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Patrycja Jędrzejewska-Michalak
Institute of History
Pomeranian University in Słupsk
patrycja.jedrzejewska@upsl.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-7897-3043

Circumstances of Wartislaw IV's Assumption of Power over the Lands of Sławno and Słupsk

Keywords: West Pomerania, Wartislaw IV, Sławno, Słupsk

Duke Wartislaw IV, born around 1290 as the son of Bogusław IV and Margaret, daughter of Wizlaw II, Prince of Rügen, ruled the Duchy of Wolgast from 1309. Around 1316, he also became ruler of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk, and from 1325, following the extinction of the Rügen[1] princely line, he held power over the island as well.

The figure of Wartislaw IV appears frequently in the works of both Polish and German historians. Although a full biography has yet to be written, various aspects of his activity have been the subject of scholarly interest. His life, marriage, and relations with the Margraviate of Brandenburg have been explored in detail by Edward Rymar.[2] Wartislaw IV's foreign policy, as well as the broader diplomatic stance of the Western Pomeranian dukes towards the Teutonic Order in Prussia between 1320 and 1423, has been analysed by Rafał Simiński.[3] Joachim Zdrenka has extensively discussed the foreign policy of the dukes of Szczecin from the division of the Duchy of Western

1 Edward Rymar, *Rodowód książąt pomorskich,* vol. 2 (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica w Szczecinie, 1995), 12.

2 For example: Rymar, *Rodowód*; Idem, *Historia polityczna i społeczna Nowej Marchii w średniowieczu (do roku 1535)* (Gorzów Wielkopolski: Wojewódzka i Miejska Biblioteka Publiczna im. Zbigniewa Herberta, 2015); Idem, "Itinerarium książąt zachodniopomorskich: Bogusława IV (1278–1309) i Warcisława IV (1309–1326)," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 22 (2007), 2: 5–53.

3 Rafał Simiński, "Z badań nad polityką zagraniczną księcia wołogoskiego Warcisława IV (1309–1326)," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 32 (2017), 2: 211–229; Idem, *Konflikt-Pojednanie-Współpraca. Studia nad polityką książąt zachodniopomorskich i biskupów kamieńskich wobec Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach w latach 1320–1423* (Wrocław: Chronicon, 2019).

Pomerania in 1295 up to 1411, also addressing Wartislaw IV's participation in relations with the princes of Szczecin.[4] The rule of Wartislaw IV over Rügen has been the subject of studies by Janisław Osięgłowski.[5] The lands of Sławno and Słupsk, especially during Wartislaw's rise to power, have been studied in depth by Józef Spors[6] and Barbara Popielas-Szultka.[7] Political circumstances linked to Wartislaw's reign and its historical context have also been discussed by Arkadiusz Bugaj,[8] Błażej Śliwiński[9] and Marek Smoliński.[10] Among German historians, the most notable contributions come from Robert Klempin,[11] Adolf Hofmeister,[12] Martin Wehrmann,[13] and Wilhelm Wegener.[14]

The Lands of Słupsk and Sławno Before Wartislaw IV's Rule

In the 13th and early 14th centuries, the lands of Sławno and Słupsk were contested by the Sobiesławids, the Piasts, the Danish and Rügen rulers, as well as the Přemyslids, the Ascanians, and the Griffins. The bishops of Kamień also took part in these disputes. From the beginning of the 14th century, the lands of Sławno and Słupsk

4 Joachim Zdrenka, *Polityka książąt szczecińskich w latach 1295–1411* (Słupsk: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne Oddział w Słupsku, 1985).

5 Janisław Osięgłowski, *Polityka zewnętrzna Księstwa Rugii (1168–1328)* (Warszawa- Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975).

6 For example: Józef Spors, *Podziały polityczne i administracyjne Pomorza Gdańskiego i Sławieńsko-Słupskiego XII–XIV w.* (Słupsk: Urząd Wojewódzki, 1979); Idem, *Dzieje polityczne ziem sławieńskiej, słupskiej i białogardzkiej XII–XIV w.* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1973).

7 Barbara Popielas-Szultka, *Początki i lokacje miast na Pomorzu Słowieńsko-Słupskim do połowy XIV w.* (Słupsk: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna: 1990); Idem, "Związki polityczne Pomorza Słupskiego z Polską od X w. do połowy XVII w.," *Słupskie Prace Humanistyczne* 14a (1995): 145–158.

8 Arkadiusz Bugaj, "Problem przynależności politycznej ziemi sławieńskiej w latach 1316–1320," in: *Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze*, vol. 9: *Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze*, ed. Błażej Śliwiński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2003), 17–39.

9 Błażej Śliwiński, "Przynależność państwowa ziemi słupskiej w XII i w początkach XIII w. Czyli o historiograficznym micie przynależności ziemi słupskiej do księstwa sławieńskiego," in: *Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze*, ed. Błażej Śliwiński, 273–289; Idem, *Mściwoj II (1224–1294) książę wschodniopomorski (gdański)* (Warszawa: DiG, 2016); Idem, *Pomorze Wschodnie w okresie rządów księcia polskiego Władysława Łokietka w latach 1306–1309* (Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2016).

10 Marek Smoliński, *Świętopełk gdański* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2016).

11 Robert Klempin, *Stammtafeln des Pommersch-Rügischen Fürstenhauses und seiner Nebenlinien. Aus dem Nachlaß von R. Klempin zum Druck gegeben von G. v. Bülow* (Stettin: Th. von den Nahmer, 1876).

12 Adolf Hofmeister, *Aus der Geschichte des pommerschen Herzogshauses* (Greifswald: Bamberg, 1938); Idem, *Genealogische Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des pommerschen Herzogshauses* (Greifswald: Universitätsverlag Ratsbuchhandlung L. Bamberg, 1938).

13 Martin Wehrmann, *Genealogie des Pommersches herzogshauses* (Stettin: Verlag Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1937); Idem, *Geschichte der Insel Rugen* (Greifswald: Verlag Dr. Karl Moninger, 1923).

14 Wilhelm Wegener, *Die Herzoge von Pommern aus dem Greifen-Hause ca. 1100–1637 mit einer Einführung* (Gottingen: Heinz Reise Verlag, 1969).

experienced frequent changes in political affiliation, as various claims were put forward by the Margraves of Brandenburg, the bishops of Kamień, and the dukes of Western Pomerania and Rügen.[15]

Despite the interest shown by historians in the political changes concerning the lands of Sławno and Słupsk, little attention has been paid to the role played in these developments by Duke Wartislaw IV. Establishing the precise basis and timing of Wartislaw IV's acquisition of these territories has long posed difficulties. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the circumstances under which the Duke of Wolgast came to assume power over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. It is worth re-evaluating the direction of Wartislaw IV's political strategies, especially his relations with Brandenburg, the Duchy of Szczecin, and the Kingdom of Poland. Was it perhaps due to a political approach differing from that of his father, with respect to the Margraviate of Brandenburg, that Wartislaw IV succeeded in expanding his domain to include the lands of Sławno and Słupsk? What actions did he take to retain them and stabilise their long-disputed political status?

This would have been of particular importance, as he intended to pass his dominion on to his sons after his death, and he certainly wished it to be as territorially expansive as possible. This article aims to gather and verify the current findings and to demonstrate the role played by Duke Wartislaw IV in incorporating the aforementioned lands into the Duchy of Wolgast. Its content focuses significantly on tracing the origins of Sławno and Słupsk's inclusion within Wartislaw IV's rule and, consequently, on the policy pursued by the Western Pomeranian dukes with regard to these territories. It is worth noting, among other things, that Wartislaw IV's father, Bogusław IV, may already have aspired to take control of these lands. Perhaps Wartislaw inherited this ambition from his father? Perhaps, as a young prince, he learned from him, and this is why, once ruling independently, he changed his allies?

The lands of Sławno and Słupsk were situated on the periphery in relation to both the Duchy of Pomerania and the Duchy of Gdańsk, and they also bordered the Margraviate of Brandenburg. The history of these territories in the 12th and early 13th centuries remains unclear.[16] Their political position had a significant impact on the processes taking

15 The historical trajectories of the lands of Słupsk and Sławno diverged significantly, which in turn affected their political and administrative structures. At least from the early 13th century, the land of Sławno remained under strong influence of the Dukes of Western Pomerania. In contrast, the land of Słupsk came under the authority of the Dukes of Eastern Pomerania. In the 13th century, the Polish model of administration was introduced in Słupsk, adopted by the Dukes of Gdańsk. The situation was different in Sławno, which at various times fell under different models of governance. See e.g. Marek Smoliński, "Termin zjednoczenia ziemi słupskiej z Pomorzem Gdańskim w świetle nowych badań nad historią Pomorza w XII i XIII w.," in: *Słupsk i ziemia słupska. Od średniowiecza do współczesności,* ed. Wojciech Skóra and Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio (Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku, 2021), 73 ff.

16 Smoliński, "Termin," 73–91. The question of whether the land of Słupsk belonged to the land of Sławno and formed a separate duchy has been addressed by Błażej Śliwiński; see: Śliwiński, "Przynależność," 273–289.

place in the region—for example, feudal relations developed here later than in the western and eastern parts of Pomerania.[17]

After the death of Duke Świętopełk[18] of Gdańsk in 1266, the land of Sławno was incorporated into the Duchy of Western Pomerania (in 1269 it was taken over by the then Duke of Rügen, Wislaw II, who in 1277 sold it to the Margraves of Brandenburg).[19] Meanwhile, the land of Słupsk and its surrounding areas came under the control of the rulers of Eastern Pomerania. Wislaw, styling himself *dei gratia Ruyanorum princeps*, referred in documents to *terra Zlauensen*.[20]

According to Błażej Śliwiński, Świętopełk's son, Duke Mściwoj II, around 1274 united the Duchy of Gdańsk. Continuing his father's policy towards western neighbours, he sought to incorporate the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. However, he managed to seize only Słupsk. When he launched his campaign to take both territories, the townspeople of Słupsk promptly opened the city gates to him. An attack on the land of Sławno did not occur, as Wizlaw II ultimately chose to begin negotiations. The aforementioned researcher suggests that the signing of the relevant document likely took place in Słupsk.[21]

It should also be noted that in February 1282, an agreement was concluded in Kępno between Duke Mściwoj II of Pomerania and Duke Przemysł II[22] of Greater Poland. A year later, in 1283, an armed conflict broke out in Western Pomerania between local forces and the Margraviate of Brandenburg. Mściwoj II took advantage of this opportunity and annexed the land of Sławno[23] into his domain.

Following the events mentioned above, likely in an effort to secure the lands held by the Pomeranian rulers—including those of Sławno and Słupsk—Dukes Mściwoj II, Przemysł II, and Bogusław IV (the Duke of Western Pomerania and father of Wartislaw IV) formed an alliance in Słupsk on 23 November 1287.[24] It is possible that they agreed at that time that, upon the death of Przemysł II, Bogusław IV would assume

17 Barbara Popielas-Szultka, ed., *Źródła do historii Słupska do połowy XIV w.* (Słupsk: Pomorska Akademia Pedagogiczna, 2000), 13.

18 Duke Świętopełk, the question of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk in his policies, and his relations with neighbouring duchies, see: Smoliński, *Świętopełk,* 184–333. For a more extensive and recent study of Świętopełk's ties to Słupsk and Sławno, see: Idem, "Termin," 73 ff.

19 Max Perlbach, ed., *Pommerellisches Urkundenbuch* (hereinafter PommU) (Danzig: Westpreussischen Geschichtsverein, 1882), no. 285. See Osięgłowski, *Polityka*, 87. On Mściwoj II's takeover of the land of Sławno, most recently see: Marek Smoliński, "Międzynarodowy kontekst odzyskania ziemi sławieńskiej przez Mściwoja II w 1283 r. i zawarcia sojuszu brandenbursko-wielkopolskiego," *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 24 (2020): 172– 211.

20 PommU, no. 285.

21 Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II*, 208–211.

22 For detailed analysis of the Treaty of Kępno, see: Bronisław Nowacki, *Przemysł II odnowiciel Korony Polskiej (1257–1296)* (Kraków: Avalon, 2013), 106 and n. Cf. Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II,* 257–272.

23 Popielas-Szultka, Źródła do historii Słupska, 14–15; Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II,* 288–296.

24 PommU, no. 426. For a more detailed discussion, see: Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II,* 331–335.

control over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. Perhaps this was part of a strategy adopted by the Duke of Wolgast to acquire these territories. If this were the case, it would suggest that Bogusław IV employed different methods to expand his domain from those later used by his son Wartislaw IV during his reign.

Most historians agree that the alliance was political in nature and most likely aimed against the Margraviate of Brandenburg.[25] After the alliance in Słupsk was concluded between the three dukes, the Brandenburgers attempted to isolate Bogusław IV from his two allies. Despite Brandenburg's efforts, the Słupsk agreement remained in force for several years, as evidenced by documents issued by Przemysł II and Bogusław IV for the Oliwa Monastery in 1291.[26]

Duke Mściwoj II died in 1294.[27] In accordance with the Kępno agreement of 1282, Gdańsk Pomerania—together with the lands of Sławno and Słupsk—came under the rule of Duke Przemysł II of Greater Poland. It is significant that the already accomplished unification of Greater Poland with Gdańsk Pomerania created the opportunity to pursue the coronation of this duke as King of Poland. This indeed took place on 25 June 1295 in Gniezno.[28] Shortly thereafter, in 1296, Przemysł II was assassinated in a plot inspired by the Brandenburgers.[29]

Przemysł's legacy was taken up by Duke Władysław Łokietek of Kuyavia. However, his rule over Gdańsk Pomerania was short-lived, as in 1300 the Polish crown passed to King Wenceslaus II of Bohemia, and then to his son, Wenceslaus III. The lands of Sławno and Słupsk remained under Bohemian rule until 1306[30] (during this period, Duke Sambor I of Rügen also laid claim to Mściwoj II's inheritance and occupied the lands of Sławno and Słupsk in 1301, ruling there until 1303).[31]

With the extinction of the Bohemian dynasty ruling in Poland and Gdańsk Pomerania, the Brandenburg margraves once again entered the scene. Their claims to Pomerania were based on an agreement concluded with King Wenceslaus III of Bohemia

25 See also: Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II,* 330 ff. An interesting perspective on the issue of succession to the Eastern Pomeranian throne after Mściwoj II is presented by Thomas Kantzow. See Thomas Kantzow, *Pomerania. Kronika pomorska z XVI wieku,* trans. Krzysztof Gołda (Szczecin: Dokument, 2005), 368, 379. See Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 134; Cf. Spors, *Dzieje,* 147.

26 PommU, no. 481, 482.

27 Rymar, *Rodowód,* vol. 1, 295.

28 August Bielowski, ed. "Rocznik Traski," in: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 2 (Lwów: Akademia Umiejętności, 1872), 853.

29 See Rymar, *Historia*, 200 and n. See also his discussion on the assassination of Przemysł II. For a broader treatment of the topic, see: Nowacki, *Przemysł II,* 201–219.

30 For more on the rule of Władysław Łokietek and the Přemyslid dynasty in Eastern Pomerania, see: Śliwiński, *Pomorze Wschodnie*, 15–40.

31 See Błażej Śliwiński, "Fragment dziejów politycznych ziemi sławieńskiej w latach 1301–1303," *Zapiski Historyczne* 56 (1991), 1: 16. On the rule of Sambor I in the lands of Sławno and Słupsk, see also: Osięgłowski, *Polityka zewnętrzna,* 109 ff.

on 8 August 1305.[32] According to this treaty, the Brandenburgers returned Meissen—previously pledged to them—to Wenceslaus III, in exchange for receiving Gdańsk Pomerania.[33] This clearly shows that the margraves remained determined to gain control over Eastern Pomerania.

Polish and German historians differ in their views on Brandenburg's occupation of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk.[34] In the summer of 1306, the Brandenburgers had an opportunity to seize the Pomeranian territories following the death of King Wacław III. However, Władysław Łokietek thwarted their efforts. The Brandenburgers used the Neumark as their base of operations on the Pomeranian front. That same year, troops under the command of the von Wedel family[35] (acting on behalf of the margraves) occupied the land of Sławno and, during their raid, destroyed Kamień, which was the seat of the bishopric. In 1307, these same forces took control of the land of Słupsk, aided by the feudal submission of the powerful Święca family. Ludolf von Wedel had to hand over the castles taken the year before—Polanów, Sianów, and Sławno[36]—which had been garrisoned by the Święcas.

Initially, members of the Święca family recognised the authority of Władysław Łokietek over the territories previously ruled by Mściwoj II and Przemysł II. However, faced with threats to their positions—both in terms of official posts and property—due to a lawsuit brought against them by Bishop Gerard of Włocławek on 17 July 1307 in Lędowo[37] near Ustka, the Święca family, along with Piotr of Nowe, submitted the land of Słupsk to the Brandenburg margraves.[38] In return for recognising Brandenburg overlordship, the family received from Ludolf von Wedel the aforementioned castles of Polanów, Sianów, and Sławno.[39]

Following the events of 1306 and 1307, the lands of Sławno and Słupsk came under Brandenburg rule. Władysław Łokietek attempted to reclaim the legacy of Przemysł II,

32 PommU, no. 640.

33 See Śliwiński, *Pomorze Wschodnie,* 36–38.

34 For discussions on this topic, see: Śliwiński, *Pomorze Wschodnie,* 153–162; Marek Smoliński, "Sytuacja na pograniczu askańsko-brandenburskim w II połowie XIII w. i na przełomie XIII/ XIV w. Najazd Brandenburgii na Pomorze Sławieńskie w 1306 r.," in: *Pomorze, Mazowsze, Prusy,* vol. 7: *Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*. (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2000), 181–234.

35 On the Wedel family, see, e.g.: Rymar, *Historia polityczna,* 915.

36 Rymar, *Historia polityczna*, 212. Cf. Śliwiński, *Pomorze Wschodnie,* 161 ff.

37 PommU, no. 656; Georg Winter, bearb. v. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch* (hereinafter PUB), Bd. IV. Abt. 2 (Stettin, 1903), no. 2355.

38 According to Arkadiusz Bugaj, the Święca family was required to swear fealty to the margraves in 1307. See Bugaj, *Problem przynależności*, 26–27. Gerard Labuda, *Historia Kaszubów w dziejach Pomorza. Czasy średniowieczne,* vol.1 (Gdańsk: Instytut Kaszubski w Gdańsku, 2006), 378–380.

39 On the issue of whether the so-called "betrayal of the Święca family" truly occurred, and for more on the 1307 agreement in Lędowo, see: Śliwiński, *Pomorze Wschodnie,* 209–234.

but the situation was difficult. Once again, Duke Bogusław IV of Western Pomerania opposed the margraves. Unable to wrest control of the Pomeranian territories from Brandenburg hands, Władysław turned to the Teutonic Order for assistance. The Teutonic Knights expelled the enemy from Eastern Pomerania but subsequently occupied Gdańsk themselves.[40] However, the Brandenburgers retained control over Sławno and Słupsk.[41]

The Oliwa Chronicle reports that in 1309 an agreement was reached between Brandenburg and the Teutonic Order, under which the Order acquired the so-called "rights" of the Brandenburgers to Pomerania up to the borders of the land of Słupsk.[42] Ultimately, the arrangement resulted in the lands of Sławno and Słupsk remaining under the rule of the Margraviate, with Margraves Waldemar, Otto, and Hermann at the helm, while the rest of Eastern Pomerania came under the dominion of the Teutonic Order.[43]

The Lands of Sławno and Słupsk under the rule of Wartislaw IV

Wartislaw, the son of Bogusław IV and Margaret of Rügen, was born around 1290 and, from the beginning of his reign in 1309, maintained good relations with Brandenburg—unlike his father. Upon the death of Bogusław IV, Wartislaw became Duke of Wolgast. His loyal stance toward Margrave Waldemar contributed to Wartislaw acquiring the lands of Słupsk, Sławno, and Darłowo.[44] According to Edward Rymar and others, these lands may have constituted the dowry of Wartislaw IV's wife, Elisabeth, who was most likely (according to the aforementioned scholar) a Brandenburg margravine.[45]

Let us take a closer look at the matter of Wartislaw IV receiving the lands of Sławno and Słupsk from Margrave Waldemar. In 1315, a great anti-Brandenburg coalition was formed, led by King Eric VI of Denmark. Apart from the king himself, the alliance included Henry of Mecklenburg, Wizlaw III of Rügen, the Duke of Lüneburg, the Archbishop of Magdeburg, the Bishop of Schwerin, many other North German lords,

40 Wojciech Kętrzyński, ed., "Kronika oliwska," in: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 6 (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1893), 318 ff.

41 See e.g. Jan Baszkiewicz, *Odnowienie Królestwa Polskiego 1295–1320* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2008), 57 ff.

42 "[T]erram *Pomeranie usque ad terminos terre Stolpensis emerunt*." Kętrzyński, "Kronika oliwska", 319. Cf. Śliwiński, *Pomorze Wschodnie,* 429 ff.

43 Popielas-Szultka, *Źródła do historii Słupska*, 17.

44 Otto Heinemann, bearb. v. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Bd. V. Abt. 2 (Stettin: 1905), no. 3152.

45 Rymar, *Historia polityczna*, 228. See also Zdrenka, *Polityka,* 45–47; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 300–305; Klempin, *Stammtafeln*, 9.

and Władysław Łokietek.[46] On Waldemar's side, apart from Wartislaw IV, stood Duke Otto of Szczecin, who, for his loyal stance towards the margrave, received the land of Pełczno. The war only came to an end with the deaths of both Waldemar of Brandenburg and King Eric of Denmark, which occurred in 1319.[47]

According to Józef Spors, in this situation the Brandenburg margrave, Waldemar, sought to win over at least the dukes of Western Pomerania. Territorial grants may have served as a convincing incentive. Thus, around 1316, the margrave granted Wartislaw IV the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. One may agree with Spors that the Margraviate adopted a visibly conciliatory attitude toward Western Pomerania[48]—likely as a result of the powerful coalition formed against it.

