/4748, pp. 1–4, 6–8.

[40] Matthias v. Bork is unlikely to have his contract renewed after 3 months.

[41] An amount of 12,000 florins was spent on officer maintenance for the first three months: APS, AKS, I/4748, pp. 15–18.

who was meant to modernize the Pomeranian artillery. He was given support by a gunsmith master with several journeymen and guards to protect the planned armoury. The main task of v. Osten was therefore to organize a real arsenal and gather the appropriate number of cannons, gunpowder and bullets.[42] In July 1626, the Bogislaw XIV Chancellery issued special articles being a set of regulations for the enlisted army. They indicated, among other things, that the basic task of the Pomeranian troops is to protect the border, check passports of the travellers and fight against the gangs willing to attack the Pomeranian population. At the same time, the enlisted soldiers were forbidden to confiscate grain, bread, beer or other food from the Pomeranian peasants under the death penalty. The troops deployed along the border should set up fortified camps to which sufficient food and supplies were to be delivered.[43]

One of the first enlisted Pomeranian units belonging to Colonel Asmus v. Glasenapp's company was directed to the vicinity of Penkun, to protect Szczecin from the south-west side. In July 1626 v. Glesenapp's company reached the level of 300 soldiers recruited for a period of 3 months.[44] At the end of July and later on in August, the money successfully collected by the Pomeranian towns was spent through contracts with successive officers and the new recruitment of soldiers to the second company, the number of which slightly exceeded 200 people, began.[45] In order to command the mercenary forces of just over 500 soldiers, the duke, supported by the Pomeranian estates, finally employed 4 colonels, 4 captains, 4 lieutenants and an appropriate number of sergeants and corporals. In total, the monthly maintenance costs of the officer and non-commissioned officer unit reached 24,884 thalers in August.[46] At the same time, Bogislaw XIV called for a review of the levy in mass near Szczecinek and Bobolice in August 1626 (orders of 18 May and 21 June), ordered the repair of neglected fortifications and forbade the Pomeranian nobility to join the foreign army. Eventually, 2,145 people stood near Szczecinek, less than half of whom were armed with firearms and

[42] APS, AKS, I/4748, pp. 22–23.

[43] Ibidem, pp. 24–29.

[44] Among other things, the captain actually commanding the company (in the field) received 200 florins a month, the lieutenant 50 florins, each of three sergeants 12 florins, and each of three corporals 10 florins: APS, AKS, I/4748, pp. 31–34, 39–41, 54.

[45] Captains Ditrich Schembach, Heinrich Normann or Johann Tydebohlen were enlisted: APS, AKS, I/4748, pp. 60, 77–78, 81–82.

[46] APS, AKS, I/4746, pp. 36–42, for example, Colonel Christian v. Nessen received 837 talars per month.

the rest with halberds and peaks.[47] In the vicinity of Bobolice, on the other hand, 2,294 defenders gathered, of which only 116 were armed with modern muskets, while 657 had older firearms with matchlocks.[48] In total, the two duchies joined together by Bogislaw XIV gathered forces consisting of about 4,500 soldiers of the common movement. At the same time the Pomeranian borders were secured by about 500 heavy ones.

Despite the duke's insistence, the project of establishing the general military treasury of Pomerania, i.e. the War Fund, controlled by the ruler, was not realized. On the other hand, Bogislaw XIV managed to obtain the estate's consent for the permanent functioning of the War Council consisting of some of the prince's councillors. The levy in mass called in August (about 4,500 people) was to be, by the intentions of the War Council, strengthened by about 3,000 permanent infantry units. Two companies, already enlisted in July 1626, with about 500 people, were to be extended to this size. However, there was not enough money to enlarge the heavy units. Thus, the Pomeranian army commanded by Claus Bruckhausen and Asmus Glasenapp was limited only to about 4,500 people,[49] reinforced by small mercenary forces.[50] In the long run, it was not possible to keep the mobilised troops, whose forces gradually melted down. Therefore, in November 1626 it was dissolved into houses. On the Pomeranian borders, there were only two heavy companies of 500 soldiers on foot left.

The effects of the military weakness of Pomerania were easy to predict. In January and February 1627, the units recruited by the Swedish in Mecklenburg were ordered to go to Royal Prussia, where since 1626 the Polish-Swedish War was waged. They intended to march on the shortest route through neutral Pomerania.[51] At the end of January, the first small groups of recruited soldiers appeared near Anklam, and here they encountered the Pomeranian sentries consisting of soldiers enlisted in 1626. Eventually, the Swedish units decided to withdraw. They decided to cut through Uckermark and cross the Oder River near Gartz. Here, however, on February 25th, Swedish officers met the envoys of Bogislaw XIV,

[47] APS, AKS, I/4746, pp. 73–201. For example, one of the units of 223 soldiers consisted of 133 armed with firearms, 53 halberdsmen and 34 pikemen and additionally 3 carpenters with axes.

[48] APS, AKS, I/4746, pp. 186, 215–218, 254–257.

[49] It consisted of a bourgeois quota of 3445 pedestrians and 727 horsemen and a noble contingent of 694 horsemen: H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie*…, pp. 180–181.

[50] At that time, it was not even possible to achieve the heavy numbers approved by sejmik in Uckermünde, which were to include 600 foot soldiers and 150 rides.

[51] H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie*..., pp. 178–179.

who persuaded them to cross the Oder near Schwedt, giving the officers the amount of 9,000 thalers. This was the end of the success of the Pomeranian ruler, because after crossing the Oder near Schwedt, several thousand soldiers enlisted by the Swedish and commanded by Colonels Streiff von Lauenstein and Maksymilian Teufel[52] marched through Stargard, Białogard and Słupsk heading for Royal Prussia. The protests of the Pomeranian Duke didn't do much good, because nobody took them seriously. Outraged by the violation of Pomeranian neutrality and borders, Bogislaw XIV once again tried to strengthen the permanent army. At the beginning, in March 1627, the Sejmik decided to establish a permanent body, the so-called War Government, in place of the War Council, which was to monitor the war events around Pomerania and counteract any possible threats.[53] During the sessions of the Sejmik it was repeatedly stressed that from the east, the Pomeranian borders were constantly being violated by Swedish and Polish troops. The news coming from different sides caused the Pomeranian states to adopt further extraordinary taxes to maintain a permanent army. At the same time, it was emphasized that the Pomeranian forces were only supposed to protect the borders and under no circumstances act offensively. The states ordered to establish a fund-raising money for the maintenance of the defence forces in Trzebiatów.[54] The taxes passed by the Sejmik were directed there and this became the source of the funds for the maintenance of permanent units and defence of Pomerania.[55] It should be emphasized at this point that duke Bogislaw XIV was largely excluded from the organization of the defence of his duchy by the aforementioned actions.

At the end of March 1627, the Swedish army approached Słupsk and started requisitioning food and goods. The number of their troops was probably over estimated at about 2,500 people.[56] Another Swedish unit estimated at about 1,000 soldiers were requisitioning food in the Sławno area, including in urban estates.

---

[52] G. Bülow, *Ein drohender…*, p. 218 and B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie…*, pp. 992–993.

[53] APS, AKS, I/4744, pp. 1–7, actually the War Government was constituted in April 1627: I/ 4744, pp. 28–34, 92–93, and its tasks are described in detail: I/4744, pp. 35–40, 57–58.

[54] APS, AKS, I/4753, pp. 69–70, 188–191.

[55] APS, AKS, I/4753, pp. 350–374; comp. also sample receipts to the Trzebiatowski cash register: I/4754, p. 60.

[56] The Swedish units rebuilding food on the Słupsk land were further strengthened by 900 additional soldiers: APS, AKS, I/4744, pp. 25–26, 60–67, comp. also I/4753, pp. 80–97, 107–110, where information about food and horses taken away by Swedes from particular villages was submitted by duke's officials.

Bread, beer, calves, sheep and lard were taken away.[57] At the same time, Amtman of Lębork Antonius Natzmer informed the Duke that the Polish army was actually occupying the Lębork and Bytów land, taking the horse feed and food they needed. Natzmer suggested that the lean Pomeranian heavyweight forces, strengthened by the common movement, should be concentrated in the east of the country, which would at least limit the outgoing foreign troops. In April, the news reached Szczecin that a Polish unit of 200 soldiers had spread out in the vicinity of Okonek and illegally took food from duke's subjects.[58] A real threat was caused by the lively correspondence of Bogislaw XIV with the amtmen residing in the eastern part of the country. It seemed that Swedish troops, in search of food, could reach Darłowo, Koszalin and Kołobrzeg. In this situation, steps had to be taken as soon as possible to drive foreign troops out of the country. The companies of captains Johan Tiedebölen and Peter Störmers, consisting of a total of 380 musketeers, hastily enlisted (with city money), set off from Kołobrzeg and Stargard. The earlier enlisted company of Colonel Asmus Glasenapp, consisting of 180 soldiers, was to support them. In total, the Duke directed most of his heavy forces (560 men) to Szczecinek with the hope of pushing Polish units out of the border area. Eventually the Poles withdrew from the Szczecinek area before the arrival of the Pomeranian companies.

In the face of the threat to the whole country, the mercenaries were also financed by the towns of the Duchy of Wolgast, which granted an increase of heavy forces by 100 musketeers and 150 riders (the whole heavy forces consisted of about 700 infantry and 150 horses). At the same time, the duke decided (at the end of April) to order a mass mobilisation.[59] Its concentration near Szczecinek was set for the beginning of July 1627. The cities of the Duchy of Szczecin turned out to be the most cooperative in the face of the threat, enlisting a total of 5 infantry companions of bourgeois. The first company of 300 soldiers under the command of Captain Johan Tidebahl was set up in Szczecin. The second company with 280 soldiers under the command of Captain Georg Hagemeister consisted of 200 inhabitants of Stargard and 80 bourgeois from Pyrzyce. The third company commanded by captain Joachim Gruntze, with a total of 265 soldiers, consisted

[57] APS, AKS, I/4753, pp. 146–152.

[58] APS, AKS, I/4744, pp. 78–79, 80–85 according to the preserved information Polish troops stayed near Szczecinek and Okonek for a month looting the whole area. Allegedly Poles squeezed two barrels of gold from amt and the city of Szczecinek.

[59] APS, AKS, I/4744, pp. 127–142.

of 50 people from Goleniów, 50 people from Gartz, 40 people from Gryfino, 80 people from Pasewalk, 25 people from Dąbie and 10 people from Banie. The fourth company of 280 people was commanded personally by Colonel Asmus v. Glasenapp and consisted of soldiers from Gryfice (60 people), Trzebiatów (100 people), Wolin, Kamień and Białogard 40 people each. The last fifth company of 260 people was commanded by Captain Büdeman Reinholt and was enlisted by cities of the eastern part of the country: Słupsk (100 people), Sławno (40 people), Darłowo (50 people), Lębork (30 people), Szczecinek and Bytów 15 people each and Sianów (10 people). In total, the cities of the Duchy of Szczecin exhibited 1,385 infantry soldiers.[60] Moreover, the cities financed a driving squad: Szczecin 60 horse riders, Stargard 50 horse riders, Trzebiatów and Słupsk 25 horse riders each, Pyrzyce and Pasewalk 20 horse riders each, Gryfice and Goleniów 15 horse riders each, Białogard 10 horse riders, Gryfino, Gartz, Kamień and Darłowo 8 each, Wolin and Sławno 6 horse riders each and Lębork 4 horse riders each.[61] Apart from the bourgeois, infantry and horsemen; noble cavalry began to be concentrated, the number of which (from the Duchy of Szczecin) reached 279 riders.[62] The whole levy in mass, consisting of 1,385 infantry and 567 horse riders, was to be spread out around Szczecinek. The above-mentioned forces were supported by heavy forces (700 infantry and 150 horse riders) stretched along the borders. In addition, Szczecin attracted a company of over 200 people to defend the city itself. In July 1627, the Pomeranian forces numbered a total of 2,285 infantry and 717 horse riders. Just like in July 1626, the appropriate regulations were published for the enlisted army (July 1627), specifying the duties of soldiers and penalties for non-compliance with discipline.[63] Almost simultaneously with the concentration of the entire Pomeranian forces of just over 3,000 people, there were widespread complaints about the high costs of the food and accommodation for the army, especially from the cities who made the greatest financial contribution.[64] Despite this, they continued to put in their own hauls and additionally created garrisons to

[60] APS, AKS, I/4749, pp. 9–10, where the costs of troops' maintenance and officers' gauges were also calculated, for example, a captain received 200 florins per month, a lieutenant received 100 florins, a sergeant received 60 florins and a corporal received 40 florins. Comp. also: APS, AKS. I/4745, pp. 122–130.

[61] APS, AKS, I/4744, p. 276.

[62] This was far below the number of aristocratic rides according to previous linen lists: APS, AKS, I/4745, pp. 237–245, 258–264, 319–320, 334–339.

[63] APS, AKS, I/4749, pp. 18–32.

[64] Ibidem, pp. 125–134, I/4745, 149–150, 153–156.

protect the cities themselves. During August 1627, the levy in mass, especially the noble's cavalry, was partly dismissed home. The number of mercenary infantry was also reduced to 600 soldiers maintaining a 150-member cavalry unit.

Seeing more and more unfavourable development of the situation in the Reich, Bogislaw XIV returned in August 1627 at the Sejmik in Wolin, to his idea of establishing a bigger permanent army. The ruler demanded that the states should allocate funds for permanent troops, which was necessary to strengthen the neutrality policy. It was decided then that an infantry unit of 1,200 soldiers would be established.[65] Unfortunately, after the resolution was passed, the funds for the army were flowing too slowly to the national treasury in Trzebiatów. In this situation, it was assumed that the Pomeranian infantry would be enlarged to the number of 1,200 people later at the beginning of 1628. Meanwhile, in October 1627, the imperial troops led by Adolph, Duke of Holstein (about 3,000 people) were going to return to the Reich through Pomerania. After longer negotiations, Bogislaw XIV, in agreement with Pomeranian estates, agreed to the emperor's troops march on a strictly defined route (from Lębork through Słupsk, Koszalin, Nowogard, Goleniów to Szczecin). Food and horse feed were prepared along the route, and some sections of the route were covered by the enlisted Pomeranian troops.[66] Thanks to this, there were no major robberies.

After the defeat of the above-mentioned expedition of Christian IV (1626), the imperial army appeared in 1627 in north-eastern Germany, gradually occupying new territories. Despite the increasingly difficult situation, Bogislaw XIV still believed in the imperial promise (July 1627) that the army of Ferdinand II would not violate Pomeranian neutrality. When the Emperor demanded that his troops be allowed into Pomerania to protect the Pomeranian ports from the Swedish, the Duke replied that they would be protected by the enlisted Pomeranian troops. Meanwhile, in October 1627, despite his earlier declarations, Ferdinand II ordered Wallenstein, as commander-in-chief of the imperial army, to order the commander of the imperial troops in Mecklenburg, General Armin, to immediately man the Pomeranian ports, especially the Duchy of Wolgast. The aim was to cut the supply of grain to Sweden. Bogislaw XIV tried at the last minute to bribe Arnima with gifts worth about 60,000 thalers so that the imperial army would not cross the Pomeranian borders. Unfortunately, on November 2, 1627, Duke Bogislaw XIV

[65] According to sejmik's resolutions, 600 soldiers each of the Duchies of Wolgast and Szczecin were to be issued by: H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie*..., p. 183.

[66] H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie*…, pp. 185–186.

was surprised in Franzburg[67] by Albrecht von Wallenstein's delegate and forced to agree to accommodate in Pomerania imperial troops commanded by General Arnim (the so-called Franzburg surrender).[68] This was a complete violation of the previous policy of neutrality, and Pomerania, although under pressure, took the side of the Emperor. It was difficult for Bogislaw XIV to do otherwise, as he was unable to oppose the Emperor's army without any significant military force. Moreover, it should be remembered that in those circumstances the duke was a vassal of the emperor from Pomerania simply obeying the rules.[69] Without finally entering into the assessment of Bogislaw XIV's decision, it must be stated that from November 1627 the Thirty Years' War also covered Pomerania.

To conclude, it must be stated that Pomerania's preparations for the Thirty Years' War were very inadequate, which resulted from the financial weakness of Pomeranian dukes and the estates' reluctance to maintain more mercenary forces. Additionally, these preparations were not a consistently implemented long-term plan. There were also no unambiguous arrangements made jointly by the states and the duke in this matter. In the activities undertaken especially by Bogislaw XIV, one can see, above all, the changing mind depending on the current external situation. Since the spring of 1626, Pomerania began to realize more and more widely the permanence of the external threat, but this did not lead to full cooperation between the duke's authorities and his subjects (Trzebiatów's cash register). It was only at the end of February 1627 that the Swedish troops heading for the war in Royal Prussia passed through their formally neutral country that had a refreshing effect on Pomerania. The threat was also intensified by constant violations of the eastern borders of Pomerania by Swedes and Poles. Therefore, in August 1627 a joint decision (estates – prince) was made to protect Pomerania from external threat. This decision was, however, very late and in November 1627 the Duchy of Pomerania was forced to accept imperial troops.

[67] In October 1627, the duke stayed at the castle in Wolgast and was probably persuaded by the bribed courtiers to travel to Franzburg where MP Wallenstein appeared: Z. Boras, *Książęta*..., pp. 343–344.

[68] *Pomorze Zachodnie poprzez*…, p. 144, H. Lesiński, *Pomorze Zachodnie*…, pp. 186–187 oraz B. Wachowiak, *Pomorze Zachodnie*…, pp. 993–995.

[69] Emperor Ferdinand II confirmed Bogislaw XIV's possession of the Duchy of Szczecin as a fiefdom in Regensburg in 1622.

Bibliography

Archival sources

Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie.

Archiwum Książąt Szczecińskich: I/4742, I/4744, I/4745, I/4746, I/4747, I/4748, I/4749, I/4753, I/4754.

Literature

Boras Z., *Książęta Pomorza Zachodniego*, Poznań 1996.

Bülow G., *Ein drohender Kosakeneinfall in 1625*, "Baltische Studien" AF 1880, 30.

Lesiński H., *Pomorze Zachodnie w latach wojny trzydziestoletniej*, in: *Z dziejów wojennych Pomorza Zachodniego*, ed. B. Miśkiewicz, Poznań 1972.

Olejnik K., *System obronny Pomorza Zachodniego do połowy XVII wieku*, in: *Z dziejów wojennych Pomorza Zachodniego*, ed. B. Miśkiewicz, Poznań 1972.

Pomorze Zachodnie poprzez wieki, ed. J.M. Piskorski, Szczecin 1999.

Rymar E., *Książęta Zachodniopomorscy wobec obronności swego państwa w XII–XVII wieku*, w: *Pomorze Militarne XII–XXI wiek*, ed. K. Kozłowski, E. Rymar, Szczecin 2004.

Wachowiak B., *Pomorze Zachodnie w początkach czasów nowożytnych (1464–1648). Odrodzenie się i upadek państwa pomorskiego*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 2/1, eds. G. Labuda, M. Biskup, M. Bogucka, A. Mączak, B. Wachowiak, Poznań 1976.

„Przygotowania" Pomorza Zachodniego do wojny trzydziestoletniej

Abstrakt

Pomorze Zachodnie nie było przygotowane do obrony swojego terytorium podczas wojny trzydziestoletniej. Pierwszą i zasadniczą tego przyczyną była słabość finansowa książąt pomorskich, których dochody z dóbr, ceł i zwyczajowych podatków nie pozwalały na pełne utrzymanie dworu, a co dopiero na zaciąg znaczniejszych oddziałów wojskowych. W rzeczywistości książęce wojska stałe składały się z około 100 drabantów osłaniających osoby książąt szczecińskiego i wołogoskiego. Podstawową siłą zbrojną księstw było więc pospolite ruszenie składające się ze szlacheckiej jazdy i mieszczańskiej piechoty, różnorodnie uzbrojone i mało zdyscyplinowane. Podstawowymi punktami oporu w razie obcej agresji miały stać się pomorskie miasta, lecz jedynie Stralsund posiadał wybudowane z własnych środków nowoczesne fortyfikacje ziemne. Pozostałe miasta były osłaniane przez średniowieczne mury częściowo (w XVI wieku) przystosowane do broni palnej. Nie trzeba tu podkreślać, że nie stanowiły one większej przeszkody dla

ówczesnej artylerii. Rosnące zagrożenie wojenne spowodowało jednak, że książęta pomorscy zwłaszcza Franciszek I i Bogusław XIV próbowali zmienić ten stan rzeczy. Podjęte działania miały doprowadzić do ufortyfikowania Szczecina (co zrobiono częściowo) oraz powołania stałych sił zbrojnych (ok. 3000 żołnierzy). Powyższe plany przedstawiane przez książąt na pomorskich sejmikach nie spotkały się z przychylnością stanów, które odmówiły pieniędzy na organizację stałej armii i budowę wokół Szczecina nowoczesnych umocnień. Jedynym krótkotrwałym sukcesem książąt, zwłaszcza Bogusława XIV, było zaciąganie na okres największego zagrożenia niewielkich sił zaciężnych mających osłaniać pomorskie granice. W tej sytuacji pozbawieni większej siły zbrojnej ostatni pomorscy książęta Filip Juliusz, a zwłaszcza Bogusław XIV próbowali zachować neutralność w rozpalającym się w Rzeszy konflikcie, lawirując między walczącymi stronami. Politykę neutralności zakończyła tzw. kapitulacja franzburska w listopadzie 1627 roku, kiedy to książę Bogusław XIV zezwolił na wkroczenie na Pomorze wojsk cesarskich.

"Preparations" of Western Pomerania for the Thirty Years' War

Summary

Western Pomerania was not prepared to defend its territory during the Thirty Years' War. The first and principal reason for this was the financial weakness of the Pomeranian dukes, whose income from goods, duties and customary taxes did not allow them to fully maintain the court, let alone to take on major military units. In fact, the duke's permanent army consisted of about 100 guards protecting the dukes of Szczecin and Wolgast. The basic armed force of the Duchies was therefore the common one – a levy in mass consisting of noble riders and the bourgeois infantry, variously armed and undisciplined. The basic points of resistance in case of foreign aggression were to become the Pomeranian cities, but only Stralsund had modern ground fortifications built within its own budget. The remaining cities were shielded by medieval walls partly (at the turn of the 15th and 16th century) adapted to firearms. However, they were not a major obstacle for the artillery of the time. The growing threat of war caused the Pomeranian dukes, especially Francis I and Bogislaw XIV, to try to change this state of affairs. The undertaken actions were to lead to fortification of Szczecin (which was done partially) and establishment of permanent armed forces (about 3,000 soldiers). The above plans presented by the princes in the Pomeranian Sejmiks did not meet with the favour of the states, which refused to provide money to organize a permanent army and build modern fortifications around Szczecin. The only short-term successes of the dukes, especially of Bogislaw XIV, were the incurring of small permanent forces to cover the Pomeranian borders for the period of the greatest threat. In this situation, the last Pomeranian dukes Philipp Julius, and especially Bogislaw XIV, who were deprived of a greater military force, tried

to maintain neutrality in the conflict which was flaring up in the Empire by repeatedly switching sides between parts of the conflict. The policy of neutrality was ended by the so-called 'Franzburg Surrender' in November 1627, when Duke Bogislaw XIV allowed the imperial army to enter Pomerania.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-08

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Radosław Skrycki
ORCID: 0000-0002-6710-4774
University of Szczecin, Faculty of Humanities
e-mail: radoslaw.skrycki@op.pl

Swedish military cartography of the Thirty Years' War. The example of Pomerania and the New March (Neumark)

Keywords: history of cartography, military cartography, fortress cartography
Słowa kluczowe: historia kartografii, kartografia militarna, kartografia forteczna

Military cartography of the modern era is rarely a subject of theoretical considerations and scientific reflection in Poland. In October 2016, a scientific conference was held in Toruń, as part of a joint initiative of the History of Cartography Group of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History and Archives of the Nicolaus Copernicus University. The conference was mainly devoted to this very field of knowledge about historical maps.[1] In a sense, it was a continuation of another meeting, which also took place in Toruń over 20 years earlier.[2] If we

[1] "Dawna kartografia wojskowa krajów młodszej Europy XVI–XX wieku", Toruń 13–15 października 2016. Materials from this conference were published in the series "Z dziejów kartografii" (vol. XXII) entitled *Dawna kartografia historyczna i wojskowa*, ed. B. Konopska, J. Ostrowski, P. Weszpiński, Warszawa 2018.

[2] "Kartografia wojskowa krajów strefy bałtyckiej XVI–XX w.", Toruń 20–22 października 1994. The meeting was followed by a volume under the same title, edited by S. Alexandrowicz, Z. Karpus and W. Rezmer (Toruń 1996).

additionally take into account that military cartography is one of the main topics of our research, which only few historians (including Stanisław Herbst or Tadeusz Marian Nowak) have made one of their main topics, and in the most recent synthesis of the history of cartography of the Polish lands it practically does not exist on its own,[3] it is clear that this field is still waiting for its monographers. Perhaps the growing interest will motivate the scientific communities to focus on developing a handbook of military cartography, because B. Olszewicz's 1921 work, which is rather a general synthesis of cartography with particular emphasis on military aspects, appears to be the only extensive one.[4] It should also be remembered that former military cartography is a part of historical cartography and as such is the important auxiliary science of history – historical geography. However, in the newest textbook by Jan Tyszkiewicz, in subsection *2.6 Military Landscape*, maps are not mentioned at all.[5]

This insufficiency is even more noticeable because any maps made by or used by the army are *the core of* modern cartographic production, especially when it comes to medium and large scale maps, manuscripts, fortresses' plans and plans for battles and war campaigns. They are of a growing interest not only to professional historians, who more and more often begin to treat them as self-sufficient sources with all the consequences, but also to regionalists, militaries' collectors or battlefield archaeologists, for whom a city plan or an exact battle plan, created in the course of a given war, or just after it, is sometimes the only or the most accurate area guide they have.

In the case of Pomerania and eastern Brandenburg (the New March), i.e. areas that were strongly "underdeveloped" in cartography, where, with one exception – the map of Eilhard Lubinus from 1618 – no domestic organized cartographic work was carried out before the middle of the 18th century. It was the Thirty Years' War that brought about a rapid development of cartography. It is a paradox that in the misfortune and trauma of the war, when these areas found themselves in the field of interest of the greediest and plundering state in the Baltic Sea basin – this brought about an incredible and unprecedented development in cartographic works.

[3] Only fragments of chapters and subchapters on the development of cartography of individual historical districts of Poland are devoted to it. See S. Alexandrowicz, J. Łuczyński, R. Skrycki, *Historia kartografii ziem polskich do końca XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2017.

[4] B. Olszewicz, *Polska kartografja wojskowa*, Warszawa 1921.

[5] J. Tyszkiewicz, *Geografia historyczna. Zarys problematyki*, Warszawa 2014.

For the purpose of this work, there has been an attempt made to systematize the types of cartography created at that time, which may become the basis for further research on the categories and types of military maps. It can also be assumed that in the area of interest and in the period 1630–1653[6] all kinds of maps and plans were created, except for the plans of battles (because it would be difficult to find out about these battles too).

The role of the map as an indispensable tool in the conduct of war (both in terms of planning the campaign and documenting its course) was significantly appreciated by Professor Jeremy Black, who included it in the canon of those issues which in modern times led to a breakthrough in the conduct of war and which he calls "tools of war".[7] For the area of the then Pomeranian Principality and the Brandenburg New March this breakthrough was made by the presence of Gustaw Adolf's army. While emphasizing the military reforms of the King of Sweden, which primarily concerned the functioning of the army in the field, it is forgotten that equally important were the aspects of the organisation of the victualling and securing the backside and fortification of places considered strategically important. For all these activities, well-trained engineering services were needed, and among them definitely the cartographers, who were not only able to develop maps but also to read already existing ones, those made with the use of different methods. Thanks to this, we now have a great and extensive collection of maps, stored in the Stockholm War Archive. Unexpectedly, as Björn Gäfvert, noted at the beginning of the 21st century the interest of Swedish researchers in them is rather limited, focused mainly on using them as sources for research, hence no synthetic monograph on military cartography in general has ever been available.[8]

General Maps

Gustaw Adolf's cartographic understanding on the eve of joining the conflict on the continent was quite good, but this is especially true of the Baltic areas. The coast of the Principality of Pomerania was chosen as the landing point on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, and for this area an excellent and accurate

[6] The time boundaries were between the years of the landing of Swedish troops in Pomerania and marking out the border between the Brandenburg and Swedish parts after the war.

[7] J. Black, *Narzędzia wojny*, Warszawa 2008, p. 123 (eng. edition: *Tools of War: The Weapons that Changed the World*, 2007).

[8] B. Gäfvert, *Maps and war – the swedish experience during the thirty years war*, https://www.lwl.org/ westfaelischer-friede-download/wfe-t/wfe-txt1-33.htm (10.07.2019).

map of Eilhard Lubinus from 1618 was available – even if not in the original, in atlas copies from Hondius or Blaeu.[9] The hypothesis expressed by Gäfvert that the King of Sweden's knowledge was based on the map of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea by Anders Buraeus should be rejected;[10] this map, although it includes Pomerania, is extremely modest in content for this area and cannot be used as a basis for campaign planning. Furthermore, it only reaches a little further south. It cannot be ruled out, and may even be very likely, that the Swedes had spies obtaining material from all over Europe. In addition, during previous campaigns in Poland, a quite substantial collection of maps were made and acquired, partly made by foreign cartographers in the Swedish service.[11]

The tradition of military cartography had its birth in 16th-century Sweden, when the first military cartographers appeared in the early Swedish state,[12] but never was cartographic service organised in this country as perfectly as in the times of Gustaw Adolf. No wonder, then, that exactly one year after the intervention in the Reich began, the king wrote to his general Johan Banér, then from Northern Saxony: 'All our land maps here come to an end'.[13]

In the case of countries such as Pomerania, it was necessary to carry out revisions in the form of maps of smaller parts of the Principality, which could be based on Lubinus and correcting his errors. There was a much bigger problem with Brandenburg, for which there was a very imperfect map of Elias Camerarius, which appeared in printed versions in atlases of Ortelius, Mercator and Dutch publishers.[14] This list of publishers alone shows that it could not meet the expectations of the demanding army quarters. For this reason, a new map of the Electorate was commissioned, and one of the most eminent cartographers for the King of Sweden and his general quartermaster, Olof Hansson Svart,[15] took on this task.

[9] See more about this map: *Eilharda Lubinusa podróż przez Pomorze*, ed. R. Skrycki, Szczecin 2013.

[10] B. Gäfvert, *Maps and war – the swedish experience…*

[11] U. Ehrensvärd, *Cartographica Poloniae 1570–1930. Katalog źródeł rękopiśmiennych do historii ziem polskich w zbiorach szwedzkich*, Warszawa–Sztokholm 2008, p. XVI.

