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Female Regency Rule in Western Pomerania Exemplified by Duchess Elizabeth, the Wife of Warcisław IV (1326–ca. 1350)

Keywords: West Pomerania, Regency, Duchess Elizabeth, Female regency rule

Female rule during the medieval period presents an interesting image of that era, especially from the perspective of the common belief that only men had the right to rule. However, if one pays attention to medieval sources, it can often be observed that women held power in the Europe of that time. A common example was the rule exercised on behalf of minor sons who were unable to assume independent power upon the death of their father.[1]

As for the Pomeranian region, it is worth mentioning the interesting cases of female regencies in the mentioned area at the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century. These women were: Anastasia, the wife of Boguslaw I, and her two daughters-in-law, namely Mirosława[2], the wife of Boguslaw II of Szczecin, and Ingarda, the wife of Kazimierz II of Demmin. Therefore, we see that Pomeranian duchesses often took on the role of regents, especially to maintain power for their minor sons. Similarly,

1 It is worth providing here a few examples of regency governments led by women in Europe. These publications are valuable material that show how over the centuries the power held by women developed, mainly in the face of the death of their husbands and the minority of their children.See for example: Anke Huschner, "Anastasia von Pommern, Herrin in Mecklenburg (1267–1317). Handlungsspielräume und Lebensführung einer mittelalterlichen Fürstin," *Mecklenburgische Jahrhbücher* 130 (2015): 7–44; Mariola Freza-Olczyk, "Stepmother and Stepson: Duchess Matilda in the Power Struggle after the Death of her Husband Barnim I, the Duke of Pomerania," *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 83–99; Julia Burkhardt, "Selbstverständnis und Herrschaftspraxis schlesischer Regentinnen im 13. Jahrhundert," in: *Regentinnen und andere Stellvertreterfiguren. Vom 10. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gabriela Signori, Claudia Zey (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2023), 156–176.

2 See: Marek Smoliński, "Mirosława – księżna pomorska, regentka i dyplomatka," in: *Kobiety i władza w czasach dawnych*, ed. Bożena Czwojdrak, Agata Aleksandra Kluczek (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2015), 135–162.

this was the case with Duchess Elizabeth (1326–ca. 1350), the wife of Wartislaw IV, who also had to secure the inheritance after her suddenly deceased husband for her children.

Thus, the aim of what follows is to present the profile of a woman, a duchess, a widow and, above all, a mother who attempted to maintain power for her sons. Considering the fact that Wartislaw IV had died suddenly during an ongoing struggle to consolidate power in the adjacent territory of Rügen, it is necessary to portray the figure of Duchess Elizabeth dealing with various problems she encountered while managing the inheritance after her deceased husband. Both the situation in which Elizabeth found herself and the subsequent difficulties in exercising regency rule determined her adopted stance and shaped the directions of her policy. Undoubtedly, the mentioned profile of the Pomeranian Duchess of the early 14th century was worth the research undertaken.

The fundamental research questions in the presented article are: how did Elizabeth manage to exercise regency rule? How was she able to withstand political manoeuvres from her political opponents? How did she build alliances or political factions, bringing together individuals who favoured her rule, and thus her children?

The main evidence consists of documents contained in the diplomatic collections from Western Pomerania, the *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*.[3] In these collections, there are documents issued both by Duchess Elizabeth herself and co-issued with her sons. There are also diplomas mentioning the duchess, which also provide necessary research material. Thanks to these sources, many aspects related to the regency rule exercised by the duchess widow and to the political situation at that time in Western Pomerania in the first half of the 14th century can be reconstructed. Additional knowledge is also provided by the 16th-century chronicle of Thomas Kantzow,[4] through which we can learn many things about the political, social, and economic issues occurring during Elizabeth's tenure as regent.

The figure of Duchess Elizabeth does not have a separate monograph yet, but several important publications that helped write this text should be indicated. Certainly, worthy of attention is the publication by Edward Rymar[5] regarding the genealogy of the Pomeranian dukes, where we will especially find information about Elizabeth's origin and the date of her marriage to Wartislaw IV. An important position in the

3 *Pommersches Urkundenbuch* (hereafter: PUB), Bd. V, Abt. II, bearb. v. Otto Heinemann (Stettin: 1905); PUB, Bd. VI, Abt. II, bearb. v. Otto Heinemann (Stettin: 1905); PUB, Bd. VII, bearb v. Hans Frederichs u. Erich Sandow (Koln, Wien: 1958); PUB, Bd. VIII, bearb v. Erwin Assmann (Köln: 1961); PUB, Bd. X, bearb v. Conrad Klaus (Köln, Wien: 1984); PUB, Bd. XI, bearb v. Conrad Klaus (Köln, Wien: 1990).

4 Thomas Kantzow, *Pomerania. Kronika pomorska z XVI wieku,* trans. Krzysztof Gołda, ed. by Tadeusz Białecki and Edward Rymar (Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie 2005).

5 Edward Rymar, *Rodowód książąt pomorskich,* vol. II (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica w Szczecinie, 1995).

conducted research was the monograph by Joachim Zdrenka,[6] which presents a political image of Western Pomerania, especially the Duchy of Szczecin, also during the period when Elizabeth served as regent. This position also contributes a lot due to the detailed presentation of the contemporary dukes of Szczecin, Otto I, and his son Barnim III, who acted as guardians of Elizabeth and her sons after the death of Wartislaw IV. However, the issues related to the West Pomeranian cities, including their influence on the policy pursued by the dukes of Szczecin, are addressed in the monograph by Jan M. Piskorski.[7] The regency rule is addressed by texts by Władysław Sobociński[8] and Błażej Śliwiński[9] with a newer look at this subject. Thanks to them, we learn primarily about the differences between the discussed forms of rule and about when the young duke could start independent rule. Issues related to female regency rule in the Middle Ages were also addressed by Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio.[10] Her monograph concerns mainly the regency rule of Piast duchesses, but Pomeranian duchesses from the 12th and 13th centuries are also mentioned there. This position provides interesting comparative material with the conducted research on the rule exercised by Duchess Elizabeth.

Important issues related to the role of the regent played by the duchess widow were also addressed by Kazimierz Bobowski,[11] Paweł Czaplewski,[12] Agnieszka Gut,[13] and Marian Gumowski.[14] Their works in the fields of diplomatic, sphragistics, and heraldry were extremely helpful in analysing and comparing issues related, among others, to Elizabeth's origin and the titles she used in documents. The publications of Janisław

6 Joachim Zdrenka, *Polityka książąt szczecińskich w latach 1295–1411* (Słupsk: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne Oddział w Słupsku, 1985).

7 Jan M. Piskorski, *Miasta Księstwa Szczecińskiego do połowy XIV wieku* (Warszawa–Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1987).

8 Władysław Sobociński, "Historia rządów opiekuńczych," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 2 (1949): 227–353.

9 Błażej Śliwiński, "Kiedy władca stawał się władcą? Na niektórych przykładach piastowskich (ale nie tylko)," in: *Ojcowie i synowie o tron, władzę, dziedzictwo. W 700. rocznicę urodzin Karola IV Luksemburskiego króla czeskiego i cesarza 1316–1378*, ed. Beata Możejko, and Anna Paner (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2018), 19–40.

10 Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio, *Piastowskie księżne regentki. O utrzymanie władzy dla synów (koniec XII w.–początek XIV w.)* (Kraków: Avalon, 2016).

11 Kazimierz Bobowski, *Dawne pieczęcie na Pomorzu Zachodnim* (Szczecin: Glob, 1989).

12 Paweł Czaplewski, "Tytulatura książąt pomorskich do początku XIV wieku," *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 25 (1949), 1–2: 9–61.

13 Agnieszka Gut, *Formularz dokumentów książąt zachodniopomorskich do połowy XIV wieku* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2002).

14 Marian Gumowski, "Pieczęcie książąt pomorskich," *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 16 (1950), 1–4: 23–66.

Osięgłowski[15] and Martin Wehrmann[16] provide an image of the situation in which the Duchy of Rügen found itself after the death of Wartislaw IV. This, in turn, helps to understand and present Elizabeth as a regent who from the very beginning of her rule had to face difficulties in maintaining power in the individual territories ruled before by Wartislaw IV. The general outline of the situation prevailing in Western Pomerania during Elizabeth's tenure as regent is also provided by the books of Wilhelm Wegener[17] and another publication by Martin Wehrmann.[18]

The Death of Wartislaw IV and the situation of Elizabeth and her children

Historians most often date the marriage of Wartislaw IV and Elizabeth to 1315 or 1316.[19] The origin of the wife of the Prince of Wolgast is questionable. The Pomeranian chronicler of the 16th century, Thomas Kantzow, in his chronicle simply called her "the daughter of a certain Silesian prince."[20] Józef Mitkowski and Tadeusz Nowak considered her to be the daughter of Bolko I of Świdnica and Beatrice of Brandenburg.[21] According to Marian Gumowski, the image on the duchess's seal showing the duchess holding a helmet with eagle feathers allows us to assume a Silesian origin (in his opinion, the Brandenburg helmet would have had peacock feathers).[22] In the opinion of Edward Rymar, Elizabeth was related to the Brandenburg Ascanians and the Wittelsbachs.[23]

When Wartislaw IV died in 1326, Elizabeth's situation was difficult. The prince had died suddenly on 31 July.[24] Nothing had foreshadowed his death. Instead, he had been in full strength, he had had many political plans, especially since in 1325, after the

15 Janisław Osięgłowski, *Polityka zewnętrzna Księstwa Rugii (1168–1328)* (Warszawa–Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975).

16 Martin Wehrmann, *Geschichte der Insel Rügen* (Greifswald: Verlag Dr. Karl Moninger, 1923).

17 Wilhelm Wegener, *Die Herzoge von Pommern aus dem Greifen-Hause ca. 1100–1637 mit einer Einführung* (Göttingen: Heinz Reise Verlag, 1969).

18 Martin Wehrmann, *Genealogie des Pommersches Herzogshauses* (Stettin: Verlag Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1937).

19 Findings on this subject are given by Edward Rymar, see: Rymar, *Rodowód*, 13.

20 Kantzow, *Pomerania*, 393.

21 Józef Mitkowski, "Elżbieta," in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, ed. Jan Henryk Dąbrowski, Piotr Stanisław Dunin, vol. V (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1939–1946), 261. Tadeusz Nowak thinks the same, *Władysław Łokietek polityk i dowódca*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1978), 273.

22 Gumowski, "Pieczęcie," 37. Among others, Martin Wehrmann also believed that Elizabeth came from Silesia, see: Wehrmann, *Genealogie*. See: Wegener, *Die Herzoge*, 43.

23 See: Rymar, *Rodowód*, 13–15.

24 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4210.

extinction of the Princes in Rügen,[25] he was proclaimed its ruler.[26] Already, on 25 November 1325, the prince began to confirm old privileges and grants to the cities and states of the Duchy of Rügen which they had received from previous rulers, and also made new ones.[27] Wartislaw IV's actions of this type lasted until July 1326.[28] This rather long period of confirmations and grants from the new ruler undoubtedly proved his commitment to strengthening and consolidating his rule in the new territory and gaining the goodwill of his new subjects. We can, therefore, agree with Janisław Osięgłowski's statement that Wartislaw IV's interest in Rügen's affairs became visible only with the death of his predecessor Wisław III and the actual prospect of taking over his inheritance. Earlier, during his reign, the Prince of Wolgast had focused mainly on the internal policy of his rule and changing relations with Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, without interfering too much in closer relations with the Principality of Rügen.[29]

Wartislaw IV left behind three minor sons. At the time of his father's death, Boguslaw V was about 8 years old, Barnim IV was about 7 years old, and Wartislaw V was posthumous.[30] The care of the minor princes and their mother was taken over by the Szczecin prince Otto I and his son Barnim III.[31] According to Władysław Sobociński's definition, the care was providing assistance to people who were unable to conduct legal activities and, therefore, their own affairs on their own. Regency, on the other hand, was the exercise of power by another person if the ruler was a minor, unable to exercise power due to illness or absent from the state.[32] Therefore, the guardian supervised not

25 Wisław III of Rügen died on 8 November 1325. PUB, Bd. VI, Abt. II, no. 3887. The Prince of Rügen had already (in 1321) concluded an agreement with the West Pomeranian princes: Wartislaw IV, Otto I and Barnim III on the inheritance of the Principality of Rügen after the potential death of Wisław III without an heir. Such a possibility of inheritance was already allowed in 1315 even by king Christopher II of Denmark. See: Wehrmann, *Geschichte*, 49.

26 The formal election of Wartislaw IV as Prince of Rügen was made in Stralsund on 3 December 1325 by the Estates of the Principality, see: PUB, Bd. VI, Abt. II, no. 3892.

27 From that time on, the prince also began to use the phrase "ac princeps Rugianorum" in his titles, which also indicated the desire to quickly consolidate his power in the Principality of Rügen, see: PUB, Bd. VI, Abt. II, no. 3890. On the difference between the title dux and the title princeps, see: Czaplewski, "Tytulatura," 54–57; Marek Smoliński, "Kilka marginalnych uwag w sprawie statusu prawnego Sobiesławiców przed 1227," *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 245–261.

28 PUB, Bd. VI, Abt. II, no. 3890–3909. For a more detailed discussion of individual documents, see: Osięgłowski, *Polityka*, 151–153. Martin Wehrmann also wrote earlier on this topic, see: Wehrmann, *Geschichte,* 57.

29 See: Osięgłowski, *Polityka*, 151.

30 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 29.

31 Kantzow, *Pomerania*, 407. The first document of Otto I and Barnim III, who appear as guardians of Wartislaw IV's sons, dates from 25 October 1326, see: PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4232. Despite this, the issue of the Szczecin princes taking over the guardianship of the minor princes was not so obvious at first, because it was the Rügen cities that, after the death of Wartislaw IV, expressed their willingness and readiness to take over the guardianship of his sons. On the disputes related to this, see: Zdrenka, *Polityka,* 80, 82 et seq.

32 Sobociński, *Historia,* 227, 230.

only the person of the ruling minor, but also his property. However, there were situations where care was separated from the issue of governance.[33] After the death of their father, minor princes were most often automatically cared for by their mother.[34] However, its function did not exclude the simultaneous participation of other people. Very often, apart from the mother, there were also other guardians who, in a sense, took care of the widow herself, alongside the children.[35] This situation occurred during the reign of Dowager Duchess Elizabeth and the Szczecin princes Otto I and Barnim III, who were co-guardians of the minor sons of the deceased Wartislaw IV. The form of issuing documents during the regency rule is also worth mentioning. Namely, as Władysław Sobociński rightly noted, in addition to documents issued only by the guardian himself, documents issued by the guardian (as a co-issuer) together with the person under care played an important role. This was the strongest form of marking the participation of minor princes.[36] The mentioned form often appeared in the case of Princess Elizabeth's documents.

Regency rules of the Duchess dowager Elizabeth

The duchy left behind by Wartislaw IV was embroiled in a struggle over the Rugian inheritance with the dukes of Mecklenburg,[37] while simultaneously facing threats from Brandenburg. Duchess Elizabeth found herself in a situation with little assistance from the Dukes of Szczecin. The regent sought help from the then-Danish king, Waldemar III, acknowledging his sovereignty over Rügen. However, this choice did not yield the desired results.[38] Facing the lack of support from her sons' guardians, the duchess had to find other ways to try to save the realm. The directions of her actions can be reconstructed by referring to diplomatic material.

In such a difficult position, Duchess Elizabeth sought other allies to maintain Rügen. Orphans of the Wolgast prince sought to defend Pomeranian cities, mainly Greifswald and Stralsund – part of the principality of Rügen. The influence of Western Pomeranian cities on rulers' policies increased noticeably. The duchess often rewarded cities

33 Ibidem, 231.

34 Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio wrote about other examples of regencies held by dowager duchesses, including in Pomerania, see: Teterycz-Puzio, *Piastowskie,* passim.

35 Sobociński, *Historia*, 276.

36 Ibidem, 317, 318.

37 For more on this topic, see: Edward Rymar, "Książęta zachodniopomorscy wobec obronności swego państwa w XII–XVII wieku," in: *Pomorze militarne XII-XXI wiek. Materiały z sesji naukowej zorganizowanej 27 listopada 2003 r. w Zamku Książąt Pomorskich*, ed. Kazimierz Kozłowski, Edward Rymar (Szczecin: Oficyna Wydawnicza Archiwum Państwowego "Dokument," 2004), 19, 20.

38 Mitkowski, "Elżbieta," 261.

for faithful service. According to Agnieszka Gut, the role of cities at the time was seen as co-decisive.[39] This role of Western Pomeranian cities began to solidify towards the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century.[40] This situation displeased the nobility, who sided with the Mecklenburg dukes. Pomeranian cities wanted to become independent from the dukes, especially the strong centres on Rügen, which did not want to be dependent on the Mecklenburgers.[41] The struggle for Rügen lasted until 1328 and ended with Mecklenburg's concession and the signing of the peace of Brudersdorf on 27 June, under which the Mecklenburg dukes renounced their claims to Rügen, receiving 31,000 silver marks in return. This sum was to be paid within 12 years, with Barth, Grimmen, and Tribsees offered as collateral.[42]

During the struggle for Rügen, Duchess Elizabeth issued two documents in 1327 in Wolgast, indicating her cooperation with the Pomeranian cities. The first document, dated 8 February, indicated that *Elizabeth dei gracia ducissa, relicta domini Wartizlai bone memorie quondam Slavorum, Cassubie et Pomeranie ducis ac principis Ruyanorum* and the councils and cities of Greifswald, Anklam, and Demmin had reached an agreement regarding the garrison of Wolgast. The citizens of Greifswald and Stralsund would staff the castle, where the young princes, sons of Wartislaw IV and Elizabeth, were hidden from their enemies.[43] The duchess, as regent and, above all, as a mother, sought to protect her children and their estates. The titling she used was likely aimed at reminding of the lands her sons should rule. It is worth noting that her titling also emphasised the rights of Wartislaw IV's sons to Rügen. Also the seal of the duchess, depicting her holding a shield with the Pomeranian griffin, may symbolise the defence of her sons' rights to their lands.[44] In the second document, *Elyzabeth dei gracia ducissa Stetinensis Ruyeque princeps*, appealed to the councilors of Stralsund, Eberhard Preetz, the governor of Rügen, to refrain from confiscating the property of one Nikolaus Bishorst.[45] This document indicates that Duchess Elizabeth was interested in various aspects of governing the realm, including advocating for, perhaps, the poorer inhabitants of Rugian cities. The difference in the titling used by the duchess may also depend on the recipient of

39 Gut, *Formularz*, 208.

40 On the subject of the cities' struggle for political independence, see: e.g. Piskorski, *Miasta,* 182–188.

41 Stanisław Nowogrodzki, *Między Luksemburgami, Wittelsbachami a Polską. Pomorze Zachodnie a Polska w latach 1323–1370* (Gdańsk: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauki i Sztuki, 1936), 9, note 13. The young princes, together with the dowager princess Elizabeth, were to be passive spectators of the cities' struggle for Rügen, and after their victory they rewarded them by granting privileges.

42 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4395; See: Nowogrodzki, *Między Luksemburgami*, 12. See: Wehrmann, *Geschichte*, 58 et seq.

43 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4270.

44 The preserved seal is in very poor condition. Bobowski, *Dawne pieczęcie*, 99, 100. See: Gumowski, "Pieczęcie," 37. There are also speculations based on Elizabeth's seal about her Silesian origins.

45 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4325.

the document. The recipient of the mentioned document was the governor of Rügen, so the duchess emphasised the title of the Duchess of Szczecin and the ruler of Rügen.

In 1329, the war between the Pomeranian dukes and Margrave Ludwig of Brandenburg began. Duke Barnim III of Szczecin, lacking resources to conduct the conflict, decided to borrow 6,000 grivnas from the Teutonic Order, offering Slupsk, its lands and the castle as collateral for 12 years.[46] The guardians of Wartislaw IV's underage sons thus placed part of their domain under the Teutonic rule, and the Teutonic Knights accepted the land of Slupsk as a permanent acquisition, establishing the seat of a separate commandery there.[47] Perhaps such a step by Prince Barnim III was already a symptom of the growing antagonism between the Szczecin dukes and the Wolgast dukes. However, it seems that such a commitment should have been made by the regency-holding Duchess Elizabeth. Stanisław Nowogrodzki noted that Barnim III, pledging the land of Slupsk to the Teutonic Knights, had to obtain the consent of the very widow of Wartislaw IV for this step.[48] Duchess Elizabeth approved this decision in exchange for 2,000 grivnas.[49] One could wonder why she agreed to such a step, especially since it involved a part of her sons' domain. Perhaps she believed in the righteousness of decisions made by Duke Barnim III and hoped the Teutonic Order would return Slupsk. Undoubtedly, she needed the money, and her position was too weak to effectively oppose it.

It seems reasonable to look at this situation from another perspective as well. The belonging of the Slupsk land to the Duchy of Pomerania was short, as Wartislaw IV had only annexed it around 1317.[50] Prior to that, for nearly a century, it had been ruled by the Sobiesławovic family of Gdańsk, and then had been briefly under the administration of the Polish (13 years) and Brandenburg rulers (about 10 years). Prince Wartislaw IV did not visit these lands very often, leaving the management to local magnates. In fact, according to diplomatic material, the Prince of Wolgast appeared in Slupsk only once, i.e. on 6 November 1325, when he confirmed to the Dominicans of Slupsk their possessions.[51] It, therefore, appears that, with her power and financial needs threatened, the duchess dowager, faced with the possibility of losing another of Wartislaw IV's

46 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4457, 4458. The treaty with the Teutonic Knights was concluded by the Szczecin dukes Otto I and Barnim III in Malbork on 1 March 1329, who titled themselves guardians of Warcisław IV's sons. They confirmed the treaty that the Teutonic Knights had concluded with them a few days earlier, on 27 February. At that time, in exchange for a loan, they pledged the city and land of Slupsk to the Order for 12 years. See: Zdrenka, *Polityka*, 92, 93.

47 Benedykt Zientara, "Walka Pomorza Zachodniego z Brandenburgią o niezależność polityczną," in: *Historia Pomorza*, ed. Gerard Labuda, vol. 1, 2 (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1972), 212.

48 Nowogrodzki, *Między Luksemburgami*, 13.

49 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4479.

50 PUB, Bd. V, Abt. II, no. 3152. See: Arkadiusz Bugaj, "Problem przynależności politycznej ziemi sławieńskiej w latach 1316–1320," *Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze*, ed. Błażej Śliwiński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2003), 17–38.

51 PUB, Bd. VI, Abt. II, no. 3886.

acquisitions – Rügen – decided to support the plans of her son's relatives. It is also possible that the rather fresh affiliation of the land of Slupsk, as well as its peripheral location in relation to the duchy, also contributed to this decision.

What were the next steps taken by Elizabeth after Barnim III had concluded this agreement, which was unfavourable to the duchess? Initially, she cooperated with the princes of Szczecin, for on 13 December 1330, in Wolin, together with Otto I and Barnim III, she concluded a defensive alliance with Bishop Frederick, Pastor Barnim of Orla and the entire chapter of Kamień Pomorski.[52] This alliance was directed against the Marches, since the Wittelsbachs were in conflict with the papacy.[53] The princes of Szczecin, together with the duchess dowager, again took a stand on the side of the pope (probably reaching out to him through the chapter of Kamień Pomorski) and in 1331 recognised their dominions as fiefs of the Holy See.[54] The Pomeranians thus wanted to become independent of Brandenburg, while challenging the rights of Emperor Ludwig IV, the Bavarian,[55] as to sovereignty over the said lands.

In the following years, the duchess widow's interest in the affairs of the Wolgast duchy becomes apparent. Thanks to the documents that Elizabeth issued or in which she was mentioned, we can see what matters her domestic policy may have been concerned with. From a document dated 25 November 1333, issued in Wolgast, we learn that Princess Elizabeth paid Martin von Winterfeld, Nicholas and Henry von Heyden, and Werner and Arnold von Schwerin a pledge of 900 marks for the island of Usedom.[56] On the other hand, on 5 January 1334, also in Wolgast, Elizabeth, as *gracia dei ducissa Stetinensis, Slavie, Cassubie et Pomeranie atque Ruye princeps*, issued a document through which she confirmed the deed of brothers Arnold and Detlev Bugenhagen and brothers Henning and Arnold von Koller of 26 February 1315, speaking of the sale of property to the church in Usedom.[57] Both documents indicate that the duchess dowager was not only interested in matters related to the external politics of her sons' rule, but was also involved in what was going on inside the duchy, which formed the basis of the late Wartislaw IV's inheritance. What is more, the second of the aforementioned documents also makes it clear that Elizabeth continued to insist on all the lands that had come under her husband's rule. This is clearly indicated by the title she used. Among the lands mentioned in it, Szczecin was included, which may have indicated that the

52 PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4604. This fact was confirmed by a document of Bishop Frederick of the same day, see: PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4605.

53 Zdrenka, *Polityka,* 96.

54 PUB, Bd. VIII, no. 4853–4854.

55 Ludwig IV was anointed emperor in Rome in January 1328. See: Władysław Czapliński, Adam Galos, Wacław Korta, *Historia Niemiec* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2010), 168–172.

56 PUB, Bd. VIII, no. 5108.

57 Ibidem, no. 5130.

duchess was showing that she and her sons, like the late Wartislaw IV, laid some claim to the land of Szczecin. Szczecin was the main residence of the dukes of Pomerania. Such a move may have been a kind of raising of the duchess's authority among her subjects.

Subsequently, Duchess Elizabeth's policies underwent a significant change, suggesting a sudden shift in her behaviour. On 3 December 1334, in Świecie, Elizabeth, *Elizabet dei gracia Stetinensis, Slavie, Cassubie Pomeranorumque ducissa Ruyanorumque princeps* allied with Margrave Ludwig Wittelsbach. By consistently using her title, she reminded of the lands she ruled on behalf of her sons. Through this alliance, Duchess Elizabeth opposed the policy pursued by the dukes of Szczecin, mainly Barnim III. This alliance indicates the duchess's independence and her disagreement with the policy of the dukes of Szczecin. As part of this alliance, the Wittelsbachs relinquished their claims to the duchy of Wolgast while maintaining their rights to the duchy of Szczecin.[58]

Subsequently, the duchess issued further documents together with her sons, somehow legitimising their power. Already on 19 December 1334, in Trzebiatów, *Elisabeth dei gracia ducissa, Bugslaus, Barnym et Wartislaus* agreed with Bishop Frederick of Kamień, citing the cooperation of the ancestors of Elizabeth's sons with the Kamień bishops. The agreement concerned mutual support against enemies, which, according to the document, did not include the Margrave of Brandenburg, Ludwig. Moreover, both sides agreed to provide mutual assistance in the number of 60 armed men.[59] The princess's behaviour shows her attempt to find effective allies: first Ludwig Wittelsbach, then Bishop Frederick of Kamień. An interesting fact is that at that time Bishop Frederick was no longer an ally of Prince Barnim III, as their paths had just diverged. Therefore, the Dowager Duchess allied herself with the enemies of the Duke of Szczecin, once again showing the directions of her policy. Joachim Zdrenka rightly noticed that by these agreements with the Dowager Duchess Elizabeth, the Margrave of Brandenburg effectively destroyed the united front of Western Pomerania.[60]

On 25 February 1335, in Trzebiatów, Elizabeth again showed her political independence towards the Szczecin princes and confirmed previous alliances. Together with her sons, probably with the consent of their advisors and the knowledge of the above-mentioned allies, they agreed with the Kamień chapter against anyone threatening both the duchess and the chapter. Of course, the agreement did not include Margrave Ludwig of Brandenburg as a possible enemy.[61] It can be assumed that such repeated strengthening of the duchess's position was an important political move in the situation at that time: Elizabeth distanced herself from the policy of the Szczecin princes and even tried to build her political faction, whose members would ensure the safety of the duchess and her

58 Ibidem, no. 5213.

59 Ibidem, no. 5217, 5218.

60 Zdrenka, *Polityka,* 102, 103.

61 PUB, Bd. VIII, no. 5249.

sons. Among the witnesses in the documents issued by the duchess herself or together with her sons, various people appear. In some documents, the lists of witnesses have not survived. In several documents, there appear people still associated with the deceased Duke Wartislaw IV– Mikołaj de Swanenbecke, who in one of the documents of the dowager duchess appears as her chaplain.[62] In addition, the following officials appear in the entourage of the Dowager Duchess: Hinrico de Kile, Nicolao Scellyn – the Duchess's attorneys, Johannis Splith, Hermann de Nwenkirchen – the Duchess's notaries, Bernardus de Lubberstorp – another chaplain of the Duchess. The people repeated in several documents at that time were Syffridus Lodo and Hinricus de Zagense. We can see that depending on what matters the Duchess's activities concerned, such people accompanied her during the exercise of her regency. It also seems that the Duchess may have deliberately surrounded herself with different people to show that her entourage consisted of many important officials and residents of Pomeranian cities.[63]

During the following years, the duchess issued legal acts regarding all aspects of the management of the duchy. According to a document issued after 31 October 1335, the knight Bertram von Gristow asked *generose principi, domine sue karissime, domine Elyzabeth ac illustris principibus Buxlao, Barnym et Wizlao* to transfer (as a fief) to the citizen of Stralsund Nikolaus Bruhn (Brunoni) revenues in the amount of 4 Mark from his owned land in Reinkenhagen (Grimmen district), which he sold and left.[64] It should be noted that the duchess is a co-issuer of this document, her sons appear next to her, which, as already mentioned, is a method of legitimising their power. At a similar time, in 1336, Elizabeth, without recalling her sons, granted Dietrich Schuppelenberg a tax on two estates in Hinrichshagen.[65] Perhaps the fact that Elizabeth appears in this document on her own is intended to show her role as regent, i.e. the person who makes decisions in various aspects. But it is also possible that she was the only one present when this document was issued.

The duchess also corresponded with the rulers of distant kingdoms. Interestingly enough, on 20 May 1337, the King of England, Edward III in York, asked the Duchess of Pomerania, Elizabeth, to grant compensation to the merchant Roger of Plumpton for the goods taken from him by the duchess's officials.[66] This document suggests that the merchant had asked the English ruler to intervene in a matter relating to his property or fees that were collected by the officials of the Pomeranian duchess. To some extent, this may both indicate the fiscal policy pursued by the duchess and suggest official abuses.

62 PUB, Bd. X, no. 5612

63 Com. Krzysztof Guzikowski, "*Milites novi* w otoczeniu księcia wołogoskiego Warcisława IV (1309–1326)," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 31 (2016), 1: 73–94.

64 PUB, Bd. VIII, no. 5311.

65 PUB, Bd. X, no. 5441.

66 PUB, Bd. X, no. 5510.

The duchess issued the next documents together with her sons, especially since they were reaching the age of functional capacity. This coexistence of mother and sons indicates the important role still played by the duchess. These documents concern both the internal affairs of the principality and its relations with its neighbours. For example, on 22 April 1338, in Wolgast, *Elyzabeth Dei gracia Stetynensis, Pomeranians, Slavie et Cassubie ducissa Ruyanorumque princeps*, together with her eldest son Boguslaw V, confirmed the purchase of an annuity of 30 marks by the city of Usedom and the Kołobrzeg councilor Albus Nicolaus for the vicar in Kołobrzeg.[67]

On 1 May 1341, in Malbork, *Elyzabeth Dei gracia ducissa* and her sons Boguslaw V, Barnim IV, and Wartislaw V, signed an agreement with the Teutonic Order to give them the city of Slupsk (after having been a collateral for twelve years) for one year, counting from 1 January 1342, for 2,766 fines.[68] The next document also concerned difficult relations with the Order, because, on 1 June 1341, in Wolgast, *Elyzabet Dei gracia ducissa Stetynensis ac principissa Ruyanorum* and her sons Boguslaw V, Barnim IV, and Wartislaw V argued about the right to represent the church in Wolgast.[69] What is interesting here is Elizabeth's title of Duchess of Szczecin and Ruler of Rügen; perhaps the title was determined by the place of issue of the document. At that moment, the princes did not have the funds to buy out Slupsk. However, soon, thanks to the help of the inhabitants of Slupsk, who collected the amount needed for the redemption, Prince Boguslaw regained Slupsk. Later, Elizabeth's sons assured the residents that such a situation would never happen again.[70]

The consent and seal of the princess are also included in the alliance with Poland of 24 February 1343,[71] which was important for Boguslaw V. Perhaps, as Józef Mitkowski suspected, Boguslaw V's rapprochement with Poland was inspired by Elizabeth,[72] who was looking for effective allies for her sons, especially since many issues were still unresolved. The case that preoccupied the duchess at that time was the trial of Rügen. On 19 January 1345, in Avignon, the papal auditor Oliverius de Cerzeto issued a document in which he instructed the clergy of the Archbishoprics of Bremen and Magdeburg and the diocese of Kamień to invite the Pomeranian princes Boguslaw V, Barnim IV, and Wartislaw V, their mother Elizabeth, or their representative, to appear before the court.[73]

67 PUB, Bd. X, no. 5612.

68 PUB, Bd. XI, no. 5938.

69 PUB, Bd. XI, no. 5945.

70 Bogdan Wachowiak, ed. "Źródła do kaszubsko-polskich aspektów dziejów Pomorza Zachodniego do roku 1945," vol. 1: *Pomorze Zachodnie pod rządami książąt plemiennych i władców z dynastii Gryfitów (990–1121–1637/1653)*, ed. Zygmunt Szultka (Poznań–Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2006), 96–97.

71 PUB, Bd. XI, no. 6119.

72 Mitkowski, "Elżbieta," 261.

73 PUB, Bd. XI, no. 6361.

Therefore, even though her sons had reached the age of fitness, the duchess was perceived as a person influencing the policy of the Duchy of Pomerania.

Therefore, Elizabeth did not stop her public activities even though her sons took over independent rule. In the light of Władysław Sobociński's research, the so-called functional years were reached at the age of 12 – 14 – 20, depending on the individual characteristics of the young prince.[74] It is assumed that the youngest son, Wartislaw V, turned 20 around 1346, so according to Edward Rymar, the duchess still took care of him until this year.[75] However, the prince had certainly been allowed to rule before. On 1 February 1350, the Duchess gave her consent by appearing in the document of Boguslaw V, so she still influenced her sons and their policies. The young dukes (they did reign together) probably appreciated her advice and the way she made decisions until the end of their mother's life. In this respect, a good summary would be the conclusion of Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio, who noticed that the longer the Dowager Duchess ruled as regent, the more she became involved in political activities, even after one of her sons took over independent rule, sometimes influencing him quite significantly.[76]

The exact date of Elizabeth's death is not known. She was still alive in 1350. She died before 1356, when her sons built the "Throne of Mary" monastery near Szczecinek, due to the recent death of the princess,[77] according to Kantzow.

Conclusions

Through the documents that Princess Elizabeth exhibited or co-exhibited,[78] we can learn a lot about the scope of her power and the directions of her policy. It should be noted that she came to rule in very difficult times. The rule, which was to be taken over by her sons after a few years, was embroiled in numerous disputes and wars. The Dowager Duchess had to fight to maintain the lands left by her husband Wartislaw IV.

Elizabeth took an active part in solving both political and economic issues. She emphasised her independence when she concluded an alliance with the Wittelsbachs, with whom her sons' guardians, the Szczecin princes, were in conflict. The mutual dislike of the duchess and the princes from the Szczecin line was probably already visible at that time. It was consolidated when Barnim III in 1338 allied with the Margrave

74 Sobociński, *Historia*, 242–248, 259. A more recent perspective on this issue is provided by Błażej Śliwiński. This researcher indicates that before the transfer of power to him, the prince was often assessed as to whether he was able to cope with this task, see: Śliwiński, "Kiedy władca," 19–40.

75 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 12.

76 Teterycz-Puzio, *Piastowskie,* 238.

77 Kantzow, *Pomerania*, 442.

78 Alone or with sons, e.g. PUB, Bd. VII, no. 4270, 4325, 4479; PUB, Bd. VIII, no. 5130, 5213, 5218, 5249, 5428, 5441; PUB, Bd. X, no. 5612; PUB, Bd. XI, no. 5938, 5945.

of Brandenburg, promising the Wittelsbachs additionally, in the event of his childless death, succession in the Duchy of Szczecin.[79] This is further proof that the Dowager Duchess did not have an easy task as regent.

We can also detect a change in the way she ruled, as well as her determination to pass on the inheritance to her sons. Therefore, it seems justified to positively assess her rule, because in the end she was able to maintain most of the territory left by Wartislaw IV and to hand it over to his rightful successors. After this, she obviously continued to advise her sons on various matters relating to the duchy, as indicated by the fact that she was further mentioned by them in documents.

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79 On this subject, see: Zdrenka, *Polityka*, 114 et seq.

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English version: Marta Gierczyńska-Kolas, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Princess Elizabeth, wife of Wartislaw IV, Prince of Wolgast, was one of the most publicly active women in Western Pomerania. After her husband died in 1326, Elizabeth had to face the function of regent because her sons were minors. When she took over, she exercised power and fought to maintain the principality using various methods. The text is intended to show in particular the situation in which the Duchess of Pomerania found herself after the death of her husband and the difficulties she had to face to maintain the inheritance of Wartislaw IV for her sons. An important aspect is also the presentation of how Elizabeth dealt with the problems she encountered during her rule, as well as the assessment of her actions. The source base consists mainly of selected documents that the duchess exhibited or co-exhibited with her sons.

Kobiece rządy regencyjne na Pomorzu Zachodnim na przykładzie księżnej Elżbiety, żony Warcisława IV (1326– ok. 1350)

Słowa kluczowe: Pomorze Zachodnie, regencja, rządy opiekuńcze, księżna Elżbieta, kobiece rządy

STRESZCZENIE

Księżna Elżbieta, żona księcia wołogoskiego Warcisława IV, była jedną z bardziej aktywnych publicznie kobiet na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Po śmierci męża w 1326 roku, Elżbieta musiała zmierzyć się z funkcją regentki ze względu na to, że jej synowie byli małoletni. Obejmując rządy, sprawowała władzę i różnymi metodami walczyła o utrzymanie księstwa. Celem artykułu jest wskazanie zakresu jej władzy oraz kierunków prowadzonej polityki. Tekst ma za zadanie ukazać zwłaszcza sytuację, w jakiej znalazła się księżna pomorska po śmierci swego męża oraz to z jakimi trudnościami musiała się zmierzyć, by utrzymać schedę Warcisława IV dla swoich synów. Ważnym aspektem jest również przedstawienie, w jaki sposób Elżbieta radziła sobie z napotykanymi problemami podczas swych rządów, a także ocena jej działań. Podstawę źródłową stanowią głównie wybrane dokumenty, które księżna wystawiała bądź współwystawiała wraz z synami.

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Milites amphibii. The Baltic Port Cities' Military Role for Sweden as a Great Power, 1561–1815

Keywords: Military history, Sweden 17th and 18th century, naval operations, troop transfers, military role of Baltic port cities, Swedish naval domination, amphibious warfare

Since prehistoric times, Sweden has been a country determined by its central position in the Baltic Sea. Particularly before the emergence of railways, water was an indispensable precondition for transport of large amounts of goods, people, and news. This is obvious even for the earliest historical times as evidenced by trading places such as Birka and Sigtuna or the port towns of medieval Sweden as for example Stockholm, Kalmar, Åbo, Raumo, Ulvsby (Björneborg), Borgå, Viborg or Visby.[1] In the early modern period, when Sweden, after having been a member of the Union of Kalmar since 1397, returned to sovereignty in 1523, one of Gustav Vasa's foremost political goals was to develop trade and a transportation network in the Baltic Sea area. It was Sweden's aim to generate trade profits – which in turn were a precondition to compete, economically and politically, with Sweden's hereditary enemy, the kingdom of Denmark and Norway, but also with the still powerful Hansa League. In order to achieve this goal, naval dominance in the Baltic Sea region was of the essence. From the middle of the 16th century, Swedish kings therefore made great efforts to develop a major merchant fleet as well as a naval force in order to protect Swedish maritime trade, but also in order to gain bridgeheads on the other side of the Baltic Sea.[2]

1 Lars Ersgård, "Medieval and Early Modern Towns in Sweden in a long-term perspective," in: *Urban Variation – Utopia, Planning and Practice*, eds. Per Cornell, Lars Ersgård, and Andrine Nilsen (Gothenburg: Department of Historical Studies, University of Gothenburg, 2018), 73–95.

2 Axel Zettersten, *Svenska flottans historia: åren 1522–1634* (Stockholm: Jos. Seligmanns, 1890); Otto Lybeck, *Svenska flottans historia. Örlogsflottan i ord och bild från dess grundläggning under*

From 1561 to 1721, Sweden in rapid succession conquered a rash of towns and cities on the southern coastline of the Baltic Sea, the majority of which were members of the Hanseatic League. Some towns and cities, however, were put under military protection only. Sweden sent armed forces to Reval[3] in 1561, to Reval and Pernau in 1581, to Narva in 1581, to Riga in 1621, to Frauenburg, Tolkemit, Braunsberg, Elbing, Fischhausen, Pillau, and Marienburg in 1626, to Lochstädt in 1627, to Stralsund in 1628, to Memel in 1629, to Stettin in 1630, to Greifswald and Kolberg in 1631, and to Wismar in 1632.[4] In Danzig, Sweden had, according to the truce of Altmark (1629), the right to collect duties related to trading transactions, from 1629 to 1635. From 1626 to 1635, Sweden blocked Danzig and conquered the fortress of Danziger Haupt, but not the city as such. Danzig was even pillaged by Sweden in 1703 during the Great Northern War (1700–1721),[5] but nevertheless remained the only larger harbour city outside mainland Sweden and Denmark that the Swedish troops failed to conquer and occupy for a longer period of time.[6] Even generally speaking, all these conquests, occupations, protective measures and exploitation rights were not necessarily long-lasting. Some of the towns and cities mentioned were under Swedish rule for only a handful of years, whereas others belonged to Sweden's crown for centuries. Subsequently, Swedish troops and naval vessels came and left, conquered and reconquered some of them during various periods of time.

Ruling over these towns and cities, most of which were in possession of a port, served a twofold purpose: to gain strategic bridgeheads on the continent and to use the trade of the mostly flourishing and wealthy urban communities to replenish the always hard-pressed royal treasury. In other terms: what Swedish politicians of the time aimed at was warfare, mercantilism, and territorial expansion. No one in the Swedish government realised this correlation better than Sweden's chancellor Axel Oxenstierna (1583–1645), when he stressed the political strategy, that Sweden should gain control

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Gustav Vasa fram till våra dagar, vol 1: 1521–1679 (Malmö: Allhem, 1942); Jan Glete: "Svenska örlogsfartyg 1521–1560: flottans uppbyggnad under ett tekniskt brytningsskede," in: *Forum navale* 31 (1977), 23–119; Lars Ericson Wolke and Anna Sara Hammar, *Sjömakt och sjöfolk: den svenska flottan under 500 år* (Forum navales skriftserie 82) (Stockholm: Nordic Academic Press, 2022), 34–88.

3 Town names are given in contemporary Swedish and German denomination.

4 Claes Annerstedt, *Grundläggningen af svenska väldet i Livland 1558–1563 samt deraf alstrade strider inom Vasahuset* (Uppsala: Edquist and Berglund, 1868), 40–41; Robert I. Frost, *The Northern Wars – War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (London and New York: Longman Publishings, 2000), 23–43, 102–181; Lars Ericson, et.al., *Svenska slagfält* (Stockholm: Wahlström and Widstrand, 2003), 77–82, 111–118; Ulf Sundberg, *Svenska krig 1521–1814* (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg Bokförlag, 1998), 42–187; Ulf Sundberg, *Svenska freder och stillestånd 1249–1814* (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg Bokförlag, 2002), 203–238; Ferdinand Gottschalk: "Der Schwedisch–Polnische Krieg in Preußen von 1626–1629," *Preußische Provinzial-Blätter* 26 (1841), 129–184; Leszek Podhorodecki, *Rapier i koncerz: z dziejów wojen polsko-szwedzkich* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1985).

5 For all Swedish wars mentioned in this contribution see: Sundberg, *Svenska krig*.

6 Sundberg, *Svenska freder och stillestånd*, 303–304; Hannes Saarinnen, *Bürgerstadt und absoluter Kriegsherr: Danzig und Karl XII. im Nordischen Krieg* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinin Seura, 1996).

over as many cities as possible, and even to build up some itself, in order to develop from a country somewhere in the remote backyard of Europe to a kingdom respected by the mightiest powers of the continent. In order to do so, he tried to concentrate all international trade in Stockholm and some of the former Hansa towns. This in turn predetermined sea routes across the Baltic Sea, which more or less all started or ended in Stockholm – for trade vessels as well as for navy ships.[7]

Sweden's amphibious warfare

An important ingredient to protect Swedish or at least Swedish-controlled trade over the Baltic Sea and to wage war in countries on the Southern coastline was to perfect a military strategy, which military experts normally call *amphibious warfare*. In a Swedish historiographical context, the term amphibious warfare goes back to works published by Swedish maritime historian Jan Glete (1947–2009)[8] and describes the strategy Sweden's military used in order to ship troops across the Baltic Sea and to safeguard the supply of Swedish troops on the continent with food, equipment, and replacements. Moreover, amphibious warfare is, at least in a Swedish context, closely connected to early modern Swedish state building, including building-up a fiscal-military system, that enabled Sweden to rapidly expand beyond its original territorial borders.[9] In terms of logistics, amphibious warfare in general belongs to the most complex military operations. It might in many cases be synonymous to a simple landing operation. In other cases, the

7 See: Oxenstierna's town regulations of 1628. *[Axel Oxenstiernas] Swerikes rikes stadz lagh, effter den stormechtige, (...) herr Gustaf Adolphs, (...) befalning, vthgångin aff trycket*, ed. Johannes Bureus, (Stockholm: Ignatius Meurer, 1628); Cfr. Eli F. Heckscher, "Den ekonomiska innebörden av 1500– och 1600–talens svenska stadsgrundningar," *Historisk tidskrift (S)* 43 (1923): 309–350; Birgitta Ericsson, "De anlagda städerna i Sverige ca. 1580–1800," in: *Urbaniseringsprosessen i Norden 2. De anlagte steder på 1600–1700 tallet*, ed. Grete Authén Blom, (Oslo-Bergen Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1977), 103–109; Sven-Erik Åström, "Anlagda städer och centralortssystem i Finland 1550–1785," in: *Urbaniseringsprosessen i Norden 2. De anlagte steder på 1600–1700 tallet*, ed. Grete Authén Blom (Oslo-Bergen Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1977), 135–157, 160; Nils Ahlberg, *Stadsgrundningar och planförändringar. Svensk stadsplanering 1521–1721* (Uppsala: Uppsalas universitet, 2005), 67–89; Lars Nilsson, "Staden och det militära. Garnisoner och urbanisering i svensk historia," in: *Nordens garnisonsstäder. Slutrapport från ett forskningsprojekt*, ed. Gunnar Artéus (Stockholm: Probus, 1997), 146–156, especially 147, 153.

8 Jan Glete, "Amphibious Warfare in the Baltic, 1550–1700," in: *Amphibious Warfare 1000–1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion*, eds. David J. B. Trim, and Mark Charles Fissel (Leiden et.al.: Brill, 2006), 123–148. On the concept of amphibious warfare see: D.J.B. Trim and Mark Charles Fissel, "Amphibious Warfare, 1000 – 1700: Concepts and Contexts," in: *Amphibious warfare 1000–1700*, 1–50.