An interesting document that may shed light on the governance of the land of Słupsk before Wartislaw IV received it from the Margrave of Brandenburg is a charter issued on 22 August 1315 in the locality of Tankow. In this document, the Brandenburg margrave confirmed the Święca family and their heirs in the possession of the villages of Kobylnica, Siemianice, Nożyno, Dąbrówno, Skórzyno, Wykosowo, Żelazo, Skórowo, Borzytuchom, Tuchomie, and Tuchomko as fiefs. Among the witnesses to this charter were Henning de Blankenburch, Piotr of Nowe, Jakub Boytin, and Ludwig von Wedel.[49] It is evident that the Święca family was well known to Margrave Waldemar and held significant influence in the lands of Słupsk, Sławno, and Bytów—as confirmed by the listed villages from this region. Furthermore, among the witnesses to Waldemar's charter was Piotr of Nowe, who also appears in other documents issued by the margrave, providing additional confirmation of the Święca family's prominence.[50]

The precise date when the lands of Sławno and Słupsk were incorporated into Wartislaw IV's domain remains a matter of scholarly debate. Historians suggest the years 1313, 1316, or 1317.[51] It can be assumed that the rule of the Dukes of Wolgast over these lands was definitively established by December 1317,[52] though this does not exclude the possibility that they were incorporated earlier. Initially, Wartislaw IV held these territories as a vassal of Margrave Waldemar of Brandenburg (until 1319), and later—after the extinction of the Ascanian line—he gained full sovereignty over them (in 1320).[53]

46 See note 159 in: Spors, *Dzieje polityczne,* 176.

47 Labuda, *Historia Kaszubów w dziejach Pomorza,* 377.

48 Spors, *Dzieje polityczne,* 177.

49 Otto Heinemann, bearb. v., *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Bd. VI. Abt. 2 (Stettin: 1907), no. 4109.

50 See, e.g. PUB, VI/2, no. 4121, here referred to as *Petrus de Pomerania*. Also mentioned is the provost of Słupsk: *Everardus, in Stolpe prepositus*.

51 See Spors, *Dzieje polityczne*, 177. For a more recent perspective on the state of research, see e.g.: Smoliński, "Termin," 73–91.

52 PUB, vol. V/2, no. 3152.

53 Bugaj, *Problem,* 17–38.

Before examining the documents that may shed more light on the circumstances under which the Duke of Wolgast took control of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk, it is worth considering another source that offers valuable insights: the *Protocol of Augustine of Stargard*, which was thoroughly annotated by Edward Rymar. This source contains interesting information about the context in which Wartislaw IV acquired the aforementioned territories. According to the accounts published, Margrave Waldemar, having possession of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk, ceded part of the former—that is, the area between the rivers Unieść and Grabowa (the eastern portion of Sławno land)—to the Bishopric of Kamień as compensation for the Brandenburg raid on Kamień in 1306. However, the remaining territory in the eastern part of Pomerania, up to the Łeba River, was reportedly sold to Wartislaw IV, Duke of Szczecin. Moreover, there was a belief at the time that Wartislaw IV could inherit the dominion of Mściwoj II following his death without heirs.[54] The protocol also mentions that Wartislaw was to have received the land of Słupsk around the year 1316, which had implications for ecclesiastical matters—specifically, for the transfer of the land from the jurisdiction of the Archdeaconry of Gniezno to that of the Bishops of Kamień.[55]

Thus, the *Protocol* suggests that Wartislaw IV gained control of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk around 1316. This aligns with the theory that he was granted these territories by Margrave Waldemar as a reward for his loyalty in the face of the large anti-Brandenburg coalition formed in 1315—or that the lands formed part of the dowry of Wartislaw's wife, Elisabeth, who was likely a Brandenburg margravine. One might also wonder whether there was a particular reason why Margrave Waldemar so generously rewarded the Duke of Wolgast with these territories. Perhaps the lands of Sławno and Słupsk had become burdensome to the Brandenburg margraves? It seems likely that the main reason was simply the strategic difficulty of maintaining control over these lands, given their location and problematic neighbourhood, as mentioned earlier. Waldemar may have concluded that these territories would inevitably fall under the authority of a duke with whom he maintained good relations. Therefore, he might have regarded such a move as a sound investment in a loyal future ally.

Let us now examine the documents issued by Wartislaw IV that may help determine the probable period when he took control of Sławno and Słupsk. On 13 January 1317, Wartislaw IV was in Wolgast, where he issued a charter for the Żukowo monastery.

54 Edward Rymar, ed., *Augustyn ze Stargardu zwany niegdyś Angelusem, Protokół. Kamieńska kronika – rodowód książąt pomorskich. Tzw. Stargardzka genealogia* (Stargard: Muzeum w Stargardzie, 2008), 24–25, 27. See also footnote 104, where Edward Rymar rightly argues that even if the succession after Mściwoj II was to include the Duke of Wolgast, it certainly did not refer (in 1294 – the year of Mściwoj's death) to Wartislaw, but rather to his father, Bogusław IV. However, in the longer term, Wartislaw IV might also have been considered as the son of Bogusław IV.

55 Rymar, *Augustyn ze Stargardu*, 20.

At that time, the duke transumed a document issued by Margrave Waldemar dated 1 November 1313. The witnesses to this act included Nicholas Swanenbeke, canon of Kamień; Konrad Vemeren; and Henryk Rethim. The titulature used in this document is noteworthy, as it deviates slightly from that typically found in diplomatic sources: it includes the title "*Duke of Pomerania*."[56] This document is of great importance for the Duke of Wolgast, as it can likely be considered the earliest evidence that Wartislaw IV received the lands of Sławno and Słupsk[57] from Margrave Waldemar. The title "Duke of Pomerania" had previously applied to rulers of the eastern parts of Pomerania,[58] and these lands had belonged to them for much of the 13th century.[59]

The document issued on 13 July 1317 in Bukowo Morskie by members of the Święca family[60]—Piotr of Nowe and his brother Jasiek, lords of Sławno and Darłowo—does not yet indicate any change in the political affiliation of the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. The act concerned the donation of the village of Dummaszloviz[61] to the monastery in Bukowo. There is no mention in the document of Duke Wartislaw IV, nor is his consent referenced, which suggests that Duke Wartisław IV was probably not considered a ruler in these lands.

The first document clearly indicating that Wartislaw IV had received the lands of Sławno and Słupsk from Margrave Waldemar is dated 18 December 1317. In Białoboki, the Duke of Wolgast transumed a document originally issued by the Brandenburg margraves Waldemar and John V on 2 February 1313 for the town of Słupsk. This act was witnessed by Konrad, bishop-elect of Kamień, Henning Bere (marshal), Arnold Monachus de Boene, Henning Bere de Stuochowe, and Byspraus de Strackemyn. In the content of the document, Wartislaw IV styled himself as the Slavic, Kashubian, and Pomeranian duke.[62] This charter unmistakably confirms that Wartislaw IV was exercising authority over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk.

56 PUB, V/2, no. 3040: *dei gracia dux Sclavorum et Caschubie Pomeranorumque*. On the titulature itself, see: Paweł Czaplewski, "Tytulatura książąt pomorskich do początku XIV wieku," *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 15 (1949), 1–2: 18–21.

57 Such assumptions had already been made by Edward Rymar. See: Rymar, "Itinerarium," 39.

58 For more on titulature, see also: Agnieszka Gut, *Formularz dokumentów książąt zachodniopomorskich do połowy XIV wieku* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2002), 73; Gerard Labuda, *Kaszubi i ich dzieje* (Gdynia: Oficyna Czec, 1996), 41–145.

59 Regarding the origins of the claims of the Dukes of Western Pomerania to the lands of Eastern Pomerania, especially Słupsk and Sławno, see: Smoliński, "Termin," 76–77.

60 On the Święca family, see e.g.: Błażej Śliwiński, "Gniazdo rodu Święców," *Studia Bałtyckie. Historia* 2 (1996), 35–51; Barbara Popielas-Szultka, "Polityka miejska Święców," *Studia nad dziejami miast i mieszczaństwa w średniowieczu. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Antoniemu Czachorowskiemu w sześćdziesiątą piątą rocznicę jego urodzin i czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej*, vol. 2, eds. Roman Czaja and Janusz Tandecki (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1996), 69–81.

61 The village was probably incorporated into the boundaries of Darłowo at a later time.

62 PUB, V/2, no. 3152: *dei gracia dux Slavorum, Cassuborum et Pomeranorum*.

It is possible that the earlier adoption of the title "Duke of Pomerania," as previously noted, was already an indication of his claims to these territories. The sporadic use of this title before 1317 may reflect Wartislaw IV's aspirations to rule over the mentioned region.[63] The fact that the document was issued in Białoboki rather than in Słupsk suggests that the duke had not yet physically been present in either Słupsk or Sławno at that time.

Another diploma confirming Wartislaw IV's assumption of authority over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk is one issued by him on 27 December 1317. The location of its issuance is unknown, but the content reveals that the duke confirmed the sale of the villages of Żukowo and Żyrawa in the land of Sławno to the Bishop of Kamień by the knight Teszlaus de Bevenhusen. This diploma was witnessed by Teszlaus himself and the following knights: Jan Urso (marshal), Jan Troge, Arnold Monych de Bone, Siegfried Lode, Theodor Scherf, Jan Urso de Stucchove, Konrad Ubesseke, Tymon Mokervitze, Konrad Vleming, Herman Silbur, and Piotr Camich.[64]

In this document, Wartislaw IV used the titulature most commonly found in his official acts.[65] The document is of particular importance for several reasons. First, it allows us to determine that the knight Teszlaus de Bevenhusen originated from the territory of Sławno or Słupsk—evidenced by his involvement in the sale of the villages of Żukowo and Żyrawa, both located in the land of Sławno. His origin from that region is further supported by the fact that he does not appear in earlier documents among the witnesses associated with the Duke of Wolgast.

Secondly, the act confirms that the sale of both villages required confirmation from Wartislaw IV himself, and not from Margrave Waldemar of Brandenburg. This provides strong evidence that the Duke of Wolgast was already ruling over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk at the time.

Furthermore, the document also sheds light on Wartislaw's relationship with the Bishop of Kamień. Had relations between the two not been amicable, it is unlikely that the duke would have approved the sale. The list of witnesses mentioned includes

63 Wartislaw IV is recorded as Duke of Pomerania as early as 1313, see: PUB, V/2, no. 2807: *dei gracia Stetynensis, Slavorum, Pomeranie et Cassubie dux*. Interestingly, the Duke of Szczecin, Otto I, usually employed the titulature *dei gracia dux Slavorum et Cassubie dominus in Stetin*, though the "Pomeranian" component also appeared in his titulature in 1311, e.g. Otto Heinemann, bearb. v. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Bd. V. Abt. 1 (Stettin: 1903), no. 2648: *dei gracia Slavie, Cassubie et Pomeranie dux*, and no. 2721: *nos dei gracia Slavie, Cassubie et Pomeranie dux*. This may have been related to his own aspirations or reflected rivalry with Wartislaw IV.

64 To illustrate the role of knights who acted as witnesses in the documents of the Griffins up to the early 14th century, see: Krzysztof Guzikowski, *Obce rycerstwo na Pomorzu Zachodnim do początku XIV wieku* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2015), 76–89. For further information on individuals in the entourage of Warcisław IV see: Idem, "Milites novi w otoczeniu księcia wołogoskiego Warcisława IV (1309–1326)," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 31 (2016), 1: 73–94.

65 PUB, V/2, no. 3157: *dei gracia dux Slavorum et Cassubie*.

the names of knights likely originating from the territory of Sławno, further reinforcing the local character of the act and Wartislaw IV's authority in the region.

Taking into account the presented source material, it can be assumed that the lands of Sławno and Słupsk were incorporated into Warcisław IV's domain by 1317. It is known that this process did not take place suddenly, so it is possible that the mentioned lands had already been prepared for the change of political affiliation.

Conclusions

The precise timing of Wartislaw IV's assumption of power over the territories of Sławno and Słupsk remains difficult to determine definitively. The year 1313 can likely be excluded, despite Wartislaw twice adding the term *Pomeranian*[66] to his titulature that year. It is possible that, in 1313, Wartislaw IV simply wished to express his claims to the eastern parts of Pomerania—claims often asserted by members of the Griffin dynasty, as previously discussed. It is also plausible that the Duke of Wolgast diplomatically aimed to signal to Margrave Waldemar his willingness to take control of those territories in exchange for loyalty to the Brandenburg side. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Wartislaw ultimately received the territory as a reward for his allegiance between 1315 and 1317. By the year 1317, we already have documented evidence confirming that Wartislaw IV had assumed power in the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. It is highly probable that decisions regarding the transfer of these lands were made as early as the previous year—evidence for which has been outlined above.[67] Although by 1317 Wartislaw IV was documented as holding authority over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk, subsequent diplomatic sources[68] reveal that his position there was not yet fully consolidated. The Święca family continued to wield considerable influence in the governance of these regions. It is very likely that members of the Święca family served as local administrators under Wartislaw IV's rule.

Two documents dated 2 July 1320, issued near the Łeba River, are crucial in confirming Wartislaw IV's authority over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk. On that day, Wartislaw—styled *dux Slavorum, Cassubie et Pomeranorum*—entered into an alliance with Bishop Konrad IV of Kamień and the Teutonic Order, represented by the Prussian Provincial Master, Friedrich von Wildenberg, on the eastern border of his dominion,

66 PUB, V/1, no. 2807: *dei gracia Stetynensis, Slavorum, Pomeranie et Cassubie dux*; no. 2820: *dei gracia Sclavorum, Cassubie et Pomeranie dux*.

67 We may also add here the previously mentioned issue of the titulature used by Wartislaw IV in diplomatic material. The element "Duke of Pomerania," or similar variants, appears increasingly often. See e.g. PUB, V/1, no. 3040; PUB, V/2, no. 3120, 3131, 3152.

68 See also PUB, V/2, no. 3297.

in Pomerania prope fluvium Leba. The witnesses to this act were Herman de Evirsten; the duke's marshal, Henning Bere, and his son Henning Bere; Piotr of Nowe, Ganzko; Piotr Putkamer; Jan Volgoszcz; Konrad of Nowynkirchin, and Olrikus; the parish priest in Bustowe.[69] These witnesses were also expected to enforce the agreement. Should Duke Wartislaw form an alliance with the King of Poland or another party opposed to the Teutonic Order, the knights of the lands of Białogard, Słupsk, and Sławno—commanded by Henning Behr, Henning de Plote, and the descendants of Voivode Święca, namely Piotr and Jasiek—were authorised to take action against the duke. This act confirms, among other things, that the knightly class from Central Pomerania acted in concert with the ruling elites of Wartislaw's state and supported the integration of these lands.[70] The meeting had the specific aim of confirming Wartislaw IV's rule over the lands of Sławno and Słupsk (the latter having belonged to Poland until 1307). The Wolgast–Teutonic alliance was explicitly aimed against "anyone or any prince or princes of the Kingdom of Poland" (*si quis vel qui princeps vel princeps regni Polonie*) who might attack any of the agreement's signatories.[71] The second act, also dated 2 July 1320, was issued by Henning Bere, Wartislaw IV's marshal. In it, he pledged to uphold the alliance made near the Łeba River and to deliver a sealed copy of the agreement to the Teutonic Order.[72] This shows that not only Bishop Konrad IV of Kamień supported Wartislaw IV's consolidation of power in the lands of Sławno and Słupsk—the Teutonic Order also accepted and endorsed this new state of affairs.

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69 PUB. V/2, no. 3375.

70 The leadership of the Święca family is clear; and they were deeply at odds with Łokietek and were eager to ally themselves with his enemies, e.g. the Teutonic Knights.

71 Simiński, "Z badań," 215.

72 PUB, V/2, no. 3376.

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SUMMARY

Prince Wartislaw IV, born around 1290 as the son of Bogusław IV and Margaret, daughter of the Rügen prince Wizlawa II, ruled the Duchy of Wolgast from 1309. Around 1316, he also became the ruler of the Sławieńskie and Słupskie lands, and in 1325, after the extinction of the Rügen dynasty, the Duke of Rügen. Prince Wartislaw IV pursued a different policy from that of his father, which resulted in the expansion of his dominion. The article aims to gather and verify previous findings and to show the role of Prince Wartislaw IV in the incorporation

of Słupsk and Sławno lands to the Principality of Wolgast. The article's content focuses largely on the origins of the inclusion of Słupsk and Sławno lands into the domain of Duke Wartislaw IV, and consequently, the policy of the Western Pomeranian dukes towards these territories. The primary source material consists mainly of documents from Wartislaw IV and other princes and rulers who participated in the circumstances of the assumption of power in the Słupsk and Sławno lands by the Duke of Wolgast.

Okoliczności objęcia władzy przez Warcisława IV w ziemi sławieńskiej i słupskiej

Słowa kluczowe: Pomorze Zachodnie, Warcisław IV, Słupsk, Sławno

STRESZCZENIE

Książę Warcisław IV urodzony około roku 1290 jako syn Bogusława IV i Małgorzaty, córki księcia rugijskiego Wisława II, od 1309 roku sprawował władzę w księstwie wołogoskim. Ów książę od około 1316 roku stał się także władcą ziem sławieńskiej i słupskiej, a od 1325 roku, po wymarciu rugijskiej dynastii, również księciem Rugii. Książę Warcisław IV prowadził odmienną politykę niżeli jego ojciec, co skutkowało poszerzaniem jego władztwa. Artykuł ma na celu zebranie i weryfikację dotychczasowych ustaleń oraz ukazanie roli księcia Warcisława IV w przyłączeniu do księstwa wołogoskiego ziem słupskiej i sławieńskiej. Treść artykułu skupia się w znacznej mierze na wskazaniu genezy włączenia ziemi słupskiej i sławieńskiej do władztwa księcia Warcisława IV, a co za tym idzie, również polityki książąt zachodniopomorskich wobec tych terytoriów. Podstawę źródłową stanowią głównie dokumenty Warcisława IV oraz innych książąt i władców, którzy uczestniczyli w okolicznościach obejmowania władzy w ziemiach słupskiej i sławieńskiej przez księcia wołogoskiego.

Citation

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Rafał Simiński
Institute of History
University of Szczecin
rafal.siminski@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-3533-0566

The Griffins Towards the Rule of Frederick VI of Hohenzollern in the March of Brandenburg in the Years 1411–1416: The Case of the Pledge of the Uckermark

Keywords: Uckermark, Griffins, Hohenzollern, Middle Ages

According to the Pomeranian chronicler Thomas Kantzow, after the death of the Duke of Stettin Swantibor I (c. 1351–1413), his sons Casimir V (c. 1381–1434) and Otto II (c. 1380–1428) got into a dispute with the Duke of Wolgast Wartislaw VIII (1373–1415) and the children of his brother Barnim VI (1365/1372–1405). The princes of Stettin and Wolgast wanted to propose to King Sigismund of Luxembourg (1368–1437) to buy the towns and estates (*die Stette und Gutter*) in the Uckermark from the pledge for the sum of 12,000 schock Bohemian groschen (*XII M behmische Schock*). The sum was to go entirely into their hands, which in turn their cousins of Wolgast did not want to agree to. The administrator of the Kammin diocese, head of the parishes in Stralsund and counsellor of the dukes of Wolgast, Kurd Bonow, then offered his mediation in the conflict. He brokered an agreement between the dukes, because of which the disputed sum was to be divided half each (*halb und halb teilen*) between representatives of both lines of the House of Griffins.[1] Slightly more detail on the matter is provided in the last edition of the High German version of Kantzow's Chronicle. According to this account, Sigismund of Luxembourg was supposed to be the initiator of the redemption of the Uckermark from the pledge. The opposition of the dukes

1 Georg Gaebel, ed. *Des Thomas Kantzow Chronik von Pommern in hochdeutscher Mundart.* Erste Bearbeitung, vol. 2 (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1898), 154. Duke Swantibor I of Stettin died 21 June 1413, see: Edward Rymar, *Rodowód książąt pomorskich* (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica w Szczecinie, 2005), 409.

of Wolgast to the plans of Casimir V and Otto II was based on the outlay in people and money (*mit Furstreckung Gelts und Lewte*) they had invested to bring the Uckermark under the joint rule of the West Pomeranian dukes. On this basis, they claimed their right to decide its fate, which was to be no weaker than that of the dukes of Stettin. In this version of the source, the pledged sum amounted to around 12,000 schock Bohemian groschen (*ungeferlich die Summa zwolfftawsent grosse behmische Schock*). The agreement negotiated by Bonow assumed that both branches of the Griffin family had the same rights to the Uckermark (*zugleiche solten zur Uckermarke berechtigt sein*), and that the money from its redemption was to be divided equally (*das Gelt zu gleiche teilen*). The heirs of Swantibor I, however, were not fully satisfied with it (*nicht alzuwol zufrieden*). As it soon turned out, Sigismund of Luxembourg did not have sufficient funds at the time to redeem the Uckermark from the pledge and the matter remained unresolved.[2] This issue soon became a source of serious conflict between the Stettin Griffins and the Burgrave of Nuremberg, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern (1371–1440), appointed by the Roman King Sigismund of Luxembourg first as administrator of the March of Brandenburg (1411) and then as its hereditary ruler and elector as Margrave of Brandenburg Frederick I (1415).