[12] K. Łopatecki, *Działalność szwedzkich kartografów na ziemiach Rzeczypospolitej w I poł. XVII w.*, in: K. Łopatecki, W. Walczak, *Mapy i plany Rzeczypospolitej XVII w. znajdujące się w archiwach w Sztokholmie*, vol. 1, Warszawa 2011, p. 28.

[13] B. Gäfvert, *Maps and war – the swedish experience…*

[14] For more information see R. Skrycki, *Dzieje kartografii Nowej Marchii do końca XVIII*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 40–68.

[15] Ibidem, pp. 73–74, here's the basic bibliography.

The manuscript of the map (Figure 1) was probably created in 1631 but its later water-coloured duplicates are also well known.[16] The map covers the whole of Brandenburg, but the abundance of detail corresponds to the range of the Swedish army at the time the map was created, as Wolfgang Scharfe pointed out at the time.[17] This is particularly evident in the eastern New March (this later resulted in empty printed variants). The content of the map, although it constitutes a significant progress in relation to the image of the Camerarius, is still incomplete – there are almost no road networks, the author focused mainly on the settlement network, forest complexes and watercourses, i.e. natural field obstacles and potential military supply sites.




Figure 1. Map of Brandenburg by Olof Hansson Svart, manuscript 1631
From the Krigsarkivet collection in Stockholm.

Since Svart's map was actually printed, also containing details about different lands in Brandenburg, it must be assumed that shortly after the drawing was made, it was copied many times and one of the main reproductions was sent

[16] *Landt Brandenburgh*, Krigsarkivet Stockholm SE/KrA/0425/02/051.

[17] W. Scharfe, *Die Brandenburg-Karte von Olof Hansson Svart (1630–31)*, in: *Mitteilungsblatt des Arbeitskreises für Historische Kartographie*, ed. G. Heinrich, Münster 1994, p. 14.

to Amsterdam. The map has been published here since the beginning of the 1940s in all important cartographic outposts. A product made for the purposes of war has thus become widely available and used by "civilian" users.

Boundary maps

The provisions of the Westphalian Peace created a new legal and political situation in Pomerania. With the extinction of the native dynasty of Griffins, the most urgent matter was to make decisions about the future fate of the country. The right of inheritance in the event of the heirless death of the principality's rulers was held by the Brandenburg Hohenzollern family, however, it was limited by the agreement between Boguslaw XIV and Gustav Adolf in summer 1630, later confirmed by the Pomeranian states in April 1631.[18] This restriction became all the more important because it was Sweden that largely dictated the conditions after the war.

Eventually, a compromise solution was reached, according to which Brandenburg occupied the eastern part of Pomerania, while the whole estuary of the Oder River with Szczecin, the islands and the area to the west of the river and a few dozen kilometers of "buffer" on its eastern side fell to Sweden. As the Treaty of Osnabrück determined the course of the border quite enigmatically, a joint commission had to be set up with its course on the ground. It happened only in 1653, i.e. 5 years after the formal end of the warfare.

We know at least two maps of Swedish provenance, which describe the border. One of them covers only the mouth of the Oder River, while the other covers the entire Swedish part of Pomerania (Figure 2).[19] It was performed by Captain Hans Heinrich Crausse probably in 1654 and dedicated it to King Charles X Gustav, who ascended the throne that year. The map is an interesting and unique example of the scale of Pomeranian photography. Although maps of this type (made mainly in cases of border disputes) were known in the Principality, they never covered such a large area and were not so accurate. It was enough to look at the map of Lubinus, which describes the state border with a soft dotted line, without any nuance and without actually reflecting the complicated situation in the field.

[18] B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa zachodniopomorskiego*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. II, part 1, ed. G. Labuda, Poznań 1976, p. 999.

[19] Untitled map, colour reproduction in: U. Ehrensvärd, *Cartographica Poloniae 1570–1930…*, item 1418, Fig. 25 (here the bibliographic description).



Figure 2. Map of the border in Pomerania after the Thirty Years' War
From Krigsarkivet collection in Stockholm.

The value of this map, from the point of view of a historian, lies not only in a fairly accurate mapping of the course of the border itself,[20] but also in the clear scrutiny of the cultural landscape within the mouth of the Oder River. The map shows a number of local names used by the local population, which are not available on topographic maps from the late 19th century. Therefore, they were not official or commonly known names, but because of their presence in the consciousness of the inhabitants of a given area, they were perfectly suited to determine the points characteristic of the border. Examples of such characteristic points are e.g.

[20] Together with history students, the author led a two-year scientific project "Border", which consisted in marking out the former border between Brandenburg and Sweden in the field. The basis was the described map, and despite many inaccuracies, it was quite good as a starting point for field work, especially in the Puszcza Bukowa (a large forest near Szczecin).

two oaks on the border with lands of Goleniów; "Three Brothers" means three trees; another "Three Brothers" – this time three hills (the name used until today); "Herring Hill" (*Herringsberg*) and others. If we add to this the great attention to details of topography (maybe apart from orography, which is quite superficial), settlement network and great attraction in recreating hydrography (with the complicated lower course of the Oder River north of the Rurzyca estuary) together with buildings such as mills, we will get a document which brings a great knowledge of the cultural landscape of Pomerania in the mid-17th century.

The fortress plans

When moving the army, especially in foreign lands, one of the most important issues is to secure the rear and supply routes. This is done, among other things, either by occupying existing fortresses or by strengthening previously undepreciated towns and establishing supply warehouses. Therefore, first of all, having an insight into the topography of the area, it is necessary to recognize the existing state of fortification of the occupied area, and then to vetting individual settlements. **Inventory** plans are therefore created which, in a way, summarise the existing state of the fortifications in a specific case. Sometimes they cover a larger area – the city with its further surroundings, sometimes they focus only on a particular town. Its buildings are usually shown in the form of whole quarters divided by a grid of larger streets (the colour of the material from which the buildings are mostly made is emphasized, e.g. red is usually brick buildings, brown is wood), without specifying the layout of individual plots, alleys or road curves. Particularly distinctive are the characteristic buildings, whose body (and usually the tower) rises above the crown of the walls, thanks to which they are easily recognizable and constitute landmarks, e.g. during the siege of the city; if the plan is carto metric, firing at specific points of the city at a certain distance from that point is not problematic. Since a larger number of, for example; churches can be difficult to identify, especially during the first contact with the city, they are often shown on the set in the form of axonometric projections, with attention to detail. An example of such a picture is the plan of Kołobrzeg from 1648, made with carefully multi-coloured ink by an excellent draftsman and military engineer, Erik Jönssona Dahlberg (Figure 3).[21]

[21] *Geometrisch Plan der Stadt Colberg Anno 1648*, Krigsarkivet Stockholm. Handritade kartenverk 21. Colourful reproduction in: R. Skrycki, *Kołobrzeg w wojnie siedmioletniej. Źródła kartograficzne do dziejów miasta w XVIII wieku*, Kołobrzeg 2011, item 8.

The plan, which is also typical, focuses on elements important from the military point of view – the complicated hydrographic situation, the course of the city's fortifications, including the medieval walls, the main communication routes and the general characteristics of the buildings with the eastern suburbs.




Figure 3. Plan of Kołobrzeg from 1648 Erik Jönssona Dahlberg
From Krigsarkivet collection in Stockholm.

The above-mentioned plan is, at the same time, an example of another kind of cartographic elaboration – **design plans**. Often it was the inventory plans that became the basis for the development of the construction /expansion /reconstruction of city fortifications. It was then possible to illustrate the concept of their development; thanks to this it is possible to capture a certain thought which guided the military engineers who decided that the strategic situation of the fortress would change here and produced this shape. In this particular case, it was planned to eliminate, among others, the eastern horn work and replace it with a bastion.

This intention was not realized, which in turn results from inventory plans made (also by the Swedes) on the eve of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).

Ordre de bataille

Non-cartographic sources, but accompanying maps (especially plans of battles and sieges) are the so-called *ordre de bataille*, i.e. graphical representations of the armies' movements before and during a battle, using simple and legible signatures. There are many such documents in the collection of Stockholm's Krigsarkivet, including a handwritten sheet showing the position of Swedish troops in seven battles between 26 June 1630 and 7 September 1631.[22]

The individual units were marked with rectangles (infantry) and squares (cavalry), with most of them having additionally described commander. These are the towns in turn: Szczecin (26 June 1630), Gryfino (23 December 1630), Frankfurt (3 April 1631), Spandau (10 June 1631), Tangermünde and Werben (10 July 1631), Wittenberg (3 September 1631) and Leipzig (7 September 1631).

The first mentioned was the battle near Szczecin. Since this event took place on the same day that the Swedish troops landed in Peenemünde,[23] it seems that it was a clash with a small unit, perhaps an observation unit, of the Imperial army. Nevertheless, the plan shows that the Swedish army developed a battle array; it was led by Colonel Teufel. From the descriptions given at most of the signatures it appears that while the cavalry was geographically identified (e.g. Finns, Livonians, Swedes from Smalandia, etc.), the infantry regiments are described by their commanders (Monroe, Hebron, Oxenstierna, etc.).

A much more accurate document is another, multi-coloured manuscript, showing two *ordre de bataille* Swedes approaching Szczecin on 30 June 1630 and Gryfino on 14 December that year (Figure 4).[24] In both cases, we have a clear, color-coded distinction of signatures, although their description is inconsistent; some of them are signed by the place of origin of the army (e.g. 4 squadrons (?)

[22] *Alla Bataille Ordningar...*, Krigsarkivet Stockholm, Sveriges Krig 2.90.

[23] M. Wehrmann (*Geschichte der Stadt Stettin*, Frankfurt a. Main 1979 [first print: Stettin 1911], p. 270) gives the date of landing on 24 June, while B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa...*, p. 998 (although later the author changed his mind and dated the landing on June 24th; idem, *Szczecin w okresie wojny 30-letniej*, w: *Dzieje Szczecina*, vol. II, ed. G. Labuda, Warszawa–Poznań 1985, p. 353) and L.E. Wolke and others. (L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Thirty Years' War. Europa i świat (1618–164)*, Warszawa 2010, p. 99–100) give the date of arrival on 24 June to the shores of Rügen, while the disembarkation was to take place only two days later.

[24] *Konung Gustavi Adolphi Bataille for Stettein...*, Krigsarkivet Stockholm, Sveriges Krig 2.88.

of cavalry from Stralsund) other, the same formations were characterized by their commander (also 4 squadrons under the command of General Åke Tott).




Figure 4. *Ordre de battaile* from 1630
From the Krigsarkivet collection in Stockholm.

In the "Szczecin" section, in two cases we find information about the number of Musketeer regiments – 250 soldiers of General Joachim von Mitzlaff and 288 under unidentified Hall. This ensures that the rectangular signature means infantry (musketeers or pikemen). An important piece of information is the identification of the front of the formation – the royal guard at Teufel is located here. It is difficult to determine the types of troops involved. It seems that we are dealing here with a mixed formation, consisting of infantry and, perhaps, artillery. Two flanks are similarly constructed (here commanded by General Alexander Leslie and Marshal Falckenberg). The other units were set up in homogeneous formations. There were 3 squadrons from the Palatinate in the drains.

The second part, describing the battle at Gryfino, presents a completely different setting of the army. It seems that the approach to Szczecin was supposed to be a demonstration; under Gryfino we are dealing with a combat formation

headed by Mitzlaff and each of the formations is signed – name of the commander, place of formation or type of weapon (e.g. dragons twice on the left wing).

It is difficult to say whether in these *ordre de bataille* we can already find echoes of the military reforms made by Gustaw Adolf, who reduced the size of the various formations, especially those of pedestrians, increasing their manoeuvrability in the field, because apart from the occasional indication of the size of the troops, their actual size we can guess. It is also difficult to clearly distinguish artillery among the weapons. We must also remember that on a flat sheet of paper we have an ideal image, reproduced *post factum,* and the conditions of the topography of the terrain forced the formation of the chic, shifts and disturbances of the assumed distances.

Iconography of propaganda

Finally, the little-known aspect of the use of cartography in propaganda leaflets should be mentioned. When Sweden joined the war, this intervention had to be justified. While King Christian IV of Denmark was at the same time Prince of the Reich as the ruler of Schleswig and his participation was completely natural, his "successor" in the role of the Lion of the North, Gustav Adolphus, had to reach for his religious kinship and the defence of the Protestant faith. It was ideal to use tracing paper from the period when Europe was overtaken by the Reformation, and the Pope and the Jesuits, who were close to him, appeared to be the cause of all evil in the eyes of Lutherans. The Swedish administration was well aware that in order to achieve success, apart from an efficient and battlegrounded army, the background and attitude of the civilian population towards the army were important. Thus, the image of Gustaw Adolf was used, on the one hand, as a defender of the faith and, on the other, as a liberator from the papist oppression.

The Germanisches Nationalmuseum in Nuremberg holds a collection of such prints (copperplates), mostly anonymous, created between 1630–1632, and in one case even a hundred years later.[25] They are built according to the same scheme, although they differ in details and composition. Therefore, there is always a portrait of the king of Sweden and plans and views of cities, arranged in ribbons.

[25] On the occasion of the centenary of Gustaw Adolf's great campaigns around 1731, the Augsburg engraver and publisher Elias Bäck published a commemorative print referring to those of the Thirty Years' War. The Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg HB 5079 Kapsel 1343 is an interesting contribution to the interest of the Swedish king in the German countries, which since the 1830s has developed into a cult that lasted until the early 20th century.



Figure 5. Extract from the 1632 leaflet

From the collection of the Germanisches Nationalmuseum in Nuremberg.

The 1632 print published in Nuremberg by Simon Halbmayer (Figure 5)[26] could be a very good example. It is an interesting instance of the extensive image which is also accompanied by an equally extensive description in the form of text printed separately. The composition is based on the placement in the central part of the half-part of Gustaw Adolf in the armour, holding the regiment, the other hand putting on the open catechism, which in turn is based on the Bible. On the opposite side of the medallion with the king, we find a hat hanging on a stick with

[26] *Kurtze description and contrafacture brought into the copper*, Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg HB 5079, Kapsel 1345.

a ribbon containing the inscription *Libertas*. It is a quite easily readable iconographic message, which speaks about a strong (armed) nobleman, whose inspiration in action was Christ and religion, and the foundations were the Holy Book's verses. The aim of the intervention was, of course, freedom, here in the sense of liberating the Protestant oppressed by Catholics.

To highlight the successes achieved thanks to Divine Providence, a snail ribbon comes out of the figure of the monarch, on which the cities in the Reich "taken away" from the Pope's cities are placed. There are over a hundred of them and they are presented in the form of views (some of them are additionally burning, which emphasizes the cost and effort of getting them) and plans and vantage projects. Although the quality of the performances is quite schematic due to their small size, they retain their individual features. Each of the towns is additionally provided with a numerical index, thanks to which the author refers us to a separate legend, which describes the circumstances of conquering that town.

Thus, apart from self-contained maps, which became a tool for propaganda and self-promotion of the dynasty and state, cartography was also used as part of larger compositions. It can therefore be concluded that the awareness with which the military authorities approached the map and the wealth of types and forms of cartography that appeared in general circulation in printed form, supplemented by those that remained in the manuscript forever, puts Swedish cartography during the Thirty Years' War in the first place among European countries. It does mark the Swedish predecessors as one of the most influential cartographers of the first half of the 17th century.

Bibliography

Sources

Alla Bataille Ordningar..., Krigsarkivet Stockholm, Sveriges Krig 2.90.

Geometrisch Plan der Stadt Colberg Anno 1648, Krigsarkivet Stockholm. Handritade kartenverk 21.

Konung Gustavi Adolphi Bataille for Stettein..., Krigsarkivet Stockholm, Sveriges Krig 2.88.

Kurtze Beschreibung und ins Kupffer gebrachte Contrafacturn..., Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nürnberg HB 5079 Kapsel 1345.

Landt Brandenburgh, Krigsarkivet Stockholm SE/KrA/0425/02/051.

Literature

Alexandrowicz S., Łuczyński J., Skrycki R., *Historia kartografii ziem polskich do końca XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2017.

Black J., *Narzędzia wojny*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 123.

Dawna kartografia wojskowa krajów młodszej Europy XVI–XX wieku, in: *Dawna kartografia historyczna i wojskowa*, eds. B. Konopska, J. Ostrowski, P. Weszpiński, Warszawa 2018.

Ehrensvärd U., *Cartographica Poloniae 1570–1930. Katalog źródeł rękopiśmiennych do historii ziem polskich w zbiorach szwedzkich*, Warszawa–Sztokholm 2008.

Eilharda Lubinusa podróż przez Pomorze, ed. R. Skrycki, Szczecin 2013.

Gäfvert B., *Maps and war – the swedish experience during the thirty years war*, https://www.lwl.org/westfaelischer-friede-download/wfe-t/wfe-txt1-33.htm (10.07.2019).

Kartografia wojskowa krajów strefy bałtyckiej XVI–XX w., eds. S. Alexandrowicz, Z. Karpus, W. Rezmer, Toruń 1996.

Łopatecki K., *Działalność szwedzkich kartografów na ziemiach Rzeczypospolitej w I poł. XVII w.*, in: K. Łopatecki, W. Walczak, *Mapy i plany Rzeczypospolitej XVII w. znajdujące się w archiwach w Sztokholmie*, vol. 1, Warszawa 2011.

Olszewicz B., *Polska kartografja wojskowa*, Warszawa 1921.

Scharfe W., *Die Brandenburg-Karte von Olof Hansson Svart (1630–31)*, in: *Mitteilungsblatt des Arbeitkreises für Historische Kartographie*, ed. G. Heinrich, Münster 1994.

Skrycki R., *Dzieje kartografii Nowej Marchii do końca XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2008.

Skrycki R., *Kołobrzeg w wojnie siedmioletniej. Źródła kartograficzne do dziejów miasta w XVIII wieku*, Kołobrzeg 2011.

Tyszkiewicz J., *Geografia historyczna. Zarys problematyki*, Warszawa 2014.

Wachowiak B., *Szczecin w okresie wojny 30-letniej*, in: *Dzieje Szczecina*, vol. II, ed. G. Labuda, Warszawa–Poznań 1985.

Wachowiak B., *Upadek państwa zachodniopomorskiego*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. II, part 1, ed. G. Labuda, Poznań 1976, p. 999.

Wehrmann M., *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin*, Frankfurt a. Main 1979 (pierwodruk: Stettin 1911).

Wolke L.E., Larsson G., Villstrand N.E., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia. Europa i świat (1618–1648)*, Warszawa 2010.

Szwedzka kartografia wojskowa okresu wojny trzydziestoletniej. Przykład pomorski i nowomarchijski

Abstrakt

Wojskowa kartografia szwedzka w okresie wojny trzydziestoletniej stanowi wzorcowy przykład rozwoju sposobów i metod wykonywania map w okresie dynamicznego rozwoju mapowania coraz to nowych obszarów świata. Rozwój ten dokonywał się za sprawą inżynierów wojskowych i był ukierunkowany przede wszystkim na zaspokojenie potrzeb wojska. Podczas wojny i w okresie tuż po niej powstały niemal wszystkie rodzaje i typy map, które wkrótce zaczęły funkcjonować w kartografii jako samodzielne kierunki jej rozwoju.

Scharakteryzowano je na przykładzie dzieł powstałych dla ziem dawnego Księstwa Pomorskiego oraz brandenburskiej Nowej Marchii. W większości przechowywane są w zbiorach szwedzkiego Archiwum Wojennego (Krigsarkivet) w Sztokholmie i pozostały w rękopisie. Do dzieł tych zaliczono także druki ulotne, które co prawda nie były szwedzkiej proweniencji, ale związane były z obecnością szwedzkiej armii na terenach Rzeszy, a które stanowią ciekawy i mało znany przyczynek do wykorzystania mapy i planu miasta jako narzędzia propagandy.

Swedish military cartography of the Thirty Years' War. The example of Pomerania and the New March (Neumark)

Abstract

Swedish military cartography during the Thirty Years' War is a model example of the development of ways and methods of mapping in a period of dynamic development of mapping new areas of the world. This development was made by military engineers and was primarily aimed at meeting the needs of the military. During the war and in the period, just after it, almost all types and types of maps were created, which soon began to function in cartography as independent directions of its development.

They are characterized on the example of works created for the lands of the former Pomeranian Principality and the Brandenburg New March. They are mostly kept in the collection of the Swedish War Archive (Krigsarkivet) in Stockholm and remain in the manuscripts. These works also included elusive prints, which, although not of Swedish provenance, were related to the presence of the Swedish army in the territory of the Reich, and which are an interesting and little-known contribution to the use of the maps and the towns plans as a propaganda tool.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-09

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Grzegorz Podruczny
ORCID: 0000-0002-5325-6363
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Collegium Polonicum in Słubice,
e-mail: g_podruczny@wp.pl

Siege activities during the Thirty Years' War and their impact on the construction of modern fortresses in Pommern, Neumark and Schlesien

Keywords: Thirty Years' War, siege war, fortifications, siege, bastion, military history, Schlesien, Neumark, Pommern
Słowa kluczowe: Wojna trzydziestoletnia, wojna oblężnicza, fortyfikacje, oblężenie, bastion, historia wojskowości, Śląsk, Nowa Marchia, Pomorze

Pommern, the historic Neumark (also Neumark) and Schlesien were areas where intensive warfare was taking place during the Thirty Years' War. This armed conflict not only permanently shaped the political geography of this part of Central Europe, but also propelled the development of siege art and contributed to the spread of the bastion fortification in this area.

The bastion, as a new solution in the fortification, was born at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Italy, but very quickly spread throughout Europe. The bastions, five-sided defensive structures, were much better than the previous solutions – generally referred as bastei. Not only did they enable more effective defence using artillery but also protected the artillery of the defenders against the attacker's shooting. The precision of the flank fire provided by the bastion front and covering the whole foreground with fire, without 'blind' fields, again gave the defenders an advantage over the attackers. The advantage




Figure 1. Bastion front operation scheme

G. Cataneo, *Libro Nuovo di fortificare offendere et difendere*, Brescia 1567, p. 38.

previously violated by the introduction of black powder artillery. The bastion fortresses started to be built outside Italy as early as the 1530s. The oldest bastions in Central Europe appeared as early as in the 1540s (Dresden) and in the present-day Poland in the next decade (Küstrin).[1] Nevertheless, a century later, at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, bastion fortresses were still uncommon in this part of the continent. This should not come as a surprise as the surrounding bastions of the entire defence perimeter was a considerable expense that only wealthy subjects – states or large and rich cities – could afford. Referring to the discussed area before 1618, there were actually two fortresses here, surrounded by a complete wreath of bastions – the already mentioned Küstrin and also Driesen situated in the Neumark.[2] Interestingly, in Pommern, before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the above-mentioned fortifications were never built but they were definitely built in Schlesien. The city closest to the creation of a full-scale bastion frontline was Breslau, where 7 bastions were erected before 1618, together with the curtains connecting them, successfully surrounding almost half of the city.[3] Much smaller scale was the bastion fortifications in Brieg with only 2 bastions and two sections of curtains.[4] The appearance of the bastion fortifications in Neiße remains a mystery still today. In 1594 architect Johann Schneider von Lindau designed a project of bastion reconstruction covering entire fortifications – surrounding the bastion circuit of the New Town and the seven-bastion-front in the Old Town area. However, it is likely that this project was only carried out in a minimised form.[5] Of the Silesian towns where new bastion fortifications ap-

[1] M. Wichrowski, *Budowniczy twierdz*, in: *In silentio et spe fortituda mea. Johann von Küstrin – Jan z Kostrzyna*, Kostrzyn nad Odrą 2014, pp. 274–275; Wichrowski M., *Najstarsze bastiony w Polsce. Zagadnienie chronologii budowy renesansowej twierdzy Kostrzyn w zwierciadle uczonej literatury i źródeł archiwalnych*, "Nowa Marchia – prowincja zapomniana" 2016, no. 12, pp. 197–201.

[2] G. Podruczny, M. Wichrowski, *Kostrzyn i jego satelity. Brandenburskie fortyfikacje stałe w dorzeczu Środkowej Odry od wojny 30-letniej po wojny śląskie*, in: *Dziennik jeńca i inne szkice. Twierdza Kostrzyn w przeszłości*, eds. B. Myketow, K. Sanocka, M. Turek, Kostrzyn–Zielona Góra 2006, pp. 24–26.

[3] G. Podruczny, *Twierdza Wrocław w okresie fryderycjańskim. Fortyfikacje, garnizon i działania wojenne w latach 1741–1806*, Wrocław 2008, pp. 19–22.

[4] G. Podruczny, *Twierdza Brzeg w okresie fryderycjańskim*, in: *Wokół bitwy pod Małujowicami. Studia z dziejów XVIII-wiecznego Brzegu i ziemi brzeskiej*, eds. G. Podruczny, A. Peszko, Brzeg 2017, pp. 22–23.

[5] The issue of the degree of implementation of this project is difficult to determine. Although the perspective view of Neiße by Georg Hayer, created in the early 17th century, shows the existence of one bastion and two pieces of curtains in the perimeter of the New Town and almost half of the front defending the Old Town, the sources known from the first half of the 17th century seem to

peared, only those in Breslau could play a significant role in the defence, although here, too, about half of the city district consisted of older, early-modern bastions.




Figure 2. Siege of the bastion fortress: proximity works (sap) scheme of artillery firing against the fortress, defence of the breach in the rampart behind the retreat
G. Cataneo, *Libro Nuovo di fortificare offendere et difendere*, Brescia 1567, p. 70.

Being parallel to the emergence of new types of fortifications, ways were sought for their effective conquest. Some of the siege techniques, such as storming, have been known since the dawn of time, but the introduction of artillery and bastion fortifications resulted in new ones. First of all, there were forms of a close-up attack, consisting in the construction of zigzagging trenches in the foreground of the fortress, which were used to approach the attacked fortress. Their arrangement into a complete procedure was a complicated matter but guaranteed to conquer the fortress. Remarkably, it was not developed until the

contradict this. Confirmation of the partial realization of at least the bastion front of the Old Town is, on the other hand, the relics of the bastions that can be read on the plans of the Neiße Stronghold from the second half of the 18th century.

time between the 17th and 18th century although the most important elements of a proximal attack – zigzagged trenches called 'sap' – appeared as early as the 16th century. Besides, artillery firing techniques were developed and quite swiftly, the attackers learned how to concentrate artillery fire on one point in order to break the breach in the rampart. The development of artillery and the emergence of new types of missiles (exploding, incendiary) and new cannons (mortars) resulted in new techniques of firing on the fortress – throwing bombs at the object together with incendiary gunfire. Finally, there were also attempts to use the energy of a black powder explosion without cannons. The most popular technique used until World War I was the mine warfare, which consisted of excavating the enemy fortifications and blowing them up from underneath. Another technique was the use of petards, specific explosive charges consisting of two heavy elements connected together in the form of a long cylinder. There was a powder cavity in one of them and a petard would be lit up and placed in front of the element to be destroyed. It would then be placed by a fortress gate from one side whilst being blocked by the ground from the other end. A petard explosion sets off its top like a rocket, destroying the target. Setting up a petard was a very difficult and risky task, and this technique has disappeared over time.[6]

The Thirty Years' War, or more specifically the intensive fortress war using all siege techniques known at the time, clearly demonstrated the weakness of the fortifications in the area described and, as a result, contributed to the spread of the bastion fortification. Towards the end of this conflict, the bastion fortifications – on a larger or smaller scale – had several dozen towns. In Schlesien, new fortifications gained: Brieg, Neiße, Glogau, Ohlau, Namslau, Liegnitz, Jauer, Reichenbach and Schweidnitz, Wohlau, Groß Wartenberg, Oels, Oppeln, Sprottau, Hirschberg and other cities were slightly strengthened, Breslau was also completely fortified. On the territory of the Neumark it was the strongholds in Crossen an der Oder, Frankfurt (Oder), Oderberg and Landsberg a. Warthe. In Pommern, on the other hand, strong bastion fortifications were built in Stettin, Damm, Kolberg, Stralsund, Anklam, Demmin, Greifswald, supplemented by smaller defense complexes in Cammin in Pommern, Rügenwalde, Dievenow, Stargard, Swinemünde, Dammgarten, Penemünde, Wolgast, Gartz, Greifenhagen and Uckermünde. Such

[6] The best synthetic overview of modern siege techniques is offered by the works of Ch. Duffy, including *Fire and stone: the science of fortress warfare, 1660–1860* (the work used the Czech translation *Kamen a ohen. Bastionova pevnost, jeji zrod a vyvoj v dejinach pevnostniho velecnictvi*, Brno 1998, pp. 104–167).

a multiplication of new fortifications should not come as a surprise, taking into account the fact that in the discussed area during the Thirty Years' War, and more precisely between 1625 and 1648, 121 events took place, which can be classified as fortress war: shootings, assaults or regular sieges with the use of trench attacks.[7] For example, in Schlesien, 32 towns were attacked 75 times in total. On the territory of the Neumark – 5 localities in total 16 times, and on the territory of Pommern – 12 localities in total 29 times. The fights were carried out for all the field points that were important at the time of the war. Small towns, not important as defensive points were not militarised so were occupied without a fight. On the other hand, the largest or strongest fortified towns were not conquered due to the whole range of potential difficulties – but this only applied to places like Breslau, a large, rich and strongly fortified town,[8] as well as Küstrin, which was a small but very strongly fortified town, and very favourably situated in the middle of the floodplains of the Warthe estuary to the Oder.

Some towns, which were particularly attractive from a military point of view, were attacked many times, sometimes even with some very short intervals. The record holder is Gartz, located at one of the crossings from Pommern to the Neumark, attacked between 1630 and 1638 as often as six times: in 1630, 1635, 1636, 1637 and even twice the same year in 1638.[9] As many as six cities were conquered five times during this period. Wolgast was attacked in 1628, 1630, twice in 1637 and 1638.[10] The Stargard was conquered in 1630, 1635, twice in 1636 and 1637.[11] Small Wohlau was attacked five times in four years between 1640 and

[7] The number of examples of a fortress war defined in this way cannot be considered as definitive. The main source of this is the references in *Theatrum Europaeum* which are often ambiguous. In search of examples of this kind of war events, attention was paid to key words such as: shelling, assault, siege, defense, but sometimes it is difficult to determine whether the mentioned sieges of the city was violent and related to fighting, or whether its conquerors did not meet with resistance. For a complete list of recorded occupations, see Annex 1.

[8] On the list of sieges in Annex 1, Breslau is listed under two dates: The first concerns the Saxon assault on Ostrów Tumski occupied by the Swedes, which, although it is located in Breslau, belonged to the Breslau bishops and was located outside the city fortifications. The second date concerns the approach to the city by Swedish troops and the two-sided firing, which resulted in one cannonball falling on the city ramparts.

[9] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 262; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, pp. 711, 824, 919, 961; W.F. Gadebusch, *Chronik der Insel Usedom: Mit einer Charte der Insel Usedom*, Anclam 1863, pp. 127, 128, 130.