9 Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State building in Europe and America, 1500–1860*. 2 volumes (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1993); Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1600* (London: Routledge, 2002).

concept points at a combined water-land-operation without any landing operation at all.[10] Sometimes, hit-and-run tactics are involved, sometimes an assault and the conquest of territories might be aimed at. Amphibious operations can be pretended, or war vessels can serve as platforms of retreat for land operations. Even evacuations or relief measures in the case of dangerous situations can be part of amphibious warfare. But whatever the operational form, bigger port cities played a central role: as muster points, supply bases, relays for military operations, fortified protection against enemies, or centres of communication. All these aspects would, of course, be worth a thorough historical analysis and extensive description, because the topic has, for the early modern Swedish case, never been studied in detail. Due to my limited space in this contribution, however, I would like to restrict myself to two central aspects, i.e. the transfer of soldiers and military equipment from Swedish port cities to port cities on the Southern coast of the Baltic Sea, and the port cities' role within the context of amphibious warfare.

Transfer of troops and military equipment

An indispensable precondition for the transfer of troops and equipment as well as for the communication of major military units like a naval fleet was the creation of a central point of embarkment. During the first years of the early modern Swedish monarchy, the Swedish naval base was situated right next to the royal castle *Tre Kronor* in Stockholm. From here, ships could sail across the Stockholm archipelago and straight to the port towns on the southern Baltic coast. In the 1550s, this naval base was transferred to the island of Blasieholmen, in those days known as Skeppsholmen ("island of ships") or simply Holmen, today a part of central Stockholm.[11] In 1634, the point of embarkment was once again transferred, now to the island of today's Skeppsholmen, opposite to the Royal castle.[12] Another point of embarkment was a natural harbour in Stockholm's southern archipelago by the name of Älvsnabben, which was used as an anchorage ground for the Swedish navy since the reign of Erik XIV (ruled 1560–1568). It was this place, where Gustav II Adolf (ruled 1611–1632) in 1630 embarked with his invasion army

10 Merrill L. Bartlett, *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993).

11 Fredrik Ulrik Wrangel, *Stockholmiana I–IV. Anteckningar* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1912), 43–55.

12 In Denmark the situation was similar. The sole Danish naval base was *Holmen* in Copenhagen. From 1690, this point of embarkment was transferred to Nyholmen. Hans Christian Bjerg, *Holmen: Flådens base gennem 300 år* (København: Søværnets Materielkommando, 1990), 7; Cfr. Hans Christian Bjerg and John Erichsen, *Danske orlogsskibe 1690–1860: konstruktion og decoration* (København: Lademan, 1980).

to intervene in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in Germany.[13] In 1679, a new point of embarkment was created with the ice-free harbour of Karlskrona in the southern Swedish region of Blekinge, which only recently (1658) had been conquered by Sweden and was located more centrally in and nearer to the opposite coastline of the Baltic Sea.[14] This north to south oriented distribution of naval bases also shows that Sweden's operational outlook during the 17th century still was more or less restricted to the Baltic Sea region. An additional naval base was created in western Sweden only in the last phase of Sweden's great power period,[15] during the Great Northern War: The "Old Wharf" (*Gamla varvet*) in the port of Göteborg, which was intended to serve Swedish warships operating in Danish and Norwegian waters of the North Sea.[16]

Just as important as the point of embarkment was the point of debarkation. This debarkation point ought to be concentrated, for reasons of effective communication and logistics, to only one single strip of land, preferably to a coast town with a good harbour. Sweden was, however, rarely in the position to build harbours for navy purposes on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea by its own means. Instead, the Swedish navy had to rely on port cities already existing or, in some cases, on spots apt for a landing on sandy shores without any harbour at all. This often was the case, when the Swedish government was not sure if the port cities in question could be trusted – as, for example, during the Thirty Years' War, the Great Northern War or Napoleon's War in Pomerania (1806–1807). In this case, Swedish troops normally were debarked on the shores of the islands of Usedom, Rügen, the spits of the lagoons of the Prussian and Lithuanian coast (Vistula and Curonian Lagoon), or in the Gulf of Riga.

What Sweden also could do, was to improve or to extend already existing harbours in those cities it was in control of. Thus, Erik XIV ordered, in the late 1560s, the recently gained, but poorly fortified Livonian port cities of Reval and Pernau to reinforce and to improve their harbours and fortifications, as he did for many other places in mainland

13 Ankarberg, Carl-Henrik, "Älvsnabben: kapartillhåll och flottbas i Stockholms skärgård," in: *Kung Valdemars segelled*, ed. Gerhard Flink (Stockholm: Streiffert, in cooperation with Riksantikvarieämbetet, 1995), 103–111.

14 Jarl Bromé, *Karlskrona stads historia. Del 1: 1680–1790* (Karlskrona: Karlskronas stad, 1930).

15 There is no standard meaning of the term "great power period" in research about Sweden's history. Some researchers take as a *terminus post quem* the beginning of Sweden's territorial expansion during the Livonian War (1558–1583), some the start of the reign of Gustav II Adolf (ruled 1611–1632); for some a "great power period" only starts after the peace treaty of Westphalia (1648), when Sweden achieved the status of a European power safeguarding the European power system in the second half of the 17th century. There is, however, a comparably large consensus about the *terminus ante quem* of Sweden's "great power period," which usually is defined by the Great Northern War (1700–1721). In this article, "great power period" means a period lasting from the Livonian War to the Great Northern War.

16 Ernst Bergman, *Gamla varvet vid Göteborg 1660–1825: historik och beskrivning* (Göteborg: Nautic, 1954); Gustaf Clemensson, *Gamla varvet i Lars och Ingela Gathenhielms besittning* (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag), 1938; Jan Lagerlund, *Skeppsgårdar och varv under svenska flottans äldre tid 1522–1680* (Kristianstad: Högskolan, [no date]).

Sweden (incl. Finland).[17] To build a separate harbour for naval vessels, however, was not implied in these measures. First in the 18th century, after the end of Sweden's status as a European great power and the loss of territories to neighbouring states, harbours were built in order to replace harbours in the lost territories. One of the best-known examples in this respect was the Finnish fortress and naval base of Fredrikshamn, created due to the loss of the harbour and fortress of Viborg, which had been ceded to Russia in the peace treaty of Nystad (30 August 1721). The already existing harbour of Vehkalahti was extended and rebuilt to fit military purposes. The small town of Vehkalahti was upgraded and renamed as Fredrikshamn in order to point to the fact that it now was a city and served the Swedish Empire's security interests and their supreme representative, king Frederik I. (ruled 1720–1751). At the same time however, Fredrikshamn turned into a military target, which during the Swedish – Russian War (1741–1743), was among the first victims of military operations and eventually got lost to Russia by the peace treaty of Åbo (7 August 1743).

Improvement and good treatment of port cities also was the order of the day, when it came to questions of supply and housing. Those port cities, which served as points of debarkation, could afford to answer to debarkation demands only, when Sweden did not press them too hard – which at the same time was a recipe for successful and lucrative commerce and profits, and for growing tax incomes to the Swedish crown. At the same time, harbour cities outside Sweden's centralised naval ports apparently never served as places of ship building for the Swedish navy. It was a common habit, however, that they were used to repair and to supply Swedish ships anchoring there with provisions and equipment. It cannot be proved here by documents, but the reason for this phenomenon seems to be that the Swedish government sought to avoid the spreading of knowledge about Swedish ship building beyond the borders of mainland Sweden. This danger was clearly given in harbour cities, where not only Swedish, but even merchants, agents and politically sensitive persons from all over Europe were present.

At the same time, Sweden profited from the fact that ships from many European states sailed through Baltic waters, some of which were taken by privateering activity or in the context of wars. Swedish ship building experts were especially interested in taking ships built in the Dutch ship building technique, because these ships were considered to be the most advanced ones – and it was Dutch merchants who possessed the biggest share of transport capacity, and suitable ships, in the Baltic Sea region during the 16th and 17th centuries.

17 Claes-Göran Isacson, *Vägen till stormakt: Vasaättens krig* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2006), 108.

Forms of amphibious warfare

In order to go into forms and functions of Swedish amphibious warfare, I would like to give some examples concerning the role of Baltic port cities in this regard. The following analysis could in general be based on original sources and historical accounts, especially diaries, memoirs, individual relations, protocols and regiment histories. Some of them are published, others can only be found in the Imperial and War Archives (*Riksarkivet*, *Krigsarkivet*) in Stockholm. The most indispensable Vademecum, though, was Julius Mankell's "Notes concerning the history of Swedish regiments" (*Anteckningar rörande svenska regementers historia*), published in 1866. Based on an analysis of Mankell's notes, four main forms of amphibious warfare, referring to different degrees of the army's and navy's mobility or stability respectively, can be distinguished:

1. The hit-and-run pattern
2. Amphibious operations with a temporary deployment of troops in the vicinity of cities
3. Amphibious operations ending up in the establishment of Swedish garrisons
4. Amphibious operations using coastal cities as centres for the distribution of troops

(1) The hit-and-run pattern

The hit-and-run pattern was not the usual approach of Swedish military operations, but has occasionally been used by Sweden's commanders, e.g. for the relief of Stralsund in 1628 or Narva in 1700. Troops were embarked in Stockholm, Älvsnabben, or later in Karlskrona, then were shipped to their operational area, where they executed their duties and returned to Sweden (or Finland). The operation period was meant to be as short as possible, because there was no such thing as a Swedish standing army before 1680 (at least not in the modern sense) and campaigns and sieges were among the, if not the, Empire's most expensive cost factors. This period in the history of the Swedish recruiting and financing system has been coined by historians as the period of the "older canton system" (*äldre indelningsverket*). Returning from a military operation meant for the soldiers to return to their villages and farms, before another call came for a new operation. We can observe this pattern already in the earliest days of the early modern Swedish monarchy, when during the Great Swedish–Russian War (1554-1557) an amphibious operation, which eventually ended the war, led via Finland to Nöteborg and immediately back to Sweden, after both adversaries had signed the peace treaty of Novgorod (2 April 1557).[18] Longer stays abroad were costly not only for the Crown's treasury, but also for the village communities, which had to contribute to financing a war.

18 Sundberg, *Svenska krig*, 34–41; Ingvar Sjöblom, *Svenska sjöofficerare under 1500-talet* (Forum navale skriftserie 60), Phil. Diss. (Malmö: Universus Academic Press, 2016), 221–231.

A successful hit-and-run operation was based, though, on one indispensable precondition: the near to total Swedish naval dominance on the Baltic Sea. Without *dominium maris Baltici*, troops on the continent could become isolated, because there was, as already mentioned, no naval base outside mainland Sweden. And port cities, or at least an apt landing spot, had of course to be available in all operational areas.[19] To give just one example here, I would like to stress an episode from the Swedish–Brandenburgian War (1674–1679), which partially was related to Swedish-Pomerania. At the beginning of the war, a contingent of the Swedish *Uppland Regiment* was stationed in Stettin and other towns of the province. After the Danish naval victory in Køge Bay (1–2 July 1677),[20] the Swedish garrison in Pomerania was isolated, because the Danish navy since then had dominated the Baltic Sea and interrupted Swedish amphibious activities. This example clearly shows the weak point of the Swedish amphibious concept and its dependency from Swedish dominance at sea. To send reinforcements was nearly impossible. The Swedish garrison troops in Pomerania soon had to withdraw to Stralsund. Hereupon, an amphibious war started within the province's borders. In January 1678, a Swedish commando unit embarked in Stralsund, debarked on the island of Rügen, which meanwhile was occupied by Danish troops, and prevailed over united Danish and Brandenburger troops in the battle of Warksow (9 January 1678).[21] This however proved to be a Pyrrhic victory, because Danish-Brandenburger troops reconquered Rügen in September 1678 and besieged Stralsund, which surrendered on 15 October 1678. True, Sweden retrieved, by the peace treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (19 July 1679),[22] all Pomeranian territories except the region of Stettin, but the Swedish garrison had to leave their fortresses and withdraw to Sweden.[23]

But not all port cities were subject to amphibious operations. During the Great Northern War, for example, only the harbours of Reval, Riga, and Pernau served as debarkation points for Swedish naval vessels and soldiers, whereas the harbours of Narva and Nyen obviously had not the necessary facilities and capacity to receive a major number of ships and people and thus had to be approached by debarking ashore.[24] Even the port of Stralsund was rarely chosen as a destination of debarkations, probably because of its narrow port entrance. Instead, Peenemünder Schanze or the island of Rügen served

19 Julius Mankell, *Anteckningar rörande svenska regementers historia* (Örebro: Lindt, 1866), 295–296, accessed 30.06.2023, http://runeberg.org/mjantreg/0299.html.

20 *Slaget i Køge bugt 1. juli 1677: forudsætninger, forløb og følger*, ed. Hans Christian Bjerg (København: Søe-lieutenant-selskabet, 1977); Gunnar Åselius, "Köge bukt 1677: Danmarks största sjöseger," in: *Svenska slagfält*, Lars Ericsson et.al. (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2003), 238–246.

21 Martin Meier, "Das Gefecht auf dem Warksower Felde," *Militärmuseum Brandenburg-Preußen* 3 (2007): 5.

22 Sundberg, *Svenska freder och stillestånd*, 294–295.

23 Herbert Ewe, *Geschichte der Stadt Stralsund* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1984), 184–185, 188.

24 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 333.

as debarkation spots without a harbour, wherefrom soldiers then could be transferred to Anklam, Stralsund or even to Prussian towns and cities. Thus, in 1628 two of the four Swedish *Norrland Regiments* – one under the Scottish officer Jakob Duwall and another under his compatriot Fritz Rosladin (c. 1589–1634) – were ordered to secure Stralsund against Albrecht von Wallenstein's (1583–1634) advances to Pomerania, whereas the remaining two regiments, commanded by the Scotsman Axel Duwall (1595–1630) and Lennart Torstensson (1603–1651), were send to Prussia and garrisoned there.[25]

(2) Amphibious operations with a temporary deployment of troops in the vicinity of cities

The more Sweden established its control and power over provinces along the southern Baltic Sea coastline, the more it had to do in order to see to the safeguard of these conquered areas, and, of course, of the cities located there – for debarkation reasons, but also because these cities constituted crucial fortified places, which offered the possibility to hold one's ground, even when the enemy had conquered large parts in the region. But forced control did not necessarily lead to permanent Swedish garrisons within the cities. They served, however, as centres for provisions, crafts, commerce, and, if necessary, also as a protective back-up in times of hostile invasions, as in the case of Elbing and Danzig in 1626 and 1627, when Swedish winter cantonments were built up in the vicinity of these cities, because the campaign against the king of Poland could not be finished in 1626.[26]

(3) Amphibious operations ending up in the establishment of Swedish garrisons

Sometimes, Sweden's military command laid stress on maintaining permanent garrisons in the cities, especially when after a siege and conquest the city had to be secured against hostile assaults and sieges and when a city had harbours at its disposal, which could be used by Swedish naval vessels for repair, supply, and/or as points of debarkation. This pattern seemingly contradicted the amphibious nature of Swedish warfare. But at close range, even here the amphibious character shows through. One function of maintaining permanent garrisons in the Baltic provinces was to secure bridgeheads and port cities against possible Russian and Polish invasions; another to maintain communication lines, via the Baltic port cities of Narva, Reval, Riga, or Pernau, with mainland Sweden. These garrisons only existed for a few years, sometimes even less than a year, before soldiers returned to their garrisons or private homes in mainland Sweden. One can find examples of this double role of Estonian and Livonian port cities from the Livonian War (1558–1583) over the Ingrian War (1610– 1617), Swedish–Polish War (1600–1629), Thirty

25 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 295–296.

26 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 67. Details of the campaign of 1626, in: David Krutmejer, ed., *Svea Rikes Drotset Grefve Per Brahes Tänkebok* (Stockholm: Carl Delén, 1806), 10–12, accessed 30.06.2023, http://hdl.handle.net/2077/42224.

Years' War and Swedish–Brandenburg War up to the Great Northern War.[27] From 1630 to 1638, sections of the Swedish *Helsinge Regiment*, an ingredient of Gustav II Adolf's invasion army in 1630, were garrisoned in Stettin. In 1638, one half of these troops were transferred to Demmin (Pomerania). And in 1642, a squadron of the *Helsinge Regiment* was shipped from Sweden to Wismar to be garrisoned there up to the end of the Thirty Years' War. A Swedish regiment was garrisoned in Pomerania even after the peace of Westphalia (1648), most of the time in Stettin, but occasionally also in Anklam und Greifswald. Another regiment was created in 1703 as "Pommersches Dragonerregiment," garrisoned in Demmin, Wolgast and Anklam.[28] During the Swedish-Brandenburg War, King Charles XI (ruled 1660/72–1697) shipped, in 1675, a battalion of the *Queen Dowager's Mounted Regiment* to be garrisoned in Riga. In turn, Riga's Swedish garrison, composed of soldiers from the *Västergöta-Dal Regiment*, was ordered back to Sweden in 1677.[29]

So, even garrisons in port cities had, to a certain degree, an amphibious character. More often than not, military units were exchanged after a short time and sent elsewhere: sometimes back home in order to relieve a military district in Sweden from high financial burdens, but sometimes even because the unit was needed and was more suitable in some other operational area. In 1631, the king's lifeguard (*Svea Livgarde*) was, obviously for the safeguard of the truce of Altmark, quartered in Königsberg, before it left for Mecklenburg the following spring to participate in Sweden's campaign in Germany.[30]

Apart from tactical and operational reasons, there also might have been another motive for transfers: conflicts with city inhabitants. To establish a city garrison meant, during the 17th century, to either quarter soldiers in burgher-houses or house them in camps outside the city. Military barracks did not exist in those times, and fortresses inhabited by exclusively military staff occurred only within the borders of mainland Sweden, but not in Sweden's occupied or annexed territories. As a consequence, missing pay, bad accommodations, prostitution, alcohol abuse, brawls, boredom, conflicts between regular soldiers and mercenaries, mutinies and the like led to increasing aggression and manifold tensions with civilians. There is a plentitude of evidence for these clashes from all cities where Swedish garrisons were established.[31]

27 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 219, 293.

28 Mankell, *Anteckningar,* 296; Cfr. Stanislaw Horoszko, "Die militärische Bedeutung der Provinz Pommern für Schweden im 17. Jahrhundert," in: *Unter der schwedischen Krone. Pommern nach dem Westfälischen Frieden*, ed. Ivo Asmus (Greifswald: Stiftung Pommersches Landesmuseum, 1998), 41–50.

29 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 321, 327.

30 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 5.

31 Carl von Bonsdorff, "Finska garnisoner i Östersjöprovinserna," *Historiallinen arkisto* 17 (1902): 268–276; Gunnar Artéus, "En vetenskapligt obelyst lokalsamhällestyp: den svenska garnisonsstaden 1620–1985," in: *Den nordiska garnisonsstaden*, ed. Gunnar Artéus, Kari Selén (Jyväskylä: Finska Historiska Samfundet, 1988), 23–39; Margus Laidre, *Schwedische Garnisonen in Est- und Livland 1654–1699* (Tallinn: Valgus, 1990).

But no matter how many conflicts and whatever military operational necessities, artillery was no part of amphibious warfare. Artillerists either cooperated with the Swedish garrisons or were left in the port cities, even without a Swedish infantry garrison, in order to cooperate with the local city militia. In Riga at the end of Charles XI's reign, for example, a unit of Swedish artillery was stationed in the city and had never been ordered back to Sweden. The reason for this interesting fact was probably that artillery and its ammunition were heavy military equipment that was too burdensome and even dangerous to be transferred at sea back and forth. Additionally, artillerists were a highly specialised category of soldiers, which were not advisable to be moved back and forth either, if one wanted to keep a certain continuity in expert knowledge about the handling of cannons and other equipment. This applied not only to the case of Riga, but to all Swedish provinces and even to areas of ongoing campaigns outside the borders of the Swedish realm.[32] It was for this reason, but also due to the fact that many soldiers of the "Swedish" armies were non-Swedish mercenaries, that the artillerists' command language was German, the *lingua franca* of the Baltic Sea region, whereas all other native Swedish troops in Baltic cities outside mainland Sweden were commanded in the Swedish language. Even this observation points to the amphibious character of (native) Swedish soldiers, which at least during the 17th century always started their campaigns in Sweden and moved, before long, back to their homeland, whereas troops with a non-Swedish command language like the artillerists and others stayed on-site and obviously were not part of amphibious operations.

(4) Amphibious operations using coastal cities as centres for the distribution of troops

Another important role of port cities was their function as a distribution centre for troops to other operation areas or smaller neighbouring towns (without a harbour). In 1621, for example, King Gustav II Adolf shipped parts of the *Norrland Regiment* and *Svea Lifeguard* from Sweden to Riga to siege the city. After its conquest, these troops were stationed in the city as a garrison, but they were also distributed, in 1626, to Dünamünde, Dirschau, and Braunsberg, in order to form a back-up for the conquest of port cities on the Prussian coastline during the war against Poland (1600–1629). They even stayed there after the truce of Altmark in 1629.[33] Similarly, sections of the *Svea Lifeguard* and *Uppland Regiment* remained, after the peace treaty of Oliva (1660), as garrisons in Riga, Stettin, and other Pomeranian cities in order to safeguard Poland's compliance with the articles of the agreement. Besides the city militias, they were an important ingredient

32 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 150.

33 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 3, 231, 280, 295, 354; Cfr. *Svea Rikes Drotset Grefve Per Brahes Tänkebok*, 14–17; Ralph Tuchtenhagen, "Riga wird schwedisch (1621)," *Nordeuropaforum* (2021), accessed 30.06.2023, https://portal.vifanord.de/blog/riga-wird-schwedisch-1621.

of the Swedish security system on the other side of the Baltic Sea.[34] But once a situation seemed to be under control, these troops were dismissed and sent back to Sweden.[35]

"Amphibious personalities"

Dealing with the amphibious character of Swedish warfare and the Baltic port cities' role for it, one ought to not only concentrate on structural questions like embarkment, debarkation, port facilities, garrisons, supplies, communication, or the distribution of troops. There is also a personality aspect shining through the matter-of-factly accounts of regiment histories and military statistics. It is quite obvious that soldiers conducting amphibious warfare (*miles amphibii*) had abilities, which summarising could be called the "amphibious personality." The mere fact that they did not belong either to the land or the sea forces, but were trained to fight both at sea and ashore and used to switch between both categories of warfare, made them not mere foot soldiers transported on ships to their next operational area; they usually were even skillful mariners, who could operate as marines. Some of their officers not only commanded ships on the Baltic or North Sea, but led their armies as field marshals or generals to places far away from shores and harbours. And it is intriguing that they did so without knowledgeable differences in the quality and velocity of their operations.

This phenomenon already occurred in the very beginning of Sweden's great power period. So, admiral Klas Kristersson Horn (1517–1566), one of the personalities who substantially contributed to early Swedish naval fame, had started as a simple private. Later, he was decorated several times for his successful military operations during the Nordic Seven Years' War (1563–1570), where he commanded military units against Denmark, sometimes as head of the entire Swedish Baltic navy or individual navy squadrons, sometimes as an officer ashore in various operational areas. At times, he also combined sea-land-operations, which obviously was of the essence in order to get ahead of the so far dominating powers of the Baltic Sea, Denmark and Lübeck. From the middle of the 1560s, Sweden thus was on its way to take over *dominium maris Baltici* and keep it up to the end of the 17th century.

Even more interesting is the case of Erik Ryning (1592–1654), admiral and councillor of the realm (*riksråd*), governor of several naval bases and port cities in the Baltic

34 About the military organisation in Swedish Pomerania, Cfr. Werner Buchholz, *Pommern* (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), 237–304, especially 254; Cfr. Johann Friedrich Zöllner, *Reise durch Pommern nach der Insel Rügen und einem Theile des Herzogthums Mecklenburg im Jahre 1795 in Briefen* (Berlin: Hans J. Herbst, 1797), 168.

35 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 14.

(like Stralsund, Riga, Älvsborg, Visby), and head of the Swedish navy.[36] In 1628, he served as a governor of the city of Elbing, commanding a unit of Sweden's *Södermanlands regemente*. One year later, Ryning became a diplomat, namely as Swedish negotiator towards the truce of Altmark (1629) between Poland and Sweden, before he was promoted admiral of the Swedish navy, operating in the waters outside Thorn, Elbing, and Königsberg.[37] In 1630, he commanded the Swedish invasion army which landed on the island of Usedom. He subsequently became chief of the Swedish navy's contingent in charge of the safeguarding of supply lines from Sweden to Pomerania and for the defence of the city of Stralsund. In 1632, he commanded a navy squadron and afterwards ground forces marching from Stralsund to Wismar, successfully conquered the city of Wismar and destroyed Wallenstein's respective Habsburg's Baltic navy, which operated in the region.[38] In short, he was a commander who successfully acted afloat and ashore, sometimes consecutively, sometimes synchronically, sometimes merely as a coordinator, sometimes in person as a navy or field officer.

Even entire regiments or units of regiments were trained and used for amphibious operations and able to operate both as marines and soldiers on the ground. Sections of the Swedish *Helsinge regemente*, for example, a regiment, which originally had been established as a military unit of ground forces and held in a stand-by position in Sweden at the beginning of the Swedish-Danish War 1643–1645 ("Torstensson War"), was later used for navy operations in Baltic waters.[39] In 1674, three companies of *Västerbottens regemente* were stationed as a garrison in the Ingrian fortress of Nyenskans. Two years later, the same soldiers transmuted to marines serving on warships of the Swedish navy – which, admittedly, did not end well in this case, because they suffered heavy defeats in the same year. Nevertheless, the pure fact that they operated in both war arenas alike, is in itself remarkable.[40]

The Swedish army obviously was, from the last third of the sixteenth century, effectively and deliberately cultivating amphibious capabilities. And this turned out to be a unique phenomenon in Europe. Every Swedish soldier should, under ideal circumstances, possess "amphibious" competences – which certainly did not really always happen everywhere, but in principle, all Swedish armed forces could be ordered to fight both afloat and ashore and thus respond to Sweden's particular geographical preconditions to wage war at all against its neighbours on the other side of the Baltic Sea.

36 Björn Asker, "Erik Ryning," *Svenskt biografiskt lexikon*, vol. 31 (Stockholm: Bonniers, 2000–2002), 141, accessed 28.06.2023, https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/artikel/6291.

37 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 67.

38 On the conquest of Wismar and the related naval operation see: Philip Tober, *Wismar im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1627–1648. Untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts-, Bau- und Sozialgeschichte* (Berlin: LIT, 2007), 31.

39 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 296.

40 Mankell, *Anteckningar*, 344.

Changes in the system of amphibious warfare after 1721

The aforementioned observations apply first and foremost to Sweden's political and military development during its great power period. The loss of eastern Finnish territories, the Baltic provinces (Ingria, Estonia, Livonia) and the duchies of Bremen and Verden after Sweden's defeats during the Great Northern War involved several changes in Sweden's approach to amphibious warfare. One would expect that, besides the already mentioned founding of new port cities and bases for the Swedish navy due to the loss of Viborg, the reduction of possible points of debarkation led to a concentration of amphibious activities in Swedish Pomerania and Wismar, which were the only remaining Swedish ruled territories outside mainland Sweden-Finland during the 18th century. However, the 1680 reforms of the Swedish recruitment system (*nyare indelningsverket*), which provided Swedish soldiers with a strip of land and a tiny farmhouse in times of peace, resulted not only in the emergence of a new class of petty land owners, but probably also affected the system of amphibious warfare. The newly shaped farmer-soldiers (*indelta soldater*) were primarily trained to fight ashore. Maybe for this reason or another, Swedish amphibious warfare in the 18th century tended to favour permanent garrisons overseas and to restrict naval activities to the transportation of ground forces from mainland Sweden to Swedish Pomerania and Wismar.[41]

To give just two examples here: In 1720, a Swedish infantry regiment, the *Queen's [Ulrika Eleonora's]*[42] *Battalion of Foot Guards*, was created by an amalgamation of two regiments from the provinces of Uppland and Västergötland. It was relocated to Sweden during the 1750s, but nevertheless participated in all major Swedish military operations during the 18th century, such as the Seven Years' War ("Pomeranian War," 1757–1762), Gustav III's war against Russia (1788–1790) and the Napoleonic Wars (1807–1810, 1812/13, 1814), before it was dissolved in 1815 and partially integrated into Prussian-Pomeranian military units. All war theatres mentioned were situated outside mainland Sweden and required overseas transportation, but there is not one single case known in which the *Queen's Battalion* was used for naval operations.[43] The "Garrison Regiment of Stralsund" (*Garnisonsregementet i Stralsund*), founded in 1721, operated, under various denominations and up to 1798, on both sides of the Baltic Sea. It was stationed in Stralsund from 1729 to 1746 and 1758 to 1766 respectively. In the remaining time, it served various purposes in Southern Sweden, primarily in Landskrona. During their

41 About *Nyare indelningsverket* see: Sven Ågren, *Karl XI: s indelningsverk för armén: bidrag till dess historia åren 1679–1697*, Phil. Diss. (Uppsala: Wretmans Boktryckeri, 1922); Janne Backlund, *Rusthållarna i Fellingsbro 1684–1748* (Uppsala: Uppsalas universitet, 1993).

42 The fallen king Charles XII's (ruled 1697–1718) sister, who ruled Sweden from 1718 to 1720.

43 Helmut Backhaus, "Quellen zur Personengeschichte Schwedisch-Pommerns in Stockholmer Archiven," *Vorträge zur mecklenburgischen Familienforschung* 5 (1995): 61–67, accessed 30.06.2023, http://www.studienstelleog.de/bestaende/stockh-backhaus.html.

Stralsund deployment, the soldiers' uniforms reflected the colours of Stralsund's city arms from the Hansa period (red and white). The regiment's company flag, however, showed the Swedish imperial colours (gold and blue). This conjuncture of German and Swedish symbols points to the fact that the Stralsund regiment obviously had a binational mission and ought to have served both Swedish and Swedish Pomeranian interests. Like the *Queen's Battalion*, it required permanent sea transportation and, in this sense, could be characterised as an amphibious unit. Nevertheless, even here no participation in genuine naval warfare has ever been bequeathed.[44]

Conclusion

To conclude, Swedish armies of the great power period and the 18th century were not only amphibious in character, but also constantly on the move. They were trained to operate at sea and ashore in equal measure and quite often relocated. A high mobility was a quasi-part of their trademark. As a consequence, one does find only a few examples of permanent Swedish garrisons in Baltic Sea port cities during the 16th and 17th centuries. There existed a few garrisons in Sweden's German provinces during the 18th century, but they were obviously not amphibiously trained the way they had been during the two previous centuries. The latter observation seems to be related to the revised Swedish recruiting system of 1680 (*nyare indelningsverket*), which rather prefigured a modern style standing army and allowed the maintenance of military units in operational areas, even outside mainland Sweden as garrison troops.[45] The rarity of permanent garrisons is also related to the fact that Sweden, during the Great Northern War, had lost most of its provinces in the Baltic Sea region and was able to concentrate its military activities in Wismar and Swedish Pomerania, especially in the cities of Stralsund, Greifswald, Anklam, Demmin, and Barth.[46] This also meant that these cities, where during the 17th century garrisons had existed only for a couple of months or years in the aftermath of Swedish campaigns in the southern and eastern Baltic regions,

44 Riksarkivet / Krigsarkivet Stockholm: KrA/1691: Garnisonsregementet i Stralsund (1721–1798), accessed 21.09.2021, https://riksarkivet.se/taby.

45 Cfr. Backhaus, "Quellen zur Personengeschichte,": "Vor 1680 wechselten die in Pommern stationierten Garnisonsverbände relativ häufig, nach 1680 bildete sich ein festes Kader von 2 bis 3 geworbenen Garnisonsregimentern heraus. Nach 1720 bestanden die pommerschen Garnisonen meistens aus zwei, zwischen 1749 und 1766 aus drei bis vier geworbenen Regimentern. Es handelt sich um das Leibregiment der Königin (1720–1815) und die Stralsunder Garnisonsregimenter Dohna/Sprengtporten (in Pommern 1729–1766), Spens/Engelbrechten (1749–1815) und Posse/Cronhielm (in Pommern 1752–1764)."

46 For garrisons in Pomerania during the 18th century see: Georg Tessin, "Wismars schwedische Regimenter im Nordischen Krieg," *Mecklenburgische Jahrbücher* 101 (1937): 101–156; Robert Oldach, *Stadt und Festung Stralsund. Die schwedische Militärpräsenz in Schwedisch-Pommern 1721–1807* (Köln et.al.: Böhlau, 2018); Robert Oldach, "Das Einquartierungswesen in der schwedischen Festung Stralsund 1721–1807," *Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit* 16 (2012), 2: 218–256.

changed their function from mere relays for the distribution and protection of troops to genuine garrison cities.

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English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The paper addresses one of the typical operational tactics during Sweden's period as a great power, in later historiography called "amphibious warfare." In the thematic context of a history of Baltic port cities, it is connected to the question of which role port cities could play for amphibious operations in times of war and peace respectively. The following account therefore deals with specific aspects of amphibious operations such as embarkments and debarkations in port cities, logistical problems and garrisons within and outside port cities, questions of supply, transfer, relocations and the housing of soldiers, conflicts between burghers and soldiers, and "amphibious personalities" (*milites amphibii*) in general. As a general thesis, one can state, that an underlying precondition for all amphibious operations was Sweden's domination of the Baltic Sea routes by a powerful navy. As a consequence, amphibious operations faced severe difficulties or were completely impossible, when this domination was lost to enemy navies.

Milites amphibii: Wojskowa rola bałtyckich miast portowych dla Szwecji jako mocarstwa, 1561–1815

Słowa kluczowe: Historia wojskowości, Szwecja XVII i XVIII wiek, operacje morskie, transfery wojsk, militarna rola bałtyckich miast portowych, szwedzka dominacja morska, wojna amfibijna

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł porusza jeden z typowych taktycznych sposobów działania w okresie, gdy Szwecja była mocarstwem, nazywany później w historiografii "wojną amfibijną." W kontekście tematycznym historii bałtyckich miast portowych odnosi się to do pytania, jaką rolę mogły pełnić miasta portowe w operacjach amfibijnych w czasach wojny i pokoju. Niniejszy tekst zajmuje się zatem specyficznymi aspektami operacji amfibijnych, takimi jak załadunki i wyładunki w miastach portowych, problemy logistyczne oraz garnizony w miastach portowych i poza nimi, kwestie zaopatrzenia, transferów, relokacji i zakwaterowania żołnierzy, konflikty między mieszczanami a żołnierzami oraz ogólnie pojęte "osobowości amfibijne" (*milites amphibii*). Ogólną tezą jest stwierdzenie, że podstawowym warunkiem wszystkich operacji amfibijnych była dominacja Szwecji nad bałtyckimi szlakami morskimi, zapewniana przez potężną flotę. W konsekwencji, operacje amfibijne napotykały poważne trudności lub były całkowicie niemożliwe, gdy ta dominacja została utracona na rzecz flot nieprzyjaciela.

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WYDAWNICTWO US NAUKOWE
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A Black Sea *Belle Epoque* Tale. Queen Elisabeta at Evksinograd: The Last Journey to Bulgaria of a Sovereign of Romania (13–16 May 1911)

Keywords: Queen Elisabeta of Romania, Eleanore of Bulgaria, Evksinograd, Romania, Bulgaria, May 1911

A legend quite familiar to the Bulgarian public was broadcast again on the airwaves of the national radio station in Sofia[1] in the middle of a hot summer day of the year 2009. According to it, on the shores of the Black Sea, right on the high and rocky coast near Varna, in 1821 a famous ship's captain, the Greek Dimitrios, built a monastery dedicated to Saint Demetrius. This was a tribute paid after a terrible storm, in which the ship managed to safely reach the shore. The monastery and the surrounding land, the legend retold on the radio continued, remained in the possession of the important Greek community in Varna until Alexander of Battenberg, the first prince of Bulgaria (1879–1886), ascended to the throne. The prince, who was spending the hot summer of the year 1880 at the solitary monastery by the sea, was handed these properties a year later and the small settlement was named Sandrovo (after Battenberg's name).

After Battenberg was forced to abdicate, the vast monastic settlement came into the possession of the new Prince (then Tsar) of Bulgaria, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (1887–1918). His first wife, Marie Louise of Bourbon-Parma,[2] fell in love with

1 Elena Karkalanova, "Euxinograd, the favorite summer residence of Bulgarian statesmen," *Bulgarian National Radio*, 10.08.2009, accessed 30.11.2023, www.https://bnr.bg/en/post/100096260/euxinograd-the-favorite-summer-residence-of-bulgarian-statesmen.

2 Marie Louise of Bourbon-Parma (1870–1899), the daughter of Robert, the last Duke of Parma (1854–1859), was the first wife of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha and the mother of the couple's four children: Princes Boris (the future Tsar), Kiril (b.1895), Evdoksia (b.1898) and Nadezhda (b.1899). The marriage took place in 1893, at the insistence of Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary. The princess was the total opposite of Ferdinand's nature, contemporaries noting the fact that she was quiet, shy, very intelligent, a fervent Catholic and completely devoid of ostentation, including in terms of clothing. Duncan M. Perry, *Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria,*

this wild place and renamed it Evksinograd, combining the ancient Greek notion of the Black Sea (*Pontus Euxinus*) with the Bulgarian designation of the term "town/city" (*grad*). Around the old monastery, Ferdinand built a palace in the *Renaissance* style of the 18th century, surrounded by a splendid park stretching over almost 100 hectares. From the last years of the 19th century, Evksinograd became one of the most beloved Bulgarian royal residences, a kind of Peleș in Sinaia (Romanian mountain royal residence) of the neighbouring country.

Queen Elisabeta of Romania spent between 13 and 16 May 1911 the last visit to the territory of Bulgaria which a sovereign of Romania would undertake. She was invited by *Tsaritsa* (Queen) Eleonore at a strictly private meeting and her presence was sanctioned by Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who demonstratively left the country. The Tsar[3] accused his consort, in an angry telegram sent to his son Boris, of "taking advantage" of his absence in order to "invent this business,"[4] i.e., the presence in Evksinograd of an unwanted guest.

In 1908, Bulgaria proclaimed itself a sovereign empire, intent to incorporating major parts of Macedonia and Thrace since the decisive victory over the Ottoman Empire.[5] Just after this, the Romanian–Bulgarian relations had begun the long process of deterioration, which would last three decades, and which had several moments of decisive degradation, including the intervention of the Romanian army in Bulgaria, in the Second Balkan War (1913) and the occupation of Dobrudja and some areas of Wallachia by the Bulgarian troops in the First World War (1916–1918).

Only King Carol I, and just once, at the end of October 1902, had been on the territory of the neighbouring country as the sovereign of Romania, on an official visit. Then, accompanied by Prime Minister Dimitrie A. Sturdza and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ion I.C. Brătianu, he spent three days in Ruse, Poradim, Pleven, Grivitsa and in several other places where 25 years ago the Russian–Romanian–Ottoman war of 1877–1878

1870–1895 (Durham-London: Duke University Press, 1993), 192; Dobrinka Parusheva, "Maria Luisa in Bulgaria. The Image of the Princess in Contemporary Memoirs," *Etudes balkaniques* 2–3 (2012): 97–111. Her Bulgarian teacher, Dobri Ganchev, who taught history at the Sofia Military School, found her to be "modest, natural, sweet and beautiful." Ibidem, 104–105.

3 Twenty years after he had abdicated (1918), being in exile in Coburg (Germany), Ferdinand wanted to specify in an interview given to the French press in 1938 (and also picked up by Romanian publications) that he saw himself as belonging "rather to the 18th century, and if, by chance, my character resembles someone else's, Louis XV, Voltaire, or Frederick the Great will have to be researched." "Cu 25 de ani în urmă, Ferdinand al Bulgariei era cât p'aci să devină împăratul Bizanțului," *Realitatea ilustrată* (10/08/1938): 4–5.

4 Stephane Groueff, *Crown of Thorns. The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria, 1918–1943* (Lanham–New York–Toronto–Plymouth, UK: Madison Books, 1998), 19.

5 Elżbieta Znamierowska-Rakk, "Romanian claims against Bulgaria during the period of the Balkan Wars," *Balcania Posnaniensia, Acta et studia* 19 (2012): 287–295.

had taken place.[6] Natively Germans, Romanian sovereigns Carol and Elisabeta very often went to the West and not to the Balkans or to Russia after the Independence War of Romania, in 1877–1878. At the Congress of Berlin (1878) Russia went back on its promise and demanded Southern Bessarabia as a further price for recognising Romania independence, offering the Danube Delta and Dobrogea as compensation. Romania's fear about Russia's intervention outstripped Bucharest's anger at the Dual Monarchy over Magyarisation. Romania signed the treaty that associated it with the Triple Alliance (October 1883) and that treaty formed the cornerstone of Romanian foreign policy for the next thirty years.[7]

Queen Elisabeta did not have access to political or diplomatic decision-making during her reign. At the end of the 19th century and until the outbreak of the First World War, sovereigns had rather aesthetic and matrimonial roles, and very rarely were their talents highlighted. "The job of a sovereign – wrote Queen Elisabeta – requires only three qualities: beauty, kindness and fecundity."[8] The wife of King Carol,[9] a German woman, cultured, childless, a smoker, broke all the traditional patterns of the society in which she lived and became one of the most prolific scholars/authors of the country that she ruled, a patron of the arts and music, founder of institutions and charity services. Debuting in literature in the year 1880, under the pseudonym *Carmen Sylva*, Elisabeta was the most prolific queen in Europe in the literary field, with more than 1,000 poems published, 90 novellas, 30 dramatic works and 4 novels.[10]

Although far from politics, Queen Elisabeta can be assumed to have performed in this area whenever her husband, the King, asked her to. One major influence of the sovereign can be attributed with certainty, towards the end of her life and reign, when, in 1914, she persuaded King Carol I (and, implicitly, the European powers) to accept one of her

6 Daniel Cain, *Diplomați și diplomație în Sud Estul european: relațiile româno-bulgare la 1900* (București: Editura Academiei Române, 2012), 194–95. About the visit, in the accounts of the time, see: "România și Bulgaria," *Universul*, 31.10.1902, 1; *Universul*, 1.11.1902, 3.

7 Joseph D. Prestia, "«Civilized States» and Situational Sovereignty: The Dilemmas of Romanian Neutrality, 1914–1916," *European History Quarterly* 51 (2021), 1: 57. Keith Hitchins, *România 1866–1947* (București: Editura Humanitas, 1996), 155.

8 Silvia Irina Zimmermann, *Carmen Sylva-Regina poetă. Literatura în serviciul Coroanei* (București: Editura ALL, 2013), 14.

9 Gabriel Badea-Păun, *Carmen Sylva. Uimitoarea regină Elisabeta a României* (București: Editura Humanitas, 2003); Romanița Constantinescu, and Silvia Irina Zimmermann, eds.,*"Cu iubire tandră, Elisabeta." "Mereu al tău credincios, Carol." Corespondența perechii regale,* vol. I: 1869–1888 (București: Editura Humanitas, 2020).

10 Elisabeth Bouleanu, "Un secol de la moartea primei regine a României. Elisabeta a fost mama răniților și poeta Carmen Sylva," *Adevărul*, 18.02.2016, accessed 6.12.2023, https://adevarul.ro/stiri-locale/alexandria/un-secol-de-la-moartea-primei-regine-a-romaniei-1688581.html.

nephews, Wilhelm de Wied, on the throne of the new Kingdom of Albania, a short and tumultuous reign, of only half a year, between March and September of the year 1914.[11]

The visit to Evksinograd, of May 1911, can be considered rather devoid of political and diplomatic value with regard to a high-level agenda that would bring into discussion aspects of the Romanian – Bulgarian relations. The presence of Queen Elisabeta in Evksinograd is the last journey of a Romanian sovereign to the territory of Bulgaria and, in general, of a Romanian head of state to the South of the Danube for the next half century, when Prime Minister Petru Groza was invited, in 1947, by the communist leader of the new People's Republic, Georgi Dimitrov.[12]

Research on Queen Elisabeta's high-level state prerogatives in terms of foreign policy, and the analyses of the diplomatic and political relations in South-Eastern Europe and, in particular between Romania and Bulgaria, have paid minimal and fleeting attention to this episode. It is rarely mentioned, and there is no generous account of this stay at Evksinograd. This text particularly accessed Romanian public sources, especially journals, to present a general atmosphere from the public opinion and a free media on the Royal Families' relations (Romanian and Bulgarian) and on the general links between the two neighbours. We did not access diplomatic archive sources or foreign reports of the time because the private visit of Queen Elisabeta was a particular journey and a possible mediation attempt with the nervous Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria.[13]

11 Florin Anghel, "Influenţe româneşti în Albania prinţului Wilhelm de Wied, 7 martie – 3 septembrie 1914," *Revista Istorică* 5–6 (1994): 487–494. Queen Elisabeta of Romania published, in 1914, an article in Albanian language entitled "Cili eshte ay?" ("Who is he?"), concerning the origins and personality of Wilhelm de Wied (1876–1945), with the aim of familiarising the Albanians with their king. "The young man – the august aunt wrote about her nephew – has been a lover of books from an early age. It is hard to see him without a book in his hand, and a finger lodged between its pages. Also at that time, he enjoyed full physical strength: while studying at the Jena High School, he was a practicing gymnast, and his colleagues tell stories about many funny incidents, when he, as a young officer, lifted a comrade from the ground with a single hand, to then put him down in the same way; his deeds were wise and valiant." Marius Dobrescu, "Regina Elisabeta a României îşi recomandă nepotul opiniei publice albaneze," in: *Momente din istoria Albaniei. Culegere de studii şi articole*, ed. Idem (Bucureşti: Editura Privirea, 2011), 147–49.

12 Florin Anghel, "Proletkult Diplomacy. What About Romania in the Last Minutes of Tsardom and the First of People's Republic of Bulgaria (1945–1947) Foreign Affairs," *Acta Marisiensis. Seria Historica* (2021): 69–83.

13 At least one credible official testimony claims that the Bulgarian Tsar was showing his negative reactions openly whenever he travelled through Romania and met with its sovereigns. Hristofor Hesapciev heard, during a journey by train, from Sinaia to the border with Austria–Hungary, in Predeal, on 4 June 1907, that "King Carol is a very interesting man. In him, the enterprising spirit of a merchant from Marseille is intertwined with the harshness of a Prussian lieutenant, with the atavism of the Hohenzollern dynasty." "I always travel through Romania emotionally drained when I see at every step what great progress has been made in all respects – Ferdinand also said to the same interlocutor in the same conversation. When it will be too late, after my death, the Bulgarians will understand how valuable I was to them, but they did not know how to use me. King Carol did not spend anything on Romania, and all the time he has worked for his own enrichment, and today he is the richest man in his state. I spent 16 million for the upliftment of Bulgaria and, instead of gratitude, they constantly attack and curse

Romania and Bulgaria, a relationship not exactly taken from the stories about friends

Some perceptions regarding the other from the proclamation of Bulgarian Independence (1908) to the Evksinograd sea journey (1911). When did the reservations regarding the qualities of his neighbour's friendship begin to appear?

Blagovest Njagulov explained that it can assume that these differentiation tendencies became apparent after the establishment of the Bulgarian autonomy in 1878, a year which also marked the start of the Dobrudja issue and the national rivalries in the bilateral relations. This trend was already dominant before the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and World War I.[14] In addition to this dissatisfaction came, of course, the entry of Southern Dobrudja within the Romanian borders, in 1913,[15] following the "punitive treaty from Bucharest," as defined by Prime Minister Aleksandar Tsankov,[16] a fact which literally froze bilateral relations until 1940. Daniel Cain noted that bilateral relations began to change around 1900, when a generational change occurred in Bulgarian politics: the newcomers were no longer sentimentally connected to Romania.[17]

The pressure of Southern Dobrudja on the good neighbourly traditions, frequently amicable until the end of the 19th century,[18] was major up to the point where it triggered a broad political, diplomatic, and intellectual insurgency in Bucharest and, especially, in Sofia. Alberto Basciani insisted on calling this bone of contention a "Balkan conflict."[19] "The strongest hatred in Romania towards Bulgaria," explained Gheorghi Kalinkov,

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me and throw mud and shit at me." Hristofor Hesapciev, *Amintirile unui diplomat bulgar în România (1905–1910),* translation and notes by Daniel Cain (București: Editura Fundației Pro, 2003), 175.