The relations of the West Pomeranian princes with the rulers of the Margraviate of Brandenburg are among the key issues in the history of West Pomerania in the Middle Ages and have already been the subject of much interest in both older and more recent research. The most important issue attracting historians' attention in this context was the dependence of the Griffins on the Margraves of Brandenburg, which dated back to 1231, when Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstauf (1194–1250) established the Ascanians, rulers of the Brandenburg March, as the Griffins' fief superiors. Attempts by the West Pomeranian princes since then to shed or minimise the effects of this dependency have attracted no less attention from researchers. The theme of rivalry for the Uckermark between the Margraves of Brandenburg and the Griffins in the late Middle Ages as a separate research problem appeared in historiography in the 19th century and was taken up by such historians as Friedrich Wilhelm Barthold, Adolph Friedrich Riedel, Julius Heidemann, Paul Gähtgens, Martin Wehrmann, Johannes Schultze,

2 Georg Gaebel, ed. *Des Thomas Kantzow Chronik von Pommern in hochdeutscher Mundart. Letzte Bearbeitung*, vol. 1 (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1897), 243–244. In the Lower German version of Kantzow's chronicle, the castles and towns mentioned were to be pledged to the Griffins for 12,000 schock Bohemian groschen, which equated to over a total of 33,000 guilders (*vor Twelff dusent behmische schock, dat itzt auer dre und druttich dusent gulden is*), Wilhelm Böhmer, ed. *Thomas Kantzow's Chronik von Pommern in Niederdeutscher Mundart. Sammt einer Auswahl aus den übrigen ungedruckten Schriften desselben. Nach des Verfassers eigener Handschrift herauszugeben, und mit Einleitung, Glossar und einigen anderen Zugaben versehen* (Stettin: Friedrich Heinrich Morin, 1835), 99. On the political situation of Sigismund of Luxembourg on the eve of the Council of Constance see: Jörg K. Hoensch, *Kaiser Sigismund. Herrscher an der Schwelle zur Neuzeit 1368–1437* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1996), 174.

Benedykt Zientara, Lieselott Enders, Joachim Zdrenka, Jan Winkelmann and Edward Rymar.[3]

The lack of sources, or sometimes their outright unreliability, resulted in some researchers formulating opinions which, after verification, proved to be untenable. The most prudent position in this context is that of Johannes Schultze, who was of the opinion that "The property relations in the vicinity of Prenzlau, Strasburg, Zehdenick, Boitzenburg were very unclear to what extent the Pomeranians had acquired a lien right to them."[4] Some scholars considering this question relied on the account of Thomas Kantzow, who stated in the pages of his chronicle in the chapter on the imprisonment of King Wenceslas IV of Luxembourg (1361–1419) in May 1394 that "for this release

3 Friedrich Wilhelm Barthold, *Geschichte von Rügen und Pommern*, vol. 3: *Vom Tode Barnims I (1278) bis zum Auftreten der Hohenzollern in der Mark Brandenburg (1411)* (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1842); vol. 4: *Vom Auftreten der Hohenzollern in der Mark Brandenburg (1411) bis zur Rückkehr Bogislavs X. vom h. Grabe (1498)* (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1843); Adolph Friedrich Riedel, *Zehn Jahre aus der Geschichte des Ahnherren des Preußischen Königshauses. Das Aufsteigen des Burggrafen Friedrich VI. von Nürnberg zur kurfürstlichen Würde und zur Reichsstatthalterschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: Ernst und Korn, 1851); idem, *Geschichte des Preußischen Königshauses, Zweiter Theil. Markgraf Friedrich, erster Kurfürst von Brandenburg aus dem burggräflichen Hause Zollern* (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1861); Julius Heidemann, *Die Mark Brandenburg unter Jobst von Mähren* (Berlin: W. Weber, 1881); Paul Gähtgens, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Brandenburg und Pommern unter Kurfürst Friedrich II. (1437): 1440–1470* (Altenburg: Bonde, 1890); Martin Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern*, vol. 1: *Bis zur Reformation (1523)* (Gotha: Perthes, 1904) (= Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, 3. Abt.: Deutsche Landesgeschichte 5); Johannes Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, vol. 2: *Die Mark unter der Herrschaft der Wittelsbacher und Luxemburger (1319–1415)* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961); vol. 3: *Die Mark unter der Herrschaft der Hohenzollern (1415–1535)* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963); Benedykt Zientara, "Rozdrobnienie feudalne (1295–1368)," in: *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 1 till the year 1466, ed. Gerard Labuda, part 2, compiled by Kazimierz Ślaski and Benedykt Zientara (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1969), 168–326; Lieselott Enders, "Siedlung und Herrschaft in Grenzgebieten der Mark und Pommerns seit der zweiten Hälfte des 12. bis zum Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts," *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 2 (1987): 73–129; eadem, "Das Bedeutung der Nachbarterritorien für die konkrete Regionalgeschichte: Erfahrungen bei der Bearbeitung der Geschichte der Uckermark," in: *Pommern, Geschichte, Wissenschaft. 2. Kolloquiums zur Pommerschen Geschichte 13. und 14. September 1991*, ed. Jürgen Schröder, Greifswald 1991, 90–97; eadem, *Die Uckermark. Geschichte einer kurmärkischen Landschaft vom 12. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1992), 105–113; eadem, "Aspekte des vielfältigen Wechselspiels zwischen Pommern und der Uckermark vornehmlich im Spätmittelalter und in beginnender Frühneuzeit," *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands* 55 (2009): 23–41; eadem, "Die Landschaften und das Zentrum. Prignitz, Uckermark und Altmark vom Spätmittelalter bis 1800," in: *Brandenburg und seine Landschaften: Zentrum und Region vom Spätmittelalter bis 1800*, eds. Lorenz Friedrich Beck, and Frank Göse (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2009), 29–44; Joachim Zdrenka, *Polityka zagraniczna książąt szczecińskich 1295–1411* (Słupsk: PTH – Oddział w Słupsku, 1987); idem, "Bitwa pod Karrenbergiem w 1399 r. Przyczynek do dziejów brandenbursko-meklemburskiego pogranicza," in: *Mazowsze, Pomorze, Prusy*, ed. Błażej Śliwiński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2000), 355–364; idem, "Die Schlacht am Karrenberg (1399): ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Grenzgebietes von Pommern, Brandenburg und Mecklenburg," *Baltische Studien Neue Folge* 88 (2002): 12–19; Jan Winkelmann, *Die Mark Brandenburg des 14. Jahrhunderts: markgräfliche Herrschaft zwischen räumlicher Ferne und politischer Krise* (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2011); Edward Rymar, *Wojny i spory pomorsko-brandenburskie w XV–XVI wieku* (Zabrze – Tarnowskie Góry: Infort Editions, 2012).

4 Schultze, *Die Mark*, vol. 3, 12.

and good deed (…) the emperor [i.e. Wenceslas – R.S. (sic!)] (…) gave the princes of Stettin in the March of Brandenburg, Boitzenburg, Zehdenick and Straßburg. Almost the whole of the Uckermark was thus now at the house of Stettin."[5] The chronicler therefore probably did not find any documents on the subject in the archives of the Duke of Griffins. It is not known what prompted him to record the version of events presented. Adolph Friedrich Riedel and Edward Rymar were of the opinion that Duke Swantibor I received the castles and towns of Boitzenburg, Zehdenick and Strasburg with their appurtenances from the King Wenceslas IV of Luxembourg in 1393/1394 as a token of gratitude for his release from captivity.[6] Julius Heidemann claimed, "Naturally, Jost did not consider handing over these territories (Boitzenburg Zehdenick and Strasburg – R.S.) to his enemies. Nevertheless, they had their eyes on these acquisitions of the rest of the Uckermark."[7] According to Ernst Daniel Martin Kirchner, Boitzenburg, Zehdenick and Strasburg were pledged to the Dukes of West Pomerania in 1392 against the will of Margrave Jost (1351–1411) by King Wenceslas IV and Sigismund of Luxembourg.[8] In a recently published monograph on the town of Prenzlau, Heidelore Böcker, an author of a chapter on its history between 1320 and 1500, noted that the town remained under the rule of the Griffins as a pledge until 6 May 1414, when its privileges were confirmed by the Burgrave of Nuremberg, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern. However, the researcher did not elaborate on the circumstances under which this event took place, pointing only to the opinion of Johannes Schultz quoted above on the subject.

5 Georg Gaebel, ed. *Pomerania. Eine pommersche Chronik aus dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. 1 (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, Stettin 1908), 306. Quoted after: Tadeusz Białecki, Edward Rymar and Krzysztof Gołda, eds. *Thomas Kantzow, Pomerania. Kronika pomorska z XVI wieku, vol. I (Księga 1 i 2)* (Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, 2005) (hereinafter Kantzow), 473. According to another High German version of Kantzow's chronicle, "Emperor Wenceslas IV of Luxembourg (sic!) pledged Boitzenburg, Zehdenick, Prenzlau and Strasburg to the Dukes of Stettin and Wolgast" (*Keiser Wentzlaff den Hertzogen von Stettin, Pomern und Wolgast zu einem Pfande gesetzt Boitzenburg, Zedenick, Prentzlow und Strasburgk*), Georg Gaebel, ed. *Des Thomas Kantzow Chronik von Pommern in hochdeutscher Mundart*, vol. 2. (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1898), 146.

6 Riedel, *Zehn Jahre*, 347–349; Rymar, *Wojny*, 14. The last researcher changed his opinion on the reliability of this fragment of Kantzow's chronicle at this point, for in 2005, in a commentary on Pomerania, he wrote that "Kantzow is wrong, because Wenceslas in 1394 did not have the area of the Uckermark." E. Rymar also wondered whether the description did not in fact refer to events that took place in November 1398, see: Kantzow, 473, note 751. The information contained in the cited study by E. Rymar that the towns of interest were located outside the territory of the Uckermark needs to be corrected. On the captivity of the Roman King Wenceslas IV of Luxembourg see: Ivan Hlaváček, "König Wenzel (IV.) und seine zwei Gefangennahmen (Spiegel seines Kampfes mit dem Hochadel sowie mit Wenzels Verwandten um die Vorherrschaft in Böhmen und Reich)," *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 18 (2013): 115–150.

7 Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 75.

8 Ernst Daniel Martin Kirchner, *Das Schloss Boytzenburg und seine Besitzer, insonderheit aus dem Arnimschen Geschlechte. Aus den Quellen bearbeitet. Mit den 10 landschaftlichen, 1 genealogischen und 2 heraldischen Beilagen* (Berlin: Alexander Duncker Verlag, 1860), 53.

She also claimed, "that Margrave Jost on 1 April 1395 pledged the Uckermark to his brother-in-law, Margrave of Meissen, Wilhelm I (1343–1407)."[9]

The subject of the following research will be one of the threads of West Pomeranian-Brandenburg relations at the turn of the 14th and 15th centuries, namely the matter of the purchase of the castles and towns of Zehdenick, Prenzlau, Strasburg and Boitzenburg on the territory of the Uckermark from the Griffins of Stettin and Wolgast by the Burgrave of Nuremberg and the Margrave of Brandenburg Frederick VI of Hohenzollern in the years 1411–1416. The following sections of the study will attempt to outline the genesis of the problem, date the moment of pledging of the listed sites and characterise the circumstances that led to their return to Hohenzollern's authority.

The Uckermark was a land situated on the border of the dominion of the princes of Stettin and the Margraves of Brandenburg and was thus a natural area of their rivalry. Sources mentioned in 1250 "The land that is called Ucker" (*terra, que Vkera dicitur*), and in 1323, "The land of Ucker" (*terra Vcrensis*).[10] The Hohen-Landin Agreement of 1250, concluded between the Margraves of Brandenburg and Duke Barnim I (c. 1210–1278), defined the borders of the Uckermark by the rivers Welse, Randow, Löcknitz and Zarow.[11] Until the middle of the 13th century, the Uckermark was part of the territorial rule of the Griffins. It is worth recalling that Prenzlau, located on its territory, was the first town founded by Barnim I under German law in Western Pomerania (in 1234/35), which initiated fundamental social and economic changes in the area. According to the Hohen-Landin Agreement of 1250, Duke Barnim I relinquished the Uckermark to the Margraves of Brandenburg – Johann I (c. 1213–1266) and Otto III (1215–1267) – in exchange for the castle and the land of Wolgast (*pro recompensacione castri et terre Wolgust*).[12] Later on, the Griffins did not abandon their attempts to reclaim this territory. In the 1350s, they succeeded in taking over part of the Uckermark.

9 Heidelore Böcker, "Prenzlau unter wechselnden Dynastien (1320 bis 1500)," in: *Geschichte der Stadt Prenzlau*, eds. Klaus Neitmann and Winfried Schich (Horb am Neckar: Geiger Verlag, 2009), 96, and note 138, 77.

10 Adolph Friedrich Riedel, ed. *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis. Erster Haupttheil oder Urkundensammlung zur Geschichte der geistlichen Stiftungen, der adlichen Familien, so wie der Städte und Burgen der Mark Brandenburg*, vol. 15 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1858) (hereinafter CDB I), 454.

11 Klaus, Conrad, ed. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1. 786–1253. Erster Teil: Urkunden [Part 1: Documents] (Köln-Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1970) (hereinafter PUB), No. 512–513; Felix Escher, "Uckermark," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. (1997), 1172, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3e709c1.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx; Werner Blaschke, "Der Landiner Vertrag – die Askanier erhandeln die Uckermark," *Mitteilungen des Uckermärkischen Geschichtsvereins zu Prenzlau* 9 (2000): 5–9.

12 PUB 1, No. 512–513; Blaschke, "Der Landiner Vertrag," 5–9. See also Kerstin Kirsch, "Pommersche und askanische Einflüsse in der Uckermark und dem nördlichen Barnim an der Wende vom 12. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert," in: *Köpenick vor 800 Jahren: von Jacza zu den Wettinern. Archäologie – Geschichte*, eds. Michael Lindner and Gunnar Nath (Berlin: Nicolai, 2014), 192–199.

In 1354, the Duke of Stettin, Barnim III (c. 1300–1368), obtained Brüssow, Schwedt, Angermünde, Stolp, and the monastery in Gramzow from Louis VI the Roman (1328–1365) of the House of Wittelsbach, the Margrave of Brandenburg, together with estates in the eastern areas of the Uckermark. The price for these acquisitions was the resignation of the Griffins from Greiffenberg, Boitzenburg, Neusund, Jagow and Werckwitz.[13] Between 26 July 1358 and 11 June 1359 under the authority of the Dukes of Wolgast, Bogislaw V (1317/1318–1374), Barnim IV (1319/1320–1365), and Wartislaw V (1326–1390) as their joint possession were Pasewalk, Alt Torgelow and Neu Torgelow in the north of the Uckermark.[14] It should also be mentioned that on 4 April 1363 the Dukes of Wolgast received the Strasburg manor from the Dukes of Mecklenburg in the form of a pledge (*dy ghantze voghedyge thu Straceborgh, beyde hus, land vnde stad*). This was part of the arrangements made in connection with the marriage of Wartislaw VI (c. 1345–1394), son of Duke of Wolgast Barnim IV, to Anna, daughter of Duke Johann I (1326–1392/1393) of Mecklenburg.[15]

A new phase in the history of the Uckermark began with the passing of the March of Brandenburg into the hands of the Luxembourgs. Emperor Charles IV (1316–1378) took it over in 1373 from the Wittelsbachs, who had ruled it until then.[16] After the death of Charles IV in 1378, his ten-year-old son Sigismund of Luxembourg took over the territory. On 22 May 1388, he pledged the March of Brandenburg to Margrave Jost and his brother-in-law, Prokop, for the sum of 565,263 guilders. In doing so, he reserved the right to redeem it within 5 years. Otherwise, it was to remain in the hereditary possession of Jost.[17] Before 2 April 1395, Margrave Wilhelm of Meissen was appointed

13 Adolph Friedrich Riedel, ed. *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis. Zweiter Haupttheil oder Geschichte der auswärtigen Verhältnisse der Mark Brandenburg und ihrer Regenten*, vol. 2 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1846) (hereinafter CDB II), 350–354, 357.

14 CDB II/2, 409–411, 414–415, 418–420; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 75; Zdrenka, *Polityka*, 152–155, 159–160.

15 Hermann Grotefend, ed., *Mecklenburgisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 15: 1360–1365 (Schwerin: Stiller'sche Buchhandlung, 1890) (hereinafter *MUB*), No. 9153; Friedrich Wigger, "Stammtafeln des Großherzoglichen Hauses von Mecklenburg," *Jahrbuch des Vereins für Mecklenburgische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 55 (1885): 206; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 351–352.

16 Franziska Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger in der Mark Brandenburg unter Karl IV. und Sigismund von Luxemburg (1373–1415)* (Warendorf: Fahlbusch Verlag, 2014), 21–30. See also Heinz-Dieter Heimann, "Meisterstück eines Brandstifters? Karls IV. Erwerb der Mark Brandenburg – gestern und heute," in: *Karl IV. Ein Kaiser in Brandenburg*, eds. Jan Richter, Peter Küvener and Kurt Winkler (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2016), 17–21; Uwe Tresp, "Kaiser IV und Markgrafschaft Brandenburg. Hintergründe, Mittel und Wege dynastischer Politik der Luxemburger," in: ibidem, 30–36.

17 CDB II/3, 97–99; Jaroslav Mezník, "Die Finanzen des mährischen Markgrafen Jost (1375–1411)," in: *Acta Creationis. Unabhängige Geschichtsschreibung in der Tschechoslowakei 1969–1980*, ed. Vilém Prečan (Hanover: Vilém Prečan, 1980), 79–80; Winkelmann, *Die Mark*, 94–101; idem, "Sigismund von Luxemburg als Markgraf von Brandenburg 1378–1388," in: *Kaiser Sigismund. Zur Herrschaftspraxis eines europäischen Monarchen (1368–1437)*, eds. Karel Hruza and Alexandra Kaar (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2012), 137–159.

by Margrave Jost as governor in the Old and Middle Marches and held this position until 1402/1403.[18] On 3 April 1397, King Wenceslas IV of Luxembourg granted the March of Brandenburg to Jost as a fief.[19] After Jost's death on 18 January 1411, Sigismund of Luxembourg reassumed power in the March of Brandenburg.[20] On 8 July 1411, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremberg, was appointed by him as administrator and governor in the March of Brandenburg (*zu einem rechten Obirsten vnd gemeinen Vorweser vnd Hauptmann*). On 30 April 1415 Frederick VI of Hohenzollern was given the Margraviate of Brandenburg, together with a seat in the Electoral College. The process of Frederick I von Hohenzollern's assumption of power in the Margraviate of Brandenburg culminated on 18 April 1417 with the solemn ceremony of his being granted the aforementioned prestigious position in fief at the Council of Constance.[21]

18 CDB I, 186; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 50; Böcker, "Prenzlau unter wechselnden Dynastien (1320 bis 1500)," 77; Schultze, *Die Mark*, vol. 2, 189–202; Winkelmann, *Die Mark*, 95; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 241, and note 138. On the Margrave of Meissen Wilhelm I, see: André Thieme, "Wilhelm I. (der Einäugige), Markgraf von Meißen, Landgraf von Thüringen, *19.12.1343 Dresden – †9.2.1407, Grimma," in: *Sächsische Biografie*, ed. Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://saebi.isgv.de/biografie/Wilhelm_I._%28der_Ein%C3%A4ugige%29,_Markgraf_von_Mei%C3%9Fen_%281343-1407%29. As early as 9 February 1394, Margrave Jost ordered the towns Brandenburg, Berlin, Cölln, Frankfurt on the Oder, Treuenbrietzen, Beelitz and Mittenwalde to pay tribute to the Margrave of Meissen, Wilhelm I, CDB II/3, 119–120.

19 Lenka Bobková, "Smělý cíl, malý úspěch. Jošt Moravský a markrabství braniborské," in: *Morava v časech markraběte Jošta*, eds. Libor Jan et al. (Brno: Matice moravská, 2012), 59–80.

20 Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 253–256.

21 CDB II/3, 178–181; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 256–263. See also Erich Brandenburg, *König Sigmund und Kurfürst Friedrich I. von Brandenburg. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlin 1891: Mayer & Müller); Mario Müller, "Burggraf Friedrich VI, von Nürnberg, Kurfürst von Brandenburg. Eine Skizze zum Forschungs- und Überlieferungsstand," in: *Burggraf Friedrich VI, von Nürnberg und die Belehnung der Burggrafen von Nürnberg mit dem Kurfürstentum Brandenburg im Jahre 1417*, eds. Mario Müller and Georg Seiderer (Ansbach: Selbstverlag des Historischen Vereins für Mittelfranken, 2019), 7–27; Clemens Bergstedt, "Burggraf Friedrich VI. von Nürnberg als Verweser der Mark Brandenburg," in: ibidem, 7–115. For basic biographical data on the Burgrave of Nuremberg, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, see: Theodor Hirsch, "Friedrich VI., Burggraf von Nürnberg," in: *Alte Deutsche Biographie* 7 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1877): 464–465, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz52985.html#adbcontent; Johannes Schultze, "Friedrich I., Kurfürst von Brandenburg (1417–1425), Burggraf von Nürnberg (als Friedrich VI, seit 1397)," in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 5 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961), 494, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz52985.html#ndbcontent; Reinhard Seyboth, "Friedrich VI. (I.), Burggraf von Nürnberg, Kurfürst von Brandenburg (1371–1440)," in: *Fränkische Lebensbilder. Neue Folge der Lebensbilder aus Franken*, vol. 16, eds. Gerhard Pfeiffer and Alfred Wendehorst (Neustadt an der Aisch: Degener, 1996), 27–48; Wolfgang Ribbe, "Friedrich VI. (I.), Burggraf von Nürnberg und erster Markgraf von Brandenburg (um 1371–1440)," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 4 (1989), 947–948, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3e709c1.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx; Manfred Jatzlauk, "Die Belehnung des Nürnberger Burggrafen Friedrich VI. mit der Markgrafschaft Brandenburg durch König Sigismund," in: *Das Zeitalter Königs Sigmunds in Ungarn und in deutschem Reich*, eds. Tilmann Schmidt, and Péter Gunst (Debrecen: Debrecen University Press, 2000), 161–172. On 15 December 1411 King Wenceslas IV recognised the decision of Sigismund of Luxembourg, CDB II/3, 187–188.