[10] Ibidem, pp. 116, 130, 131; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 236; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, pp. 884, 898.

[11] Ch.G. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*, Stargard 1843, pp. 117, 121, 122, 125; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, pp. 678, 707 and 874.



Figure 3. Crossen an der Oder, a hornwork from the Thirty Years' War
Photo: G. Podruczny.



Figure 4. Hirschberg, St. Ann's Chapel, former bastei
Photo: G. Podruczny.




Figure 5. Defending the retirata during the siege
Theatrum Europaeum, 5, taf. 4.



Figure 6. The siege of Zittau in 1643. Retirata marked with R
Theatrum Europaeum, 5, taf. 12.

1644 – twice in 1640, twice in 1642 and once in 1644.[12] The city of Oppeln was attacked in 1627, twice in 1633, 1634, 1642 and 1643.[13] Leobschütz was captured by storm in 1626 by the Danish army, a year later by the Imperial army, in October 1632 the Swedish' attempt to capture the town failed, but they succeeded in 1642 and 1645.[14] Finally, the list of towns attacked five times is closed by Glogau attacked in 1632, 1633, 1634 and twice in 1642. Four times each the Pomeranian Demmin (1631, 1637, 1638, 1639[15]), the New Marchian Landsberg (1631, 1633, 1634, 1639[16]), the lower-silesian Groß Wartenberg (1634, 1642, 1643, 1646[17]) and Hirschberg (1634, and three times in 1640[18]) were conquered.

Worth mentioning is the fact that the level of intensity of fights for any fortified tergets did not depend on their size and strength. Bloody and violent battles were fought over large fortresses such as Stralsund in 1628, Brieg in 1642 and Glogau in 1642, as well as small, provisionally fortified towns. In the latter case, the fights for Wohlau, Crossen an der Oder and Hirschberg are clear examples. Particularly interesting are the fights for these smaller strongholds, because enemies were attacking weakly fortified places and yet the severe struggle was very often the main and only outcome.

In the case of Wohlau, this small stronghold, defended only by the city walls and an early modern rampart, probably reinforced by some kind of sconces, was attacked 5 times in total. The severest defence was the one that took place in January 1644. After a period of blockading the area, the imperial army began a siege, fired a breach in the city wall and stormed it. However, the Swedish crew

[12] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej na Śląsku*, Wrocław 2000, pp. 138, 4, pp. 226, 227, 863, 687; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 273.

[13] F. Idzikowski, *Geschichte der Stadt Oppeln*, Oppeln 1863, p. 170; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 990; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, pp. 7, 24, 262.

[14] F. Troska, *Geschichte der Stadt Leobschütz*, Leobschütz 1892, pp. 124–126, 130, 134–135.

[15] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 343; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 898; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, pp. 71, 72; W.F. Gadebusch, *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 131.

[16] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 70.

[17] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 687; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 187; M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae*, Frankfurt am Main 1652, p. 189.

[18] J.K. Herbst, *Chronik der Stadt Hirschberg in Schlesien bis zum Jahre 1847*, Hirschberg 1849, pp. 108–112; J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 142; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, pp. 227–228.

defended themselves stubbornly, repulsed the attack and forced the besiegers to retreat. As a result the Emperor's army lost 500 men in combat.[19]

Additionally, in Crossen an der Oder, the successful Swedish defence against the assault occurred as many as three times. Surprisingly, this small town in 1631 manned by a tiny Swedish garrison (260 soldiers) defended itself twice (in May and August), when the first time it was attacked by an army of 6,000 soldiers. The other successful defence took place in May 1634, when the town was defended by a small, 200-person crew supported by the townspeople against the 4,000 Imperial Army. It should be mentioned that this was before the modernization of the fortifications and only after the siege of 1634 the Swedish erected the first bastion fortifications. The city, which was fortified in this way, was only conquered as a result of a regular attack, lasting 8 days, by the combined Brandenburg and Swedish armies.[20]

The best example of how fierce was the defence of the poorly fortified city could be the siege of Hirschberg in the autumn of 1640, one of the four different sieges of the city during the conflict. The fortifications of this town were relatively weak, limited to the double, still of medieval origins, town wall with three gates reinforced by early modern bastei together with an earthy rampart erected during the war. The siege of 1640 lasted more than 2 months, from September the 5th to November the 10th. The city was besieged by a large army of 18,000 soldiers commanded by General Martin Maximilian von der Goltz. Inside, a small Swedish crew supported by the townspeople strived to defend themselves. Imperial troops tried to conquer the city in many ways. They were attacked with proximal attempts – by means of twisting trenches, firing – with both flat-track and bombardment (it was here that the bombardment with the largest, 200-pound bombs, was recorded) and firing with the use of incendiary ammunition. Five times the mines under the city fortifications were blown up, each of them led to a breach in the wall, one of them even blew up the city tower. There were also attempts at subterranean breakthrough in order to enter the city this way. As a result, the city was stormed many times – the biggest attack of this kind involved a total of 1000 attackers. Another assault, which was carried out on 31 October, focused on a mine breakthrough in the wall and even led to the entry of a few hundred imperial troops into the city. However, after three hours of street fighting they

[19] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej…*, p. 138; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 273.

[20] C. von Obstfelder, *Chronik der Stadt Crossen*, Crossen 1895, pp. 76–78.

were pushed out and the assault finally failed, so did the rest of the "siege, which lasted over 10 weeks."[21]

Different techniques for fighting fortifications

To conquer the city defended by the enemy all siege techniques known at that time were used; the most common being artillery fire. Various ammunition was used – both iron solid shot and stone bullets, as well as explosive ammunition (mortar bombs, the largest recorded are those from a 200-pound mortar) and incendiary projectiles, like carcasses or hot round shots (cannonballs). The aim of the shooting was either to force the enemy to surrender the city - this was often achieved by setting fire to the city (see Opava 1627[22]), but more often the aim was to break out a breach in the rampart/city wall. The latter technique was usually associated with an assault (although not always, sometimes the breaking through the breach induced the besieged to surrender) – after the breaking through the wall, there was usually an open attack, and interestingly, very often it was an unsuccessful ending with great losses among the besieged. The explanation for such a turn of things, apart from poor organization of the attack and fierce defence, may be the use of temporary fortifications erected at the back of the breach called Retirata. Unfortunately, the majority of the references about this type of sieges are inaccurate, therefore it is not known how many cases of the successful defence against the breakthrough was due to Retirata, but at least three of them were clearly identified. The oldest known example of this solution in a battlefield took place in 1631 in Greifenhagen. The town was then poorly fortified – it had a single line of medieval wall and a shallow moat, and as part of a rapid reinforcement in 1630, the Pomeranian garrison erected an earthwork defending the bridge and a blockhouse. In December 1630, the city was already manned by a strong imperial army garrison of 2,500 men. The attack was carried out by the 18 thousand Swedish army led by King Gustav Adolph. On December 23rd, after a violent shooting from land and water (80 cannons in total), its artillerymen fired a breach in the wall. After a few more hours, the opening was wide enough to allow three people, at the same time, to enter the enemy's area. Immediately, the soldiers were sent to take over the breach but it was impossible, because the defenders prepared the above mentioned extra fortification retrenchment (Retirata)

[21] J.K. Herbst, *Chronik der Stadt Hirschberg…*, pp. 127–136.

[22] Theatrum Europaeum, 1, p. 991.

and defended themselves fiercely. Only the introduction of a field cannon into the breach and the firing of this makeshift fortification allowed it to be forced through. A mention that may indicate the use of this extra retrenchment can also be found in the description of the 1640 imperial siege of Hirschberg – according to the *Theatrum Europaeum*, after a breach in the wall was achieved on 17 September, General Golz stopped the assault and the breach was rebuilt overnight. Another case of retaliation was the storming of Wohlau in 1644 – according to a description from the *Theatrum Europaeum* "haben die Belagerte hergegen inwendig dargestalt sich verbawet und eisn solchen wiederstand gethan, dass die Keyserlichen mit verlust in 550 mann, so wohl Beschädigter als Todten wieder zu rück weichen müssen". Other, unambiguously identifiable examples of the use of retaliation could not be found, but they were probably more frequent and finally quite obvious way to continue the defence. A good example of the application of this solution, outside the area of our interest was the siege of Zittau and Freiburg in 1643. The plans of these occupations show several enforcements (Retirata) (Zittau)[23] and one (Freiburg)[24] – erected in advance in one place, whilst in Zittau – after one of the breakthroughs. As far as the second town is concerned, the image of defending such a retaliation is also known.

However, the storm also proved to be effective. A great example of this is the final assault in Greifenhagen, which saved only 200 people from the cast of this city, and the day after that the attack on Gartz. A similarly devastating effect on the enemy was the assault of Frankfurt (Oder) in 1631, one of the greatest triumphs in the fortress war of Gustav Adolph.[25]

The second most frequent attack technique was the storm – in total, there were 44 identifiable references to the 44 sieges in which it was carried out.[26]

Often, earthworks were also used during the siege. Usually it was the construction of siege batteries, but the conquering of fortresses were also attempted with an trench attack. Not only large and strong strongholds were attacked, but also temporary reinforced city fortifications and small entrenchments. We know

[23] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, taf. 12 (description of the siege of Zittau), pp. 201–203.

[24] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, taf. 4 (description of the Freiberg siege), pp. 21–28.

[25] Christian Wilhelm Spieker, *Geschichte der Stadt Frankfurt an der Oder.* Part 1: *Von der Gründung der Stadt bis zum Königtum der Hohenzollern…*, Frankfurt/Oder 1853, pp. 188–191. The attack on Frankfurt was widely described in Erik Dahlberg's novelised biography by Peter Englund, entitled *Lata wojen*, Warszawa 2013, pp. 123–125.

[26] A complete list of identified assaults from this period is included in Annex 2.



Figure 7. The storm of Frankfurt (Oder) in 1631

Theatrum Europaeum, 3, taf. 13.




Figure 8. The attack in 1630 on Alte Fehr Schanze near Gustov on Rügen

Theatrum Europaeum, 3, p. 160.

about the use of the sap from 15 sieges from 1628 (Stralsund) 1630 (Alte Fehr Schanze near Gustow on Rügen,[27] Greifenhagen) 1631 (Demmin,[28] Frankfurt (Oder), Kolberg),[29] 1634 (Oppeln, Crossen a. Oder, Frankfurt (Oder), Landsberg),[30] 1637 again Demmin,[31] 1639 again Landsberg[32] 1640 Hirschberg, 1642 Brieg[33] and Glogau.

Mines were used relatively rarely in attacks on fortresses. The technique is mentioned in 1631 from Demmin,[34] 1640 from Hirschberg and 1642 from Brieg. In the first two cases, mines were used to break out a breakthrough in the medieval wall, in Brieg, ravelin was captured with mines (and, what is important, counter-mines were used there for defence).[35] This technique was very dangerous for the attackers, as evidenced by the example of Hirschberg, where mines killed more imperial soldiers than defenders of the city.[36]

A unique, rarely mentioned technique was the use of petards. Examples of this dangerous siege technique were found twice – in 1630 in Stargard, where the Red Sea Tower was captured using this technique, and during the Danish storm on Leobschütz, where the city gate was blown up using it.[37]

Sieges and city fortifications

In total, 49 cities were besieged during the war, 45 were fortified with bastions. There is a rather limited sense in presenting the history of the creation and then demolition of them all. Basically, there are three groups of fortified towns – those

[27] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 160.

[28] Ibidem, p. 343.

[29] O. Rubow, *Stadt und Festung Kolberg*, Kolberg 1936, p. 15.

[30] A. Engelien, Fr. Henning, *Geschichte der Stadt Landsberg an der Warthe von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, mit einer lithographierten Ansicht der Stadt vom Jahre 1650*, Landsberg 1857, p. 118.

[31] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 898.

[32] A. Engelien, F. Henning, *Geschichte der Stadt Landsberg.*…, p. 120.

[33] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, pp. 873–874.

[34] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, pp. 343–344.

[35] G.F. Buckisch, *Schlesischer Religions Acten Fifth Part, dealing with the unfortunate times of the Mannsfeldisch-Saxon and Swedish wars, also what dabey bies to the*…, Książnica Cieszyńska, sygn. SZ DD II 2 f, k. 1230.

[36] J.K. Herbst, *Chronik der Stadt Hirschberg.*…, pp. 127–135.

[37] F. Troska, *Geschichte der Stadt Leobschütz*…, p. 124.

that lost their importance just after the war, those that disappeared within a century after the war, and those that remained important until the 19th century.

In the first group, there are 21 bastion fortifications constructed during the war, including Beuthen, Leobschütz, Jauer, Kosel, Reichenbach, Rügenwalde, Hirschberg, Trahenberg, Oppeln, Sprottau and Schweidnitz. The second group consists of 15 towns, which were also important defensive points in the decades following the war. They were: Namslau, Liegnitz, Ohlau, Jabłonkowska Pass, Crossen an der Oder, Frankfurt (Oder), Oderberg, Landsberg, Greifswald, Anklam, Demmin, Gartz, Cammin i. Pommern, Dievenow, Wolgast, Dammgarten and Stargard. Most of these fortified complexes were somehow modernized after the war, but to a small extent, they never reached the status of a fully-fledged fortress (except for the one in the Jabłonkowska Pass) and gradually lost their importance. Some of them were liquidated after the end of the Great Northern War, others only after the Seven Years' War. In the last group – cities whose fortress history began during the Thirty Years' War, and as such, they functioned for a long time – there are only 9 locations – Brieg, Neiße, Glogau, Stettin, Damm, Kolberg, Stralsund, Swinemünde and Penemünde. Of these, 6 were large, important fortresses that constituted the backbone of the defence system for the lands in which they were located.

In Schlesien, this concerns Glogau, Neiße and Brieg. The first stronghold survived the longest functioning as a fortress until World War I, and in some aspects, even until 1945. During the Thirty Years' War, the town was fortified by the imperial Army, the first fortifications were made as early as 1620. The fundamental reconstruction took place in the years 1630–1632 and was influenced by the Swedish army joining the war. The construction of a new city bastion has caused the demolition of suburbs. Despite new fortifications, the town was conquered in 1642 by the Swedish and later still fortified by them. After the end of the war, the fortress was thoroughly rebuilt and new, much more massive works erected during the war were created. The process of re-erection of the city enceinte continued until the beginning of the 18th century. Further extensions took place after the Prussian occupation of Schlesien, when new external works were erected, in front of the main ditch, as well as the extended works – Fort Stern and the Wasser Redoute defending the Dominsel. In the 19th century, after the Napoleonic Wars, the fortress gained strong fortifications by the Old Oder and new external works. In the second half of the nineteenth century, new external works were created, and the city district was expanded. Despite the liquidation of some




Figure 9. Explosion of a mine during the Siege of Brieg in 1642

F.B. Wernher, *Topographia oder Prodromus Delineati Principatus Lignicensis Bregensis, et Wolaviensis*, University Library of Wrocław, Acc. 1948/1094, k. 84 (340).




Figure 10. Siege of Glogau in 1642

Theatrum Europaeum, 4, taf. 41.




Figure 11. Ohlau in 1750

F.B. Wernher, *Topographia oder Prodromus Delineati Principatus Lignicensis Bregensis, et Wolaviensis*, University Library in Wrocław, Acc. 1948/1094, k. 396–397.



Figure 12. Fortifications of Stettin

M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae*, Frankfurt am Main 1652.

of the fortifications at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, Glogau still served as a fortress – thanks to the erection of new sconces in the northern foreland. Finally, these works laid the foundations for the defensive lines planned in the 1920s and 1930s.[38]

The Neiße stronghold lasted as a fortress until 1903. The decision to fortify the town was made by the Bishop of Breslau and the Duke of Neiße Charles Habsburg at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. Despite the commencement of works, including the demolition of suburbs and buildings in the Old Town, the effect of these actions was rather small. The construction of new fortifications was not seriously started until after the catastrophic siege of the city and its conquest by the Swedish in 1642. A year later, the construction of a new rampart began, the bastion expansion of the town's fortifications lasting until the beginning of the 18th century. The next fortifications were reconstructed during the age of Frederick the Great, when not only strong fortifications were built in front of the main city rampart, but also the fort of Prussia with two redoubts north of it. These fortifications were extended after 1763. Further modernisations and extensions took place after the Napoleonic wars – new forts were built in the foreground at that time and, after the railway line was built, with a new defensive rampart protecting it.[39]

In the case of Brieg, already in the year of the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, it was decided to end the bastion circuit started in the 16th century. New bastions and ramparts were already erected from the ground, following the Dutch example, for the most part, the bastion circuit was completed by the 1630s. After the end of this conflict, the work on the fortifications of the fortress consisted of regular repairs of poor quality ramparts and bastions. A fundamental change was brought about during the age of Frederick the Great, when the fortress was extended and extensive external fortifications were erected, which in turn were demolished in the second half of the 18th century. After 1763, only one external fortified work in Brieg was created, and about 1800 – a large bridgehead in the

[38] G. Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze. Fryderyk Wielki i pruska fortyfikacja stała w latach 1740–1786*, Oświęcim 2013, pp. 98–106, 205–207; W. Eckert, *Fortyfikacje Głogowa*, Zielona Góra 2006, pp. 19–55.

[39] G. Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze…*, pp. 106–115, 246–257; J. Bogdanowicz, *Twierdza w Nysie*, in: *Fortyfikacja*, vol. V, Warszawa–Kraków 1998, pp. 197–198.

form of a hornwork. The history of the fortress ended with its conquest by the French, who demolished the local fortifications.[40]

The Stettin stronghold was developing very intensively. Before the war, it was defended by city walls locally reinforced by a rampart with bastions. Construction of the bastions began as early as in the 1620s, even before the Swedes took power. After 1631 the work significantly accelerated and led to the completion of the bastion circuit around the city, the bastion fortification of Łasztownia, and the fortification of the area south of the city, for the army's fortified camp, in form of rampart with a single external sconce. After the war, the fortifications of the camp were liquidated and the focus was on the main city fortifications, which were regularly repaired and strengthened after the sieges during the wars of the second half of the 17th century. After Stettin was taken over by Prussia as a result of the Great Northern War, the city was strongly reinforced – with a belt of external works, in which two of their special groups called Leopold and William forts stood out, as well as a new, protruding Fort Prussia – a small, independent fortress on a star-shaped plan. After the completion of the expansion in 1740, the fortress did not develop until the 19th century, there were even plans to demolish it. This did not happen, after 1815 the fortress was maintained and in the years 1845–1857 it was extended, due to the necessity to include a new railway line in the defensive circuit. Finally, the end of the Stettin stronghold came in the 1870s.[41]

The fortress in Kolberg had a similar history to Stettin. The first bastion fortifications were erected by the municipal, Pomeranian crew in 1627.[42] After the Swedish occupation of the city in 1631 a full bastion circuit was created. After the end of the war and the takeover of the fortress by Brandenburg, the main circuit was erected again, during a long process lasting from 1655 to 1715. Another stage, was the period of the Seven Years' War, after which the fortress was thoroughly modernised again. During the course of the event, among other things, new external works were created, including the Fort Münde defending the harbour. Another modernization took place after the Napoleonic Wars, when new external works were erected in front of the town to form a fortified camp. The fortifications were

[40] G. Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze*…, pp. 161–166; G. Podruczny, *Twierdza Brzeg w okresie fryderycjańskim*…, pp. 34–49.

[41] H. Berghaus, *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin der Hauptstadt von Pommern*..., Berlin 1876, pp. 548–631; G. Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze*…, pp. 39–40, 295–300.

[42] R. Stoewer, *Geschichte der Stadt Kolberg*, Kolberg 1897, p. 120.

maintained and modernized until the 1870s, later they were suppressed with the exception of the longer maintained coastal fortifications.

The beginnings of the bastion fortifications in Stralsund date back to the mid-1720s. In 1625 the Dutch engineer Johan van Valckenburgh designed a new fortified district, which has been in operation since 1626. After the Swedish took power in the city, the city gained a full bastion circuit. After the war, during almost 200 years of Swedish rule, the fortress was besieged and blocked five times, forcing constant modernization and expansion. It continued after the city was taken over by Prussia after 1815, when the main circuit was modernized in the New Prussian style. Prussian fortifications were also built on the island of Danenholm, defending Stralsund port. During the Franco-Prussian War another 4 forts were erected on the foreground of the fortress, but this was the last phase of its development, because in 1873 the fortress was deleted.[43]

In addition to these key fortresses, there are three weaker but equally long lasting ones. The first is the fortress in Damm, existing in the shadow of the Stettin stronghold. The beginnings of the bastion fortifications are not clear, they were probably started during the war, after the Swedish occupation of the city, but they were not completed before the end of the conflict, the plan from Stockholm's Kriegsarkivet in 1649 shows a gap in the seven-bastion circuit – one of the bastions and one and a half curtains were missing.[44] This fortress was conquered several times during the wars of the second half of the 17th century, after Stettin was taken over by Prussia, the importance of the fortress decreased to such an extent that before the Seven Years' War the Prussian ruler allowed for the splicing of the local fortifications. However, after the end of this conflict, it was decided to rebuild and expand the fortress, lasting from 1772 to 1786. The fortified function of Damm lasted until the second half of the 19th century.[45] Another fortress, Penemünde, is actually a large coastal fort. It was founded in 1627 by the Imperial Army. In 1630 it was captured by the Swedes and then kept until the end of the

[43] G. Möller, A. Pfenning, *Die Stralsunder Festung*, in: *Festungsbaukunst in Europas Mitte. Festschrift zum 30-jährigen Bestehen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Festungsforschung*, Regensburg 2011, pp. 199–205.

[44] Damm Ao. 1649, SE/KrA/0406/25/043/003.

[45] Lack of a complete study of the history of Damm fortifications. References to his history can be found in G. Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze*…The fact that the fortress functioned after 1815 is evidenced by the plans of the fortress and its parts stored in Berlin's GStA SPK from 1823–1866, as well as its detailed plans from 1843 by Erich, lieutenant of the engineering inspection, Die Festung Stettin und Damm, bearbeitet im Jahre 1843, SBB Denkschriften des Preussischen Generalstabes, XXXVIII Stettin, no. 39.



Figure 13. Erik Jönsson (Dahlbergh),
View of Kolberg in the middle of the 17th Century

M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae*, Frankfurt am Main 1652.




Figure 14. The fort of Penemünde

Theatrum Europaeum, 3, taf. 9.

war.[46] During the Brandenburg-Swedish wars of the 17th and 18th centuries it was repeatedly conquered and modernized, the last time in the 1840s. Later on, it slowly fell into oblivion, although the Prussian planners of the defence system did not forget about this place. Moreover, in the 1840s-renovation works were carried out there.[47]



Figure 15. Swinemünde, fortifications

M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae*, Frankfurt am Main 1652.

Swinemünde is a special case, because as a result of the Thirty Years' War, only relatively small and unimportant defensive objects were built here. In 1627 the Imperial Army erected several redoubts and associated batteries there, maintained in the standard of a field fortification.[48] Nevertheless, on every war occasion these fortifications were repaired or erected anew, or planned to be rebuilt. This was the case during the Seven Years' War, when the reconstructed sconces

[46] W.F. Gadebusch, *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, pp. 116, 119.

[47] G. Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze*…, pp. 45, 170–171; U. von Bonin, *Geschichte des Ingenieurkorps und der Pioniere in Preußen*, Berlin 1878, vol. 2, p. 256.

[48] W.F. Gadebusch, *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 116.

were captured by the Swedes. After the end of this conflict, a project of erecting a fortress there was created, which was ultimately not realized. Also during the war unrest at the end of the 18th century (1791) and the beginning of the 19th century (1806), the fortifications defending the mouth of the Swine River were built anew. In this makeshift form, Swinemünde as a defensive complex survived until the first half of the 19th century, when it was decided to erect permanent fortifications, extended until 1945.

Among the large urban fortresses, three of them – Neiße, Glogau and Kolberg – should be given special attention. The fortresses have the same genesis and they developed in a very similar way was later on. Their fortified circuits were built from scratch, on the basis of medieval city fortifications, during the war. Although they were extensive and quite strong, they were de facto field fortifications, which is perfectly illustrated by the cross-section through the fortifications of Glogau from 1642. For this reason, in the period of several dozen years after the war, they were rebuilt into permanent fortifications – the curtains and bastions were put up again – higher, thicker and preceded by wider moats, in place of the old, provisional ones. In Kolberg this process lasted from 1655 to 1715, in Glogau from 1650 to 1720, in Neiße from the end of the 30-year war until 1709.

It should be emphasized that not all fortified towns attacked during this long conflict were equipped with bastion fortifications during the war. In total, out of 60 towns conquered, 11 cases (Bunzlau, Grottkau, Guhrau, Jägerndorf, Lüben, Löwenberg, Oppau, Parchwitz, Strehlen, Striegau, Sprottau) are involved. Besides, there were places where such fortifications were created and which were not attacked. Out of 45 examples of fortified settlements during this war, 5 were never attacked (Damm, Greifswald, Uckermünde, Rügenwalde, Stettin). There was also no correlation between the frequency with which the towns were attacked during the war and their post-war fates – for example, Kolobrzeg was conquered only once, and there is no doubt about its importance as a fortress. Hirschberg, on the other hand, which was attacked 5 times, in one siege lasting more than 2 months, was not considered at all as the location of the permanent fortress. The final decision, which fortified complex was finally transformed into a fortress, depended on the post-war analysis (Schlesien, a process traced by Willi Klawiter) and subsequent wars (mainly in Pommern and Neumark). There is no doubt, however, that the Thirty Years' War was a conflict which permanently influenced the shape of fortified systems in the described area.

Annex 1

The sieges during the Thirty Years' War

Schlesien

Beuthen – 1640,[49] 1642[50]

Brieg – 1642[51]

Bunzlau – 1642[52] and again later in 1642 [53]

Reichenbach – 1633[54]

Grottkau – 1633[55]

Guhrau – 1642[56]

Glogau – 1632, 1633, 1634, 1642 – Swedish attack, shelling, breaking out the breach, assault successful, again in 1642 – the imperial attack – trenches, shelling, three failed assaults[57]

Leobschütz – 1626, 1627, 1632, 1642, 1645[58]

Jauer – 1640,[59] 1648[60]

Hirschberg – 1634,[61] 1640,[62] 1640 another one[63] and again in 1640

Kosel – 1627 assault on the entrenchment, 1642 assault on the city [64]

Jägerndorf – 1627,[65] 1643[66]

---

[49] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 228.

[50] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 863.

[51] Ibidem, pp. 873–874.

[52] Ibidem, p. 863.

[53] Ibidem, p. 872.

[54] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 7.

[55] Ibidem, p. 8.

[56] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 867.

[57] F. Minsberg, *Geschichte der Stadt und Festung Gross Glogau*, vol. 2, Glogau 1853, pp. 29–32.

[58] F. Troska, *Geschichte der Stadt Leobschütz*, Leobschütz 1892, pp. 124–126, 130, 134–135.

[59] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 226.

[60] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej…*, p. 145.

[61] Johann Karli Herbst, *Chronik der Stadt Hirschberg…*, pp. 108–112.

[62] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 227.

[63] Ibidem, p. 228.

[64] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 990; A. Weltzel, *Geschichte der Stadt, Herrschaft und ehemaliegen Festung Kosel*, Kosel 1888, pp. 170, 191.

[65] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 990.

[66] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 170.

Liegnitz – 1634[67]

Lüben – 1640[68]

Löwenberg – 1642,[69] 1642,[70] 1643[71]

Neiße – 1633[72] 1642[73]

Namslau – 1634,[74] 1643[75] 1646[76]

Oels – 1634,[77] 1640[78]

Ohlau – three times 1633, 1642, 1647[79]

Oppau – 1627,[80] 1634,[81] 1642, 1646[82]

Oppeln – 1627 (two companies of soldiers were bravely entrenched),[83] 1633 (the Emperor's troops, they defeated the Saxonians),[84] 1633 again,[85] 1634[86] (shelling, including incendiary ammunition), firing a breach in the wall and an assault – repulsed, 1642 – storm, Torstenson,[87] 1643 – three unsuccessful assaults[88]

Parchwitz – 1642[89]

Jablunka Pass – 1625, 1645[90]

---

[67] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej…*, p. 129.

[68] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 227.

[69] Ibidem, p. 863.

[70] Ibidem, p. 872.

[71] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 190.

[72] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 8.

[73] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae…*, p. 165.

[74] Ibidem, p. 163.

[75] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 189.

[76] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae…*, p. 163.

[77] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 262.

[78] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae…*, p. 169.

[79] F. Lucae, *Schlesiens curiose Denckwürdigkeiten, oder vollkommene Chronica Von Ober- und Nieder-Schlesien*, Franckfurt am Mayn 1689, p. 1480.

[80] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 991.

[81] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 262.

[82] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae…*, p. 188.

[83] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 990.

[84] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 7.

[85] Ibidem, p. 24.

[86] Ibidem, p. 262.

[87] F. Idzikowski, *Geschichte der Stadt Oppeln…*, p. 170.

[88] Ibidem.

[89] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 875.

[90] K. Burk, *Handbuch der Festungen des Historischen Deutschen Ostens*, Osnabrück 1995, p. 98.

Steinau – 1632[91]

Strehlen – 1633[92]

Striegau – 1640[93]

Schweidnitz – 1633,[94] 1642[95]

Groß Wartenberg – 1634,[96] 1642,[97] 1643,[98] 1646[99]

Sprottau – 1642[100]

Trahenberg – 1640,[101] 1642,[102] 1644[103]

Wohlau – 1640,[104] 1640 again,[105] 1642,[106] 1642 and again[107] 1644[108]

Breslau Dominsel – 1633[109]

Breslau – city 1647 (not a siege, exchange of fire between the city and the Swedes, only one round shot hit the city walls)[110]

Neumark

Crossen an der Oder – 1631 (assault by Emperor's troops) – twice,[111] 1633,[112] 1634[113]

---

[91] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 669.

[92] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 8.

[93] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 226.

[94] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 126; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 95.

[95] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 869.

[96] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae*…, p. 189.

[97] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 687.

[98] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 187.

[99] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae*…, p. 189.

[100] F. Matuszkiewicz, *Geschichte der Stadt Sprottau*, Sprottau 1908, p. 106.

[101] O.L. Goedsche, *Geschichte und Statistik des Militsch-Trachenberger Kreises*, Breslau 1847, p. 248; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 226.

[102] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 867.

[103] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 139.

[104] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 226.

[105] Ibidem, p. 227.

[106] Ibidem, p. 863.

[107] Ibidem, p. 687.

[108] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 138; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 273.

[109] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 140.

[110] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 6, p. 151.

[111] C. von Obstfelder, *Chronik der Stadt Crossen*…, p. 76.

[112] Ibidem, p. 77.

[113] Ibidem, p. 78.