14 Blagovest Njagulov, "Les images de «l'autre» chez les Bulgares et les Roumains (1878–1944)," *Études balkaniques* 2 (1995): 3; Lidya Mihova, "L'image de la Roumanie et des Roumains dans la littérature bulgare (fin du XIXe siècle)," *Recherches. Culture et histoire dans l'espace roman* 3 (2009): 87–96.

15 Constantin Iordachi, "Diplomacy and the Making of a Geopolitical Question: The Romanian–Bulgarian Conflict Over Dobrudja, 1878–1947," in: *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*, vol. IV, *Concepts, Approaches, and (Self-) Representations*, eds. Roumen Dontchev Daskalov, Diana Mishkova, Tchavdar Marinov, and Alexander Vezenkov (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 291–393; Florin Anghel, "Borderland's Country: South Dobruja. Imperial Nostalgias on the Edge of the National Ideal," in: *The Empire. Between Dispute and Nostalgia*, eds. Emanuel Plopeanu, Gabriel Stelian Manea, and Metin Omer (Berlin: Peter Lang Internationaler Verlag Wissenschaften, 2021), 173–191.

16 Constantin Iordan, *Dobrogea (1878–1940) în istoriografia bulgară postcomunistă* (București: Editura Academiei Române, 2013), 181.

17 Vladimir Mitev, "Dintre toate popoarele din regiune, românii și bulgarii sunt cei mai apropiați," *Podul Prieteniei*, 02.06.2020, accessed 29.12.2023, https://www.friendshipbridge.eu/ro/2020/06/02/cain-interview-ro/.

18 Constantin Velichi, *România și Renașterea bulgară* (București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1980); Aleka Strezova, "Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Bulgaria and Romania and First Bulgarian Diplomatic Agents in Bucharest (1879–1886)," *Bulgarian Historical Review/Revue Bulgare d'Histoire* 1–2 (2016): 3–22.

19 Alberto Basciani, *Un conflitto balcanico. La contesa fra Bulgaria e Romania in Dobrogia del Sud, 1918–1940* (Cosenza: Periferia, 2001).

a minister in Bucharest from the end of the year 1910 until 1913, "appeared when our Russophilia was the strongest, and the weakest, when Russophobia was strong."[20]

King Carol I, despite many devastating assessments of the Romanians' political and social habits, was above criticism. Minister Hristofor Hesapciev remembered the Romanian King as a "crystallized character, without whims and bouts of nervousness,"[21] "and by the way in which he led his existence modestly, sparingly, without special brilliance, without any excesses or exaggerations, the king gave an instructive example to the wasteful landlords," Hesapciev continued to write in his memoirs about his stay in Romania.[22] Following Romania's military and diplomatic victory over Bulgaria, in 1913, the newly appointed minister Simeon Radev[23] noticed that "in terms of intellectual qualities, Carol I was not an extraordinary man. Nevertheless, he had a sense of duty, a sense of measure, diligence in terms of fulfilling his duties as a sovereign, a sound judgment, a quiet firmness."[24]

The trip which lasted several days, albeit a private one of Queen Elisabeta of Romania to Evksinograd, at the invitation of Queen Eleonore, was the last window of opportunity in terms of unblocking the relations and calming suspicions and hostile intentions. In fact, in 1911, the sovereign from Bucharest brought to Bulgaria the last peaceful initiative from Romania for more than two decades to come.

Queen Elisabeta had designed and built, according to her own instructions, a pavilion on the main pier of Constanța port,[25] near "Carol I" Lighthouse.[26] The residence dates from 1910 and was completed in two weeks according to the plans of engineer Anghel Saligny. A few days before leaving for Evksinograd, the Queen officially inaugurated the residence, on 2 May 1911, in the presence of King Carol I, conservative Prime Minister Petre P. Carp, ministers Alexandru Marghiloman and Barbu Ștefănescu-Delavrancea,

20 Daniel Cain, "Un diplomat bulgar la București: Gheorghi Kalinkov (1911–1913)," *Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană* 27 (2014): 78.

21 Daniel Cain, "România lui Carol I în memorialistica diplomatică bulgară," in: *Diplomație și destine diplomatice în lumea românească*, eds. Paul Nistor, Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu (Târgoviște: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2011), 94.

22 Hesapciev, *Amintirile unui*, 22.

23 Simeon Radev (1879–1967) was a member of the Bulgarian delegation to the peace negotiations of 1913, then a minister in Bucharest between 1913 and 1916. Daniel Cain, "Început de carieră diplomatică: misiunea lui Simeon Radev la București (1913–1916)," in: *Diplomați, societate și mondenități. Sfârșit de "Belle Epoque" în lumea românească*, eds. Claudiu Lucian Topor, Alexandru Istrate, and Daniel Cain (Iași: Editura Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," 2015), 201–208.

24 Daniel Cain, "România lui Carol I," 94.

25 Doina Păuleanu, *Regalitatea și marea. Dobrogea, 1878–1914* (București: Editura Monitorul Oficial, 2015).

26 Florin Anghel, Cristian Andrei Leonte, "Fantoma Farului Carol I. Regele, feldmareșalul Mackensen și salvarea statuii lui Ovidiu din Constanța Veche," *Info Sud-Est*, Constanța, 22.07.2015, accessed 28.12.2023, https://www.info-sud-est.ro/fantoma-farului-carol-i-regele-feldmaresalul-mackensen-si-salvarea-statuii-lui-ovidiu-din-constanta-veche.

engineer Anghel Saligny and 45 other guests.[27] The Royal Family had previously also built in Constanța a small Royal Palace,[28] which was meant to host it during the summer months spent here.

King Carol remained in Constanța, and did not agree to reinforce relationship also with Tsar Ferdinand and with Bulgaria. After the end of Stefan Stambulov's regime, in 1894, political and military Russophile factions in Bulgaria were resurrected, the aim of Russia being to make a wall against the German or Austria-Hungarian penetration into the Balkans.[29] Romania was afraid of this Russian opportunity and, together with German direction sustained by the King and a strong Francophile one of the politics and society, rejected such a project.

On 13 May 1911, the ship "România" left, at 11 o'clock, from the main quay of the port of Constanța, with Queen Elisabeta of Romania on board. "Romania" was a very new passenger ship, which had been built in the shipyards of Saint-Nazaire. The ship arrived in Constanța on 1 April 1905, entering the custody of the Romanian Maritime Service on the lines to Constantinople-Smyrna (Izmir) and Piraeus.[30] Also present were her two oldest Queen's ladies-in-waiting, Zoe Bengescu[31] and Maria Poenaru,[32] commander Nicolae Gracoski, the commander of the Military Household of the Royal Court, the private secretary of the sovereign, Italian Edgar Dall'Orso, the director of the Romanian Maritime Service (SMR), Pavel Popovăț,[33] several officers, including the police chief of the city of Constanța.[34]

It was raining heavily when the passengers boarded and showers accompanied them throughout the journey, for six hours, until, at 5 p.m., the ship docked in front of the Evksinograd palace. When entering the port of Varna, located less than eight kilometres

27 Delia Roxana Cornea, *Reședințele regale de la Marea Neagră. Casele de vis ale Reginelor României* (Târgoviște: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2021), 67–68.

28 Ibidem, 59.

29 Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements 1806–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 221.

30 Carmen Atanasiu, "Contribuții la o posibilă istorie a marinei comerciale române," *Revista Istorică* 1(1990), 11–12: 1021.

31 Zoe Bengescu, born Rosetti, was the Queen's lady-in-waiting in 1873 and she remained so until her death, in November 1913. Codruța Șoroagă, "Structura și organizarea Curții Regale în perioada domniei lui Carol I: Casa Reginei Elisabeta," *Philohistoriss*, Cluj-Napoca, 7 (January 2021), 10: 65–83.

32 Maria Poenaru (née Văleanu, married to General Constantin Poenaru) was the Queen's lady-in-waiting from 1900 until the sovereign's death, in 1916.

33 Marian Moșneagu, "Cu patima științei. Comandorul Pavel Popovăț," *Ziua de Constanța*, 29.04.2022, accessed 2.12.2023, https://ziuaconstanta.ro/in-constanta/lumea-marinarilor/lumea-marinarilor-cu-patima-stiintei-comandorul-pavel-popovat-galerie-foto-781613.html.

34 "Vizita M.S. Reginei la Euxinograd," *Universul*, 15.05.1911, 1; "Regina Romîniei în Bulgaria," *Dimineața*, 15.05.1911, 1; "Sosirea Reginei Elisabeta la Varna," *Adevărul*, 15/05/1911, 2; "Vizita M.S. Reginei la Euxinograd," *Conservatorul Constanței*, 15.05.1911, 1; "Plecarea M.S. Reginei la Euxinograd," *Minerva*, 15.05.1911, 4; "Plecarea M.S. Reginei la Euxinograd," *Seara*, 15.05.1911, 2; "Plecarea M.S. Reginei României la Euxinograd," *Românul*, Arad, 17/30/05/1911, 1.

from the royal residence, "România" was greeted with cannon salvoes fired from the small Bulgarian cruiser "Nadejda." During the same torrential rain from which she had parted on the Constanța quay, Queen Elisabeta was greeted at the official wharf by a crowd of people, most of them curious, to the sounds of the Royal Anthem sung by the brass band of the Bulgarian Navy.[35]

The Romanian newspapers commented on the lack of official ceremony associated with welcoming a sovereign, the explanation being the absence of Tsar Ferdinand[36] from this visit. The main Bucharest daily newspapers thought they knew that the sovereign had arrived in Vienna on the morning of 14 May 1911, after having travelled for three days "in the strictest incognito." In the Austro-Hungarian capital, the Bucharest newspapers also wrote, there were many rumours according to which "the king of Bulgaria had left the country unexpectedly when the Queen of Romania announced her arrival at the palace in Euxinograd."[37]

The journalists were right.

Ferdinand was extremely angry with his wife, Eleonore, for inviting Queen Elisabeta to Bulgaria. A telegram sent from the road to his son Boris most assuredly expresses his deep contempt for his consort and her guest. "Two half-mad royal women,"[38] Tsar Ferdinand described Tsaritsa Eleonora and Queen Elisabeta to Boris. Both were guilty, in the rich imagination of the sovereign, of "plotting" a "business" against him.[39] Most certainly, the impetuous Ferdinand could have suspected that Eleonore and Elisabeta were going to discuss at least one topic that directly concerned the future of the Bulgarian Crown: a marriage of the young Crown Prince Boris, now 18 years old, who needed to be found a royal wife.

The rudeness with which the Tsar had treated Queen Elisabeta's visit was also adopted by certain central and local authorities. No member of the government came to greet the sovereign of Romania and the mayor of the city of Varna, Ivan Tserov,[40] refused to participate in any official ceremony throughout Queen Elisabeta's stay.[41]

On the wharf where "Romania" was docked, Queen Elisabeta was greeted by Tsaritsa Eleonore in the late afternoon of 13 May 1911, and a welcome speech was given by the prefect of the Varna region (*oblast*), Jeku Jekov. Then, together with their small entourages,

35 "Escursiunea M.S. Reginei la Varna," *Universul*, 19.05.1911, 1.

36 *Universul*, 19.05.1911, 1.

37 *Adevărul*, 16.05.1911, 3.

38 Groueff, *Crown of Thorns,* 19.

39 Groueff, *Crown of Thorns*.

40 Ivan Tserov (1857–1938) was mayor of Varna between 1909 and 1912. He was a teacher and a publicist, and he had important projects aimed to modernise the city's infrastructure. A bronze statue, alongside a memorial plaque, the work of the Bulgarian sculptor Plamen Bratanov, were inaugurated on 15 April 2019 in the central pedestrian area of the city.

41 "Regina Elisabeta la Euxinograd. De la corespondentul nostru particular," *Adevărul*, 19.05.1911, 2.

the two sovereigns headed, in automobiles, to the royal residence in Evksinograd, where they arrived in time for a small dinner.[42]

The Queens of Bulgaria and Romania lacked power in terms of political and administrative decision-making. Nevertheless, through their interests regarding institutionalised charity activities, the two queens shared a formidable reputation among public opinion, Queen Elisabeta being a true legend in her country. The Queens, both born and educated in the old German Empire, also shared a passion for the sea, for households in its immediate vicinity and for spending time outdoors by the sea. While Queen Elisabeta had in Constanța a pavilion erected right on the pier of the port and a Royal Palace built on the high cliff of the city, Queen Eleonore, for her part, made Evksinograd the main official royal residence outside Sofia.

In Evksinograd, with Queen Elisabeta of Romania and Tsaritsa Eleonore of Bulgaria

Tsaritsa Eleonore of Bulgaria, born in 1860, into the German Reuss-Köstritz family, married Ferdinand I on 15/28 February 1908, after the latter had lost his first wife, Marie Louise of Bourbon-Parma in 1899, after the birth of his last daughter, Nadezhda. A few days after the wedding, between 6 and 8 March 1908, the Bulgarian princely couple stayed in Romania, coming from Vienna, and had meetings with King Carol and Queen Elisabeta. The Romanian sovereign wanted to tell Hristofor Hesapciev that she was immediately emotionally attached to the new princess of Sofia, who had told her "very interesting things from her experience as a volunteer, head of a medical train during the Manchurian war." We gave our word – Elisabeta continued – to meet more often, given the fact that the two peoples have very good interests, and every opportunity must be used in order to create more friendly ties."[43]

The Queen kept her word, and, between 24 and 29 October 1909, the new Tsaritsa was her personal guest in Peleș castle, in Sinaia. Eleonore also had the chance, immediately noticed and diplomatically capitalised on by the Bulgarian minister in Bucharest, to have made a very favourable impression on the Romanian political environment, mainly by comparison with the capricious Tsar Ferdinand. "All those who had the opportunity to see her or to talk to her were charmed by the naturalness of her relationships and by her obvious kindness and cordiality," Hesapciev[44] recounted with delight after the Bulgarian princely couple's visit to Romania in March 1908.

Even though the weather was fickle on the day of the trip, on 14 May 1911, the sun appeared at the seaside and the queens were able to create a program with many

42 "Sosirea Reginei Elisabeta la Varna," *Adevărul*, 15.05.1911, 2.

43 Hesapciev, *Amintirile unui*, 184.

44 Hesapciev, *Amintirile unui,* 189.

outdoor activities. They took a tour of the palace's park by car, followed by a visit to the Tsaritsa's foundation, the marine sanatorium for children with tuberculosis, located in the immediate vicinity.[45]

> It is easy to assume, the only special envoy of the Romanian press wrote from the scene, for the daily newspapers «Adevărul» and «Dimineața,» what closeness of the soul must have determined, between the sovereigns of the two neighbouring countries, this matching of charitable ideas, which dominates them to the same extent. The mother of the «wounded» of the war of 1877–1878 found in Queen Eleonore the volunteer who, at the risk of her life, led the Red Cross service in the Russo-Japanese war.[46]

After the extended stay in the salons of the establishment, the queens returned to the residence in Evksinograd for a gala lunch with their entourages and the local Bulgarian officials, such as Prefect Jeku Jekov, the Commander of the Bulgarian Navy, the Chief Engineer of the new port of Varna, and the Chief of the city's police inspectorate.[47]

In the afternoon, the queens chose to remain in the palace's elegant reading room,[48] so as to further discuss their interests. Queen Elisabeta, at that moment 68 years old, explained to the host that she was feeling the fatigue of the trip. The conversation, held in German, most certainly included both life experiences, in terms of royal and state duties, and personal memories or immediate projects. During this time, the Queen's entourage was invited on a trip, on the royal motorboat "Chaika," in order to visit the new port of Varna, inaugurated in 1906,[49] and the navigable channel which connected the Black Sea, in front of Varna, to Lake Devnya,[50] a long construction of approximately three kilometres.[51] The guests admired the scenery from the picturesque shores of the lake.[52]

For the next day, 15 May 1911, Tsaritsa Eleonore offered Queen Elisabeta two possible ways of spending the entire day together. Either a trip, by sea, from Evksinograd to the picturesque town of Balchik (at that time, completely unknown to the Romanians), almost 20 kilometres away, or a journey, by rail, to Pleven (about 300 kilometres away),

45 "Regina Elisabeta la Euxinograd," 2; "Escursiunea M.S. Reginei la Varna," *Universul*, 19.05.1911, 1.

46 "Regina Elisabeta la Euxinograd," 2.

47 Ibidem.

48 Ibidem.

49 Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria, 1878–1918. A History* (New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia University Press, 1983), 386.

50 Lake Devnya was originally a harbour at the mouth of the Provadiya River, with a depth of about 9 metres, and it was separated from the sea by a 2-3-kilometre-long strip of sand. In 1906–1909, after the construction of the new port of Varna, the canal connecting the Black Sea to Lake Devnya, a lake supplied with fresh water by the rivers Provadiya and Devnya, was also excavated. Sergei R. Grinevetsky, Igor S. Zonn, Sergei S. Zhiltsov, Aleksey N. Kosarev, Andrey G. Kostianoy, *The Black Sea Encyclopedia* (Berlin– Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2015), 791–92.

51 "Vizita portului Varna și canalului maritim," *Adevărul*, 18.05.1911, 2.

52 Ibidem.

in order to see the field of the battle of 1877, the monuments built there, and also the house in the village of Poradim, which the villager Varban Iliev had given to King Carol, who lived and had his headquarters here during the War of Independence.[53]

It was the first time, on May 14, 1911, that a Bulgarian sovereign invited a Romanian counterpart to visit Balchik, and Queen Elisabeta got the opportunity to reach the small town on the Black Sea coast a few years before it was discovered by Queen Maria. At that time, the locality counted 6,641 souls, of which around 3,000 were Bulgarians, just over 2,000 Turks and Tatars, around 1,000 Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Gypsies and only 17 Romanians.[54] Moreover, so far there are no direct testimonies of the visit of a Romanian official to Balchik until 1913.

Queen Elisabeta did not arrive in Balchik for a very trivial reason. On the morning of 15 May 1911, a Sunday, torrential rain engulfed the Bulgarian coast of the Northern Black Sea, and the sovereign felt a physical weakness, which she blamed on the weather.[55] Therefore, Elisabeta missed the chance to discover, the first among the Romanians, what Lucian Boia designated as the "paradise" of Greater Romania (1918–1940).[56]

The lost opportunity to discover Balchik, the first among the Romanians, on 15 May 151911, was replaced by Tsaritsa Eleonore with an *ad hoc* program, in the context of the continuous spring rain and of the physical indisposition of Queen Elisabeta. Immediately after breakfast, the sovereigns entered the church of the monastery of Saint Demetrius, located in the palace's park, in order to attend the Sunday service, after which they stayed for a short official photo shoot.[57] The other members of the Romanian delegation were invited to an official banquet organised at the municipal casino in Varna, on the seashore, hosted by prefect Jeku Jekov.[58] For the ordinary residents of Varna, Sunday was a Doors Open Day on the ship "Romania," which was moored in the port. Most of them wanted to see and convince themselves regarding a technology which dumbfounded and delighted them: wireless telegraphy.[59] Extremely attentive and invested in their role, the Romanian telegraph operators kept, for the public, the connection between the shipboard and the port of Constanța, but also with the other ships operated by the Romanian Maritime Service.

53 "Vizita portului Varna şi canalului maritim," *Adevărul*, 18.05.1911, 2; George Capceff, *Casa-Muzeu "Carol I." Regele României în satul Poradim,* translated from Bulgarian by St. Nicolaescu (București: Atelierele Grafice Socec, 1910); Ioana Cristache-Panait, "Monumente comemorative ale Războiului de Independență (1877–1878)," *Revista Muzeelor și Monumentelor* 46 (1977): 78.

54 Lucian Boia, *Balcic. Micul paradis al României Mari* (București: Editura Humanitas, 2014), 19.

55 "Regina Elisabeta la Euxinograd," 2.

56 Doina Păuleanu, *Balcicul în pictura românească* (București: Editura Arc, 2003).

57 "Regina Elisabeta la Euxinograd," 2.

58 Ibidem.

59 Ibidem.

On the last day of her stay in Evksinograd, both the weather and, above all, the condition of Queen Elisabeta changed noticeably, although she began to move around in a mobile chair with wheels, on the instructions of the attending medical specialist.[60] Already on the morning of Monday 16 May 1911, the two sovereigns left for Varna, in automobiles, in order to visit the city's very rich and interesting Museum of Antiquities.[61] Open for several years, on 11 June 1906, on the former Girls' High School, the Museum was designed and run by the Czech brothers Hermenegild and Karel Škorpil (the latter also being the founder of the Bulgarian School of Medieval Archaeology[62]), and it housed extremely valuable and interesting artefacts, discovered on the shore of the Black Sea and near the city. Karel Škorpil led the two sovereigns through the exhibits and provided answers to their questions.

Returning to Evksinograd, Queen Elisabeta and Tsaritsa Eleonore granted an audience to a delegation of the leaders and representatives of charity societies from Varna.

Tsaritsa Eleonore made sure to be present at all the moments of the official separation from her guest: they both arrived in the port of Varna at half past six in the evening, and the Bulgarian sovereign accompanied Queen Elisabeta from the board of the royal motorboat "Ceaika" to the exit of the ship "Romania" from the waters of the quay where it had been moored.[63] A large audience, along with local Bulgarian officials, witnessed the Queen's official boarding ceremony.[64] Late at midnight, the modern Romanian ship docked in front of the Royal Pavilion on the main quay of Constanța port, following what would be the last visit to Bulgaria of a Romanian sovereign.

Conclusions

Queen Elisabeta of Romania visited Evksinograd in May 1911 without bringing a political or diplomatic message to Tsaritsa Eleonore of Bulgaria. The reasons for this meeting are the personal relationships established between the two sovereigns, women with very distinct personalities from their husbands. Previous private talks between the two, in 1908 and in 1909, had fuelled a sympathy that neither of them shared with any other royal consort.

60 "Regina Elisabeta la Euxinograd," 2.

61 *Ibidem*.

62 Florin Curta, "With Brotherly Love: The Czech Beginnings of Medieval Archaeology in Bulgaria and Ukraine," in: *Manufacturing Middle Ages: Entangled History of Medievalism in Nineteenth-century Europe*, eds. Patrick J. Geary, Gábor Klaniczay (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2013), 379.

63 Ibidem.

64 "Plecarea M.S. Reginei Elisabeta din Varna," *Minerva*, 18.05.1911, 1; "Plecarea M.S. Reginei Elisabeta din Varna," *Seara*, 17.05.1911, 3; "Plecarea M.S. Reginei Elisabeta din Varna," *Minerva*, 19.05.1911, 1; "Întoarcerea M.S. Reginei," *Conservatorul Constanței*, 22.05.1911, 2.

The discussions held in the residence located on the shore of the Black Sea between Elisabeta and Eleonore were not a political dialogue and did not, in essence, aim to repair bilateral relations. Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria did not approve of the organisation and agenda of this visit, in fact he wanted to openly express this disapproval through his untimely departure from the country on the day of Queen Elisabeta's arrival in Evksinograd and through the lack of ceremonies and governmental or local decision-makers from both Sofia and Varna.

This was rather a trip full of a certain gallant value, Queen Elisabeta's, which marked, nonetheless, a stimulation of the ties between the Royal Houses, a channel of discussion that would remain essential in the troubled period between 1913 and 1916. Although traditionally considered to be historically good, the relations between the Romanian and the Bulgarian heads of state, during the periods of the constitutional monarchy, were reserved and practically nothing was narrated about the visits of the Romanians (King Carol I in 1902, Queen Elisabeta in 1911, and no other travel was recorded until December 1947).

The last visit to Bulgaria of a Romanian sovereign, in May 1911, in Evksinograd, in a residence that was situated only a few kilometres from the future border between the two countries, i.e. the one in 1913, was also a clear sign of the level of degradation of the bilateral relations, a process which began in the early years of the 20th century and which would extend for a period of over three decades, practically until the occupation of the two states by the Red Army (in 1944) and the installation of communist regimes in both Bucharest and Sofia.

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SUMMARY

Between 13 and 16 May 1911, the last visit that a sovereign of Romania made to the territory of Bulgaria took place. Queen Elisabeta of Romania was invited by Tsaritsa Eleonore of Bulgaria to Evksinograd, the royal residence near Varna, on the shore of the Black Sea. The presence of Queen Elisabeta was not approved by Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who demonstratively left the country. The visit to Evksinograd, in May 1911, can be considered without political and diplomatic value in the context of Romanian – Bulgarian relations. The presence of Queen Elisabeta in Evksinograd is the last journey of a Romanian sovereign to the territory of Bulgaria and, in general of a Romanian head of state to the South of the Danube for the following half century, when Prime Minister Petru Groza was invited, in 1947, by the communist leader of the new People's Republic, Georgi Dimitrov. Research on Queen Elisabeta's high-level state activities, analyses of the diplomatic and political relations in Southeast Europe and, in particular, between Romania and Bulgaria have given fleeting attention to this episode. It is rarely mentioned, and a more generous account of this stay at Evksinograd was not found.

Bałkańska Opowieść z Czasów *Belle Époque* nad Morzem Czarnym. Królowa Elżbieta w Ewksinogradzie: Ostatnia Podróż do Bułgarii Monarchini Rumunii (13–16 maja 1911)

Słowa kluczowe: Królowa Rumunii Elżbieta, Eleonora Bułgarska, Ewksinograd, Rumunia, Bułgaria, maj 1911

STRESZCZENIE

W dniach 13–16 maja 1911 roku miała miejsce ostatnia wizyta monarchy Rumunii na terytorium Bułgarii. Królowa Rumunii Elżbieta została zaproszona przez carycę Eleonorę Bułgarii do Ewksinogradu, królewskiej rezydencji niedaleko Warny, nad brzegiem Morza Czarnego. Obecność królowej Elżbiety nie została zaakceptowana przez cara Ferdynanda Bułgarskiego, który demonstracyjnie opuścił kraj. Wizytę w Ewksinogradzie w maju 1911 roku można uznać za pozbawioną wartości politycznej i dyplomatycznej w kontekście relacji rumuńsko-bułgarskich. Pobyt królowej Elżbiety w Ewksinogradzie stanowi ostatnią podróż monarchy rumuńskiego na terytorium Bułgarii, a w ogóle głowy państwa rumuńskiego na południe od Dunaju przez kolejne pół wieku, aż do zaproszenia premiera Petru Grozy w 1947 roku przez komunistycznego przywódcę nowej Ludowej Republiki Bułgarii, Georgi Dymitrowa. Badania

dotyczące działalności państwowej królowej Elżbiety, analizy stosunków dyplomatycznych i politycznych w Europie Południowo-Wschodniej, a w szczególności między Rumunią a Bułgarią, poświęcają tej wizycie jedynie przelotną uwagę. Rzadko się o niej wspomina, a bardziej szczegółowy opis tego pobytu w Ewksinogradzie nie został odnaleziony.

Citation

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The Contract for the Construction of Ocean Liners MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory" of 29 November 1933

Keywords: ocean liners, ships, Polish merchant navy, contract, voyages, art, design, symbol, Second Polish Republic

The contract for the construction of ocean liners MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory" of 29 November 1933,[1] which had been a part of the archives of the Gdynia-America Shipping Lines (hereinafter: "GAL") and has been stored in Gdynia's branch of the State Archive in Gdańsk (hereinafter: "APG OG"), and is a highly valuable source on the development of the Polish merchant navy in the Second Polish Republic. Its typescript, which no researcher has been granted access to before by Gdynia's archives, consists of 21 pages and is a copy of the primary contract (without the signatures and appendixes). It is the oldest of mere three surviving contracts for the construction of ships of the "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe" (Polish Transatlantic Shipping Company Limited, or PTTO), which has been known since 1934 as GAL.[2] The purpose of this article is to describe the circumstances of signing of the contract between Poles and Italians and its contents, and to present construction stages and history of the famous Polish ocean liners up until their first voyages. The final part of the article contains the entire original contract.

1 Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni [State Archives in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch] (hereinafter: APG OG), Gdynia–Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe SA w Gdyni (hereinafter: "GAL"), Umowa zawarta między "Polskim Transatlantyckim Towarzystwem Okrętowym" a Towarzystwem "Cantieri Riuniti dellAdriatico SA Trieste w sprawie budowy dwóch statków pasażersko-towarowych (późniejszy "Piłsudski" i "Batory"), 795/77, 1–3.

2 The archives of APG OG also include contracts with the shipyard "Swan Hunter and Wigham Richardson, Ltd." in Newcastle-on-Tyne on the construction of MS "Chrobry" (1937) and MS "Sobieski" (1938).

The history of PTTO started in Gdynia on 16 February 1929, when the Minister of Industry and Trade, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, announced the signing of a contract between his ministry and the shipping company "East Asiatic Company Limited" for the creation of a Polish-Danish shipping line from Gdynia to the ports of North America.[3] Due to the contract, three steam ocean liners underwent a change flag to that of Poland. Two of the ships, SS "Estonia" and SS "Lituania," received new names - SS "Pułaski" and SS "Kościuszko," respectively; while the third ship, SS "Polonia", kept its previous name.[4] The ships, during their stay under the Danish flag, had already been sailing between Gdańsk and the North American ports since 1921. As property of PTTO, their goal was to maintain regular and direct transfer of passengers and goods between Gdynia and Halifax and New York.[5]

From the very beginning of PTTO's operations, its operating results were unfavourable as compared to other Polish shipping companies, recording steady declines in freight and passenger traffic.[6] This was exacerbated by the economic crisis of 1931–1932, which had a negative impact on the development of world shipping as a whole. As Polish shipping companies had an outdated fleet, which was profitable in good economic times, but in the face of the crisis made them unable to compete with foreign competitors, it was necessary to undertake a campaign to replace the ships with modern ones adapted to the competitive struggle, from which only the fastest and at the same time the cheapest ships could emerge victorious. The action was included in the plan for the expansion of the Polish merchant fleet, carried out gradually by all shipping companies. This route was chosen also by PTTO, whose two ships (SS "Kościuszko" and SS "Pułaski") no longer met the requirements of passenger communication in the Atlantic,

3 The initial capital of PTTO, which was a joint-stock company, amounted to PLN 9,000,000, out of which the Polish side paid PLN 4,700,000 (52.2%) and the Danish side paid PLN 4,300,000 (47.8%). According to the contract, the Head of the Board of Directors and the CEO of the company had to be Poles, and ship crews were supposed to be "polonised" within a year (Henryk Tetzlaff, "Bandera polska na Atlantyku," *Morze* 2–3 (1930): 26; Władyslaw Gieysztor, "Bolączki żeglugowe," *Polska Gospodarcza* 46, (1930): 2009–2011). In 1934 an extraordinary general meeting changed the name "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA" to "Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe SA" (see: "Nowa siedziba «Linii Gdynia-Ameryka» w Warszawie," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 10 (1934): 5–6). Jerzy Miciński, *Księga statków polskich 1918–1945*, Vol. 1 (Gdańsk: Polnord-Oskar, 1996), 241.

4 APG OG, Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni (hereinafter: SGG), File No. 149/506, "Statut spółki", in Akta rejestrowe spółki "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA" Linia Gdynia–Ameryka, vol. 1, 11–12.

5 During the initial period of PTTO's existence, the ships had still sailed under the Danish flag due to the necessity of completing all formalities. The celebrations of flying the Polish flag on the ships were held in Gdynia: on August 7, 1930 for MS "Pułaski"; on August 8 of the same year for SS "Polonia"; and finally, on August 20 of the same year for SS "Kościuszko" (Bolesław Kuźmiński, "Regularne połączenia żeglugowe portu gdyńskiego," *Morze* 8 (1930): 9; "Flaga polska na Atlantyku," *Morze* 8 (1930): 15; "Ostatnie wiadomości znad morza", *Polska Gospodarcza* 33 (1930): 1466. "Ostatnie wiadomości znad morza," *Polska Gospodarcza* 35 (1930): 1556).

6 APG OG, SGG, File No. 149/605, "Sprawozdanie zarządu P.T.T.O. za rok 1932", 181; APG OG, SGG, File No. 149/507, "Sprawozdanie zarządu P.T.T.O. za 1933 rok" in Akta rejestrowe spółki "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA" Linia Gdynia–Ameryka, vol. 2, 2–4.

where international competition was particularly strong, and needed to be replaced by modern vessels as soon as possible. As the purchase of ready-made new ships proved impossible, the construction of new transatlantic ships began. The development of their technical details was handled by English experts from Liverpool: Thomas Graham, Andrew McCance Robband William Heslop Woolnough, who at the same time carried out an analysis of the offers sent to Warsaw by Europe's best shipyards, paying particular attention to compensation, credit, and technical conditions. Their choice fell on the Italian company "Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico" (CRDA), which offered the Polish side better and cheaper in operation ships than other competitors, the best credit terms, and the concept of coal compensation. The Italians granted convenient repayment terms over 6 years, declaring their willingness to purchase over the next 4 years hard coal from Silesian mines worth almost 100% of the price of the ships.[7] It amounted to 69,253,855.15 lire, but in 1937 the sum eventually rose to 88,153,417.92 lire, which was affected by the exchange rate difference provided for the contract and which led both parties to decide to refer the matter to arbitration in London, as stipulated by the provisions of the contract. After lengthy negotiations, the arbitration proceedings were withdrawn, and an agreement was concluded on 27 November 1937, closing the dispute (the amount owed to the shipyard was set at USD 1,900,000, of which USD 1,250,000 was to be paid in coal). The remaining amount (USD 650,000) was to be paid by the Polish side in cash by 14 December 1939.[8]

The key to signing of the contract was a resolution of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers of 21 June 1933, which authorised the Ministry of Industry and Trade (hereinafter: MPiH) to acquire two passenger ships for the North American line. We do not know the course of the negotiations with the Italian side – the documents themselves have not survived, nor has the press reporting on them. The contract for the construction of the transatlantic ships was signed on 29 November 1933 in Warsaw, in the office of the head of the Maritime Department of the MPiH, Leonard Możdżeński, in the presence of Capt. Augusto Cosulich (Director of the CRDA), Aleksander R. Leszczynski (Chief Executive Officer of PTTO), Marius Plinius (Director of PTTO), and notary Zygmunt Nowicki.[9] Under the contract the Italian side undertook, among others, to purchase iron in Poland, and it ensured that during the construction and equipment of ships, under equal conditions of competition, it would adopt the principle of giving priority

7 Tadeusz Ocioszyński, "Nowe statki dla Linii Gdynia-Ameryka," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 12 (1933): 5–6; Bogusław Bagniewski, "Nowe polskie statki transatlantyckie," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego*, 5 (1934): 11–13.

8 Henryk Dehmel, *Gdynia Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe SA 1930–1950* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1969), 36–37.

9 APG OG, GAL, 795/77, 1–43; APG OG, GAL, Szkic działalności Przedsiębiorstwa "Gdynia–Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe SA," 795/68, 10. See also: "Ostateczne załatwienie sprawy zamówienia statków dla linii Gdynia-Ameryka," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 33 (12/12/1933): 33.

to Polish industrial materials and products. As soon as the contract for the construction of MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory" was signed, the period of supervision of its execution began. Control over the entire work was exercised by the Supervisory Commission, chaired by Leonard Możdżeński. It consisted of Aleksander R. Leszczynski, Marius Plinius, Bogusław Bagniewski, M. Petersen, and Thomas Graham. An Artistic Sub-Committee was set up under the Commission, charged with overseeing the aesthetics the interiors of both transatlantic ships. It was established by the MPiH in agreement with Wacław Jędrzejewicz (Minister of Religious Denominations and Enlightenment, who became the honorary chairman). It included: Professor Wojciech Jastrzębowski (chairman), Stanisław Brukalski, Eng. Arch., Professor Lech Niemojewski, PhD, and Professor Tadeusz Pruszkowski. The commission developed an original design for the interior decoration of both transatlantic ships, including works by 78 leading Polish artists, as a counterproposal to the drawings previously proposed by the Italians.[10]

The laying of the keel for MS "Piłsudski" took place in mid-March 1934.[11] Shortly afterwards, a senior engineer was sent from Gdynia to Monfalcone to familiarise himself on site with the details of the construction and to supervise the construction of the machinery and equipment that he was soon to manage.[12] The dedication and launching ceremony of MS "Piłsudski" took place on 19 December 1934 in Monfalcone.[13] Among those present were the Polish Ambassador to Rome, Alfred Wysocki, Deputy Ministers Franciszek Doleżal (Ministry of Industry and Trade) and Aleksander Bobkowski (Ministry of Communications), MPs Władysław Kosydarski and Major Zygmunt Tebinka, and Aleksander R. Leszczyński. Following the consecration of the vessel by the Archbishop of Gorizia, Fr. Carlo Margotti, the godmother, Wanda Pełczyńska (independence activist, publicist and member of the Sejm) gave a speech, followed by the act of baptism, and a demonstration and trial of the ship's engines.[14] Technical tests were carried out on 12–13 August 1935, on the Adriatic island of Cherso. They started in fine weather and ended in violent gusts of dry and hot wind called sirocco, thanks to which it was possible to see how the ship behaved in both calm and rough seas. As her speed, manoeuvrability and stability were satisfactory, it was decided that the official acceptance of MS

10 Rowmund Piłsudski, "Nowe polskie transatlantyki," *Polska Gospodarcza* 48 (1933): 1501–1502; "Nowe statki transatlantyckie «Piłsudski» i «Batory»," *Morze* 1 (1935): 2; J.L., "M/S «Piłsudski»," *Morze* 8–9 (1935): 8–9; "Rozbudowa polskiej floty handlowej," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 11 (1933): 50.

11 "Rozpoczęcie budowy polskich transatlantyków," *Morze* 3 (1934): 20; "Rozpoczęcie budowy drugiego polskiego transatlantyku," *Morze* 6 (1934): 29.

12 Bagniewski, "Nowe polskie statki," 11.

13 Feliks Rostkowski, "Święto polskiej marynarki handlowej," *Morze* 2 (1935): 8–9.

14 "M/S «Piłsudski» spuszczony na wodę," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 12 (1934): 1–2; "Spuszczenie na wodę M/S «Piłsudski»," *Polska Gospodarcza* 51–52 (1934): 1592.

"Piłsudski" would take place on 20 August 1935, and a week later the ship would sail from Trieste to her home port in Gdynia.[15]

MS "Piłsudski" sailed on its first voyage with over 700 passengers on board at noon on 27 August 1935 from Trieste, docking four hours later at the Venice pier.[16] It then passed the archipelago of the Pelagosa Islands (currently Palagruža) and the Apennine Peninsula (to the Strait of Messina), and then sailed via Palermo, Algiers, Malaga, Lisbon, Antwerp, and the Kiel Canal to the Baltic Sea, to finally arrive in Gdynia on 12 September (after a 16-day journey).[17] Two days later, a ceremony was held in front of the building of Dworzec Morski for the hoisting and consecration of the Polish flag by Bishop Stanisław Wojciech Okoniewski. It was attended by Henryk Floyar-Rajchman (Minister of Industry and Trade), as well as by members of the Government (Ministers Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Michał Butkiewicz, gen. Tadeusz Kasprzycki) and special guests, including Józef Piłsudski's daughter, Jadwiga, and his brothers, Jan and Kazimierz Piłsudski. Also present at the ceremony were the Pomeranian Governor Stefan Kirtiklis, Admirals Jerzy Świrski and Józef Unrug, the director of the Maritime Department of the MPiH, Leonard Możdżeński and representatives of the authorities of the company "Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe SA."[18] The following day, MS "Piłsudski" left the port of Gdynia for New York. Among the passengers was Deputy Treasury Minister Adam Koc, who carried a letter from the President of Poland, Professor Ignacy Mościcki, to the President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and engravings depicting fights for US independence. Also sailing overseas were: army inspectors Maj. Gen. Gustaw Orlicz-Dreszer and Maj. Gen. Aleksander Osiński, Maj. Gen. Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, Bishop S. W. Okoniewski, the President of the City of Warsaw Stefan Starzyński, Leonard. Możdżeński and Aleksander R. Leszczyński.[19] The ship's return to Gdynia took place on 8 October 1935.[20]

The laying of the keel for MS "Batory" took place on 1 May 1934 in the shipyard in Monfalcone,[21] and the launching ceremony took place on 3 July 1935. On the Polish side, it was attended by: Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Franciszek Doleżal, Director of the Maritime Department of the Ministry of MPiH L. Możdżeński, Eng., the Polish Consul in Trieste Stanislaw Dygat, the Polish Vice Consul Jerzy Lasocki, the

15 "Próby M/S «Piłsudski»," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 8 (1935): 7–8.

16 Julian Ginsbert, "Pierwsza podróż M/S «Piłsudski»," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 9 (1935): 1–2.

17 "Przybycie M/S «Piłsudski» do Gdyni," *Polska Gospodarcza* 37 (1935): 1140; Ginsbert, "Pierwsza podróż," 1–2.

18 "M/S Piłsudski wszedł w skład polskiej marynarki handlowej," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 9 (1935): 12; "Poświęcenie bandery na M/S «Piłsudski»," *Polska Gospodarcza* 38 (1935): 1172–1173.

19 "Poświęcenie bandery na M/S «Piłsudski»," 1173.

20 "Powrót do Gdyni M/S «Piłsudski»," *Polska Gospodarcza* 41 (1935): 1267.

21 "Rozpoczęcie budowy polskich transatlantyków," *Morze* 3 (1934): 20; "Rozpoczęcie budowy drugiego polskiego transatlantyku," *Morze* 6 (1934): 29.

Commercial Counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Rome Władysław Mazurkiewicz, the President of the Supervisory Board of GAL Wacław Szuyski, the General Director of GAL A. R. Leszczyński, and a group of engineers and journalists. The ship's godmother was Jadwiga Barthel de Weydenthal, a respected independence activist (soldier of the First Brigade of the Legions; lady of the Order of Virtuti Militari) and sculptor, chosen for this role by Aleksandra Piłsudska, widow of Marshal J. Piłsudski.[22] On the Italian side, it was attended by, among others: the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Communications Giovanni Host-Venturi, the President of the CRDA Supervisory Board F. Giunta, the directors of the Monfalcone shipyard: Capt. A. Cosulich and Cesare Sacerdotti, as well as the Deputy Commercial Counsellor of the Italian Embassy in Warsaw, Manlio de Santi. After the consecration, which was performed by Archbishop Carlo Margotti, the godmother gave a speech and then cut the wire from which the traditional bottle of champagne was suspended. When it crashed into the ship's hull, the ropes were loosened and MS "Batory" floated down to the shipyard basin, after which it was pulled by tugboats into the basin and placed next to MS "Piłsudski."[23]

The ceremony of hoisting and consecrating the flag of MS "Batory" by Rev. Canon Teodor Turzyński (in the presence of Bishop Stanisław Wojciech Okoniewski) took place on 17 September 1936 in Gdynia. It was attended by Deputy Prime Minister E. Kwiatkowski, Eng., Undersecretaries of State Franciszek Doleżal and Kazimierz Świtalski, Member of Parliament for the Kingdom of Hungary in Warsaw Andràs de Hory, and representatives of ministries and social organisations. After the ceremony, the guests were given a tour of the ship, which on 19 September 1936, with the Government representative Franciszek Doleżal on board, embarked on its first voyage via Copenhagen and Halifax to New York.[24] From then on, she was on regular duty on this route, alternating with MS "Piłsudski." During the summer, in between cruises, she made tourist trips to European ports (including Amsterdam, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Lipawa, Oslo, Stockholm, and Tallinn).[25]

The new Polish transatlantic ships MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory" were an excellent shipping investment, although it was assumed in advance that they would not be able to compete in speed and luxury with the mighty ships connecting Western Europe with North American ports. At the time of their launch, they were the most modern vessels of their type sailing the seas of north-eastern and central-eastern Europe.[26] They

22 "«Piłsudski» i «Batory»," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 7 (1935): 1–2.

23 "Spuszczenie na wodę M/S «Batory»," *Polska Gospodarcza* 27 (1935): 845–846.

24 "Poświęcenie bandery na M/S «Batory»," *Polska Gospodarcza* 21 (1936): 599.

25 "Nasza flota handlowa rośnie," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 3 (1936): 5.

26 The ships were of: 160 m length, 21.5 m width, 11.43 m hull height and 7.5 m draught, 15,000 t displacement, 14,400 t gross tonnage (GRT), 8,650 t net tonnage (NRT), and a speed of 18-20 knots. They had seven decks, connected by illuminated staircases and electric lifts. The engines were powered by oil, making the ships more efficient and economical than SS "Kościuszko" and SS "Pułaski". They did not

were also the fastest ships sailing regularly between Gdynia and New York. The duration of their voyages (8 and a half days instead of the previous 12) influenced and shortened the regularity of transport, which was of great importance for the development of mail transport and freight exchange, in which many foodstuffs were badly affected by long sea transport. The new ships facilitated so-called trade calculations, guaranteeing both exporters and importers timely transportation of their goods. The inaugural voyages of MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory" were received by the press (both domestic and foreign) with great interest. The mentions, articles and photographs published on this occasion are evidence of GAL's promotional success, which has contributed, among other things, to the popularisation of Poland abroad (mainly in the USA).

After the outbreak of World War II, MS "Piłsudski" which had been returning from New York remained in England and came with its crew under British command. In October 1939, Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General of the Polish Army, Władysław Sikorski, gave the order for it to be used (along with MS "Sobieski") as an auxiliary cruiser. As a result, the ship sank after running into mines on 26 November 1939, during its first voyage from Newcastle to Australia, south-east of Cape Flamborough (among the victims of the tragedy was Capt. Mamert Stankiewicz). MS "Batory" called at New York on 5 September 1939, from where she then sailed to Halifax, where she was requisitioned by the British Admiralty on 5 December 1939. It underwent an adaptive refit and armament, before being sent on its first voyage to Glasgow on 23 December 1939. After more than 6 years of active service during World War II, the ship was returned to GAL on 2 April 1946, and the Polish flag was flying on it once again. The ship was withdrawn from service on 1 July 1969.[27]

SOURCE DOCUMENT

State Archives in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch

29 November 1933, Warsaw – A contract between "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe" and "Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico Trieste" for the construction of two passenger and cargo ships (later called MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory"), copy, typescript, APG O/Gdynia, no. 795/77, pp. 1–43

The contract [for the construction of ships MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory"]

Warsaw, 29 November 1933

emit smoke and soot, which haunted older steamers, and their chimneys, in addition to discharging exhaust products, served as decoration. On board of MS "Piłsudski", 773 seats were prepared for passengers (371 in tourist class cabins and 402 in third class cabins). Therefore, 1,078 people (including the crew of 305) could travel on board. MS "Batory" could also accommodate 773 passengers, but its crew consisted of 263 people, so it provided space for a total of 1,036 people.

27 Dehmel, *Gdynia Ameryka,* 123–129.

Between Chief Executive Officer Aleksander R. Leszczyński[28] and Director Marius Plinius [Rasmussen],[29] acting by virtue of the certified copy from the Commercial Register of the District Court in Gdynia Section B No. 105, attached hereto, on behalf of and for the benefit of the "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe, LINIA GDYNIA–AMERYKA, Spółka Akcyjna" in Gdynia, hereinafter "the Purchaser," and Gr. Uff. Capitano Augusto Cosulich,[30] acting by virtue of the power of attorney attached hereto on behalf of and for the benefit of the company "CANTIERI RIUNITI DELL'ADRIATICO SA." Trieste,[31] hereinafter "the Supplier," the following contract has been concluded today:

§ 1.