Information on the place of the Uckermark in the administrative structure of the March of Brandenburg and the characteristics of its settlement at the time when the Luxembourgs took power there is contained in the so-called *Landbuch* of Emperor Charles IV of Luxembourg from 1375. The Uckermark was part of the Middle Marche, which stretched between the Elbe and Oder rivers (*Marchia media est inter Albeam et Oderam situata)*.[22] Due to its large area, its territory was divided into nine smaller territorial units (*et quia magna est, subdiuiditur in nouem territoria*), including the *Vkera* territory (*Territorium Vkera*).[23] According to the so-called *Landbuch* of 1375, there were fifteen castles and fortified points (*Vkera has habet municiones*) in the territory of the Uckermark. Prenzlau, Templin and Boitzenburg belonged to the Margrave of Brandenburg (*Premsla, Templyn, Boeszelnburg domini marchionis*), Pasewalk was "occupied" by the Dukes of Wolgast (*Poswalk occupant duces Sundenses*), and Stolp was ruled by the Duke of Stettin (*Stolp tenet dux Stettinensis*). Löcknitz, on the other hand, remained the property of the bishops of Kammin (*Lokenitz est Episcopi Caminensis*).[24] Gramzow (*Gransoye*) and Greiffenberg (*Grifenberg*) as fiefdoms were respectively in the hands of the counts of Lindow and the knightly family of Greiffenberg. In addition, defences were recorded in Torgelow, Wulfeshagen, Jagow, Biesenbrow, Angermünde, Schwedt and Brüssow in the Uckermark.[25] There were six towns in the area: Strasburg, Zehdenick, Fürstenwerder, Liebenwalde, Prenzlau and Templin. The Margraves

22 The following edition was used: Ernst Fidicin, ed. *Kaiser Karl's IV. Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg nach den handschriftlichen Quellen* (hereinafter *Landbuch*) (Berlin: Guttentag, 1856). Two more recent editions of this source are also available: Johannes Schultze, ed. *Das Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg von 1375* (Berlin: Gsellius, 1940); Lutz Partenheimer and André Stellmacher, eds. *Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg von 1375/76* (Potsdam: Klaus Becker Verlag, 2020). On the source see: Felix Escher, "Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 5 (1991), 1642, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3un08d9.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx; Gerlinde Schlenker, "Karl IV. und das Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg von 1375," in: *Die Altmark. Eine Region in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Protokoll des wissenschaftlichen Kolloquiums am 11./12.10.1997 in Havelberg*, ed. Landsheimatbund Sachsen-Anhalt (Halle (Saale): Druck-Zuck, 1998), 40–49; Joachim Stephan, "Le Landbuch de la Marche de Brandenbourg (1375)," in: *Quand gouverner, c'est enquêter. Les pratiques politiques de l'enquête princière, Occident, XIIIe–XIVe siècles. Acte du colloque d'Aix-en-Provence et Marseille, 19–20 mars 2009*, ed. Thierry Pécout (Paris: De Boccard, 2010), 481–492; Sascha Bütow, "Das Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg," *Die Mark Brandenburg* 101 (2016): 12–19.

23 For information on the Uckermark in the so-called *Landbuch* of Emperor Charles IV of Luxembourg from 1375, see: Johannes Schultze, "Der Zustand der Uckermark nach dem Landbuch von 1375," *Heimatkalender Kreis Prenzlau* 16 (1941): 60–61. At this point, it is also worth citing the work of Benedykt Zientara, *Kryzys agrarny w Marchii Wkrzańskiej w XIV wieku: z badań nad strukturą rolnictwa krajów nadbałtyckich* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1961).

24 On this subject see: Georg von Winterfeldt, *Schloß Löcknitz: ein Beitrag zur brandenburgisch-preußischen Geschichte* (Prenzlau: A. Mieck Verlagshandlung G.m.b.H., 1909).

25 *Landbuch*, 37; Felix Escher, "Brandenburgische Burgen und ihr Zubehör – Gedanken zum Burgenverzeichnis im Landbuch von 1375," in: *Die Dinge beobachten …: archäologische und historische Forschungen zur frühen Geschichte Mittel- und Nordeuropas. Festschrift für Günter Mangelsdorf zum 60. Geburtstag*,

of Brandenburg had the right to a higher court in Zehdenick and Fürstenwerder.[26] The possession of the Uckermark was of considerable importance not only politically but also economically, enhancing he territorial power of the Ascanians, Wittelsbachs and Luxembourgers through the revenues it generated, including, among other sources, the tax imposed on the towns there (the so-called *orbeda*).[27] According to the *Landbuch* of 1375, the burghers of Strasburg were obliged to make annual payments to the territorial authority of 36 silver marks, Zehdenick – 20 silver marks, Fürstenwerder – 16 silver marks, Liebenwalde – 7 silver marks, Prenzlau – 100 silver marks and Templin – 40 silver marks. The latter centre was to pay the tax twice a year – on St Walpurgis (1 May) and St Martin (11 November). The revenue from the higher court there and half of the revenue from the lower court were pledged to the town councillors for the sum of 50 silver marks.[28] The *Landbuch* also listed 188 villages and settlements in the Uckermark. Among them were the villages of Fahrenwalde and Rullewitz, under the rule of the Griffins of Stettin (*sub imperio Ducum Stettinensium*), and the village of Schönfeld , in which the part of the benefits were collected by the alderman of the Duke of Wolgast (*Aduocatus Ducis de Wolgast*). The ten villages, which were annotated in the so-called *Landbuch* as *in pignore Ducum* or *sub vadimonio Ducum*, were also under the authority of the Griffins as a pledge.[29]

Both castles and towns in the Uckermark were under pledge in the March of Brandenburg at the beginning of Luxembourg rule. On 26 June 1369, Margrave Otto V of Wittelsbach (1346–1379) pledged the castles of Boitzenburg and Oderberg to the knights and towns of Brandenburg for 3,000 marks.[30] Before 1 May 1376, Duke Albrecht II

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ed. Felix Biermann (Rahden Westf.: Leidorf, 2008), 225–230; Antonia Schütz, "Die hoch- und spätmittelalterliche Burgen und Adelssitze in der Uckermark, Land Brandenburg," (PhD diss., Berlin: Humboldt University, 2007), 288, 294, 312, 355, 359, 383, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/items/352d2979-dc6f-4e95-b7e3-fee7d532b3eb. DOI: 10.18452/15816.

26 *Landbuch*, 31, 32.

27 The so-called *orbeda* was a fixed tax paid by towns to the territorial authority in the March of Brandenburg and Western Pomerania in the Middle Ages, see: Jan Maria Piskorski, *Miasta księstwa szczecińskiego do połowy XIV wieku* (Poznań-Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2005), 136–149. For further discussion on this subject, see also: Clemens von Looz-Corswarem, "Bede. II. Städtischer Steuer," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 1 (1980), 1780–1781, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3700124.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx; Laurence Buchholzer, "Medieval German Holy Roman Empire," in: *The Routledge Handbook of Public Taxation in Medieval Europe*, eds. Denis Menjot, Mathieu Caesar, Florent Garnier and Pere Verdé Pijuan (London: Routledge, 2022), 269–293.

28 See Hans-Dieter Dannenberg, "Steuerliche Abgaben der Städte nach dem Landbuch der Mark Brandenburg von 1375, mit Anmerkungen zu Berlin-Cölln, Spandau, Potsdam und bestimmten Münzstätten," *Beiträge zur brandenburgisch-preussischen Numismatik* 12 (2004): 75–90.

29 *Landbuch*, 36–137, 138, 140–141, 145–147; Matthias Helle, "Hufen, Herren und Besitz. Das märkische Landbuch Karls IV.," in: *Karl IV. Ein Kaiser*, 57–60.

30 CDB I/21, 456–457.

of Mecklenburg (c. 1318–1379), together with his brother Duke Johann I (1326/1327–1393), had the towns of Liebenwalde, Zehdenick, Strasburg and Fürstenwerder in pledge. Emperor Charles IV Luxembourg obliged the Mecklenburg sovereigns to release all the pledged properties by 29 September 1376. Duke Albrecht II was to transfer the sum of 6000 marks to Luxembourg by 24 June 1377. This agreement was part of a marriage treaty providing for the marriage of one of the daughters of the Duke of Mecklenburg to Margrave Johann, son of the Emperor.[31] On 12 July 1377 Emperor Charles IV, as Margrave of Brandenburg, confirmed the hereditary pledge of half the town of Pasewalk and Alt Torgelow Castle and its appurtenances to Bogislaw VI, Duke of Wolgast, for 6,500 marks.[32] After the death of Charles IV and the assumption of rule by Wenceslas IV, the new ruler ceded the Uckermark to Sigismund of Luxembourg on 11 June 1378, together with the towns of Prenzlau, Templin, Strasburg, Fürstenwerder, Jagow and Zehdenick.[33] In 1393 Boitzenburg was in the possession of Lippold von Bredow, who then mortgaged it to Ludeke von Maltzahn for four years. In 1398 it was in turn occupied by the Dukes of Mecklenburg-Stargard, Johann II (c. 1370–1416) and Ulrich I (c. 1382–1417).[34] Around 11 November 1398, Boitzenburg Castle was captured by the Margrave of Meissen, Wilhelm I.[35]

The pledge of property and sovereign rights was an extremely popular financial instrument used in the German Holy Roman Empire in the 14th and 15th centuries. It was a standard mechanism for raising funds for the day-to-day running of the rulers of the time.[36] The mastery in this field was achieved by the Hungarian and Roman King Sigismund of Luxembourg. Recent research by international scholars has prompted a re-evaluation of earlier judgements has brought to light many new findings in this area.[37] The subject of pledges could be towns, castles or even entire lands,

31 CDB I/21, 463–465; Hermann Grotefend, ed. *MUB*, vol. 19: 1376–1380 (Schwerin: Stiller in Komm, 1899), No. 10875–10876. On 18 May 1376, Emperor Charles IV agreed to postpone the payment of 6000 marks until St Michael's (29 September) in 1377, see: *MUB*, vol. 19, No. 10885.

32 CDB II/3, 59–62; Wehrmann, *Kaiser Karl IV.*, 155.

33 CDB I/21, 465–466.

34 Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 66.

35 Friedrich W. H. Stuhr, ed. *Mecklenburgisches* Urkundenbuch. Vol. 23: 1396–1399 (Schwerin: Bärensprungsch'sche Buchdruckerei, 1911), No. 13357

36 On the estimated incomes of medieval rulers see: Mezník, "Die Finanzen," 73, and note 21; Andreas Büttner, *Geld – Gnade – Gefolgschaft. Die Monetarisierung der politischen Ordnung im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert* (Wien/Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2022), 107–123. On the virtue of austerity in the Middle Ages see: Gerhard Fouquet, "Sparsamkeit - ein Phänomen des Haushaltens in den Lebenswelten des Mittelalters," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 99 (2012): 1–15.

37 For an introduction to the problem see: Holger Buck, "Pfand. II. Deutsches Recht," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 6 (1993), 2019, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3sc056d.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx; Lothar Weyhe, "Pfandschaft-, -politik," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*,

as well as all sovereign rights and revenues. Pledge agreements were concluded for a fixed period or for life. The pledgee became the ruler of the land, castle or town. For the duration of the pledge, he also had the right to appoint his own officials and collect the benefits due to the rightful owner.[38] It is worth recalling in this context, as an excellent illustration of the phenomenon, the example of the pledge of Spiš made on 8 November 1412 by King Sigismund of Luxembourg to the Polish king, Władysław II Jagiełło (c. 1362–1434), for the sum of 37,000 schock broad groschen.[39]

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vol. 6 (1993), 2020–2021, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3sc056d.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx. The state of research on pledging in the medieval German Holy Roman Empire is summarized by Jonathan R. Lyon, "Pledging Lordly Rights and Squeezing Local Communities in the Later Middle Ages," *Austrian History Yearbook* 55 (2024): 607–611. For a selection of works on the role of the pledge in the financial policy of the rulers in the Middle Ages, see: Stanislav Bárta, "A Financial Dimension of Pledge Policy of King Sigismund of Luxembourg in Bohemia (1419–1437)," in: *Money and Finance in Central Europe during the Later Middle Ages*, ed. Roman Zaoral (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 76–86; idem, "Pfand in Krieg und Frieden. Die Verpfändung von böhmischen Kron- und Kirchengütern unter Sigismund von Luxemburg," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 109 (2022): 234–259; János Incze, "King Sigismund's Deeds Pledge in Hungary," in: *Money and Finance in Central Europe during the Later Middle Ages*, ed. Roman Zaoral (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 87–109; idem, "The beginnings of royal pledging in the Kingdom of Hungary," in: *A History of the Credit Market in Central Europe. The Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, ed. Pavla Slavícková (London: Routledge, 2021), 52–61; idem, *Our Lord the King Looks for the Money in Every Corner. Sigismund of Luxembourg's Pledging in Hungary* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2024); Zdeněk Žalud, "Loans and debts of the Bohemian kings in the Middle Ages. From the Přemyslids until the End of the Pre-hussit Period (1262–1419)," in: *A History of the Credit Market in Central Europe. The Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, ed. Pavla Slavícková (London: Routledge, 2021), 33–41; Boglárka Weisz, "Loan transaction in the Kingdom of Hungary up to the end of the 14th century," in: *A History of the Credit Market in Central Europe. The Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period*, ed. Pavla Slavícková (London: Routledge, 2021), 21–32. Matthias Kluge, *Verschuldete Könige. Geld, Politik und die Kammer des Reiches im 15. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2021); Oliver Auge, "Macht- und Landgewinn durch Pfandpolitik. Das Beispiel der Grafen von Holstein im 14. Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 109 (2022): 189–210; Janusz Szyszka, "Zastaw jako narzędzie zapobiegania roztrwonieniu dóbr królewskich. Z dziejów królewszczyzn na Rusi Czerwonej w XV–XVI wieku," in: *Jagiellonowie i ich świat. Bogactwo i ubóstwo Jagiellonów*, eds. Barbara Czwojdrak, Jerzy Sperka and Piotr Węcowski (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2025), 103–123.

38 On the pledging of German Holy Roman Empire cities in the Middle Ages see: Albert Werminghoff, *Die Verpfändung der mittel- und niederrheinischen Reichsstädte im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Breslau: M.&H. Marcus, 1893); Götz Landwehr, *Die Verpfändung der deutschen Reichsstädte im Mittelalter* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1967). The pledging of castles by the Hessian landgraves (1263–1413) and by the Margraves of Brandenburg (1373–1415) has been examined in the research of Bernd Fehrenbach, *Die Burgenpolitik der Landgrafen von Hessen im Spätmittelalter (1263–1413)* (Marburg: Selbstverlag des Hessischen Landesamtes für geschichtliche Landeskunde, 2012), 193–223, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/eb/2020/0400; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 103–109, 193–195, 227–230, 275–279.

39 Janusz Kurtyka, "Początki starostwa spiskiego. Z dziejów polityki Władysława Jagiełły wobec Zakonu Krzyżackiego i Zygmunta Luksemburskiego w latach 1410–1430," *Studia z Dziejów Państwa i Prawa Polskiego* 9 (2006), 153–179. See also Klaus Neitmann, "Die Pfandverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 41 (1992): 1–67.

As mentioned above, the pledge document of the Uckermark issued by Margrave Jost in favour of Duke Swantibor I of Stettin has not survived. The date of the pledge and the conditions under which the Griffins took over the territory are also unknown. The views expressed on this subject by Julius Heidemann are quoted above. Unfortunatelly, the problem is also not addressed by Václav Štěpán in his biography of Margrave Jost of Moravia.[40] However, documents dating from 1400 till 1416, which concerned the possible pledging of the Uckermark and its redemption by Sigismund of Luxembourg, as well as the settlement of the dispute which arose in this context between the Griffins of Stettin and Wolgast and the Burgrave of Nuremberg, Fredrick VI of Hohenzollern, allow some conclusions on this matter. Very interesting – and so far overlooked in historiography – document from 19 November 1400 records that the Duke of Stettin, Bogislaw VII (1355–1404/1405), attested, "the city council of Stettin had lent him 1,200 marks for a pledge of the Uckermark." The ruler undertook to return the borrowed amount if the transaction failed to materialise. It is likely that preliminary arrangements had already been made between the settling parties on this subject, but it is not known whether a final agreement was ever reached.[41] According to the wording of the document negotiated by the councillors of the Dukes of Stettin and Wolgast on 29 July 1414, Duke Swantibor I was to put up 1,400 schock groschen (*ere vader hertoge Swantebor seliger dechtnisse en rede geleghen hadde vor dy virteyn hundert schok*) as pledge for the castles and towns of "Boitzenburg, Zehdenick, Prenzlau, Strasburg and the whole of the Uckermark" (*Bozenborch, Czedenick, Prenczlow, Straseborch unde dat gancze Ukerland*).[42] This is also mentioned in a document from the Dukes of Stolp, Bogislaw VIII (c. 1362/1364–1418) and Mecklenburg Ulrich I (before 1393–1417) issued on 16 December 1415 in Neustadt-Eberswalde in connection with the settlement of a conflict between the Griffins of Stettin and Wolgast and Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, the Margrave of Brandenburg. It confirms that Prince Swantibor I ruled the Uckermark by appointment of Margrave Jost and had the right to collect taxes from the local population.[43]

40 Václav Štěpán, *Moravský markrabě Jošt (1354–1411)* (Brno: Matice moravská, 2002).

41 Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie [State Archives in Szczecin] (hereinafter APS), Fonds: "Rękopisy i Spuścizny" (hereinafter RiS), No. 714, 7–8; Bogdan Frankiewicz and Jerzy Grzelak, eds. *Regestenbuch der Urkundensammlung der Stadt Stettin 1243–1856. Auf Grund des Manuskriptes von Karl Otto Grotefend zum Druck vorbereitet. Erster Teil: Regesten* (Szczecin: Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, 1996) (hereinafter Regestenbuch), No. 157. On the same day, the duke pledged to the Stettin council that he would protect all the rights granted to the Stettin burghers in their privileges, Regestenbuch, No. 156.

42 Landesarchiv Greifswald (hereinafter LAG), Rep. 2 Ducalia No. 228.

43 Georg Wilhelm von Raumer, ed. *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis continuatus. Sammlung ungedruckter Urkunden zur Brandenburgischen Geschichte*. Vol. I (Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1831) (hereinafter CDB continuatus I), 61–63.




Figure 1. The borderland between Western Pomerania and the Margraviate of Brandenburg at the turn of the 14th and 15th centuries

Source: Map prepared by Marcin J. Sobiech based on: *Atlas Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Atlas of the Republic of Poland. Informacje ogólne, spis treści, skorowidz nazw,* ed. Michał Najgrakowski (Warsaw: Chief Surveyor of Poland, Ministry of Spatial Economy and Construction, Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization PAS, 1997), plates 13.1–13.2; *Geschichte Mecklenburgs und Vorpommerns in Karten*, compiled by Gyuli Pápay, accessed 1.10.2025. https://www.lpb-mv.de/themen/geschichte-mv-in-karten/; Antonia Schütz. "Die hoch- und spätmittelalterliche Burgen und Adelssitze in der Uckermark, Land Brandenburg." PhD diss., Berlin: Humboldt University, 2007 DOI: 10.18452/15816; *Wirtschafts- und verkehrsgeographischer Atlas von Pommern*, ed. Geographischen Institut der Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald mit Unterstützung des Provinzialverbandes von Pommern (Stettin: Ostsee-Druck, 1934), 99–100.

The three documents cited above allow us to conclude that the pledge of the Uckermark was made on the basis of an agreement between Margrave Jost and Duke Swantibor I for the sum of 1,400 schock groschen. The date of issue and detailed records of the document are unknown. The time span of this act may be determined, on the one hand, by the source-certified efforts of the Griffins to obtain the cash earmarked for the pledge of the Uckermark from the councillors of Stettin on 19 November 1400, and, on the other hand, by the death of the Moravian Margrave Jost on 18 January 1411.[44] In the following study, arguments will be made for and against a more precise dating of the act of interest.

Margrave Jost's rule in the March of Brandenburg was already assessed extremely critically by his contemporary chronicler Engelbert Wusterwitz. Luxemburg was supposedly only interested in deriving financial gain from his rule in Brandenburg. According to the chronicler, he collected money from his Brandenburg subjects and took it to Moravia. In more recent historiography, this assessment is more balanced.[45] Between 1391 and 1398, 1403 and 1408, and after 1409, Jost did not come to his Brandenburgian territory.[46] Jost's financial situation, which was characterised in more detail by Jaroslav Mezník, was extremely interesting in the context analysed. Unlike Emperor Charles IV and his sons, the Moravian Margrave enjoyed great stability and financial independence in the first years of his independent reign. The Czech researcher linked this fact to the favourable location of his dominion and Jost's non-involvement in big politics, and above all to the impressive inheritance he received from his father. Gradually, with his participation in further political ventures, Jost's situation deteriorated. The greatest financial problems affected him in the 1390s and at the beginning of the following century. Pledges of property then became a necessity for him and allowed him to catch his financial breath.[47]

44 Peter Hilsch, "Jost (Jobst, Jodocus, Jodok), Markgraf von Mähren und von Brandenburg, gewählter deutscher König, *1354, † 18.1.1411 Spielberg bei Brünn," in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 10 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974), 627–628, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd12930963X.html#ndbcontent; idem, "Jodok (Jobst), Markgraf von Mähren und von Brandenburg (1354–1411)," in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vol. 5 (1991), 492–493, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://apps-1brepolis-1net-1006ba3e709c1.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/lexiema/test/Default2.aspx.

45 See Stefanie-Friederike Weissmann, "Raubritter in der Mark? Fehderecht und Fehdepraxis am Beispiel der Berliner-Fehde Johanns und Dietrichs von Quitzow," *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte* 145/146 (2009/2010): 323, and note 285; Lenka Bobková, "Smělý cíl," 59–80.