Frankfurt an der Oder – 1631, 1633,[114] 1634[115]
Oderberg – 1637,[116] 1639[117]
Landsberg – 1631, 1633, 1634, 1637, 1639[118]
Driesen – 1639[119]

Pommern

Anklam – 1637[120]
Dammgarten – 1630[121]
Demmin – 1631,[122] 1637,[123] 1638,[124] 1639[125]
Greifenberg in Pommern – (1630)[126]
Garz – (1630),[127] 1635,[128] 1636,[129] 1637,[130] 1638,[131] and again in 1638[132]
Gustow, entrenchment – 1630[133]
Kolberg – 1631[134]

[114] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 140.

[115] Ibidem, p. 277.

[116] J.M. de la Pierre, *Ausführliche Geschichte der Ukermark, nach Urkunden bearbeitet und mit besondern historischen Untersuchungen begleitet*, Prenzlau 1847, p. 205

[117] F.L.J. Fischbach, *Statistisch-topographische Städte-Beschreibung der Mark Brandenburg: Des ersten Theiles, erster Band, enthaltend den Ober-Barnimschen Kreis*, Potsdam 1786, pp. 381–382.

[118] A. Engelien, F. Henning, *Geschichte der Stadt Landsberg…*, pp. 115–121.

[119] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 71.

[120] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 824.

[121] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 249.

[122] Ibidem, p. 343.

[123] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 898.

[124] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom…*, p. 131.

[125] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, pp. 71, 72.

[126] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 261.

[127] Ibidem, p. 262.

[128] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom…*, p. 127.

[129] Ibidem, p. 128; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 711.

[130] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom…*, p. 130; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 824.

[131] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom…*, p. 131; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 919.

[132] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 961.

[133] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 160.

[134] O. Rubow, *Stadt und Festung Kolberg…*, p. 15.

Peenemünde – 1628, Danish siege,[135] 1637[136]
Stralsund – 1628[137]
Stargard – 1630,[138] 1635,[139] 1636,[140] and again in 1636,[141] 1637[142]
Swinemünde – 1628 stormed by Danish troops [143]
Wolgast – 1628 Danish,[144] 1630 Swedes,[145] 1637,[146] again 1637,[147] 1638[148]

Annex 2

Storms during the sieges

Schlesien

Brieg – 1642[149]
Guhrau – 1642[150]
Glogau – 1632, 1634, 1642, 1642[151]
Leobschütz – 1626, 1627, 1632
Jauer – 1640[152]
Hirschberg – 1640[153]

[135] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, pp. 115–116; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 1089.

[136] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 130.

[137] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, pp. 1065–1067.

[138] Ch.G. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*…, p. 117.

[139] Ibidem, p. 121.

[140] Ibidem, p. 122; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 678.

[141] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 707.

[142] Ch.G. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*…, p. 125; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 874.

[143] R. Burkhardt, *Chronik der Insel Usedom. 3. Abschnitt: Seit der Reformation (1535)*, Swinemünde 1909, p. 25.

[144] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 116; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 1089.

[145] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 236.

[146] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 130; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 884.

[147] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 898.

[148] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 131.

[149] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, pp. 873–874.

[150] Ibidem, p. 867.

[151] F. Minsberg, *Geschichte der Stadt und Festung Gross*…, pp. 29–32.

[152] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 226.

[153] Ibidem, pp. 227–228.

Kosel – 1627, 1642[154]
Namslau – 1634[155]
Ohlau – 1633[156]
Oppeln – 1633,[157] 1634,[158] 1642, 1643[159]
Strehlen – 1633[160]
Striegau – 1640[161]
Schweidnitz – 1633[162]
Groß Wartenberg – 1634[163]
Sprottau – 1642 [164]
Wohlau – 1644[165]

New Mark

Crossen an der Oder – 1631, 1631,[166] 1633,[167] 1634[168]
Frankfurt an der Oder – 1631[169]
Landsberg – 1639[170]
Driesen – 1639[171]

[154] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 1, p. 990; A. Weltzel, *Geschichte der Stadt*…, pp. 170, 191.

[155] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae*…, p. 163.

[156] F. Lucae, *Schlesiens curiose Denckwürdigkeiten*…, p. 1408.

[157] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 7.

[158] Ibidem, p. 262.

[159] F. Idzikowski, *Geschichte der Stadt Oppeln*…, p. 170.

[160] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 8.

[161] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 226.

[162] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 126; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 95.

[163] M. Merian, M. Zeiller, *Topographia Bohemiae*…, p. 189.

[164] F. Matuszkiewicz, *Geschichte der Stadt Sprottau*…, p. 106.

[165] J. Maroń, *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej*…, p. 138; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 5, p. 273.

[166] C. von Obstfelder, *Chronik der Stadt Crossen*…, p. 76.

[167] Ibidem, p. 77.

[168] Ibidem, p. 78.

[169] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, pp. 348–350.

[170] A. Engelien, F. Henning, *Geschichte der Stadt Landsberg*…, p. 121.

[171] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 4, p. 71.

Pommern

Dammgarten – 1630[172]
Greifenberg in Pommern – 1630[173]
Garz – 1630,[174] 1635,[175] 1638,[176] 1638[177]
Penemunde – 1628[178]
Stargard – 1630,[179] 1636,[180] 1637[181]
Swinemünde – 1628[182]
Wolgast – 1637[183]

Literature

Berghaus H., *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin der Hauptstadt von Pommern*, Berlin 1876.
Bonin von U., *Geschichte des Ingenieurkorps und der Pioniere in Preußen*, vol. 2, Berlin 1878.
Bogdanowicz J., *Twierdza w Nysie*, in: *Fortyfikacja*, vol. 5, Warszawa–Kraków 1998, pp. 197–198.
Burk K., *Handbuch der Festungen des Historischen Deutschen Ostens*, Osnabrück 1995.
Burkhardt, R. *Chronik der Insel Usedom. 3. Abschnitt: Seit der Reformation (1535)*, Swinemünde 1909.
Duffy Ch., *Kamen a ohen. Bastionova pevnost, jeji zrod a vyvoj v dejinach pevnostniho velecnictvi*, Brno 1998.
Eckert W., *Fortyfikacje Głogowa*, Zielona Góra 2006.
Engelien A., Henning Fr., *Geschichte der Stadt Landsberg an der Warthe von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, mit einer lithographierten Ansicht der Stadt vom Jahre 1650*, Landsberg 1857.

[172] *Theatrum Europaeum*, 2, p. 249.
[173] Ibidem, p. 261.
[174] Ibidem, p. 262.
[175] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 127.
[176] Ibidem, p. 131; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 919.
[177] Ibidem, p. 961.
[178] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 131.
[179] Ch.G. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*…, p. 117.
[180] Ibidem, p. 122; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 678.
[181] Ch.G. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*…, p. 125; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 874.
[182] 182 W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 116.
[183] W.F Gadebusch., *Chronik der Insel Usedom*…, p. 130; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 3, p. 884.

Englund P., *Lata wojen*, Warszawa 2013.

Gadebusch W.F., *Chronik der Insel Usedom: Mit einer Charte der Insel Usedom*, Anclam 1863.

Goedsche O.L., *Geschichte und Statistik des Militsch-Trachenberger Kreises*, Breslau 1847.

Herbst J.K., *Chronik der Stadt Hirschberg in Schlesien bis zum Jahre 1847*, Hirschberg 1849.

Idzikowski F., *Geschichte der Stadt Oppeln*, Oppeln 1863.

Maroń J., *Militarne aspekty wojny trzydziestoletniej na Śląsku*, Wrocław 2000.

Minsberg F., *Geschichte der Stadt und Festung Gross Glogau*, vol. 2, Glogau 1853.

Matuszkiewicz F., *Geschichte der Stadt Sprottau*, Sprottau 1908.

Möller G., Pfenning A., *Die Stralsunder Festung*, in: *Festungsbaukunst in Europas Mitte. Festschrift zum 30-jährigen Bestehen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Festungsforschung*, Regensburg 2011, pp. 199–222.

Obstfelder von C., *Chronik der Stadt Crossen*, Crossen 1895.

Pierre de la, J.M., *Ausführliche Geschichte der Ukermark, nach Urkunden bearbeitet und mit besondern historischen Untersuchungen begleitet*, Prenzlau 1847.

Podruczny G., Wichrowski M., *Kostrzyn i jego satelity. Brandenburskie fortyfikacje stałe w dorzeczu Środkowej Odry od wojny 30-letniej po wojny śląskie*, in: *Dziennik jeńca i inne szkice. Twierdza Kostrzyn w przeszłości*, eds. B. Myketow, K. Sanocka, M. Turek, Kostrzyn–Zielona Góra 2006, pp. 9–48.

Podruczny G., *Twierdza Wrocław w okresie fryderycjańskim. Fortyfikacje, garnizon i działania wojenne w latach 1741–1806*, Wrocław 2008.

Podruczny G., *Król i jego twierdze. Fryderyk Wielki i pruska fortyfikacja stała w latach 1740–1786*, Oświęcim 2013.

Podruczny G., *Twierdza Brzeg w okresie fryderycjańskim*, in: *Wokół bitwy pod Małujowicami. Studia z dziejów XVIII-wiecznego Brzegu i ziemi brzeskiej*, ed. G. Podruczny, A. Peszko, Brzeg 2017, pp. 21–51.

Rubow O., *Stadt und Festung Kolberg*, Kolberg 1936.

Spieker Ch.W., *Geschichte der Stadt Frankfurt an der Oder*. Erster Teil: *Von der Gründung der Stadt bis zum Königtum der Hohenzollern*, Frankfurt/Oder 1853.

Stoewer R., *Geschichte der Stadt Kolberg*, Kolberg 1897.

Teske Ch.G., *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*, Stargard 1843.

Troska F., *Geschichte der Stadt Leobschütz*, Leobschütz 1892.

Weltzel A., *Geschichte der Stadt, Herrschaft und ehemaliegen Festung Kosel*, Kosel 1888.

Wichrowski M., *Budowniczy twierdz*, in: *In silentio et spe fortituda mea. Johann von Küstrin – Jan z Kostrzyna*, Kostrzyn nad Odrą 2014, pp. 255–284.

Wichrowski M., *Najstarsze bastiony w Polsce. Zagadnienie chronologii budowy renesansowej twierdzy Kostrzyn w zwierciadle uczonej literatury i źródeł archiwalnych*, "Nowa Marchia – prowincja zapomniana" 2016, no. 12, pp. 144–203.

Old prints, sources and manuscripts

Buckisch G.F., *Schlesischer Religions Acten Fünfter Teil, handelnd von den unseeligen Zeiten des Mannsfeldisch-sächsischen und Schwedischen Krieges, auch was dabey bies zu dem Pragerischen Neben Recess und hernach in Schlesien Religions-Sachen vorgelaufen / durch Gottfriedt Buckischen Kays[er-] und König[lichen] Regierungs-Secretarium zum Brieg colligiret und zusammengetragen*, Książnica Cieszyńska, sygn. SZ DD II 2 f, k. 1230.

Cataneo G., *Libro Nuovo di fortificare offendere et difendere*, Brescia 1567.

Damm Ao. 1649, Riksarkivet Stockholm, SE/KrA/0406/25/043/003.

Die Festung Stettin und Damm, bearbeitet im Jahre 1843, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Denkschriften des Preussischen Generalstabes, XXXVIII Stettin, no. 39.

Fischbach F.L.J., *Statistisch-topographische Städte-Beschreibung der Mark Brandenburg: Des ersten Theiles, erster Band, enthaltend den Ober-Barnimschen Kreis*, Potsdam 1786.

Lucae F., *Schlesiens curiose Denckwürdigkeiten, oder vollkommene Chronica Von Ober- und Nieder-Schlesien*, Franckfurt am Mayn 1689.

Merian M., Zeiller M., *Topographia Bohemiae, Moraviae Et Silesiae: das ist, Beschreibung vnd eigentliche Abbildung der Vornehmsten, vnd bekandtisten Stätte, vnd Plätze, in dem Königreich Boheim vnd einverleibten Landern, Mähren, vnd Schlesien*, Frankfurt am Main 1650.

Merian M., Zeiller M., *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae*, Frankfurt am Main 1652.

Theatrum Europaeum, 1: *Abelinus, Johann Philipp Theatrum Europaeum, Oder Außführliche/ und Wahrhaftige Beschreibung aller und jeder denckwürdiger Geschichten…*, Franckfurt am Mayn 1635.

Theatrum Europaeum, 2: *Theatrum Europaeum, oder außführliche und warhafftige Beschreibung aller und jeder denckwürdiger Geschichten…*, Bd. 2, Franckfurt am Mäyn 1646.

Theatrum Europaeum, 3: *Theatri Europaei Continuatio III. Das ist: Historischer Chronicken Dritter Theil…*, Franckfurt am Mäyn 1670.

Theatrum Europaeum, 4: *Theatri Europaei Vierdter Theil Das ist: Glaubwürdige Beschreibung Denckwürdiger Geschichten die sich in Europa…*, Franckfurt am Mäyn 1692.

Theatrum Europaeum, 5: *Theatrum Europaeum, oder außführliche und warhafftige Beschreibung aller und jeder denckwürdiger Geschichten, so sich hin und wieder in der Wel…*, Franckfurt am Mäyn 1651.

Theatrum Europaeum, 6: *Theatri Europaei Sechster und letzter Theil, das ist Ausführliche Beschreibung der Denkwürdigsten Geschichten*…, Franckfurt am Mayn 1663.

Wernher F.B., *Topographia oder Prodromus Delineati Principatus Lignicensis Bregensis, et Wolaviensis*, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu, Oddział Rękopisów, Akc. 1948/1094.

Działania oblężnicze w trakcie wojny trzydziestoletniej i ich wpływ na budowę nowożytnych twierdz na terenie Pomorza, Nowej Marchii i Śląska

Abstrakt

Fortyfikacja bastionowa narodziła się na przełomie XV i XVI wieku we Włoszech i bardzo szybko rozpowszechniła się w całej Europie. Na terenie Pomorza, obecnej Ziemi Lubuskiej i Śląska pojawiły się już w połowie XVI wieku, jednak, u zarania wojny trzydziestoletniej twierdze bastionowe nadal były rzadkością w tej części kontynentu. Po wojnie trzydziestoletniej sytuacja zmieniła się diametralnie. Bastionowo ufortyfikowano 45 kolejnych miejscowości. Stało się to na skutek bardzo intensywnych działań oblężniczych na tym terenie. W okresie między 1625 a 1648 rokiem, doszło do 121 oblężeń. Miasta zdobywano ostrzałem, atakiem zbliżeniowym, szturmem i minami lub też kombinacją tych technik.

Spośród miejscowości bastionowo ufortyfikowanych w czasie tej wojny, 21 straciło znaczenie tuż po tym konflikcie, 15 zanikło w ciągu stulecia po wojnie, a 9 zachowało znaczenie aż po XIX wiek. Spośród tych ostatnich trzy były niewielkimi i mało istotnymi warowniami (Dąbie, Szczecin i Peenemünde), pozostałe – Brzeg, Nysa, Głogów, Szczecin, Kołobrzeg i Stralsund zachowały znaczenie jako istotne warownie aż po XIX, a niekiedy aż po połowę XX wieku.

Siege activities during the Thirty Years' War and their impact on the construction of modern fortresses in Pommern, Neumark and Schlesien

Abstract

The bastion fortification was born between the fifteenth and sixteenth century in Italy and spread very quickly throughout Europe. In Pommern, today's Lubusz Land and Schlesien, bastion strongholds appeared as early as in the mid-16th century, however, at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, bastion strongholds were still a rarity in this part of the continent. After the Thirty Years' War, the situation changed dramatically. The bastion was fortified with 45 more towns. This was due to very intensive siege operations

in the area. In the period between 1625 and 1648, there were 121 occupations. Cities were captured by fire, proximity attack, assault and mines or a combination of these techniques.

Of the bastion fortified towns during the war, 21 lost their importance just after the conflict, 15 disappeared within a century after the war and 9 remained important until the 19th century. Of the latter, three were small and insignificant strongholds (Damm, Stettin and Penemünde), while the others – Brieg, Neiße, Glogau, Stettin, Kolberg and Stralsund – retained their importance as important strongholds until the 19th and sometimes until the mid-20th century.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-10

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Monika Ogiewa-Sejnota
ORCID: 0000-0002-5131-411X
Stargard Archaeological-Historical Museum
e-mail: m.ogiewa-sejnota@muzeum-stargard.pl

A picture of the Duchy of Szczecin[1] during the Thirty Years' War in light of the chronicle by Peter Rudolphy between 1627 and 1637

Keywords: Thirty Years' War, Pomerania, the Duchy of Szczecin, Gryfice, Kołobrzeg, Pyrzyce, Stargard, Szczecin, Peter Rudolphi
Słowa kluczowe: wojna trzydziestoletnia, Pomorze, Księstwo Szczecińskie, Gryfice, Kołobrzeg, Pyrzyce, Stargard, Szczecin, Peter Rudolphi

When the imperial governors were thrown out of the window of the Prague Castle on 23 May 1618, hardly anyone thought that this event would become a pretext for the outbreak of war, considered to be one of the bloodiest conflicts in history. At that time, Pomerania was divided into two Duchies – Szczecin and Wolgast. The first was ruled by Philipp Julius (1584–1625) and the second was by Francis I (1577–1620). In the initial period of the war (Bohemian Revolt) both rulers kept their neutrality. Above all, they wanted to maintain proper diplomatic relations with all their neighbours, which was due to the weak position of their duchies

[1] The division into the Duchy of Szczecin and the Duchy of Wolgast existed until 1625, when after the death of the Duke of Wolgast, Philippe Julius, the whole land of Pomerania was united by Bogislaw XIV. In this article, the use of the name of the Duchy of Szczecin is to indicate the area of Pomerania currently within the Polish borders.

in the international arena, the lack of serious military force and the estates strong influence on the current situation in the country. However, this did not mean that Bohemian Revolt was unnoticed in Pomerania, because both courts intensified their diplomatic activities and even attempted to increase the defence of the duchies borders, but it ends with not the best result. A real threat of conflict appeared in 1625, when Denmark, headed by King Christian IV (1577–1648), joined the war. In the same year, both Duchies of Pomerania were united in the hands of Bogislaw XIV (1580–1637), who was the last reigning ruler of the Griffin dynasty. During his reign, the territory of the duchy was occupied by the fighting imperial and Swedish troops, which contributed to the economic collapse.[2]

Information on the course of warfare in Pomerania has been very well preserved in the archival materials kept in the Archiwum Państwowe in Szczecin.[3] Unfortunately, so far they have not been comprehensively developed to compare Peter Rudolphy's record with the actual state of affairs. The description of those events was also recorded in chronicles created at that time. Worth mentioning here is the work of Johannes Micrälius (1597–1658) *Sechs Bücher Vom Alten Pommerlande*, whose fifth book was devoted to the period from 1627, i.e. from the time of the signing of the Franzburg surrender by the Pomeranian Duke Bogislaw XIV until his death in 1637. The work was published in the Szczecin printing house in 1640, i.e. before the end of the warfare.[4] Comparing the content of Micrälius' and Rudolphy's chronicles one can risk a statement that the former became an inspiration for the latter one devoted to the history of Pomerania and the native dynasty, which is the basis of these considerations.

Peter Rudolphi and his work

Currently, the chronicle by the Pomeranian pastor Peter Rudolphy is in the collection of the Archiwum Państwowe in Szczecin in the fonds of Samuel Gottlieb

[2] T. Rudel, *Die Lage Pommerns von Beginn des dreißigjährigen Krieges bis zum Eintreffen Gustav Adolph (1520–1630)*, "Baltische Studien Alte Folge" (later: „BS AF"), 1890, no. 40, pp. 68–71; B. Wachowiak, *Państwo zachodniopomorskie w okresie hegemonii szlachty (1570–1625)*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 2, part 1, ed. G. Labuda, Poznań 1977, pp. 986–989.

[3] The fonds Archiwum Książąt Szczecińskich contain 85 seperate units of files describing issues related to the Thirty Years' War.

[4] W. Böhmer, *Übersicht der allgemeinen Chroniken und Geschichten Pommerns seit Kantzow*, "BS AF", 1835/36, no. 3, pp. 101–102.

Loeper (1712–1778).[5] This Pomeranian collector had a large library collection, which he inherited from his father and then gradually expanded it. His collection included manuscripts of the Pomeranian chronicler Thomas Kantzow, old prints and other valuable materials. After his death, his grandchildren donated the collection to the Gesellschaft für Pommersche Geschichte und Altertumskunde, which then gave it to the Szczecin archive. According to Wilhelm Böhmer (1791–1842), the donated collection contained a copy of the Chronicle in three parts, while the original was to be part of the so-called Liebeherr collection from the mayor of Szczecin Matthäus Heinrich von Liebeherr (1693–1749), who was a passionate bibliophile and a well-known collector. He in turn donated his collection to the castle library in Płoty established by Friedrich Wilhelm von der Osten (1721–1786), whose collection was scattered after World War II.[6] Another location of the original Rudolphy's chronicle was given by Martin Wehrmann (1861–1937), who found it in the library collection of Joachimsthalsche Gymnasium in Templin under inventory number 52.[7]

Peter Rudolphi was born between 1671 and 1675 in Gryfice.[8] His father, Matthias, was secretary of the city court in this city. Unfortunately, no more detailed information about his family could be found. According to Hans Moderov (1877–1945), the young chronicler was to study at the University of Wittenberg. However, it is difficult to find his name in the list of students of this university.[9] It appears on the register of the University of Rostock, where it was enlisted as

[5] The Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie (later: APS), Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera (later: Rudolphi), 45 a.

[6] W. Böhmer, *Übersicht der allgemeinen…*, p. 104; F. v. Bismarck-Osten, *Die Sammlungen zu Schloß Plathe und ihr Begründer Friedrich Wilhelm von der Osten (1721–1786)*, "Baltische Studien Neue Folge" (later: "BS NF"), 1976, no. 62, pp. 63, 70.

[7] APS, Spuścizna Martina Wehrmanna (later: Wehrmann), 15, n.p.; M. Wehrmann, *Ein altes Gedicht über Pommern im 30jährigen Kriege*, in: *Pyritz im 30 jährigen Kriege: Erinnerungsheft an das Brandjahr 1634 und sein Gedächtnis 1934*, ed. R. Holsten, Pyritz i. Pom. 1934, p. 31.

[8] Martin Wehrmann stated 1671, whereas Hans Moderow claimed 1675; comp. H. Moderow, *Die Evangelischen Geistlichen Pommerns. Von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart*, vol. 1, *Der Regierungsbezirk Stettin*, Stettin 1903, p. 243; M. Wehrmann, *Ein altes Gedicht*…, p. 31.

[9] H. Moderow, *Die Evangelischen Geistlichen*…, In the spring of 1698, a person with a similar name, Petrus Rudolphus Schröder of Selenopolitanus (*Lüneburg*), was admitted to the university. Comp. Universität Wittenberg, *Wittenberger Matrikel*, vol. 7, 1675, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt 2017, f. 227.

Petrus Rudolphi, Gryphisberga-Pomer in May 1697.[10] Interestingly, even before he started his university studies, he took up a teaching job in the newly built palace in Stuchowo, belonging to the von Plötz family. After completing university education in 1701, Rudolphi took the post of pastor in Witno, which belonged to the von Edeling family from 1665. The parish was subordinate to the synod in Gryfice and had its branch in Stuchowo. They were under the patronage of Rudolphy's former employers, the von Plötz family.[11] That same year he married Cathatrina Sophia Hoppe. Her father, Samuels, was a previous pastor in Witno. Peter Rudolphi died childless on 25 May 1708.[12]

The handwritten history of Pomerania *Des durch Krieg u. Sieg umb. sich greiffende endlich durch Noth und Tod ergriffenenen Pommerischen Greiffens*, popularly known as *Der Pommersche Greif,* were created at the end of the 17th century and consist of three parts.

The first one entitled *Erster Theil: in welchen der Regierenden Vor- u. Hinterpommerschen Herzogen Leben und Thaten*[13] was written down in Kołobrzeg in 1693 and begins with a list of sources used by the author, among which are *Annales Marchianenses*, *Annales Pomeraniae* by Valentin von Eickstedt, *Sechs Bücher vom alten Pommernland* by Johannes Micrälius, *Das Grosse Pomrische Kirchen Chronicon* by Daniel Cramer, *Chronica Sclavorum* by Helmond, *Historische Beschreibung der Stadt Alten* by Paul Friedeborn, *Gesta Danorum* by Saxo Grammar, *Chronicle of Poland* by Marcin Kromer. After this list, the author placed a preface, in which he included a dedication and motivations that guided

[10] Together with him, other Pomeranian students from Goleniów, Kołobrzeg and Stargard were admitted to the group. Immatrikulation von Petrus Rudolphi, matrikel.uni-rostock.de/id/100047733 (3.01.2019).

[11] APS, Akta miasta Gryfice, 153 a, n.p.; APS, Wehrmann, 79, n.p.; L.W. Brüggemann, *Ausführliche Beschreibung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes des Königl. Preußischen Herzogthums Vor- und Hinter-Pommern*, vol. 2, part 1, *Beschreibung der zu dem Gerichtsbezirk der Königl. Landescollegien in Stettin gehörigen Hinterpommerschen Kreise*, Stettin 1784, p. 453; J.T. Bagmihl, *Pommersches Wappenbuch*, vol. 4, Stettin 1854, p. 152.

[12] Some researchers see the descendant of the pastor as Albrecht Friedrich Rudolfi, the town's treasurer and founder of the Girls' School founded in 1734 in Gryfice. However, there is no confirmation of this information, e.g. in Moderow. The widow of the chronicler married another pastor from Witno, Joachim Ulrich, whom she gave birth to two children. Comp. APS, Akta miasta Gryfice, 153 a, n.p.; H. Moderow, *Die Evangelischen Geistlichen*…, p. 243, P. Gut, *Gryfice w 2. połowie XVII wieku i w wieku XVIII*, in: *Gryfice. Dzieje miasta*, ed. T. Białecki, Szczecin 2012, p. 154.

[13] A copy of this part can be found in Szczecin's archives in fonds Rękopisy i spuścizny. The title page misspelled the author's name indicating that it was Paul. APS, Rękopisy i spuścizny, 453, p. 2.

him through writing the history of Pomerania. The person to whom he offered his work was an unnamed *famous, learned and respected Lord*. In the further part of the foreword he described the situation in which Pomerania found itself after the extinction of the Griffin dynasty, i.e. about the division of the country between the *Marche eagle* (*märckischen Adler*) identified with the person of the elector of Brandenburg and the *Swedish lion* (*schwedischen Löwe*), the king of Sweden. In his introduction, he mentioned some of the lands forming the Pomeranian Duchy, Rügen and the County of Gützkow and Kashubia, whose symbols are part of the Pomeranian coat of arms and the title of the native dukes.[14] The author then followed in the traces of earlier chroniclers, who in line with the tendencies of German historiography, glorified the history of own nation in their works, derived from ancient times.[15] Rudolphi himself also brought out the history of Pomerania from antiquity, woven into it references to Alexander the Great, the ancient Romans, the Longobards, the Baltic Wends and the Goths. The connection between the history of Pomerania and the history of ancient nations also referred to the used motif of Griffin, from which the native dynasty took its name and placed it on its coats of arms, stamps, coins and works of art.[16] The legendary animal appeared in the illustrations in the chronicle. For example, you can see Griffin descending from the heavens separating two fighting armies. Such a performance is an allegory presenting events related to the Thirty Years' War and then to the division of the Pomeranian lands between Brandenburg and Sweden. At the end of the foreword the author wrote down the place and date of its creation *an der Hinterpomerischen Baltichen Vestung* [Kołobrzeg – M.O.-S] *im Jahr 1693, d. 11 Julii*. On the following pages of the manuscript there is already content covering the history of the state from the earliest times until the death of duke Francis I of Szczecin on the 27th of November 1620 and the assumption of the throne in the Duchy of Szczecin by Bogislaw XIV. The layout of the content was characteristic of the annals, where the most important events, according to the author, were described under the following year. On the margins, there are

[14] APS, Rudolphi, 45, n.p.

[15] A.F. Grabski, *Dzieje historiografii*, Poznań 2006, p. 219.

[16] About the symbolism of the Griffin and its appearance in Pomeranian symbolism read: R.-G. Wehrlich, *Początki pomorskiego herbu Gryfitów w ówczesnym kontekście politycznym i heraldycznym z okazji 800-lecia najstarszego przedstawienia obrazowego*, in: *Pod skrzydłami Gryfa*, ed. A. Gut, Szczecin 2014, pp. 28–34; B. Ochędowska-Grzelak, *Motyw Gryfa w sztuce książęcej Pomorza Zachodniego na tle sztuki europejskiej*, in: *Pod skrzydłami…*, pp. 39–42.



Figure 1. Title page of the second part of the manuscripted history of Pomerania by Peter Rudolphi

Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: 45 a, p. 5.

references to the above-mentioned chronicles which contain the author and place in the original text.[17]

The next part, *Zweiter Theil: Des umb. sich greiffenden Pomm. Kreises ander Alter* (Figure 1) was established in the manor house in Stuchowo in 1696, belonging to the aforementioned von Plötz family. Their family estate was divided into two parts. The palace was located in the first of them, which was the main

[17] APS, Rudolphi, 45, n.p.

residency of the family. This part belonged to to Landrat Joachim Christoph von Plötz at the time, and perhaps it is in his person that Rudolphy's principal and the mysterious master from the foreword to the work should be seen.[18] The second volume of the chronicle began with a map of the Duchy of Pomerania containing marked borders and more important localities. On the next page Rudolphi placed an illustration, which is an allegory of a divided Pomerania after the death of Bogislaw XIV. There is the coat of arms cut in two and the dead Griffin, whose body was laid down on the altar of the fatherland. Then the author went on to the proper content, i.e. the description of the history of the duchy. This part was divided into five books, which could be inspired by the earlier Micrälius chronicle. Each book began with a three-part line, briefly describing the content of each of them. As Wehrmann noted, these poems were not outstanding works of poetry, but they are worth noting as they were written in Pomerania and are examples of local poetry from the end of the 17th century. The second part of the Pomeranian pastor's chronicle begins with the unification of the Duchy under Bogislaw XIV in 1625 and ends with a description of the funeral ceremony of this duke in May 1654. The first one includes graphics presenting profiles of people important for the course of the conflict, among them: rulers (Christian IV, Gustav II Adolph 1594–1632, Maria Eleonora 1599–1655), commanders (Hans Georg Arnim 1583–1641, Johann Gustav Banér 1594–1641, Matthias Gallas 1584–1647) and civil servants (Axel Gustaffson Oxenstierny 1583–1654). The second group includes graphics of significant Pomeranian cities, such as Stralsund, Wolgast, Szczecin, Stargard or Kołobrzeg. All illustrations were signed with the initials of the author – PR. In this part of the chronicle Rudolphi kept the chronological-river system, and in the margins, unlike in the first part, there is no reference to the sources from which the author drew his knowledge.[19]

Last, third part entitled *Dritter Theil: Des durch Krieg u. Sieg umb. sich greiffenden Pom. Kreises. Dritter Alter* seems to be the humblest. Unfortunately, the lack of first pages does not allow us to determine when and where it was written and what important event, after the division of Pomerania between Sweden and Brandenburg, inspired it. Based on an analysis of the content, the ending moment is known best – the signing of the treaties in Nijmegen in 1679. They crowned the

[18] APS, Wehrmann, 80, n.p.; L.W. Brüggemann, *Ausführliche Beschreibung...*, pp. 453–454; L. v. Zedlitz-Neukirch, *Neues Preussisches Adels-Lexicon, oder genealogische und diplomatische Nachrichten*, part 4, Lepizig 1837, p. 40.