I. The Purchaser shall order and purchase from the Supplier, and the Supplier shall build and deliver to the Purchaser two identical steel twin-screw motor passenger and cargo ships of the following main dimensions, main machinery type, and class:

a) DIMENSIONS

1. length after summer waterline	513′4.5″
2. length between perpendicular	492′11″
3. construction width	70′6.5″
4. design moulded depth in relation to the bulkhead deck	30′6″
5. average design draught at full load	24′9″
6. displacement at the full load approximately	15,000 tonnes
7. gross tonnage of the vessel approximately	14,400 tonnes
8. net tonnage of the vessel approximately	8,650 tonnes

28 Alexander R. Leszczyński (1894–1939). Polish merchant, trader, and shipping manager. Head of the Warsaw branch (1931), and then Managing Director of PTTO and GAL (1932–1939). He died in 1939, during the battles for Tomaszówka near Włodawa during the September Campaign. He was awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (1936).

29 Marius Kristian Plinius Rasmussen (1894–1962). Danish-Polish shipping manager. He worked for "The East Asiatic Company Limited" (EAC) in Copenhagen as the Baltic-American line manager. After the establishment of PTTO, he became its Deputy Managing Director (1930–1934), remaining in this position after the company was renamed GAL (1934–1939). During World War II, after the company's headquarters were moved to London, he became its superintendent (1940–1945) and, on its return to Gdynia, its managing director (1946–1949). He was awarded the Commander's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (1947).

30 Augusto Cosulich (1875–1949) Italian grand navy captain. CEO of CRDA and, from 1938, Director of the "Unione degli Industriali di Trieste." During World War II, he worked to protect the CRDA shipyard and the port of Trieste from requisition and destruction by the Germans. In February 1945, he was arrested on suspicion of financing the Italian National Liberation Committee. After World War II, he led the reconstruction of the CRDA shipyard complex. He was the president of the Association of Industrialists in Trieste and a member of the executive committee of the General Confederation of Italian Industry.

31 In 1930, "Stabilimento Technico Triestino, Cantiere San Rocco," "Cantieri San Marco," and "Cantiere Navale Monfalcone" combined into one company called CRDA. The Italian shipyard is best known for its passenger ships "Vulcania," "Saturnia," "Neptunia" and "Oceania."

b) MACHINERY TYPE

Two Sulzer, single-action, compressorless main machines, each with 9 cylinders, a cylinder diameter of 720 mm and a piston stroke of 1,250 mm.

c) CLASS

The ships will be built under the supervision and in accordance with the regulations of the Lloyd's Register of Shipping according to the highest class of the company, with ice reinforcements, while all supervision costs, as well as costs and fees associated with the classification of the ships, shall be borne by the Supplier.

II. The ships, which are the subject of this contract, shall exactly and in all respects conform to the plans, specifications, and inventory and spare parts lists, which are drawn up concurrently with this contract, signed by both parties and attached to the contract, as an integral part thereof, binding the parties jointly and on an equal footing with the contract itself.

III. The Supplier shall mark at its own expense the materials used in the construction of the ordered ships with No. 1126 for the first ship and No. 1127 for the second ship. These numbers will also be placed on the ship bows, respectively.

§ 2.

I. The ships shall be built by the Supplier under the control of the Purchaser, who had the right to appoint its representatives for this purpose. These representatives shall have the right to and shall be given by the Supplier due access at all times to the shipyards, workshops, warehouses, offices, and any other places where works related to the construction of the ships or to the collection and preparation of materials for their construction is to be carried out. These representatives shall have the right to require the Supplier to test any materials to be used in the construction, to inspect the works being carried out, and to communicate their comments and observations to the Supplier. The above also applies to sub-suppliers who will perform any part of the work for the Supplier, or supply it with materials for the construction of the ships. The Supplier assumes the obligation to enable the Purchaser to carry out this inspection at the sub-suppliers.

II. The performance of inspections on the above terms by the Purchaser does not in any way alter or diminish the Supplier's liability for meeting the deadlines and for the quality of the purchased ships, and may not in any way serve as a basis for defence against any grievances or claims of the Purchaser for the performance of this contract.

§ 3.

I. The Purchaser shall have the right to amend at any time the specifications, plans, and inventory and spare parts lists approved by this contract and its appendices for either

or both of the ships constituting the subject of this contract, and the Supplier shall be obliged to accept and apply the amendments proposed by the Purchaser, provided that they do not increase the costs, do not delay the agreed delivery dates, and do not alter the main characteristics of the ships.

II. In the event that changes to the specifications, plans, or inventory and spare parts lists proposed by the Purchaser increase the costs or extend the construction time, which the Supplier shall prove to the Purchaser upon request, the Supplier also undertakes to accept and apply such changes insofar as the price or delivery times are amended accordingly by an additional written agreement of both parties, which shall then replace the relevant provisions of this contract. Any costs arising from such additional provisions and specified in writing by such provisions shall be borne in full by the Purchaser upon acceptance of each relevant ship.

§ 4.

I. The ships, which are the subject of this contract, shall be finished by the Supplier completely and in strict conformity with the specifications, plans, and inventory and spare parts lists attached to this contract, and shall be fully prepared and equipped for the inspections and tests specified in the contract or in the specifications no later than: the first vessel - within 20 months from the date of entry into force of this contract (§ 21); the second vessel - within 26 months from the date of entry into force of this contract (§ 21).

II. In the event that any of the vessels are not submitted for testing by the Supplier within the above-mentioned deadlines, the Supplier shall, as compensation for damage and loss, pay the Purchaser without summons and without judgement the sum of Italian lire 15,000 per vessel for each day of delay. If, however, an event of force majeure or other circumstances beyond the Supplier's or its sub-suppliers' control prevent the Supplier from meeting the agreed delivery dates, the Purchaser shall, at the Supplier's request and upon proof of such circumstances, agree to an extension of the delivery date, but only for a period of time corresponding to the period of force majeure or circumstances beyond the Supplier's or its sub-suppliers' control proven by the Supplier, and only if the Supplier notifies the Purchaser of such impediment no later than within 7 days of the impediment. In the event of a delay in payment of any instalment for the ships acquired by the Purchaser, the Supplier shall receive one day of extension of the delivery date of the ships for each day of delay.

§ 5.

I. The acceptance of the ships by the Purchaser is subject to the trials of each ship at sea (in the Adriatic Sea along the island of Cherso) according to the principles and to the extent specified in the specifications.

II. The Supplier shall notify the Purchaser of the readiness of each ship to be inspected and tested, and in such a way that the Purchaser shall receive written notification in Warsaw at least 10 days before the date set for the tests.

III. All costs of testing the ships, including the insurance of the ships during the tests, shall be borne in full by the Supplier, who shall, by its own efforts and at its own expense, man the ships during the tests and for the delivery of the ships for the tests with a crew meeting the conditions of safe navigation, and shall provide the ships with the necessary amount of fuel, lubricants, fresh water, and supplies necessary for the full and effective performance of any tests agreed upon and marked in the specification, as well as provide the ships with the ballast for their load during the tests. Fuel and lubricants must comply with the conditions set out in the specification. If, at the time of acceptance of the ships by the Purchaser after the completion of the tests, there are stocks of fuel, lubricants, or fresh water remaining on the ships after the trials, the Purchaser shall purchase these stocks for themselves and pay the Supplier the value of these stocks at the local market price. At the Purchaser's request, the Supplier shall, at their own expense, remove the ballast from the ships, and clean and tidy the ships before their delivery.

§ 6.

I. If, as a result of the inspection and testing of each ship separately, the results of which shall be recorded with the signatures of the authorised representatives of both parties immediately after performing the relevant operations, the ships presented for acceptance are considered by the Purchaser not to comply with any of the terms of the contract or its annexes, then at the request of the Purchaser, the Supplier shall be granted an appropriate period of time to carry out the necessary alterations or corrections, and to deliver the ships for new inspection and testing, the result of which shall be final and authoritative.

II. In the event of the above, insofar as the deadline for the presentation of the ship for testing according to § 4 pt. I expired, then from the date of the protocol of the first inspection and testing, the time of the delay in the delivery of the vessel through the fault of the Supplier will be counted, and the compensation for the delay for the Purchaser specified in § 4 pt. II will be calculated, unless the force majeure events provided for in this paragraph apply.

§ 7.

I. If, as a result of final inspection and testing (§ 6 pt. I), the ship or ships shall be found to have an average draught under the conditions of the specification of more than 25 feet, then the Purchaser may require the Supplier to pay, and the Supplier shall upon such request pay the Purchaser by way of compensation, 6,500 Italian lire for each ship for each commenced inch of excess draught between 25 feet and 25 feet

and 6 inches, and over that draught in the amount increased by 25% of this rate for each further commenced inch of excess draught over 25 feet and 6 inches.

II. If, in the same way, it is found that the fuel consumption under the conditions of the specification exceeds per day for each ship: a) 39.7 tonnes for speed tests at a speed of 18 knots; or b) 59.8 tonnes for speed tests at a speed of 20 knots - which take into account the tolerance provided for in the specification, then the Supplier shall, on demand, pay the Purchaser as compensation 50,000 Italian lire for each additional tonne of excess fuel consumption commenced for each ship, calculated for one and the other, but not for both together, of the tested speeds of each vessel, up to a maximum of 2 tonnes per day, and in excess of this standard, in the amount increased by 25% of this rate for each next commenced tonne of excess fuel consumption. The basis for calculating this compensation will always be the higher of the two excess fuel consumptions determined according to points a) and b).

III. If, in the same way, as a result of testing each of the purchased ships, it is found that they do not, under the conditions specified in the specification, attain the speed of 20 knots, then the Supplier shall, at the Purchaser's request, pay by way of compensation 30,000 Italian lire for each ship for each 0.1 knot not achieved between 20 and 19.5 knots, and below this speed, in the amount increased by 100% of this rate for each further 0.1 knot missing.

IV. If, after completing the first two round trips of each ship across the Atlantic (Gdynia-New York and back) on the next, i.e. third round trip of each ship, it is found that the average consumption of lubricating oils under the conditions in the specification is higher than 525 kg per day, which takes into account the tolerance provided for in the specification, then the Supplier shall, at the Purchaser's request, pay the Purchaser, by way of compensation, 400 Italian lira for each ship for each commenced kilogram of additional lubricating oil consumption up to 60 kg of this additional outflow, and in excess of this standard, in the amount increased by 25% of this rate for each further commenced kilogram of excess lubricating oil consumption. Authorised representatives of the Supplier may be present at this test, to whom the Purchaser will provide all necessary conditions for full control of lubricating oil consumption.

§ 8.

I. The Purchaser shall have the right to reject the acceptance of any of the ships ordered under this contract, provided that the final testing (§ 6 pt. I) of the ship in question proves that one or more of the following conditions apply: 1) the ship does not achieve a speed of 20 knots during the tests, 2) the ship's machinery does not develop its full power as stipulated in the machinery specification, 3) the guaranteed fuel consumption is exceeded on tests by more than 5 tonnes per day in relation to those specified

in § 7 pt. II, 4) the ship has an average draught greater than 25 feet and 6 inches at a load of 5,100 tonnes CW under the conditions of the specification

II. Rejection of acceptance of the ship or ships by the Purchaser, under the conditions set out in pt. I of this paragraph, shall be deemed to have arisen through the fault of the Supplier. In the event of non-acceptance of the ships or ship under and within the meaning of this paragraph, this contract shall be terminated through fault of the Supplier, and the Supplier shall have no grievance or claim against the Purchaser on this account, and any payments made by the Purchaser to or on behalf of the Supplier under this contract shall be immediately refunded directly to the Purchaser or at the request of the Purchaser with an additional 6.5% from the date of payment. In order to secure the obligations arising from this clause, the Supplier shall, at the Purchaser's request, provide a bank guarantee, the cost of which the Purchaser shall contribute to only up to the amount of the Supplier's own costs, and in any case not exceeding 1% per annum.

§ 9.

I. The acceptance of the ships shall take place at the port of Trieste immediately after the full, satisfactory completion of all the visual inspections and tests, resulting from this contract and its annexes and amendments thereto, whereby the acceptance shall be carried out by means of exchange of an acceptance report, recorded in duplicate for each ship and signed by the authorised representatives of both parties. The acceptance report shall be accompanied by the original reports of inspections and testing under this contract and its annexes and any amendments thereto, as well as acceptance reports of inventory and spare parts lists, as well as of supplies (fuel, lubricants, and fresh water), insofar as these exist on the ship.

II. Upon acceptance of each ship, the Supplier shall hand over to the Purchaser, without any surcharge, all ship documents, and original plans and drawings of the ships – all in accordance with the specification.

III. The Supplier shall provide the Purchaser upon acceptance of each ship with a declaration that the ship is free from all financial encumbrances, other than those arising or likely to arise from this contract, which would justify any grievances or claims against the Purchaser or the owners of the ships, and in particular those of the beneficiary of a statutory or contractual priority (privilege or mortgage). In particular, each ship is to be completely free of all encumbrances from any taxes, fees or public levies from the country of the port of the ship's acceptance, as well as from any obligations of the Supplier towards its sub-suppliers, employees, and crew, as well as for the supply of the ship for testing and its delivery to the place of testing.

§ 10.

I. The ships, which are the subject of this contract, shall be the property of the Purchaser from the time of the laying of the keel of each of them. In addition to the ships themselves, the Purchaser's property includes all their equipment and supplies, as well as all materials purchased by the Supplier for the construction of the ships.

II. The ships under construction and all their equipment and supplies, as well as the materials for their construction, shall remain at the complete and exclusive risk of the Supplier until the ship's acceptance. The Supplier undertakes to insure in its own name and on its own account with a first-class insurance company, namely Assicurazioni Generali Trieste and/or Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta, each ship under construction until the date of the official acceptance of each ship separately, and in such a way that the insurance shall at all times fully cover the value of the ship under construction in accordance with the progress of its construction, together with the machinery and all equipment and supplies for the ship and the materials for its construction, against all risks, and in particular against the risks of fire, launching accident, completion accident, accident in port or on the high seas, total or partial loss of the ship, risk of war or riots, etc. The policies shall be deposited by the Supplier with Banque Federale Suisse a Zurich in the joint names of the Supplier and the Purchaser, and the policies shall contain reservations of the rights of the Purchaser, as owner of the ships, to the sums insured under this contract. In the event of damage to or destruction of a ship during construction, should the construction of the ship or ships be abandoned as a result of the damage or destruction, the sums insured shall serve to satisfy the Purchaser's claims against the Supplier for reimbursement of all sums paid to the Supplier by the Purchaser. Should the Supplier neglect to take out insurance in accordance with the above provisions or fail to complete the policy to the due amount, the Purchaser shall be entitled to take out insurance for the ship or ships in its own name in accordance with the terms of this clause, and shall deduct the cost of this insurance, together with a percentage of 6.5% per annum, from the sums due to the Supplier.

§ 11.

I. In the event that the Supplier delays the delivery dates of the ships as defined in § 4 pt. I, or fails to correct, in accordance with § 6 pt. I, errors or deficiencies found during the inspection and testing of the ships, the Purchaser shall be entitled to require the Supplier to deliver the ship or ships within a period of time set by the Purchaser, and the Supplier shall be obliged to deliver to the Purchaser within that period the ship or ships, in condition which they are in at that time, together with all machinery, parts, and equipment, as well as all materials in the Supplier's possession or at its disposal, or in the possession or at the disposal of its sub-suppliers, for the construction of the ship or ships, wherever they are at the time of the request, as well as to surrender the

plans and drawings of the ship or ships, and the Purchaser shall then be entitled to finish the construction in progress or to effect the rectification of errors and deficiencies at the expense of the Supplier, strictly in accordance with the specifications, plans, and inventory and spare parts lists in force under this contract, with all costs to be incurred by the Purchaser in this respect being deducted from the unpaid purchase price, and if the remaining purchase price is insufficient, then the difference shall be paid by the Supplier. In exercising its rights under this paragraph, the Purchaser shall have the right to conclude contracts with other shipyards and sub-suppliers or to use the shipyards, workshops, facilities, and tools of the Supplier or its sub-suppliers and subcontractors.

II. The exercise of the aforementioned rights shall in no way affect the provisions of § 4 and § 6 on compensation for delay.

§ 12.

I. Upon delivery of the ship or ships to the Purchaser, which shall be upon the exchange of the delivery and acceptance report pursuant to § 9, or upon taking possession of the ship pursuant to § 11 of this contract, all responsibility for the safety and condition of the ship or ships shall pass to the Purchaser. However, at the Purchaser's request, the Supplier undertakes to rectify in its own yard and at its own expense any discovered errors and deficiencies in the hulls, hull equipment, main and auxiliary machinery, boilers and any mechanical equipment connected therewith, which arise from poor material quality or poor workmanship, provided that these errors and deficiencies are discovered within 12 calendar months from the date of taking possession of each ship by the Purchaser and are notified to the Supplier in writing no later than one month after their discovery. For indirect damage resulting from these or other errors and deficiencies, as well as in connection with their removal, as lost time, etc., the Supplier assumes no liability.

II. In the event that the Purchaser recognises the impossibility of delivering the ships to the Supplier's yard, the Supplier shall pay the Purchaser or at the Purchaser's request the cost of the repairs carried out, but only up to the amount of the cost of such repairs at the Purchaser's own yard as proven by the Purchaser.

III. The Purchaser shall be obliged to prove to the Supplier that the errors, damages or deficiencies subject to the provisions of this paragraph actually arose from the reasons mentioned in point I. The Supplier shall not be obliged to repair and shall not be liable for damage to the vessels occurring after handover and caused not standing in relation to the errors and deficiencies set out in pt. I of this paragraph by accidents at sea, on rivers or in harbours and canals, or arising from fires or mismanagement or negligence of the Purchaser or the owners, or of any person having charge of the ship, as well as the officers, crew or agents of the Purchaser. The Supplier shall not be liable

for, and shall not be obliged to rectify, any such errors or deficiencies that arise from the repairs made by the Purchaser on the basis of pt. II of this paragraph.

IV. The Supplier will appoint its responsible engineer for the above-mentioned twelve-month warranty period, who will be remunerated by the Purchaser for this period according to Polish wage standards for the first ship's engineers. This engineer will have full authority and all due conditions to carry out inspections of the condition of the ships and how they are used and maintained.

§ 13.

I. The Supplier undertakes to purchase in Poland in connection with the construction of the two vessels, which are the subject of this contract, approximately 2,070 tonnes of angle iron at a price of PLN 172.20 per tonne c.i.f. Trieste under the fabrication programme of "Związek Polskich Hut Żelaznych"[32] of rolled iron under Lloyd's Register of Shipping conditions. The dates and other terms of delivery have been agreed between the Supplier and the "Związek Eksportowy Polskich Hut Żelaznych."[33] In addition, the Supplier undertakes to give preference to Polish suppliers of machinery, equipment and supplies for ships, which are the subject of the present agreement, insofar as the c.i.f. prices of the Supplier's yard, grades and deadlines from Polish suppliers are not less favourable than the conditions of competition. The Supplier shall in no way alter or diminish its liability for materials and workmanship on the grounds that any materials or equipment included in the construction of these ships will be purchased in Poland.

II. The Supplier undertakes, at the request of the Purchaser or the Polish Government (Minister of Industry and Trade) to engage, for the duration of and in connection with the construction of these ships, graduates of the Mechanical Department of the State Maritime School in Gdynia and/or students of the Polish Universities of Tehcnology or Gdańsk University of Technology for unpaid traineeships in the number of two persons from the deck service and four persons from the machinery service for each ship, each for a period of 15 months during the construction of the ships, as well as two Polish engineers for practical training during the construction of machinery and ships in the Supplier's own shipyard or in the workshops and plants of sub-suppliers. The manner and mode of performance of the aforementioned practices shall depend simultaneously by written agreement between the parties.

32 Związek Polskich Hut Żelaznych sp. z o.o. – a cartel agreement located in Katowice, uniting 13 ironworks and owning stocks of smelting companies, which was in place from 1 January 1926 to 1939. Its purpose was perpetuating a shared price policy and protecting economic interests of smelting companies. It conducted commissionaire sales of smelting products and raw materials, and set production sizes via agreement.

33 Związek Eksportowy Polskich Hut Żelaznych sp. z o.o. – a central organisation of export of rolling products located in Katowice, founded in 1935. It represented the Polish group of ironworks and steelworks in the international cartel.

§ 14.

I. The price of one ship is 30,910,000 Italian lire, i.e. the total purchase price of the two ships, which are the subject of this contract, is 61,820,000 Italian lire.

II. The above sum as well as any other sums of money due or to be due to the Supplier from the Purchaser or the Purchaser from the Supplier under this contract shall be understood in Italian gold lira, 100 gold lire being equivalent to the value of 7.919 grams of pure gold or equivalent.

III. The purpose of the acquisition, set out in pt. I of this paragraph, shall be paid as follows:

a) The Supplier shall debit the Purchaser's account with receivables due to the progress of construction of ordered ship, according to the following table:

Instalment	Percent of the full price	First ship [date and amount]	Second ship [date and amount]
First	10% of the full ship price at the signing of this Contract	01.12.1933 3,091,000	01.12.1933 3,091,000
Second	15% of the full ship price at the ship keel beam installation	01.03.1934 4,636,500	01.05.1934 4,636,500
Third	15% of the full ship price at the frame construction or equivalent	01.07.1934 4,636,500	01.10.1934 4,636,500
Fourth	15% of the full ship price after covering with metal sheet or equivalent	01.10.1934 4,636,500	01.02.1935 4,636,500
Fifth	15% of the full ship price after floating off the ship	01.01.1935 4,636,500	01.06.1935 4,636,500
Sixth	30% of the full ship price at the ship delivery	01.07.1935 9,273,000	01.02.1936 9,273,000

b) the sum of the above instalments, starting from the second instalment, i.e. from the instalment due at the time of keel beam installation of each ship, i.e. instalments for the total amount of 55,638,000 Italian lire are spread over 12 equal semi-annual instalments of 4,636,500 Italian lire each, the due dates of which are specified in column I of the table below:

No.	Payment date	Principal instalment	Interest due	Total
1	2	3	4	5
1	01.12.1933	6,182,000.00		6,182,000.00
2	01.06.1934	4,636,500.00	100,457.50	4,736,957.50
3	01.09.1934	–	125,571.90	125,571.90
4	01.12.1934	4,636,500.00	251,143.75	4,887,643.75
5	01.03.1935	–	301,372.50	301,372.50

1	2	3	4	5
6	01.06.1935	4,636,500.00	376,715.60	5,013,215.60
7	01.09.1935	–	426,944.40	426,944.40
8	01.12.1935	4,636,500.00	527,401.90	5,163,901.90
9	01.03.1936	–	502,287.50	502,287.50
10	01.06.1936	4,636,500.00	602,745.00	5,239,245.00
11	01.09.1936	–	527,401.90	527,401.90
12	01.12.1936	4,636,500.00	527,401.90	5,163,901.90
13	01.03.1937	–	452,058.75	452,058.75
14	01.06.1937	4,636,500.00	452,058.75	5,088,558.75
15	01.09.1937	–	376,715.65	376,715.65
16	01.12.1937	4,636,500.00	376,715.65	5,013,215.65
17	01.03.1938	–	301,372.50	301,372.50
18	01.06.1938	4,636,500.00	301,372.50	4,937,872.50
19	01.09.1938	–	226,029.40	226,029.40
20	01.12.1938	4,636,500.00	226,029.40	4,862,529.40
21	01.03.1939	–	150,686.25	150,686.25
22	01.06.1939	4,636,500.00	150,686.25	4,787,186.25
23	01.09.1939	–	75,343.10	75,343.10
24	01.12.1939	4,636,500.00	75,343.10	4,711,843.10
Total		61,820,000.00	7,433,855.15	69,253,855.15

c) The Purchaser undertakes to pay the Supplier interest on the sums referred to in para. a) at a rate of 6.5% per annum for the periods from the dates proven by the Supplier to have arisen in accordance with para. a) up to the dates specified in the table of agreed payment dates, whereby the interest in the second column of the above table has been calculated for three-month periods in arrears and is to be paid by the Purchaser on the dates specified in the table. It is understood that the calculation of interest in the above table is based, on the one hand, on the fixed payment dates of the twelve semi-annual instalments of the purchase price of the ships, and, on the other hand, on the fixed dates of the shipbuilding schedule according to pt. III a) in the event that the dates indicated by pt. III a) have not been met by the Supplier, the relevant sums of interest will be adjusted accordingly.

d) In the event that the Purchaser fails to pay the instalments of the purchase price of the ships or the interest due up to the acceptance of the ships within the aforementioned deadlines, the Supplier shall receive interest on these sums from the Purchaser for the periods of delay in the amount of 2% higher, i.e. 8.5% per annum on both the overdue instalments of the purchase price and the overdue instalments of interest. Due to the provisions of § 19 of this contract, the aforementioned interest shall not be calculated

for the period from the date of signing of the contract to 1 December 1934, however, the contractual interest of 6 ½ % per annum shall be paid by the Purchaser to the Supplier on the instalments of the purchase price of the ships and the interest instalments for the period from the date of entry into force of this contract to 1 December 1934, calculated every three months.

e) In the event of non-payment of instalments and interest payable on the specified dates after delivery of both ships, the Supplier shall also have the right to calculate interest as per para. d) for the periods of delay at a rate of 8.5% per annum, calculated up to the date of payment of the requested rest of the purchase price of the ships.

f) The Purchaser reserves the right to make instalment payments before the agreed dates, provided that it notifies the Supplier of its intention to make an early payment at least three months before the relevant date. In this case, interest of 6.5% p.a. will be charged to the Purchaser on sums paid in advance from the date of payment until the agreed payment date.

g) All payments under this contract to the Supplier, not excluding payments resulting from the provisions of § 19, shall be made by the Purchaser to a first-class Italian bank, which the Supplier shall appoint in writing.

h) after acceptance of the ships by the Purchaser, the Supplier shall have the right to require the Purchaser to issue bills of exchange to cover the remaining amount due to the Supplier over and above the payments made, taking into account the provisions of § 19 hereof. These bills of exchange will be for the respective amounts and dates indicated in the repayment table (para. b). The stamp duty on bills of exchange shall be borne by the Purchaser.

§ 15.

I. In order to secure the fulfilment of its obligations to pay the purchase prices of ships with interest in accordance with the provisions of this contract, the Purchaser shall register a pledge for the Supplier, separately for each of the purchased ships, according to the following principles:

a) During the construction of the ships, until their acceptance, a pledge in favour of the Supplier shall be registered at the Italian ship registry in Trieste, at the Supplier's request, for each ship under construction, in the amount of 30,910,000 Italian lire for each ship, and insurance policies shall be deposited in accordance with the provisions of § 10 pt. II.

b) After completion and acceptance of the ships in accordance with § 9, the right of pledge will, at the Supplier's request, be reserved on temporary consular certificates (temporary flag certificates), which will be issued for both ships in accordance with Polish law until they are registered in the Polish Register of Ships at the Municipal Court in Gdynia. The Supplier shall have the right to appoint pledge representatives for this period of time,

who will travel in this capacity on the ships from the place of their acceptance to the home port.

c) Simultaneously with the entry of the ships into the Polish Register of Ships, which will be made at the Purchaser's request immediately upon the arrival of each ship in the Port of Gdynia after the acceptance of the ship, a pledge will be registered in accordance with the rules of law in force in Gdynia. For this purpose, the Purchaser shall make all necessary court applications, records, or deeds, or the Supplier shall have the right to do so under this contract via its representatives, and by this contract the Purchaser permits and authorises the Supplier to do all acts before the judicial and administrative authorities in Poland in order to record in the Polish Register of Ships a registered pledge in favour of the Supplier pursuant to the provisions of this contract in an amount corresponding to the unpaid price of the ships at the time of their handover plus interest according to the instalment plan (§ 14 pt. III) and 10% of the total sum so determined to cover the interest of the delay and possible costs, on each ship, with the simultaneous deletion of the deposit entries, established on these ships in accordance with point a) of this paragraph in the Italian Register oh Ships in Trieste. In order to enable the Supplier to exercise the rights granted to it above, the Purchaser shall be obliged to issue an appropriate power of attorney to the Supplier prior to the acceptance of the ships.

d) A pledge in accordance with the provisions above shall be registered separately for each of the two purchased ships, together with all appurtenances, equipment, fixtures, appliances, machinery, instruments, tools, lifeboats, stores, and materials of all kinds which are in each case on each of the ships in that capacity and owned by the Purchaser or the owner of the ship.

e) The pledge shall also cover the sums insured under § 16 of this contract. In view of the above, the pledge and its clauses will be visible on the insurance policies. The Supplier may not refuse the Purchaser consent to collect remuneration for ship failures or damage if all instalments and interest, the dates and payments of which, in accordance with the provisions of § 14 pt. III, occurred prior to the payment of the insurance sum, were paid in full on time. The Purchaser shall have the right to collect sums up to 100,000 Italian lire or the equivalent without the permission of the Supplier. In the event of total loss or abandonment of the ship or ships, the Supplier may make its consent conditional on receiving from the insurance sum all residual receivables for the lost or abandoned ship. All the above conditions should be disclosed in the policy.

f) The registered pledge defined in this contract shall be established separately for each of the ships as the first number in the register of pledges of each ship, and as long as the total purchase price of the ships together with the interest due is not paid, the Supplier's rights of priority over any other pledge shall always remain in force. Should the above condition not be complied with by the Purchaser, then the total unpaid portion of the

purchase price of each ship, plus interest, shall become immediately due and payable, and the Supplier shall have the right, in order to secure and enforce its claims, to take any legal action against the ship or ships which are the subject of this contract.

g) The Supplier shall have the same rights whenever 1) an instalment or interest due pursuant to § 14 pt. III is not paid by the Purchaser in full after acceptance of the ships, 2) the ship or ships change flag, 3) the Purchaser or subsequent owner of the ship or ships goes into bankruptcy or liquidation, 4) the insurance of the ship or ships is not renewed on time.

h) The Purchaser undertakes to keep the ships in proper order until the full payment of the receivables for the ships, including interest.

i) In the event that other creditors of the Purchaser demand that one or both of the ships that are the subject of this contract be or become subject to a receivership, the Supplier shall, unless this is contrary to applicable law, have the right to appoint its own receiver or receivers with the rights of receivership; the latter shall be registered at the ship's registry, unless this is objected to by the registry authority.

§ 16.

I. From the time of acceptance of the ships until the full purchase price for both ships including interest according to the provisions hereof has been paid, the Purchaser shall insure the ships including all furnishing, equipment, etc. at their full value against all risks and perils. The Supplier is obliged to indicate to the Purchaser two insurance companies, authorised to operate in Poland, from which the Purchaser shall choose one at its own discretion, provided that the insurance rates and other insurance conditions are not higher or worse than those of other competing first-class insurance companies in Poland. Otherwise, the insurance will be taken out with the company of the Purchaser's choice.

II. The Purchaser undertakes to notify the insurance company of the registered pledge in favour of the Supplier on both ships existing under this contract.

III. The insurance policies will be deposited by the Purchaser with Banque Federale Suisse a Zurich until the purchase price for both ships, including interest, has been paid in full.

§ 17.

I. This contract shall be governed by English law.

II. In the event of any dispute arising between the Supplier and the Purchaser in relation to the interpretation or performance of any terms of this contract or its appendices, both parties agree that such dispute shall in any event be submitted to arbitration (arbitration court), which shall consist of three persons and shall be held in London under

English law. For the arbitration, both parties shall appoint one arbitrator each, and these arbitrators shall select a super arbitrator. Should the arbitrators be unable to unanimously select a super arbitrator, the latter shall be designated by the President of the London Chamber of Shipping.

III. The arbitration court's awards are final and binding upon both parties.

IV. The costs of the arbitration shall be borne by both parties in equal shares.

§ 18.

Costs and charges related to this agreement shall be borne by the Supplier in the amount of PLN 30,000, and the remaining part of these costs and charges shall be borne by the Purchaser. The costs and fees of registering the pledges in Italy shall be borne entirely by the Supplier, while the costs and fees of registering the pledges in Gdynia shall be borne entirely by the Purchaser.

§ 19.

I. Due to the obligations of the Italian State Railways to purchase from the Polish coal mines the sum of Italian lire 60,000,000 f.o.b. Gdynia, over a period of 4 years, and in view of the agreement between the Purchaser and the Polish coal mines, and in order to avoid the transfer of currency from one country to another, the sum of 60,000,000 Italian lire to be paid by the Italian State Railways to the Polish mines will be used in Italy for the payment of instalments and interest to be paid to the Supplier by the Purchaser. The Supplier and the Purchaser hereby agree that the Supplier shall credit the Purchaser's account with all sums to be transferred to the Supplier by the Italian State Railways, whereby the Supplier shall continue to credit the Purchaser's current account at the end of every three months with interest at the rate of 6.5% per annum on any credit balances to the Purchaser in connection with instalment payments (§ 14 pt. III).

II. The Purchaser, for its part, undertakes to pay directly to the Polish coal supplying mines the equivalent of the sums paid to the Supplier by the Italian railways as dues for coal purchased in Poland pursuant to the above undertaking.

III. The Purchaser undertakes to obtain the following from the Polish coal mines, represented by the "Ogólnopolska Konwencja Węglowa":

a) that the agreement to be concluded between the Board of Directors of the Italian State Railways and the Polish coal mines, hereinafter referred to as the Coal Agreement, will contain a clause specifying that all payments for delivered coal are to be made by the Italian State Railways to the Supplier ("Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico" Trieste).

b) that the Polish coal mines authorise the Supplier by a separate letter to collect from the Italian State Railways all amounts due from the Polish mines under the above-mentioned Coal Agreement, to retain these collected sums, and to use these sums to cover

the instalments due for the ships as provided for in this contract and the interest instalments due.

IV. If, in connection with the performance of the Coal Agreement, there would be a delay in the payment of the amount due for the coal accepted from the Polish mines by the Italian State Railways, then the Supplier shall not have the right to benefit from the clause of immediate enforceability of the rest of the purchase price of the ships (§ 14 pt. III), while it shall have the right to claim interest on these sums at the rate of 6.5% per annum.

V. If, in view of the application of the gold valorisation clause pursuant to § 14 pt. II, and in the absence of such a clause in the Coal Agreement, the Purchaser was to make supplementary payments to the Supplier, then, in view of the economic link between the two contracts and in order to avoid the transfer of currencies from country to country, it is agreed that the supplementary payments would be made only through the delivery of Polish goods, either by increasing the amount of coal to be delivered by the Polish coal mines to the Italian State Railways, or by some other means to be determined at a later date. It is further agreed that no interest will be charged by the Supplier to the Purchaser on these additional payments and for the period of time between their maturity date and the date of the new contract or the relevant new contracts for additional deliveries of coal or other goods.

§ 20.

This Contract has been drawn up in Polish and English, the annexes only in English. The Contract and Annexes are signed in two identical copies, one of which is received by the Supplier and the other by the Purchaser. In case of doubt, the English text is authoritative and binding.

§ 21.

This contract becomes binding for both parties upon the conclusion and signing of the Coal Agreement provided for in § 19 above between the Board of the Italian State Railways and the managements of the Polish coal mines in the person of or through the "Ogólnopolska Konwencja Węglowa".

Stamp	Stamp
"Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico"	"Polish Transatlantic Shipping Co. Ltd."
(–) Augusto Cosulich	(–) A. R. Leszczyński (–) M. Plinius

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English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The purpose of this article is to provide insight into the signing circumstances and the contents of the contract of 29 November 1933, between "Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe" (Polish Transatlantic Shipping Company Limited, or PTTO) and "Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico" (United Shipbuilders of the Adriatic, or CRDA) for the construction of ocean liners MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory." PTTO, a Polish – Danish shipping line, was created

on 16 February 1929, on the basis of a contract signed between the Polish Ministry of Industry and Trade and "East Asiatic Company Limited". Three steam ocean liners underwent a change of flag to flag of Poland (SS "Pułaski," SS "Kościuszko," and SS "Polonia"), the goal of which was to maintain regular transfer of passengers and goods between Gdynia and Halifax and New York. Unfavourable operating results and the economic crisis of 1931–1932 meant that PTTO, like other Polish shipping companies with outdated ships unable to compete with foreign competitors, was forced to replace its ships with modern ones - the fastest and cheapest in operation. As the purchase of ready-made new ships proved impossible, it was decided to subcontract their construction to the Italian company CRDA of Trieste, which offered the Polish side good and cheap to operate ships, as well as favourable credit conditions and the concept of coal compensation. The Italians have also indicated their willingness to purchase hard coal from Silesian mines over the next few years, almost matching the value of the ships. The contract for the construction of MS "Piłsudski" and MS "Batory" was signed on 29 November 1933 in Warsaw, and the period of supervision of its execution by the Supervisory Commission began. MS "Piłsudski" was launched on 19 December 1934 at the Monfalcone shipyard and arrived in the port of Gdynia on 12 September 1935. Two days later, a ceremony of consecration and hoisting of the Polish flag took place, and on 15 September 1935 MS "Piłsudski" left the port of Gdynia for her first voyage to New York. The ceremony of the launching of MS "Batory" took place on 3 July 1935 in Monfalcone, while the consecration of the Polish flag took place on 17 September 1936 in Gdynia. Two days later, the transatlantic liner set off on her first voyage to New York, henceforth making regular voyages while alternating with MS "Piłsudski." During the summer, in between voyages, she made tourist trips to European ports. The new transatlantic ships were an excellent shipping investment, being the most modern vessels of their type sailing the seas of north-eastern and central-eastern Europe. After the outbreak of World War II, they were requisitioned by the British. MS "Piłsudski" sailed as an auxiliary battlecruiser and on 26 November 1939, sank during her first voyage to Australia. MS "Batory," after being refitted and rearmed, served for six years during World War II, before being returned to GAL in 1946 and once again flying the Polish flag.

Umowa na budowę transatlantyków "Piłsudski" i "Batory" z dnia 29 listopada 1933 roku

Słowa kluczowe: transatlantyki, statki, polska marynarka handlowa, umowa, rejsy, sztuka, design, symbol, II RP

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł ma na celu przybliżenie okoliczności zawarcia i treść umowy z 29 listopada 1933 r., pomiędzy "Polskim Transatlantyckim Towarzystwem Okrętowym SA" (PTTO), a "Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico (CRDA)," na budowę transatlantyków M/S "Piłsudski" i M/S "Batory." PTTO, polsko-duńską linię żeglugową powołano do życia 16 lutego 1929 r. na mocy umowy podpisanej przez Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu z "A/S Det Østasiatiske Kompagni." Pod polską banderę przeszły wówczas 3 parowce transatlantyckie ("Pułaski," "Kościuszko" i "Polonia"), które miały zapewnić regularną wymianę pasażersko-towarową między Gdynią

a Halifaxem i Nowym Jorkiem. Niekorzystne wyniki eksploatacyjne i kryzys gospodarczy lat 1931–1932 sprawiły, że PTTO, podobnie jak inne polskie towarzystwa żeglugowe, posiadające przestarzałe statki, nie będący w stanie rywalizować z zagranicznymi konkurentami, zmuszone zostały do ich wymiany na nowoczesne – najszybsze i najtańsze w eksploatacji. Jako że zakup gotowych nowych, okazał się niemożliwy, postanowiono zlecić ich budowę włoskiemu przedsiębiorstwu CRDA z Triestu, które zaproponowało stronie polskiej statki dobre i tanie w eksploatacji oraz dogodne warunki kredytowe i koncepcję kompensaty węglowej. Włosi zgłosili też gotowość zakupu w ciągu kolejnych lat węgla kamiennego z kopalń śląskich, prawie w pełni odpowiadającej wartością cenie statków. Umowę na budowę motorowców "Piłsudski" i "Batory" podpisano 29 listopada 1933 r. w Warszawie i z tą chwilą rozpoczął się okres wykonywania nadzoru nad jej wykonaniem przez Komisję Nadzorczą. Wodowanie "Piłsudskiego" odbyło się 19 grudnia 1934 r. w stoczni Monfalcone, a do portu w Gdyni zawinął 12 września 1935 r. Dwa dni później odbyła się na nim uroczystość poświęcenia i podniesienia polskiej bandery, a 15 września 1935 r. "Piłsudski" opuścił port gdyński, udając się w pierwszą podróż do Nowego Jorku. Uroczystość spuszczenia na wodę "Batorego" odbyła się 3 lipca 1935 r. w Monfalcone, zaś poświęcenie polskiej bandery 17 września 1936 r. w Gdyni. Dwa dni później transatlantyk wyruszył w pierwszą podróż do Nowego Jorku, odbywając odtąd regularne rejsy na zmianę z "Piłsudskim," a w okresie letnim, w przerwach między rejsami, odbywał wycieczki turystyczne do portów europejskich. Nowe transatlantyki były doskonałą inwestycją żeglugową, będąc najnowocześniejszymi jednostkami tego typu, pływającymi na morzach północno-wschodniej i centralno-wschodniej Europy. Po wybuchu II wojny światowej zostały zarekwirowane przez Brytyjczyków. "Piłsudski" pływał jako pomocniczy krążownik i 26 listopada 1939 r., zatonął podczas pierwszego rejsu do Australii. "Batory," po przebudowie i uzbrojeniu, przez 6 lat służył w czasie II wojny światowej, po czym w 1946 r. zwrócono go spółce GAL i ponownie podniesiono na nim ponownie polską banderę.

Citation

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Preparations of the Shipping Company "Żegluga Polska SA" for the Second World War

Keywords: "Żegluga Polska SA," World War II on the Baltic Sea, the merchant fleet of the Second Polish Republic, Polish shipowners

Introduction

"Żegluga Polska SA" was established in 1926. It was the first Polish shipowner financed entirely by the Polish government and, what is more, one that received governmental subsidies throughout the interwar period. Initially, the company was called "Żegluga Polska,"[1] yet in 1932 the name was changed to "Żegluga Polska SA"[2] when the enterprise transformed into a joint stock company. In the same year in which the company was established, "Żegluga Polska" purchased five steamships from the French shipowner "Chantiers Navals Français." Since the vessels were designed to transport wood, coal and scrap metal,[3] in the first few years, they were primarily used in tramp shipping,

1 Jordan Siemianowski, "The Circumstances of the Establishment of "Żegluga Polska" in 1926," *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 99; "1934 styczeń 30, Gdynia – Informacje Inspektoratu Straży Granicznej Gdynia dla Pomorskiego Inspektora Okręgowego Straży Granicznej w Bydgoszczy o przedsiębiorstwie armatorskim „Żegluga Polska" w Gdyni," in: *Wywiad gospodarczy Straży Granicznej wobec firm gdańsko–gdyńskich w latach 1932–1938*, compiled by Piotr Kołakowski, Ryszard Techman (Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2010), 41–42.

2 Wanda Czerwińska, "Na morzu i zapleczu," in: *Dzieje Gdyni*, ed. Roman Wapiński (Wrocław: National Institute Ossolińskich, 1980), 45; Jarosław Drozd, "Register Files of The State Enterprise and the Joint Stock Company «Żegluga Polska» in Gdynia as a Source in Research on the Polish Merchant Navy under the Second Polish Republic," *Studia Maritima* 34 (2021), 89.

3 Siemianowski, "The Circumstances," 102.

carrying mainly bulk cargo, which also included ores and fertilisers apart from the above-mentioned items.[4]

In 1939, the ships of the company operated mainly in Baltic ports and maintained the following shipping lines: to Finland (Helsinki via Tallin), to East Baltic ports (Riga and Klaipeda), to eastern and western Sweden (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö), to Rotterdam, to Hamburg, as well as to ports in the Middle East (the Levantine line).[5] At the outbreak of the Second World War, the fleet of „Żegluga Polska SA" included the following vessels with a gross register tonnage exceeding 250 GRT: the motor ships: MV "Lewant" (1,942 GRT), MV "Lechistan" (1,907 GRT), MV "Oksywie" (766 GRT), MV "Rozewie" (766 GRT), as well as the steamships: SS "Chorzów" (845 GRT), SS "Cieszyn" (1,386 GRT), SS "Gdańsk" (538 GRT), SS "Gdynia" (1,636 GRT), SS "Hel" (1,066 GRT), SS "Katowice" (1,995 GRT), SS "Kraków" (2,018 GRT), SS "Poznań" (2,017 GRT), SS "Puck" (1,055 GRT), SS "Śląsk" (1,402 GRT), SS "Tczew" (760 GRT), SS "Toruń" (2,018 GRT), SS "Wilno" (2,018 GRT) and SS "Wisła" (3,108 GRT).[6]

In the interwar period, „Żegluga Polska SA" was the greatest Polish shipowner and one which continued to develop. Needless to say, the company played an important role in the war plans of the Polish government with regard to maritime transport. As a consequence, it had to be protected against destruction or falling into enemy hands. In this context, the question that arises is what steps the shipowner took to prepare itself for an armed conflict between the Second Polish Republic and the Third Reich in order to meet the challenge. In the remaining part of the article, the present author makes an attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to this research question.

The contents of this article are the outcome of a thorough analysis of written records available for researchers in the archival holdings of "Żegluga Polska SA," stored at State Archive in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch (Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, Oddział w Gdyni, catalogue numbers 23, 37) and the Naval Museum in Gdynia (Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni, sygn. 580A). As for the literature of the subject, its usefulness turned out to be relatively limited in this case, due to the fact that in-depth academic research into the subject matter has not been conducted so far. From the perspective of this contribution, the most important works were written by Jerzy Pertek,[7] Jerzy Piwowoński[8]

4 Janusz Czechowski, *Gdynia i Wolne Miasto Gdańsk w politycznej, gospodarczej i kulturalnej perspektywie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2018), 125.

5 Teodor Brandowski, "Polska marynarka handlowa," in: *Monografia Wielkiego Pomorza i Gdyni. Z okazji 20-lecia powrotu ziemi pomorskiej do Macierzy* (Toruń: Polska Niepodległa, 1939, reprint: Lublin: Wydawnictwo Petit, 2009), 71.

6 Jerzy Pertek, *Druga mała flota* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie), 1983, 27; Jan Piwowoński, *Flota spod biało-czerwonej* (Warszawa: Nasza Księgarnia, 1989), 17–35; Roger W. Jordan, *The World's Merchant Fleets 1939. The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships* (Londyn: Chatham Publishing, 1999), 345.

7 Pertek, *Druga mała*.

8 Piwowoński, *Flota spod*.

and Stanisław Darski.[9] However, despite their undeniable value, they should be regarded as complementary sources.