46 Winkelmann, *Die Mark*, 95.

47 Mezník, "Die Finanzen," 69–91. On 8 September 1393, Margrave Jost pledged the towns and castles of Briesen, Beelitz, Mittenwalde, Trebbin, and Saarmund to his brother-in-law, Margrave Wilhelm I of Meissen, for 12,000 guilders. Vincenz Brandl, ed. *Codex Diplomaticus et Epistolaris Moraviæ. Urkunden-Sammlung zur Geschichte Mährens. Im Auftrage des Mährischen Landes-Ausschusses*. Vol. 12: 1391–1399 (Brünn: Verlag des Mährischen Landes-Ausschusses, 1890), No. 169. On 24 August 1400, Wilhelm I and his wife Elisabeth received half of the customs revenue in Oderberg as a pledge from Jost for 1,036 schock groschen. CDB I/12, 358. See also Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 241, and note 138.

In July 1398, Jost of Moravia arrived in the Marches of Brandenburg.[48] He stayed there until February 1399, and his presence in the area was again recorded in March 1401. Specifically, he was in Berlin between 29 March and 24 May 1401, again in Berlin on 25 November 1402, in Tangermünde on 11 June 1403 and 25–31 October 1403, and finally from 21 to 24 November 1403.[49] In August and September 1398, Jost set out for Boitzenburg and attempted to recapture it from the Mecklenburg princes. This feat was only accomplished in November 1398 by Wilhelm I, Margrave of Meissen.[50] On 9 May 1399, in Pasewalk, the Dukes of Stettin, Swantibor I and Bogislaw VII, and the Dukes of Wolgast, Barnim VI and Wartislaw VIII, concluded an agreement containing a pledge to maintain peace in the lands of the March of Brandenburg from the date of the document to St Bartholomew (24 August). There is no doubt that this was about putting the situation in the Uckermark in order.[51] On 25 November 1399, the Battle of Karrenberg took place, in which the Dukes of Mecklenburg, Johannes II and Ulrich I, defeated the Knights of Uckermark and the burghers of Prenzlau.[52] According to Friedrich Wilhelm Barthold, "after the retreat of the Mecklenburg princes, the Griffins then occupied the town of Prenzlau."[53] This supposition is confirmed by the fact that on 6 December 1399 Dukes Swantibor I and Bogislaw VII confirmed the privileges of this urban centre, including all imperial, royal and margrave documents issued so far

48 Lenka Bobková, "Jošt Moravský markrabetem braniborským," in: *Ad vitam et honorem Jaroslao Mezník. Profesoru Jaroslavu Mezníkovi žáci a přátéle k pětasedmdesátým narozenínam*, eds. Tomáš Borovský, Libor Jan and Martin Wihoda (Brno: Matice moravská 2003), 313–325; eadem, "Markrabství braniborské v rukou Lucemburku," in: *Korunní země v dějinách českého státu. II, Společné a rozdílné. Česká koruna v živote a vědomí jejích obyvatel ve 14.–16. století. Sborník příspěvků přednesených na kolokviu pořádanem ve dnech 12. a 13. května 2004 v Clam-Gallasově paláci v Praze*, eds. Lenka Bobková and Jana Konvičná (Ŭstí nad Labem: Albis international 2005), 159–190.

49 Adolph Friedrich Riedel, ed. *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis. Sammlung der Urkunden, Chroniken und sonstigen Geschichtsquellen für die Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg und ihrer Regenten. Fortgesetzt auf Veranstaltung des Vereins für die Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg. Chronologisches Register zu sämmtlichen Bänden*, vol. 1: 768–1751 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1867) (hereinafter CDB. Chronologisches Register), 451–453, 462, 465–466, 468. On 25 November 1402, the Dukes of Mecklenburg, Johann I and Ulrich I, were granted the district of Prignitz *tzu vorstaen und tzu vorwesen*, together with the bishopric of Havelberg, for a period of six years by Margrave Jost. In return, they were to receive an annual sum of schock groschen, half of which was to come from the tax paid by the towns of the territory under their administration. The margrave paid each of the princes 400 schock groschen. CDB II/3, 157–159; Martin Liebegott, *Der brandenburgische Landvogt bis zum XVI. Jahrhundert* (Halle a. S.: Niemeyer, 1906), 27, 30; Oliver Auge, "Fürsten und Finanzen im Mittelalter. Ein Problemaufriss," in: *Fürsten und Finanzen im Mittelalter*, ed. Oliver Auge (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2024), 17, note 31.

50 On 7 September 1398, Jost wrote from Boitzenburg to the Berlin councillors. Ernst Fidicin, ed. *Historisch-diplomatische Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Berlin, Bd. 4: Berlinische Urkunden von 1232 bis 1700* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1842), 60–61; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 66-68; Štěpán, *Moravský markrabě*, 456, 814.

51 CDB II/3, 139.

52 Zdrenka, "Bitwa pod Karrenbergiem," 355–364; idem, "Die Schlacht am Karrenberg," 12–19.

53 Barthold, *Geschichte*, vol. 3, 562.

for the local burghers.[54] On 5 March 1402, a convention of the dukes of Mecklenburg, Wolgast and Brunswick took place in Boitzenburg, during which an agreement was made against the March of Brandenburg.[55] Around 15 July 1402, Duke Swantibor I captured the town of Zehdenick and by September of that year was in the lands formally under the rule of Margrave Jost, including Bötzow (c. 25 July 1402) and Strausberg near Berlin (20–24 September 1402).[56] On 24 August 1403 in Boitzenburg, Dukes Swantibor I and Bogislaw VII, together with their Wolgast cousins Barnim VI and Wartislaw VIII, granted the local nunnery the town and village of Boitzenburg (*dat Stedeken vnde dat dorp to Boysenburch*) with all appurtenances, except the higher court and services, for a period of ten years.[57] Julius Heidemann, on the basis of the two documents cited below, inferred the unusual dynamics of the events taking place at this time on the West Pomeranian-Brandenburg borderland and the vicissitudes of the fate of the Uckermark. On 23 March 1405, Thitzo von Gloyen, as "fief judge in the Uckermark due to the illustrious Lord Jost, Margrave of Brandenburg and Lord of Moravia" (*Mannrichter in deme Vckerlande van des Dorchlüchtegen Vorsten wegen Hern Jostes, Marggraven tu Brandenborg vnd Hern tu Merhen*), decided a case between the burghers of Prenzlau and Ludeke Cratze.[58] In turn, on 6 December 1405, Duke Swantibor I mediated an agreement in Prenzlau on the conflict between Albrecht von Blankenburg and his son and the local burghers.[59] Finally, a document issued by the Prenzlau town councillors on 16 December 1407 mentions local burghers who "were imprisoned because of the tax [payment of which – R. S.] we remained indebted to the Lords of Wolgast" (*[…] dy gefangen wyren van der Orbede weghen, dy wy den Wolgastschen heren wyren schuldich gebleuen*).[60]

54 CDB I/21, 232–233. In addition, the Griffins guaranteed the burghers of Prenzlau an exemption from customs duties on land and water in the territory of their dominion.

55 CDB I/4, 84; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 111–112.

56 Joachim Zdrenka, "Itinerar des Stettiner Herzogs Swantibor I., ca. 1351–1413," *Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte, Siegel- und Wappenkunde* 41 (1995): 185–186. On 29 September 1402, the Dukes of Stettin and Wolgast issued letters of introduction to the deputies of the cities of Berlin and Cölln who were attending the congress in Strausberg. Adolph Friedrich Riedel, ed. *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis. Sammlung der Urkunden, Chroniken und sonstigen Geschichtsquellen für die Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg und ihrer Regenten. Fortgesetzt auf Veranstaltung des Vereins für die Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg. Supplementband und Schluß des ganzen Werkes bis auf die Register* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1865) (hereinafter CDB Suppl.), 255; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 113. The document was also issued on behalf of the Dukes of Wolgast, the Counts von Lindow and the von Quitzow family.

57 CDB I/21, 54–55. In addition, the Griffins donated 100 schock groschen to the nuns. On 6 December 1404, the Dukes of Mecklenburg granted the village of Bentz to the monastery. CDB I/21, 56.

58 CDB I/21, 239–240; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 139. Among the witnesses to the agreement was Eckhard von Sidow, a knight serving Duke Swantibor I.

59 CDB I/21, 240–241; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 139. On the same day, Albrecht von Blankenburg issued a document of reconciliation with the councillors and the burghers of Prenzlau, CDB I/21, 241.

60 CDB I/21, 244–245; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 149–150.

The documents cited above show that in 1399, the Griffins of Stettin were lords of Prenzlau, in 1402 they briefly ruled in Zehdenick and in 1403, and 1405 in Boitzenburg, while before 16 December 1407, the Dukes of Wolgast claimed the right to collect tax from the burghers of Prenzlau. The latter source indicates that the Griffins actually exercised power in this town and supports the date contained therein as the *terminus ad quem* of Jost's pledge of the towns and castles in the Uckermark to Duke Swantibor I.[61]

Before 8 December 1409, Margrave of Brandenburg Jost entrusted Duke Swantibor I with the function of administrator of the Middle March.[62] This did not lead to an orderly situation in the Brandenburg lands, which then became an arena of unrest and chaos.[63] The circumstances under which the Griffins operated soon changed. On 8 July 1411, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, Burgrave of Nuremberg, was appointed governor of the March of Brandenburg by Sigismund of Luxembourg.[64] Hohenzollern maintained very close ties with the Roman King Ruprecht of the Palatinate of the Wittelsbach family (1352–1410), who, through his marriage to Hohenzollern's sister Elisabeth,became his brother-in-law. According to Gerhard Fouquet, during Ruprecht's reign he was among "The most important and closest financiers of the kingdom."[65]

61 Sigismund of Luxembourg declared on 1 September 1410 that he had pledged part of the March of Brandenburg to the Duke of Stettin (*einen andern mercklichen Deile desselben Landes dem Hertzogen von Stetin versetzit*). CDB II/3, 173–174; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 253. No document has survived to confirm the reliability of this reference.

62 Franziska Heidemann, ed. *Regesten der Markgrafen von Brandenburg aus dem Hause Luxemburg. Karl IV., Wenzel, Sigismund und Johann sowie deren Hauptmänner 1373–1415* (Warendorf: Fahlbusch Verlag, 2016) (hereinafter Regesten), No. 404n, 289, and note 1; Wolfgang Ribbe, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Engelbert Wusterwitz. Überlieferung, Edition und Interpretation einer spätmittelalterlicher Quelle zur Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1973), 104; Schultze, *Die Mark*, vol. 2, 218, and note 63; Winkelmann, *Die Mark*, 99; Clemens Bergstedt, "Neue Überlegungen zur Überlieferung und Abfassung der Aufzeichnungen des Engelbert Wusterwitz," in: *Die Mark Brandenburg unter den frühen Hohenzollern. Beiträge zu Geschichte, Kunst und Architektur im 15. Jahrhundert*, eds. Peter Küvener and Dirk Schumann (Berlin: Lukas Verlag für Kunst- und Geistesgeschichte, 2015), 74–103; Jan Winkelmann, "*Ja Gott, durch bitte der armen bewogen hat ihn als von der höhe gesandt […].* Burggraf Friedrich, der erste Hohenzollern in der Mark Brandenburg," in: *Beiträge zur Landes-, Kultur- und Ordensgeschichte. Heinz-Dieter Heimann zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. Sascha Bütow, Peter Riedel and Uwe Tresp (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2014), 65–88.

63 On 3 June 1409, Margrave Jost informed the Berlin councillors of an expected invasion of Neuruppin by Duke Wartislaw VIII of Wolgast. CDB II/3, 171. Not much information has survived from this period concerning the activity of Swantibor I in relation to the March of Brandenburg. On 15 August 1409, Duke Swantibor I exempted the councillors of Berlin and Cölln from paying part of the tax to the treasury of the territorial lord. CDB III/2, 172. He was also to mediate a settlement of the conflict between the Berlin burghers and Dietrich von Quitzow, see: Weissmann, "Raubritter in der Mark?" 339–341.

64 CDB II/3, 178–181; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 256–263, 270–271.

65 Gerhard Fouquet, *Die geliehene Zeit eines Königs. Der »arme« Ruprecht und die Reichsfinanzen (1400–1410)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2022), 171.

He also maintained close political and financial tiesith Sigismund of Luxembourg. In 1396, he took part in Sigismund's crusade, which ended with the defeat of his army at Nicopolis. He is also believed to have contributed to Sigmund's election as King of the Romans. Serving as Sigismund's courtier, he handled financial matters for the ruler.[66] The Burgrave of Nuremberg was likewise on fairly close terms with the Duke of Stettin, Swantibor I.[67]

At the time of Frederick VI's appointment as administrator, many towns and castles in the March of Brandenburg, along with associated sovereign rights, were under the pledge. It is estimated that around 90 per cent of the territorial authorities' revenue sources were in this condition.[68] On 11 July 1411 Sigismund of Luxembourg announced to the knights and inhabitants of Barnim, Teltow, Havelland and Glien that he had appointed the Burgrave of Nuremberg as his governor in the March of Brandenburg.[69] On 14 January 1412, Sigismund of Luxembourg, unable to secure Frederick VI of Hohenzollern's arrival in the March of Brandenburg, called on its estates and inhabitants to recognise Wend von Ileburg as his temporary deputy (*czu seinem vnderhouptmanne*). At the same time, he reminded them that some of his subjects in the March of Brandenburg were still, unlawfully, acknowledging the Duke of Stettin, Swantibor I, as governor. Taking the oath of allegiance to Frederick VI of Hohenzollern and Wend von Ileburg, as representatives of Sigismund of Luxembourg, must have automatically rendered the Griffin's authority in the area illegitimate.[70] On the same day, Sigismund of Luxembourg ordered Dietrich von Quitzow to comply with a royal injunction directing the Burgrave Frederick VI to give him the castles, towns, and seigniorial rights.[71] This was soon followed by further steps to bring a gradual order to the situation. On 5 August 1412 Sigismund of Luxembourg ordered Frederick VI to combat all internal conflicts and to restore peace to the March of Brandenburg.[72] The culmination of this phase of stabilising the situation came on 12 August 1412, when Luxembourg ordered the Burgrave to redeem the castles and towns of Brandenburg from pledge.[73]

66 On this subject see: Kluge, *Verschuldete Könige*, 152, 157, and note 344, 185, 239, 249–250, 313, 321, 345–346, 349, 393, 409.

67 See Joachim Zdrenka, *Włości szczecińskie we Frankonii 1374–1400: historia i dokumenty = Stettiner Landbesitz in Franken 1374–1400: Geschichte und Urkunden* (Gdańsk: WiM, 2004); Rymar, *Rodowód*, 409–410.

68 Kluge, *Verschuldete Könige*, 54.

69 CDB II/3, 181–183.

70 CDB I/4, 316–317; II/3, 192–194; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 265–268.

71 CDB II/3, 194. On 14 January 1412, Sigismund of Luxembourg called on the burghers of Strasburg to submit to the authority of Frederick VI. Regesten, No. 274.

72 CDB II/3, 195–196.

73 CDB II/3, 196–197.

The Burgrave of Nuremberg, Frederick VI, arrived in Treuenbrietzen in the Middle March on 22 June 1412 and stayed in Brandenburg until 13 August 1414.[74] His presence was recorded primarily in Berlin, but also in other centres of the March of Brandenburg, including Brandenburg, Spandau, Nauen, Beelitz, Mittenwalde, Münchberg, Frankfurt on the Oder, Strausberg, Bernau, Bad Belzig, Wittenberg, Tangermünde, Stendal, Salzwedel, Werben, Lehnin, Reppen, Zerbst, Kyritz, Rathenow, the Plaue area and in Wittstock. He also made several appearances on the northern fringes of his jurisdiction: on 29 July 1412, 24 September 1412, 26 September 1412, 19 March 1413, 19 March 1413, 29 March 1413, 11 July 1413, and 11 May 1414 in Neustadt-Eberswalde,[75] and on 12 July 1412 and 27 July 1414 in Templin.[76]

The Dukes of Stettin did not want to submit to Sigismund of Luxembourg's plans. According to Franziska Heidemann, "Frederick terminated […] the pledges that the Pomeranians had in the Uckermark." The consequence of these steps was the capture of Templin by Otto II and Casimir V and the Battle of Kremmer Damm on 24 October 1412, in which they supported the Knights of Havelland against the army of the Burgrave of Nuremberg.[77] Until the middle of the following year, nothing is known about any steps taken by the two sides to resolve the misunderstandings. It was not until 30 June 1413 – nine days after the death of the Duke of Stettin, Swantibor I (died 21 June 1413)[78] – that the negotiations took place in Prenzlau between Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, as governor of the Margravate of Brandenburg, and the Dukes of Stettin.[79]

74 Wolfgang Neugebauer, *Die Hohenzollern*, Bd. 1: *Anfänge, Landesstaat und monarchische Autokratie bis 1740* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1996), 32–40. See Felix Escher, "Die Mark Brandenburg unter den frühen Hohenzollern. Eine historische Einführung," in: *Die Mark Brandenburg unter den frühen Hohenzollern. Beiträge zu Geschichte, Kunst und Architektur im 15. Jahrhundert*, eds. Peter Küvener and Dirk Schumann (Berlin: Lukas Verlag für Kunst- und Geistesgeschichte, 2015), 17–34.

75 Regesten, No. 308, 384a, 384b, 404n, 405, 417b, 456a.

76 Regesten, No. 308a, 465.

77 Quoted in: Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 274. See also Riedel, *Geschichte*, 106–114. According to Kantzow, this was an indefinite pledge that could be redeemed by the rightful owner at any time. The chronicler claimed that "The princes of Stettin were to allow Emperor Charles and his sons to redeem the Uckermark when it pleased them" (*die Hertzogen von Stettin hetten Keiser Karll und seinen Sohns gegunt, das sie, wans inen gefile, die Ukermarke mochten widder losen*). Georg Gaebel, ed. *Des Thomas Kantzow Chronik von Pommern in hochdeutscher Mundart. Letzte Bearbeitung*, vol. 1 (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1897), 243.

78 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 409.

79 APS, RiS, No. 714, 18–19; Regestenbuch, No. 163. The document concluding the negotiations has not survived in the original form, and its contents are known only from a modern transcription. The text of the agreement bears the seals of the Burgrave of Nuremberg, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, as well as those of the guarantors on the Brandenburg side. This fact has not been taken into account by, among others, Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 298. Between 23 June 1413 and 3 July 1413, the Burgrave Frederick VI was in Berlin. Regesten, No. 416–417. His journey from Berlin to Prenzlau and back was not within the possibilities of medieval travel.

Can this event be seen as a turnaround in their policy towards the new ruler of the March of Brandenburg? The young princes moved from direct confrontation on the battlefield to peace negotiations with the Burgrave of Nuremberg. The timing of the reunion makes one wonder about its causes and initiator. Two possible scenarios can be considered. Perhaps it was still toward the end of Duke Swantibor I's life that the Stettin court decided to enter into talks with the new Brandenburg ruler, likely realising that further escalation of the conflict would not bring positive results in the long term. Alternatively, a less probable scenario is that the date and place of negotiations were only being arranged after the death of the senior member of the Stettin ducal family.

During the talks, only very general points were agreed upon regarding the path to resolve the conflict. Both sides were to submit their complaints against the adversary in the Brandenburg town of Chorin by 25 July 1413 and to respond to them by 24 January 1414. The Elector and Duke of Saxony-Wittenberg Rudolf III (c. 1373–1419) and Duke of Stolp Bogislaw VIII were appointed as arbitrators in the conflict and were to settle the dispute in Kostrzyn on 29 September 1414. If no agreement could be reached, the role of superior judge (*oberman*), whose ruling would be final, was to be performed by the Duke of Mecklenburg, Ulrich I. He was to scheduled to rule in such a case on 11 November 1414.[80] The choice of arbitrator was not accidental. Rudolf III, Elector of Saxony, had the opportunity to meet Frederick VI at the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg in Wissegrad. There, the Roman king brought about a resolution of the conflict between them. He also arranged the betrothal of Wettin's daughter to Frederick VI's son.[81] Bogislaw VIII had hitherto used the mediation services of Duke Swantibor I on several occasions, and now the situation was reversed.[82] Duke Ulrich I was the son-in-law of Swantibor I, whose daughter Margaret had married the Duke of Mecklenburg before 1400.[83] He was also, from 29 March 1413, a courtier to the Burgrave Frederick VI with

80 On the importance of the superior judge in judicial procedure see: Anna Rad, *minne oder recht. Konflikt und Konsens zur Zeit Karls IV. und König Wenzels* (Köln/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2020), 149–155.

81 Otto von Heinemann, "Rudolf III.," in: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 29 (1889): 555–556, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd137797958.html#adbcontent; Lorenz Friedrich Beck, "Rudolf III.," in: *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 22 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 186, accessed: 1.05.2025, https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd137797958.html#ndbcontent; Heidemann, *Die Luxemburger*, 260.

82 Joachim Zdrenka, "Dokument poznańskiego rozejmu polsko-pomorskiego z 1409 r. w kontekście «Wielkiej Wojny»," in: *Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze*, ed. Błażej Śliwiński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2003), 427–431; Rafał Simiński, *Konflikt – pojednanie – współpraca. Studia nad polityką książąt zachodniopomorskich i biskupów kamieńskich wobec zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach w latach 1320–1423* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Chronicon, 2019), 127–128, 130, 192–193.