[19] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 506.

so-called Dutch War, in which France (supported by the Bishopric of Münster and Sweden) faced the Empire, Spain, Brandenburg and the Netherlands. In the following part, information about the death of Ernst Bogislaw von Croÿ (1620–1684), the last living member of the Griffin family, was added and copies of documents concerning the history of Pomerania were included. This part was also enriched with graphics. Among them there was a manuscript map of Vorpommern, which was ruled by the Swedes, and images such as Carl Gustaf Wrangel (1613–1673)[20] and Joachim Ernst von Görzke (1611–1682).[21]

The analysis of the content of the chronicle indicates that the second part of the chronicle discusses the course of the Thirty Years' War and its consequences in the Pomeranian lands. The reader's attention is attracted by the author's great attention to detail, which at the same time forces him to reflect on how the 17th century author had such knowledge. Böhmer wrote in one of his articles on Pomeranian history since the time of Kantzov, that most of the news contained in the chronicle came from materials scattered around Pomeranian libraries. However, the author of the article drew attention to the pompous style used by Rudolphy's, which, in his opinion, suggested that the chronicle was addressed to ordinary readers.[22] Wehrmann spoke in a similar tone, emphasizing the importance of this source in Pomeranian historiography, especially as regards the part devoted to the events of the Thirty Years' War. The historian also pointed out that Rudolphy's work was very popular in the second half of the 18th century and at that time it was often used to reconstruct events related to the stay of Swedish and Imperial troops in Pomeranian lands. However, he was far from taking the initiative to print this work in its entirety, because its author was strongly inspired by his predecessors.[23] In Polish literature, frequent references to Rudolphy's work are in vain. More popular are the chronicles of city graphics, which are presented on websites or museum exhibitions.

[20] Son of Hermann von Wrangel (1584–1643), Swedish Field Marshal, commander of the Swedish army during the Thirty Years' War.

[21] APS, Rudolphi, 45 b, n.p.

[22] W. Böhmer, *Übersicht der allgemeinen*…, pp. 104–106.

[23] M. Wehrmann, *Ein altes Gedicht*…, p. 31.

The situation of Pomerania in 1626 and early 1627

Rudolphi initiated the description of the Thirty Years' War from Duke Bogislaw XIV's concerns about the events on the eastern borders of the duchy in the mid-1620s. At that time, there were armed clashes between Sweden and Poland over Royal Prussia. The situation was difficult for Bogislaw because he was a Polish feudatory for the possession of the lands of Lębork and Bytów, while he was connected with the Scandinavian state by advantageous trade contracts.[24]

On the pages of the chronicle, the dispute between Poland and Sweden began with the gathering of 10,000 soldiers in the area between Oliwa and Starogard occupied by the Swedes in 1626. In October of the same year, Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski (1590/1594–1646), who (according to Rudolphy) commanded about 7,000 soldiers, arrived in Czarlin at the head of the quarterback army.[25] The approaching winter allowed the Swedes to reorganize the branches stationed in Pomerania and to carry out new hauls. For this purpose Lieutenant Colonel Johann Streiff, Baron von Lauenstein (?–1632) and Maximilian Teuffel, Baron von Guntersdorf und Weyerburg (1565–1631) were sent to Mecklenburg to recruit 2,000 footmen and 1,000 horses. The third envoy Johann Friedrich von Kötteritz (1593–1633) was obliged to carry out the train in Brandenburg. Rudolphi made no mention of the Swedish King's demands on the Pomeranian Duke to authorise the march of the recruited troops through the territory of his duchy. Despite the fact that Bogislaw XIV, who was afraid of the Emperor's reaction, did not issue a permit for the passage of troops, the mercenary army crossed the border of Pomerania. The troops withdrew only after she paid 9,000 thalers of ransom. This did not mean, however, that the Swedes respected the neutrality of Pomerania, because their troops, which *nota bene* did not have the best reputation, again violated the border and on the 11th (12th) of March 1627 they entered Recz and marched further north towards the border with Poland. It was then that Hetman Koniecpolski found out about the troops marching from Mecklenburg, who entered the land of Lębork and was preparing to repel the attack there. According to Rudolphy, the Polish commander had about 7,000 men at his disposal at that time – that was his entire army. The decisive battle took place at Czarne (*Hammerstein*,

[24] B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa zachodniopomorskiego*, in: *Historia Pomorza*…, p. 990.

[25] The Koniecpolski Hetman had counting forces: 4,200 rides, 1,000 dragons and 1,000 infantry. After: P. Skworoda, *Wojny Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją*, Warszawa 2007, p. 65.

then Hamersztyn), where Koniecpolski concentrated his main forces and ordered the construction of a gallows where cannons and musketeers were placed. In the morning on the 15th of April, the Polish army carried out a fake attack, and then, simulating a defeat, it retreated forcing the Swedes to chase. At that time, the unsuspecting Swedish soldiers were defeated by musketeers and artillery hidden in the gallows. Two days later, the Swedes signed the act of capitulation, while Bogislaw XIV and the estates decided to carry out a train to defend their own borders. Adam von Glasenapp and Claus von Brockhausen were appointed as commanders.[26]

Albrecht Wallenstein and the surrender in Franzburg

After all, Rudolphie focused on joining the war of Danish king Christian IV in 1625, because then the units of fighting armies started to approach the borders of the Duchy of Pomerania. In the same year one of the commanders of the imperial army, Albrecht Wallenstein, thanks to his wartime successes and his constantly growing wealth, was appointed Duke of Friedland which further strengthened his position in the imperial army. A year later, this imperial commander, with his own money, put an army of 40,000 men at the disposal of the Emperor, provided that he purchased weapons and equipment from his own factories. Wallenstein also initiated the financing of the army by means of the so-called contribution. This system consisted in the fact that commanders signed contracts with local authorities, which regulated the amount of monthly payments to soldiers stationed in the area, in return for which they received protection (the so-called *salva guardia*). When such a large army marched north to meet the enemy Danish troops, it became clear that Pomerania was in danger. The situation was aggravated by information about the entry of the imperial army into the neighbouring duchy, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg. In addition, Emperor Ferdinand II (1578–1637) looked with increasing interest towards the Baltic Sea. This was due to information reaching the imperial camp about the planned agreement between Sweden and Denmark, which could mean that the theatre of war would move to Baltic

[26] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 13–14. Comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher von alten Pommernland*, *Buch V*, Stettin–Leipzig 1723, p. 129; T. Rudel, *Die Lage Pommerns…*, pp. 75–80; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern*, part 2, *Bis zur Gegenwart*, Gotha 1906, p. 114; B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa…*, pp. 991–992; B. Warlich, *Streiff Baron von Lauenstein, Johann* [*Reinhold*], http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/streiff-freiherr-von-lauenstein-johann-2 (14.04.2019); idem, *Teuffel [Dyvell], Maximilian, Baron von Guntersdorf and Weyerburg*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/teuffel-maximilian-freiherr-von-guntersdorf (14.04.2019). P. Skworoda, *Wojny Rzeczpospolitej…*, pp. 68–71.

waters. Even worse, the Duke of Friedland planned to overwinter ten regiments in the untouched by war Pomeranian area, as he could provide food supplies for his numerous army. According to Rudolphy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army notified the Duke Bogislaw XIV of his plans for Pomerania in October 1627, when Wallenstein gave him an ultimatum that he would either agree to the accommodation of the Imperial troops or that Pomerania would be occupied by force. A month later, Wallenstein's envoy, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Rudolf von Bindhoff (1593–1631), came to the duke's residence in Franzburg. He repeated the commander's proposal and a few days later another delegate – Johann von Götz (1599–1645) – came with demands. Although the prince tried to block the deployment of soldiers on Pomeranian soil, he was forced by imperial representatives to sign the act of surrender in front of the imperial commander Hans George von Arnim (Figure 2).[27]



Figure 2. Hans Georg Arnim (1583–1641)

Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: 45 a, p. 41.

[27] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 15. Comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher…*, p. 133; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern…*, pp. 115–116; B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa…*, pp. 989–990, 994; L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia. Europa i świat 1618–1648*, Warszawa 2010, p. 102; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648. Tragedia Europy*, Oświęcim 2017, p. 394.

The chronicler described in detail the provisions which were included in the document referred to in the historiography as the Franzburg surrender. It confirms that Pomeranian dukes could preserve their dignity, immunities and regalia. Apart from that, soldiers were not to be accommodated in residential cities – Szczecin and Wolgast, as well as in Dąbie and Koszalin, and in all duke's domains, noble estates or church properties. The inhabitants of Pomeranian cities were guaranteed peace and ensured that weapons stored in municipal warehouses would not be confiscated. The retention of existing officials was confirmed and a commitment was made to respect the fact that the Duchy was a Protestant region. Mayors, town councillors, receivers, secretaries, aristocratic widows in all Pomeranian cities are guaranteed exemption from accommodation. Without the reigning duke's consent, the construction of the city walls could not be violated. At the very end, the imperial party undertook to make every effort to maintain discipline among its soldiers and not to judge the population on its own.[28] In fact, the contract signed in Franzburg guaranteed the imperial regiments a monthly payment of 40,000 thalers, which represented almost half of the annual expenditure of the Duchy. This money was to be used to support 22,000 soldiers. It would seem that the document guaranteed Pomerania at least a bit of safety, even though it was a pure substitute for the real one. Needless to say, it soon turned out to be a bare illusion, because the imperial commanders started to impose much greater contributions on the cities and allowed the soldiers to confiscate food from the people they were staying with. According to the agreement, the troops were to stay in the Duchy of Pomerania during the winter period for six weeks, but this time was extended to six months. During this period, cattle, poultry and fish were confiscated for the army's needs, which led to the total collapse and destruction of the economy. In addition, even after leaving the wintering grounds, local authorities still had to pay contributions and provide food for the army.[29]

During the Imperial soldiers' stay in Pomerania it soon turned out that the provisions of the Franzburg surrender did not apply. As Rudolphi described, more regiments were accommodated in the Duchy than expected, and the objections of Duke Bogislaw writing numerous complaints to the emperor, were of no use. Soldiers with a low sense of morality and the gangs of marauders who followed them,

[28] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 17.

[29] T. Rudel, *Die Lage Pommerns…*, pp. 92–94; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern…*, p. 115; B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa…*, p. 995; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia…*, pp. 394–396.

immediately after their appearance on Pomeranian soil, robbed everything that could be robbed. They chose cities as their accommodation, which allowed them to collect larger spoils. In addition, the city centres were generally surrounded by defensive walls, which made it very difficult for enemy units to capture them. After the occupation of Pomeranian cities by the imperial army, work began on the expansion of existing city fortifications. The costs associated with this work were to be covered by the city's cash registers, which had already been damaged by the contributions imposed.[30]

The war in the Duchy of Szczecin

According to Rudolphy's description, the war affected the Duchy of Wolgast to a greater extent, especially Stralsund, whose authorities did not agree to accommodate the imperial troops and as a result the city was besieged by them. On his side was Denmark, fighting in the ranks of the Protestant Union, and Sweden, which increasingly wanted to join the war and pursue its own political goals.



Figure 3. The view of Stargard before 1635

Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: 45 a, p. 375.

[30] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 22–23.

When writing about the city centres besieged in the Duchy of Szczecin, Rudolphi was the first to mention Stargard (Figure 3). Already before the capitulation was signed by Duke Bogislaw XIV, the authorities of this city asked him to join the group of cities where the imperial soldiers were not to be accommodated. These requests were not successful because on the 30th of November 1627 Ottavio Piccolomini (1599–1656) entered the city through the Pyrzycka Gate leading the eight light-cavalry subunits of 120 soldiers each. After taking control of the city, weapons from the local arsenal were seized and keys to the city gates were confiscated. Civilians suffered greatly from the presence of soldiers, as grain, cattle, and all copper and tin objects were stolen from them. No one could feel safe in the city, because there were rapes, beatings or arrests on the agenda. Such behaviour was not tolerated by the residents, so there were riots, in which an imperial army ensign was killed. In retaliation, the city was punished with 10,000 German thalers. In addition, private weapons were seized and young boys were called up to dig trenches. It is worth mentioning that as soon as Piccolomini appeared at the city gates, he received 10,000 thalers of contribution from the city authorities.[31] During the stay of the Imperial troops, work was undertaken to expand the fortifications around the city. Although Stargard had already been surrounded by walls before, unfortunately, the fortification system used was highly outdated and did not fit into the modern defence system based on the use of artillery. For this reason, Piccolomini proceeded to modernize the fortifications, especially the Roundels of St. John. At the same time, the walls were surrounded by galleries, and a warehouse was built in the city to store food in case of a siege.[32]

In the further part of the chronicle, Rudolphi did not show what the soldiers' accommodation in other cities of the Duchy of Szczecin looked like. He paid more attention to the behaviour of the soldiers stationed in the Pomeranian lands, and above all to the issue of their nationality. He often emphasized that among the military there were a large number of foreign acorns, e.g. Italians, Spaniards or Scots, who were characterized by greater cruelty than native Germans.[33] He mentioned various examples, such as the contributions also imposed on residential towns and

[31] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 24, 71. Comp. T. Rudel, *Die Lage Pommerns*…, p. 97; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*…, p. 397.

[32] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 24. Comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher*..., pp. 137–138, 153; G.Ch. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*, vol. 1, Stargard 1843, p. 116; G. Podruczny, *Niezrealizowane projekty twierdzy w Stargardzie*, "Stargardia" 2015, no. 10, p. 282.

[33] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 109–110.

other urban centres mentioned in the 1627 document. The situation was similar in terms of the local officials who were also meant to be protected, but there were situations when people from the local administration were threatened with arrests if they refused to pay the contribution to the army stationed there. Despite the prevailing terror, the city officials tried to save precious objects by collecting them in the premises of the city hall, as was the case for instance in Gryfino or Stargard.[34] What could not be saved was the subject of looting. In many cities, even sacred buildings were not spared, from which chasubles, chalices, patens, monstrances, chairs and other liturgical instruments were stolen, and what is worse, the crypts in the church interiors were opened and robbed.[35]



Figure 4. Gustav II Adolph (1594–1632)

Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: 45 a, p. 157.

[34] Ibidem, p. 110. In Stargard in 1673, a well-closed silver box was opened; it was originally hidden in the City Hall's auditorium. Comp. *Inwentarz sreber zgromadzonych w skrzyni przechowywanej w stargardzkim Ratuszu do 1673 roku*, in: *W czasach, gdy Stargard był stolicą…*, ed. M. Majewski, Stargard 2014, p. 31.

[35] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 151.

In his second book, Rudolphi provided more information about the warfare in the Duchy of Szczecin, which he started with a description of the journey of King Gustav II Adolph of Sweden leading his army to Pomerania (Figure 4). The Swedish king arrived in the land of Griffins on the 24th of June 1630. The chronicler pointed out the symbolism of this date, because on this day the memory of St. John was celebrated in the church, but more importantly it was the 100-year-anniversary of the announcement of the Augsburg Confession.[36] The island of Usedom was chosen to replace the Swedish landing, and from there it was intended to break through further south. This decision was linked to the plans of Gustav II Adolph, who wanted to control the Oder estuary in order to secure rapid supplies of weapons and rolling stock with supplies from Sweden and to be able to move more easily and in less time into Germany. After going ashore near Peenemünde, the construction of the camp began. By creating a frontline, Swedish troops also captured the nearby island of Wolin. It should be remembered that Wolin was a ducal residence of a widow (renovated in 1626), in which at that time the duchess-wed Zofia Saska (1587–1635) resided. As a result, and in accordance with the provisions of the Franzburg surrender, no imperial troops could be accommodated in this city. However, these regulations did not apply to Swedish troops, so they occupied the duke's castle, making it the king's temporary quarters. After it was taken over, the Swedes started to work on fortification of the city, consisting of building new bastions and pouring out embankments and digging moats. At that time the behaviour of Swedish soldiers was no better than that of those fighting on the Emperor's side. After Wolin was seized, the Dziwnów were ravaged, which opened the way for the Swedes to Kamień Pomorski. On the news of these events, the duke's diplomacy was activated. At the Wolin Castle, King Gustav II Adolph met with delegates of Duke Bogislaw XIV, headed by Heinrich Schwalenberg. The task of the Pomeranian envoys was to negotiate a promise to respect the neutrality of Pomerania, but as it turned out these and subsequent talks did not bring any results.[37]

[36] The Augsburg Confession was announced at the Reich Parliament in Augsburg on 25 June 1530.

[37] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 155–169; cf.: M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern*…, p. 23; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin*, Stettin 1911, p. 270; B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa*…, s. 998; T. Balcerzak, M. Gibczyński, S. Słowiński, *Woliński zamek – odkrycie zapomniane siedziby książąt pomorskich*, in: *Wolińskie spotkania mediewistyczne. Ekskluzywne życie – dostojny pochówek. W kręgu kultury elitarnej wieków średnich*, ed. M. Rębkowski, Wolin 2011; L.E. Wolke et al., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*…, pp. 99–100.



Figure 5. The view of Szczecin from Łasztownia
Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: 45 a, p. 179.

Then Rudolphi returned to the description of the situation in the imperial camp. At the same time as Gustav II Adolph created his bridgehead on the island of Usedom, Catholic troops under the command of Torquato Conti (1591–1636) occupied Gryfino and Gartz, blocking the crossing of the Oder River for the Swedes and posing a real threat to Szczecin (Figure 5). The city where the main duke's residence was located was guaranteed by the act of Franzburg surrender that there would be no accommodation for imperial soldiers, and that it would not be on the route of the march of Catholic troops. The Catholic army still maintained its crews in Stargard and Kołobrzeg, preparing to repel a possible attack. At that time, new demands were also made to Bogislaw XIV to accept the imperial crew in Szczecin, which met with a very negative response from the Pomeranian ruler and city councillors. However, it was decided to increase the number of the crew defending the capital of the Duchy to 3,000 people and Zygfried von Damitz (1592–1631) was appointed as commander.[38]

[38] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 170–171. Comp. J.H. Zedler, Conti, in: *Grosse vollständige Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschafften und Künste*, https://www.zedler-lexikon.de/index.html?c=blaetternandnummer=6eitenzahl=580 (16.04.2019); B. Wachowiak, *Upadek państwa…*, p. 998; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin…*, p. 268; Z. Anusik, *Gustaw II Adolf…*, p. 201; G. Brzustowicz, *Pułkownik Zygfryd von Damitz (8.10.1592–7.09.1631 Breitefeld), dowódca*

Further on, Rudolphi described how, in July, Gustav II Adolph set off at the head of his troops to the capital of the Duchy of Szczecin – Szczecin. With 10,000 (some historians say 8,000) soldiers at his disposal, the king stood outside the city walls on the 10th of July, and made the duke's residence in Oderburg his temporary seat and set up camp. It is assumed that it was then that Damitz betrayed and opened the city gates to foreign troops. The historiography failed to answer the question of whether he acted in agreement with the Duke, who, due to his relations with the Emperor, could not officially take the Swedish side. Attempts at any kind of mediation between the Swedish and the Pomeranian rulers were of no use and Bogislaw XIV had to capitulate once again before a foreign monarch. This took place on the 20th of July, when the defence treaty between Sweden and the Duchy of Pomerania was signed. During the negotiations, Gustav II Adolph told Bogislaw XIV that from that moment on the country would be under Swedish rule (the area was to be returned after the warfare was over). In the signed agreement, the king also guaranteed the right to collect customs duty from the Oder trade, collected a single contribution of 200,000 riksdalers and introduced the Swedish coin. Furthermore, the king guaranteed the right to inherit these lands after the dynasty had died out, which was incompatible with the treaties under which the Griffins country was to pass under the rule of the Elekctor of Brandenburg. A day later, Damitz decided to open the city gates to Scandinavian soldiers.[39]

According to the chronicler, similarly to Wolin, after the occupation of Szczecin, the Swedes began to expand the city fortifications, existing since the Middle Ages. The works started with digging trenches defending the access to Szczecin, galleries and low earthworks near the Mill Gate and further in the direction of the castle in Oderburg up to the Oder River and in front of the Pasava Gate up to the end of the present Kolumba Street (*Oberwiek*). These works were mainly carried out by Finns and Saami in the service of the Swedish king. According to Rudolphy, they were characterized by great bravery in combat, so the soldiers of this nationality constituted the majority of the crew stationed in

pomorskiego regimentu, tzw. Białej Brygady, w służbie króla szwedzkiego Gustawa II Adolfa, "Stargardia" 2013, no. 8, p. 123.

[39] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 173. Comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher…*, p. 182; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern…*, p. 124; Z. Anusik, *Gustaw II Adolf*, Wrocław 2009, pp. 202, 206–207; G. Brzustowicz, *Pułkownik Zygfryd von Damitz…*, p. 125; P.H. Wilson, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia…*, pp. 453–454.

Szczecin. The residents of the city itself and of the areas outside the walls were also forced to help in these works, which gave a total of 2,259 people.[40]

In his description, the Pomeranian chronicler showed the course of the Swedish occupation of Pomerania. Simultaneously with the occupation of the capital of the duchy, the soldiers of Gustaw II Adolph began to take back other Pomeranian cities from the imperial hands. Rudolphi began the description of these events again with Stargard. The city by the Ina River was prepared to repel a possible attack, as the city walls were strengthened and rye was gradually stored in the newly built warehouse. On the 13th July 1630, a Swedish company under the command of von Damitz stood under the walls of Stargard and despite the expected attack, it managed to surprise the enemy. The next day in the morning the Swedish cannons were in Dąbie, and their units were stationed in the village of Kunowo, where they divided into two groups. The first part was to remain unnoticed in the area surrounding Stargard, while the second part took the road straight from St. Jobst's chapel, standing on the side of the St. John's Roundel stationed by 400 men commanded by the city commander Johann Jacob di Fore (d. 1643). The second group was to distract the attention of the crew locked behind the city walls. At that time, the first group of soldiers entered the city unnoticed through the water gate and passed through a narrow street near St. Mary's Church towards the square, where the imperial guards were defeated. When the crew gathered on the walls noticed the Swedes attacking the walls, they started artillery fire. However, the Swedes managed to take up positions near St. John's Church, whose tower they tried to blow up, and with it bury the enemy under the rubble. At the same time, explosives were placed at the foot of the Red Sea Tower, which blew up holes in the wall through which the remaining Swedes entered the city. At that time, the tower of St. John's Church was not blown up. After a rapid success, the Imperial Commander was requested to surrender the city the following day by 11 o'clock. After the act of surrender, the Imperial troops were led out of Stargard, leaving all their ammunition and supplies behind.[41]

---

[40] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 183–185. See: M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin*…, p. 271.

[41] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 196–197. Comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher*…, pp. 185–187; G.Ch. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*…, pp. 116–118; H.K.W. Berghaus, *Landbuch des Herzogtums Pommern – Beschilderung der Zustände dieser Länder in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 2: *Landbuch des Herzogthums Stettin, von Kamin und Hinterpommern; or the Administrative District of the Royal Government of Szczecin*, part 4: *Saatziger Kreis, especially the town of Stargard*, Anklam 1867, pp. 127–128.

Rudolphy's description shows that at the same time the Swedes turned their attention to Kołobrzeg (Figure 6). It was an important port city for Wallenstein, whom the Emperor appointed as Admiral of the Baltic Sea. Besides, it was the best fortified of all Pomeranian cities. After the Franzburg surrender, Kołobrzeg was occupied by Imperial Lieutenant Colonel Johann Christoph von Fünfkirchen (1600–1630), who commanded five regiments. Just like other towns in the duchy, the municipal authorities had to put enormous contributions to the maintenance of the imperial troops, and at their expense the occupiers continued to work on strengthening the fortifications. Expansion of the fortress required burning down several villages: Budzistowo, Lęborskie Przedmieście, Panewnik and Zielenina. The religious buildings outside the city walls were also destroyed. On the 29th of September 1629, the church of St. James burned down, and in June the following year the same fate was shared by the churches of St. Gertrude, St. John and St. Nicholas. The equipment from these churches, i.e. chasubles, altar covers, etc., simply disappeared. On the 11th of September 1630, St. George's Church was destroyed, along with the hospital and nearby houses. Within the city walls, the fire consumed many houses and buildings of the city, one hundred carts of grain, as well as gardens and numerous fruit trees. The townspeople and farmers were chased by imperial soldiers to help clean up the damage. During the occupation of Kołobrzeg by the Imperial army, plagues often broke out, the first time during their accommodation in 1627, and then 3 years later.[42] Later in the chronicle Rudolphi described how on the 20th of September 1630 the Swedish general Wolf Heinrich von Baudissin (1579–1646) stood at the gates of Kołobrzeg, who had earlier crushed the Imperial army at Świdwin. He had about 1,500 musketeers and 1,000 horsemen under his command but the approach to the city itself was difficult, so the commanding officer of the royal troops decided to wait for the reinforcements, which unfortunately came a month later. At that time, ships from Rostock and Wismar, carrying supplies for soldiers locked in the fortress, entered the port of Kołobrzeg. However, they were immediately taken over by the Swedes, who confiscated all goods for their own use. In October, the siege of the fortress began, supervised by Gustav Karlsson Horn (1592–1657). The defence of Kołobrzeg was then commanded by Heinrich Johann Guyard, Count St. Julian (1590–1642). The tactics that the Swedes chose was based on simulated attacks

[42] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 200–201; comp. H. Riemann, *Geschichte der Stadt Colberg*, Colberg 1873, pp. 397–399.

conducted under the cover of night, forcing the enemy to fire all the ammunition. The fortress surrendered in early March 1631.[43]



Figure 6. The View of Kołobrzeg during the siege by the Swedish army
Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: 45 a, p. 259.

Another city described by Rudolphy and occupied by the Swedes was Gryfice. The city was affected by warfare three years earlier, when the Imperial Cuirassier troops entered the town on the 4th of December. At that time, the city was captured by three companies under the command of Heinrich Count Schlick zu Bessano und Weißkirchena (1580–1650).[44] They were followed by marauders and

[43] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 262; comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher…*, pp. 201–202; M. Wehrmann, *Ein altes Gedicht…*, p. 34.

[44] The historiography also states that Gryfice was occupied by units commanded by Herberstein and Fuchs. However, it seems impossible because, the first of them, Maximilian Count von Herberstein (1609–1688) was a Swedish commander who appeared in Pomerania with the army of Gustav II Adolph. The origin of the second commander is unclear. The only Fuchs in the Emperor's service were found on the battlefield at Breitenfeld in 1631. It is possible that these people were in command of the individual companies stationed in Griffins. Comp. H. Riemann, *Geschichte der Stadt Greifenberg in Pommern*, Greifenberg i. P. 1862, p. 166; R. Gaziński, *Dzieje Gryfic w XVI wieku i 1. połowie XVII wieku*, in: *Gryfice. Dzieje miasta*, ed. T. Białecki, Szczecin 2012, p. 117; B. Warlich, *Herberstein, Maximilian Freiherr von*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/herberstein-maximilian-freiherr-von (27.04.2019); B. Warlich, *Fuchs, N.*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/fuchs-n (27.04.2019).

women who followed the army. The Pomeranian pastor strongly emphasised the brutality of the Imperial soldiers, their crimes included locking councillors in the city hall and forcing them by torture and starvation to pay contributions to the imperial troops. At that time, the city officials decided to take out a loan of 623 thalers as collateral for the village of Skalin. The duty to maintain about 400 soldiers and a large number of horses was put on the residents' shoulders, so the city's warehouse and cash register resources were quickly depleted. In addition, as in other localities, residents had experienced fear, theft and rape. Two years later the imperial army commanders imposed 1,200 guilders on the town so in order to meet the demands, the city authorities sold the village of Białobudź, as they had already done with other villages. Interestingly, in the same year, as a result of reprehensible behaviour, the army was forced to leave the city and for the next six months it was not occupied by any of the fighting parties. It was not until January 1630 that the Imperial army of Colonel Augustin Morando (d. 1634) entered Gryfice again. Among them there was a large group of soldiers of Italian nationality whose stay was marked by even more cruelty than that of the previous occupants – Germans. In addition, the soldiers brought with them the plague, which decimated the number of local residents. At that time, among others, two mayors died together with their families. The occupiers also robbed all items that could be melted down into ammunition. The stay in the city of Morando's soldiers ended with news of the landing of the army of Gustav II Adolph on the island of Usedom. Sent by the King of Sweden to Kołobrzeg in autumn, the soldiers were partly stationed in Gryfice. Their number increased by three regiments, which was related to the stay in the city between 16–21 November by Gustav II Adolph. After the collapse of Kołobrzeg at the beginning of 1631, the main Swedish forces were retreated to the west, so that Gryfice and its environs had peace and quiet. Duchess-wed Sophie, who came to the city together with King Gustav II Adolph, was involved in helping the inhabitants of the area.[45]

Rudolphi finished his second book with a description of the Swedes leaving the frontline in Pomerania and their march southwards. In his report, he particularly focused on the battles conducted against the imperial troops in the New March. The breakthrough moment for the chronicler was the death of King Gustav II Adolph at Lützen in 1632 and the changes it brought about in the existing

[45] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 230, 249–250. Comp. H. Riemann, *Geschichte der Stadt Greifenberg…*, pp. 172–177; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Land und Stadt Greifenberg*, Greifenberg in Pomm. 1927, pp. 118–120; R. Gaziński, *Dzieje Gryfic…*, pp. 117–120.

balance of power. Despite the death of the ruler, the Swedes were still successful in the war arena. After the monarch's funeral, the Imperial army invaded Pomerania, but had to withdraw. At that time, Pyrzyce was the place most vulnerable to destruction. At the turn of 1633/1634, Swedish troops under the command of Jacob Burgsdorff and an unknown baron were wintering in the city, which were then to go in the direction of Gorzów. Unfortunately, the reckless behaviour of the soldiers, and especially the careless handling of the fire by rittmeister Knocken, led to the shooting in the stables on the evening on the 29th of March. The flames consumed 1/4 of the city, including 90 houses and many sheds and stables. After the troops left in the direction of Gorzów on the 1th of April, another fire broke out in the city. The fire in various parts of the city was probably set by the retreating Swedes. It was supposed to be a revenge on the inhabitants for accusations that they had suffered great harm from the Swedish soldiers who were accommodated there. This time the flames consumed 75% of the city including both gates, the rebuilt church and the town hall. Residents forged holes in the city walls in order to have better access to water bodies and thus save the burning city faster.[46]

According to the chronicler's account, urban fires were characteristic of this period. Apart from Pyrzyce, a huge fire broke out in nearby Stargard on the 7th of October 1635. The retreating Swedes destroyed the cities buildings so that they were not used by the imperial soldiers conquering the city. Then Colonel Johann Baum (or Bohm)[47] set fire to shed in the suburbs. As a result of strong wind, the flame quickly spread to the buildings within the walls, completely destroying urban buildings. At that time, only St. John's Church standing on a hill and 18 houses and 4 kennels survived. The effects of this fire also reached the famous astrologist David Herlitz (1557–1636) who worked in a market tenement house. Unfortunately, it burned down along with his entire rich library. In addition, the following burned down: the Marian parish, the parsonage, the city hall, the city

[46] APS, Rudolphie, 45 a, pp. 303–304. Comp. M. Zeiller, M. Merian, *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae* […] *das ist Beschreibung der Vornembsten und bekantisten Stätte vnd Plätz in dem* […] *Churfürstenthum vnd March Brandenburg: vnd dem Hertzogtum Pommeren, zu sampt einem doppelten Anhang, 1. Vom Lande Preussen vnnd Pomerellen. 2. Von Lifflande vnnd Selbige beruffenisten Orten,* Franckfurt am Mayn 1652, p. 86; J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher…*, pp. 228–229.