Security conditions of "Żegluga Polska SA" until the spring of 1939

The headquarters of „Żegluga Polska SA" were situated in the town of Gdynia, which was also a home port for the vessels belonging to the company. Being located by the sea and in the close vicinity of the Free City of Danzig, the company was particularly vulnerable to military operations. The constantly growing number of German vessels entering the ports in Gdańsk and Gdynia created numerous opportunities for captains and sailors working on these ships to establish contacts with employees of the ports located within the Polish customs area.[10] What is more, „Żegluga Polska SA" as well as other companies located in Gdynia, such as "August Wolff i Ska," "Ferdynand Prowe," "Rothert i Kiłaczycki," operated maritime connections with German ports, which attracted the interest of both Polish intelligence and the Polish Border Guard.[11] Contacts with the German shipping community were further fostered by private agreements signed by representatives of the Polish and German iron industry on 19 October 1934, which constituted a supplement to the main protocol of 7 March 1934, which ended mutual economic discrimination. At that time, Polish shipping lines were represented by „Żegluga Polska SA" persuant to other agreements signed on 28 February and 1 March 1934, which formed some kinds of cartel agreements. One of them was a shipping agreement which stated that a pool be established between specified German shipping lines and "Żegluga Polska SA," or its potential legal successor.[12]

The Maritime Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu) and the Polish military authorities began preparations for the inclusion of merchant ships at the end of 1936. At that time, shipowners were obliged by secret orders to specially strengthen the hulls and superstructures during periodic repairs of ships or the design of new ones. The implementation of these activities was supervised by Leonard Możdżeński and Tadeusz Ocioszyński, director of the Department and head of the Shipping Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

On 30 March 1939, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland adopted the "Act on Communications in the Service of State Defense," which came into effect immediately after its

9 Stanisław Darski, *W służbie żeglugi* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1978).

10 In the interwar period, the ports in Gdynia and Gdańsk belonged to the Polish customs territory.

11 Jan Tymiński, *Administracja morska w Gdyni w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Organizacja, kadry, działalność* (Gdynia: Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni, 2020), 306.

12 Stefan Franciszek Królikowski, *Zarys polskiej polityki handlowej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki celnej* (Warszawa: Instytut Społeczny, 1938), 242–244.

announcement on 1 April. This act introduced the obligation not to employ or dismiss persons indicated by the authorities, regarding whom there were concerns that they would not ensure the safety of state secrets.[13]

Some of the initial steps taken to secure the port in Gdynia included the regulations, dated 23 October 1929 and issued by the director of the Maritime Office (MO), Józef Poznański, which forbade residing within the port area without a special permit obtained from MO. In addition to that, third parties and people who were not employed within the port area were forbidden entry without a special pass issued by the Harbour Master's Office. The office also issued passes to visitors and tour operators, which had to be shown on request by the port's authorities or police officers.[14] With regard to vessels, on 3 February 1939, an amendment regarding the rules of keeping a log-book was introduced, which, first of all, facilitated the introduction of navigational records. However, the document did not state whether it was obligatory to keep a log-book during wartime.[15]

It should be remembered that the above-mentioned regulations formed part of routine preventive measures that were not directly linked with Poland's preparations for the Second World War. As a matter of fact, both the Polish state authorities and the management of the port in Gdynia had procrastinated for a very long time with regard to implementing necessary measures to adjust the merchant fleet to war conditions. The situation did not change even in May 1938 when the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a message from the Allies that Germany might provoke a European war.[16] After the events which took place in Munich in the autumn of 1938, the Polish policy of equilibrium, based on agreements with the Soviet Union (1932) and the Third Reich (1934) became unrealistic in the long run. It was not until December 1938 that the Polish minister of foreign affairs, Józef Beck, started to understand that Adolf Hitler's appetite had grown when he had realised how weak Germany's neighbours were.[17] In early January 1939, Beck was overcome by deep pessimism as once again he rejected Germany's demands to incorporate the Free City of Danzig and create an extraterritorial connection, linking the Third Reich with East Prussia and running across the so-called Polish Corridor, also known as the Danzig Corridor, which belonged to Poland.[18] According to the

13 Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni, sygn. 580 A, Jan Kazimierz Sawicki, *Ewakuacja polskiej floty handlowej z Bałtyku (sierpień–listopad 1939)*, [wrzesień 1989], Referat wygłoszony na sesji Klubu Publicystów Morskich w Gdyni-Oksywiu z okazji 50 rocznicy wybuchu drugiej wojny światowej, 14.09.1989, 1.

14 Tymiński, *Administracja*, 208–209.

15 Jan Kazimierz Sawicki, *Podróże polskich statków 1939–1945* (Gdynia: Polskie Towarzystwo Nautologiczne, 1989), 8.

16 Marek Kornat, Mariusz Wołos, *Józef Beck. Biografia* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2020), 556–557.

17 Kornat, Wołos, *Józef Beck*, 633, 643.

18 Jan Szembek, *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka (1935–1945)*, vol. 4, compiled by Jan Zarański (Londyn: The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 1972), 467; Kornat, Wołos, *Józef Beck*, s. 653.

Polish minister, the incorporation of the Free City of Danzig by the Third Reich would inevitably lead to the outbreak of a military conflict between Poland and Germany.[19] The uneasy situation became even more complicated in December 1938 when the incidence of Polish citizens of Danzig being harassed by Germans increased significantly.[20]

The atmosphere in the Polish government became even more tense after the Germans established a protectorate in Czechia and Moravia in March 1939.[21] In April 1939, in turn, Col. Antoni Szymański presented J. Beck with compelling evidence confirming that Germany was preparing for mobilisation.[22]

The Polish state authorities had a relatively detailed knowledge of the advantage of Germany's military and economic potential. In one of the most important documents related to Poland's preparations for the war against Germany[23] – *A study of the strategic plan of Poland against Germany* (*Studium planu strategicznego Polski przeciw Niemcom*) – authored by Gen. Stanisław Kutrzeba and Lt. Col. Stefan Mossor, which was based on a thorough analysis, it was stated, among other things, that the Third Reich's military power is three times greater than that of Poland (in terms of size, military equipment and operational mobility). According to the report, Germany was also at an advantage with respect to its industrial potential, yet smaller differences were reported in the domain of agriculture.[24]

For a long time, the advanced works aimed at determining the military and economic potential of the Third Reich did not result in Poland's beginning real preparations for war at sea. It is confirmed by the fact that on 23 March 1939, the Maritime Coast Defence Command still did not have a defence plan, nor was it prepared to realise key defence tasks.[25]

19 Marian Zgórniak, *Europa w przededniu wojny. Sytuacja militarna w latach 1938–1939* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 1993), 283.

20 Henryk Stępniak, *Polska i Wolne Miasto Gdańsk 1920–1939. Stosunki polityczne* (Gdańsk: Oficyna Pomorska, 2004), 197–213.

21 Szembek, *Diariusz*, 525–530.

22 Marian Leczyk, *Polska i sąsiedzi. Stosunki wojskowe 1921–1939* (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Filii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1997), 322.

23 Other studies regarding the preparations of the Second Polish Republic for war include: a study by the Chief of Staff of the Army Inspectorate in Kraków, Col. Jan Thullie (1921), operational plans of the Chief of General Staff, General Stanisław Haller (1929), an inspector's plan army of General Aleksander Osiński (1930), plan by General Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki, study by General Gustaw Orlicz–Dreszer. See: Piotr Stawecki, "Studium planu strategicznego Polski przeciw Niemcom Tadeusza Kutrzeby i Stanisława Mosora." *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 98 (1991), 1: 61–66.

24 Dariusz Kozerawski, "Polskie planowanie strategiczne przeciw Niemcom przed II wojną światową," in: *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. Andrzej Pepłoński, Adam Szymanowicz (Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. generała T. Kościuszki, 2010), 422–423.

25 Wacław Tym, Andrzej Rzepniewski, "Przygotowania do obrony rejonu Gdyni przez siły Lądowej Obrony Wybrzeża," in: *Gdynia 1939. Relacje uczestników walk lądowych*, compiled by Wacław Tym, Andrzej Rzepniewski (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1979), 22.

Preparations of "Żegluga Polska SA" for an armed conflict

It was not until the spring of 1939 that a state of emergency was introduced for Polish vessels. Also, infrastructure work was intensified to enhance defensive readiness on the coast.[26] First of all, efforts were made to protect the Polish merchant fleet against destruction or falling into enemy hands. At the end of March 1939, the Maritime Department at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which at that time was in charge of the merchant fleet, passed a number of laws related to sea shipping in time of war. Among other things, the department prepared an evacuation plan, which involved moving the offices of most important shipping companies from Gdynia to Warsaw, developed plans for evacuation and deployment of the merchant and fishing fleet and made a decision to establish representative offices for individual Polish shipping companies in Great Britain.

The Ministry of Industry and Trade also started to collect information regarding preparatory work regarding merchant vessels. The last activity related to works that had been conducted for several years by the Department of Merchant Fleet at the Organisation and Mobilisation Unit of the Command Headquarters of the Polish Navy in Warsaw (Referat Marynarki Handlowej przy Wydziale Organizacyjno-Mobilizacyjnym Sztabu Kierownictwa Marynarki Wojennej w Warszawie). The works were intended to assess all the merchant and fishing vessels in terms of technical and technological usability in times of war. Auxiliary vessels were also re-examined with respect to suitability for performing support functions, e.g. transporting troops, military supplies, munitions or for patrolling and minesweeping.[27] The activities only consisted in determining which of the ships were suitable for serving as auxiliary vessels while transporting military materials or soldiers necessary to perform military actions. Thus, they did not involve developing Poland's military potential or defence capabilities, but they focused on controlling the existing equipment resources.

In practice, Polish state authorities had already been using, to a limited extent, merchant vessels to carry military supplies, which meant they were being tested for their usability in warfare. As these transports were to be kept secret, at the end of August 1939, Polish vessels were ordered to bypass the Kiel Canal and head towards the Sund and the Belts. For example, in July 1939, 50 medium tanks were loaded onto the MV "Lewant" in Dunkirk. The ship sailed through the Sund with its lights off, the tanks were offloaded in Gdynia.[28] It is also worth noting that, in the second half of August 1939,

26 Czesław Ciesielski, "Obrona Gdyni w 1939 roku," in: *Dzieje Gdyni*, ed. Roman Wapiński (Wrocław: National Institute Ossolińskich, 1980), 199.

27 Pertek, *Druga mała*, 36.

28 Stefan Ciundziewicki, "Lata wojny na m/s «Lewant»," in: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę* (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1972), 75.

the SS "Hel" entered the Kiel Canal contrary to the recommendations[29]. What is more, in the months leading to the outbreak of WWII, Polish vessels belonging to „Żegluga Polska SA" almost entirely stopped entering the port of Danzig.[30]

When the Polish government began preparations for war, „Żegluga Polska SA" also had to intensify its efforts. The first actions of the management of the Polish shipowner aimed at preparing the company for warfare took place on 29 March 1939 and consisted in issuing a secret code for its vessels. Every captain was provided with the code, hidden in a sealed envelope without revealing its contents. The envelopes were to be kept under lock and key and could only be opened after a special order issued by the management in a specific form. The code was also passed on to the Fleet Command on 22 April 1939.[31]

Secret codes produced by means of the spirograph and addressed to selected captains working for the company were delivered to the SS "Wisła," MV "Lewant," MV "Lechistan," SS "Poznań," SS "Katowice," SS "Wilno," SS "Kraków," SS "Toruń," SS "Cieszyn," SS "Puck," SS "Śląsk," SS "Hel."[32] It is worth pointing out that the MV "Tczew" did not receive the codes as it was under repair in Gdynia.[33] This undertaking was supervised by the General Department of „Żegluga Polska SA" led by Jerzy Fink-Finowicki, and Ostrowski as his deputy.[34]

The contents of the document in the sealed envelope were carefully guarded till the outbreak of the war and the procedure of disclosing the contents had been planned down to the tiniest detail. The order issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade stipulated that the first officer be informed where the envelopes with the codes were kept. According to the management of "Żegluga Polska SA," the first officer should be entitled and obliged to automatically take charge of both envelopes and follow the instructions whenever he took command of the ship outside the port of Gdynia, e.g. in the case of the captain's illness, an unfortunate accident involving the captain or any other important reason.[35]

In the case of change in the position of captain outside the port of Gdynia, the shipowner's management demanded that the retiring captain hand over both envelopes, opening the one bearing the notice "Open at the handover." As soon as the captain read the instructions, the opened envelope and the instructions were to be put into another envelope which was to be sealed. Then, the retiring captain and his successor were obliged to place their signatures on the sealed part of the envelope. The handover of the

29 Tadeusz Szczygielski, *Pod obcą i polską banderą* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1977), 202.

30 Darski, *W służbie*, 96.

31 Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni (hereinafter: APGOG), Żegluga Polska, sygn. 23, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do Dowództwa Floty w Gdyni, 22.04.1939, 3.

32 Ibidem, Pismo Żegluga Polska SA do K. Jacynicza, 26.04.1939, 11.

33 Piwowoński, *Flota spod*, 22.

34 APGOG, Żegluga Polska, sygn. 23, Pismo z 24.04.1939, 17.

35 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 26.07.1939, 69–70.

envelopes was to take place in the presence of the first officer.[36] The management of the shipowner promised the Ministry of Industry and Trade to deliver five sealed envelopes to the selected captains.[37]

It turned out that, due to shortages in equipment, the sealed envelopes addressed to the captains of ships could not be kept in a fireproof case, which would guarantee the safety of the secret codes while anchoring in the port of Danzig. For this reason, the Ministry of Industry and Trade ordered that, in the case of vessels which did not have a fireproof case, the Head of the Merchant Fleet Office should receive mail in person or by a deputy and then forward it to the General Commissariat of the Republic of Poland in Danzig.[38]

Additionally, upon recommendation issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, „Żegluga Polska SA" provided the ministry with confirmation that all employees maintained professional secrecy, which was ordered verbally. A special memo was issued for employees working both at sea and ashore reminding them about the necessity to maintain professional secrecy. A special clerk was entrusted with the duty of keeping the shipowner's archive. Secret and confidential files were to be stored in a special fireproof case or, alternatively, in iron closets.[39]

The instructions hidden in the sealed envelopes ordered the crews and employees to stay alert and wait for war announcements. All vessels which were outside of Gdynia, i.e. from the time of leaving the port till returning to it, but within the range of the SPG radio station, i.e. approximately 300 nautical miles, were obliged to maintain a radio watch on the wavelength of 3178 mtr. (94 kc/sec) at the following hours: 8.55–9.10; 12.55–13.10; 20.55–21.00. While radios were to be tuned to the wavelength of 1339 mtr. (224 kc/sec) at 10.55–11.10; 14.55–15.10 Central European Time. Exactly the same orders applied to vessels that had called at foreign ports.

A decision was made that the radio station SPG would transmit its announcements for the Polish Merchant Fleet at 9.00, 13.00 and 21.00 on the wavelength of 3,178 mtr. (94.5 kc/sec) in the following manner:

– the signal "2P" (for everyone) repeated five times,
– the signal "Pogoń" ("Chase"),
– the abbreviation "sk."

The SPG radio station was to repeat each announcement three times during one transmission at 9.00, 9.10, 9.20 or 13.00, 13.10, 13.20 or 21.00, 21.10, 21.20. Apart from that, the same announcement was to be repeated six times at the following hours:

36 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 26.07.1939, 70.

37 Ibidem, 79.

38 Ibidem, Pismo L. Możdżeńskiego do Naczelnika Urzędu Marynarki Handlowej, 27.05.1939, 117.

39 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 22.04.1939, 145.

– 9.00, 9.10, 9.20, 13.00, 13.10, 13.20,
– 13.00, 13.10, 13.20, 21.00, 21.10, 21.20,
– 21.00, 21.10, 21.20, 9.00, 9.10, 9.20.

The captains of the vessels to which the order applied were not obliged to confirm in writing that they had received the message. Identical instructions were issued to vessels belonging to the Polish shipowners: "Polskarob Polsko-Skandynawskie Towarzystwo Żeglugowe SA" in Gdynia as well as to those owned by the "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA" ("Polbryt").

It had been decided that if the SPG radio station did not have to transmit any announcements, it would not broadcast. However, regardless of the SPG radio station, a radio watch of Warszawa 1, on the wavelength of 1339 mtr., was to be maintained, particularly at 11.00 and 15.00 ECT. Reception of the signal "Pogoń" meant that the dark blue sealed envelope had to be opened as well as the sealed envelope inside it. From that moment on, the guidelines regarding communication had to be strictly followed. After reading the instructions, the envelope had to be sealed again. The captains of the Polish vessels bore personal and legal responsibility for proper protection of the instructions included in the dark blue envelope as well as the above-mentioned explanations from falling into the wrong hands.[40]

The guidelines included in the envelopes were intended to coordinate the movements of ships belonging to "Żegluga Polska SA" with vessels of other Polish shipowners by means of efficient radio communication. On 20 April 1939, the Ministry of Industry and Trade sent a secret letter to the management of "Żegluga Polska SA" informing them that retired Lt. Cmdr. Konstanty Jacynowicz, in cooperation with the Fleet Command, had been entrusted with organising a special radio network for the merchant fleet. In the case of an immediate threat, the network was to be used to transmit orders to vessels belonging to the Polish Merchant Fleet. The ministry emphasised the fact that when the new codes for the network were introduced, all previous directives regarding this matter should be nullified.[41]

The actions of the Ministry of Industry and Trade persuaded the Polish shipowner to check all radio receivers with which its vessels were equipped. Radio inspector Jurkiewicz examined one such radio receiver on the SS "Poznań."[42] Unfortunately, the device allowed for communicating only with local radio stations within the radius of less than 100 nautical miles. In general terms, maintaining communication with ships belonging to „Żegluga Polska SA" was not unproblematic.[43] When the ships called at a port,

40 Ibidem, sygn. 37, Kody telegraficzne, Zarządzenie dotyczące kodów dla statków, 18.

41 Ibidem, sygn. 23, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do Dowództwa Floty w Gdyni, 22.04.1939, 3.

42 Ibidem, Pismo K. Jacynicza ze Związku Armatorów do Dyrekcji Towarzystwa Żeglugi Polskiej w Gdyni, 1.06.1939, 5.

43 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polska SA do K. Jacynicza, 26.05.1939, 9.

it was often impossible to maintain a radio watch due to the fact that the antenna had to be dismantled either during or after unloading the cargo. Breakdowns in communication could also appear during a voyage as a consequence of bad weather conditions, interference caused by other radio stations, insufficient power of the radio receivers or some fault of the ship's radio station. According to the management of "Żegluga Polska SA," an alternative way of maintaining communication should be implemented, which would not be dependent on the above-mentioned factors, e.g. by involving diplomatic posts abroad which would receive all the announcements addressed to Polish ships.[44]

At that time, only the SS "Katowice," SS "Toruń," SS "Poznań," SS "Kraków" and, to a certain extent, SS "Wisła" were equipped with receivers which could receive messages sent on the wavelengths of 3,178 m and 1,339 m within a range of no greater than 300 nautical miles from Gdynia. Unfortunately, neither the SPG radio station nor Warszawa 1 could be heard when the range exceeded 300 miles. Only in good weather conditions and late at night could the ships receive signals from the radio stations due to having concert receivers.[45]

This state of affairs forced the management of the shipowner to turn to representatives of the "State Tele- and Radio Engineering Company" ("Państwowe Zakłady Tele-i Radiotechniczne") and request that they remove, immediately if possible, the obstacles that prevented Polish ships from receiving messages over long distances. Unfortunately, an effective and immediate solution of the problem could not be found; therefore, a change of the receivers was ordered. However, equipping the ships with new devices involving the "State Tele- and Radio Engineering Company" could start no sooner than on 1 January 1940.[46]

The above-mentioned directive and a too long order processing time on the part of the "State Tele- and Radio Engineering Company" caused that the management of „Żegluga Polska SA" made plans to hasten the replacement of radio stations installed on ships and scheduled the investments for the beginning of August 1939. At the same time, a question arose as to the type of receiver that the ships should be equipped. The device originally planned by the shipowner, adapted to receive waves no longer than 1,840 m, did not meet all the requirements imposed on the shipowner by the ministry, which ordered listening on the wavelength of 3,178 m. For these reasons, it was recommended to purchase OV3 radio devices, which could easily receive messages from the SPG station on the 3,178 m wave. This solution required greater financial outlays, because the originally designed OB2 receiver cost PLN 800, whereas the price of the OV3 radio receiver was PLN 3,500. This amounted to a total difference of PLN 10,800. The complications that arose meant that the purchase of four radios in Denmark was considered

44 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 26.07.1939, 70–72.

45 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 5.08.1939, 61.

46 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 5.08.1939, 62.

as it could happen in a relatively short time and at a much lower price than that of the receivers produced in Poland.[47]

The facts presented in the literature on the subject point to the conclusion that the procedure in which the sealed envelopes and radio receivers were used, fulfilled its purpose in a majority of cases, despite many difficulties. Analyses of documents, scientific and diary studies indicate that the ship captains were to learn about the direction of their cruises by radio after opening the envelope. One of the ports of destination was Gothenburg. Jerzy Pański, a crew member of the SS "Chorzów," recalled that, on 1 September 1939, his captain ordered a change of course to this port. Other ships of Polish shipowners soon started coming to Gothenburg.[48] According to Jerzy Pertek and Edmund Kosiarz, on 27 August 1939, Polish merchant ships were ordered to urgently set course not only for Gothenburg, but also for Amsterdam or one of the British ports. The SS "Wilno" and the SS "Wisła" were among the ships of „Żegluga Polska SA" which received such an order. The MV "Rozewie" was ordered to stay in Stockholm, the SS "Poznań" in Luleå, while the SS "Śląsk" was to go either to Helsinki or Swedish ports. On 27 and 28 August, similar orders were received by the SS "Chorzów," SS "Hel" and SS "Kraków," sailing to Belgian (Antwerp), Dutch (Rotterdam) and English (London and Hull) ports. In general terms, the traffic plan for Polish merchant ships predicted leaving 5% of the cargo at the disposal of the Polish Navy, as well as leaving several medium-tonnage vessels in the Baltic Sea to supply Poland via Sweden and Finland.

The above-mentioned orders were intended not only to protect the fleet from destruction or capture by the enemy, but also to ensure the necessary supplies of materials for the state engaged in warfare. These decisions constituted an element of the aforementioned inspection of all serviceable merchant ships for suitability with respect to transport during an armed conflict. In the event of a war with Germany, the Organisation and Mobilisation Department of the Navy Headquarters (Wydział Organizacyjno-Mobilizacyjny Sztabu Kierownictwa Marynarki Wojennej w Warszawie), in cooperation with the Maritime and Trade Departments of the Ministry of Industry and Trade developed supply routes through the following ports:

– Galacz and Constanţa,
– Norwegian and Swedish ports,
– Petsamo in Finland,
– Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.[49]

The above list proves that the Polish state authorities were planning to include ports in friendly countries (Galacz and Constanţa in Romania) or neutral ones (Sweden,

47 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 5.08.1939, 62.

48 Jerzy Pański, *Wachta lewej burty* (Gdynia: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1965), 28–29.

49 Pertek, *Druga mała*, 28, 36–37, 39; Edmund Kosiarz, *Flota Białego Orła* (Gdynia: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1984), 47; Edmund Kosiarz, *Wojna na Bałtyku 1939* (Gdańsk: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1988), 51.

Norway and Finland) in their supply routes. However, the choice of unfriendly and unneutral Soviet ports may be surprising.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of 31 July 1939, „Żegluga Polska SA" began preparations for the evacuation of the company. In the event of a military conflict and threat to Gdynia, its logistics and commercial centre was to be moved to Warsaw. For this purpose, a three-room apartment at Plac Napoleona 9 was rented together with "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA." Thus, the apartment was located on the same floor as the representative offices of „Żegluga Polska SA" If it was necessary to leave Gdynia, the shipowner would have an office space consisting of five rooms in Warsaw.[50]

In addition to technical difficulties and shortage of equipment, the Polish shipowner was also seriously understaffed especially as far as radio operators on ships were concerned. To make matters worse, in August 1939, two radio operators from "Żegluga Polska SA," namely Kazimierz Tęczar from the SS "Kraków" and Marian Skrzyszowski from the SS "Puck," were called up for a six-week military training. However, being unable to find substitutes for the two radio operators, the company turned to the Fleet Command in Gdynia, via the Regional Draft Office, with a request to postpone the date of their military training. Due to the fact that „Żegluga Polska SA" did not receive any response from the military authorities, the radio operators had to disembark. As a consequence, the SS "Kraków" and SS "Puck" set off on a voyage without radio operators, who would be able to maintain a radio watch as ordered by the Ministry of Industry and Trade pursuant to a letter of 21 July 1939. It resulted in a bizarre situation in which the shipowner's management requested that the Ministry of Military Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych) stop conscripting ship radio operators for an unspecified period of time and exempt the aforementioned employees from their military training.[51]

It is worth adding that, in "Żegluga Polska SA," understaffing with regard to radio operators was also caused by other factors. For quite a while, there had been a lack of qualified and certified radio operators on the job market. This prevented radio operators from being called up for military trainings,[52] which further contributed to the shortage of radio operators in the Polish army.

Apart from telegraphic communication, the Ministry of Industry and Trade considered optical communication as an alternative way of communication. On 22 August 1939 a secret letter was sent to „Żegluga Polska SA" with respect to conducting optical communication exercises and selecting signal personnel.[53] In the document, the

50 APGOG, Żegluga Polska, sygn. 23, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 5.08.1939, 52.

51 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 14.08.1939, 50.

52 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 5.08.1939, 63.

53 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH, 31.08.1939, 30.

Ministry of Industry and Trade drew attention to the necessity of conducting communication exercises whenever an opportunity arose and, on the other hand, of selecting signal personnel trained according to the same method so that crews could be better able to cooperate. It was also recommended that, as a priority, even in peacetime, former navy sailors specialising in optical communications should be employed.[54]

Such an approach was intended to reduce the number of personnel that the Polish Navy had to assign to merchant ships during the war.[55] Additionally, attempts were made to unify the activities of the merchant fleet and the Navy. This fact was further confirmed by the order issued to captains of merchant ships to test optical communications with vessels of the Polish Navy using all means at their disposal. A decision was also made to leave the initiative to establish communication to captains of warships as, during various special exercises, they were not always in a favourable position to respond to signals coming from ships passing within their range. Such a regulation still allowed captains of merchant ships to establish communication in those cases when it was justified by important reasons. "Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe," „Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA in Gdynia," "Polskarb Polsko-Skandynawskie Towarzystwo Transportowe SA" in Gdynia and the "Bałtycka Spółka Okrętowa in Gdynia."[56]

The personnel issue constituted a point of contention between „Żegluga Polska SA" and the Ministry of Industry and Trade as the shipowner's management tried to take care of its own interest by intervening in staff issues of other companies. On 17 June 1939, the management turned to the Ministry of Industry and Trade with a request to ask the military authorities to exempt the managing director of "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA" Feliks Kollat and his deputy Stanisław Darski from the obligation to carry out their military assignment.[57] Additionally, on 13 June 1939, "Żegluga Polska SA" sent to the Ministry of Industry and Trade several lists of employees working in the administration, on ships and in various repair shops who should be called up for military service in the Polish Navy in order to ask the military authorities to exempt them from the obligation to carry out their assignments in the event of mobilisation.[58] With regard to staff from outside of the company, in August 1939, the Polish shipowner applied to the Ministry of Industry and Trade for exempting Hugo Pistel, the director of the ""Gdynika" Maklerzy Ubezpieczeń Morskich" (maritime insurance brokers), from military service. "Gdynika" was the only insurance brokerage company that handled all insurance matters for the entire Polish merchant fleet, as well as almost all freight import and export. Also, it took care of public and private assets worth

54 Ibidem, Pismo MPiH do Żeglugi Polskiej SA, 22.08.1939, 32.

55 Ibidem.

56 Ibidem.

57 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 17.06.1939, 100.

58 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 13.06.1939, 109.

approximately PLN 100,000,000 in all areas related to insurance. The request made by „Żegluga Polska SA" was justified by the damage that could be caused by "Gdynika's" failure to properly perform its duties. The shipowner further argued that a number of "Gdynika's" employees had already been called up for military service, so making Hugo Pistel stay in the army was unjustified.[59]

Initially, the activities of „Żegluga Polska SA" aimed at limiting the conscription of its employees into the army did not bring the expected results, although the Polish government had not announced even a partial mobilisation. At that time, individual appointments were made, which resulted in a conflict between „Żegluga Polska SA" and the Navy command. This indicated that, despite intensive communication between the ministry and the shipowner, there was a lack of mutual understanding, as attempts were still made to recruit captains, engineers and officers for military service. In addition, most of the deck and engine crew members were reservists, which created the risk of ships being immobilised due to staff shortages, which might negatively affect planned war transports. Ultimately, the shipowner's management succeeded in explaining it to the Navy Command, with the help of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, that there is basically no difference between the Polish Navy and the merchant navy during an armed conflict.[60]

In addition to the personnel issue, the Ministry of Industry and Trade also sought to make use of the ships belonging to „Żegluga Polska SA" in warfare, as evidenced by the ministry's decision on the possibility of donating the shipowner's vessels to the Fleet Command for military purposes for an adequate compensation.[61] The commandeering of the SS "Toruń" by the Navy took place in August 1939. According to the plan, the crew under the command of Captain Jerzy Kossakowski was to sail the ship to the roadstead in the port of Gdańsk and sink her at the entrance to Nowy Port in order to prevent the battleship "Schleswig-Holstein" from leaving the port after the outbreak of the war, thus limiting its operational capabilities against the Polish defence. The plan was ready on 26 August, but no order was issued and, after the outbreak of the war, these actions were cancelled.[62]

Apart from improving radiotelegraphic communications, other important tasks included ensuring the safety of all ships and port facilities. On 17 May 1939, a conference on this matter was held at the Government Commissariat. The event was attended by many representatives of Polish maritime institutions and shipowners. „Żegluga Polska SA" was represented by J. Fink-Finowicki. During the meeting, the head of the Investigation Office in Toruń, Buliński, noted that a special security service needed to be launched in Gdynia which would involve security authorities of plants, institutions,

59 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH, 26.08.1939, 47.

60 Darski, *W służbie*, 93.

61 APGOG, Żegluga Polska, sygn. 23, Pismo L. Możdżeńskiego do Żegluga Polska SA, 24.04.1939, 141.

62 Jerzy Miciński, *Księga statków polskich 1918–1939*, Vol. 1 (Gdynia: Polnord–Oskar, 1996), 195–196.

as well as the police. The police, apart from fulfilling its primary duties, was to supervise the performance of the other institutions. The decision to establish the unit was motivated by the need to increase security in the port of Gdynia as well as the security of all passenger, cargo and commercial ships. Another benefit had to do with improving the system of exchanging information about sabotage actions carried out by foreign intelligence. The activities of the new security service were to be primarily focused on public utility buildings, port warehouses, passenger ships, cargo and commercial ships. According to Buliński, these activities had to be introduced due to the international situation at that time, especially with regard to Poland's relations with Germany.[63]

Due to the unsatisfactory condition in the above-mentioned fields, it was recommended that all existing deficiencies be removed, and that military intelligence and the security service be strengthened. During the conference, particular importance was attached to the following issues:

- reducing to a minimum visits to passenger, cargo and commercial ships by unknown and suspicious individuals,
- identifying and expelling all individuals staying in the port or on ships without a permit,
- recruiting absolutely reliable and trustworthy people,
- verifying companies, and in particular workers of those companies that performed all kinds of work in the port and during reloading,
- checking workers going to ships and the port area, including personal searches,
- verifying all guards of the security agency "Argus," eliminating the suspicious ones and hiring new ones whom the police were to evaluate,
- making the management of "Argus" ensure that their officers fulfilled their duties conscientiously and rigorously at that time,
- issuing very strict instructions to port workers and ship crew members to be the first to ensure safety in given areas of work and to immediately report any observations to their superiors and then to the police,
- observation, surveillance and intelligence had to be interconnected and work efficiently so as to provide a total guarantee of security,
- restrictions regarding various visits on ships, or controlling visitors after and during a visit,
- making windows in port warehouses to enable fire safety control, etc.[64]

Other objectives of the conference included establishing the rules for coordinating the activities of all authorities, including the entire port area. K. Jacynicz decided

63 APGOG, Żegluga Polska, sygn. 23, Protokół z konferencji odbytej w Komisariacie Rządu w dniu 17 maja 1939 r. w sprawie bezpieczeństwa statków i obiektów portowych, 21.

64 Ibidem, Protokół z konferencji odbytej w Komisariacie Rządu w dniu 17 maja 1939 r. w sprawie bezpieczeństwa statków i obiektów portowych, 21–22.

to erect fences around various port facilities and to use guards employed by the security agency "Argus," yet interventions were to be carried out by the police authorities. With respect to strangers' access to ships, K. Jacynicz distinguished five groups: crew, workers, suppliers, crew's families, and visitors.[65] He suggested that crews be controlled by the shipowner's office, that only workers on a permanent contract have access, and that the "Argus" agency provide a list of workers, which was to be submitted in advance. Apart from the crews and workers, only their closest relatives could be allowed on board, i.e. wife, children, parents and siblings. Referring to the families of third-class passengers, they were banned from boarding the ships unless they showed a tourist pass. Group excursions were allowed to visit the ships under the supervision of a crew member, and individuals were allowed to visit the ships under the supervision of a crew member after presenting a pass. No pass was valid without a Customs Office stamp. Suppliers were banned from boarding. Moreover, K. Jacynicz requested that the restaurant at the bottom of the Maritime Station be closed. The request was accepted by Borkowski, head of the Commercial Department of the Maritime Office.[66]

According to J. Fink-Finowicki, „Żegluga Polska SA" and "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe SA" expected that the activities would give rise to certain problems, one of them being the fact that protection could only depend on ship workers. Moreover, he predicted that family control would be difficult due to the shortage of police officers. The meeting participants finally decided to introduce two types of passes for families and visitors, the latter of which were to be recorded upon boarding the ship. Visiting the ships by other people was to be prohibited.[67]

During the conference, it was also decided to expel people who were described as "unreliable elements," i.e. former crew members. It was established that people who got or tried to get on any of the ships without passes should be held criminally liable for illegally crossing the border. It was also decided that workers would be subject to a detailed search before and after work. Ukrainians were also included among potential suspects, but the problems related to them were resolved outside the conference at the Crew Engagement Office. Unfortunately, the understaffing of the Port Police Office made it very difficult to carry out the tasks in the port. For these reasons, apart from the police, the area was to be guarded by the Harbour Police and Border Guard.[68]

65 In the document five groups were listed, even though only four were mentioned. See: Ibidem, Protokół z konferencji odbytej w Komisariacie Rządu w dniu 17 maja 1939 r. w sprawie bezpieczeństwa statków i obiektów portowych, 23.

66 Ibidem.

67 Ibidem.

68 Ibidem.

A little time later, in July 1939, a law was introduced which allowed guards on passenger ships to check travellers' tickets.[69]

The provisions of the 17 May conference were expanded a month later to include new decisions. On 19 June 1939, the shipowner's management sent a circular to the captain of the SS "Śląsk," ordering him to increase supervision over the ship in order to prevent possible acts of sabotage. First of all, the captain was ordered to ensure that no undesirable or suspicious individuals were allowed to go aboard the ship, and that unauthorised individuals were strictly prohibited from entering the engine and boiler rooms, the captain's bridge, the navigation and radio cabins, the ship's stores, the food storage room and the cargo bay. Outsiders allowed access to the above-mentioned rooms in order to perform certain tasks should, according to the guidelines, remain under the supervision of the police or crew members.[70] Even though the „Żegluga Polska SA" files found in the State Archives in Gdańsk contain only one document regarding the above-mentioned provisions, which relates to the SS "Śląsk," it should be assumed that these decisions applied to all ships that belonged to the company.

Unfortunately, the stricter procedures did not bring the desired results. On 30 June 1939, Zygmunt Kurczyński took command of the SS "Cieszyn" from Osmólski. On that day, a spy was captured, a Jew named Silberbuch, in the passenger cabins. Apart from his ID card, Silberbuch had a book, a notebook, and two or three postcards showing ships. One of them contained information regarding torpedoes. Also, he had some pieces of paper with drawings and notes about the army. Kurczyński learned from the constable that Silberbuch was a dangerous spy.[71]

The issue of supplies had a broader scope, going far beyond the warehouses of ports in the Polish customs area. In April 1939, the Ministry of Industry and Trade established the Transport Committee, whose main responsibility was to staff specified posts abroad in order to act as an intermediary in the transport of raw materials and war materials in the event of the Baltic Sea being cut off by the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. F. Kollat was appointed chairman of the committee, and its members included shipping and forwarding workers, as well as military personnel.[72]

In addition, it was ordered, whenever possible, to inspect ship premises where outsiders carried out work, e.g. renovation, delivery of materials and provisions, and loading. Such inspections were to be carried out by the duty officer or other officers supervising the work immediately after its completion. Outsiders having access to a ship had the right to stay on the ship only in places where their stay was justified by the activities performed. Immediately after completing the work, these people were told to leave the

69 Ibidem, Pismo E. Mieszkowskiego z „Argus" Ochrona Mienia do Żegluga Polska SA, 2.07.1939, 1.

70 Ibidem, sygn. 37, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do kapitana statku s/s Śląsk, 19.06.1939, 7.

71 Ibidem, sygn. 23, Raport z dn. 30/6 na 1/7. 39 r., 2.

72 Darski, *W służbie*, 93.

ship. In order to prevent items that could be used to carry out acts of sabotage from being brought onto the ship, they had to be presented before boarding if their purpose was questionable. The obligation to show such items applied to all outsiders, i.e. those who were not subordinated to the authority of the captain on the ship, with the exception of representatives of the Polish authorities performing official duties on the ship. The obligation to show such items also applied to crew members because it was assumed that the enemy could use them in sabotage operations.[73]

One of the most important tasks of „Żegluga Polska SA" involved arming the ships and ensuring that they were adequately supplied with food and necessary materials. On 10 February 1939, the construction of the SS "Olza,"[74] which was being built at "Stocznia Gdyńska SA," was coming to an end. For that day, the instalment of special reinforcements for 75 mm guns was planned.[75] One of the guns was to be installed at the stern, the other between hatch number 1 (bow) and the anchor windlass.[76] On 31 August 1939, the Ministry of Industry and Trade informed „Żegluga Polska SA" that it had no objections to the proposed structure of the reinforcements. The implementation of the reinforcements was supervised by the Head of the Technical Service of the Gdynia Military Port in consultation with the Head of the Armament Service of the Gdynia Military Port.[77] However, the SS "Olza" was never used by „Żegluga Polska SA" It is also worth noting that the documents do not confirm the installation of similar guns on the decks of other ships belonging to the shipowner.

With respect to warehouse resources, on 1 July 1939, the company's management sent a letter to the Ministry of Industry and Trade containing an itemised list of the current stocks of technical materials in the shipowner's material warehouse and the coal bunker, as well as provisions on the company's ships. The management of „Żegluga Polska SA" ordered that all its ships, immediately after arriving in Gdynia or Gdańsk, be supplied with provisions, coal and other technical materials in quantities sufficient to travel beyond the waters of the Baltic Sea. Also, the company organised special protection of official secrets and secured the company's facilities against acts of sabotage by issuing to all captains and managers of individual plants on land (port warehouses, material warehouses, repair shops, marinas) a number of orders regarding intensified

73 APGOG, Żegluga Polska, sygn. 37, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do kapitana statku s/s Śląsk, 19.06.1939, 8.

74 Zamówienie na s/s Olza MPiH złożyło 31 grudnia 1937 r. Budowę statku o 1080 BRT planowano zakończyć w listopadzie 1939 r. Zob. Czesław Jeryś, *Budownictwo okrętowe w Gdyni 1920–1945* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980), 138–139, Tabela 14.

75 APGOG, Żegluga Polska, sygn. 23, Pismo Żegluga Polska SA do Kierownictwa Marynarki Wojennej przez Biuro Wojskowe przy MPiH, 25.07.1939, 19.

76 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do Stocznia Gdyńska SA, 10.02.1939, 155.

77 Ibidem, Pismo MPiH do Żeglugi Polskiej SA, 31.08.1939, 59.

supervision over individual facilities and restrictions on and strict control of the movement of unauthorised individuals.[78]

Conclusion

The preparations for war conducted by „Żegluga Polska SA" were based on two pillars, namely efficient communication and securing the shipowner's property, especially ships, against sabotage. The first of the above-mentioned factors was related to the important issue of coordinating the movements of own ships with units of other shipowners, as well as with vessels of the Polish Navy. This is confirmed by the fact that both commercial and military units were ordered to practise optical communications at every opportunity. The lack of a sufficient number of appropriate radiotelegraphy devices, and even fireproof safes, which were also supposed to improve communications, point to the conclusion that the problems that affected communication were caused by starting preparations for war too late. The shortage of equipment, as well as insufficient time to replenish it, contributed to modifying the plans and, thus, complicating the procedure of opening and handing over the sealed envelopes, which were so important when the conflict broke out.

It seems that the Ministry of Internal Affairs also acted sluggishly, which negatively affected the organisation of the shipping company. Delays in the training of military personnel, especially radio operators, and the resulting obligation to conscript the shipowner's crew members, ultimately led to a conflict between the ministry and „Żegluga Polska SA" This fact may be surprising, since, in the plans of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the merchant fleet was to play the role of an important link in the supply chain of military materials and all types of supplies for the needs of the fighting state.

The facts cited in the article allow us to make the claim that, in principle, „Żegluga Polska SA" managed to fully implement only those procedures preparing it for the conflict that did not involve significant financial outlays. In this regard, the following should be mentioned: the procedure for controlling unauthorised individuals, checking the supply of warehouses and the efficiency of equipment, as well as intensifying anti-subversion control.

78 Ibidem, Pismo Żeglugi Polskiej SA do MPiH Departament Morski, 1.07.1939, 98–99.

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SUMMARY

In the interwar period, „Żegluga Polska SA" was the largest Polish shipowner which was financially subsidised by the Polish government. The unique role played by the merchant fleet during the armed conflict (including transport of military materials and supplies) prompted Polish shipowners to prepare for war in 1939. The first steps in this regard were taken as late as the second half of March 1939. The analysis and criticism of sources allowed us to draw many interesting conclusions in the presented article. It quickly turned out that „Żegluga Polska SA" suffered from shortages of basic equipment necessary in war conditions, especially long-range radios. Moreover, the company entered into a conflict with the Ministry of Industry and Trade regarding the mobilisation of seamen, ship handling and management staff, which created a serious risk of immobilisation of the shipowner's ships. Generally, the preparations of „Żegluga Polska SA" to the war included communication (radio and optical), coordination of ship traffic with units of other shipowners and the activities of the Navy, as well as protection of ships against possible acts of sabotage. The steps taken were aimed at preventing a situation in which the shipowner's vessels would be destroyed or fall into the enemy's hands. Important preparations also included securing the port by state authorities.

Przygotowania przedsiębiorstwa armatorskiego "Żegluga Polska SA" do drugiej wojny światowej

Słowa kluczowe: "Żegluga Polska SA," druga wojna światowa na Morzu Bałtyckim, flota handlowa Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, polscy armatorzy

STRESZCZENIE

"Żegluga Polska SA" była największym polskim przedsiębiorstwem armatorskim w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym w dodatku stale subsydiowanym finansowo przez polski rząd. Wyjątkowa rola jaką odgrywa flota handlowa podczas konfliktu zbrojnego (m.in. transporty materiałów militarnych oraz zaopatrzenia) skłaniała do przygotowania polskich armatorów w 1939 r. do warunków wojennych. Podjęte w tym kierunku działania nastąpiły dość późno, bowiem dopiero w drugiej połowie marca 1939 r. Przygotowania do wojny Żeglugi Polskiej SA zasadniczo opierały się na dwóch filarach, a mianowicie sprawnej łączności oraz zabezpieczeniu mienia armatora, przede wszystkim statków, przed działaniami dywersyjnymi. Analiza i krytyka źródeł pozwoliła wysnuć w prezentowanych artykule wiele interesujących wniosków. Szybko również okazało się, że „Żegluga Polska SA" cierpiała na braki podstawowej aparatury niezbędnej w warunkach wojennych, przede wszystkim radioodbiorników o dalekim zasięgu. Ponadto przedsiębiorstwo to weszło w konflikt z Ministerstwem Przemysłu i Handlu dotyczącym mobilizacji marynarzy, obsługi statków oraz kadr kierowniczych, co rodziło poważne niebezpieczeństwo unieruchomienia statków armatora. W zasadzie przygotowania "Żeglugi Polskiej SA" do konfliktu zbrojnego objęły łączność (radiową oraz optyczną), koordynację ruchu statków z jednostkami innych armatorów oraz działaniami Marynarki Wojennej, a także

ochronę statków przed ewentualnymi dywersantami. Podjęte kroki miały na celu niedopuszczenie do sytuacji, w której statki armatora zostałyby zniszczone lub dostały się w ręce wroga. Do istotnych przygotowań należało również zabezpieczenie portu przez władze państwowe.

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A Ship Emerges in the Distance... People Stand and Applaud. The (Un)obvious Contexts of the Wrocław Sea Festival Celebrations in June 1945

Keywords: "Recovered Territories," Lower Silesia, Wrocław, Sea Festival, Maritime League, Oder River

The capitulation of Fortress Breslau marked a new era in the history of the old town on the Oder. The post-war establishment of Wrocław was accompanied by the rubble of hundreds of houses, the flames of the burning cathedral, and the pain and suffering of thousands of people… Zofia Skrowaczewska, who would later become a professor of chemistry at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, arrived in the city in the first weeks after the fall of the "fortress," as a young girl, and she recorded the image of the place in her memory as follows: "(…) I looked towards the Grunwald Bridge. There was an eerie silence, I saw no one, only the street covered with rubble and broken glass, fragments of destroyed tenement houses. I looked in horror and thought: «Can we restore life here?»."[1]

Andrzej Jochelson, a remarkable figure in the city on the Oder, one of the most active municipal officials and a leader in the social and cultural life of post-war Wrocław, echoed her sentiments. Even in June 1945, he described the city as "one big ruin."[2] He also remembered its "traditional sounds" as the noise of gunfire and the explosion of mines.[3]

The apocalyptic realities did not deter the people under Bolesław Drobner, who, on 9–10 May 1945, began the process of transferring the city to Polish administration under his leadership. Along with them came settlers, mainly from Mazovia, Lesser

1 Zofia Skrowaczewska, "Ze Lwowa przez Kraków nad Odrę," in: *Wspomnienia wrocławskich pionierów*, ed. Włodzimierz Suleja (Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 1995), 131.

2 Andrzej Jochelson, *Kronika Semipałatyńsk–Wrocław*, ed. and introd. by Stanisław Bereś (Wrocław: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Polonistyki Wrocławskiej, 1997), 195.

3 Ibidem, 209.

Poland, Greater Poland, and the Kielce region, and over time, also from the Eastern Borderlands, particularly from Lviv and its surroundings, from Vilnius, Volhynia, Tarnopol, and Stanisławów. Life and work in a city in such extreme living conditions was a real challenge for its new Polish residents, who had to contend not only with the unprecedented difficulties of daily life but also with cultural unfamiliarity. Wrocław bore a clear mark of centuries of German culture, and until the spring of 1946, the Polish settlers' neighbours were still German citizens of the city.[4]

In such complex circumstances, two main projects were pursued consistently from the very beginning. First: creating basic conditions for the residents' existence. Second: the physical rebuilding and construction of the city' s broadly understood urban substance, as well as developing its new identity on different levels. Regarding the latter, it involved both purely administrative actions by the authorities of Wrocław and grassroots initiatives, often initiated by the City Management Board or active socio-cultural leaders. However, one must not forget the impact of the political and propaganda factors of the emerging communist power. On the map of the "Recovered Territories," the city on the Oder quickly became an important site for propaganda activities, serving both the political goals of the communists and the re-Polonisation of the city, as well as the construction of its new identity.[5] One of the significant tools in the process of communist ideological influence, with a potentially considerable impact on society, were the celebrations and secular ceremonies sponsored by the authorities of the time. These were organised by the Ministry of Information and Propaganda and its agencies, as well as by organisations used by the communists in the latter half of the 1940s to legitimise Polish claims to the Western and Northern Territories. This includes, among others, the Polish Western Union and the Maritime League.[6]

This article attempts to answer the question of whether the aforementioned celebrations and secular ceremonies sponsored by the emerging communist governments in Poland can be reduced, as is often the case, solely to the fulfillment of ideological tasks leading to the political subjugation of the nation. How did this issue look from the perspective of the local society defined by the immediate post-war reality, full

4 Joanna Nowosielska-Sobel, "Pionierski czas nauki polskiej we Wrocławiu w świetle wspomnień," in: *Nauka w powojennym Wrocławiu 1945–1915. W 70. Rocznicę powstania polskiego środowiska naukowego we Wrocławiu*, eds. Wojciech Kucharski, Katarzyna Bock-Matuszyk, Grzegorz Strauchold (Wrocław: Ośrodek "Pamięć i Przyszłość," 2015), 33; Elżbieta Kościk, "Przemiany demograficzne na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945–1950," in: *Ziemie Zachodnie – historia i perspektywy*, eds. Wojciech Kucharski, Grzegorz Strauchold (Wrocław: Ośrodek "Pamięć i Przyszłość," 2011), 93–102.