83 Wigger, "Stammtafeln des Großherzoglichen Hauses von Mecklenburg," 206; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 419. According to a document of King Sigismund of Luxembourg dated 31 May 1417, Duke Rudolf III of Saxony-Wittenberg was to act as arbiter in the disputes between the Dukes of Stettin, Otto II and Casimir V, and the Margrave of Brandenburg, Frederick I. See Otto von Heinemann, "Die kaiserlichen Lehnsurkunden für die Herzöge von Pommern," *Baltische Studien Neue Folge* 3 (1899): 179–181.

the obligation to provide him with "faithful advice, assistance and service" (*getrulichen rathen, helffen vnd czu dinste*) for the annual sum of 600 Rhine guilders or 200 Rhine schock.[84] The document from 30 June 1413 went on to record the agreed options for dealing with complaints by subjects from both authorities. The agreement was vouched for and sealed by knights and burgesses delegated by the Brandenburg side – Johann von Torgau from Zossen, the castle governor of Oderberg, Heinrich von Stranz,[85] Dietrich von Quitzow, Werner von Holtzendorf, Hans von Uchtenhagen, Ebel von Krumensee and the councillors of Berlin and Frankfurt on the Oder. What is surprising is the presence among the guarantors on the part of the Burgrave of Nuremberg, Dietrich von Quitzow. In April 1413 there was a brief reconciliation between brothers Dietrich and Hans von Quitzow and the Brandenburg ruler and so on 30 June 1413 Dietrich found himself in Prenzlau.[86]

At the same time as the conflict with Hohenzollern over the pledge of the Uckermark was dying down, the Griffins were faced with the need to resolve disagreements within their own family over the terms on which the pledge was to be dissolved and the cash raised shared. According to Kantzow's account quoted at the beginning of this article, the conflict between the Griffins of Stettin and those of Wolgast over this issue erupted after the death of the Duke of Stettin, Swantibor I, on 21 June 1413.[87] The visit of the trusted counsellor of the dukes of Wolgast and administrator of the diocese of Kammin, Kurd Bonow, to the ducal court of Casimir V and Otto II in Stettin on 26 July 1413 must certainly be linked to the case. The ducal counsellors, noted on the witness list, probably participated in the talks: the *provest* of St Mary's chapter in Stettin, Voltze von Melsholtz, the knights Heinrich Wussow, Hermann Vos, Peter Trampe and Dietrich von Schwerin, and the squires Marshal Ludeke von Malzahn and Betram Hase.[88] The situation in the towns pledged to the Griffins on the territory of the Uckermark was also changing dynamically at this time. On 26 July 1413, the burghers of Strasburg paid

On the situation in Mecklenburg during the reign of Sigismund of Luxembourg see: Ernst Münch, "Mecklenburg zur Zeit von König und Kaiser Sigmund (1410–1437)," in: *Das Zeitalter Königs Sigmunds*, eds. Tilmann Schmidt and Péter Gunst, 181–190.

84 CDB III/1, 205–206.

85 Carl Friedrich Ferdinand von Strantz, *Geschichte des dem freien Herrenstande, den Schlosgesessenen und Rittern im Mittelalter angehörenden Edlen Geschlechts Strantz urkundlich und kirchlich nachgewiesen vom Anfange des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts bis neuster Zeit* (Breslau: Graß, Barth und Comp., 1838), 9–10.

86 Clemens Bergstedt, "Schuldscheine und Intrigen. Aufstieg und Fall der Quitzow-Brüder," in: *Im Dialog mit Raubrittern und Schönen Madonnen: die Mark Brandenburg im späten Mittelalter. Begleitband zum Ausstellungsverbund Raubritter und Schöne Madonne*, eds. Clemens Bergstedt et al. (Berlin: Lukas Velag 2011), 306–311; idem, "Und wenn es ein Jahr Nürnberger regnete. Quitzows gegen Hohenzollern," *Die Mark Brandenburg* 119 (2020): 14–18.

87 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 409.

88 LAG, Rep. 1 Kloster Jasenitz, No. 12.

homage to Frederick VI. This was the first of the four Brandenburgian centres that had hitherto been in the hands of the princes of Stettin and Wolgast in the disputed area.[89]

The Dukes of Wolgast took a different approach to settling the dispute with Frederick VI of Hohenzollern compared with the Griffins of Stettin. At a convention in Neuruppin on 19 November 1413, Wartislaw VIII reached an agreement with the Burgrave of Nuremberg. Two agreements were concluded, reflecting the establishment of friendly Wolgast-Brandenburg relations. The first of concerned mutual military support, while the other provided for the marriage between Wartislaw's VIII son, Wartislaw (died c. 1414/1415), and Frederick VI's daughter, Margaret.[90] These agreements also had the effect of settling the issue of the pledge of castles and towns in the Uckermark. As noted above, the Griffins of Wolgast exercised authority over the town of Prenzlau and demanded financial contributions for their benefit from its burghers. In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that, following the conclusion of the treaties with the Brandenburg side in November 1413, it was the burghers of Prenzlau who paid a tribute of allegiance to the Burgrave of Nuremberg, who, on 6 May 1414, confirmed their rights and privileges to them. It was the second town in the Uckermark to return to Hohenzollern hands.[91] On 26 July 1414, the Burgrave of Nuremberg issued a debt document in Templin intended for Duke Wartislaw VIII for the sum of 400 schock Bohemian groschen, to be handed over to the Pomeranian side in Stettin by the next St Martin (11 November).[92]

Wartislaw VIII, Duke of Wolgast, was negotiating in parallel with both Hohenzollern and with the Dukes of Stettin. Dukes Otto II and Casimir V had to acknowledge that they would not be able to retain the Uckermark for long and would eventually be compelled to hand over the local castles and towns to the Margrave of Brandenburg. The main issue to resolve was to the amount of the pledge redemption and its division between the Griffins. On 29 July 1414, negotiations on this matter took place in Templin between the representatives of the Wolgast duke Wartislaw VIII and the children of Barnim VI, and the Dukes of Stettin, Casimir V and Otto II. The Dukes of Wolgast were represented by Kurd Bonow, the mayors of Stralsund and Greifswald – Klaus von der Lippe and Heinrich Rubenow – and the knights Henneke Starkow, Ricwan Lepel, and Wedego von Bugenhagen. On behalf of the Dukes of Stettin, on the other hand, talks were held by the knight Heinrich Wussow, the squires Ludeke von Maltzahn and

89 CDB continuatus I, 67; Heidemann, *Die Mark*, 235.

90 CDB II/3, 208–210; CDB continuatus I, 53–54; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 366–368, 371–372. On 6 June 1414, the Duke of Wolgast acceded to a six-year treaty concluded by the Burgrave Frederick VI with the Dukes of Mecklenburg and the Lords of Werle. CDB II/3, 218–220.

91 CDB I/21, 253–254.

92 CDB II/3, 221. The commitment of the Burgrave guaranteed Johann von Torgow of Zossen, Johann von Bieberstein, Gebhard von Alvensleben, Hasso von Bredow, Bertram Hase and Hans von Uchtenhagen. The recipients of the charter were Kurd Bonow and Henneke Starkow.

Albrecht von Blankenburg, and the mayors of Stettin – Jakob Kunne and Gerd Rode. It was confirmed that the Uckermark together with the towns and castles of Boitzenburg, Zehdenick, Prenzlau and Strasburg were pledged to Duke Swantibor I by Margrave Jost for 1,400 schock groschen (*virteyn hundert schok groschen*). The Wolgast princes had the right to a fourth part of the castle and the town in Boitzenburg, which they gave up in favour of the princes of Stettin. In the event that it was decided that the Uckermark should be redeemed from the pledge by the rightful owner, the redemption amount was set at 12,000 schock Bohemian groschen (*twelff dusent schok guder Bemischer groschen*), which was to be divided equally between the two lines of the House of Griffins. All decisions concerning the pledged objects were to be made with the full consent of the Griffins. If any lord, knight or squire decided to attack one of the pledged castles, each pledgee was obliged to oppose it with full commitment.[93] The findings at Templin may have formed the basis for further action taken against Frederick VI in relation to the Uckermark.

The hostile stance of the Stettin Griffins towards the Hohenzollern was well known at the Berlin court. On 13 August 1414 the Burgrave Frederick VI renewed an agreement with Duke Ulrich I of Mecklenburg, who was admitted as a courtier to the Roman and Hungarian king Sigismund of Luxembourg and to Frederick VI himself for a period of two years, in return for a payment of 2,000 Rhine guilders. The document contained an interesting provision concerning Hohenzollern's relations with the Dukes of Stettin, Otto II and Casimir V. Ulrich I was obliged to participate in a possible armed conflict undertaken by the Brandenburg ruler against the Griffins of Stettin. He was to provide active support contribute his own troops to such operations, and he was not permitted to conclude a peace agreement with the West Pomeranian rulers without Frederick VI's consent.[94]

In August 1414, even before leaving the Brandenburg March, Frederick VI appointed Johann von Bieberstein as his governor and deputy in the March of Brandenburg (*hauptmann und stadhalter*).[95] In his absence, the Pomeranians attacked on 21 August 1414 and burned the town of Nauen north-west of Berlin. According to the chronicler Engelbert Wusterwitz, the main perpetrator of the raid was Dietrich von Quitzow. A note on the event written by the authorities of the affected town, states that the perpetrators of the destructive expedition were invaders from the Duchy of Stettin and Zehdenick (*vt deme lande thu Stettyn alze van Czedenyk*). The losses caused by the attackers were valued at 5,000 schock groschen.[96]

93 LAG, Rep. 2 Ducalia, No. 228.

94 CDB II/3, 222–223.

95 Müller, "Chronologisches Überblick zum Leben und zur Herrschaft Burggraf Friedrichs VI. von Nürnberg, Kurfürsten von Brandenburg (1371–1400)," in: *Burggraf Friedrich VI*, eds. Müller and Seiderer, 272.

96 CDB I/7, 351; Ribbe, *Die Aufzeichnungen*, 100; Weissmann, "Raubritter in der Mark?", 281–369. See also Lutz Partenheimer and André Stellmacher, *Die Unterwerfung der Quitzows und der Beginn*

The chronicler Ulrich Richental recorded the Burgrave's spectacular arrival in Constance at Christmas 1414, with 400 horses and four carts for the Universal Council.[97] His presence at the Council is further attested by documents dated 26 February 1415, when, together with his brother Johann III, he received confirmation of his fief from Sigismund of Luxembourg.[98]

The next steps in the Stettin-Brandenburg conflict are not known until 9 May 1415. At that time, the Margrave Frederick VI, issued in Constance a summons to the Brandenburg states to prepare for an armed confrontation with the princes of Stettin.[99] He also succeeded in persuading King Sigismund of Luxembourg to issue an act of banishment within the Roman Empire on 10 May 1415 against the Dukes of Stettin, Casimir V and Otto II, as well as to the mayors, councillors, and burghers of Stettin, Garz on the Oder, and Strasburg, along with 54 knights and squires in the Uckermark, on the account of "their disobedience" (*durch sollicher Irer vngehorsamkeit*) in view of the Griffins' threefold refusal to appear before the Reich court (*hofgerihte*).[100]

The radical measures taken by Sigismund of Luxembourg soon produced the desired effect. On 18 June 1415, the Elector and Duke of Saxony-Wittenberg Rudolf III and Duke of Mecklenburg Ulrich I met in Neustadt-Eberswalde. The outcome of the convention – certainly attended by the Burgrave Frederick VI – was the issuance of a provisional resolution in the conflict between him and the Dukes of Stettin, Casimir V and Otto II. Both Dukes of Stettin were probably also present. Unfortunately, only a copy of the document sealed by Frederick VI and the conciliators has survived. There must also have been a document to which the Griffins attached their seals, but this has not survived. At the convention it was agreed that the truce between the two sides would last from 18 June 1415 to 24 June 1416. The agreement also included Bishop Otto of Havelberg,

Hohenzollernherrschaft über Brandenburg (Potsdam: Becker, 2014). On 24 April 1416, the Burgrave Frederick VI, in response to the extensive damage caused by the burning of the town of Nauen, exempted the burghers from all payments to the state for a period of ten years. CDB I/7, 352–353.

97 Mario Müller, "Burggraf Friedrich VI. von Nürnberg in der Konstanzer Konzilschronik des Ulrich Richental (1414–1418). Ein Verzeichnis der Erwähnungen," in: *Burggraf Friedrich VI*, eds. Müller and Seiderer, 164. Taking Richental's information as authoritative, Frederick VI's two stays in the March of Brandenburg at the end of December 1414 remain puzzling. On 28 December 1414, his presence in Tangermünde was recorded, and on 30 December 1414, in Berlin, see: Regesten, No. 472–473. For Frederick VI's presence at the Council of Constance, see: Thomas Martin Buck, "Und wie vil herren dar koment, sy wärind gaistlich oder sy wäremd weltlich. Zu den Namen- und Teilnehmerliste der Konstanzer Konzilschronik Ulrich Richentals," in: *Das Konstanzer Konzil als europäisches Ereignis: Begegnungen, Medien und Rituale*, eds. Gabriela Signori, and Birgit Studt (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2014), 335.

98 Müller, "Chronologisches Überblick," 272.

99 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin-Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensbriefarchiv, No. 2223. The letter refers to the end of the truce with the Griffins of Stettin on 24 June 1415 (*so der vrede als ir wol wisset zu sant Johans tag uszgen wirt*). No document survives that indicates the date and place of the said agreement.

100 CDB II/3, 233–235.

Count Ulrich von Lindow, the inhabitants of the Uckermark, including the fiefs of Frederick I of Hohenzollern. One article of the document also addressed the case of Dietrich von Quitzow. It ruled out his further support and the possibility of him taking refuge in the territory of the Grifins' of Stettin rule. Both sides were also to release prisoners of war. In the event of possible breaches of peace, a separate convention was to be convened. It was emphasized that all the arrangements made were not to affect the Margrave of Brandenburg's sovereign rights over the Dukes of Stettin.[101]

On 6 November 1415, Duke Wartislaw IX (c. 1400–1457) and Duchess Agnes (died 1435) stayed on the territory of the Uckermark in Templin. It is possible that negotiations with representatives of the Brandenburg side took place at that time, during which a further course of action was established.[102] More than a month later, a decisive settlement was reached. On 16 December 1415, at Neustadt-Eberswalde, the Dukes of Stolp, Bogislaw VIII, and Mecklenburg's Ulrich I settled a dispute between Frederick I and the Dukes of Stettin, Casimir V and Otto II, and the Duke of Wolgast, Wartislaw IX. The arbitrators decided that the burgrave should pay the Griffins c. 4,000 schock Bohemian groschen, which "before his arrival were to be paid to them by the knights, towns and castles of the Uckermark, and whose collection the margrave Jost entrusted to the Prince Swantibor I." In addition, the princes of West Pomerania were to receive 2,000 Rhine guilders towards the redemption of Boitzenburg and Zehdenick from their pledge.[103] Prince Bogislaw VIII was to resolve the remaining disagreements as a superior judge (*ein overman*). Both sides were also to release captives, and Hohenzollern was to pardon his subjects who had paid tribute to the Griffins. In the longer term, the conflict was to be settled by Sigismund of Luxembourg. The act of banishment he had imposed on Dukes Casimir V and Otto II was declared invalid "so far as the burgrave could dispose of it", and he "undertook with all fidelity to work with the emperor to have it annulled."[104]

Two debt documents dated December 1415 are to be associated with the repayment of the pledge sum for the Uckermark. The first was issued on 16 December 1415 by the councillors of Frankfurt on the Oder, Berlin and Cölln for the amount of 1,937.5 schock

101 CDB III/1, 76–77. According to Mario Müller, the Margrave Frederick I was again in the March of Brandenburg on 18 December 1415, see: Müller, "Chronologisches Überblick," 272.

102 LAG, Rep. 1 Kloster Pudagla, No. 154.

103 According to Kantzow, because "The princes of Wolgast had used it for a long time and, moreover, had done a lot of damage in the Marches – he [Frederick I – R. S.] was to give them only three thousand schock Prague groschen, and for Boitzenburg and Zehdenick only two thousand schock groschen." Georg Gaebel, ed. *Pomerania. Eine pommersche Chronik aus dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. I, 327–328; Quoted in: Kantzow, 501.

104 LAG, Rep. 2 Ducalia, No. 231a: *Verdracht tuschen den markgreff, den stetinschen und wolgastischen heren*; CDB continuatus I, 61–63; quoted in: Barthold, *Geschichte*, vol. 4, 24–27; Kirchner, *Das Schloss*, 69; Schultze, *Die Mark*, vol. 3, 15. On 3 June 1417, Sigismund of Luxemburg accepts the Dukes of Stettin, Otto II and Casimir V, into his court service. See Kluge, *Verschuldete Könige*, 239, and note 746.

Bohemian groschen, the recipients of which were the dukes of Stettin Otto II and Casimir V.[105] On 23 December 1415, Margrave Frederick I pledged to Agnes, the widow of Wolgast, and the Dukes Wartislaw IX and Barnim VII (c. 1404–1449) to pay a pledge for the Uckermark in the amount of 2,537.5 schock Bohemian groschen.[106] In both cases, it was agreed that the obligations would be settled on two dates. Half of the sum was to be handed over by the nearest St Martin's Day (11 November), while the entire obligation was to be settled by the next Easter (19 April 1416). The Brandenburg side undertook to deliver the cash to the Dukes of Stettin to Stettin, and to the Dukes of Wolgast to Pasewalk or Alt Torgelow Castle.

At the beginning of 1416, both Boitzenburg Castle and Zehdenick Castle were already in the possession of the Burgrave Frederick VI of Hohenzollern. On 16 January 1416 Hasso von Bredow received from him the castle of Boitzenburg, together with the authority over the administrative unit in Uckermark (*vogty des ukerlandes*), for a period of one year from 2 February 1416. For this he was to be rewarded with 300 schock groschen from town taxes and rents collected in the territory.[107] It should be recalled that Hasso von Bredow was one of the guarantors of the treaty of 27 July 1414, concluded by Frederick VI with the representatives of the Duke of Wolgast, Wartislaw VIII, on the repayment of 400 schock Bohemian groschen for the redemption of the Uckermark from pledge.[108] On 18 January 1416, the castle of Zehdenick (*Slosz Zedenick*) and Heckelberg passed into the hands of Gerick von Holtzendorf as a pledge of 400 schock groschen. The agreement was to come into effect on 2 February 1416 and last for one year.[109]

Settlements with the Dukes of Stettin and Wolgast dragged certainly on until the end of 1416, and possibly even by the end of 1417. Not all documents relating to the payments have been retained. On 21 November 1416, Agnes, Duchess of Wolgast, scolded the Brandenburg Margrave Frederick I for receiving the pledge sum for the Uckermark. The Duchess received half of the amount agreed for the pledge of the Uckermark (*de helfte der penninghe van des ukerlandes wegen*) from the knights Jürgen von Kynseberghe, Hasso von Bredow, and the councillors of Prenzlau – Clawes Bolte, Zabel Myddewolde, Zabel Grybe. On behalf of Duchesse, the money was collected by the archdeacon of Tribsees Kurd Bonow, the administrator of Alt Torgelow castle, Hans of Neuenkirchen (*unse voget to deme olden torghelow*) and the court scribe Johann Lobeke. The document

105 CDB Suppl., 272.

106 CDB II/3, 245–246. The guarantors of the pledge were the Bishop of Lebus, Johann, Johannes von Torgow of Zossen, and the town councillors and mayors of Frankfurt on the Oder, Berlin and Cölln.

107 CDB I/7, 142–143.

108 Regesten, No. 440, 465.

109 CDB I/13, 137–138. From 12 September 1412, Gerick von Holtzendorff had Heckelberg, together with the higher court, as a fief from the Burgrave Frederick VI. See Regesten, No. 368a. Settlements of 400 schock groschen were to be made by the knight with the margrave in Prenzlau or Templin, should the burgrave wish to recover the said grants.

does not state what amount was specifically involved. Witnesses to the document were Kurd Bonow, Hans of Neuenkirchen, and the councillors of Pasewalk.[110] The interesting redemption sums are broken down somewhat differently in a document issued on 27 December 1416 by the knights of Barnim, Teltow and Havelland, and the councillors of Brandenburg, Spandau, Bernau and Mittenwalde. According to its wording, the Margrave of Brandenburg allocated the total amount of 4,437.5 schock groschen to redeem the Uckermark from the pledge. Of this sum, 1,900 schock groschen were allocated to the Dukes of Stettin, Otto II and Casimir V, and 2,537.5 schock groschen to Duchess Agnes of Wolgast and the Dukes Wartislaw IX and Barnim VII.[111] Princess Agnes was to receive the same amount as stipulated in the earlier agreement, while the amount for the Dukes of Stettin was 37.5 schock groschen less than agreed.

The aim of this article was to analyse the attitude of the Griffins toward the rule of the Burgrave of Nuremberg Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, in the March of Brandenburg between 1411 and 1416. During the period, the region underwent a political shift and a change in its topleadership: the Luxembourgers were replaced by a representative of the Hohenzollern family as Margrave and Elector of Brandenburg. A central issue at the time was the redeemption of the castles and towns of Zehdenick, Prenzlau, Strasburg and Boitzenburg in the Uckermark, which Margrave Jost had pledged to the Duke of Stettin, Swantibor I, no later than 1407. It remains unclear whether the Griffins were able to staff the subordinate castles and towns with their own officials. Instead, they demanded that the taxes collected from the burghers in Prenzlau be directed to their own treasury. With his rise to power, Frederick VI began efforts to redeem the aforementioned centres from pledge. This process was successful in Prenzlau, where the Wolgast dukes, who had previously ruled there, entered into a political alliance with Hohenzollern, resulting in the town passing into his hands. Strasburg even earlier followed under the rule of the new Brandenburg ruler. The Dukes of Stettin were initially reluctant to support Frederick VI's efforts and even confronted him militarily. Only when pressed by Sigismund of Luxembourg did they reach an agreement with the new Margrave of Brandenburg, culminating the redemption of the remaining mortgaged castles and towns – Boitzenburg and Zehdenick. The case of Pomeranian-Brandenburg relations also highlights the significant role of the social estates of West Pomerania in resolving internal disputes within the House of Griffins and shaping the regions's foreign policy.

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110 CDB I/21, 466–467.