[47] Comp. B. Warlich, *Bohm, Jacob*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/bohm-boom-baum-jacob (30.04.2019).

scale building, the city council pharmacy and other market buildings. After the fire, the city was abandoned by many residents who lost all their possessions.[48]

In the same year, the Swedes took over the castle in Wolin, which until then belonged to the above-mentioned Duchess-wed Sophie. She was the sister of the Elektor of Saxony John George I (1585–1656), who after the Battle of Nördlingen, won by the Catholic army, made peace in Prague with Emperor Ferdinand II (1578–1637), while at the same time standing up against his former allies, the Swedes. As a result, the army forced Sophie to leave her residence in Wolin and her property was repossessed.[49] The signing of the agreement in Prague led to numerous invasions of imperial troops under the command of Count Rudolf Giovanni Marazzino (1585–1645) and General Wrangl's soldiers fighting against them[50]. In May 1636, the Swedes under the command of Colonel Johann Skytte (d. 1636) entered burnt Stargard again. The imperial troops commanded by Marazzini first conquered him and then occupied him, murdering all armed Swedish soldiers. The military were there between 5 July and 26 August, robbing everything that the inhabitants managed to save from the fire. The inhabitants of the destroyed city were obliged to provide the warriors with beer, bread and other victuals. After the complete destruction of the city, Marazzino retreated to Mecklenburg.[51]

The chronicler devotes one's attention to familiarizing the reader with the moment of death of the last ruler of the Griffin dynasty, Bogislaw XIV, who died on the 10h of March 1637, and with issues related to the inheritance of Pomeranian lands. On the basis of the survival treaties concluded between the Griffins and the Hohenzollerns, the Pomeranian region was to be incorporated into the Brandenburg state.[52] The Swedish rulers did not agree to such a solution, as already in 1630. Gustav II Adolph stipulated that after the heirless death of Bogislaw XIV these lands would become a part of the Kingdom of Sweden. Rudolphi did not mention that this unregulated situation resulted in further robbery actions

[48] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 311. Comp. Landesarchiv Greifswald, Rep. 55, no. 115, p. 17; J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher…*, p. 237; G.Ch. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard…*, pp. 121–122; H.K.W. Berghaus, *Landbuch des Herzogtums…*, p. 128.

[49] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, p. 313.

[50] M. Wehrmann, *Ein altes Gedicht...*, p. 34.

[51] APS, Wehrmann, 94, n.p. Comp. J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher...*, pp. 244–248; G.Ch. Teske, *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard...*, p. 122; H.K.W. Berghaus, *Landbuch des Herzogtums...*, p. 128.

[52] More: E. Rymar, *Wojny i spory pomorsko-brandenburskie w XVI i XVII w.*, Zabrze–Tarnowskie Góry 2012, p. 197; M. Ogiewa-Sejnota, *Stosunki pomorsko-brandenburskie w świetle małżeństwa książąt Pomorskich w XVI wieku*, "Rocznik Chojeński" 2016, no. 8, p. 207.

by soldiers of the fighting army. The provisions of the Franzburg surrender also lost their power, which is why many estates of the dukes in Podlesie and the bishop's estate in Kamień were plundered and destroyed. However, he mentions the plundering of the noble estates of the von Ebestein family in Maszewo and Nowogard and the von Wedel family in Krępcewo.[53]

After describing the situation that occurred in Pomerania after the death of the ruler, Rudolphi began to describe the numerous military successes that the Swedish army had enjoyed in central Germany. Under their rule there were parts of Saxony and Brandenburg, but General Banér, who commanded the Swedish army at Torgau, was surrounded by Catholic troops. He managed to withdraw to Pomerania, where he was awaited by the units under the command of Wrangl. Gallas' imperial troops went to chase the escaping army. Then again, many Pomeranian cities were looted and destroyed, including Pyrzyce and Stargard. In the latter city, imperial soldiers and the poor stayed from 29 June to 28 July, aggravating its economic collapse.[54]

The last two books of Rudolphy's chronicle focused on the war activities after the death of Bogislaw XIV and described the events of the last, so-called French war period. Pomerania continued to function as an area where foreign army quarters were held. Peter Rudolphi closed his description of the events of one of the bloodiest conflicts in history on the division of Pomerania sanctioned during peace talks with Swedish and Brandenburg representatives in Osnabrück, Westphalia. It was then agreed that Sweden would rule the area of Vorpommern with the islands of Rügen and Usedom and Szczecin. It also received the *the privilegium de non appellando*, which meant that the annexed territories were not subject to the imperial tax and administrative tribunal. Rear Pomerania and the bishopric of Cammin received Brandenburg. Unfortunately, both countries ratified the treaty only in 1654. By that time the Swedes were quartering their soldiers in Pomerania. During the talks, it was also decided that the funeral of the

[53] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 315–316; comp. Z. Boras, *Bogusław XIV – ostatni Gryfita*, "Przegląd Zachodniopomorski" 1967, no. 3, p. 40; M. Ogiewa, *O Sownie słów kilka…*, in: *Z dziejów Sowna w XX wieku*, ed. A. Gut, M. Ogiewa, Szczecin–Stargard 2014, p. 13; J.A. Kościelna, *Z dziejów rezydencji myśliwskiej księcia Jana Fryderyka w Podlesiu (Friedrichswalde)*, "Stargardia" 2015, no. 9, pp. 127–128, 133.

[54] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 321–374; APS, Wehrmann, 94, n.p.; J. Micraelius, *Sechs Bücher…*, pp. 258–259; L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia…*, pp. 150–151.

last Griffin would be held, which was the symbolic end of "Griffin's rule" over Pomerania.[55]

A handwritten chronicle by Peter Rudolphy provides the reader with a description of the course of the Thirty Years' War, which is a testimony to the events leading to the economic disaster in the Duchy of Pomerania. This article does not exhaust the entire history of the conflict described by the pastor in the pages of his work, but is an encouragement to explore this little-known Pomeranian chronicle. Analysing its content, one should agree with Martin Wehrmann that there are strong references to earlier Pomeranian chroniclers, especially to Johann Micrälius, which, according to the historian, significantly reduced the value of the chronicle. Comparing the course of the Thirty Years' War in the years 1627–1637 in Rudolphy's case with the information published in the 19th century literature on the subject, one can see that the work of the pastor from Witno was known and often used by researchers working on the reconstruction of Pomeranian history. However, it is now necessary to undertake research on confronting the information contained in the chronicle with the archives produced by the then administration, which would help to significantly verify the authenticity of the events described in the chronicle.

Bibliography

Archival sources

Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie
Akta miasta Gryfice: sygn. 153 a.
Rękopisy i spuścizny: sygn. 453.
Spuścizna Martina Wehrmanna: sygn. 15, 79, 80, 94.
Zbiór Samuela Gottlieba Loepera: sygn. 45, 45 a, 45 b.

Landesarchiv Greifswald
Rep. 55, no. 115.

Printed Sources

Micraelius J., *Sechs Bücher von alten Pommernland*, *Buch V*, Stettin–Leipzig 1723.

[55] APS, Rudolphi, 45 a, pp. 504–506; H. Backhaus, *Verfassung und Verwaltung Schwedisch-Pommers*, in: *Under the Swedish Crown*, ed. I. Asmus, Greifswald 1998, p. 29 f; L.E. Wolke, G. Larsson, N.E. Villstrand, *Wojna trzydziestoletnia*…, pp. 314 f, 729.

Universität Wittenberg, *Wittenberger Matrikel*, vol. 7, 1675, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen–Anhalt 2017.

Analysis

Anusik Z., *Gustaw II Adolf*, Wrocław 2009.

Backhaus H., *Verfassung und Verwaltung Schwedisch-Pommers*, w: *Unter der schwedischen Krone*, ed. I. Asmus, Greifswald 1998.

Bagmihl J.T., *Pommersches Wappenbuch*, vol. 4, Stettin 1854.

Balcerzak T., Gibczyński M., Słowiński S., *Woliński zamek – odkrycie zapomniane siedziby książąt pomorskich*, in: *Wolińskie spotkania mediewistyczne. Ekskluzywne życie – dostojny pochówek. W kręgu kultury elitarnej wieków średnich*, ed. M. Rębkowski, Wolin 2011.

Berghaus H.K.W., *Landbuch des Herzogtums Pommern – Schilderung der Zustände dieser Lande in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, vol 2: *Landbuch des Herzogthums Stettin, von Kamin und Hinterpommern; oder des Verwaltungs-Bezirks der Königl. Regierung zu Stettin*, part 4: *Saatziger Kreis, insbesondere Stadt Stargard*, Anklam 1867.

Bismarck-Osten F.v., *Die Sammlungen zu Schloß Plathe und ihr Begründer Friedrich Wilhelm von der Osten (1721–1786)*, "Baltische Studien" NF 1976, no. 62.

Böhmer W., *Übersicht der allgemeinen Chroniken und Geschichten Pommerns seit Kantzow*, "Baltische Studien" AF 1835/36, no. 3.

Boras Z., *Bogusław XIV – ostatni Gryfita*, "Przegląd Zachodniopomorski" 1967, no. 3.

Brüggemann L.W., *Ausführliche Beschreibung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes des Königl. Preußischen Herzogthums Vor- und Hinter-Pommern*, vol. 2, part 1, *Beschreibung der zu dem Gerichtsbezirk der Königl. Landescollegien in Stettin gehörigen Hinterpommerschen Kreise*, Stettin 1784.

Brzustowicz G., *Pułkownik Zygfryd von Damitz (8.10.1592–7.09.1631 Breitefeld), dowódca pomorskiego regimentu, tzw. Białej Brygady, w służbie króla szwedzkiego Gustawa II Adolfa*, "Stargardia" 2013, no. 8.

Gaziński R., *Dzieje Gryfic w XVI wieku i 1. połowie XVII wieku*, in: *Gryfice. Dzieje miasta*, ed. T. Białecki, Szczecin 2012.

Grabski A.F., *Dzieje historiografii*, Poznań 2006.

Gut P., *Gryfice w 2. połowie XVII wieku i w wieku XVIII*, in: *Gryfice. Dzieje miasta*, ed. T. Białecki, Szczecin 2012.

Immatrikulation von Petrus Rudolphi, in: matrikel.uni-rostock.de/id/100047733 (3.01. 2019).

Inwentarz sreber zgromadzonych w skrzyni przechowywanej w stargardzkim Ratuszu do 1673 roku, in: *W czasach, gdy Stargard był stolicą…*, ed. M. Majewski, Stargard 2014, pp. 30–33.

Kościelna J.A., *Z dziejów rezydencji myśliwskiej księcia Jana Fryderyka w Podlesiu (Friedrichswalde)*, "Stargardia" 2015, no. 9.

Moderow H., *Die Evangelischen Geistlichen Pommerns. Von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart*, vol. 1, *Der Regierungsbezirk Stettin*, Stettin 1903.

Ochędowska-Grzelak B., *Motyw Gryfa w sztuce książęcej Pomorza Zachodniego na tle sztuki europejskiej*, in: *Pod skrzydłami Gryfa*, ed. A. Gut, Szczecin 2014.

Ogiewa M., *O Sownie słów kilka…*, in: *Z dziejów Sowna w XX wieku*, eds. A. Gut, M. Ogiewa, Szczecin–Stargard 2014.

Ogiewa-Sejnota M., *Stosunki pomorsko-brandenburskie w świetle małżeństw książąt pomorskich w XVI wieku*, "Rocznik Chojeński" 2016, no. 8.

Podruczny G., *Niezrealizowane projekty twierdzy w Stargardzie*, "Stargardia" 2015, no. 10.

Riemann H., *Geschichte der Stadt Colberg*, Colberg 1873.

Riemann H., *Geschichte der Stadt Greifenberg in Pommern*, Greifenberg i. P. 1862.

Rudel T., *Die Lage Pommerns von Beginn des dreißigjährigen Krieges bis zum Eintreffen Gustav Adolph (1520–1630)*, "Baltische Studien" AF 1890, no. 40.

Rymar E., *Wojny i spory pomorsko-brandenburskie w XVI i XVII w.*, Zabrze–Tarnowskie Góry 2012.

Skworoda P., *Wojny Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją*, Warszawa 2007.

Teske G.Ch., *Geschichte der Stadt Stargard*, vol. 1, Stargard 1843.

Wachowiak B., *Państwo zachodniopomorskie w okresie hegemonii szlachty (1570–1625)*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 2, part 1, ed. G. Labuda, Poznań 1977.

Wachowiak B., *Upadek państwa zachodniopomorskiego*, in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 2, part 1, ed. G. Labuda, Poznań 1977.

Warlich B., *Bohm, Jacob*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/bohm-boom-baum-jacob (30.04.2019).

Warlich B., *Fuchs, N.*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/fuchs-n (27.04.2019).

Warlich B., *Herberstein, Maximilian Freiherr von*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/herberstein-maximilian-freiherr-von (27.04.2019).

Warlich B., *Streiff Freiherr von Lauenstein, Johann [Reinhold]*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/streiff-freiherr-von-lauenstein-johann-2 (14.04.2019).

Warlich B., *Teuffel [Dyvell], Maximilian, Freiherr von Guntersdorf und Weyerburg*, http://www.30jaehrigerkrieg.de/teuffel-maximilian-freiherr-von-guntersdorf (14.04.2019).

Wehrlich R.-G., *Początki pomorskiego herbu Gryfitów w ówczesnym kontekście politycznym i heraldycznym z okazji 800-lecia najstarszego przedstawienia obrazowego*, in: *Pod skrzydłami Gryfa*, ed. A. Gut, Szczecin 2014.

Wehrmann M., *Ein altes Gedicht über Pommern im 30jährigen Kriege*, in: *Pyritz im 30 jährigen Kriege: Erinnerungsheft an das Brandjahr 1634 und sein Gedächtnis 1934*, ed. R. Holsten, Pyritz i. Pom. 1934.

Wehrmann M., *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin*, Stettin 1911.

Wehrmann M., *Geschichte von Land und Stadt Greifenberg*, Greifenberg in Pomm. 1927.

Wehrmann M., *Geschichte von Pommern*, part 2, *Bis zur Gegenwart*, Gotha 1906.

Wilson P.H., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648. Tragedia Europy*, Oświęcim 2017.

Wolke L.E., Larsson G., Villstrand N.E., *Wojna trzydziestoletnia. Europa i świat 1618–1648*, Warszawa 2010.

Zedler J.H, Conti, in: *Grosse vollständige Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschafften und Künste*, https://www.zedler-lexikon.de/index.html?c=blaettern&bandnummer=6&seitenzahl=580 (16.04.2019).

Zedlitz-Neukirch L. v., *Neues Preussisches Adels-Lexicon, oder genealogische und diplomatische Nachrichten*, part 4, Lepizig 1837.

Zeiller M., Merian M., *Topographia Electoratus Brandenburgici et Ducatus Pomeraniae* […] *das ist Beschreibung der Vornembsten und bekantisten Stätte vnd Plätz in dem* […] *Churfürstenthum vnd March Brandenburg: vnd dem Hertzogtum Pommeren, zu sampt einem doppelten Anhang, 1. Vom Lande Preussen vnnd Pomerellen. 2. Von Lifflande vnnd Selbige beruffenisten Orten*, Franckfurt am Mayn 1652.

Obraz wojny trzydziestoletniej w Księstwie Szczecińskim w kronice Petera Rudolphiego w latach 1627–1637

Abstrakt

W artykule omówiono przebieg wojny trzydziestoletniej w Księstwie Szczecińskim od momentu podpisania kapitulacji we Franzburgu przez księcia Bogusława XIV w 1627 roku do śmierci tego władcy dziesięć lat później. Opis ten oparto na informacjach pochodzących z drugiej części rękopiśmiennej kroniki pastora Petera Rudolphiego z 1696 roku. Z jej tekstu wybrano te wydarzenia, które były przełomowymi w historii Pomorza, jak kwaterunek żołnierzy cesarskich czy przystąpienie do wojny króla szwedzkiego Gustawa II Adolf. Zaprezentowano również mechanizmy, którymi posługiwali się żołnierze obu armii przy zajęciu ośrodków miejskich, np. Gryfic, Kołobrzegu, Pyrzyc, Stargardu i Szczecina. Artykuł nie wyczerpuje tematu w całości, lecz stanowi jedynie przyczynek do poznania nie tylko historii konfliktu na terenie Pomorza, ale także samej kroniki.

A picture of the Duchy of Szczecin during the Thirty Years' War in light of the chronicle by Peter Rudolphy between 1627 and 1637

Abstract

The article discusses the course of the Thirty Years' War in the Duchy of Szczecin from the moment of signing the capitulation in Franzburg by Duke Bogislaw XIV in 1627 until the death of this ruler ten years later. This description is based on information from the second part of the manuscript Chronicle of Pastor Peter Rudolphy from 1696. From its text, the events that were breakthrough in the history of Pomerania were selected, such as the accommodation of imperial soldiers or the entry into war of the Swedish King Gustav II Adolph. Mechanisms used by soldiers of both armies to occupy city centres, e.g. Gryfice, Kołobrzeg, Pyrzyce, Stargard and Szczecin, were also presented. The article does not exhaust the whole subject, but is only a contribution to the knowledge not only of the history of the conflict in Pomerania, but also the chronicle itself.

DOI: 10.18276/pz.2019.4-11

PRZEGLĄD ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI
ROCZNIK XXXIV (LXIII) ROK 2019 ZESZYT 4

ARTYKUŁY

Karol Łopatecki
ORCID: 0000-0002-7921-9421
University of Bialystok
e-mail: karollopatecki@gmail.com

The influence of maps and plans created in the 1620s in the Netherlands on the development of military concepts in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth[1]

Keywords: modernization of the state, military revolution, siege of Breda (1624–1624), siege of 's-Hertogenbosch (1629), lines of circumvallation, lines of contravallation, military hydro- engineering, military cartography, field fortifications, manoeuvres, Krzysztof Arciszewski, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, Władysław Waza, drawings of the 17th century

Słowa kluczowe: modernizacja państwa, militarna rewolucja, oblężenie Bredy (1624–1624), oblężenie 's-Hertogenbosch (1629), linie cyrkumwalacyjne, linie kontrwalacyjne, hydroinżynieria wojskowa, kartografia wojskowa, fortyfikacje polowe, działania manewrowe, Krzysztof Arciszewski, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, Władysław Waza, ryciny XVII w.

Geoffrey Parker analysing the phenomenon of the "military revolution" at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, drew attention to the ease of dissemination of new solutions in the military field.[2] New inventions, concepts and

[1] The article was written within the research project of the SONATA National Science Centre, no. 2016/23/D/HS3/03210 entitled "The military revolution as a modernization factor in the public finance and state organization of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the comparative perspective" [Rewolucja militarna jako czynnik modernizacyjny skarbowości i organizacji państwa polsko-litewskiego na tle europejskim].

[2] G. Parker, *Od domu orańskiego do domu Bushów: czterysta lat „rewolucji militarnej"*, trans. M. Kopczyński, "Przegląd Historyczny" 2005, no. 2 (96), pp. 232–237; idem, *From the*

tactical and strategic solutions were not an urgent secret. The flow of information took place together with the recruitment of foreign engineers, officers and even entire units. Printed military treaties were widely available.[3] The most effective way of spreading the "continuous fire" – which is the basis of the author's considerations – were the drawings showing the soldiers' drills, which were then published in the form of prints.[4] This phenomenon can be applied into a broader background – new theories including siege operations and applications of field fortifications, which were very well reflected in military cartography. The article presents the reception of solutions developed in the Netherlands in the 1720s which were transferred to the Republic. The chronological scope of the article is related to the new stage of the 80-year war. Since 1621, the United Provinces and Belgium were the most innovative theatre of warfare in Europe.[5] Two sieges from this period should be highlighted: Breda (1624–1625) and 's-Hertogenbosch (1629), both were excellent examples of the use of circumvallation and contravallation lines and the use of hydro-engineering.[6]

The third decade of the seventeenth century is a 'blind spot' in the up to date research on Polish and Lithuanian military cartography.[7] Meanwhile, the war with

House of Orange to the House of Bush: 400 years of military revolutions, or how to prepare for the next Gulf War, "Military Spectator" 2003, no. 4 (172), pp. 187–190.

[3] In the sixteenth century it was popular to make military treatises in a manuscript version – more such works were made than printed. However, this was not an activity aimed at concealing knowledge (copies were not uncommon), the main role was played by raising the prestige of the work as an exceptional one. M. Rogg, *Die Kriegsordnung Albrechts des Älteren von Brandenburg, Herzog in Preussen*, in: *Die Kriegsordnung des Markgrafen zu Brandenburg Ansbach und Herzogs zu Preussen Albrecht des Älteren – Königsberg 1555*, eds. H. J. Bömelburg, B. Chiari, M. Thomae, Braunschweig 2006, pp. 23–24.

[4] See J. de Gheyn, *The renaissance drill book*, ed. D.J. Blackmore, London 2003.

[5] This was due, among other things, to the fact that the process of establishing fortresses according to the rules of the old Dutch fortification was completed in 1621. Thus, it was traditionally almost impossible to get a perfectly fortified, food- and gunpowder-supplied fortification crew. Comp. E. Swart, *"Qualifications, knowledge and courage": Dutch military engineers, c. 1550-c. 1660*, in: *Military engineers and the development of the Early-Modern European state*, ed. B.P. Lenman, Dundee 2013, p. 63.

[6] S. Zurawski, *New Sources for Jacques Callot's Map of the Siege of Breda*, "Art Bulletin" 1988, no. 4 (70), pp. 621–639; J.P. Roose, *De belegering van Breda door Spinola 1624–1625*, [Alphen aan den Rijn] 2005; P. de Cauwer, *Tranen van bloed. Het beleg van 's-Hertogenbosch en de oorlog in de Nederlanden. 1629*, Amsterdam 2008; C.J. Gudde, *'s-Hertogenbosch. Geschiedenis van vesting en forten*, 's-Hertogenbosch 1974; O. van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588–1688*, trans. A. May, Woodbridge 2010, pp. 209–212, 217–224.

[7] See S. Alexandrowicz, J. Łuczyński, R. Skrycki, *Historia kartografii ziemi polskich do końca XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2017, passim; B. Olszewicz, *Kartografia polska XV–XVIII wieku. Chronological and bibliographic review*, ed. J. Ostrowski, Warszawa 2004, pp. 36–38. The only

Sweden between 1621–1622 and 1625–1629 should give rise to the creation of numerous engravings or the dissemination of manuscript maps and plans.[8] The extremely modest cartographic output of military engineers in this decade is all the stranger when we compare it with the 1630s. Many excellent works were created at that time, and in 1636, in Gdańsk, Wilhelm Hondius published probably the most monumental engraving concerning the military of the Polish nobility. In the literature on the subject, Stanisław Alexandrowicz assessed the changes taking place when writing: "the true turnover occurred in the military cartography of Poland and Lithuania only at the beginning of the reign of Władysław IV Waza".[9]

In this text, I show that the military elite of the Republic of Poland was following closely all the changes taking place in the field of manoeuvring, tactics and military engineering. The 1620s were crucial as the Lithuanian and Polish armies came into contact with the modern Swedish army. As a result, it was necessary to adapt to the new way of conducting warfare.[10] Drawings or engravings showing the plans of the Dutch occupations were an important way of acquiring this knowledge. The information obtained formed the basis for the process of modernization in the field of old Polish military during the reign of Władysław IV Waza.[11]

---

drawing from this period is the plan of the Battle of Chocim of 1621, which was published in print by Giacomo Lauro in 1624: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Stamp. Barb. X.I.80, fol. 23r.

[8] At the same time, the Swedes attached great importance to the mapping of the area of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were in the area of warfare. K. Łopatecki, *Prace kartograficzne wykonane na ziemiach Rzeczypospolitej przez szwedzkich inżynierów wojskowych w XVII wieku*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 2009, no. 46, pp. 59–68.

[9] It is, consisting of 16 boards plan of the Smolensk siege from 1633–1634 (218 cm x 154 cm). *Smolenscum urbs ope divina Vladislai Poloniae Sueciaeque regis invictissimi Principis virtute liberatum* was published on the basis of plans of the engineer at the Lithuanian service – Jan Pleitner. S. Alexandrowicz, *Kartografia Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego od XV do połowy XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2012. In the 1730s, excellent maps and military plans of Fryderyk Ghetto and Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan were also created: see T. Nowak, *Polski atlas wojskowy z lat 1634–1639*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1969, no. 15/2, pp. 13–61; A.B. Pernal, *Two newly-discovered secenteenth-century manuscript maps of Ukraine*, in: *Od Kijowa do Rzymu. Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej ze Stolicą Apostolską i Ukrainą*, eds. M.R. Drozdowski, W. Walczak, K. Wiszowata-Walczak, Białystok 2012, pp. 983–992.

[10] K. Radziwiłł do Zygmunta III Wazy, Mitawa 25 VII 1622, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, sygn. 1a, k. 217. "About a field battle and thoughts [Gustav II Adolf – K.Ł.] yes he wanted her effugere where the densest forests, where the top mud, where the impassable rivers, there he hosts and positions himself, and the Dutch mode he leased all his hope in the coppery and planted his rifle".

[11] Obviously, the territory of the United Provinces and Belgium was not within the sphere of influence of the Republic. Thus, the acquired maps and plans were not used for intelligence

The specificity of the development of the sixteenth-century Crown military was based on the domination of cavalry, which was needed to fight the Tartar invasions on the south-eastern borders of the Republic.[12] As a result, this has led to clear differences in military development in comparison with trends in Western Europe. The Republic of Poland did not pay much attention to the construction and maintenance of fortresses, and army commanders were striving for victory in a typical 'old fashioned' battle.[13] In Western Europe, the key role was to build and modernize fortresses and protect them from the hands of the enemy. In the face of dynamically developing defensive forces – the development of bastion fortifications[14] – the aim was to completely cut off the defenders from supplies by creating lines of contravallation and circumvallation.[15] The main breakthrough turned out to be the siege of Geertruidenberg in 1593, where Maurycy of Orange focused great attention on the construction of a contravallation and cutting off any access

purposes and strategic concepts. For this purpose, ambassadors and spies obtained numerous maps of sieges, battles and city plans both in manuscript and printed engravings, and then sent them to headquarters. P. Barber, *"Procure as many as you can and send them over." Cartographic Espionage and Cartographic Gifts in International Relations, 1460–1760*, in: *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, eds. R. Adams, R. Cox, Basingstoke 2011, pp. 13–29.

[12] The Crown began to maintain permanent field troops organized around the so-called colloquial defense, which in the years 1548–1557 numbered from 1000 to 3000 soldiers driving. Then a "quarterback" army was created, paid from a special military treasury based on a fifth of the royal revenue. M. Plewczyński, *Żołnierz jazdy obrony potocznej za czasów Zygmunta Augusta. Studia nad zawodem wojskowym w XVI w.* Warszawa 1985, pp. 61 (Table 8), 63.

[13] B. Dybaś, *Fortece Rzeczypospolitej. Studium z dziejów budowy fortyfikacji stałych w państwie polsko-litewskim w XVII wieku*, Toruń 1998. In the book, the author points out that in the Republic of Poland no fortresses understood as "large, strongly fortified bastions of the city" developed in the seventeenth century. Instead, there were different types of fortifications used, with very different formal and legal status, which were part of the "partial systems". Ibidem, pp. 327–328.

[14] D. Parrot, *The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and Their Citadels, 1540–1640*, "War in History" 2000, no. 7/2, pp. 127–153; E. Swart, *"Qualifications, knowledge and courage"...*, pp. 47–70. The development of the fortifications enabled even several hundred garrisons to defend themselves effectively against the many thousands of troops besieging the fortress. M. Kingra, *The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution during the Eighty Years' War, 1567–1648*, "The Journal of Military History" 1993, no. 3 (57), pp. 437 ff.

[15] At the end of the 16th and in the first quarter of the 17th century, the siege art of cutting off defenders from outside help developed mainly in the Netherlands. This was done by means of circulation, i.e. a fortified line directed against the fortress in order to protect against excursions. The siege was coming out of circulation. In addition, a countertable line was built – i.e. defensive fortifications directed outside of the fortress, in order to protect against possible relief. This solution was known as early as in antiquity, but it was used again during the 80-year war. See D.R. Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603–1645*, Leiden 2009, pp. 335–336.

to the city from the coast (Figure 1).[16] As a result, the Spanish crew capitulated after a two-month siege. Willem Lodewijk van Nassau-Dillenburg assessed the contemporary events that the methods and actions of war used at the time went beyond primitive violence, and this siege is a clear example of the use of science and ancient martial techniques, which had been ridiculed by many commanders before.[17]



Figure 1. Siege and capture of Geertruidenberg from 1593. Figure Jacob de Gheyn (II) based on a drawing by Giovaia Battista Boazio, text by Petrus Hogerbeets (700 × 550 mm)

Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, RP-P-OB-80.138,
http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.448716 (public domain).

[16] Ch.M. Klinkert, *Nassau in het nieuws: nieuwsprenten van Maurits van Nassaus militaire ondernemingen uit de periode 1590–1600*, Zutphen 2005, pp. 142–143, 262, Figure 37.

[17] R. Fruin, *Tien jaren uit den Tachtigjarigen Oorlog 1588–1598*, Den Haag 1899, pp. 131–132.