5 Jakub Tyszkiewicz, *Sto wielkich dni Wrocławia. Wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych we Wrocławiu a propaganda polityczna Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych w latach 1945-1948* (Wrocław: Arboretum, 1997), 15–70.

6 Piotr Osęka, *Rytuały stalinizmu. Oficjalne święta i uroczystości rocznicowe w Polsce 1944–1956* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2007); Tyszkiewicz, *Sto*, 61–67; Tadeusz Białas, *Liga Morska 1944–1953* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo „KORAB," 2006); Adam Makowski, *Między iluzją a realiami. Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich w latach 1957–1970* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2019), 27–30.

of contradictions and still evolving, where a sense of celebration and joy, great hopes, as well as disappointments and fears intertwined?[7] Marcin Zaremba writes that "Poland in 1945 was a country celebrating in various national, state, and church ceremonies."[8] Before the time of fear and dread fully takes hold, Polish society, driven not only by the propaganda slogans present in the public space from the very moment the guns fell silent, will devote itself to the work of rebuilding the country, reviving the economy, and initiating activities in the fields of education and culture. In the context of this text, it is also important to note that "after the period of initial chaos, the world depicted did not yet appear unequivocally negative. […] The ideological constraints had not yet stifled cultural life, which was dynamically developing immediately after the war."[9] The realisation of the mentioned goal is designed in the form of a case study, which will present and analyse the diverse, (un)obvious contexts of the Sea Festival celebrations in Wrocław in 1945, an event that has not yet received due attention from historians. Generally, the issue of these ceremonies in the broader national context, not only in relation to the immediate post-war period, has not garnered significant interest from researchers (unlike the issues of ritualisation of celebrations in the People's Republic of Poland and the PRL, such as the anniversaries of the Battle of Grunwald, Victory Day, Labor Day, the Polish Revival Day, Constitution Day on 3rd May, not to mention the Millennium of the Polish State celebrations).[10] In monographic publications dealing with various dimensions of propaganda in Poland, the fact that the Sea Festival has been part of the official state ceremonies since 1945 is primarily noted. However, this topic is usually treated in a marginal or merely indicative manner.[11] Even in the monographic

7 Marcin Zaremba, *Wielka trwoga. Polska 1944–1947* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2012), 13.

8 Ibidem, 14.

9 Ibidem, 410–411.

10 Ryszard Tomkiewicz, *Rocznice bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Polsce Ludowej* (Olsztyn: Towarzystwo Naukowe – Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego w Olsztynie, 2011); Grzegorz Strauchold, *Wrocław – okazjonalna stolica Polski. Wokół powojennych obchodów rocznic historycznych* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2003); Agnieszka Dytman-Stasieńko, *1 Maja w PRL. Święto zawłaszczonych znaczeń. Ideologia, rytuał, język* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej Edukacji TVP, 2006); Paweł Sowiński, *Komunistyczne święto. Obchody 1 maja w latach 1948–1954* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2000); Jakub Tyszkiewicz, "Uroczystości obchodów państwowych i rocznicowych na Dolnym Śląsku w okresie stalinowskim (1949–1953)," in: *Piastowsko-komunistyczna satysfakcja? Obchody rocznic historycznych i świąt państwowych na Śląsku po II wojnie światowej*, eds. Joanna Nowosielska-Sobel, Grzegorz Strauchold, (Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe, 2008, 131–144; Adam Makowski, "1 i 3 maja – dwa symbole w walce o różne wizje powojennej Polski na przykładzie Pomorza Zachodniego," in: *Piastowsko-komunistyczna satysfakcja*, 151–165; Marek Ordyłowski, "Obchody Tysiąclecia Państwa Polskiego na Dolnym Śląsku," in: *Piastowsko-komunistyczna satysfakcja,* 167–180.

11 Osęka, *Rytuały*, 65–66; Paweł Migdalski, "Polityka historyczna na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1945–1989," in: *Region czy regiony? Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne 1945–1989*, ed. Wojciech Kucharski (Wrocław: Ośrodek "Pamięć i Przyszłość," 2022), 507–518; Hubert Wilk, "Święta, rocznice, obchody – oficjalne świętowanie w Kielcach (1945-1948)," *Studia Muzealno-Historyczne* 2 (2010): 7.

study of the post-war history of the Maritime League, the mentioned issue, especially in relation to 1945, is addressed rather modestly.[12] Some light on this issue is shed by texts published in 1983 in the periodical *Nautologia*. The presented articles, which contain many important pieces of information, are, however, heavily imbued with the ideological climate of the times in which they were written.[13] A similar approach to the issue of the Sea Festival celebrations can be observed in research on the "Recovered Territories." Most often, this topic is not even acknowledged, even in texts addressing propaganda issues.[14] Oftentimes it is merely signalised.[15] In the approach to the mentioned issue, there are also certain simplifications and inaccuracies.[16] Regarding Lower Silesia, this topic has only been more extensively addressed in relation to Jelenia Góra, where the Sea Festival was first organised in the year 1946.[17]

In this situation, the aim of this text, while considering the role of Wrocław in the propaganda of the Polish State during the second half of the 1940s, is to address the mentioned research gap. The author's intention is not only to highlight the political and ideological dimension of the Sea Festival celebrations in Wrocław in 1945 but also to equally focus on their social and cultural context. On these levels, the diverse cultures and people, in the specific (geo)political and ideological conditions, were creating an intriguing and constantly changing amalgamation of the city's uniqueness/identity in the early post-war months. The author's intention was not to conduct a comparative analysis of Wrocław's case with other urban centres in Poland at that time. While the text clearly refers to Gdynia and Gdańsk, this was due to the fact that the "central"

12 Białas, *Liga Morska 1944–1953*, 242–251.

13 "Tradycje Dni Morza w Polsce," *Nautologia* 1 (1983); Henryk Tetzlaff, "Geneza i tradycje Dni Morza w Polsce (ze wspomnień współorganizatora pierwszego Święta Morza w Gdyni)," *Nautologia* 1 (1980): 16–25.

14 Zbigniew Mazur, "Obchody świąt i rocznic historycznych na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych (1945–1948)," in: *Wspólne dziedzictwo? Ze studiów nad stosunkiem do spuścizny kulturowej na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, ed. Zbigniew Mazur (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2000), 111–163; Ryszard Tomkiewicz, "Polityka historyczna na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych w latach 1945–1989. Wprowadzenie," in: *Region czy regiony?*, 467–477; Joanna Nowosielska-Sobel, "Polityka historyczna na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945–1989," in: *Region czy regiony?*, 487–497; Grzegorz Strauchold, *Myśl zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1957* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003), 112–114; idem, "The Maritime League. A Study of the Dissolution of a Social Institution," *Studia Maritima* 34 (2021): 161–183, DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-07; Tyszkiewicz, *Sto*, 61–67.

15 Migdalski, "Polityka," 507–518.

16 Radosław Domke, *Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne Polski w propagandzie lat 1945–1948* (Zielona Góra: Oficyna Wydawnicza Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego, 2010), 194–218.

17 Ivo Łaborewicz, "Działalność Ligi Morskiej w Jeleniej Górze w latach 1945–1950," in: *Między Legnicą a Jelenią Górą. Prace dedykowane Stanisławowi Firsztowi w 40-lecie pracy w muzealnictwie i 65. urodziny*, eds. Ivo Łaborewicz, Marek Szajda (Jelenia Góra: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Jeleniej Góry, Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu Oddział w Jeleniej Górze, 2020), 261–279; Marek Szajda, *Między propagandą a turystyką. Dni Karkonoszy i 840-lecie Jeleniej Góry w 1948 roku*, (Wrocław: Ośrodek "Pamięć i Przyszłość", 2023), 116.

celebrations of 1945 in those cities marked the beginning of a new post-war chapter in the history of the Sea Festival in Poland, simultaneously setting the standards that would apply for the coming years. Their broader discussion in the article primarily served to emphasise the (un)obvious contexts of Wrocław's celebration for the reader. The decision to elaborate more extensively on the Tri-City celebrations was also influenced by the fact that, as noted in the review of the state of research on the Sea Festival, there has been relatively modest interest in this subject among historians.

The proposed time frame is the year 1945. This date is defined by the end of World War II, the new role of the "Recovered Territories" in propaganda, the early post-war format of "socialist rituals," and finally, the organisation of the first nationwide Sea Week in the new geopolitical reality of Poland, held from 23 to 29. The culmination of the celebrations was the Sea Festival (29 June), which, according to the plans of the emerging communist authorities, was to be celebrated throughout the country, including in Wrocław.[18]

The source base for the scientific inquiry is varied in both quantity and quality. The research involved archival sources created by provincial and municipal authorities, political parties, and associations operating in Wrocław in 1945, which are held in the State Archives in Wrocław. Upon evaluating the collected material, it turned out to be relatively modest, except for a few documents from the collections of the City Management Board of Wrocław and the Wrocław Provincial Office. In this context, the press becomes of particular importance, with key titles including "Naprzód Dolnośląski" and "Gazeta Dolno-Śląska." Unfortunately, the transition from spring to summer 1945 in Lower Silesia also appears sparse in this regard.[19] In that situation, memorials and journals became important.[20] It is also worth noting the ephemeral prints in the form of informational posters and proclamations from the collection of Social Life Documents of the Silesian-Lusatian Office, which are held in the University Library in Wrocław.

The first post-war Sea Festival celebrations in Poland, ideologically referencing the pre-war events (initiated in Gdynia in 1932)[21], were organised as early as June 1945.[22]

18 Osęka, *Rytuały*, 31–94; Tyszkiewicz, *Sto*, 36–40; Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 242–243.

19 Krystyna Bednarz, "Prasa dolnośląska," in: *25 lat prasy na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, ed. Andrzej Wakar (Kraków: Ośrodek Badań Prasoznawczych RSW „Prasa," 1972), 37–54; Bronisław Winnicki, "Polpress-Naprzód Dolnośląski," in: *Trudne dni (Wrocław 1945 r. we wspomnieniach pionierów)*, ed. Mieczysław Markowski, vol. 1 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1960), 235–255; Jan Kowalski, "Narodziny pierwszej gazety," in: *Trudne dni (Wrocław 1945 r. we wspomnieniach pionierów)*, ed. Mieczysław Markowski, vol. 2 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1961), 83–88.

20 Włodzimierz Suleja, ed. *Wspomnienia wrocławskich pionierów*. (Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 1995); *Trudne dni (Wrocław 1945 r. we wspomnieniach pionierów)*, vol. 1, vol. 2.

21 Henryk Tetzlaff, "Tradycje obchodów Dni Morza i ich znaczenie," *Nautologia* 1 (1983): 18–22; idem, "Geneza," 16–25.

22 Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 242.

The main initiator and organiser was the Maritime League – a successor to the mass social organisation from the interwar period that promoted maritime issues and the idea of building a great-power country.[23] As Tadeusz Białas notes, both the revival of this association and its assignment by the communists, albeit under their control, to organise the aforementioned propaganda event was not a coincidence: "The new government, socially isolated, sought a platform that would attract people far from its program and even win supporters. Such a platform was certainly the «Western» program of the Polish Committee of National Liberation" from 22 July 1944, which called on Poles to fight for the "return to the Motherland of the old Polish Pomerania, […], for wide access to the sea, for Polish border posts on the Oder!".[24] This manifest naturally aligned with the pre-war dreams of members and sympathisers of the Maritime League, who had previously emphasised the need for Polish expansion to the sea. Alina Hutnikiewicz also pointed out that a significant ideological element uniting the two formations was their strong anti-German sentiment. Additionally, the similar style of propagating the "maritime ideology" in the public sphere in a patriotic and emotional convention was not insignificant.[25]

The first post-war Sea Festival celebrations, organised as part of Sea Week (23–30 June 1945), took place on 29 June, directly referencing the pre-war tradition.[26] It is worth noting that although the Gdynia celebrations of 1932 were held on 31 July, in subsequent years, the patronal feast day of Saints Peter and Paul was consistently highlighted as the event's date.[27] To maintain the term of the celebrations already embedded in public memory after the intervention of Bishop S. W. Okoniewski (with the episcopate also involved), who emphasised the specificity of the church rituals and customs of Saints Peter and Paul, the name was changed from Sea Festival to Sea Day in 1935[28]. In 1945, however, the original nomenclature was restored (the Sea Day later returned in 1950).[29]

A specific reference to the pre-war period was also the choice of location for the post-war event. This refers to Gdynia, the city that organised the first central celebrations in 1932. However, this reference should be considered somewhat symbolic. Certainly,

23 Ibidem. The organization, which has operated since 1930 under the name Maritime and Colonial League, was founded on the basis of the Maritime and River League (1924–1930), which in turn was linked to the activities of the "Polish Shipping League" Society, established in 1919, and the Association of Workers for the Development of Shipping "Polish Flag" (since 1918): Tadeusz Białas, *Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1983).

24 Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 24.

25 Alina Hutnikiewicz, *Szczecin w Polskiej Polityce morskiej w latach 1945–1950* (Szczecin: Polskie Pismo i Książka, 1991), 21–22.

26 Osęka, *Rytuały*, 66.

27 Tetzlaff, "Geneza," 22–23.

28 Ibidem, 20; Walenty Aleksandrowicz, "Dni Morza w powojennej Polsce 1945–1980", *Nautologia* 1 (1983): 34.

29 Ibidem; Witold Bublewski, "Z tradycji dni morza w Polsce," *Nautologia* 1 (1980): 29.

the choice of Gdynia was met with nostalgia and acceptance among pre-war Maritime League activists. It should be noted, though, that the original plan was to organise the first post-war celebrations in Szczecin – a city considered ideal for propaganda purposes.[30] The main issue that ultimately prevented this was Szczecin's uncertain geopolitical situation in the first post-war weeks of 1945.[31]

Ultimately, the national Sea Festival celebrations (spread over two days, June 28 and the main day, June 29) were organised in Gdynia – a city relatively less damaged compared to the port city and the cruelly affected Gdańsk. In Gdynia, events included a military parade and the casting of a wreath from the quay into the sea to honour fallen war heroes. The Gdańsk celebrations, on the other hand, took on a special patriotic and martyrological dimension, symbolised by the collection of blood-soaked Polish soldiers' soil from Westerplatte. This soil was then ceremoniously transported by motorboats to the city and embedded in the pre-war National Monument to the Fallen (erected in 1933 to honour German soldiers from World War I), which was reappropriated in 1945 for Polish memory politics. Until 1957, this monument, known as the Freedom Monument or the Monument to the Defenders of the Coast (both unofficial names), with the Prussian eagle replaced by the Polish one, remained a visible public symbol honouring the military heroes who fell fighting the Nazis. On 29 June, a solemn Mass was held at the then Freedom Square, followed by a march of its participants to 1 May Square, where, in the presence of provincial and municipal authorities, the Navy, other military formations, and the stationed Soviet Army, a parade took place. However, Bolesław Bierut was absent from the celebrations. The absence of higher representatives of the Polish People's Party (PPR) was due to the formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity in Warsaw during those days. Bolesław Bierut and Michał Rola-Żymierski arrived in the city only on 1 July, when the celebrations were repeated.[32] It is also worth noting the events that took place in nearby, and importantly, war-undamaged Sopot. In addition to a military parade, Sopot hosted a Polish Music Festival, a tennis tournament, and a folk festival on the pier at the end of June. It is noteworthy that on St. John's Night, the Tri-City area did not forget to celebrate ancient Slavic traditions, including the "wianki" (wreaths), bonfires, and fireworks.[33] This way, the traditional repertoire of the Sea Festival/Sea Day, established in the interwar period, was almost entirely exhausted, including:

> (...) parades, manifestations, and demonstrations often preceded by church services, (...) readings, lectures, concerts (...), school performances, and meetings with maritime people. Wreaths on the rivers, evening gatherings, folk dances, and sometimes even

30 Aleksandrowicz, "Dni," 35.

31 Ibidem.

32 Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 242–243.

33 Osęka, *Rytuały*, 66.

balls were highlights closing the events associated with the celebrations. [One certainly cannot forget about the sports and tourism events or the special participation of scouts].[34]

A characteristic feature inherited from the interwar period in 1945 was also that, to some extent, certain elements of the program (although not crucial from a propaganda perspective) were allowed to be adapted to regional preferences and needs.[35]

When discussing the Gdańsk celebrations, it should be noted that among researchers of the issues addressed in the text, there is no unanimous opinion on their national-level significance (unlike the Sea Festival of 1946).[36] This view was clearly articulated in Tadeusz Białas's publication, where he stated that the first post-war celebrations had a "very limited character," which was a consequence of the "dramatic internal situation of the country at that time" and the still ongoing (until mid-November 1945) state of emergency in the country.[37] However, it is a fact that the first Sea Festival was celebrated in various organisational forms not only in Pomerania but also in many other places across the country (including Kielce and Kraków),[38] as well as in the "Recovered Territories."[39]

The Sea Festival organised in 1945, with a significant logistical effort and in the complex post-war internal conditions of the country as well as the realities of dynamic geopolitical changes, was intended to serve several important political and propaganda purposes from the perspective of the communists.[40] It was another element embedded in the difficult process of legitimising their rule in Poland, and references to pre-war traditions were meant to serve as a smokescreen for the true intentions of seizing control of the state. At the same time, it was seen as a clear propaganda statement against the "minimalist" policy of the Second Polish Republic, whose successive governments, "satisfying themselves" with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, pursued a minimal maritime plan. Both in terms of reality and propaganda, the Sea Festival served to confirm Poland's rights to the "Recovered Territories," with a particular emphasis on broad access to the sea and Baltic ports. The theme of the Oder River – connecting the south and west of the emerging state with the Baltic and serving as a foundation for its western

34 Bublewski, "Z tradycji," 30.

35 Ibidem.

36 Domke, *Ziemie*, 205; Aleksandrowicz, "Dni," 35; Osęka, *Rytuały*, 66; Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 242.

37 Ibidem.

38 Wilk, *Święta*, 84.

39 Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu, *Dokumenty życia społecznego Gabinet Śląsko-Łużycki*, Odezwa do mieszkańców Dolnego Śląska w dniu 29 czerwca 1945. Wojewódzki Komitet Organizacyjny "Święta Morza" na Dolnym Śląsku, Lignica, 23.04.1945; Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu, *Dokumenty życia społecznego Gabinet Śląsko-Łużycki*: Afisze z hasłami propagandowymi [tzw. sztrajfy] związanymi z tematem odzyskania dostępu do morza w 1945 roku.

40 Anna Magierska, "Próby konsolidowania społeczeństwa wokół haseł powrotu nad Odrę i Bałtyk w myśli politycznej pierwszych lat Polski Ludowej," in: *Studia z dziejów polskiej myśli politycznej*, ed. Kazimierz Przybysz (Warszawa: Dom Wydaw. Elipsa, 1991), 62–83.

border – was also deliberately included. According to the communists, this fact demonstrated not only the realisation of historical justice but also a new perspective for building a strong Poland economically. This element was exploited for the purposes of social mobilisation towards the country's reconstruction, especially for the maritime economy. The first post-war Sea Festival had a distinctly anti-German tone. In the context of the recently concluded war, the heroism of the Polish soldier in the fight against Nazi Germany was emphasised, and patriotic and martyrological themes were particularly visible. It is also important to note the significance of these celebrations in the context of important propaganda elements that contributed to one of the main foundational myths of the People's Republic of Poland. This includes highlighting the contributions of the "fraternal" Soviet Army in "liberating" Poland from German occupation, emphasising the "Polish–Soviet alliance," and the "brotherhood of nations" (mainly Slavic).[41]

Wrocław also found itself on the map of the Sea Festival celebrations in 1945. Based on the rather modest archival material collected, it is difficult to determine where, apart from the aforementioned city on the Oder, such events also took place. According to a call issued by the Provincial Organising Committee of the Sea Festival in Lower Silesia, which encouraged not only active participation in events organised by local Organising Committees but also "decorating houses with national flags [original spelling – JNS] and greenery," it can be stated that political activists in the region took this issue very seriously. However, it is difficult to verify public reactions to this campaign during that period.[42] Interestingly, even in places where the environment of pre-war Maritime League activists, visible in the new Polish social landscape, relatively quickly entered a process of reactivation – primarily referring to Jelenia Góra – the decision was made not to organise the mentioned event there in June 1945. The Sea Festival in this city took place for the first time only a year later.[43]

Available sources allow us to conclude that, despite Wrocław being clearly chosen as the broadly understood centre of Lower Silesia, the celebrations there did not have a central significance within the entire region. This was largely due to the very serious problems faced by the city, caused by the extensive scale of destruction, and the fact that the emerging provincial authorities (at that time, the Representative of the Government of the Polish Republic for the Lower Silesia Administrative District/which later became the Provincial Office) were based in Legnica for several post-war weeks, until September 1945.

41 Nowosielska-Sobel, "Polityka," 490–492, 495–497; Tyszkiewicz, *Sto*, 33–38; T. Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 242–243; *Dokumenty życia społecznego*, Odezwa do mieszkańców Dolnego Śląska w dniu 29 czerwca 1945. Wojewódzki Komitet Organizacyjny "Święta Morza" na Dolnym Śląsku, Lignica 23 IV 1945; *Dokumenty życia społecznego*, Afisze z hasłami propagandowymi.

42 *Dokumenty życia społecznego:* Odezwa do mieszkańców Dolnego Śląska w dniu 29 czerwca 1945.

43 Łaborewicz, "Działalność," 265, 272.

The limited source base also complicates the unequivocal determination of the specific organisers responsible for arranging the Sea Festival celebrations in Wrocław. The archival materials do not allow for the precise identification of individuals, institutions, or organisations within the mentioned Provincial Organising Committee or its relationship with local Wrocław activists. The preserved documentation does not indicate the existence of a specific local organising committee in the city. However, it can be stated that the Maritime League was not among the mentioned groups, as it did not have its structures in the region at that time. Ivo Łaborewicz, a researcher of the discussed issues, points out that the first highly active branch associated with the Maritime League was established only in July 1945 in Jelenia Góra.[44] Wrocław Maritime League, on the other hand, was established with difficulty, as evidenced by several unsuccessful attempts to organise its structures in the city. It was only at the turn of 1945/1946 that it was possible to establish and activate the Maritime League's Regional Office in Wrocław, which immediately began the process of subordinating to itself, as the regional headquarters, the already existing branches.[45] Although in the following years the presence of the mentioned association in the organisation of the Sea Festival was almost a necessary condition, Tadeusz Białas notes that in 1945 it was often the case that the organisers of the festival were Polish settlers, not so much active members of the League, but rather its pre-war sympathisers or simply former citizens of the Second Polish Republic – participants in such events.[46]

At this point, it is necessary to ask who was responsible for organising the first post-World War II Sea Festival in Wrocław. Sparse archival materials, as well as memoir sources, indicate Adam Kabaja, a Wrocław pioneer who arrived in the city with a government-appointed operational group led by the PPS member Bolesław Drobner on 10 May 1945. Connected with Kraków, an experienced technical worker from the Juliusz Słowacki Theatre there, and, as demonstrated by his activity in Wrocław, also an excellent organiser and a man of many skills (driver and mechanic) very useful in the war-torn city.[47] Adam Kabaja's presence in the operational group rather than in the

44 Ibidem, 265; Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, IV 215, Urząd Wojewódzki Wrocławski, Protokół z Walnego Zgromadzenia Ligi Morskiej w Jeleniej Górze z 21 lipca 1945 r.; Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, IV 215, Urząd Wojewódzki Wrocławski, Pismo Zarządu Okręgu Ligi Morskiej w Jeleniej Górze do Urzędu Wojewódzkiego, Jelenia Góra, 26 września 1945.

45 Łaborewicz, "Działalność," 270–271. At this point, it should be noted that so far, no monograph has been written on the activities of the Maritime League either in Wrocław or in the entire Lower Silesia region. The monographic publication by T. Białas, which focuses on the central authorities of the organisation and its activities at that level, essentially overlooks the activities of local structures, except in coastal regions; "Kultura i sztuka," *Naprzód Dolnośląski* 1, 26.06.1945, 4. M.K., "Symbol łączności Śląska z Morzem," *Pionier* 3, 23.11.1945; "Liga Morska organizuje się," *Naprzód Dolnośląski* 31, 16.03.1946, 4.

46 Białas, *Liga Morska 1944*, 243.

47 Józef Kelera, *Wrocław teatralny 1945–1980* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich 1983), 7; Adam Kabaja, "Pionierski okres organizacji teatrów we Wrocławiu," in: *Trudne dni*, vol. 2, 193–205.

scientific-cultural group of Professor Stanisław Kulczyński was not accidental. Bolesław Drobner tasked him with "securing the assets of Wrocław's theaters," primarily referring to the buildings and their entire technical infrastructure. The delegation did not include tasks related to initiating cultural activities, as Adam Kabaja was not an artist. The first facility he took over was the German opera house on today's Świdnicka Street. Relatively undamaged by the war, with a complete theatrical setup including decorations, costumes, and even a sewing room, it was well-suited to serve as the first cultural centre in Polish Wrocław. It is also noteworthy that, together with the German staff of the opera and members of its orchestra, he not only effectively defended the building from looting but also quickly brought it back into usability.[48] For his efforts and determination, he was appointed "Technical Director of the Theatres of the City of Wrocław."[49]

Adam Kabaja did not limit himself to merely restoring the historic building to the city. He was simultaneously establishing the first cultural institution in the literal sense of the term. With extensive contacts in Kraków, he tirelessly brought to Wrocław individuals qualified for the administrative roles of the future theatre and, importantly, artists. Among his most significant achievements was the "recruitment" of the Kraków conductor Stefan Syryłła. Not only did Syryłła, in June 1945, assemble the first symphony orchestra for the Polish Municipal Theatre primarily from German (and a small group of Polish) opera and philharmonic musicians, but he also proved to be an excellent organiser of the city's musical life.[50]

Sources, both archival and memoir-based, are largely silent on whether the initiative to organise the Sea Festival in June 1945 came from Adam Kabaja himself or if it was officially assigned to him. The fact is that such celebrations did take place. Kabaja received personal thanks from the head of the Provincial Office of Information and Propaganda "for the effort put into organising the Sea Festival in Wrocław."[51] Along with the congratulations, there was hope expressed that: "He would soon be able to expand his highly beneficial activities for our city, and that the Municipal Theatre in Wrocław would become one of the main centres of cultural life in Lower Silesia."[52]

This modest official letter should be considered quite significant in the context of what made the Sea Festival celebrations in Wrocław in 1945 unique compared to other

48 "Kultura i sztuka," *Naprzód Dolnośląski* 1, 26.06.1945, 4.

49 Kelera, *Wrocław*, 7.

50 Kabaja, "Pionierski," 197; Stanisław Drabik, "W operze wrocławskiej," in: *Trudne dni*, vol. 1, 266; Kazimierz Kuligowski, "W ruinach," in: *Trudne dni*, vol. 1, 153; Piotr Łabosz, "Pierwsze takty muzyki," in: *Trudne dni*, vol. 1, 230; Andrzej Jochelson, "Pionierskie dni Zarządu Miejskiego," in: *Wspomnienia wrocławskich pionierów*, 42.

51 "Wojewódzki Urząd Informacji i Propagandy dziękuje Adamowi Kabaji za organizację akademii w dniu "Święta Morza," document reproduction in: *Trudne dni*, vol. 2, 208.

52 Ibidem.

centres in the country, such as Gdańsk, Kielce, or Kraków.[53] Alongside the propagandistic aspect, these events primarily constituted the beginning of Polish culture in the city, which was not only a direct consequence of top-down administrative actions but also a result of the involvement, often ad hoc and "on the fly," of a small group of people genuinely committed to the creation of a new city. Historical sources do not allow us to determine whether it was Adam Kabaja's personal desire to initiate cultural events in Wrocław, specifically through the Sea Festival, or if it was a fortunate coincidence that he was able to utilise perfectly for his role as a cultural organiser. However, it is true that he managed to renovate the former opera building sufficiently and prepare its team to inaugurate, not coincidentally on 29 June 1945, the city's first Polish cultural institution under the name of the Municipal Theatre.[54]

Very limited financial resources allowed Adam Kabaja to organise the event as just an academy.[55] Thanks to his organisational skills and like-minded collaborators, particularly Stefan Syryłła, Adam Kabaja successfully reconciled the political and propaganda aspects of the event with the potential artistic expectations of its participants. After all, the theatre was inaugurating its activities! Adam Kabaja later recalled:

> On June 29, 1945, the first theater poster was published. The theater was opened to the public. The Sea Festival. The Festival of Wrocław Theater. The Festival of Polish Culture. The audience was packed. A gong. Silence. The curtain rises. The stage, shrouded in darkness, begins to lighten. The first applause. In the distance, a ship symbolizing the Polish sailing ship *Dar Pomorza* emerges. Chopin's Polonaise in A-flat major. As its sounds play, the curtain falls. Applause. Nothing happens on stage. The audience is illuminated, people stand and applaud. I had the impression that the applause was primarily for the birth of Polish theater in Wrocław. Part two – an official speech. Part three – a concert.[56]

The Wrocław Sea Festival must have been organised impeccably, as evidenced not only by the tone of the congratulatory letter sent to Adam Kabaja by the head of the Provincial Office of Information and Propaganda (which he himself also mentions in his memoirs) the day after the event – a sign of satisfaction with the political and propaganda expectations met by the authorities – but also by the expressions of appreciation from other circles. "The next day, the Rector of the University of Wrocław, Professor Stanisław Kulczyński, sent a delegation of students to the theater, who presented us with a bouquet of flowers, expressing their gratitude for this first event. [...] The military commander, Colonel Liapunov, sent 100 liters of wine," recalled Adam Kabaja years later.[57]

53 Wilk, *Święta*, 84; Aleksandrowicz, "Dni," 35.

54 Kelera, *Wrocław*, 7.

55 Ibidem.

56 Kabaja, "Pionierski," 197.

57 Ibidem.

Although it is difficult to unequivocally reconstruct the course of the second part of the aforementioned academy, filled with official speeches (Adam Kabaja himself also remains silent on this topic), examining the preserved printed materials, archival documents, and very few newspaper articles from that time reveals a party and administrative effort and mobilisation to strongly emphasise the political and propaganda dimensions of the Sea Festival celebrations in June 1945 in Wrocław (in the reviewed collection of leaflets from the resources of the University Library in Wrocław, there is no official program of the event; similarly, it is absent in other sources).

The ideological program of the celebrations was precisely outlined in the proclamation issued by the Provincial Organising Committee of the "Sea Festival" in Lower Silesia on 23 June 1945.[58] Alongside mobilising the region's population to participate in the festivities, the proclamation also included criticism of the maritime and border policies of the Second Polish Republic:

> We are facing historical changes that will determine the fate of not just one, but dozens of generations. What yesterday seemed an unattainable dream of poets, today has taken on flesh and blood – becoming reality. Our narrow 140 km maritime border, granted to us by the Treaty of Versailles, is now a thing of the past. We have firmly set our foot on the white sands of the Baltic coast across hundreds of kilometers. The small window through which we communicated with the world has transformed before our eyes into magnificent, wide gates through which a stream of salty sea air now flows throughout Poland.[59]

The proclamation also highlighted the significant prospects for economic development in post-war Poland based on the maritime economy. The authors of the document believed that the success of this project required both changes in the society's mindset and its full engagement:

> The Baltic calls us to work, to effort! We must rebuild and expand our maritime economy as quickly as possible, on which 75% of our economy depends! Own shipyards and ships – these are the foundations of maritime independence, guaranteeing our sovereignty. We must quickly transform the "land-based Polish soul," as Żeromski called it, into the "maritime Polish soul." We must integrate the sea into our daily lives, tame it, and adapt it to the needs of the nation. On the streets of cities and villages, the sailor will cease to be a curiosity that children run after and will become a common guest, on par with representatives of other professions.[60]

The document also included arguments reinforcing Poland's historical and pragmatic rights to the "Recovered Territories," with a particular focus on the Oder River

58 *Dokumenty życia społecznego*, Odezwa do mieszkańców Dolnego Śląska w dniu 29 czerwca 1945.

59 Ibidem.

60 Ibidem.

as a boundary river and emphasising the role of the new, appropriately propagandised government. The theme of political alliance with the USSR (here in the context of the "fraternal Slavic nation") and the brotherhood in arms in defeating the Germans completed the narrative:

> The "Sea Festival" day is especially solemn for us, citizens of Lower Silesia. We have returned to these ancient Polish lands, inextricably linked with the Baltic by the gray ribbon of the Oder, to unite them once and for all with the Motherland. We have returned here, as well as to the maritime coast, not due to some coincidence, but primarily thanks to the wise, foresighted, and genuinely national policy of the leaders of our state. Our nation is returning to the ancient Piast lands, to the white shore of the Baltic, after many years under the leadership of Polish democracy. Our nation is returning under the leadership of those patriots who understood that only an alliance with the fraternal Slavic nations, and above all, sealed by the blood of Polish and Soviet soldiers, the Polish–Soviet alliance, gives us the opportunity for truly great development.
>
> Once again, history condemns us to greatness! Let us prove ourselves worthy of our great ancestors!
>
> We will show the whole world that we will not be pushed off the path we have chosen, that like the heroes of Westerplatte, we will defend our ancient Piast lands along the Neisse, Oder, and Olza, our maritime coast from Szczecin to Kołobrzeg, Gdynia, Gdańsk, and Elbląg to the last bullet.[61]

In the public space of Lower Silesia, there were also so-called "sztrajfs," which were posters with propaganda slogans that perfectly aligned with the aforementioned proclamation. On the walls appeared colourful prints announcing to the Polish people that "We were a land-based nation – we will be a maritime nation," and "Wide access to the sea – a guarantee of Poland's prosperity."[62] The society was also mobilised to work with the slogan: "With the effort of the whole nation – we will build a maritime economy!".[63] There were also references to the recent war and the idea of social unity: "The soldier fought for the sea – the worker will build the fleet!".[64] The sztrajfs were complemented by newspaper headlines. In the PPS-affiliated "Naprzód Dolnośląski," the Sea Festival was commemorated with the slogans: "The Polish Sea is the foundation of Poland's power! The sea – our gateway to the world!".[65]

The preparations for the celebrations were accompanied by organisational mobilization manifested by various political environments as well as local authorities. Bolesław

61 Ibidem.

62 *Dokumenty życia społecznego*, Afisze z hasłami propagandowymi.

63 Ibidem.

64 Ibidem.

65 "Polskie morze podstawą potęgi Polski!", *Naprzód Dolnośląski* 1, 26.06.1945, 1.

Drobner himself appealed to the heads of departments of the Municipal Management Board of Wrocław and the directors of municipal institutions and enterprises, urging them and their entire staff to participate in the academy organised to celebrate the Sea Festival in Wrocław.[66] The Representative of the Polish Government for the city of Wrocław justified his "request" as follows:

> I need not emphasize that the manifest participation of the Municipal Management officials on this territory is a national necessity, and therefore incidents like those which have unfortunately already occurred, where employees have neglected the call of the City Presidium to participate in the ceremony, must not be repeated. The understanding of the necessity of manifest participation in Polish celebrations in the city of Wrocław must permeate every employee of the Municipal Management Board.[67]

By Bolesław Drobner's decision, supporting the logistics of the event, the Municipal Transportation Authority was involved in organising transportation for guests both to the celebrations at the Municipal Theatre and their return home.[68]

Fundamentally, apart from Adam Kabaja's memoirs, we do not have a broader account of the academy. Interestingly, none of the few Dolnośląsk newspapers of the time bothered to include information about the Wrocław celebrations. The aforementioned "Naprzód Dolnośląski," apart from the quoted propaganda slogan, focused more on Adam Kabaja's renovation activities and the organisational efforts of "Krakow's Kapellmeister" Stefan Syryłło, rather than on the Sea Festival celebrations, to which no mention was made.[69] Similarly, the other title (like the aforementioned magazine associated with Legnica-Wrocław), "Gazeta Dolno-Śląska," noted that 29 June was celebrated as the Sea Festival in the country, but the entire text was a propagandistic panegyric perfectly corresponding with the aforementioned proclamation of the Provincial Committee for the Organisation.[70]

As noted, the Wrocław celebrations, compared to Kraków, Kielce, Gdynia, Sopot, or even war-damaged Gdańsk, were quite modest, limited to organising an academy at the Municipal Theatre. This specificity was also fundamentally different from what could be seen in the city a year later (due to preparations for the national referendum, the festival was moved to 27–28 July 1946), when the main co-organisers, the Maritime League, offered Wrocław residents nearly the entire traditional repertoire of events, including:

66 Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, 82/334/0/203, Zarząd Miejski Miasta Wrocławia, Pismo okólne Bolesława Drobner do Naczelników Wydziałów i Dyrektorów Zakładów i Przedsiębiorstw Miejskich, Wrocław 27 czerwca 1945 r.

67 Ibidem.

68 Ibidem.

69 "Polskie morze podstawą potęgi Polski!", *Naprzód Dolnośląski* 1, 26.06.1945, 1; "Kultura i sztuka," *Naprzód Dolnośląski* 1, 26.06.1945, 4.

70 "Święto Morza," *Gazeta Dolno-Śląska* 4, 01-07/07/1945, 1–2.

lighting bonfires on the Bishops' Bank by the Oder, a service at the Bonifraters' Church on the then Klasztorna Street, parades of sports equipment on the Oder, a 3-kilometre race "Swimming through Wrocław," and a performance by the prima donna of the Warsaw Opera, not to mention the official political and propaganda manifestations.[71]

However, considering Adam Kabaja's organisational success and the demand from both municipal and provincial authorities and political parties for political and propaganda events, the Municipal Theatre became the central location for organising similar types of events in Wrocław over the following months of 1945. One of the prominent officials from the Municipal Management Board, Andrzej Jochelson, recalled:

> In June 1945, the first artistic event took place in the Municipal Theatre Hall, formerly the "Operhaus" – "Maritime Academy" on the occasion of the Sea Festival. The preservation of the Municipal Theatre in quite good condition and the existence of the German symphony orchestra facilitated this. The initial period of theatrical and musical life also involved utilizing these two assets and frequently organizing academies with an artistic part, where Polish (and sometimes Soviet) soloists performed accompanied by the German orchestra, as well as arranging concerts.[72]

Among the aforementioned events (including the Sea Festival, a total of six), the following took place: 1 August in honour of the "Polish heroes [fallen – JNS] in the Warsaw Uprising," 18 August in honour of the Polish socialist activist Norbert Barlicki, murdered in 1941 in the Auschwitz concentration camp, 13 October on the occasion of the Battle of Lenino (with participation of Soviet soldiers), 1 November in memory of the "Fallen," 7 November for the "National Holiday of the USSR" (also with the participation of Russians), and finally 2 December "in honor of the late Wincenty Witos," who died in October 1945 (organised by the Provincial PSL Department).[73]

Adam Kabaja approached the role of the Municipal Theatre as a venue for propaganda activities very pragmatically. However, that was not his primary goal. Consistently striving to establish a professional artistic scene in Wrocław, he sought to make the most of the success of the Sea Festival. He recounted this in his memoirs: "Immediately after the academy, I sent a letter to the Ministry of Culture and Art, earnestly requesting further directives regarding the organization of artistic life."[74] Since such directives did not arrive, and due to unspecified organisational and financial issues, as well as the lack of a professional management, the Municipal Theatre, although it undertook various

71 Jakub Tyszkiewicz, *Od upadku Festung Breslau do stalinowskiego Wrocławia. Kalendarium 1945–1950* (Warszawa-Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2000), 70.

72 Andrzej Jochelson, "Życie kulturalne i artystyczne polskiego Wrocławia (9.V.1945–9.V.1946)," in: *Trudne dni*, vol. 2, 86.

73 Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, 82/334/0/270, Zarząd Miejski Miasta Wrocławia, Spis imprez zorganizowanych w Teatrze Miejskim w 1945 r.

74 Kabaja, "Pionierski," 197.

artistic initiatives (guest performances by visiting ensembles and soloists of "sometimes dubious quality," but also valuable presentations by the Kraków Rhapsodic Theatre), was still unable to define clear directions for its development.[75] The ambition of not only Adam Kabaja but also conductor Stefan Syryłło and the distinguished Kraków tenor Stanisław Drabik (who came to Wrocław at the invitation of Bolesław Drobner) was to create, alongside a network of theatres, a Polish opera scene in the city.[76] This was particularly significant given that the increasing number of Poles moving to the Silesian capital could potentially form a base of audience for local artistic activities. However, time showed that building a theatrical and operatic life was a labourious and lengthy process.[77] Similarly, the issue of expanding the "social base of Wrocław's theatres" was problematic, with only eighteen percent of the city's nearly quarter-million population in 1947 coming from large centres such as Warsaw, Lwów, or Vilnius. The rest of the new Wrocław residents (about forty percent) had previously lived in medium-sized cities or towns (with a clear predominance of the latter) or had come directly from the countryside (about forty percent).[78] As Józef Kelera noted: "Thus, it was necessary to attract such an audience to the theatre." This, however, is a topic that extends beyond the main scope of this article. It should be noted that, in both cases, the academy organised as part of the Sea Festival on 29 June 1945, in Wrocław, inaugurated both processes.

In the majority of scholarly publications discussing the forms and significance of holidays and commemorative events in the People's Republic of Poland and the PRL, there is a prevailing view, which the author agrees with, about the pronounced standardisation of these rituals serving specific purposes. This concerns the constant mobilisation of society by the emerging communist authorities, where "all citizens should be harnessed in various «actions» and «campaigns» [...] extending beyond daily work obligations."[79] The mentioned activism was intended to give society the illusion of active participation in the construction of the new regime while simultaneously occupying its attention and consuming social time and energy that could potentially be directed against the authorities.[80] According to Piotr Osęka: "There is no doubt that the ruling elite suffered from a sense of alienation. Holidays were a form of affirming their own legitimacy, which could not be provided by falsified elections; they also created the appearance of a bond with society."[81]

75 Kelera, *Wrocław*, 7–8.

76 Ibidem, 8.

77 Ibidem, 8–31.

78 Irena Turnau, *Studia nad strukturą ludnościową polskiego Wrocławia* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1960), 52–75.

79 Osęka, *Rytuały*, 243.

80 Ibidem, 245.

81 Ibidem.

They also served as a tool for exercising power, creating an "illusion of social unanimity."[82] Commemorations and holidays were supposed to also fulfil an integrative function around specific symbolism.[83]

All these characteristics of secular/state celebrations were evident already during the first post-war Sea Festival in 1945. They were most clearly manifested in Gdynia/Gdańsk. However, the picture of the mentioned celebrations in Wrocław is more complex. Although the author of this text is far from concluding that the Wrocław phenomenon originated in 1945, it remains a fact that the events described in the article cannot be reduced solely to the propaganda dimension that dominated the national view of the event.

Politics and propaganda were indeed very visible throughout the Wrocław celebration. At the same time, almost on the same level, there was an aspect that is difficult to find in other regions of the country. This concerns the significance of the Sea Festival for the city in the context of the symbolic founding moment of Polish culture in Wrocław. Therefore, this judgement frequently emerges in the memoirs of pioneers who arrived in the city shortly after the fall of Festung Breslau.[84] It is primarily the voice of the then elites of the Silesian capital. It is difficult to speak of the mobilising and integrating role of the discussed celebrations in the context of the entire local society, as the number of Poles inhabiting the city at that time was relatively small (only several tens of thousands of Polish residents!).[85] A small group of Wrocław Polonia, former forced labourers, and prisoners from the Gross-Rosen concentration camp branch, as well as Polish settlers arriving from neighbouring regions of Lower Silesia from May as part of spontaneous settlement (a change in the settlement process only occurred in August following the Potsdam Agreements), represented a very modest community in June 1945. This new community faced both the foreign landscape of the city (severely damaged by the war!) and the German residents, as well as their own traumatic wartime experiences. Therefore, it is not surprising that Bolesław Drobner primarily activated the local elites, including the administrative staff of Wrocław, to emphasise the new Polish dimension of the city through their participation in the celebrations. In this context, it is also not surprising that the emerging academic community in the Silesian capital became involved in the project. The presence of representatives of the Soviet command during the June academy, given the political conditions of the time, should be considered almost natural.

82 Ibidem, 246–247.

83 Mazur, "Obchody," 114.

84 Andrzej Jochelson, "Życie kulturalne w 1945 roku w polskim Wrocławiu," in: *Wspomnienia wrocławskich pionierów*, 120.

85 Marek Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne we Wrocławiu 1945–1948* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991), 24; Małgorzata Ruchniewicz, "Lata 1945–1948," in: *Dolny Śląsk. Monografia historyczna*, ed. Wojciech Wrzesiński (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2006), 646–648.

The situation described here changed starting in 1946, when in the markedly different reality of the city (evacuation of Germans in the spring, noticeable increase in the number of Poles, gradual and consistent reconstruction of the urban fabric), but also within the dynamically transforming political realities of the state increasingly taken over by the communists, subsequent Sea Festival celebrations (particularly between 1946–1948) would integrate Wrocław society into the nationwide ideological formation process through a standardised formula.

The author of this text proposes to treat this certain difference/atypicality in the model of the Sea Festival celebrations in Wrocław in 1945 as a polemical voice calling for a more individualised approach to the issue of pronounced "standardisation" in research on the creation of the new political-propaganda reality of the "Recovered Territories" in the early post-war years. The top-down assumption about the functioning of the phenomenon of Gleichschaltung in the dimension of ritualisation of propaganda practices across the country often prevents the recognition of specific regional characteristics, particularly in the early years after the war. Only a thorough confrontation with a specific research issue and going beyond the well-trodden paths of archival research allows one to perceive the distinctiveness of the problem concerning a particular location on the map of post-war Poland.

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English version: Aleksandra Rusiniak, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The aim of this article is to attempt to answer whether the celebrations of secular holidays and ceremonies sponsored by the emerging communist governments in Poland can be reduced solely to the implementation of ideological tasks leading to the political subjugation of the nation. How did this issue appear from the perspective of the local society defined by the immediate post-war reality? The realisation of this goal has been designed in the form of presenting and analysing the (un)obvious contexts of the Sea Festival celebrations in Wrocław in 1945, which have not yet (similarly to other parts of the "Recovered Territories") received the attention they deserve from historians. In this situation, this text, while also considering the role of Wrocław in the propaganda of the Polish state in the second half of the 1940s, aims to fill this research gap. The author's intention in this case study is not only to highlight the

political and ideological dimensions of the Wrocław Sea Festival in 1945 but also to equally emphasise its social and cultural context. Through the analysis of archival sources created by municipal and provincial authorities, notes and press articles, memoirs, and leaflets, it has been determined that while propaganda was the dominant feature of these celebrations, their significance for the foundational moment of Polish culture in the post-German city was equally fundamental. The Sea Festival in Wrocław in 1945 also exemplifies grassroots awakening of authentic social activity, skilfully reconciling the propaganda needs of the authorities with the requirements of the devastated city.