111 CDB I/21, 467–468.

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SUMMARY

The aim of this article was to present the attitude of the Griffins towards the rule of the burgrave of Nuremberg, Frederick VI of Hohenzollern, in the Brandenburg March between 1411 and 1416. In 1250, Duke Barnim I gave up the Uckermark to the Margraves of Brandenburg. In the 14th century, the Griffins sought to regain control of the area, which they partly succeeded in the 50s–70s of that century. In the first decade of the 15th century, the Duke of Stettin Swantibor I took the castles and towns of Strasburg, Boitzenburg, Zehdenick and Prenzlau as a pledge from the Brandenburg Margrave Jost with the help of cousins of Wolgast. The Griffins of Stettin and Wolgast ruled there until 1414–1416, during which time Frederick VI of Hohenzollen ruled as governor of the Margraviate of Brandenburg on behalf of King Sigismund of Luxembourg and regained the above-mentioned centres. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of relations between the dukes of Western Pomerania and the rulers of the March of Brandenburg.

Gryfici wobec rządów Fryderyka VI von Hohenzollern w Marchii Brandenburskiej w latach 1411–1416. Sprawa zastawu Marchii Wkrzańskiej

Słowa kluczowe: Marchia Wkrzańska, Gryfici, Hohenzollernowie, średniowiecze

STRESZCZENIE

Celem niniejszego artykułu było przedstawienie stosunku Gryfitów do rządów burgrabiego norymberskiego Fryderyka VI von Hohenzollern w Marchii Brandenburskiej w latach 1411–1416. W 1250 r. książę Barnim I zrezygnował z Marchii Wkrzańskiej na rzecz margrabiów brandenburskich. W XIV w. Gryfici dążyli do odzyskania władzy nad tym obszarem, co częściowo udało im się w latach 50.–70 tego stulecia. W pierwszej dekadzie XV wieku książę szczeciński Świętobor I wziął przy pomocy swoich wołogoskich kuzynów zamki i miasta Strasburg, Boitzenburg, Zehdenick i Prenzlau w zastaw od margrabiego brandenburskiego Josta. Gryfici szczecińscy i wołogoscy panowali tam do lat 1414–1416. W tym czasie rządy namiestnicze w Marchii Brandenburskiej z ramienia króla rzymskiego Zygmunta Luksemburskiego sprawował Fryderyk VI Hohenzollern, który odzyskał wymienione ośrodki. Rozpoczął się wówczas nowy etap w dziejach relacji książąt Pomorza Zachodniego z władcami Marchii Brandenburskiej.

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Krzysztof Kuczyński
Faculty of History
University of Warsaw
k.kuczynski@uw.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-7512-6781

The Kapers of Augustus II Wettin in 1700–1701: Military and Political Significance in the Light of the Newest Research*

Keywords: Great Northern War (1700–1721), privateer, navy, Augustus II, Poland, Saxony, Livonia, the Baltic Sea

During the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795), Polish monarchs made several more or less successful attempts to establish naval forces. The complexities of the State's republican political system, coupled with relatively low income, the high autonomy of the coastal cities, and the hostile attitude of neighbouring states, made it difficult to secure a foundation for a regular royal navy, which in practice was only achieved by Sigismund III (reigned 1587–1632) and Ladislaus IV (1632–1647).[1] A decidedly less expensive and faster way to establish a naval force was to appoint kapers (as privateers[2] were typically called in the Baltic region). Privateering under Polish patronage began during the reign of Casimir IV Jagiellon (1447–1492) and reached its peak under Sigismund II Augustus (1548–1572). The last Polish monarch to issue

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1 Eugeniusz Koczorowski, *Flota Polska w latach 1587–1632* (Warszawa: Wyd. MON, 1973), 48, 55, 74–75; Kazimierz Lepszy, *Dzieje Floty Polskiej* (Gdańsk-Bydgoszcz-Szczecin: Instytut Bałtycki, 1946), 50–51, 61, 213, 223; Lucjan R. Lewitter, "Russia, Poland and the Baltic, 1697–1721," *Historical Journal* 11 (1968): 5–6.

2 The term *kapers* originates from Dutch and refers to privateers active in the Baltic and North Sea regions during the early modern period. These two terms (primarily referring to ships rather than sailors) will be used interchangeably in this article.

letters of marque was Augustus II Wettin. Some of the naval projects undertaken during his reign has already been documented in Polish and German historiography. Still little known, however, is the case at the beginning of the Great Northern War (summer 1700), when the king decided to appoint a small squadron of kapers to fight the Swedish freight in the Baltic. It took more than two centuries for the first modern research in this area to be carried out. It was initiated in 1960 by Przemysław Smolarek, who, in an article citing extracts from numerous Swedish and Danish archival documents, briefly outlined the genesis of the royal privateers and provided a framework for their activities.[3] However, he did not link their commission to the King's other maritime projects, as pioneering research on the subject was only then being undertaken and was not yet known to historians. It was only in the following years that articles by Johannes Kalisch, Józef Gierowski, and Bogusław Dybaś were published, delving deeper into various aspects of Augustus II's naval policy.[4] In the works of non-Polish historians, the problem is basically non-existent; it has been addressed only fragmentarily by Scandinavian researchers.[5]

Therefore, research into the history of the privateer squadron from 1700–1701 remains preliminary. In undertaking this study, it was necessary not only to review the findings of previous historians, but also to conduct extensive research in Swedish, Danish, and, above all, Saxon archives. A range of valuable information on the political context of the issue in question can be found primarily in the diplomatic correspondence of Sweden (Riksarkivet Stockholm: *Diplomatica Polonica*, *Diplomatica Danica*), Denmark (Rigsarkiv København: *Tyske kancelli*, *Udenrigske afdeling*) and Saxony (Hauptsaatsarchiv Dresden: *Geheimes Kabinett*), as well as in the archives of the Scandinavian navies (Riksarkivet Stockholm: *Flottans Arkiv*; Rigsarkivet Købehavn: *Admiralitetet /Søetaten*). Contemporary newspapers, as it turned out, with a vested

3 Przemysław Smolarek, "Próba zorganizowania floty kaperskiej w latach 1700–1701," *Studia i Materiały do dziejów Wielkopolski i Pomorza* 6 (1960): 327–353.

4 Johannes Kalisch, "Sächsisch-polnische Pläne zur Gründung einer See- und Handelskompanie am Ausgang des 17 Jh.," in: *Um die Polnische Krone: Sachsen und Polen während des Nordischen Krieges 1700–1721,* eds. Johannes Kalisch, Józef Gierowski (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1962), 45–69; Bogusław Dybaś, "Przyczynek do polityki morskiej Augusta II w pierwszych latach panowania," *Zapiski Historyczne* 55 (1990): 137–141; Józef Gierowski, "Problematyka bałtycka w polityce Augusta II Sasa," in: *Strefa bałtycka w XVI–XVIII w. Polityka, społeczeństwo, gospodarka. Ogólnopolska sesja naukowa zorganizowana z okazji 70-lecia urodzin Profesora Edmunda Cieślaka,* ed. Jerzy Trzoska (Gdańsk: Marpress, 1993), 51–62; Jerzy Trzoska, *Kaprzy króla Augusta Mocnego (1716–1721). Z problematyki morskiej czasów saskich* (Gdańsk: Wyd. Gdańskie, 1993); Krzysztof Kuczyński, "Kaprzy Augusta II Wettina w latach 1700–1701 w świetle nieznanych szwedzkich poloników wojennomorskich," *Zapiski Historyczne* 88 (2023): 5–23.

5 Einar Wendt et al., *Amiralitetskollegiets historia*, vol. 2: 1696–1803 (Malmö: Allhems förlag, 1974), 67, 69; Hannes Saarinen, *Danzig und Karl XII. im Nordischen Krieg* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1997), 44–45.

interest in the activities of the kapers in the Baltic, also provide valuable information.[6] The result of the research is this article. The aim is to recall the maritime venture of the king of Poland, Augustus II, in 1700–1701, and to depict the (hitherto widely unknown) establishment, operations and impact of the royal privateers on the early stages of the Great Northern War, with reference not only to the military but also to the political context.

Before the War, 1697–1699

From the beginning of his reign in Poland, Augustus II made numerous efforts to consolidate his position as king of Poland. He saw such an opportunity in regaining some of the formerly lost provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and making them a hereditary dominion of the House of Wettin. This would ensure that the Polish elites, eager to maintain their connections with the recovered province, would be compelled to elect Saxon princes as kings of Poland.[7] Augustus II initially pursued this policy within the framework of the Commonwealth's participation in the Holy League, inherited from John III Sobieski. In June 1698 he launched a military campaign aimed at capturing the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Already during the campaign, a meeting took place between Augustus II and the tsar of Russia, Peter the Great in Rawa Ruska. The tsar then proposed to the king an offensive alliance against Sweden, which was to result in a joint partition of its eastern provinces. Peter's intention was to gain access to the Baltic Sea, which would facilitate trade in Russian goods, hitherto exported via Archangelsk. Embracing the idea and forging the alliance with the tsar created an opportunity for Augustus II to conquer Livonia[8] and make it his own hereditary dominion. The alliance was joined by Christian V of Denmark, and upon his death, by his successor, Frederick IV. The Danes wanted to regain their lost sovereignty over the Duchy of Holstein, which was then a Swedish satellite. Of the alliance members, only Denmark had a strong navy capable of facing the Swedish fleet and was to cover the military activities of the other allies at sea.

6 The article uses the Gregorian calendar by default. In 1700, the Julian calendar (with a difference of 11 days back) was still used in some European countries, and in Sweden also the original Swedish calendar (10 days back). Accordingly, quoted documents are double dated where necessary. Individual newspaper publishers used various numbering systems. The article retains their original numbering, with non-Gregorian dates marked as [j.s.] for Julian, or [s.s.] for Swedish.

7 Jacek Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II i Rzeczpospolita. 1697–1706* (Kraków: Arcana, 2013), 112–115, 144–145.

8 Lost by the Commonwealth to Sweden because of the wars of the 1620s and ultimately as a result of the Treaty of Oliva, signed in 1660, see: Lewitter, "Russia, Poland," 3–4.

According to the seventh point of the alliance treaty concluded on 25 September 1699 between Saxony and Denmark, the king of Poland was to have two ships of the line, armed with 40–50 cannons and three frigates at his disposal in Riga (implicitly, in the event of its rapid capture) or in any Livonian port designated by him. The Danes also undertook to support sea transports to Livonia.[9]

It should be noted at this point that Augustus II himself, from the first years of his reign, also tried to activate maritime policy in Poland. A general declaration of the restitution of the King's and the Commonwealth's maritime rights on the Baltic Sea already appeared in his *Pacta Conventa*,[10] while in a memorial entitled *How to transform Poland into a prosperous country enjoying the respect of its neighbours*, drafted around 1697, he included demands for the construction of seaports and a strong fleet.[11] In the spring of 1698, Johann Friedrich von Thilow proposed the establishment of a maritime trade company in Poland, aiming to engage in European and colonial trade. The plan was to gain a foothold on the Black Sea coast, thereby making the Commonwealth a key trade route to the Middle East. Warships under the Polish royal flag would protect the company's vessels, with management by a newly established admiralty. Despite the support of Augustus II' court, the project collapsed due to the signing of the Peace of Karlovitz in January 1699, which undermined its eastern prospects, and the poor response from western European investors. Nevertheless, the King endeavoured to establish a small navy. Such a postulate was passed in 1699 at the general assembly (sejmik) of Royal Prussia, on the initiative of people associated with the court: Voivode of Malbork, Jan J. Przebendowski and Standard-Bearer Piotr E. Kczewski. However, the Sejm of 1699 did not engage in debate on this proposal. In fact, the Council of the City of Gdańsk reacted with considerable hostility to the plans, perceiving them as a threat to the security of its interests. However, on the king's orders, the revitalisation of the port of Palanga (located on the coast of Samogitia) was undertaken, which also served as a justification for the concentration of Saxon troops in Lithuania.[12]

9 For the Treaty of Dresden (Saxon-Danish) of 25 September 1699, and the Treaty of Préobrazhenskoye (Russian-Saxon) of 21 November 1699, see: Carl Hallendorff, ed., *Handlingar angående konung August den starkes utrikespolitik före hans afsättning* år *1704*, in: *Historiska Handlingar*, vol. 19, part 2 (Stockholm: Kungliga Boktryckeriet, 1908), 80–86, 97–101.

10 Text of Augustus II's *Pacta conventa* in: *Volumina Legum*, vol. 6 (Petersburg: nakładem i drukiem Jozafata Ohryzki, 1860), 23.

11 Augustus II, *Umb Pohlen in Flor und in Ansehung gegen seine nachbaren zu sehzen*, in: Stanisław Piotrowicz, "Przyczynek do charakterystyki Augusta II," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 26 (1912), 83–87. The political plans of August II were discussed by: Jacek Staszewski, *"Jak Polskę przemienić w kraj kwitnący…," Szkice i studia z czasów saskich* (Olsztyn: OBN, 1997), 69–95.

12 Kalisch, "Sächsisch-polnische Pläne," 51–54, 63–65, passim; Dybaś, "Przyczynek," 138–140; Idem, *Sejm Pacyfikacyjny 1699* (Toruń: TNT, 1991), 194–195.

The Beginning of the War and the Establishment of the Privateers

The establishment of privateers by Augustus II in the summer of 1700, was the outcome of events at the outset of the Great Northern War, which, contrary to the plans of the anti-Swedish coalition members, proved entirely unfortunate for them. In March 1700, the Danish army, advancing south, was halted at Tönning. Charles XII of Sweden, backed at sea by the guarantors of Holstein's independence, England and the Netherlands, received considerable naval support when a squadron of twenty-four warships under Admirals George Rooke and Philips van Almonde was dispatched to the Baltic. The Swedish fleet under admiral Hans Wachtmeister, working in coordination with the Anglo-Dutch squadron, effectively neutralised the Danish navy by blocking it at the Sound. Following this, the Swedish army landed on Zealand and advanced towards Copenhagen, which was left almost defenceless. King Frederick IV was compelled to sue for peace, which resulted in the Treaty of Travendal, signed on 18 August 1700. The guarantees given to the treaty by England and the Netherlands prohibited Frederick IV from supporting his former allies. Meanwhile, Augustus II's plans to swiftly capture Riga in February also faltered. Instead of a quick victory, the Saxon army found itself besieging the city, managing only to capture the fort of Kobron on 14 February 1700 and the fortress of Dünamünde (vainly renamed *Augustusburg*) a month later. But without the support of the Tsar, who delayed his entry the conflict until the conclusion of Russia's ongoing war with Turkey, there was little hope of quickly concluding the campaign. Augustus II, who did not achieve any spectacular success, could not count on official support from Poland either. Waging war against Sweden, he acted as Saxon elector, though he officially held the highest title of the king of Poland. He deployed both the Saxon army and Polish volunteers, but in May 1700 the Senate of the Commonwealth categorically refused to officially involve the state in the war.[13]

In this situation, the Saxon army in Livonia found itself in a difficult position, strongly dependent on seaborne supplies (particularly heavy artillery), which were to be sent between Gdańsk and Palanga (or Memel) and then overland to Riga. The route began to be used as early as in 1699 and, in accordance with the Saxon-Danish alliance, Danish ships were to secure it. By April 1700, however, these had still not arrived, while it was reported from Dünamünde that several Swedish kapers had appeared in the roadstead of Riga.[14]

13 Jørgen H. Barfod, *Niels Juels Flåde* (Copenhagen: B. Thorgils, 1997), 117–124 passim; Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I*, 216, 244, 253–254. The legal fiction that Poland did not participate in the conflict (even though Swedish troops had been marching through it since 1702) was maintained until 1704, when a Polish-Russian offensive treaty was signed in Narva. See: Ibidem, 461.

14 Sächsisches Staatsarchiv–Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden (hereinafter HStAD), Geheimes Kabinett (hereinafter GeKa), loc. 3610/01, fol. 119, Arnold O. Paykull to prince Ferdinand Kettler, Dünamünde, 12 April 1700.

This prompted the Saxons to intensify their diplomatic issues. In early May 1700, Balthazar Heinrich von Nischwitz, a Saxon diplomat, arrived in Copenhagen with the objective of accelerating the dispatch of the requested ships. The mission proved successful, and three Danish frigates set course on 9 May for Elbląg and Gdańsk, from where they were to escort ships with supplies for the Saxon army.[15] Nischwitz's exact instructions are not known, but it seems likely that he was also ordered to investigate the possibility of enlisting captains-shipowners directly into the service of the king of Poland as privateers.[16] Difficulties in cooperation at sea, alongside with news from Livonia must have prompted the royal entourage to dust off the idea of creating the king's own naval forces, and thus become independent of Danish assistance. Indeed, as early as in mid-May, both Nischwitz and the Saxon resident in Copenhagen, Johann de Schade,[17] began to report to their superiors that the first captains (Musman and Jens Jenssen) had volunteered to privateer against the Swedes and asked for further instructions on the matter.[18] Significantly, these activities were not cancelled after the dispatch of the Danish frigates, which arrived at Dünamünde on 18 June 1700.[19] Regardless, Augustus II approved the recruitment of privateers and assured Nischwitz of the imminent issuance of letters of marque. In a report dated 8 July, the diplomat advised the King not to delay, stressing that even more volunteers had emerged.[20] This indicates that the kapers were intended primarily to counter Swedish shipping, rather than for convoy escort. This had already been provided by Danish frigates, which, however, returned to Denmark at the end of July due to the increasingly difficult situation in the Sound. This put a question mark over further Saxon-Danish cooperation at sea, which soon after the conclusion of the Swedish-Danish

15 Rigsarkivet København (hereinafter RK), Admiralitets- og Kommissariatskollegiet, Admiralitetet, Generalkopibog, package no. 247, fols. 1501–1502, Adm. Jens Juel's orders to Capt. Daniel Wilster, commanding frigate "Hejren," 7 May 1700.

16 It is not known exactly who came up with this idea. Saxon General and Augustus II's favourite Jacob Heinrich von Flemming's later claims (recorded in his memoires dated 1706), that such a move was suggested by Antoine Moreau (Polish envoy in Copenhagen from 11 August 1700) after the Treaty of Travendal, are not supported by the sources accessed. See: Jacob H. Flemming, *Mémoires concernant l'élection d'Auguste II pour roi de Pologne et les débuts de la guerre du Nord (1696–1702),* ed. Urszula Kosińska (Warszawa: Neriton 2017), 211–212. A similar dating of the origins of recruitment was also erroneously adopted by: Smolarek, "Próba," 334. See: Ludwig Bittner, Lothar Gross, eds., *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder sett dem Westfälischen Frieden 1648,* vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1936), 414.

17 Bittner, Gross, *Repertorium*, 451.

18 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 2704/02, fol. 12v, Schade to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 11 May 1700; HStAD, GeKa, loc. 3610/01, fol. 422v, Nischwitz to Augustus II, Copenhagen, 15 May 1700.

19 RK, Generalkommissariatet (Søetaten), V. Skibsjournaler, package no. 24A– 25D, [no pagination], Logbook of the „Hejren" frigate, entries of 9 May 1700, 10, 18 June 1700, 27 July 1700. According to the logbook, the frigates did not call at Memel or Palanga but continued on as far as Dünamünde. See: Barfod, *Niels Juels,* 118.

20 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 3610/02, fol. 207, Nischwitz to Augustus II, Rednsburg, 8 July 1700.

peace became definitively impossible. Having gained operational freedom, the Swedes began moving their troops across the sea to Livonia. With their domination of the Baltic, continuing to send convoys for the Saxons became very risky.

However, the King did not wait for the situation to develop. On 15 August 1700, even before the news of the Treaty of Travendal reached Riga,[21] Augustus II officially authorized the establishment of his own privateers through a special letters patent. By virtue of the document, they were entitled to attack any Swedish subjects at sea and bring their prizes into the harbours of Courland[22] or any others within the king of Poland realm. The letters patent also entrusted the organisation of the flotilla to Johann de Schade, granting him full authority and royal patronage to all his activities concerning the matter.[23] The documents, issued to every recruited captain, were not yet proper letters of marque. These were to be issued by Schade, who, after the conclusion of Nischwitz's mission and his departure from Copenhagen in late July 1700, became the main organiser of the flotilla. The role proved difficult, as the resident acted through official channels under the authority of the then head of Saxon foreign policy, Chancellor Wolf Dietrich von Beichlingen. Lacking precise guidelines for recruitment, in late August and early September 1700, Schade continually asked the chancellor for them.[24] It seems that he received proper instructions only on 21 September, when August Wygand, another Saxon diplomat with whom he was to collaborate, came to Copenhagen from Hamburg.[25]

From this point onwards, the organisation of the kapers gathered pace. Wygand was soon reporting to Beichlingen on the details of contracts made with the captains, while Schade mentioned a total of "four or five" ships preparing to go to sea at the end of September 1700.[26] Letters of marque issued by Schade to volunteer captains generally repeated the content of the royal letters patent of 15 August 1700, but included a few new details: a commitment by the captain not to attack neutral ships and not to take any booty until it had been confirmed by royal officials as legitimately captured.[27] The king's share

21 On 29 August 1700, see: Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I*, 209.

22 The Duchy of Courland was then a fief of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

23 Letters patent of Augustus II on the kapers' establishment, Saxon camp by Riga, 15 August 1700 – the copy in: Riksarkivet Stockholm (hereinafter RS), Diplomatica Polonica (hereinafter DP), II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 19 March 1701. See: Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 11–13.

24 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 2704/02, fol. 26r, 46r, 50r, Schade to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 17 August 1700, 14 and 18 September 1700.

25 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 2704/02, fol. 51v, Schade to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 21 September 1700.

26 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 2704/02, fol. 53r, Schade to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 25 September 1700. HStAD, GeKa, loc. 2762/01, fol. 73, Wygand to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 28 September 1700.