On a wider scale, the appearance of maps and plans published in the form of drawings in Western Europe occured in the 1620s. Of course, the main role is played here by the journey of Prince Władysław Waza with a large magnate and noble procession around Europe in the years 1624–1625.[18] Apart from the educational, tourist and political aspect, it is worth emphasizing its contribution to the material culture. The trip was a very expensive undertaking with the duke himself incurring expenses of 170,000 zloty[19] and 12,000 zloty in Hungary, to which we must add the costs incurred by the magnates accompanying the king.[20] Unfortunately, the bills from the prince's journey have not survived, however, as Juliusz Chrościcki points out, part of this sum was invested into works of art – jewels, medals, portraits. During the trip, contracts for further huge amounts were also concluded (contracts for 28,215 florins were signed with weavers in Brussels).[21]

Undoubtedly, there was a fraction of this sum allocated for the purchase of works on military themes – books and engravings. There was also an excellent opportunity for this – the prince's visit to the Spanish army besieging Breda at the end of September 1624.[22] The official, solemn meeting of Władysław Waza with Ambrosio Spinola took place on 26 September in the evening. The main Spanish camp and the system of fortifications were observed very carefully for three days from 27 to 29 September 1624. During these days, the Prince personally went around and watched most of the camps, the blockhouses and the circumvallation and contravallation lines for 12 hours. From the perspective of the Polish and Lithuanian nobility, this journey became part of the canon of foreign educational travels, in which, one of the key elements was to learn about Western European military camps advancement.

[18] Together with Prince Władysław, a 50-person procession was traveling, which consisted of such eminent people as Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, Stefan Pac, Łukasz Żółkiewski, Gerhard Denhoff, Adam Kazanowski, Samuel Rylski. A. Przyboś, *Wstęp*, in: *Podróż królewicza Władysława Wazy do krajów Europy Zachodniej w latach 1624–1625 w świetle ówczesnych relacji*, ed. A. Przyboś, Kraków 1977, pp. 17–18.

[19] Money of account: 1 Polish zloty = 30 groshes.

[20] Władysław's guardian – Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł assessed the costs incurred at 100 000 Polish zloty. A.S. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, vol. 2, *1637–1646*, tłum. A. Przyboś, R. Żelewski, Warsaw 1980, p. 311.

[21] J.A. Chrościcki, *Wizerunki królewicza Władysława Zygmunta Wazy z podróży (1624–1625)*, "Rocznik Historii Sztuki" 1988, no. 17, pp. 211–212; *Podróż królewicza Władysława…*, p. 49.

[22] General characteristics: S. Kot, *Polen in Breda in de 17e eeuw.*, "Jaarboek De Oranjeboom" 1954, no. 7, pp. 92–94.

A momentous event took place on 28 September, when a war council was convened to discuss further fortification activities. "They also advised the Prince, who when he said his sentence, they approved it and now they threw it there, calling it *forte del principe di Polonia*".[23] For this type of meeting, it was necessary to use cartographic sources which were not only familiarised with by the Polish guests but also copies of them were given or made for further analysis. It is characteristic, however, that in the figures depicting this event, there are no fortifications named according to the source mentioned, although the person of the Polish prince himself is accented (Figure 2).[24] Hence, the conclusion that Władysław's proposal was accepted only courteously, while in reality another solution was applied.

The arrival of Prince Władysław's entourage to the camp was eagerly exhibited by the creators of engravings presenting the siege of Breda. The greeting was always shown near Francisco Dada's rampage by the so-called German fortifications. This is where the meeting of Frans Hogenberg (*Beleg van Breda door Spinola* – Figure 2A), Jacob van der Heyden (*Breda Ab Excellentiss. March. Ambr. Spinola nomine Catholici Regis obsessa, cum oppositis Illustriss* – Figure 2B) and Claes Janszoon Visscher (*Beleg van Breda, 1624–1625* – Figure 2C).[25]

It is almost certain that these graphics have arrived, probably in more copies, at Władysław Waza or directly at the Warsaw court.[26] This is evidenced by the

[23] *Podróż królewicza Władysława…*, pp. 182–190 (quoted p. 188). A similar description of visiting the fortifications: H. Hugo, *Obsidio Bredana armis Philippi IV. auspiciis Isabellae duct Ambr. Spinolae perfecta*, Antverpiae 1626, pp. 34–36.

[24] This event was noted, among others, in the work of the Jesuit and military chaplain: H. Hugo, *Obsidio Bredana…*, pp. 34–35. The author identified the lunar eclipse with the arrival of the Prince and augurned him with great military deeds and the defeat of the Port of Otto ("crescent" symbol). The arrival of the Prince and the review of the fortifications was also highlighted in Pedro Calderón de la Barca's play *El sitio de Berdá*. W. Folkierski, *Ślady podróży flandryjskiej królewicza Władysława (1624) w teatrze Calderona*, "Pamiętnik Literacki" 1935, no. 32, pp. 113–116; S.A. Vosters, *La rendición de Bredá en la literatura y el arte de España*, London 1973, pp. 8–9, 28–29, 120. See *Noue guerre di Fiandra dalli 21 luglio 1624 sino alli 25 d'Agosto 1625*, Venetia 1627, p. 15.

[25] It is regrettable that the Polish procession, which Jacques Callot drew with interest, was not placed in the most important ricin of the siege of Breda. These drawings were issued: M. Thausing, *Livre d'esquisses de Jacques Callot, dans la collection Albertine à Vienne*, Wien 1880; comp. M. Sokołowski, *Z powodu portretów polskich we Florencyi, tudzież Zygmunta III i Konstancyi jego żony w Pinakotece monachijskiej o malarzach Soutmanie, Rubensie i Callocie*, "Sprawozdania Komisyi do Badania Historyi Sztuki w Polsce" 1903, no. 7/3, p. CXXXII.

[26] J.A. Chrościcki, *Wizerunki królewicza…*, pp. 214–218, where the author presents engravings showing the figure of the Prince, which were created during the journey. The artists tried to take advantage of the arrival of the retreat and created (often in a hurry) their own engravings, which were to bring them financial gratuities.




Figure 2. Welcome by Ambrosio Spinola to King Władysław Waza on 26 September 1624. A – Picture by Frans Hogenberg, *Beleg van Breda door Spinola*, circa 1625–1627; B – Jacob van der Heyden, *Breda Ab Excellentiss. March. Ambr. Spinola nomine Catholici Regis obsessa, cum oppositis Illustriss*, I 1625; C – Claes Janszoon Visscher, *Beleg van Breda, 1624–1625*, about 1624–1625, http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.442293; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.458712, http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.392440. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam: RP-P-OB-78.785-395; RP-P-OB-81.097, RP-P-AO-16-110 (public domain).

business model of the 'then' publishers of maps and plans.[27] Cartographic services in the first quarter of the 17th century were becoming more common and affordable. For 12 guilders (7.2 guldens), the publishers accepted drawings from

[27] In the next two paragraphs, I convert currencies based on work: W.P. Guthrie, *The Later Thirty Years' War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia*, London 2003, p. 34.

random people, which they were obliged to transfer onto copperplates. An important strategy of the publishers of maps was to send them to influential people or institutions with the hope of being rewarded. Niclaes Geelkerck received 48 guilders (28.8 guldens) from Bergen op Zoom and two pounds (13 and 1/3 guldens) from Middelburg for the 1622 siege plan of Bergen op Zoom.[28] The location of the figure of Prince Wladyslaw, as well as the information about this event constituting the description for the figure, undoubtedly prompted the publishers to send them to the Republic (Figure 2).[29]

Of course, there were still great cartographic projects concerning the fortifications and the sieges. The order of Archduchess Isabella Klara Habsburg for a drawing showing the Spanish triumph at Breda was unique. Jacques Callot was to receive 850 escudes (over 1,416 guldens) for his work.[30] However, 11 years later, the Dutch army reclaimed Breda – instead of paying out such huge sums of money, they only preferred to guarantee publishers to buy a certain number of copies. Yes Balthasar Florisz van Berckenrode received 336 guldens for 28 prints of the Breda siege in 1637 from the Dutch military budget (12 guldens each consisting of nine prints of 40 × 54 cm).[31] For comparison purposes, it should be noted that a typical design of an ordinary city plan cost about 200 guldens.[32]

When the royal procession was approaching Breda, and the Spanish army greeted him with intense shelling of the city, the hustle was heard by a nobleman from Wielkopolska, Krzysztof Arciszewski, who was serving in the enemy Dutch

[28] H. Helmers, *Cartography, War Correspondence and News Publishing: The Early Career of Nicolaes van Geelkercken, 1610–1630*, in: *News Networks in Early Modern Europe*, eds. J. Raymond, N. Moxham, Leiden–Boston 2016, pp. 355–356, 362–263.

[29] The principle of reciprocity between rulers and magnates to whom the works were dedicated or given has not yet been explored. In the light of the general public's opinion, such a person should thank in a material way for the honour he has done. However, these did not have to be significant sums. It is worth noting that 10 Polish zloty was paid in the court accounts for 1612. "Cudzoziemcowi, który wiersze niemieckie JK Mci dedicował" see the Jagiellonian University Library, Berol. Ms. Slaver. Fol. 5, k. 29.

[30] The payment was to be made in 10 instalments, but Spinola paid Callot an advance of 550 escudes. S. Zurawski, *New Sources*…, p. 623.

[31] It is worth noting that a similar form of purchase was made by Jan Zamoyski. He sent J. Lauro 300 florins with the obligation to provide 100 copies of engravings showing the siege of Wolmar and Felin each. J.A. Chrościcki, *Sztuka i polityka: funkcje propagandowe sztuki w epoce Wazów 1587–1668*, Warszawa 1983, p. 85.

[32] 300 guilders (or 180 guldens) were given to Niclaes Geelkerck by the city council of Aachen for preparing the town plan in 1610. This was equivalent to the annual salary of a military engineer in the second quarter of the 17th century. E. Swart, *"Qualifications, knowledge and courage"*…, pp. 62–63.

army. He was the son of the Arian activist Eliasz from Śmigiel.[33] He was educated in Śmigiel and then studied at the University of Frankfurt (Oder) (1608). He was in the circle of Krzysztof Radziwiłł's servants and during the war in Inflants in 1622 he was used by the Field Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for intelligence activities.[34] At that time, he had to have had his first serious contact with military cartography, because the activity entrusted to him consisted of collecting all information about the enemy's actions[35]. This concerned in particular the fortification activities at Livonian castles and the possible establishment of new fortifications.[36] We know that in July a map showing the siege of Mittawa by the Swedish army was created.[37]

After the murder of Kasper Jaruzel Brzeźnicki, Arciszewski was sentenced to outlaw, which forced him to emigrate. He decided to go to the United Provinces. There, as a client of Krzysztof Radziwiłł (from whom he was paid), he studied engineering and artillery, but also served in the Dutch army or the Dutch West India Company. He was sharing many very reliable and substantive war tactics with the magnate, an important aspect of them are the maps attached to the letters, which were to illustrate the events described. This practice was known among Polish and Lithuanian elites, for example; the battle plan was requested by Anna Wazówna Jan Karol Chodkiewicz in 1605.[38] In 1616, Alexander Gosiewski added a map to his correspondence presenting fortification activities around Smolensk. Such a letter to King Zygmunt III Waza and Lithuanian field hetman Krzysztof

[33] Latest biography: U. Augustyniak, *W służbie hetmana i Rzeczypospolitej. Klientela wojskowa Krzysztofa Radziwiłła (1585–1640)*, Warszawa 2004, p. 309.

[34] *Memoriał słudze memu urodzonemu Krzysztofowi Arciszewskiemu*, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, sygn. 309, pp. 32–33. In 1622 the hetman assigned 250 zloty to K. Arciszewski for this purpose. K. Radziwill to K. Arciszewski, Kokenhauzen 29–30 VIII 1622, ibidem, p. 15.

[35] K. Radziwiłł do K. Arciszewskiego, Birże 1 IX 1622, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, sygn. 309, p. 17.

[36] *Memoriał słudze memu urodzonemu Krzysztofowi Arciszewskiemu*, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, sygn. 309, p. 33.

[37] K. Radziwiłł do Zygmunta III Wazy, Mitawa 25 VII 1622, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, file 1a, k. 215v; H. Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, vol. II: *Wojsko Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego – dyplomacja – varia*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 212–213.

[38] Anna Waza do J.K. Chodkiewicza, Kraków 21 X 1605, Biblioteka Polska w Paryżu, rkps. 56/36, pp. 303–304. On the basis of the drawing sent later, a drawing depicting the battle of Kircholm was created. J. Theodoric, Z. Zygulski, *Dwugłos o bitwie pod Kircholmem. Historia i ikonografia*, "Rocznik Historii Sztuki" 1999, no. 24, pp. 101–103.

Radziwiłł, undoubtedly, it had to reach Jan Karol Chodkiewicz as well.[39] Six years later, Krzysztof Radziwiłł passed on a letter to the field writer of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who was going to Warsaw – in this letter he was describing the siege at Mittawa (*a map or a counter-context of the siege of Nitawa, the location of our and the Swedish camps, gallows and forests, rivers and fields*).[40]

In a letter dated 12 January 1625. Krzysztof Arciszewski characterizes the actions of the Spanish army besieging Breda. He then presents the decision of the Dutch to station at the camp at Roosendaal during the winter season, which was the reason they hoped to cut off Ambrogio Spinola's army from supply.[41] In addition to the descriptive information, Arciszewski also sends a plan to siege Breda. *To show you the way of this siege, I'm sending out maps, from which your princely majesty will easily understand. The last works concerned the heap the dyke, which is supposed to stop the water so that the enemy camp is flooded, but Spinola [the Spanish] is also piling up the second dyke opposite.*[42] Thus, the field hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania received a cartographic source which presented the most innovative siege of the world at that time. I exclude Arciszewski from making such a map himself. There was no such need, due to the prevalence of existing cartographic sources.

What map could Krzysztof Arciszewski have sent? The siege of Breda resulted in many graphics and paintings. Nowadays, the most famous are those that were created several years after the event[43]. This is due to the fact that after the victorious siege, beautifully finished, usually large, often coloured maps were issued for propaganda purposes.[44] The most famous images are of course the map of

[39] A. Gosiewski to A. Boboli, Twerdelica 30 XI 1616, Svenska Riksarkivet (Stockholm), Skoklostersamlingen, E 8600, k. 72v; A. Gosiewski do K. Radziwiłła z Twerdylicy 12 XII 1616, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 4560/II, p. 20.

[40] K. Radziwiłł do Zygmunta III Wazy, Mitawa 25 VII 1622, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, sygn. 1a, k. 215v. A similar practice took place in Sweden, where handwritten maps were attached in correspondence. J. Rudbeckius do M.J. Zabrasynthio, Pskov 3 XI 1615, in: J. Hallenberg, *Svea rikes historia under Konung Gustav den Stores regering*, vol. 4, Stockholm 1794, pp. 1005–1011, map after p. 1010. A handwritten version has been preserved: Uppsala universitetsbibliotek, Ms E 369, the cards are not pegged (map entitled "Pleschovia Obsidio").

[41] O. van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army…*, p. 55.

[42] K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 12 I 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, pp. 48–51 (quoted: p. 50).

[43] Review of cartographic works concerning the siege of Breda in the years 1624–1625: S.A. Vosters, *La rendición…*, pp. 78–90.

[44] H. Helmers, *Cartography…*, pp. 362–363.

Joan Bleau and Jacques Callot – but they only show the final phase of the siege.[45] Also during siege operations, maps and handwritten plans were often transferred to copperplates. That is why Arciszewski did not have to possess maps and manuscript plans, but rather bought (received or possibly drew) engravings made at the turn of 1624 and 1625.[46] It should be noted that the mechanism of drawing maps and plans was not a rare situation. For example, Józef Naronowicz-Naroński drew the siege of Breda in 1637. The model was a drawing by Claes Janszoon Visscher (II) entitled *Belegering en verovering van Breda*.[47]

The necessity to use the latest available works resulted from continuous fortification and hydro-engineering activities, cartographic works quickly became obsolete, as Arciszewski stated himself.[48] That is why I don't think that the plan can omit the details noted in the correspondence (especially the dykes that are buried). Therefore, I believe that Krzysztof Arciszewski used Jacob van der Heyden's engraving or its drawing archetype (see Figure 3).[49] The publication was published in January 1625 in the form of an ephemeral print. On a single card at the top there are graphics, while at the bottom there is a description of the siege ended on December 25, 1624. In the upper left corner of the engraving there is the arrival of the Polish prince Władysław Waza, which was also noted in his letter to Prince Radziwiłł by Krzysztof Arciszewski (Figure 2B). In the lower right corner, on the other hand, the camp of Maurice of Orange was presented, which arrived with the army in the area around Breda at the end of September, and there

[45] See S. Zurawski, *New Sources…*, pp. 621–639.

[46] Arciszewski was eager to use leaflets and newspapers published in the Netherlands to provide information. For example: "Oh Prince His Majesty our Polish, the evil ones were here to spread the news, now others are printing". K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 18 II 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 53. "Other news as I am printed. P. Winold will translate them, if in Vilnius Ks[iżęca] M[iłość] is found". K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 8 IV 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 58.

[47] J. Naronowicz-Naroński, *Optica oro Perspectiva (...) also peculiarly architectura militaris, i.e. the wartime buildings*, Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, rkps. 1954, p. 116; J. Naronowicz-Naroński, *Budownictwo wojenne*, ed. T.M. Nowak, Oświęcim 2016, p. 187. See http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.461724 (10.02.2019).

[48] The changes are perfectly visible in the drawings of Theodor Galle attached to the work: H. Hugo, *Obsidio Bredana*, p. or after pp. 13, 27, 96, 128. See S. Zurawski, *New Sources…*, pp. 630, 633–636.

[49] J. van der Heyden, *Breda Ab Excellentiss. March. Ambr. Spinola nomine Catholici Regis obsessa, cum oppositis Illustriss; Mauritii Nassouii Castris*, Germany 1625; see https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/nl/collectie/RP-P-OB-81.097.

is also a bottleneck which the Spaniards created to protect themselves from the approaching relief, as detailed in the letter.[50]



Figure 3. A drawing of the siege of Breda,
which was sent by Krzysztof Arciszewski to Krzysztof Radziwiłł

Jacob van der Heyden, *Breda Ab Excellentiss. March. Ambr. Spinola nomine Catholici Regis obsessa, cum oppositis Illustriss; Mauritii Nassouii Castris*, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RP-P-OB-81.097; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.458712 (public domain).

Arciszewski, in addition to the plans of a Breda siege, in April, also sent a smaller scale map showing the operational activities carried out by the Spanish and Dutch armies to the prince. *Due to changes in the location of the camps, I am sending a map of the Breda area with all distances and well noted places. This way, if anything comes to the Duke's ears, You will easily find a new camp site and also find out how the Dutch want to sink the Spanish camp.*[51] The correspond-

[50] K. Arciszewski to K. Radziwiłła, Haga 12 I 1625, 1625 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, no. 190, p. 49: 'we heard a salvo from the cannons, from muskets, as the king of the JM of our Polish Spinol in the army he greeted the camp'; 'the camp was formed. In which we stood three Sundays, the army did nothing on both sides (...). The enemy spoiled our impetus with water, which he sank the field between himself and us by digging a dyke, and in that place where the water from us didn't flood the fortification".

[51] K. Arciszewski to K. Radziwiłła, Haga 8 IV 1625 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 58.

ence shows integrated spatial thinking combining tactical maps with medium and large-scale maps. The title of the work is not given. However, if we take into account the fragment in which the author writes that on the sent map there are recorded distances between cities, it is likely that the archetype or the drawing of *Baronye van Breda* Niclaes Geelkercken itself is mentioned (Figure 4).[52] This belief is also confirmed by the fact that Geelkerck was personally present at the siege of Breda, and this map was ordered for the Dutch army.[53] So Arciszewski had easy access to it.




Figure 4. A map of the Breda area sent by Krzysztof Arciszewski to Krzysztof Radziwiłł

Jan van Bergen (author), Niclaes Geelkerck (publisher), *Baronye van Breda. 'T welck is een part van Brabandt, daer in te sien is de teghenwoordighe belegeringhe des Iaers 1624. ende 1625*, [Netherlands 1625]. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, RP-P-AO-16-111; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.363727 (public domain).

[52] It should be noted that it is not known in which month of 1625 this figure appeared in print. If it was printed at the beginning of the year Arciszewski could buy it and send it to Krzysztof Radziwiłł. See Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.363727 (10.02.2019). Niclaes Geelkerck's cartographic work is presented in more detail: J. Keuning, *Nicolaas Geelkerken*, "Imago Mundi" 1954, no. 11/1, pp. 174–177.

[53] H. Helmers, *Cartography…*, pp. 353–373.

Krzysztof Arciszewski's correspondence is a perfect illustration of the phenomenon described by Helmer Helmers. He noted that the engravings combined with the situational description of warfare enabled the European public to observe the ongoing wars – military manoeuvring operations, marches and fortification progress. The speed of information flow and the timeliness of the figures was very important for the recipients.[54] The title case of this article is also included here. It is characteristic because the recipient was Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the commander of the Lithuanian army, who lived in Birża – by 1,800 kilometres (counted by road line) from Breda. The differences should also be indicated. The distance and the lack of extensive mail meant that letters arrived after a very long time, often disappeared along the way. We know some information about sending and receiving letters concerning the war situation in the Netherlands. One of Hieronim Piestrzecki's shipments reached Jan Stanislaw Sapieha after 89 days.[55] Knowing that it was broadcast with Leuv, and received in Inflants, near the village of Walmojza (now Valle), we know that the average daily flow of information was about 23.6 km.[56] In turn, Krzysztof Arciszewski received the letter after 81 days, as a result of which the daily pace was about 24.7 km.[57] It should be assumed that, on average, the consignment arrived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Netherlands after 80 days and the average daily journey speed was about 24 km. This is not a high value, but it does not differ significantly from other mail items sent on postal lines. In the first half of the 17th century, the speed of postal correspondence from the nunciature in Warsaw to Rome was 40 km a day

[54] H. Helmers, *Cartography…*, pp. 358–359. The author quotes an inscription from a graphic *Afbeelding van Gulik naer't leven geconterfeyt*, Amsterdam: Nicolaes van Geelkercken, in which the publisher informs that the source was created by hand. Thanks to this, as the inscription says, the reader is provided with great entertainment, without the danger of being shot.

[55] H. Piestrzecki do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanum 8 X 1625, Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių Biblioteka (Vilnius), f. 139, nr 3348, k. 1–2v.

[56] A. Ziober, *Po klęsce pod Walmojzą. Korespondencja Lwa Sapiehy z synem Janem Stanisławem z pierwszej połowy 1626 roku*, "Wieki Stare i Nowe" 2016, no. 11, pp. 34–47. I've calculated the way according to the information contained in the letter: H. Piestrzecki do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium n.d., Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В. Стефаника, f. 103, teka V/133, in which we can find a description of the safest and most commonly used travellers' route (also used for correspondence – from Leuven to Cologne, Frankfurt (Oder), Leipzig and Wroclaw). I assumed that I would calculate the distance by the shortest land road available. It is obvious that in reality the shipment had to travel much longer, if only because of the fact that the addressee was commanding the Lithuanian army in Inflants at that time and his place of stay often changed. To 1,906 km I estimate another 10%, which means that the consignment has travelled about 2,100 km.

[57] K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 12 I 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 48.

in the summer, and in winter it fell to 32.8 km.[58] Of course, we also had extreme cases, the fastest correspondence arrived after 41 days, but there were more frequent perturbations along the way and then the parcel was received after 30, 43, 65 weeks, and sometimes even after about a year.[59]

The described case of Krzysztof Arciszewski is an explanation of the phenomenon, not an exception. To illustrate this, it is worth quoting the sons of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania's Leo Sapieha studying in the Netherlands at the same time. During their studies in Cologne, Leuven and Brussels, Kazimierz Lew and Krzysztof Michał sent letters with detailed information about military events to their father and step-brother.[60] They described the situation in Breda with particular details, reporting on the fortification progress, ruses and military potential on both sides. They visited fortresses, ports and cities, and in Brussels they learned the basics of military engineering. The most exciting experience of the brothers was to observe the surrender of Breda.[61] They arrived in the Spanish camp the day before, so they witnessed all the ceremonies. When informing about this event, however, they emphasized that the: *The fortifications of both sides*

[58] Calculation based on data collected by Tadeusz Fitych. In the summer, the parcels typically reached Rome after, on average – 41 days, and in the winter season it took nine days more. The couriers travelled almost 1,640 km. T. Fitych, *Personel i organizacja nuncjatury Giovanniego Battisty Lancellottiego 31-szego posła apostolskiego w Polsce (1622–1627)*, "Saeculum Christianum" 2001, no. 8/1, p. 76.

[59] K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, b.m.w. 24 VIII 1626, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka V/97; K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 7 X 1625, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/58; K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 12 I 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 48; K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 8 IV 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 56; K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 12 VII 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 60.

[60] K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Kolonia 28 IV 1625, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/2; K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 7 V 1625, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/5; K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do L. Sapiehy, Lovanium 7 X 1625, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В. Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/51; K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 7 X 1625, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В. Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/58; K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Kolonia 17 XI 1625, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/61; K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium n.d., Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/63; K. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 19 XI 1626, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В. Стефаника, f. 103, teka V/122.

[61] H. Piestrzecki do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium n.d., Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В. Стефаника, f. 103, teka V/133.



Figure 5. Fortifications, the construction of dykes and floodplains and the Breda fortress and surrounding camps

Theodora Galle, *Obsidio Bredae Perfecta*, in: H. Hugo, *Obsidio Bredana armis Philippi IV. auspiciis Isabellae duct Ambr. Spinolae perfecta*, Antverpiae 1626, p. 126 (extract).

are not described in the letter, because Spinola's confessor is about to publish a book or a Jesuit diary together with plans and dimensions, which we will send out immediately after publication.[62] The brothers obviously referred to the person of Herman Hugo,[63] who in early 1626 published in Antwerp the work of *Obsidio Bredana armis Philippi IV. auspiciis Isabellae duct Ambr. Spinolae perfecta*, in which there were excellent engravings of Theodor Galle depicting fortifications, the construction of dykes and floodplains and the Breda fortress and surrounding camps (Figure 5). The sons of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania did not stop with theory and observation. In particular, Krzysztof Michał Sapieha was an enthusiast of camp life, fortification work and hydro-engineering and asked his father to agree to practical lessons in Spanish military camps in order to "practice the military work".[64]

[62] K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium n.d., Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka IV/63.

[63] B. De Groof, *A noble courtier and a gentelman warrior: Some aspects of the creation of the Spinola image*, in: *Narratives of Low Countries History and Culture: Reframing the Past*, eds. J. Fenoulhet, L. Gilbert, U. Tiedau, London 2016, p. 27.

[64] K. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 28 IX 1626, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka V/114; K.M. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 19 XI

Returning to the cartographic materials collected by Lithuanian Field Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł, it should be emphasized that he had much more works on the sieges from the Netherlands than results from the correspondence with Krzysztof Arciszewski. This is indicated by the magnate's mobility inventory made on 15 July 1633, in which it was recorded:

– *Map Fourth, whith expressed siege of Bołdak, behind the hetmitage of Hendrych Fryderyk, the Aurasian graf from Nasan in 1629*;
– *Map Fifth, which expresses the Balduk's 1629 occupation*.[65]

This source refers to the activities of the stadtholder Frederick Henryk Oranski (29 I 1584 – 14 III 1647) during the siege of 's-Hertogenbosch (after Fr. Boisle-Duc, and after the Spanish Bolduque) in 1629. The author of the inventory used the titles of maps to paraphrase them into Polish. Therefore, it is almost certain that the first map given is a print entitled *Buscoducum Obsessum a Frederico Henrico Pr. Auransiae Com. De Nassau etc. A°. 1629* (see Figure 6). It is worth mentioning that in Duke Radziwill's inventory – this object was listed in the category "different images and contexts" – and therefore it was a map glued and hung on the wall.[66]

There is a chance that these maps could have been sent by Krzysztof Arciszewski before he sailed to Brazil in November 1629. We know that he participated in 1629 in the conquest of the La Rochelle fortress with the French army, and then served with Frederick Henry of Orange during the conquest of s-Hertogenbosch.[67]

However, it is more likely that they were brought by Krzysztof's son, Janusz Radziwiłł, who at that time was peregrinating around Europe.[68] The siege of

1626, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka V/122; K. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Bruksela 13 VI 1627, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka VI/40; K. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do L. Sapiehy, Lovanium 1 VIII 1627, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, teka VI/48; W. Sokołowski, *Studia i peregrynacje Janusza i Krzysztofa Radziwiłłów w latach 1595-1603 (model edukacji syna magnackiego na przełomie XVI i XVII w.)*, "Rozprawy z Dziejów Oświaty" 1992, no. 35, p. 31.

[65] Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. XXVI, sygn. 45, p. 91.

[66] Ibidem, p. 89.

[67] K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Wicht 26 XI 1695, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 76; M. Paradowska, *Krzysztof Arciszewski: admirał wojsk holenderskich w Brazylii*, Warszawa 2001, pp. 48–50; A. Kraushar, *Dzieje Krzysztofa z Arciszewa Arciszewskiego*, vol. 1, Petersburg 1893, pp. 231–233.

[68] R.T. Tomczak, *Podróż młodego magnata do szkół – książę Janusz Radziwiłł w cudzych krajach (1628–1633)*, in: *Społeczne i kulturowe uwarunkowania edukacji Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVIII wieku. Materiały z badań, część druga*, eds. K. Puchowski, J. Orzeł, Warszawa 2018, pp. 125–148.




Figure 6. The map hung on the wall in the palace of Krzysztof Radziwiłł

Claes Janszoon Visscher, *Buscoducum obsessum a Frederico Henrico, pr. auransiae, com. de Nassau, etc. Ah. 1629*, Amsterdam 1629, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.468324 (public domain).

s-Hertogenbosch had a sentimental meaning for Krzysztof Radziwiłł, as he himself travelled around Europe and participated for three months in this siege in 1603.[69] His son went on a trip abroad at the age of 16 at the turn of 1628 and 1629.[70] Of course, the aim of the peregrination, in addition to studying and renewing the friendships made a quarter of a century earlier by his father, was also military education.[71] Janusz Radziwiłł arrived in the United Province, or rather Leiden, only

[69] K. Radziwiłł do J. Radziwiłła, Hercegenbush 28 X 1603, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. IV, sygn. 297, p. 35; W. Sokołowski, *Studia i peregrynacje*…, p. 25.

[70] H. Wisner, *Lata szkolne Janusza Radziwiłła. Przyczynek do dziejów szkolnictwa kalwińskiego na Litwie w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" 1969, no. 14, pp. 193–194; E. Kotłubaj, *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła*, Wilno–Witebsk 1859, pp. 23–24.