Z dala wyłania się okręt… Ludzie stoją i biją brawa. (Nie)oczywiste konteksty wrocławskich obchodów Święta Morza w czerwcu 1945 roku

Słowa klucze: "Ziemie Odzyskane", Dolny Śląsk, Wrocław, Święto Morza, Liga Morska, Odra

STRESZCZENIE

Celem artykułu jest podjęcie próby odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy obchody świąt i uroczystości świeckich firmowane przez konstytuujące się rządy komunistyczne w Polsce można sprowadzać tylko do realizacji zadań ideologicznych prowadzących do zniewolenia politycznego narodu? Jak ten problem wyglądał z punktu widzenia społeczeństwa lokalnego definiowanego tuż powojenną rzeczywistością? Realizację wspomnianego celu zaprojektowano w formie przedstawienia i analizy (nie)oczywistych kontekstów obchodów Święta Morza we Wrocławiu w roku 1945, które do tej pory (podobnie jak w odniesieniu do innych części "Ziem Odzyskanych") nie spotkało się z należytą uwagą historyków. W tej sytuacji niniejszy tekst, bacząc równocześnie na rolę Wrocławia drugiej połowy lat 40. w propagandzie państwa polskiego, ma wypełnić tę lukę badawczą. Zamiarem autorki w niniejszym studium przypadku jest jednak nie tylko zwrócenie uwagi na polityczno-ideowy wymiar wrocławskich obchodów Święta Morza w 1945 r., lecz w takim samym stopniu na ich kontekst społeczny i kulturowy. Dzięki analizie źródeł archiwalnych wytworzonych przez władze miejskie i wojewódzkie, noty i artykuły prasowe, wspomnienia oraz druki ulotne, ustalono, że co prawda propaganda stanowiła dominantę tych obchodów, to ich znaczenie dla momentu założycielskiego kultury polskiej w poniemieckim mieście było równie fundamentalne. Święto Morza we Wrocławiu w 1945 r. stanowi również przykład oddolnego wzbudzenia autentycznej inicjatywy aktywności społecznej doskonale godzącej zapotrzebowanie propagandowe władzy z potrzebami zniszczonego miasta.

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Evolution of West Pomerania Towards a Green Region

Keywords: Western Pomerania, heavy industry, economic transformation, green investment, renewable energy, onshore and offshore wind energy

Introduction

In recent years, West Pomerania has become a leader in the pro-environmental reconstruction of the economy towards a green region. Due to its natural conditions and industry specialisation, West Pomerania's transformation towards an environmentally friendly area is based primarily on investments in renewable energy sources (RES), with a particular focus on the wind power sector, including offshore.[1] Until recently, Western Pomerania was associated with energy-intensive and environmentally degrading heavy industry. However, by making consistent, profound structural changes and

1 *Regionalna strategia innowacji województwa zachodniopomorskiego 2030* (Szczecin: Centrum Inicjatyw Gospodarczych, Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego, 2021), 21, accessed 3 July 2023, http://eregion.wzp.pl/sites/default/files/ris3_wzp_1.pdf.

implementing innovative technological solutions, favourable conditions were created for achieving climate neutrality goals.

The purpose of the article is to present the evolution that West Pomerania has undergone from a region whose economic importance in the post-war period was based primarily on environmentally burdensome industry, to an area at the forefront of economic modernisation and implementation of the European Green Deal. For the purposes of the analysis, green investments were defined as pro-environmental projects leading to the transformation of entities, regions and economies towards sustainable development.

The region's energy transformation, which requires significant financial resources, is proceeding with the involvement of various sources of funds, including the European Union. Due to the limited framework of the study, the assessment of the use of EU funds was made on the basis of regional operational programs. Due to the availability of data, the spatial scope of the statistical analysis was limited to the West Pomeranian Voivodeship.

In accordance with the adopted purpose and method of analysis, the first part introduces the research methodology. The second part presents in a synthetic way the economic development of West Pomerania in the period from the end of World War II until Poland's entry into the European Union. Part three is devoted to a brief analysis of regional operational programs implemented in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship, focused on changes in the approach to RES investments. The fourth part presents selected projects – planned or in the course of implementation – that continue the local authorities' efforts to transform West Pomerania into a green investment region. In addition, the trend of further pro-ecological development of the region is set. The article closes with final conclusions and a discussion of the course, directions and future of West Pomerania's economic transformation.

Literature review

Energy transition is one of the biggest challenges of both international, interregional and intraregional nature. As Kardaś notes, Poland needs an appropriate strategy for this transformation for three reasons: strengthening energy sovereignty, improving the competitiveness of various sectors of the economy, and improving Poland's position in the EU and strengthening the Community's economic position.[2] Different EU countries are pursuing their energy transition goals in different ways, as evidenced by the results

2 Szymon Kardaś, *Od węgla do konsensusu: wyzwania i perspektywy transformacji energetycznej Polski* (Warszawa: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 2024), 2–3.

of studies on the directions of green transition changes and the dynamics of energy transition in Community countries.[3]

Taking into account the requirements of the European Green Deal and national energy policy and the fact that total energy consumption in the Polish economy is growing and the overall supply of primary energy is decreasing, changes in the energy sector are necessary.[4] They are an opportunity to modernise existing and develop new enterprises and sectors, as well as to specialise regions. Examples of innovative solutions related to RES include German bioenergy villages[5] or hydrogen clusters/valleys.[6] Polish regions are also embarking on different energy transition paths related to RES development, as exemplified by eastern Greater Poland Voivodeship – a region based for years on the mining and energy sector. As Karkoszka notes, Greater Poland Voivodeship is among the six Polish provinces supported by the Equitable Transformation Fund (along with Silesia, Lower Silesia, Łódź, Lublin and Lesser Poland Voivodeship).[7] Conditions conducive to investment in alternative energy sources have been created for many years, as demonstrated by the creation of the Greater Poland Hydrogen Platform, the province's

3 Katarzyna Cheba, Iwona Bąk, Katarzyna Szopik-Depczyńska, and Giuseppe Ioppolo, "Directions of Green Transformation of the European Union Countries," *Ecological Indicators* 136 (2022): 108601, accessed 26 June 2024, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1470160X22000723; Anna Manowska, "Towards Energy Transformation: A Case Study of EU Countries," *Energies* 17 (2024): 1778, accessed 26 June 2024, DOI: 10.3390/en17071778; Agnieszka Ewa Rządkowska, "Quantitatively estimating the impact of the European Green Deal on the clean energy transformation in the European Union with a focus on the breakthrough of the share of renewable energy in the electricity generation sector," *Energy Policy Journal* 25 (2022), 2: 45–66, accessed 26 June 2024, https://epj.min-pan.krakow.pl/Quantitatively-estimating-the-impact-of-the-European-Green-Deal-on-the-clean-energy,150372,0,2.html; Paweł Ziemba and Abdullah Zair, "Temporal Analysis of Energy Transformation in EU Countries," *Energies* 16 (2023): 7703, accessed 26 June 2024, DOI: 10.3390/en16237703.

4 Andrzej Graczyk, "Oddziaływanie transformacji energetycznej na gospodarowanie przestrzenią w Polsce w perspektywie roku 2050," in: *Przestrzeń i regiony w nowoczesnej gospodarce. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Stanisławowi Korenikowi*, ed. Dorota Rynio and Alicja Zakrzewska-Półtorak (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, 2023), 259–267; Ewelina Kochanek, "Poland's energy transformation in the context of the challenges of the European green deal," *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 20 (2022), 1: 79–101, accessed 26 June 2024, DOI: 10.36874/RIESW.2022.1.5.

5 Wojciech Zbaraszewski and Dariusz Pieńkowski, "Biowioska – niemiecka koncepcja wsi bioenergetycznej," *Optimum, Studia ekonomiczne* 88 (2017), 4: 99–113, accessed 26 June 2024, https://repozytorium.uwb.edu.pl/jspui/handle/11320/6234.

6 Bogusław Piotr Bembenek, "Kształtowanie tożsamości zrównoważonych klastrów wodorowych w warunkach transformacji energetycznej," *Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Poznańskiej, Organizacja i Zarządzanie* 88 (2023): 5–25, accessed 26 June 2024, https://zeszyty.fem.put.poznan.pl/Ksztaltowanie-tozsamosci-zrownowazonych-klastrow-wodorowych-w-warunkach-transformacji,169473,0,1.html; Beata Barszczowska, "Polska Strategia Wodorowa. Rola dolin wodorowych," *Zeszyty Naukowe Instytutu Gospodarki Surowcami Mineralnymi i Energią PAN* 111 (2023), 1: 100–110, accessed 26 June 2024, DOI: 10.33223/zn/2023/09.

7 Łukasz Karkoszka, *Transformacja Wielkopolski Wschodniej – nowy impuls dla regionu*, Nasz region rozwija się z Europą, Nasz region – e-magazyn UMWW, 04.09.2020, accessed 27 June 2024, https://wrpo.wielkopolskie.pl/e-biuletyn/2020/4/transformacja-wielkopolski-wschodniej.html.

accession to the Platform of Mining Regions in the Process of Transformation, the creation of the Territorial Plan for Fair Transformation, or the construction and promotion of the Greater Poland Energy Valley brand. As Elżbieciak[8] points out, eastern Greater Poland Voivodeship is a region where many RES projects have been undertaken on post-industrial (lignite mine) sites, including Kleczew Solar & Wind – Poland's first large-scale photovoltaic-wind farm, ZE-PAK Group's photovoltaic farm in Brudzyn. Photovoltaic farms are being built as part of the development of post-industrial areas also in the Sub-Carpathian region – PV Jeziórko on the reclaimed land of the company Siarkopol Tarnobrzeg (Grupa Azoty) [Azoty Group], or in Upper Silesia – PV in Mysłowice on the site of the reclaimed furnace waste dump of Jaworzno III Power Plant.[9] The peculiarities of the region undoubtedly determine the directions of changes in energy generation – in the Podlaskie Voivodeship, for example, activities are promoted within the framework of the energy revolution, which, as noted by Staniurski,[10] support investments in green energy by residents of the region, rather than external investors. The strategy of renewable energy production is based on small, generators run by individuals or legal entities established, for example, by residents or local governments.

The northern part of the country is an interesting area for offshore wind energy. The region of Pomerania, broadly defined, has been the subject of various analyses related to the operation of offshore wind energy, including local content,[11] the sector's infrastructure needs,[12] or the sector's importance to the country's energy security.[13] Pomerania is also the subject of studies related to the overall assessment of the RES sector in the context of the energy transition.[14] Much of the research related to energy in Pomerania, however, focuses on Gdansk Pomerania and the current situation, so the analysis carried out for the purpose of this article, fills the research gap regarding the historical conditions of West Pomerania's evolution into a green investment region.

8 Tomasz Elżbieciak, *Zielona energia przejmuje tereny poprzemysłowe*, WysokieNapiecie.pl, 16.02.2023, accessed 27 June 2024, https://wysokienapiecie.pl/82949-zielona-energia-przejmuje-tereny.

9 Ibidem.

10 *Podlaska "rewolucja energetyczna."* Teraz-środowisko.pl, 4.11.2015, accessed 27 June 2024, https://www.teraz-srodowisko.pl/aktualnosci/Podlaska-rewolucja-energetyczna-1508.html.

11 Julia Tomicka, "Wyzwania dla *local content* w rozwoju morskiej energetyki wiatrowej w Polsce," in: *Edukacja na Rzecz Zrównoważonego Rozwoju*, ed. Sylwia Mrozowska, and Dorota Pyć (Warszawa: Difin, 2023), 62–75.

12 Michał Bazaczek, "Przygotowanie oraz funkcjonowanie portu instalacyjnego do obsługi morskich farm wiatrowych," in: *Edukacja na Rzecz Zrównoważonego Rozwoju*, 147–158; Mateusz Richert, "Wytwarzanie energii elektrycznej w morskich farmach wiatrowych w kontekście budowy magistrali *offshore* XXI w.," in: *Edukacja na Rzecz Zrównoważonego Rozwoju*, 195–207.

13 Anna Błażewicz-Stasiak, "Znaczenie morskiej energetyki wiatrowej dla bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski," in: *Edukacja na Rzecz Zrównoważonego Rozwoju*, 180–194.

14 Bartłomiej Iglinski, et al., "Renewable Energy in the Pomerania Voivodeship – Institutional, Economic, Environmental and Physical Aspects in Light of EU Energy Transformation," *Energies* 14 (2021): 8221, accessed 26 June 2024, DOI: 10.3390/en14248221.

We treat the considerations undertaken in terms of primarily a case study, and therefore an analysis necessarily limited in terms of presenting a broader context, comparisons with other regions of Poland, Europe, or the world, etc. Our aim is to focus primarily on the evolution of the West Pomeranian region and to show its past and present situation in more detail. Embedding the considerations presented here in the context of a more elaborate regional analysis, on the other hand, is an interesting perspective worth taking up in future research.

Research methodology

Consideration of the phenomena and processes occurring over the years in the West Pomeranian region was based mainly on a critical analysis of the literature on the subject. In addition, basic methods of descriptive statistics were used. In the fourth part of the article, an analysis of the development trend of power installed in selected technologies based on renewable energy sources was carried out. The analysis used data for the West Pomeranian Voivodeship for 2011–2020. The method of least squares was used, assuming that the trend is a linear function[15] ($y = a + bt$). The parameters of the trend function were determined using the following formulas:

$$a = \frac{\sum y - b\sum t}{N} \tag{1}$$

$$b = \frac{N\sum yt - \sum y \sum t}{N\sum t^2 - \left(\sum t\right)^2} \tag{2}$$

where: a, b – parameters of the function; y – empirical values of the phenomenon (real); t – numbers of periods; N – number of periods analysed.[16]

15 According to Henryk Mruk, *Analiza rynku* (Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 2003), 82, the vast majority of development processes qualify for representation by a straight line, and the linear function is the model most often used to analyse and forecast the development of a phenomenon over time.

16 Mruk, *Analiza rynku*, 76; Hanna Pondel, "Agriculture in the Face of Climate Challenges – The Problem of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," *Annals PAAAE* 21 (2019), 2: 247–248, accessed 3 July 2023, DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0013.2178.

The fit of the trend to empirical values was assessed based on the following measures:[17]

a) coefficient of convergence (compatibility):

$$\varphi^2 = \frac{\sum\left(y - \hat{y}\right)^2}{\sum\left(y - \overline{y}\right)^2} \tag{3}$$

where: y – the values of the individual expressions of the time series; $\hat{y}$ – the theoretical values obtained from the trend function; $\bar{y}$ – the arithmetic mean of the empirical values of the variable;

b) coefficient of determination:

$$R^2 = 1 - \varphi^2 \tag{4}$$

The baseline data for the trend analysis was obtained from the portal of the Marshal's Office of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship.

Economic development of West Pomerania – historical outline (1945–2004)

After World War II, West Pomerania became one of the most economically important regions of Poland.[18] Gradually, the well-developed pre-war industry and services, infrastructure, including beaten roads and railroads, destroyed maritime enterprises were rebuilt, and in 1947 it was finally decided to activate the port and the Szczecin region.[19] The state's economic policy aimed at reconstructing the pre-war potential of the western lands was halted in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a result of Poland's increasing dependence on the Soviet Union, which resulted in a shift away from the traditional directions

17 Ibidem.

18 On the economic development of these areas, cf. Alfred Wielopolski, *Gospodarka Pomorza Zachodniego w latach 1800–1918* (Szczecin: Szczecińskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1959); Edward Włodarczyk, *Wielki przemysł Szczecina w latach 1850–1914* (Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982); Idem, *Rozwój gospodarczy miast portowych pruskich prowincji nadbałtyckich w latach 1850–1914* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1987); *Pomorze Zachodnie w okresie od Traktatu Wersalskiego po klęskę III Rzeszy w 1945 r.*, comp. by Idem, vol. 4 of *Źródła do kaszubsko-polskich aspektów dziejów Pomorza Zachodniego do roku 1945*, ed. Bogdan Wachowiak (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Gdańsk: Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko–Pomorskie, 2006).

19 Jerzy Kocieszewski, "Integracja gospodarcza ziem zachodnich i północnych z Polską," *Słupskie Studia Historyczne* 4 (1995): 188–189; Alina Hutnikiewicz, "Pomorze Zachodnie po drugiej wojnie światowej (do 1995 r.). Polskie Pomorze Zachodnie," in: *Pomorze Zachodnie poprzez wieki*, ed. Jan Maria Piskorski (Szczecin: Zamek Książąt Pomorskich, 1999), 397; Kazimierz Czapliński, Jan Chabowski and January Buksak, "Działalność inwestycyjna PRL w porcie szczecińskim," in: *Port szczeciński. Dzieje i rozwój do 1970*, ed. Bronisław Dziedziul (Warszawa–Poznań: PWN, 1975), 127–134. For more on the development of road, water and rail transport in the 19th century and the interwar period in these areas, cf. Andrzej Mielcarek, *Transport drogowy, wodny i kolejowy w gospodarce prowincji pomorskiej w latach 1815–1914* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2000); Idem, *Transport we wschodnich prowincjach Niemiec w latach 1919–1945* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2019).

of Pomerania's economic development to its unification with the rest of Poland. Intense industrialisation based mainly on mining, heavy industry and machinery and energy industries was not compatible with the economic structure of West Pomerania. The entire region became a base and equipment reservoir for the enterprises of central Poland.[20] The rapid pace of industrial development, the dominance of the fuel, raw material and materials industries led to increasing degradation of the natural environment.

By 1949, the Szczecin–Świnoujście waterway had been adapted for operation. In the following years, the bulk handling region was put into operation, ports and vessels were modernised, the port of Szczecin was rebuilt, and shipbuilding began at the Stocznia Szczecińska im. A. Warskiego [A. Warski Szczecin Shipyard].[21] The growing needs of Polish trade (the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia, destroyed during the war, were inadequate) resulted in a gradual increase in the role of Szczecin as the largest commercial port and shipbuilding centre on the Baltic Sea. The shipbuilding industry developed most rapidly in West Pomerania, placing Poland among the world's leading shipbuilders.[22] In addition, food, fish, chemical, electrical engineering, electronics, machinery, paper and clothing industries developed in the region. In terms of the concentration of industrial employment, Szczecin was ahead of Warsaw, second only to Łódź.[23] The increasingly dynamic economic development of the country and the region contributed to an increase in sea transshipments (grain, mineral resources: ore, apatite and phosphate, coal), which made extensive use of rail transport.[24] In 1985, the Oder estuary ports handled 43% of Poland's seaport turnover.[25]

20 Adam Makowski, *Pomorze Zachodnie w polityce gospodarczej Polski 1950–1960* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2006), 342.

21 Czapliński, Chabowski and Buksak, "Działalność inwestycyjna PRL," 136–151; Ryszard Łangowski, Henryk Salmonowicz, "Gospodarka morska w estuarium Odry," in: *Dzieje Szczecina 1945–1990*, ed. Tadeusz Białecki and Zygmunt Silski (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo "13 Muz," 1998), 308; Małgorzata Kamola-Cieślik, *Polityka morska na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1956–1970. Żegluga i porty* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2005), 47–49.

22 Małgorzata Kamola-Cieślik, *Polityka morska na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1956–1970. Przemysł stoczniowy i rybołówstwo* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2007), 189–190; Agnieszka Zaremba, "Zmiany produkcyjne Stoczni Szczecińskiej im Adolfa Warskiego w latach 1957–1970: wokół zamówień Związku Radzieckiego i państw zachodnich," *Edukacja Humanistyczna* 25 (2011), 2: 75–80; Eugeniusz Skrzymowski, "Stocznie Pomorza Zachodniego," in: *50 lat polskiej gospodarki morskiej na Pomorzu Zachodnim*, ed. Izabella Dunin-Kwinta, Józef Stanielewicz (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo FOKA, 1995), 150.

23 Tadeusz Białecki, *Szczecin. Rozwój miasta w Polsce Ludowej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1977), 174.

24 Kamola-Cieślik, *Polityka morska na Pomorzu Zachodnim*, 192; Eadem, "Rozwój przemysłu stoczniowego na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1956–1970," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 2 (2005), 83–106. The largest cargo stations were Szczecin Port Central, Świnoujście and Kołobrzeg; Jerzy M. Kosacki, ed., *Kolej na Pomorze Zachodnim 1945–1999* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Ines, 1999), 46.

25 Łangowski and Salmonowicz, "Gospodarka morska w estuarium Odry," 317. For comparison, in 1960, cargo turnover at the DOKP Szczecin was over 23,000, steadily increasing to reach a turnover of over 50,000 tons in 1975; Kamola-Cieślik, *Rozwój przemysłu stoczniowego*, 95.

The deep economic crisis in the first years of political transition, characterised by a radical decline in industrial production and the collapse of many plants, strongly affected Western Pomerania, which as a region "did not become the expected beneficiary of the transformation and modernisation processes."[26]

Most of the existing large state-owned entities, which had outdated, environmentally harmful technologies, did not survive the operation of the free market.[27] In the structure of business entities, the importance of small and medium-sized industrial enterprises increased, as they began to reduce the unit consumption of fuels, raw materials and materials, introduced more environmentally friendly technologies, modernised operations and production processes. In the nineties, despite the reduction of energy wastage, raw materials and materials inherent in a planned economy, the principle of eco-development was not guided by economic policy. Transformation goals were not consistent with ecological goals. Too little support was given to innovative technical, technological and ecological solutions of an energy-, water- and resource-saving nature. As a result, the ecological effects of the industrial transformation in the form of environmental improvement proved to be disproportionate to the economic effects achieved.[28]

It was only through EU programs that specific environmental investments were financed. International agreements already at the stage of accession[29] allowed to introduce Pomerania into the network of ties with partners belonging to the Union, transferring their experience to the region. Thanks to EU financial assistance (PHARE, PHARE CBC programs), Western Pomerania has intensified cross-border cooperation, improved the regional structure in the fields of transport and environment.[30] The establishment of the Euroregion Pomerania on 15 December 1995, which promoted cross-border contacts, city partnerships, cooperation of local governments and organisations brought West Pomerania even closer to the countries of the community.[31] Thanks to Poland's accession to the EU, funding for environmental protection was increased. The harmonisation of Polish

26 Stanisław Flejterski, "W poszukiwaniu «wehikułów» rozwoju gospodarki na Pomorzu Zachodnim," in: *Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1945–2005. Wybrane problemy polityczne, administracyjne, demograficzne i ekonomiczne,* ed. Kazimierz Kozłowski (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska, Instytut Politologii i Europeistyki Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2005), 249.

27 Leonard Rozenberg, "Kondycja firm – bankructwa/restrukturyzacja," in: *Oblicza koniunktury na Pomorzu Zachodnim*, ed. Aleksandra Grzesiuk (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Zachodniopomorskiej Szkoły Biznesu, 2014), 92.

28 Stefan Kozłowski, ed., *Ocena zrównoważonego rozwoju (ekorozwoju) w procesie transformacji polskiej gospodarki. Ekspertyza* (Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk Komitet "Człowiek i Środowisko" przy Prezydium PAN, 2002), 25, 100–101.

29 On 31 March 1998, Poland officially entered accession negotiations closed in December 2002.

30 Janusz Ruszkowski, "Droga Pomorza Zachodniego do Unii Europejskiej," in: *Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1945–2005*, 294–295.

31 Andrzej Chodubski, "Drogi rozwoju Pomorza w XXI wieku," in: *Kongres Pomorski: od historii ku przyszłości Pomorza*, ed. Hubert Bronk and Edward Włodarczyk (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 1999) 278.

environmental law and the adaptation of institutions to the requirements of the Community have contributed to giving economic growth an eco-developmental character. The concept of eco-development as a concept of economic, social and environmental policy, integrating these areas, began to be present in the long-term activities of the region. As part of the City Council's discussion in October 2004. Development Strategy of Szczecin, developed by City Hall staff with representatives of the Szczecin scientific community, the openness of the local government on the issue of sustainable development was declared.[32]

Financing green investments with EU funds – example of regional operational programs (2004–2022)

Due to the comprehensiveness of the issues presented, only selected pro-environmental projects defined in the regional operational programs for the province over the years will be presented below, with a particular focus on RES-related initiatives.

In the 2004–2006 programming period, the West Pomeranian Voivodeship was ranked first in the ranking of provinces in terms of the use of Integrated Regional Development Operational Program (IROP) funds.[33] Projects related to environmental protection were carried out mainly under Measures 1.2 Environmental protection infrastructure (9 contracts worth PLN 49.6 million), 3.1 Rural areas (70 contracts worth PLN 70.2 million) and 3.2 Areas under restructuring (19 contracts worth PLN 23.2 million). In line with the needs of the residents and the region, projects such as the construction or modernisation of sewage and water supply networks, water treatment stations or sewage treatment plants dominated at the time. Measures 1.2 and 3.1 also allowed investments in the construction or modernisation of power plants using RES, but there was no interest in these measures in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship at the time. However, in the analysed voivodeship – one of five in the country, projects including modernisation of the district heating network were implemented under the IROP (although to a small extent at the time – less than 17 km under Measures 1.2 and 3.2).

In the next programming period, i.e. 2007–2013, the Regional Operational Program (ROP WZ) was implemented in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship, with its Priority Axis 4 (OP4) aimed at activities to improve the state of the natural environment in the region. The final support of the European Regional Development Fund for co-financing investments under this Axis amounted to just under 48 million euros (about 6% of the

32 Flejterski, *W poszukiwaniu*, 255.

33 *Końcowy raport z postępu wdrażania Zintegrowanego Programu Operacyjnego Rozwoju Regionalnego 2004–2006* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, 2010), accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.funduszeeuropejskie.gov.pl/strony/o-funduszach/zasady-dzialania-funduszy/poprzednie-perspektywy-fe/sprawozdania-koncowe, appendix 1.

total funds available under the ROP WZ). Almost half of the funds were directed to the development of renewable energy sources, a significant portion to water and sewage management, nature protection and risk prevention, slightly less to the development of waste management, and the least support – to projects related to air protection.[34]

At the time, an important area of intervention from the WZ ROP funds was renewable energy sources (Measure 4.1). Although the sphere of environmental protection was much less subsidised under this program than in other provinces, an amount comparable to other regions was allocated to the development of RES. Funding for this area was concentrated on wind power (Table 1). Despite the fact that seven large projects were subsidised from EU funds in the mentioned perspective, it is worth noting that investments involving wind farms, implemented from the ROP, accounted for and represent a small share of the development of this energy market in the province. Many installations were and are also being built in the region without the participation of EU funds or with the participation of such funds – but available under other programs or funds.

Table 1. Structure of projects implemented under Measure 4.1. of ROP WZ 2007–2013. Renewable energy and energy management

Type of project	Number of projects	Value of projects (PLN)
Wind farm	7	34,899,451.52
Biogas plant/cogeneration	4	17,867,663.09
Photovoltaics	10	9,166,091.64
Other/mixed: solar collector, geothermal, heat pumps	6	5,781,971.60

Source: *Ewaluacja podsumowująca postęp rzeczowy i rezultaty RPO WZ 2007–2013* (Warszawa–Szczecin, 2017), 120, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/strony/badania-i-analizy/wyniki-badan-ewaluacyjnych/badania-ewaluacyjne/ewaluacja-podsumowujaca-postep-rzeczowy-i-rezultaty-rpo-wojewodztwa-zachodniopomorskiego-2007-2013.

According to a study by IMAPP and PAG Uniconsult,[35] between 2007 and 2015, annual production in installations of the RES sector in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship increased from about 500 GWh to nearly 3,900 GWh (over 7 times), and this growth was the fastest in the country during the analysed period. As a result of the investments made, in 2017 more than 1/3 of electricity came from renewable sources and more than 1/4 of the country's total capacity of this technology was then located in the region.

34 *Ewaluacja podsumowująca postęp rzeczowy i rezultaty RPO WZ 2007–2013* (Warszawa–Szczecin, 2017), accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/strony/badania-i-analizy/wyniki-badan-ewaluacyjnych/badania-ewaluacyjne/ewaluacja-podsumowujaca-postep-rzeczowy-i-rezultaty-rpo-wojewodztwa-zachodniopomorskiego-2007-2013.

35 Ibidem.

In subsequent years, the West Pomeranian region also dominated in terms of the share of renewable energy in the energy production of both the region and the country – in 2019 it was 72.7% and 17.4%, respectively.[36]

An analysis of the directions of the use of funds from the WZ Regional Operational Program for the 2014–2020 programming period shows that under Priority Axis II (OP II) – Low-carbon economy, among other things, investments are planned to support the generation and distribution of energy obtained from renewable sources (Investment Priority (PI) 4a) and investments supporting the wider use of RES in public buildings and the residential sector (Investment Priority (PI) 4c).[37] The program document emphasises that due to the inadequate level of development of the electricity grid in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship – inadequate for the growing needs of the RES sector – financial support will also be directed to projects involving the modernisation and expansion of such infrastructure.[38] In total, the implementation of the measures included in OP II has received funding from the European Union in the amount of nearly 240 million euros.[39]

As can be seen from Table 2, the largest number of applications by the end of 2020 were submitted under OP II for projects related to RES (PI 4a and 4c), and in these cases the largest number of investment co-financing agreements were also concluded. At the same time, this group of applicants had the lowest percentage of successful applicants – mainly as a result of the high interest of potential beneficiaries in implementing projects in this area.

Currently, the European Funds for Western Pomerania 2021–2027 (FEPZ 2021–2027) program is being implemented in the West Pomeranian region. Of particular importance for the region's green transformation is Priority 2 – *European Funds for a Green West Pomerania*, and its specific objectives:

- RSO 2.1 *Supporting energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions* – it prioritises the promotion of energy efficiency and energy savings; nearly € 87.5 million has been allocated for this objective:
- RSO 2.2 *Supporting renewable energy in accordance with the Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2018/2001, including the sustainability criteria specified therein* – support

36 *Diagnoza społeczno-gospodarcza. Komplementarny element ewaluacji RPO WZ 2014–2020* (Szczecin: Openfield, 2021), 377–378, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/media/107327/Diagnoza_spolgosp.pdf.

37 *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego 2014–2020. Pomorze Zachodnie, Perspektywa 2020* (Szczecin: UMWZ, 2022), 2, accessed 3 July 2023, https://rpo.wzp.pl/o-programie/poznaj-program-regionalny-i-jego-zasady/regionalny-program-operacyjny-wojewodztwa-zachodniopomorskiego-2014-2020.

38 Ibidem, 90.

39 *Raport cząstkowy – ewaluacja efektów interwencji RPO WZ 2014–2020* (Szczecin: Openfield, 2021), 140, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/media/107331/raportczastkowyewaluacjainterwencji.pdf.

includes, among other things, the construction and expansion of installations, energy storage, hybrid installations, associated infrastructure, networks for energy consumption and fuels; funds of almost 74.6 million euros are planned for the implementation of the mentioned activities.[40]

Table 2. Characteristics of the application process for the 2014–2020 ROP 2014–2020 funds under Priority Axis II. Low-carbon economy (as of the end of 2020)

Applications submitted	Contracts concluded / positive decisions issued	Effectiveness of the process applications
PI 4e – *Promotion of low-carbon strategies for all types of territories, especially for urban areas, including support for sustainable multimodal urban mobility and adaptation measures having a mitigating impact on climate change*		
98	82	84%
PI 4c – *Supporting energy efficiency, intelligent energy management and the use of renewable energy sources in public buildings and the residential sector*		
204	94	46%
PI 4a – *Supporting generation and distribution of energy from renewable sources*		
590	151	26%
PI 4g – *Promoting the use of high-efficiency cogeneration of heat and electricity based on the demand for useful heat*		
8	6	75%
PI 6e – *Undertaking projects to improve the quality of the urban environment, urban revitalisation, reclamation and decontamination of post-industrial sites (including post-military sites), reduction of air pollution and promotion of noise reduction measures*		
73	29	40%

Source: *Raport cząstkowy – ewaluacja efektów interwencji RPO WZ 2014–2020* (Szczecin: Openfield, 2021), 149, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.ewaluacja.gov.pl/media/107331/raportczastkowyewaluacjainterwencji.pdf; *Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego 2014–2020. Pomorze Zachodnie, Perspektywa 2020* (Szczecin: UMWZ, 2022), 74–102, accessed 3 July 2023, https://rpo.wzp.pl/o-programie/poznaj-program-regionalny-i-jego-zasady/regionalny-program-operacyjny-wojewodztwa-zachodniopomorskiego-2014-2020.

As can be seen from a summary analysis of the level of use of EU funds available under successive regional operational programs, interest in supporting renewable energy projects has been and continues to be high, and green investments, including RES, have been given high priority in the province.

West Pomerania – prospects for a leader in green transformation

Referring directly to the United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030, the authorities of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship emphasise that the

40 *Program Fundusze Europejskie dla Pomorza Zachodniego 2021–2027* (Szczecin: UMWZ, 2022), 82–98, accessed 3 July 2023, https://rpo.wzp.pl/sites/default/files/pliki/fundusze_europejskie_dla_pomorza_zachodniego_2021-2027_v1_3.pdf.

transition to a climate-neutral economy is a priority for West Pomerania[41] and announce the continuation of existing green growth efforts.[42] Already, nearly 20% of RES is located in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship,[43] and the green energy produced in this way covers 82% of the region's residents' demand – with the national average being a dozen or so percent.[44] In 2020, 268 renewable energy installations with a total production capacity of nearly 2,000 MW were in operation in the West Pomeranian region (Figure 1). This means that by now this is where the largest renewable capacity in the entire country has been installed. As Figure 1 shows, the RES structure is dominated by wind power in the region, and it is in this area that further development opportunities should be seen, given the relevant natural conditions, already signalled earlier.

The development trend of RES in the West Pomeranian region is part of a broader trend related to the decarbonisation of energy supply. According to the European Commission, in the coming years offshore wind energy is to be one of the pillars of the energy strategy and one of the strategic goals of the European Green Deal. According to forecasts of the Polish Wind Energy Association, the potential share of offshore wind energy in electricity production is expected to reach 12% in 2030, 29% in 2035 and 57% in 2040. In addition, Poland, in the opinion of Wind Europe and the Polish Wind Energy Association, has the greatest development potential in this area of all countries along the Baltic Sea – by 2040, it could reach 33 GW (by comparison, the potential of Sweden by 2050 is expected to reach 19.6 GW, Denmark – 6.4 GW, Germany – 3.4 GW, Estonia – 1.5 GW), with an expected average annual energy production of 130 TWh. Further investments in offshore wind energy, moreover, are a prerequisite for the development of green hydrogen production.[45]

41 *Polityka gospodarcza województwa zachodniopomorskiego* (Szczecin: Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego, styczeń 2021), 41, accessed 3 July 2023, http://eregion.wzp.pl/sites/default/files/polityka_gospodarcza_wz_2021_0.pdf.

42 *Strategia rozwoju województwa zachodniopomorskiego do roku 2030* (Szczecin: Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego, 2019), accessed 3 July 2023, http://eregion.wzp.pl/sites/default/files/srwz_2030_pl_size_3.pdf.

43 *Pomorze Zachodnie pionierem polskich technologii wodorowych* (2022), accessed 3 July 2023, https://zielona.interia.pl/eko-technologie/energetyka/news-pomorze-zachodnie-pionierem-polskich-technologii-wodorowych,nId,6443730.

44 *Bezpieczni energetycznie jak Pomorze Zachodnie* (Szczecin: Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego, 2022), accessed 3 July 2023, https://regiony.rp.pl/ekologia/art36399661-bezpieczni-energetycznie-jak-pomorze-zachodnie.

45 Karol Pogorzelski, *Potencjał Morskiej Energetyki Wiatrowej w Polsce. Kompleksowa analiza możliwości rozwoju morskiej energetyki wiatrowej w polskich obszarach morskich. Skrócona wersja raportu*, 10, accessed 3 July 2023, https://konferencja-offshore.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FarmyMorskie_RaportShort_Prev.pdf; *Local content w offshore – gotowość polskich przedsiębiorców do rozwoju morskiej energetyki wiatrowej*, 8, (Warszawa: BGK – Departament Badań i Analiz, 2023), accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.bgk.pl/files/public/Pliki/Analizy_ekonomiczne/Local_content_w_offshore_gotowosc_polskich_przedsiebiorcow_do_rozwoju_morskiej_energetyki_wiatrowej.pdf




Figure 1. Installed capacity of selected RES technologies in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship in 2011–2020 (MW) with an outlook to 2028

Source: *Odnawialne źródła energii. Portal Urzędu Marszałkowskiego Województwa Zachodniopomorskiego* Szczecin: UMWZ, 2023), accessed 3 July 2023, http://eregion.wzp.pl/obszary/odnawialne-zrodla-energii.

As an expression of the drive to continue the "greening" of West Pomerania with hydrogen, a letter of intent to cooperate in the construction of a hydrogen valley in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship was signed in November 2022 in Szczecin. Hydrogen, an environmentally friendly, non-toxic, efficient and virtually inexhaustible fuel produced in the West Pomeranian province in a low-emission manner using offshore wind farms, photovoltaic installations and biogas plants, is expected to become a source of energy needed for industrial plants, transportation (including maritime) and building heating systems.[46] As Tomasz Hinc, ex-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Grupa Azoty [Azoty Group], said:

> Starting in 2023, we will be able to talk about the production of more than 120,000 tons of hydrogen per year in the case of Grupa Azoty Police [Azoty Police Group] and Grupa Azoty Polyolefins [Azoty Polyolefins Group]. Importantly, it is already forecast that ports will play a key role in the energy transition, hence the key role in this aspect for our region could be played by the Port Morski Police [Police Seaport], becoming a «green feedstock hub», including green hydrogen and green ammonia. [47]

46 *Energia z wodoru coraz bliżej! Delegacja z Pomorza Zachodniego w Schwedt i Cottbus*, wzp.pl, 03.04.2023, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.wzp.pl/biuro-prasowe/biuro-prasowe/aktualnosci/energia-z-wodoru-coraz-blizej-delegacja-z-pomorza-zachodniego-w-schwedt-i-cottbus.

47 *Zachodnie Pomorze chce rozwijać gospodarkę wodorową* (2022), accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.chemiaibiznes.com.pl/artykuly/zachodnie-pomorze-chce-rozwijac-gospodarke-wodorowa.

According to Globe Newswire,[48] the global green hydrogen market was worth $1 billion in 2021, while it is expected to grow as much as 72 times by 2030. The development of a hydrogen hub in the West Pomeranian region may, therefore, herald a large influx of capital and further dynamic development of the region.

Also included in the plans to develop a hydrogen hub in West Pomerania is the innovative H2Ebuffer research and development project being carried out by the Uniwersytet Szczeciński [University of Szczecin], the Zachodniopomorski Uniwersytet Technologiczny [West Pomeranian University of Technology] and the Grupa Enea [Enea Group]. Launched in June 2021, the project aims to create an energy buffer to store energy and stabilise the power grid. The system is to use green hydrogen obtained from renewable energy installations. The H2Ebuffer project, due to its technological sophistication, has the potential to solve one of the biggest problems of the energy transition and the transition to a hydrogen economy, namely the storage of the green fuel produced.[49] For it is this aspect that often effectively inhibits the expanding role of hydrogen in the regional economy. It is to be hoped that the pioneering and innovative project being implemented in the West Pomeranian region will initiate further projects of this type in other regions of the country involved in the pro-ecological reconstruction of the Polish economy.

The Tauron Group, which has begun construction of the Mierzyn wind farm, also has a stake in the green transformation of the West Pomeranian region. This is to be the Grupa Tauron's [Tauron Group] second project in terms of size and power obtained and will consist of 15 wind turbines with a total capacity of 58.5 MW. The farm, expected to be completed by the end of 2024, will provide power to more than 68,000 households in the region.[50] At this point, it is worth noting that in 2021 in the West Pomeranian province – in addition to 15 photovoltaic farms with a capacity of 13.7 MW and an agricultural biogas plant with a capacity of 0.5 MW – 5 wind power plants with a total capacity of 14.8 MW were built.[51]

One of the largest investments in offshore wind energy includes PKN Orlen's construction of Europe's most modern offshore wind farm installation terminal. It is part

48 *Pomorze czeka inwestycyjny boom wodorowy*, Chemiaibiznes.com.pl, 28.12.2022, accessed 3 July 2023, https://zielonagospodarka.pl/pomorze-czeka-inwestycyjny-boom-wodorowy-8725.

49 *Enea Operator rozpoczyna kolejny etap prac nad wodorowym buforem energetycznym H2eBuffer* (2022), Cire.pl, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.cire.pl/artykuly/serwis-informacyjny-cire-24/enea-operator-rozpoczyna-kolejny-etap-prac-nad-wodorowym-buforem-energetycznym-h2ebuffer.

50 *Tauron rozpoczął budowę farmy wiatrowej na Pomorzu Zachodnim*, media.tauron.pl, 14.03.2023, accessed 3 July 2023, https://media.tauron.pl/pr/796234/tauron-rozpoczal-budowe-farmy; *Pomorze czeka inwestycyjny boom wodorowy* (2022), accessed 3 July 2023, https://zielonagospodarka.pl/pomorze-czeka-inwestycyjny-boom-wodorowy-8725.

51 *Zachodniopomorska Dolina Wodorowa. Produkcję zielonego wodoru będą zasilać bałtyckie farmy wiatrowe*, światOZE.pl, 29.11.2022, accessed 3 July 2023, https://swiatoze.pl/zachodniopomorska-dolina-wodorowa-produkcje-zielonego-wodoru-beda-zasilac-baltyckie-farmy-wiatrowe/.

of the Baltic Power project, an offshore wind farm consisting of 76 turbines of 15 MW each, being developed jointly with Northland Power.[52] It will be the first terminal of its kind in Poland, located on the site of the former Stocznia Remontowa Gryfia [Gryfia Repair Yard] in Świnoujście. The terminal will be used for pre-assembly of turbines and masts up to a height of 100 metres and a lifting capacity of 1,000 tons, which will then go to offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea. The terminal will be able to handle about 80 specialised vessels installing wind farm components annually, but it will also be adapted for other types of transshipment. The launch of Grupa Orlen's [Orlen Group] first offshore wind farm is planned for 2026. In addition, tenders are underway for land in Świnoujście and Szczecin for the location of further wind farm projects.[53]

Conclusions

In the period after World War II, the main driver of economic growth in West Pomerania was energy-intensive heavy industry, built and developed in a way that generated numerous externalities noticeable within the natural environment. Over time, the situation began to change and the watershed moment was Poland's accession and entry into the European Union and access to huge financial resources from successive programs and funds, which began to be allocated to economic transformation based on green ventures. The numerous efforts towards decarbonisation and "greening" of West Pomerania can be seen not only in current development policies, but also – and perhaps especially – in strategic plans for the future. Green investments require very large investments, but West Pomerania is making good use of EU funds and other financial instruments to develop, for example, energy from RES. The development of RES is gradual but systematic, as evidenced by the evolution of the direction of the use of funds for this purpose, available, among others, from EU regional programs. A change in the approach to the nature and forms of implementation of RES investments is a necessity. According to EU plans, the power obtained from power plants located on the seas and oceans is to increase about 30 times by 2050, for which almost 800 billion euros are to be spent.[54] Priority in the implementation of investments in the field of energy is to be given

52 *Fabryka turbin Vestas w Szczecinie, terminal instalacyjny MFW w Świnoujściu*, PortalMorski.pl, 13.10.2022, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.portalmorski.pl/wiadomosci/offshore/52156-fabryka-turbin-vestas-w-szczecinie-terminal-instalacyjny-offshore-wind-w-swinoujsciu.

53 *Terminal instalacyjny offshore w Świnoujściu – szczegóły inwestycji*, Gospodarkamorska.pl, 9.11.2022, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.gospodarkamorska.pl/terminal-instalacyjny-w-swinoujsciu-szczegoly-inwestycji-67622; Bogna Skarul, *W Świnoujściu powstaje najnowocześniejszy terminal instalacyjny offshore w Europie* (2023), GS24.pl, accessed 3 July 2023, https://gs24.pl/w-swinoujsciu-powstaje-najnowoczesniejszy-terminal-instalacyjny-offshore-w-europie/ar/c1-17198935.

54 Magdalena Skłodowska, *800 mld euro na europejskie wiatraki*, WysokieNapięcie.pl, 20.11.2020, accessed 3 July 2023, https://wysokienapiecie.pl/33829-800-mld-eur-na-europejskie-wiatraki-na-morzu/.

to international projects, created in cooperation, involving the state, local governments, entrepreneurs, the scientific community. In the West Pomeranian Voivodeship, various initiatives are being undertaken that are in line with the aforementioned assumptions, as evidenced by the establishment of the Wind Energy Cluster, the Zachodniopomorskie Program – Offshore 2027, or the Polish Wind Energy Association.

The most important problems to overcome in the context of wind energy development, including offshore, increasing the chances of West Pomerania developing into a green region are:

- Alignment of the Polish Maritime Spatial Plan with the needs of development of this sector – in the Plan passed in June 2021, only 2,000 km^2 of the approximately 22,500 km^2 of the total area of the Polish Exclusive Economic Zone was allocated for wind energy;[55]
- Poland's backwardness in organising activities in the area of offshore wind energy, despite an increase in activity in this area in recent years – the problem of the lack of sufficient activities in this area and the associated threat to the country's energy security was pointed out by the Supreme Audit Office in its information on the results of the 2022 audit;[56]
- Too large a role for the Pomeranian Voivodeship in planning the development of the sector in Poland;
- Insufficient level of central investment to increase access to transmission infrastructure;
- Amendments to laws regulating the wind installation sector, or maritime safety;
- Effective implementation of technological solutions that allow not only to generate energy, but also to store it.

The area of onshore wind energy was and is supported by regional programs, among others, while the development of the offshore wind energy sector – particularly important for the energy transition of the region, the country and the European Union – is planned primarily with the participation of companies. In order to realise their potential, however, adequate financial, investment, or legal-political support is necessary. According to a BGK report presenting the results of a survey of Polish entrepreneurs potentially interested in participating in the construction of offshore wind farms,[57] the willingness

55 Paweł Bednarz, *Farmy wiatrowe na Bałtyku nadzieją polskiej energetyki* (2022), Obserwator Finansowy.pl, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/makroekonomia/trendy-gospodarcze/farmy-wiatrowe-na-baltyku-nadzieja-polskiej-energetyki.

56 *Rozwój morskiej energetyki wiatrowej. Informacja o wynikach kontroli. Delegatura w Gdańsku* (NIK: 2022), accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/P/21/065.

57 The survey was conducted using the 2023 interview method, and the results present the opinions of 216 respondents selected on the basis of PKD codes. *Local content w offshore – gotowość polskich przedsiębiorców do rozwoju morskiej energetyki wiatrowej* (Warszawa: BGK – Departament Badań i Analiz, 2023), 6, 23, 27, accessed 3 July 2023, https://www.bgk.pl/files/public/Pliki/Analizy_ekonomiczne/

to use European funds and obtain subsidies under public funds was declared by half of the companies indicating the need for various investments.[58] It seems, therefore, that regional programs, can also be used in the latter case.

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58 Ibidem, 23.