[71] Departure plans were prepared much earlier. As early as 1625. Krzysztof Arciszewski recommended the Netherlands to his patron as an excellent area to learn about the latest military

in April 1631 and stayed in the city until the end of 1632.[72] During this time he spent four months in military camps, first of all with Frederick Henry the Duke of Orange in Heusden but also under s'Hertogenbosch.[73] A detailed analysis of this journey goes beyond the scope of the article; however, it is worth emphasizing that Janusz Radziwiłł made large purchases of books, including many on military subjects.[74] It is very likely that he bought or received the siege drawings of the Dutch fortresses as a gift. This significantly increased the number of maps and plans of military activities in Western Europe existing in the Republic of Poland.[75]

The frequency of importing purchased or copied maps and plans is confirmed by the information provided in the already analysed inventory of Krzysztof Radziwiłł. There is an inscription saying that there were numerous engravings coiled on a shaft in Lubcza Castle, which depicted *various Gustaws' victories* [Swedish – K.Ł.] *and Dutch* [Spanish and Dutch – K.Ł.][76] Most of them were created or related to the war activities carried out in the 1720s, as it was noted that they were brought by Janusz Radziwiłł, who had recently returned from a trip. During his expedition, he drew 17 plans of siege himself.[77] There are many

concepts. K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłłła, Haga 8 IV 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 56: "Father[iżę]ciu J[ego] M[iłość] Janusz would have a wonderful memorial if he had come here on holiday, so that he could see such wonderful aramids and the fortified camps, which are so wonderful, one can hardly see through the life of one man. And there are ways in which who has money (and even more so when who has royal recommendations), that securissime can reorder the Spanish camp everywhere".

[72] T. Tomczak, *Podróż młodego magnata*…, pp. 130 ff.; M. Chachaj, *Zagraniczna edukacja Radziwiłłów od początku XVI do połowie XVII wieku*, Lublin 1995, pp. 81–82; M. Zachara, T. Majewska-Lancholc, *Instrukcja Krzysztofa II Radziwiłła dla syna Janusz*, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" 1971, no. 16, pp. 171–184. Towards the end of 1632, he was authorised to hold lectures on behalf of Władysław IV Vasa, King of the Republic of Poland, at the home of Fryderyk Henryk Oranski in The Hague, Izabela Klara Habsburg's Infanta in Brussels and Charles I Stuart in London. U. Augustyniak, *In the service of the Hetman*…, p. 292.

[73] T. Tomczak, *Podróż młodego magnata*…, p. 133.

[74] M. Jarczykowa, *Książka i literatura w kręgu Radziwiłłów birżańskich w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, Katowice 1995, p. 46–47.

[75] The description of troops stationed near Breda on 25 May 1625 also reached the Republic of Poland. *Ordre zu marching*, Breda 2 V 1625, Riksarkivet (Stockholm), Extreanea IX Polen, 120, cards not pegged.

[76] Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. XXVI, sygn. 45, p. 91.

[77] Janusz Radziwiłł used his cartographic and artistic skills through his entire life. He sketched not only panoramas and building plans, but also fortifications and city plans all by himself. Нацыянальны гістарычны архіў Беларусі (г. Мінск), f. 694, op. 1, no. 287, k. 1–47. Comp. [Wolkow M.] Волков Н.А., *Оборонительные сооружения Беларуси и Украины середины XVII века на рисунках Абрахама ван Вестерфельда и набросках из архива Радзивиллов в Минске*, "Новые материалы по истории фортификации" 2016, no. 2, pp. 40–52.

similar descriptions in the magnate's inventories, this one is distinguished by the fact that the number of objects can be directly identified with a particular peregrination, it also contains a clarification of the subject matter (military), which is rare in this type of sources. In my opinion, this source gives the rationale about the number of maps and plans of a military nature the magnate could have brought from the journey.

***

From the perspective of the military authorities of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the way of conducting wars following Western European patterns became increasingly attractive. The experience of military operations with Gdansk in the years 1576–1577, three expeditions to the Moscow Tsar (1579–1582), the siege of Krakow by Archduke Maximilian III Habsburg (1587), the war in Inflants (1600–1611), the siege of Smolensk (1609–1611). In all these conflicts, defending or conquering fortifications was a key element of the warfare. In the second decade of the 17th century, the strategy began to change and manoeuvring measures were introduced, involving the establishment of field fortifications (spurs), which limited the enemy's manoeuvrability.[78] The use of infantry and field fortifications intensified during the wars with Sweden conducted by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1621–1622, 1625–1626) and the Crown (1626–1629).[79] The conflicts with Sweden were the direct cause of the search for the latest military knowledge in the Netherlands. In the context of the changes taking place, the analysis carried out allows to draw the following conclusions and research theses.

1. The key role in transferring new solutions and ways of warfare was, of course, played by soldiers, and above all officers and engineers recruited from

[78] K. Łopatecki, *Pierwszy poetycki traktat wojskowy z mapą – Jana Kunowskiego Odsiecz smoleńska. Wykorzystanie kartografii w działaniach operacyjnych (1616–1617*), "Rocznik Lituanistyczny" 2018, no. 4, pp. 41–75. The reforms were the reception of Russian solutions. During the reign of Vasyl Shuisky, he supported the Russian troops of the Swedish allied corps of James Pontus de la Gardie. Chief Prince Michał Skopin-Szujski carried out infantry reforms on the Dutch model. In order to stop the excellent Lithuanian-Polish driving, Krister Summ and Jakub de la Gardie proposed the construction of field fortifications ("warning signs"). В.В. Пенской, Попытка *военнных реформ в Росссии начала XVII века*, "Вопросы истории" 2003, no. 11, pp. 129–133.

[79] Comp. *Polskie tradycje wojskowe. Tradycje walk obronnych z najazdami Niemców, Krzyżaków, Szwedów, Turków i Tatarów*, vol. 1, ed. J. Sikorski, Warszawa 1990, pp. 244–263; H. Wisner, *Wojsko litewskie 1 połowy XVII wieku,* part. 2, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1976, no. 20, p. 6; idem *Wojsko litewskie 1 połowy XVII wieku,* part 3, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1978, no. 21, pp. 136–140.

other countries.[80] However, an important source of knowledge was the personal observation of the functioning of foreign armies by the Polish and Lithuanian nobility and magnates going abroad. The new way of "camp" education began at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. Since 1621 the Netherlands was once again covered by a warfare, so the area has become an excellent place to learn about practical military knowledge.[81] The main role in this was played by Prince Wladyslaw, who together with the whole procession dedicated three days (26–29 September 1624) to the sightseeing and analysis of the siege of Breda, which constituted the foundation and model for future peregrination expeditions.[82] It is worth noting that the 12-hour observation of the fortifications and military camps, which Władysław Waza performed, contributed to the change of the views on the nature of war rather than any specific military improvements however, it should not be underestimated.[83] On the other hand, magnates and nobles were often present in the camps for several months, hence the possibility of making in-depth observations and evaluation of new inventions and strategic and tactical solutions.

2. The maps and military plans which reached the Republic of Poland, either in manuscript or printed form, played an important role in transferring military knowledge from the Netherlands. In this article, I have indicated that the maps were imported or sent by people peregrinating or working abroad. I found out that a magnate returning from the journey alone could bring from a dozen to several dozen engravings, as well as his own drawings of the plans of sieges and

[80] Of course the Netherlands was an ideal area for recruiting military engineers. It was recommended to accompany the young magnates. Yes, in 1626. Hieronim Piestrzecki staying in Leuven was commissioned by the Cracow castellan Jerzy Zbaraski to enlist two engineers. Everyone was offered a 1,000 Polish zloty annual salary, and several hundred Polish zloty as compensation for travel. This offer exceeded the standard wage in the Netherlands by far (see footnote 31). H. Piestrzecki do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 6 IV 1626, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103, briefcase V/32.

[81] For this reason, Tomasz Zamoyski, who travelled around the Netherlands in 1615 and was in camps: Dutch at Maurice Orange and Spanish at Ambrosio Spinola's, could not observe the warfare. His stay was limited to the "inspection" of Western European troops. A.A. Witusik, *Tomasz Zamoyski's Foreign Peregrinations in 1615–1617*, "Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio F, Philosophical and Humanistic Sciences" 1970, no. 25, pp. 33–35.

[82] It is characteristic that magnates wanting to learn more about the warfare carried out by Spanish troops asked Prince Vladislav for letters of recommendation. K.M. Sapieha i K.L. Sapieha do J.S. Sapiehy, Lovanium 4 XII 1626, Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В Стефаника, f. 103, briefcase V/125.

[83] The great role of Wladyslaw Vasa's peregrination for the reforms of discipline and military drift is seen by a contemporary observer: E. Wassenberg, *Gestorvm Gloriosissimi ac Invictissimi Vladislai IV. Poloniae & Sveciae Regis*, part 2, Gedani 1641, pp. 174–176.

fortifications (the example of Janusz Radziwiłł). Books were also purchased which contained engravings of the siege and were intended to deepen the knowledge of the warfare (the example of the Sapieha brothers). The siege of Breda (1624–1625) and 's-Hertogenbosch (1629) were particularly often exposed. I have presented engravings, which were placed at the magnate and royal courts (il 3–6). These maps and plans showed the application of the most modern military engineering solutions - among others, construction of circumvallation and contravallation lines, hydro-engineering works. This led to the dissemination and appreciation of the field fortifications by the commanders of Polish and Lithuanian troops.[84]

3. The article emphasizes the role in the dissemination of cartographic sources thanks to the foreign journey of Prince Władysław (1624–1625), observation of the condottiere of Krzysztof Arciszewski (1624–1629) and peregrination of the magnate's retinue of Janusz Radziwiłł (1628–1633) and Kazimierz and Krzysztof Sapieha (1625–1629). It should be remembered, however, that these unitary messages are only a small part of the phenomenon, as the prevalence of education, foreign travel and military service in the Netherlands among the Polish-Lithuanian nobility and townspeople testifies to the scale of the phenomenon.[85] The engravings were relatively cheap and, above all, universally available, thus they started to be increasingly popular in the Republic of Poland. Presentations of contemporary sieges have entered the culture of the nobility, which is an obligatory element of knowledge. It was no coincidence that Stanisław Ciświcki received a series of tapestries in 1642 in Maksymilian van der Gucht's workshop, which

[84] K. Arciszewski do K. Radziwiłła, Haga 12 VI 1625, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, sygn. 190, p. 61: 'We could not give Breda any relief by any means, he was equal to the enemy and the army, and he was so powerful in digging in behind the Dutch encroachment that we couldn't hurt him and a hundred thousand people from such wonderful trenches.

[85] For example, R.T. Tomczak, *Podróż młodego magnata*…, pp. 133, 139–140, noted that in 1631 alone, seven Poles and seven Inflans and one Lithuanian enrolled at the University of Leiden, apart from Janusz Radziwill and his entourage (16 people). Out of 132 doctors practicing in Gdańsk, as many as 52 were after graduation in that city. In the years 1625–1626, six representatives of the Sapieha family studied in Leuven, 77 km away, and at the end of 1626, two representatives of the Wielkopolska magnateateate, Krzysztof and Łukasz Opaliński, enrolled at the university. In the first half of the 17th century, 110 citizens of the Republic of Poland studied at the university, including 80 representatives of senatorial families. S. Kot, *Stosunki Polaków z Uniwersytetem Lowańskim (w 500 rocznicę otwarcia Uniwersytetu Lowańskiego)*, "Minerwa Polska" 1927, no. 1/3, pp. 215–216, 221.

represented, among others, the siege of Breda (1624–1625), 's-Hertogenbosch (1629), La Rochelle (1629), Masstricht (1632) and additionally Smolensk (1634).[86]

4. The 1720s saw the beginning of a phenomenon as the noble elites were able to participate, from a distance, in the war in the Netherlands. This was possible thanks to the newspapers and leaflets that were published on a massive scale in the United Provinces and neighbouring countries. Current information was given in the correspondence to which maps and plans were attached. This phenomenon was visible on the national ground as early as the beginning of the 17th century and concerned the chieftains and the royal court. The 1720s, on the other hand, are a breakthrough in cartographic observation of wars in Europe.[87] However, information from the Dutch-Spanish wars reached the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with a considerable 80-day delay. The average daily speed of mail sent was about 24 km.

5. The transfer of modern fortification patterns from the Netherlands to the Republic of Poland was fully implemented during the Smolensk siege in 1632–1634. At that time, both defenders (the Republic of Poland) and aggressors (the Moscow Tsar) applied the scheme developed in the 1720s in the Netherlands.[88] It was a phenomenon fully comprehensible by contemporaries. During the warfare aimed at liberating Smolensk from the Russian siege, Jakub Maximilian Fredro wrote: *So, yesterday the king was just about to visit Smolensk, and all the bases, blockhouses, and entrenchments abandoned by the enemy. And it's not surprising, because it is confirmed by those who saw the siege of Breda and 's-Hertogenbosch that bigger and better work couldn't have been done by fortifications built and dug out, from which one another can go around Smolensk through dug ditches.*[89]

---

[86] R. Szmydki, *Wydatki artystyczne dworu Jana Kazimierza w latach 1650–1653*, "Roczniki Humanistyczne" 1999, no. 47/4, p. 198.

[87] The analysed phenomenon did not disappear in the following decades. For example, in 1637 Krzysztof Radziwiłł received a number of sketches of German and French fortifications from Adam Freitag. H. Wisner, *Wojsko litewskie 1 połowy XVII wieku*, part 2, p. 14.

[88] W. Lipiński, *Materiały i źródła do wojny smoleńskiej 1632–1634*, "Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy" 1930, no. 2, pp. 119–141; D. Kupisz, *Smoleńsk 1632–1634*, Warszawa 2001, passim; P. Gawron, *Finansowanie oraz zaopatrzenie armii polsko-litewskiej w czasie wojny smoleńskiej*, in: *Historia na źródłach oparta. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Tadeuszowi Srogoszowi w 65. rocznicę urodzin*, ed. A. Stroynowski, Częstochowa 2017, pp. 199–200.

[89] *Diariusz of the Smoleńsk Campaign of Władysław IV 1633–1634*, ed. M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2006, p. 130 (analogous quotation: ibidem, p. 228).

6. The dissemination in the Republic of Poland of the maps produced in the Netherlands has developed a new standard in military cartography, which has in particular been reflected in the plans for fortresses and possible siege operations. First of all, the space began to be mapped on a two-dimensional plane. A significant part of the military work created so far has been done diagonally (from the bird's eye view) or even in a perspective. In addition, the use of engineering and cartographic tools allowed for a partial replacement of normal re-focusing. This made it possible for cartography to develop uniquely in the Republic of Poland in the 1730s and 1840s, when Friedrich Getkant, Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan and Jan Pleitner created their works.[90]

Bibliography

Archives

Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów:
dz. IV, sygn. 1a, 297, 309.
dz. V, sygn. 190, 4560/II.
dz. XXVI, sygn. 45.
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Stamp. Barb. X.I.80.
Biblioteka Polska w Paryżu, rkps. 56/36.
Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Berol. Ms. Slaver. Fol. 5.
Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, rkps. 1954.
Bibliothèque nationale de France, GE DD-628 (75RES)
Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka (Vilnius), f. 139, nr 3348.
Rijksmuseum Amsterdam:
RP-P-OB-80.138; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.448716.
RP-P-AO-16-110; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.392440.
RP-P-OB-81.097; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.458712.
RP-P-OB-78.785-395; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.442293.
RP-P-AO-16-111; http://hdl.handle.net/10934/RM0001.COLLECT.363727.
Svenska Riksarkivet (Sztokholm):
Skoklostersamlingen, E 8600.
Riksarkivet (Sztokholm), Extreanea IX Polen, 120.
Uppsala universitetsbibliotek, Ms E 369.

[90] The fact that engineers enlisted abroad made cartographic sources for Western European fashion is nothing unusual. It is important that the military authorities and patrons in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania expected this form of execution.

Львівска Наукова Бібліотека НАН України ім. В.Стефаника, f. 103:
IV/2, IV/5, IV/51, IV/58, IV/61, IV/63, V/32, V/97, V/114, V/122, V/125, V/133, VI/40, VI/48

Нацыянальны гістарычны архіў Беларусі (г. Мінск), f. 694, op. 1, no. 287.

Printed Sources

Diariusz kampanii smoleńskiej Władysława IV 1633–1634, ed. M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2006.

Gheyn J. de, *The renaissance drill book*, ed. D.J. Blackmore, London 2003.

Hallenberg J., *Svea rikes historia under Konung Gustav den Stores regering*, vol. 4, Stockholm 1794.

Hugo H., *Obsidio Bredana armis Philippi IV. auspiciis Isabellae ductu Ambr. Spinolae perfecta*, Antverpiae 1626.

Naronowicz-Naroński J., *Budownictwo wojenne*, ed. T.M. Nowak, Oświęcim 2016.

Noue guerre di Fiandra dalli 21 luglio 1624 sino alli 25 d'Agosto 1625, Venetia 1627.

Podróż królewicza Władysława Wazy do krajów Europy Zachodniej w latach 1624–1625 w świetle ówczesnych relacji, ed. A. Przyboś, Kraków 1977.

Radziwiłł A.S., *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, vol. 2: *1637–1646*, trans. A. Przyboś, R. Żelewski, Warszawa 1980.

Thausing M., *Livre d'esquisses de Jacques Callot, dans la collection Albertine à Vienne*, Wien 1880.

Analysis

Alexandrowicz S., *Kartografia Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego od XV do połowy XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2012.

Alexandrowicz S., Łuczyński J., Skrycki R., *Historia kartografii ziem polskich do końca XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2017.

Augustyniak U., *W służbie hetmana i Rzeczypospolitej. Klientela wojskowa Krzysztofa Radziwiłła (1585–1640)*, Warszawa 2004.

Barber P., *"Procure as many as you can and send them over": Cartographic Espionage and Cartographic Gifts in International Relations, 1460–1760*, in: *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, eds. R. Adams, R. Cox, Basingstoke 2011, pp. 13–29.

Cauwer de P., *Tranen van bloed. Het beleg van 's-Hertogenbosch en de oorlog in de Nederlanden. 1629*, Amsterdam 2008.

Chachaj M., *Zagraniczna edukacja Radziwiłłów od początku XVI do połowy XVII wieku*, Lublin 1995.

Chrościcki J.A., *Sztuka i polityka: funkcje propagandowe sztuki w epoce Wazów, 1587–1668*, Warszawa 1983.

Chrościcki J.A., *Wizerunki królewicza Władysława Zygmunta Wazy z podróży (1624–1625)*, "Rocznik Historii Sztuki" 1988, no. 17, pp. 211–218.

Dybaś B., *Fortece Rzeczypospolitej. Studium z dziejów budowy fortyfikacji stałych w państwie polsko-litewskim w XVII wieku*, Toruń 1998.

Fitych T., *Personel i organizacja nuncjatury Giovanniego Battisty Lancellottiego 31-szego posła apostolskiego w Polsce (1622–1627)*, "Saeculum Christianum" 2001, no. 8/1, pp. 41–80.

Folkierski W., *Ślady podróży flandryjskiej królewicza Władysława (1624) w teatrze Calderona*, "Pamiętnik Literacki" 1935, no. 32, pp. 110–118.

Fruin R., *Tien jaren uit den Tachtigjarigen Oorlog 1588–1598*, Den Haag 1899.

Gawron P., *Finansowanie oraz zaopatrzenie armii polsko-litewskiej w czasie wojny smoleńskiej*, in: *Historia na źródłach oparta. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Tadeuszowi Srogoszowi w 65. rocznicę urodzin*, ed. A. Stroynowski, Częstochowa 2017, pp. 199–213.

Groof B. De, *A noble courtier and a gentelman warrior: Some aspects of the creation of the Spinola image*, in: *Narratives of Low Countries History and Culture: Reframing the Past*, eds. J. Fenoulhet, L. Gilbert, U. Tiedau, London 2016, pp. 26–34.

Gudde C.J., *'s-Hertogenbosch. Geschiedenis van vesting en forten*, 's-Hertogenbosch 1974.

Guthrie W.P., *The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia*, London 2003.

Helmers H., *Cartography, War Correspondence and News Publishing: The Early Career of Nicolaes van Geelkercken, 1610–1630*, in: *News Networks in Early Modern Europe*, eds. J. Raymond, N. Moxham, Leiden–Boston 2016, pp. 350–374.

Jarczykowa M., *Książka i literatura w kręgu Radziwiłłów birżańskich w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, Katowice 1995.

Keuning J., *Nicolaas Geelkerken*, "Imago Mundi" 1954, no. 11/1, pp. 174–177.

Kingra M., *The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution during the Eighty Years' War, 1567–1648*, "The Journal of Military History" 1993, no. 3 (57), pp. 431–446.

Klinkert Ch.M., *Nassau in het nieuws: nieuwsprenten van Maurits van Nassaus militaire ondernemingen uit de periode 1590–1600*, Zutphen 2005.

Kot S., *Polen in Breda in de 17e eeuw.*, "Jaarboek De Oranjeboom" 1954, no. 7, pp. 91–114.

Kot S., *Stosunki Polaków z Uniwersytetem Lowańskim (w 500 rocznicę otwarcia Uniwersytetu Lowańskiego)*, "Minerwa Polska" 1927, no. 1/3, pp. 199–224.

Kotłubaj E., *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła*, Wilno–Witebsk 1859.

Kraushar A., *Dzieje Krzysztofa z Arciszewa Arciszewskiego*, vol. 1, Petersburg 1893.

Kupisz D., *Smoleńsk 1632–1634*, Warszawa 2001.

Lawrence D.R., *The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603–1645*, Leiden 2009.

Lipiński W., *Materiały i źródła do wojny smoleńskiej 1632–1634*, "Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy" 1930, no. 2, pp. 119–141.

Łopatecki K., *Pierwszy poetycki traktat wojskowy z mapą – Jana Kunowskiego Odsiecz smoleńska. Wykorzystanie kartografii w działaniach operacyjnych (1616–1617)*, "Rocznik Lituanistyczny" 2018, no. 4, pp. 41–75.

Łopatecki K., *Prace kartograficzne wykonane na ziemiach Rzeczypospolitej przez szwedzkich inżynierów wojskowych w XVII stuleciu*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 2009, no. 46, pp. 55–80.

Nagielski M., *Wojsko kwarciane obrońcą granic rzeczypospolitej w latach 1563–1651*, in: *Dzieje organizacji polskich formacji obrony granic. Od obrony potocznej do II wojny światowej*, ed. A. Gosławska-Hrychorczuk, Kętrzyn 2007, pp. 43–62.

Nimwegen van O., *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588–1688*, trans. A. May, Woodbridge 2010.

Nowak T., *Polski atlas wojskowy z lat 1634–1639*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1969, no. 15/2, pp. 13–61.

Olszewicz B., *Kartografia polska XV–XVIII wieku. Przegląd chronologiczno-bibliograficzny*, ed. J. Ostrowski, Warszawa 2004.

Olszewicz B., *Wzmianki o znaczeniu map w literaturze polskiej XVI wieku*, "Acta Universitatis Vratislaviensis" 1963, no. 9, pp. 129–140.

Paradowska M., *Krzysztof Arciszewski: admirał wojsk holenderskich w Brazylii*, Warszawa 2001.

Parker G., *From the House of Orange to the House of Bush: 400 years of military revolutions, or how to prepare for the next Gulf War*, "Military Spectator" 2003, no. 4 (172), pp. 177–193.

Parker G., *Od domu orańskiego do domu Bushów: czterysta lat „rewolucji militarnej"*, trans. M. Kopczyński, "Przegląd Historyczny" 2005, no. 2 (96), pp. 217–243.

Parrot D., *The Utility of Fortifications in Early Modern Europe: Italian Princes and Their Citadels, 1540–1640,* "War in History" 2000, no. 7/2, pp. 127–153.

Pernal A.B., *Two newly-discovered secenteenth-century manuscript maps of Ukraine*, in: *Od Kijowa do Rzymu. Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej ze Stolicą Apostolską i Ukrainą*, eds. M.R. Drozdowski, W. Walczak, K. Wiszowata-Walczak, Białystok 2012, pp. 983–999.

[Pienskoj W.W.] Пенской В.В., *Попытка военных реформ в России начала XVII века*, "Вопросы истории" 2003, no. 11, pp. 127–138.

Plewczyński M., *Żołnierz jazdy obrony potocznej za czasów Zygmunta Augusta. Studia nad zawodem wojskowym w XVI w.*, Warszawa 1985.

Polskie tradycje wojskowe. Tradycje walk obronnych z najazdami Niemców, Krzyżaków, Szwedów, Turków i Tatarów, vol. 1, ed. J. Sikorski, Warszawa 1990.

Przyboś A., *Wstęp*, in: *Podróż królewicza Władysława Wazy do krajów Europy Zachodniej w latach 1624–1625 w świetle ówczesnych relacji*, ed. A. Przyboś, Kraków 1977, pp. 7–36.

Rogg M., *Die Kriegsordnung Albrechts des Älteren von Brandenburg, Herzog in Preussen*, in: *Die Kriegsordnung des Markgrafen zu Brandenburg Ansbach und Herzogs zu Preussen Albrecht des Älteren – Königsberg 1555*, eds. H.J. Bömelburg, B. Chiari, M. Thomae, Braunschweig 2006, pp. 19–27.

Roose J.P., *De belegering van Breda door Spinola 1624–1625*, [Alphen aan den Rijn] 2005.

Sokołowski M., *Z powodu portretów polskich we Florencyi, tudzież Zygmunta III i Konstancyi jego żony w Pinakotece monachijskiej o malarzach Soutmanie, Rubensie i Callocie*, "Sprawozdania Komisyi do Badania Historyi Sztuki w Polsce" 1903, no. 7/3.

Sokołowski W., *Studia i peregrynacje Janusza i Krzysztofa Radziwiłłów w latach 1595–1603 (model edukacji syna magnackiego na przełomie XVI i XVII w.)*, "Rozprawy z Dziejów Oświaty" 1992, no. 35, pp. 3–35.

Swart E., *"Qualifications, knowledge and courage": Dutch military engineers, c. 1550-c. 1660*, [in:] *Military engineers and the development of the Early-Modern European state*, ed. B.P. Lenman, Dundee 2013, pp. 47–70.

Szmydki R., *Wydatki artystyczne dworu Jana Kazimierza w latach 1650–1653*, "Roczniki Humanistyczne" 1999, no. 47/4, pp. 193–212.

Teodorczyk J., Żygulski Z., *Dwugłos o bitwie pod Kircholmem. Historia i ikonografia*, "Rocznik Historii Sztuki" 1999, no. 24, pp. 97–130.

Tomczak R.T., *Podróż młodego magnata do szkół – książę Janusz Radziwiłł w cudzych krajach (1628–1633)*, in: *Społeczne i kulturowe uwarunkowania edukacji Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVIII wieku. Materiały z badań, część druga*, eds. K. Puchowski, J. Orzeł, Warszawa 2018, pp. 125–148.

Vosters S.A., *La rendición de Bredá en la literatura y el arte de España*, London 1973.

Werff Y.P.W. van der, *Breda in het Nieuws (1618–1625)*, "Jaarboek De Oranjeboom" 1959, no. 12, pp. 112–118.

Wisner H., *Lata szkolne Janusza Radziwiłła. Przyczynek do dziejów szkolnictwa kalwińskiego na Litwie w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" 1969, no. 14, pp. 183–194.

Wisner H., *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, vol. 2: *Wojsko Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego – dyplomacja – varia*, Warszawa 2004.

Wisner H., *Wojsko litewskie 1 połowy XVII wieku*, part 2, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1976, no. 20, pp. 5–26.

Wisner H., *Wojsko litewskie 1 połowy XVII wieku*, part 3, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1978, no. 21, pp. 45–148.

[Wolkow M.] Волков Н.А., *Оборонительные сооружения Беларуси и Украины середины XVII века на рисунках Абрахама ван Вестерфельда и набросках из архива Радзивиллов в Минске*, "Новые материалы по истории фортификации" 2016, no. 2, pp. 40–52.

Zachara M., Majewska-Lancholc T., *Instrukcja Krzysztofa II Radziwiłła dla syna Janusza*, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" 1971, no. 16, pp. 171–184.

Ziober A., *Po klęsce pod Walmojzą. Korespondencja Lwa Sapiehy z synem Janem Stanisławem z pierwszej połowy 1626 roku*, "Wieki Stare i Nowe" 2016, no. 11, pp. 34–47.

Zurawski S., *New Sources for Jacques Callot's Map of the Siege of Breda*, "Art Bulletin" 1988, no. 4 (70), pp. 621–639.

Wpływ map i planów powstałych w latach 20. XVII wieku w Niderlandach na rozwój koncepcji wojskowych w Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej

Abstrakt

Artykuł analizuje wpływ map i planów dotyczących działań wojskowych w Niderlandach w latach 20. XVII stulecia na modernizację i reformy sztuki wojennej w Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej. Przeprowadzono w niej analizę, która prowadzi do konstatacji, że źródłem wiedzy taktycznej, operacyjnej i strategicznej były źródła kartograficzne docierające do ziem Rzeczypospolitej. Najczęściej przywoziły je osoby, które wyjeżdżały z Korony i Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego na Zachód w celach edukacyjnych i zarobkowych, a następnie wracały do ojczyzny. Ustalono, że magnat powracający z podróży przywoził od kilkunastu do kilkudziesięciu rycin i własnoręcznych rysunków planów oblężeń i fortyfikacji. Rozpowszechnioną formą było dostarczanie map do korespondencji. Źródła kartograficzne miały pomóc w ocenie podejmowanych działań militarnych i pozwalały odbiorcom „na bieżąco" obserwować konflikty europejskie.

Dzięki podróży królewicza Władysława Wazy po Europie w latach 1624–1625 ukształtował się wzorzec pobierania „nauk wojskowych" nie tylko na uniwersytetach ale i obozach wojskowych w Niderlandach. Ukazana została również rola Krzysztofa Arciszewskiego – klienta hetmana polnego litewskiego, który dostarczał Krzysztofowi Radziwiłłowi liczne, powstałe w Niderlandach mapy i plany. Zaakcentowano również analogiczny kontekst wyprawy edukacyjnej Janusza Radziwiłła oraz Krzysztofa Michała i Kazimierza Lwa Sapiehów.

The influence of maps and plans created in the 1620 in the Netherlands on the development of military concepts in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Abstract

The article analyses the impact of maps and plans for military operations in the Netherlands in the 1620s on the modernisation and reform of the art of war in the Republic of Poland. The analysis showed that the source of tactical, operational and strategic knowledge were cartographic sources that reached the lands of the Republic. They were most often brought by people who left the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the West for education and work and then returned to their homeland. It was established that a typical magnate returning from the journey brought between a dozen and a few dozen or so engravings and his own drawings of the sieges and fortification plans. A common form was to provide maps for correspondence. Cartographic sources were supposed to help evaluate the military actions taken and allow the recipients to "keep an eye on" European conflicts.

Thanks to the journey of Prince Wladyslaw Vasa around Europe in the years 1624–1625, a pattern of taking "military science" was formed not only in universities but also in military camps in the Netherlands.