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SUMMARY

West Pomerania has become known in recent years as a national leader in green economic transformation. The purpose of the article is to present the evolution that West Pomerania has undergone, from a region whose economic importance in the post-war period was based primarily on environmentally burdensome industry, to an area at the forefront of economic modernisation and implementation of the European Green Deal. The reason for the change in the direction of development after 1989 was, on the one hand, the deep economic crisis of the first years of political transition – characterised by a radical decline in industrial production, based on outdated and environmentally harmful solutions and, on the other hand, Poland's accession and entry into the European Union and access to huge financial resources from subsequent programs and funds. In addition, the increase in environmental awareness, technological progress and the requirements of competitiveness of the market economy have led to increasing investment in economic transformation based on green ventures. The research used literature on the subject, industry publications, reports and studies, basic methods of descriptive statistics and analysis of development trends. As the analysis shows, due to its natural conditions and industry specialisation, the evolution of West Pomerania into an environmentally friendly area is based on investments in renewable energy sources (RES), with a particular focus on the wind power sector, including offshore. The development of RES is gradual but systemic, and this is confirmed by the use of increasing funds for this purpose, including from EU regional programs. Although progress toward decarbonisation and "greening" of the region faces some problems, it is hoped that they will be overcome. Indeed, local authorities stress that the transition to a climate-neutral economy is a priority for West Pomerania.

Ewolucja Pomorza Zachodniego w kierunku regionu zielonych inwestycji

Słowa kluczowe: Pomorze Zachodnie, przemysł ciężki, transformacja gospodarcza, zielone inwestycje, odnawialne źródła energii, energia wiatrowa lądowa i morska

STRESZCZENIE

Pomorze Zachodnie zyskało w ostatnich latach miano krajowego lidera zielonej transformacji gospodarczej. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie ewolucji, jaką Pomorze Zachodnie przebyło od regionu, którego znaczenie gospodarcze w okresie powojennym oparte było przede wszystkim na przemyśle uciążliwym dla środowiska, do obszaru przodującego w modernizacji

gospodarczej i realizacji założeń Europejskiego Zielonego Ładu. Powodem zmiany kierunku rozwoju po 1989 r. był z jednej strony głęboki kryzys gospodarczy pierwszych lat przemian ustrojowych – cechujący się radykalnym spadkiem produkcji przemysłowej, opartej na przestarzałych i szkodliwych dla środowiska rozwiązaniach, z drugiej natomiast akcesja i wstąpienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej oraz dostęp do ogromnych środków finansowych z kolejnych programów i funduszy. Dodatkowo, wzrost świadomości ekologicznej, postęp technologiczny oraz wymogi konkurencyjności gospodarki rynkowej sprawiły, że coraz większe nakłady zaczęto przeznaczać na transformację gospodarczą opartą na zielonych przedsięwzięciach. W badaniach wykorzystano literaturę przedmiotu, publikacje branżowe, raporty i opracowania, podstawowe metody statystyki opisowej oraz analizę tendencji rozwojowej. Jak wynika z przeprowadzonej analizy, ze względu na swoje naturalne uwarunkowania oraz specjalizację branżową, ewolucja Pomorza Zachodniego w kierunku obszaru przyjaznego środowisku opiera się przede wszystkim na inwestycjach w odnawialne źródła energii (OZE), ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sektora energetyki wiatrowej, w tym morskiej. Rozwój OZE jest stopniowy, lecz systematyczny, a potwierdzeniem tego jest wykorzystywanie na ten cel coraz większych środków, m.in. z unijnych programów regionalnych. Chociaż postęp w kierunku dekarbonizacji i "zazielenienia" regionu napotyka pewne problemy, to można mieć nadzieję, że zostaną one pokonane. Władze lokalne podkreślają bowiem, że przejście na gospodarkę neutralną dla klimatu jest dla Pomorza Zachodniego priorytetem.

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Distribution of Seafarers' Earnings Versus Salary Distribution in Poland – Statistical Analysis

Keywords: earnings, salary, distribution, comparative analysis, seafarers, Poland

Introduction

The pursuit of income is the primary motivation for employment, and the anticipated level of earnings is a key criterion in selecting an employer. Current information on the market-driven formation of salaries in various professions influences individual decisions regarding the choice of future careers and, consequently, the preferred direction of education.[1]

Studies on the socio-economic condition of seafarers and the impact of their work on the labour market are crucial for interdisciplinary research on maritime economics and employment at sea. However, there is a lack of in-depth studies concerning seafarers' earnings distribution and how it compares to national salary distributions. Addressing this issue is important because differences in pay distributions can influence workforce recruitment, retention, and overall industry sustainability. This article aims to bridge this gap by offering a detailed analysis of seafarers' earnings, which provides

1 More in: Debra Steiner Friedman, "Pay Transparency: The New Way of Doing Business," *Compensation & Benefits Review* 46 (2014), 5–6: 292–294; Shelly Marasi, Rebecca J. Bennett, "Pay Communication: Where do we go from here?", *Human Resource Management Review* 26 (2016), 1: 50–58; Shelly Marasi, Alison Wall, Rebecca J. Bennett, "Pay Openness Movement: Is it Merited? Does it Influence More Desirable Employee Outcomes than Pay Secrecy?", *Organization Management Journal* 15 (2018), 2: 58–77; Konrad Kulikowski, "Jawność wynagrodzenia jako aktualny problem społeczno-prawny [Pay Transparency as a Current Social and Legal Problem]," *Horyzonty Polityki* 43 (2022), 13: 157–174; Richard G. Trotter, Susan Rawson Zacur, Lisa T. Stickney, "The New Age of Pay Transparency," *Business Horizons* 60 (2017), 4: 529–539.

a deeper understanding of income structures in this key sector that significantly affects both global and local labour markets and maritime security.

There is no doubt that working at sea is associated with numerous difficulties, hazards, and sacrifices.[2] Eligiusz Józef Sitek provides an extensive list of the specific components affecting living conditions at sea.[3] In the broadest sense, inconveniences in the seafarer profession can be divided into physical factors (microclimate in engine rooms, noise, vibrations, rocking, specific dietary conditions, etc.), natural factors (e.g., abrupt climate changes, hydrometeorological conditions), psychological factors (separation from family, isolation), and social factors (living in a small group).[4] The inability to meet many individual needs on the ship can lead to different types of psychological tension.[5] The well-being of seafarers is closely tied to their working conditions, which are among the most challenging compared to other professions.[6] Despite these inconveniences, seafaring work offers various benefits, making it attractive in many respects.

In the context of global challenges, such as changing market conditions, the growing demand for highly skilled labour in the maritime sector, and regulations regarding salary reporting, the analysis of seafarers' earnings takes on particular significance. Remuneration in this industry not only reflects the unique nature of work at sea but also has a direct impact on recruitment decisions, job stability, and the competitiveness of the entire sector.

The aim of this article is to assess the attractiveness of seafarers' earnings in the context of salaries in Poland. The hypothesis posits that the distribution of earnings in the seafarers' cohort is characterised by a higher average value and lower dispersion, skewness, and concentration than the salary distribution in the broader population of workers in Poland. This hypothesis is grounded in the expectation that the unique demands and international nature of maritime work lead to more standardised and higher compensation, reducing income disparities within the cohort.

2 Umut Yildirim, Arda Toygar, Cavit Çolakoğlu, "Compensation Effect of Wages on Decent Work: A Study on Seafarers Attitudes," *Marine Policy* 143 (2022): 1; Arkadiusz Kołodziej, Agnieszka Kołodziej-Durnaś, "O rozumieniu, wdrażaniu i potrzebie wychowania morskiego. Wychowanie morskie w opiniach nauczycieli z województwa zachodniopomorskiego [On the Understanding, Implementing and the Need for Maritime Upbringing. Maritime Upbringing in the Opinion of Westpomeranian Teachers]," *Studia Maritima* 30 (2017): 274.

3 Eligiusz Józef Sitek, "Problemy pracy i życia marynarzy na statkach transportowych," *Nautologia* 4 (1980): 25.

4 More on the subject: Zenon Borucki, "Czas wolny marynarzy na lądzie a problem przystosowania," in: *Czas wolny marynarzy na lądzie. Rozprawy i materiały*, ed. Ludwik Janiszewski (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Zachodniopomorskiego, 1973), 107.

5 Maciej Kijowski, "From the Studies on the Suicides of Polish Seafarers," *Studia Maritima* 33 (2020): 184.

6 Helen Sampson, Minghua Zhao, "Multilingual Crews: Communication and the Operation of Ships," *World Englishes* 22 (2003), 1: 31–34.

To achieve the research goal and verify the hypothesis, the values of various measures describing the distribution of incomes in the seafarers' population and the salary distribution in the national economy were calculated and compared. Based on the results obtained, final conclusions have been formulated.

The article relies on data from the Central Statistical Office (CSO) publication titled *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020*, released in February 2022. The publication provides information on the monthly earnings of individuals employed in entities with 10 or more workers. The CSO conducts salary surveys biennially based on data related to persons engaged in employment or equivalent contracts. Therefore, the presented salary statistics do not include individuals working under civil law agreements. In 2020, the selected sample comprised 34.7 thousand entities, representing 15.0% of the total units with 10 or more employed persons. Information was collected about approximately 761.5 thousand staff who worked the entire month of October 2020. As of the preparation of this article, data for October 2022 were not yet available.

The analysis of earnings[7] was conducted based on gross values. Therefore, it should be emphasised that the amounts used include mandatory social security contributions and personal income tax. Importantly, the obtained results refer to the units in the sample and not all units constituting the general population. Surveying the sample is the only possible way to acquire knowledge about the distribution of salaries in Poland. In this context, it should be noted that in this article, wherever the term "population" appears, it is intended to refer to the sample population, not the general population.

However, it is crucial to highlight that the CSO survey is representative, and the selected sample, being representative, reflects the structure of the entire population. Consequently, the study outcomes can be generalised to the whole population, bearing in mind that the values obtained from the sample are treated only as estimates of unknown parameters for the entire population.

The study concerns full-time employees as well as part-time employees who worked the entire month of October. The amounts of remuneration have been adjusted to reflect a full-time workload.

Social and economic aspects of remuneration

There are numerous elements that determine whether a given job is perceived as attractive or not. However, the findings of several studies unequivocally indicate that, when

7 To avoid multiple repetitions, the terms "earnings," "salary," and "income" will replace the term "remuneration" in this article. However, it must be remembered that the data used exclusively pertain to individuals engaged under employment or equivalent contracts. Hence, the scope of the analysis does not include persons working under civil law agreements.

evaluating one's professional life, the greatest importance is attributed to earnings.[8] The size of income is a significant factor for individuals in building a sense of self-worth and utility.[9] Money is one of the most critical criteria people use to ascertain their position in comparison to others.[10] It also serves as the basis for appraising the abilities, effort, resourcefulness, and effectiveness of persons, both by themselves and by the surrounding environment.[11] In other words, money is the primary measure of achieved success and a source of social respect.

Society has a distinct internal structure with a hierarchical order. Some attributes are crucial for assigning people to specific categories in the social structure, while others define their place to a much lesser extent or not at all. Unquestionably, the level of income is an attribute that plays a pivotal stratifying role.[12]

Changes in the standard of living have certain consequences in an individual's emotional sphere. In the case of an increase, it undoubtedly results in an improvement in well-being and a boost in self-esteem, while in the case of a decrease, it can be a source of stimulation but may also lead to discouragement, frustration, anxiety, or even fear.[13] A reduction in the standard of living induces strong stress in people, often culminating in psychosomatic illnesses.[14]

Certainly, money significantly facilitates life, enables personal development, and allows the pursuit of one's interests. It provides a sense of autonomy, freedom, and even power. Often, the acquisition of money is a means for people to satisfy needs that could be fulfilled in ways other than by money.[15] An example here is building one's attractiveness and success solely based on the amount of money one possesses. Indeed, wealth influences the establishment and maintenance of social connections, but it is not and cannot be a condition for forming friendships or having a stable and satisfying family life.

8 Anna Turczak, *Nierówności płacowe w Polsce* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2019), 292–293.

9 Dominik Śliwicki, "Czynniki determinujące poziom wynagrodzenia," *Wiadomości Statystyczne* 617 (2012), 10: 1.

10 David Charles Wilson, Robert Harold Rosenfeld, *Managing organizations* (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1990), 73.

11 Ewa Beck, "Polityka płacowa polskich przedsiębiorstw w kontekście nierówności społecznych [Compensation Policy of Polish Firms in the Context of Social Inequalities]," *Nierówności Społeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy* 8 (2006): 488.

12 Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 32–35.

13 Ewa Beck-Krala, "Kształtowanie systemów wynagrodzeń pracowniczych w czasie kryzysu [Creating Employee's Compensation During the Recession]," *Organizacja i Kierowanie* 157 (2013), 4: 107–108; Truman Fassett Bewley, "Alfred Marshall Lecture. Why not Cut Pay?", *European Economic Review* 42 (1998): 471–472; Hanna Karaszewska, *Ewolucja wynagrodzeń w Polsce w okresie zmian systemu ekonomicznego* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2003), 6.

14 OECD, *In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 59–61.

15 Alfred Czermiński et al., *Zarządzanie organizacjami* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo TNOiK & Dom Organizatora, 2002), 363.

From an economic perspective, salary distribution takes shape due to the decisions of individual employees and employers.[16] The sum of their choices forms the image of the supply and demand sides of the market, determining the price through the interaction between labour supply and demand.[17] Furthermore, dynamic shifts in global industries, driven by technological advances and the evolving demands of specific skills, continually impact salary structures. The maritime sector, in particular, must remain responsive to these changes to stay competitive, especially as technological advancements increasingly shape the future of this industry.

Seafarers' salaries, like those in many other high-risk industries, are strongly regulated at the international level. Ensuring competitive remuneration in the face of a shortage of qualified labour has become a key challenge in the global maritime industry.[18] This shortage, exacerbated by an ageing workforce and increasing demand for advanced technological competencies, puts pressure on the maritime sector to remain attractive for younger workers. The introduction of global remuneration standards and increasing demands for pay transparency, as developed by the International Labour Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation, contributes to the sustainable development of this sector. Evidence suggests that pay transparency policies help reduce income inequality and improve overall working conditions.[19] Increased transparency enhances trust between employees and employers, fosters a more equitable distribution of salaries, and serves as a tool for retaining skilled workers and ensuring salaries remain competitive globally.[20]

Understanding the distribution of earnings across professions is crucial for both individuals and policymakers. In the context of seafarers, examining their earnings compared to the national salary distribution provides valuable insights into the attractiveness of maritime careers, potential labour shortages, and the maritime sector's competitive position in the global economy. Since remuneration structures significantly influence the supply of qualified seafarers by affecting career appeal – which can lead to workforce shortages or surpluses and impact maritime nations' competitiveness – the importance of analysing these earnings distributions becomes evident.

16 George J. Borjas, *Labor Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2016), 27–50.

17 Zofia Sekuła, *Uwarunkowania i instrumenty polityki płac w firmie* (Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 2003), 18.

18 Yildirim et al., "Compensation Effect of Wages," 2.

19 Trotter et al., "The New Age of Pay Transparency," 529–539.

20 Peter Bamberger, *Exposing Pay: Pay Transparency and What It Means for Employees, Employers, and Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

Adopted concept of remuneration

The understanding of remuneration proposed by the Central Statistical Office has been adopted. According to the given definition, remuneration encompasses all monetary payments due for work performed.[21] In the case of in-kind benefits, their value is expressed in monetary terms, and, thus, is also included in the amount defined by the Central Statistical Office as remuneration.[22]

Generally speaking, remuneration can be divided into personal earnings and other earnings. Among the other earnings, honoraria[23], agency and commission-based remuneration, and annual bonuses for employees in the public sector are distinguished.

The concept of personal earnings encompasses, in particular, base pay, bonuses and rewards, shift work allowances, as well as remuneration for overtime work. Base pay usually constitutes the primary component of remuneration. It is determined using a time-based rate, most often a monthly rate in Poland. The amount of base pay depends on the position held, the nature of the work, and its level of difficulty and complexity. Consequently, the more complex and challenging the work, and the higher the job's requirements, the higher the base pay generally is.

Unlike base pay, payments such as bonuses and rewards are variable. They can depend on the performance of a given individual, team, or even the entire organisation. A characteristic feature of bonuses and rewards is that they must be earned repeatedly through demonstrated achievements to be granted again.

Table 1 compares the structure of average gross monthly remuneration in October 2020 between seafarers and the overall population of employees.

Table 1. Comparison of remuneration structure (total remuneration = 100%)

Selected remuneration component	Considered variables	October 2020 (%)
1	2	3
Personal earnings, including	salaries among seafarers	99.8
	salaries in the economy	98.2
base pay	salaries among seafarers	67.2
	salaries in the economy	75.6
bonuses and rewards	salaries among seafarers	5.2
	salaries in the economy	9.0

21 *Methodological Report. Wages and Salaries in the National Economy* (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2020), 20, accessed 9 January 2024, https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/labour-market.

22 Cf. Zdzisław Czajka, *Zarządzanie wynagrodzeniami w Polsce* (Warsaw: PWE, 2009), 12.

23 These are honoraria that constitute employee remuneration, resulting from an employment contract and applicable, for example, to journalists or producers of films, radio, and television programs.

1	2	3
shift work allowances	salaries among seafarers	0.1
	salaries in the economy	0.8
overtime work remuneration	salaries among seafarers	3.5
	salaries in the economy	2.7

Source: own study based on *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020* (Bydgoszcz & Warsaw: Surveys and Analysis of Labour Market Centre, Central Statistical Office, 2022), Table 8, Excel spreadsheet, accessed 9 January 2024, https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/labour-market.

The data in Table 1 indicate that, in the population of all employees, about 3/4 of the average gross monthly remuneration consisted of base pay, while among seafarers, it was slightly more than 2/3. It is, therefore, undeniable that base pay is the main component of remuneration in Poland, though its share in the remuneration structure of seafarers is smaller compared to other employees. It is also worth noting that during the period under consideration, seafarers earned, on average, every 29th zloty (PLN) through overtime work, while in the overall employee population, every 37th zloty (PLN) was received as overtime pay.

Research methodology

The fundamental measure in the analysis of central tendency is the arithmetic mean. However, the salary distribution in Poland is characterised by the presence of observations that significantly deviate from the others and, thus, the informative value of the arithmetic mean is limited. Therefore, in the course of central tendency analysis, the median will also be determined. The median has the advantage of being resistant to distortions caused by extremely high and extremely low values of a given variable.

The median (or middle value) divides the statistical population into two equal parts, with half of the elements having values of the variable less than or equal to the median, and the other half having values equal to or greater than the median.

If the considered population, ordered by the amount of income from the smallest to the largest, is divided into ten equal parts, nine values separating these parts are obtained. These values are called deciles, and the groups of statistical units constructed in this way are referred to as decile groups. Three deciles will be analysed, namely the first decile, the fifth decile, and the ninth decile, denoted by $D_{1.10}$, $D_{5.10}$, and $D_{9.10}$, respectively. The value of the first decile ($D_{1.10}$) corresponds to the highest income in the first decile group, the value of the fifth decile ($D_{5.10}$) corresponds to the highest income in the fifth decile group, and the value of the ninth decile ($D_{9.10}$) corresponds to the highest income in the ninth decile group. The fifth decile is identical to the median (i.e., $D_{5.10} = M$).

The inter-decile range is the area of variability[24] formed after excluding 10% of observations with the highest values and 10% of observations with the lowest values. It is calculated using the following formula:

$$R_D = D_{9.10} - D_{1.10} \tag{1}$$

The inter-decile range is an absolute metric. The relative metric is the inter-decile ratio, representing the quotient of the ninth decile to the first decile. The formula for it is as follows:

$$V_D = \frac{D_{9.10}}{D_{1.10}} \tag{2}$$

The greater the disparities in income, the greater the value of the inter-decile range and the inter-decile ratio.

For each decile group, the average value can be calculated. In the case of the first decile group, it would be the average based on 10% of units with the lowest values of the analysed variable. In the case of the last – the tenth – decile group, it would be the average based on 10% of units with the highest values of the analysed variable. Then, the average value obtained for the tenth decile group can be divided by the average value obtained for the first decile group, thus creating a measure as a dimensionless quantity. The following formula presents the construction of the discussed indicator:

$$V_{\overline{x}_{\text{group}}} = \frac{\overline{x}_{10.10}}{\overline{x}_{1.10}} \tag{3}$$

where $\overline{x}_{1.10}$ is the average from the first decile group, and $\overline{x}_{10.10}$ is the average from the tenth decile group.

It should be noted that the average calculated for the first decile group is significantly influenced by extremely low values of the variable. Analogously, the average calculated for the tenth decile group is significantly influenced by extremely high values of the variable. Therefore, the derived quotient of these averages is exceptionally sensitive to the occurrence of observations that deviate markedly from the others. In the case of salaries in Poland, the discussed measure will have a much higher value than the inter-decile ratio.

To determine the variability in the entire population, the standard deviation is used. It can be interpreted as the average deviation of individual values from the arithmetic mean. However, as an absolute metric, the standard deviation does not allow for comparing the diversity in different datasets. The coefficient of variation permits such

24 The terms "variability," "dispersion," "variation," and "diversity" will be used interchangeably in this article.

a comparison, calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the arithmetic mean. To facilitate interpretation, its value is expressed as a percentage.

Based on the arithmetic mean and standard deviation, it is possible to determine the so-called typical range of variability.[25] Observations that fall within this range are referred to as typical for the considered population, while observations located outside this range are considered atypical. The lower boundary of the typical range of variability is calculated by subtracting the value of the standard deviation from the arithmetic mean, and the upper boundary is calculated by adding the value of the standard deviation to the arithmetic mean.

In the next step, after computing and interpreting measures of central tendency and dispersion, the degree of distribution asymmetry will be assessed. To check the strength of asymmetry, the decile-based coefficient of skewness will be used, expressed by the formula:

$$S_D = \frac{\left(D_{9.10} - M\right) - \left(M - D_{1.10}\right)}{\left(D_{9.10} - M\right) + \left(M - D_{1.10}\right)} \tag{4}$$

The coefficient of skewness is a dimensionless number. The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of asymmetry. If the distribution is symmetrical, the coefficient of skewness has a value equal to 0. For a distribution characterised by left asymmetry, the coefficient has a negative value. Conversely, in the case of a distribution with right asymmetry, the coefficient of skewness is positive. The decile-based coefficient of skewness is normalised and falls within the range ⟨–1, 1⟩.

A synthetic measure that describes how the overall sum of variable values gets distributed among units in the population is the Gini concentration coefficient. It is a dimensionless and normalised metric – taking values from the range ⟨0, 1⟩. The greater the concentration, the higher the value of the discussed coefficient. In the situation of organising observations in non-decreasing order, the Gini coefficient of concentration can be calculated using the formula:

$$G = \frac{2}{n^2 \overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} i x_i - \frac{n+1}{n} \tag{5}$$

where i is the observation number, n is the size of the studied population, x_i is the i-th observation of variable X, and $\overline{x}$ is the arithmetic mean.

25 Anna Turczak, Patrycja Zwiech, "Variability of Household Disposable Income per Capita by Types of Residence in Poland," *Statistics in Transition new series* 15 (2014), 4: 576.

Additionally, besides the Gini coefficient, the maximum equalisation index can be used to describe the degree of unevenness in the distribution. It is computed according to the formula:

$$E = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_A} \left(x_{iA} - \overline{x} \right)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i} \tag{6}$$

where x_{iA} is the values of the variable satisfying the condition $x_i > \overline{x}$, and n_A is the number of observations satisfying the condition $x_i > \overline{x}$. The maximum equalisation index informs about the percentage of the total fund that constitutes a surplus above an even distribution of this fund.

Results

In Table 2, the outcomes of the central tendency analysis are presented.

Table 2. Arithmetic mean and median

Statistical measures	Considered variables	October 2020 (PLN)
Arithmetic mean	salaries among seafarers	7,499.62
	salaries in the economy	5,748.24
Middle value	salaries among seafarers	7,520.00
	salaries in the economy	4,702.66

Source: own study based on *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020*, Tables 5 and 13, Excel spreadsheet.

The disparity between the mean income of a seafarer and the mean remuneration in the national economy is PLN 1,751.38. The mean income of a seafarer is 130.5% of the mean salary in Poland.

The drawback of the arithmetic mean is its sensitivity to extreme values. Therefore, the median was also computed. It turns out that the median remuneration in the national economy is much lower than the mean remuneration. This suggests the distribution of salaries in Poland is right-skewed, with a predominance of workers earning below the mean. In contrast, for seafarers, the median and mean values are similar, indicating that in their cohort, the percentage of individuals with incomes above and below the mean is approximately equal.

The median income among seafarers is PLN 2,817.34 higher (i.e., 59.9% higher) than the median remuneration in the whole population of workers. When comparing these medians, the gap between Poland's salaries and seafarers' earnings is significantly

greater than when comparing arithmetic means. Thus, the reasons for this pattern need further investigation beyond the central tendency analysis. To gain a fuller picture of the differences between the income distribution of seafarers and the whole population, measures of dispersion, skewness, and concentration were calculated. Table 3 presents the results of the dispersion analysis.

Table 3. First decile, ninth decile, inter-decile range, inter-decile ratio, ratio of averages from the tenth and first decile groups, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation

Statistical measures	Considered variables	October 2020
First decile	salaries among seafarers	PLN 3,700.40
	salaries in the economy	PLN 2,719.68
Ninth decile	salaries among seafarers	PLN 11,299.72
	salaries in the economy	PLN 9,384.92
Inter-decile range	salaries among seafarers	PLN 7,599.32
	salaries in the economy	PLN 6,665.24
Inter-decile ratio	salaries among seafarers	3.054
	salaries in the economy	3.451
Ratio of averages from the tenth and first decile groups	salaries among seafarers	3.856
	salaries in the economy	5.625
Standard deviation	salaries among seafarers	PLN 2,767.36
	salaries in the economy	PLN 4,242.20
Coefficient of variation	salaries among seafarers	36.9%
	salaries in the economy	73.8%

Source: own computations based on *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020*, Tables 5, 13, and 14, Excel spreadsheet.

Based on the information in Table 3 regarding the values of the first and ninth deciles, it can be stated that 10% of workers with the lowest salaries earn at most PLN 2,719.68, while 10% of workers with the highest salaries earn at least PLN 9,384.92. In the narrowed variability range obtained by excluding 20% of extreme observations, the difference between the highest-earning individual and the lowest-earning individual is PLN 6,665.24. The ratio of PLN 9,384.92 to PLN 2,719.68 is approximately 3.451.

In the seafarers' cohort, to cover 80% of the middle values of the variable, one needs to establish a range with ends at PLN 3,700.40 and PLN 11,299.72. The range between the considered deciles is PLN 7,599.32 and dividing the ninth decile by the first decile results in 3.054.

Since the sizes of each decile group are the same and constitute 1/10 of the total size, dividing the sum of the earnings of the top 10% by the sum of the earnings of the bottom 10% yields the same result as dividing the average earnings of the top 10% by the average

earnings of the bottom 10%. It can be concluded, therefore, that the total earnings of the top 10% of workers in Poland are 5.625 times higher than the total earnings of the bottom 10%, or equivalently, that the average earnings of the top 10% of workers in Poland are 5.625 times higher than the average earnings of the bottom 10%.

In the case of salaries in the national economy, the quotient of the average from the tenth decile group to the average from the first decile group is much higher than the ratio of the ninth decile to the first decile. This indicates that in the population of workers in Poland, there are individuals whose salaries deviate significantly from the rest. On the other hand, among seafarers, the quotient of the average from the tenth decile group to the average from the first decile group is only slightly higher than the ratio of the ninth decile to the first decile. Thus, in seafarers' cohort, individuals with extreme earnings are relatively close to the centre of the distribution, and their numbers are small.

As explained earlier, the inter-decile ratio and the quotient of averages from the tenth and first decile groups are measures of variability that do not capture all existing differences in earnings but only those observed in the selected part of the population. In contrast, all differences affect the outcome of the standard deviation because, when calculating this measure, the value of each observation in the distribution is taken into account. Therefore, determining the standard deviation and, subsequently, the coefficient of variation based on it, will be a meaningful complement to the analysis of earnings dispersion in the compared populations.

In the examined period, the employees' salaries deviated on average from the mean by ±PLN 4,242.20, i.e., ±73.8%. Among seafarers, earnings deviated on average from the mean by ±PLN 2,767.36, i.e., ±36.9%. Thus, in terms of income, the group of seafarers is much less diverse. A typical seafarer had an income between PLN 4,732.26 and PLN 10,266.98, and the range of this typical area of variability is relatively narrow compared to the range for all employees (PLN 1,506.04 to PLN 9,990.44).

In Figure 1, the relative positions of the two means along the income axis are illustrated. The figure also highlights the span of typical variability ranges for the two compared populations.




Figure 1. Mean values and boundaries of typical variability ranges (in PLN)

Source: own study based on Tables 2 and 3 mentioned above.

In October 2020, a typical seafarer could be considered one who earned at least PLN 4,732.26 but no more than PLN 10,266.98. The lower boundary of the typical variability range for seafarers was over three times higher than the lower boundary for all workers. Additionally, the upper boundary for seafarers was higher than that for all workers. Notably, the lower boundary of the typical variability range for seafarers was only about one thousand PLN below the average income in Poland.

Knowledge of the values of measures of central tendency and dispersion provides a certain insight into the appearance of the distribution, but it still does not exhaust the information about its shape. Hence, for a better understanding of the specificity of seafarers' income distribution, measures of skewness and concentration were added. Table 4 presents the results of the skewness analysis.

Table 4. Distance from median to first decile, distance from ninth decile to median, and decile-based coefficient of skewness

Statistical measures	Considered variables	October 2020
Median minus first decile	salaries among seafarers	PLN 3,819.60
	salaries in the economy	PLN 1,982.98
Ninth decile minus median	salaries among seafarers	PLN 3,779.72
	salaries in the economy	PLN 4,682.26
Decile-based coefficient of skewness	salaries among seafarers	–0.005
	salaries in the economy	0.405

Source: own computations based on *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020*, Table 13, Excel spreadsheet.

When discussing the findings related to measures of central tendency, attention was drawn to the fact that in the distribution of salaries in the national economy, the arithmetic mean has a value greater than the median. It was also noted that the relationship $\overline{x} > M$ indicates a right-skewed distribution. Since, in the case of right-skewness, the mean is greater than the median, and the median always divides the population into two equal parts, it can be concluded that numerically there is a prevalence of units with values below the mean, while there are fewer units with values above the mean.

In a right-skewed distribution, the first decile is closer to the median than the ninth decile, leading to a positive numerator in the decile-based coefficient of skewness. Table 4 presents details regarding the difference between the ninth decile and the median, as well as between the median and the first decile. As easily observed, in the case of salaries in Poland, the following relationship holds:

$$D_{9.10} - M > M - D_{1.10} \tag{7}$$

The situation is different for seafarers. The distribution of seafarers' earnings is almost symmetrical, as evidenced by the decile-based coefficient of skewness oscillating

around zero. As a consequence, the percentage of seafarers earning incomes below the mean is approximately equal to the percentage of seafarers earning incomes above the mean.[26] Table 5 compiles the outcomes of the concentration analysis.

Table 5. Gini coefficient of concentration and maximum equalisation index

Statistical measures	Considered variables	October 2020
Gini coefficient of concentration	salaries among seafarers	0.211
	salaries in the economy	0.297
Maximum equalisation index	salaries among seafarers	15.6%
	salaries in the economy	21.1%

Source: own study based on *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020*, Table 14, Excel spreadsheet.

If every person in the national economy earned the same amount, the distribution of salaries would be a uniform (egalitarian) distribution. In this case, each decile group would receive 10% of the total salary fund. In reality, it is not true that the salary fund is evenly distributed among different groups of workers, indicating concentration.

Based on the information in Table 5, it can be stated that the sum of incomes among seafarers is distributed more evenly than the sum of salaries in the entire national economy, as evidenced by the lower Gini coefficient of concentration for the seafarers' cohort. Further confirmation of this pattern is the lower value of the maximum equalisation index for seafarers' incomes compared to its value relating to the national economy. The received results of the maximum equalisation index can be interpreted as follows: in the population of all workers, about 1/5 of the salary fund should be transferred from the group with higher-than-average earnings to the group with lower-than-average earnings to achieve an egalitarian distribution. In the seafarers' cohort, to achieve an egalitarian distribution, only 15.6% of incomes need to be transferred.

A valuable complement to the salary analysis conducted for the two statistical populations – the population of seafarers and the population of all employees in Poland – is a comparison of how the number of persons is spread across different salary brackets. To this end, frequency distributions were constructed for both populations, using the same class intervals, with the lower and upper boundaries of these intervals defined as multiples of the average salary in the national economy.[27] The width of each interval

26 When interpreting the results, it is essential to note that the S_D coefficient refers only to units within the narrowed range of variability obtained by excluding 10% of extremely high and 10% of extremely low observations. The exclusion of these 20% of observations was intentional, as it led to a skewness measure resistant to distortions caused by values significantly deviating from the rest.

27 The average salary in the national economy at that time was PLN 5,748.24 (see Table 2 mentioned above).

was set at 25% of the average salary.[28] With the class intervals defined, the counts were recorded, and percentages were calculated. Information about the lower and upper boundaries of the class intervals, along with the constructed frequency distributions, is presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Frequency distributions by salary brackets – data for October 2020

Class interval boundaries		Distribution by salary (%)	
as a multiple of $\overline{x}_p$	in PLN	seafarers	all employees
Up to 50% $\overline{x}_p$	up to 2,874.12	2.1	13.4
50% $\overline{x}_p$ to 75% $\overline{x}_p$	2,874.13 to 4,311.18	10.8	29.5
75% $\overline{x}_p$ to 100% $\overline{x}_p$	4,311.19 to 5,748.24	22.7	22.7
100% $\overline{x}_p$ to 125% $\overline{x}_p$	5,748.25 to 7,185.30	12.1	14.2
125% $\overline{x}_p$ to 150% $\overline{x}_p$	7,185.31 to 8,622.36	13.3	7.7
150% $\overline{x}_p$ to 175% $\overline{x}_p$	8,622.37 to 10,059.42	19.0	4.2
175% $\overline{x}_p$ to 200% $\overline{x}_p$	10,059.43 to 11,496.48	11.7	2.4
200% $\overline{x}_p$ to 225% $\overline{x}_p$	11,496.49 to 12,933.54	6.6	1.5
225% $\overline{x}_p$ to 250% $\overline{x}_p$	12,933.55 to 14,370.60	1.8	1.0
Over 250% $\overline{x}_p$	over 14,370.61	0.0	3.4

Source: own study based on *Structure of Wages and Salaries by Occupations in October 2020*, Table 12, Excel spreadsheet.

Based on the information gathered in Table 6, it can be concluded that seafarers most frequently earned between 75% and 100% of the average salary in Poland (denoted here as $\overline{x}_p$). Nearly one in four seafarers had earnings within this range. Another commonly earned amount in this population was 150%–175% of $\overline{x}_p$, with the incomes of one in five individuals falling within this bracket. In contrast, in the entire national economy, the most common earnings range was 50–75% of $\overline{x}_p$, accounting for nearly thirty percent of all employed persons.

Based on the percentages provided in Table 6, cumulative percentages were calculated. The results are presented in Table 7.

During the period under study, individuals earning at most the average salary in Poland accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total population, but only slightly more than one-third of the seafarer population. An income of at least 1.5 times the average salary was earned by as many as 39% of seafarers, while only one in eight employees in the overall workforce earned that much. Salaries exceeding 175% of $\overline{x}_p$ were more than twice as common among seafarers as they were among all employees.

28 Except for the first and last intervals, which are open intervals.

Table 7. Cumulative salary frequency distributions – data for October 2020

Upper class interval boundaries		Cumulative distribution by salary (%)	
as a multiple of $\overline{x}_p$	in PLN	seafarers	all employees
50% $\overline{x}_p$	2,874.12	2.1	13.4
75% $\overline{x}_p$	4,311.18	12.9	42.9
100% $\overline{x}_p$	5,748.24	35.6	65.6
125% $\overline{x}_p$	7,185.30	47.7	79.8
150% $\overline{x}_p$	8,622.36	61.0	87.5
175% $\overline{x}_p$	10,059.42	80.0	91.7
200% $\overline{x}_p$	11,496.48	91.7	94.1
225% $\overline{x}_p$	12,933.54	98.3	95.6
250% $\overline{x}_p$	14,370.60	100.0	96.6

Source: own calculations based on Table 6 mentioned above.

The findings of this study highlight that the distribution of earnings in the seafarers' cohort differs significantly from the general salary distribution in Poland. This difference reflects the unique characteristics of the maritime labour market, including international regulations, standardised pay agreements, and the specific demands of seafaring occupations. Furthermore, the more homogeneous composition of the seafaring workforce – requiring specific certifications and rigorous training – leads to a more uniform level of qualifications compared to the general workforce.[29] Understanding these differences is crucial for policymakers and industry stakeholders aiming to address labour shortages, enhance recruitment strategies, and ensure fair compensation within the sector. Future research could employ income decomposition techniques to identify the impact of factors such as education, experience, gender, and firm characteristics on earnings, providing deeper insights into the underlying causes of income disparities.[30]

29 Gary S. Becker, *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15–20.

30 Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska, Iga Magda, "The Gender Wage Gap in the Workplace: Does the Age of the Firm Matter?", *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 26 (2020), 2: 128–130; Ronald L. Oaxaca, "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets," *International Economic Review* 14 (1973), 3: 693–696; Alan S. Blinder, "Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates," *Journal of Human Resources* 8 (1973), 4: 436–438.

Conclusions

Income magnitude plays a significant stratifying role and is one of the key determinants of a person's position in the social hierarchy.[31] Earned incomes define material status, influence the level and richness of consumption by an individual and the associated family, and also impact non-material aspects of life, such as participation in culture, tourism, professional and non-professional development, admiration, and recognition from the surrounding environment.[32]

This article focused on the topic of incomes earned by seafarers, comparing their income distribution with the salary distribution in Poland. In the course of the conducted research, the following measures belonging to the descriptive statistics apparatus were determined and interpreted: arithmetic mean, median, first decile, ninth decile, inter-decile range, inter-decile ratio, ratio of averages from the tenth and first decile groups, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, decile-based coefficient of skewness, Gini coefficient of concentration, and maximum equalisation index.

Results were obtained based on a sample study. This was a sample of very large size, and its structure reflected the structure of the whole population. Thanks to these properties of the sample, research findings can be generalised to the whole population. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the values of calculated statistics, since they refer to the sample, represent, at most, an estimate (a very good estimate, but still only an estimate) of the formation of the sought parameters in the general population.

The starting point in the analysis of the distribution is the examination of the central tendency, which was conducted using the arithmetic mean, the median and selected deciles.

In October 2020, the mean salary in Poland amounted to PLN 5,748.24. If the overall salary fund were evenly distributed among all workers, each would receive exactly PLN 5,748.24. However, the middle salary was lower, amounting to PLN 4,702.66. Since the relationship $M < \overline{x}$ was fulfilled, employees in Poland tended more towards lower salaries. Meanwhile, among seafarers, mean income was almost equal to median income,

31 Piotr Oleksiak, "Dysfunkcje systemu wynagradzania w organizacji [Dysfunctions of the System of Rewarding in the Organization]," *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica* 288 (2013): 132; Jarosław Sokołowski, "O funkcjach wynagrodzeń raz jeszcze," *Przegląd Organizacji* 842 (2010), 3: 33.

32 Olimpia Grabiec, Joanna Bednarczyk, "Wynagrodzenia i świadczenia na rzecz pracowników jako koszt przedsiębiorstwa [Wages and Benefits for Employees as the Cost of the Enterprise]," *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Humanitas. Zarządzanie* 3 (2018): 91; Wojciech Stefan Zgliczyński, "Wynagrodzenia w Polsce," *INFOS Biuro Analiz Sejmowych* 159 (2013), 22: 1; Ewa Beck-Krala, *Wynagrodzenia pracowników w organizacji. Teoria i praktyka* (Kraków: Wydawnictwa AGH, 2013), 36–37; Ewa Polak, *Globalizacja a zróżnicowanie społeczno-ekonomiczne* (Warsaw: Centrum Doradztwa i Informacji Difin, 2009), 237–238; Jerzy Wratny, "Prawo do wynagrodzenia za pracę w świetle zasad sprawiedliwości i równości [The Right to Remuneration for Work in the Light of the Principles of Justice and Equality]," *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio G* 62 (2015), 2: 298–299.

indicating that individual units in this population concentrated around the middle of the variability range.

During the examined period, the mean remuneration of seafarers was at the level of PLN 7,499.62, which was 30.5% higher than the mean salary in Poland. In the comparison of medians, the advantage of seafarers turned out to be even greater, reaching 59.9% (PLN 7,520.00 against PLN 4,702.66). The absolute difference between the means was equal to PLN 1,751.38, and the absolute difference between the median values was PLN 2,817.34.

The inter-decile ratio had a lower value in the population of seafarers than in the population of all workers – among seafarers, the ninth decile was about 3 times larger than the first decile, while among all workers, it was close to 3.5 times larger. The value of the ratio based on the averages from the last and first decile groups was also lower in the seafarers' cohort compared to the population of all workers. The quotient of averages from the tenth and first decile groups among seafarers was 3.856, while among all workers, it was 5.625. The income dispersion in the seafarers' cohort was, therefore, much smaller than the salary dispersion in the national economy. The smaller dispersion of seafarers' earnings from the dispersion of salaries in Poland was further confirmed by the analysis of the coefficient of variation (36.9% versus 73.8%).

The income distribution in Poland was a right-skewed distribution, meaning that the majority of people in Poland had salaries below the mean. In contrast, the distribution of seafarers' earnings was essentially symmetrical. Thus, every other seafarer could enjoy remuneration exceeding the mean.

The final group of metrics analysed were the concentration measures. Based on the acquired values of the Gini coefficient of concentration and the maximum equalisation index, it was shown that in the seafarers' cohort, the degree of unevenness in the distribution of earnings was lower than in the population of all workers in Poland.

In summary, the conducted study allowed us to conclude that the distribution of earnings in the population of seafarers is characterised by a higher average value and smaller dispersion, skewness, and concentration than the distribution of salaries in the population of workers in Poland. The hypothesis stated in the introduction was positively verified, and the research goal was achieved.

These differences in earnings distributions can be attributed to the unique structure of employment within the maritime industry.[33] Factors such as global competition, standardised pay agreements, and the challenging working conditions at sea significantly influence remuneration structures. The seafaring profession, characterised by a more homogeneous group in terms of skills, qualifications, and job requirements, may lead to a more equitable earnings distribution. Additionally, international pay standards and

33 Jakub Harman, Lucia Bartůsková, "The Gender Pay Gap in the Visegrad Groups," *Journal of Economic Studies* 51 (2024), 4: 740–743.

collective bargaining agreements contribute to reducing salary disparities among seafarers.[34] Applying income decomposition analyses to the maritime sector could provide deeper insights into the structural factors affecting seafarers' earnings.[35] For instance, investigating how elements like international crew compositions, flag states, and shipping company ownership influence income distributions can reveal important dynamics within the industry.[36]

Practical implications and recommendations

Work at sea is distinguished by a unique combination of challenges rarely encountered in other professions. Long periods spent at sea, difficult weather conditions, and living in isolation from family and society require seafarers to demonstrate significant mental resilience. The nature of their work shapes their expectations regarding remuneration, which should compensate for both the physical and emotional hardships associated with the profession.[37]

The results of this study, which highlight higher earnings and lower income dispersion among seafarers compared to the broader workforce in Poland, suggest that the profession offers more stable and attractive remuneration. The salary distribution, characterised by lower skewness and concentration, may indicate a balanced structure within the seafarer cohort, reducing the risks of extreme income disparities. However, while the statistical analysis demonstrates a more equitable earnings structure in the seafarer population, it does not necessarily indicate whether this state is advantageous or problematic for the industry.

In light of global trends in the shipping industry, including potential labour shortages and the increasing demand for qualified maritime professionals, it is essential to assess whether the current salary distribution aligns with the long-term sustainability of the workforce. The relatively high average earnings among seafarers could be seen as a strength, attracting new entrants to the profession. However, the lower salary dispersion might limit opportunities for rapid financial progression, potentially affecting

34 *Maritime Labour Convention* (MLC, 2006). Adopted at the 94th (Maritime) Session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2006).

35 Aleksandra Matuszewska-Janica, Dorota Witkowska, "Differences Between Determinants of Men and Women Monthly Wages Across Fourteen European Union States," *Equilibrium: Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy* 16 (2021), 3: 510–512.

36 Paulina Broniatowska, Paweł Strawiński, "Foreign- and Domestic Firm Ownership and Its Impact on Wages: Evidence from Poland," *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 27 (2021), 4: 450–452; Maximilian Sprengholz, Maik Hamjediers, "Intersections and Commonalities: Using Matching to Decompose Wage Gaps by Gender and Nativity in Germany," *Work and Occupations* 51 (2024), 2: 255–258.

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retention among highly skilled or experienced employees seeking greater financial rewards.

From a policy perspective, it may be beneficial to explore the possibility of making adjustments to the salary framework in the maritime sector. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on pay transparency, particularly in the context of international maritime regulations. Implementing policies that promote transparency and reporting on salary structures can help improve working conditions in the maritime sector. Additionally, creating a more dynamic pay progression system, where higher levels of performance, expertise, or years of service are more clearly rewarded, could incentivize both recruitment and retention. Such changes have the potential to prevent future labour shortages and ensure a steady supply of qualified professionals in the seafaring industry. Furthermore, increased transparency in remuneration policies is likely to enhance satisfaction and trust within the workforce.

This study provides a statistical foundation for understanding the specifics of the salary distribution in the seafaring profession. While the findings validate the hypothesis of higher average earnings and more symmetrical income distribution, further research is needed to assess the long-term impact of these patterns on the labour market within the maritime sector. Future studies could investigate how salary schemes influence career decisions, job satisfaction, and employee retention among seafarers, as well as the sector's ability to adapt to global economic changes. Moreover, the role of remuneration policies in maintaining a competitive and sustainable maritime workforce should be a key area of focus for policymakers and industry leaders alike.

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SUMMARY

Although remuneration is not the sole determinant of workplace attractiveness, it is considered the most crucial factor. The aim of this article is to assess the pattern of seafarers' incomes in comparison to salaries in the national economy. To achieve this goal, a statistical analysis of earnings distribution in the seafarers' cohort and the distribution of all earnings in Poland was conducted, followed by relevant comparisons. The article begins with an introduction presenting the research problem and concludes with key findings. The main part of the work

consists of a detailed description of the applied methodology and the presentation of the obtained results along with their interpretation. All calculations were based on data from the Central Statistical Office. The validity of the hypothesis was confirmed, indicating that the income distribution in the seafarers' cohort has a higher average value but smaller dispersion, skewness, and concentration than the income distribution in the entire population of employees in Poland.

Rozkład zarobków marynarzy a rozkład wynagrodzeń w Polsce – analiza statystyczna

Słowa kluczowe: zarobki, płaca, rozkład, analiza porównawcza, marynarze, Polska

STRESZCZENIE

Choć wynagrodzenie nie jest jedynym wyznacznikiem atrakcyjności miejsca pracy, uważa się je za czynnik najistotniejszy. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ocena kształtowania się dochodów marynarzy na tle płac w gospodarce narodowej. Aby zrealizować ten cel, przeprowadzono analizę statystyczną rozkładu zarobków w kohorcie marynarzy i rozkładu wszystkich zarobków w Polsce, a następnie dokonano odpowiednich porównań. Artykuł rozpoczyna się od wstępu, który przedstawia problem badawczy, a kończy się kluczowymi ustaleniami. Zasadniczą część pracy stanowi szczegółowy opis zastosowanej metodyki oraz prezentacja uzyskanych wyników wraz z ich interpretacją. Wszystkie obliczenia wykonano na podstawie danych Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego. Potwierdzono prawdziwość hipotezy, według której rozkład dochodów w kohorcie marynarzy charakteryzuje się wyższą wartością przeciętną, ale mniejszą dyspersją, skośnością i koncentracją niż rozkład dochodów w całej populacji pracowników w Polsce.

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