27 Letter of marque issued by Schade to Cornelis Neuvell, Copenhagen, 19 October 1700 – the copy in: RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 19 May 1701. See: Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 11–13.

from the sale of the booty was set at 10%, with a further 5% allocated to Beichlingen and 2.5% each to the Schade and Wygand. Having received letter of marque, the captain had to pay a bail of 100 *Reichstaler*. He and his entire crew also had to take an oath of allegiance to the King of Poland, and obedience to the *See-Articul* (sea articles), consisting of thirty-one points and regulating the duties of sailors of all ranks.[28]

Despite these advances, a key issue remained unresolved: the establishment of prize officials in the ports, who would confirm the booty as legally seized and thereby enable its legal sale. The diplomats' repeated requests for this, made throughout October 1700, went unanswered by the Chancellor for a long time. They suggested establishing prize officials in the ports of Courland: Windau, Libau and Angern (present-day Ventspils, Liepāja, and Engure in Latvia), as well as in Dünamünde and Palanga. When Beichlingen finally appointed Johann Friedrich Bötticher, Saxon resident in Gdańsk, as prize officer, Schade and Wygand greeted this with concerns about the port's remoteness from the coast of Courland – the planned epicentre of privateering.[29] These problems were probably the reason for the further delay in entering the battle against Swedish shipping. Captain Cornelis Neuvell (former lieutenant in Danish navy),[30] commanding the frigate[31] "Postillion," was preparing to go to sea as early as the end of September, but in fact he received his letter of marque on 16 October 1700, and set sail from Copenhagen three days later.[32] Shortly afterwards (before 26 October), it was also issued to Captain Abbe Seribs commanding the ship "Fliegender Wolf," who planned to sail from Lübeck after equipping himself there. The next two ships were also preparing to set sail.[33] In the autumn of 1700, a separate project for commissioning privateers was also developed by Polish General Michał Brandt, likely unaware of the measures already undertaken by Augustus II.

28 They drew on the established customary maritime law of the era, but some of the provisions of the articles sounded identical to the naval articles of the earlier kaper fleet of Sigismund II Augustus and the royal navy of Sigismund III. The resemblance was most likely unintentional. See: Stanisław Bodniak, "Polska a Bałtyk za ostatniego Jagiellona," *Pamiętnik Biblioteki Kórnickiej* 3 (1946): 131–132; Koczorowski, *Flota Polska*, 98–102.

29 HStAD, GeKa, Loc. 2762/01, fo. 81v, Wygand to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 30 October 1700. See: Bittner, Gross, *Repertorium*, 451.

30 RK, Admiralitets- og Kommissariatskollegiet, Admiralitetet, Generalkopibog, package no. 247, fol. 1591, Cornelis Neuvell's dismissal from service by the Admiralty, Copenhagen, 23 September 1700. The date of dismissal suggests that he most likely deliberately transferred to the service of the King of Poland.

31 Neuvell himself referred to his ship by this term, but her exact type remains uncertain, as the term *frigate* at the time could denote both light three-masted ships (e.g., French *Fregate Légère* or English 6th rates) and any agile corsair vessels, regardless of rig or armament. See: Nicolas Aubin, "Navire fregaté," in: Idem, *Dictionaire de Marine* (Amsterdam: P. Brunel, 1702), 578; Krzysztof Gerlach, *Historia Fregat żaglowych* (Gdańsk–Warszawa–Józefów: ACAD, 2019), 164.

32 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 3610/01, fol. 288, Schade to Beichlingen, 19 October 1700.

33 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 3610/01, fols. 280–286v, Schade to Beichlingen, 16 October 1700. HStAD, GeKa, loc. 2704/02, fol. 69, Schade to Beichlingen, Copenhagen, 26 October 1700.

The undated project assumed privateering not primarily in the Baltic Sea (as controlled by the kings of Denmark and Sweden), but rather in the North Sea, with guarantees of the inviolability of royal privateers being obtained from England, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal. Brandt also proposed the implementation of one of two variants: the voluntary recruitment of 10–30 captains with ships, or the direct king's purchase of only four frigates, but heavily armed and manned by a crew of 120 each.[34] Therefore, his project was somewhat tardy, although it is possible that some of Brandt's suggestions were considered.

The five-month interval between the initial idea of establishing the kaper flotilla and its implementation – from May to October 1700 – may seem long at first glance. However, considering the official procedures, the lengthy mail route between Copenhagen, Warsaw, and Riga, as well as the time needed to prepare ships and recruit crews, the delay appears quite explainable. By contemporary standards, it was conducted relatively swiftly. Nevertheless, the kapers began cruising in autumn, just as the Baltic storm season was starting. Furthermore, the onset of winter was imminent, bringing with it the freezing of ports.

Activity of the Polish Royal Kapers

The first privateering action took place on 5 November 1700, when a Swedish skipper Ewout Hillebrantz, sailing his ship "3 Salmen" from Stockholm to Amsterdam, was passing Bornholm from the north. There he encountered a small frigate, approaching under the Swedish merchant flag and two pennants – red on the fore topmast, and blue on the main topmast. This aroused distrust in Hillebrantz, who raised his colours. In response, the frigate lowered the Swedish flag and raised a *bloody flag* depicting an arm wielding a sabre. Realising he was dealing with a kaper, Swedish skipper began to flee. The frigate set off in pursuit, which lasted until two o'clock in the afternoon. Her crew tried to board the Swedish ship several times, but only one of them succeeded. Seeing himself abandoned, the sailor surrendered to the Swedes. Hillebrantz eventually escaped pursuit and reached Elsinore, where he reported the attack

34 Archiwum Państwowe w Łodzi, Zbiór Bartoszewiczów, no. 69, fol. 6, Michał Brandt, Project wie Ihro Mayst. von Pohlen Schiffe unter dero Flaggen im Baltischen Meer haben Könten [undated]. The only clue to the dating of the Project is the mention of "congratulations on the crown to the King of Prussia." The coronation of Frederick William was not approved by Emperor Leopold I until 16 November 1700. Therefore, I believe that the project could not have been submitted to the Polish court before that date. See: Albert Waddington, *L'acquisition de la couronne royale de Prusse par les Hohenzollern* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1888), 140.

to the Swedish commissar Peter Barchman.[35] From the testimony of the captured sailor, the frigate in question proved to be Captain Neuvell's "Postillion." Barchman immediately passed the news on to his superiors as well as to the Swedish envoy in Denmark, Anders Leijonkloo, who, in his own report to Charles XII, promised to investigate the matter.[36] The incident received wide coverage in the European press. The "Oprechte Haerlemsche Courant," mentioned that the frigate was in "Saxon or Polish service"[37]; English newspapers described the episode in similar terms. The "Leipziger Post- und Ordinar-Zeitung" claimed that the Polish kaper pursued the Swedes "as far as the coast of Rügen,"[38] while the Swedish "Ordinarie Stockholmiske Post Tijdender" provided the most detailed description of the flag, depicting "an arm wielding a sword on a red background."[39] The failure did not discourage Captain Neuvell, who achieved his first success on 9 November 1700, when he captured the Swedish smack "Jung Frau Elizabeth" from Stockholm. The ship was then manned with a skeleton crew under the command of Barents Thomsen and sent back to Gdańsk.[40] Neuvell released the captured smack's crew members on Bornholm, issuing them with a document confirming the capture of their ship.[41] It is likely that the action was also mentioned by "Wochentliche Post-Zeitung" of Braunschweig, which in a communiqué of 13 November 1700 claimed that unknown Polish kaper "had captured another Swedish ship laden with copper."[42]

35 Ewout Hillebrantz's account of a meeting with a Polish kaper, Elsinore, 9 November 1700, copy in: RS, Flottans Arkiv, Flottans centrala ledning, Amiralitetskollegium, kansliet 1630–1807 (hereinafter FFA), E II b, vol. 5, fol. 56–57v, Kanslikollegium to adm. Hans Wachtmeister, Stockholm, 7/17 November 1700.

36 RS, Diplomatica Danica (hereinafter DD), 3 a, vol. 437, [no pagination], Barchman to Charles XII, Elsinore 12 November 1700. RS, DD, 1, 13, vol. 110, fol. 341–341v. Leijonkloo to Charles XII, Copenhagen, 16 November 1700. The envoy noted that Capt. Neuvell's ship carried a crew of 32 and four cannons, though most newspapers and later Swedish reports indicated her armament as eight.

37 "[H]et Kapertje te Coppenhage gehuurt was en met Poolsse of Saxise Commissie voer." *Oprechte Haerlemsche Courant* 46 (1700), 16 November 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011227879.

38 *The London Post* 225 (1700), 11–13 November [j.s.] 1700; *The English Post* 13 (1700), 8–11 November [j.s.] 1700. *Leipziger Post- und Ordinar-Zeitung*, 3/45 (1700), accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1527456.

39 "[E]n röd Flagga hwaruti en Arm med et i handen hållande Swård." *Ordinarie Stockholmiske Post Tijdender* 46 (1700), 12 November [s.s.] 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://tidningar.kb.se/k3wbsnpw1h0br7p.

40 RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 19 March 1701.

41 RS, Riksarkivets ämnessamlingar. Militaria, (hereinafter RM), 4, vol. M 1858, Om den polsk kapare, [no pagination], Cornelis Neuvell's pass for the crew of "Jung Frau Elizabeth," on the frigate "Postillion," 14 November 1700 (copy) ; RS, DD, 1, 13, vol. 110, fol. 355v. Leijonkloo to Charles XII, Copenhagen,4 December 1700.

42 "[E]in ander Schwedisches Fahrzeug aber mit Kupffer beladen soll aufgebracht sein." *Wochentliche Post-Zeitung (Wöchentlicher Mercurius zur Ordinai Post-Zeitung)* 46 (1700), accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1149726.

Neuvell kept cruising in the southwestern Baltic, reaching the port of Prestø[43] before the end of November. Subsequently, as the "Amsterdamse Courant" reported, the "Polish privateer «Postillion»" sailed from there on the pretext of "searching for negroes in the West Indies" [sic!] and, on 3 December 1700, captured the galliot of skipper Michael Levestael bound for Stralsund.[44]

What is intriguing in the above accounts is the appearance of the flag used by the privateers. Schade and Wygand in their correspondence to superiors never proposed its specific design, which indicates that the vexillum was imposed by the king. The sign of a sword-armed hand on a red background, known as the *bloody flag*, appeared on Polish warships as early as the 1620s, functioning as a naval battle jack similar to those used by other fleets of the time (e.g. Dutch or Swedish).[45] Seven years prior to the events discussed here, Pieter Mortier published an atlas of nautical charts, where, for unknown reasons, he described the *bloody flag* as the Polish royal flag.[46] It remains unclear whether Augustus II, in equipping his privateers with this flag, used the existing design from the atlas or whether he intended to evoke the tradition of the Polish royal navy. Nevertheless, now it was clearly treated as a sign of political affiliation, not only as a battle jack or as a "no quarter" signal customarily displayed by corsairs of the time in the event of resistance by a pursued ship.[47] It should also be noted that sources continually referred to the privateers of Augustus II as Polish (or less frequently as Saxon), despite the fact that none of the captains or crewmen were likely to be ethnic Poles (or Saxons). This was an obvious mental shortcut, indicating primarily political affiliation – the privateers remained in the service of the king of Poland and operated under his royal flag. The ethnic affiliations of the crews, which – as usually in the era – consisted of a mixture of several nationalities, were not relevant here.[48]

43 Town on the east coast of Zealand, located in the bay of Prestøfjord.

44 "[E]en Poolsche kaper de Postillion, gemonteerd met 8 stukken, 4 bassen, en 30 man (die van Brestog (…) was uytgeloopen, ondet voorwendsel van in West-Indien op de Negers te kruisen) het galiot van Schipper Michiel Levestael (…) haest genomen." *Amsterdamse Courant* 151 (1700), 18 December 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMSAA06:165528151. This was the sole occasion any of said newspapers mentioned the Polish privateer by name.

45 The Polish naval ensign of the time depicted a white eagle on a red background. Marian Huflejt, *Bitwa pod Oliwą 1627: Fakty i Mity* (Olsztyn: Mantis, 2019), 108–110.

46 Pieter Mortier, *Le Neptune françois, ou Atlas nouveau des cartes marines* (Amsterdam: Mortier, 1693), Feuille de Pavillons no. 9.

47 Benerson Little, *The sea rover's practice: pirate tactics and techniques, 1630–1730* (Washington: Potomac, 2005), 112–113.

48 The Saxon archives preserve no official data (e.g. muster rolls) identifying the nationality of crewmen. Sparse Swedish records indicate Danish-Norwegian, Hamburger, Ingrian, Dutch, or even Latvian origins only for certain sailors. There is no evidence as to whether already experienced privateers were among them, although this seems probable.

Another action by an anonymous Polish kaper also received wide attention and was described in the most detail by the "Oprechte Haerlemsche Courant" of 30 November 1700. The newspaper, in a communiqué of 29 November from Amsterdam, relayed news from Königsberg, where a merchant going from Lübeck called in. The skipper reported that near Bornholm, they encountered a small ship (*dubbelde Boot*[49]), manned by forty men, armed with four cannons and several swivel guns. She approached the Lübeckers and forced them to stop. The privateer captain removed the Lübeck skipper from his vessel, trampling the imperial passports that were presented to him, and subsequently ordered his men to loot the ship. The Lübeck crew, however, resisted, and a fight ensued during which the privateers killed the ship's boy. After this incident, they retreated and allowed the Lübeck skipper to sail on. He testified that the kaper carried a "red flag with a golden sword," and that "he saw two more of such ships."[50] It is difficult to ascertain what exactly prompted the privateer to intercept a vessel flying a neutral flag, which, after all, was not allowed according to the stipulations in the letters of marque and equalled piracy. Moreover, the vessel's documentation should have dispelled any suspicion of links with Sweden. The ship's boy thus appears to have been the first (most likely unintended) verified casualty of the Polish privateers.

The unluckiest was to be Captain Seribs, partly due to his own recklessness. Upon arriving in Lübeck, he purchased four cannons along with ammunition, small arms, and food supplies, loaded them onto an old punt and sailed down the Elbe to Travemunde, where his ship was to await him. At the time, Seribs also became acquainted with a Dutch merchant, Stoffel Heneckes, to whom he not only secretly confessed that he was a privateer, but even displayed the weapons and supplies he had purchased, together with the "red Polish flags," one of which depicted "white hand wielding a sabre." Almost immediately after Seribs set sail on 16 November 1700, the aforementioned Dutchman reported all he had witnessed to the Lübeck authorities, who in turn alerted nearby Wismar (then part of Swedish Pomerania).[51] The news caused a great stir,

49 The term used by Dutch publisher appears to derive from the French *Double Chaloupe* – small, deckless, lightly or unarmed, two-masted vessel used for corsair and liaison tasks. The latter term was also occasionally applied to somewhat larger, fully weather-decked, two-masted vessels carrying several light carriage guns, known as *Barque Longue*. The ship's armament suggests that she belonged to the latter type. In the Netherlands both types were also collectively referred to as *Snauw* (ang. Snow). See: Walter Debrock, "Het Vlaamse kapersschip der 17de eeuw: de Snauw," *Mededelingen van de Marine Academie van België* 11 (1958–1959), 17–18; Jean Boudriot, *Historique de la corvette La Créole, 1827: Monographie* (Paris: Ancre, 1990), 6, 12–15.

50 "De Lubecker verhaelde verdet, dat dit Kapertje een roode Vlag met een vergulde Swaert voerde (…) Hy had noch 2 diergelijcke Kapertjes gesien." *Oprechte Haerlemsche Courant* 48 (1700), 30 November 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011227886; *The English Post* 19 (1700), 22–25 November [j.s.] 1700; *The London Post* 230 (1700), 25–27 November [j.s.] 1700.

51 RS, FFA, E II c, vol. 22, fol. 603–605, Niels Stromberg to Swedish Amiralitetskollegium, Stralsund, 22 November 1700.

and some of the vessels bound for Norrköping and to other Swedish ports did not dare put to sea.[52] The governor od Wismar, Bernhard von Liewen, dispatched a ship with a strong detachment of soldiers to search for and destroy the "Polish privateer." On 25 November, the Swedes finally located the "Fliegender Wolf" anchored off the shore of Fehmarn.[53] They approached and launched a surprise attack, killing two crew members with the first broadside and then bombarding her deck with grenades. During the fight with the enemy boarding his ship, Captain Seribs shot one of the Swedes in the arm but, after being wounded by two others, he jumped in desperation into the hold to set fire to the powder magazine. However, the ship, torn apart by grenades, had already begun to go down, so the Swedes tried to take their own wounded and anything else they could get in their hands. Seribs lost his life in combat and went down with the ship, along with four of his crew. The Swedes took 13 prisoners, together with the "great Polish flag" and pennants as a trophy. The entire clash was said to last no longer than half an hour and was described in detail by "Hamburger Relations-Courier" of 2 December 1700.[54] Only the "Leipziger Post- und Ordinar-Zeitung" provided information about Captain Seribs (not mentioning him by name though), suggesting he was a citizen of Altona and a successful privateer during the Nine Years' War.[55] The captured crewmen (some of whom proved to be Hamburgers and Ingrians, as well as even former sailors of the Swedish navy) were taken to Wismar for interrogation. As the preserved protocol stated, they claimed they had boarded the ship unaware that she was a privateer, which they only discovered later. During a short cruise the captain had tried to intercept a Swedish ship sailing from Västervik, in which they did not want to assist and firmly opposed it. Some even accused him of being a scoundrel and an insane man.[56] There is no doubt that with these unprovable statements, the captured sailors were trying to save their endangered lives.

52 "[E]ine grosse Alteration unter denen Negotianten allhier enstanden, und einige nach Norköping und andern Schwedischen Plätzen seegelfertig liegende Schiffe, sich nicht getrauen abzugehen." *Stralsundischer Relations-Courier* 94 (1700), 22 November [s.s.] 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1164448.

53 The island off the northern coast of Rügen.

54 "Sie haben 13. Gefangene, nebst der grossen Polnischen Flagge, zween rechte wimpels (…) bekommen." *Hamburger Relations-Courier* 183 (1700), 2 December 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1276698. Reprinted in *Wochentliche Post-Zeitung ("Freytags-Ord: Beylage, zur Wöchentlichen Post-Zeitung)* 48 (1700), accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1149750.

55 "[W]elcher vor einigen Jahren, unter waehrenden Krieg zwischen Frankreich und Holland, auch auf Caperey gefahren, und damahls gute Beute gemacht." *Leipziger Post- und Ordinar-Zeitung* 3/48 (1700), accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1527486.

56 RS, Wismariensia, I, vol. 38, [no pagination], Relation aus dem Wismarischen General kriegsgericht Protocoll vom 24n Novemb. bis d. 3n Decemb. wegen das d. 25n November genommen Capers.

In the second half of November, the privateers headed towards the Bay of Gdańsk, which did not go unnoticed by the Swedish commissioner in Gdańsk, Per Cuypercrona. In his letter to Charles XII dated 24 November 1700, he reported the arrival of a ship armed with six cannons, four swivel guns and a crew of 40. Her captain, a Dane named Jan Tansen Huxbrie,[57] presented the royal Polish letter of marque to the Gdańsk magistrate, demanding permission to sell the captured Swedish prize he had brought there. As this was refused to him, he sent the prize to Puck, but anchored his ship near Hel,[58] because her draft was too deep. Cuypercrona added that he had received news from Elsinore about the passage to the Baltic Sea of two Dunkirk corsairs in Polish service.[59] In his subsequent relations, the Swedish commissioner reported that three more privateers, with another prize, actually arrived in the roadstead of Gdańsk.[60] Their arrival (two Dunkirkers, a Dutchman, the aforementioned Dane) was also reported in the "Hamburger Relations-Courier," and the "London Gazette." The latter noted that the magistrate of Gdańsk justified the ban on the sale of prizes by the absence of a state of war between the Commonwealth and Sweden.[61] Indeed, in a letter to its representative at the court of Warsaw, Laurentius Gereth, the city council ordered him to oppose the kapers' activity, out of concern for the safety of trade.[62] The city's attitude was noted with approval in Stockholm. Gdańsk, as the most powerful city in the Commonwealth, was well aware that it risked retaliation by Charles XII if it openly supported Augustus II's war effort. Its highly autonomous status, guaranteed by the old privileges of the Polish kings, coupled with an awareness of its crucial role in the Polish economy, enabled the city to effectively manoeuvre between the Polish and Swedish monarchs.[63] On 9 December 1700, another privateer reached the Polish shores (as Cuypercrona noted, armed with eight cannons and six swivel guns, manned by crew of 40). The ship turned out to be Captain Neuvell's "Postillion", which entered the Bay of Puck and anchored there for winter. The Swedish diplomat repeatedly urged his monarch to send several

57 Most likely the commissioner misspelled the name of Capt. Jens Jenssen, mentioned earlier.

58 Puck and Hel – ports located, respectively, at the end of the bay and at the tip of the peninsula of the same names.

59 RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 24 November 1700; report published by: Smolarek, "Próba," 344.

60 RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, 27 November 1700, 1 December 1700.

61 *Hamburger Relations-Courier* 185 (1700), 6 December 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1276702; *The London Gazette* 3658 (1700), 28 November – 2 December [j.s.] 1700, accessed 1 March 2025, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/3658/page/1.

62 Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, sygn. 300 R, Dd 18, fol. 506, City Council to Gereth, Gdańsk, 22 November 1700.

63 As a matter of fact, in July 1700, Augustus II had demanded from Gdańsk the expulsion of Cuypercrona – a demand that the city council resolutely opposed. Saarinen, *Danzig*, 20, 33–35.

frigates to block the corsairs' nest and recapture the Swedish vessels that had been brought there.[64]

The fact that the privateers sent their prizes to Puck indicates that, according to royal plans, this port was to become one of their bases. Puck harbour was also advantageous because the city did not have the extensive privileges that Gdańsk had and could not oppose the King's will to sell the prizes as strongly. It was separated from the Bay of Gdańsk by a strip of shallows that caused difficulties in navigation but theoretically could also protect against the approach of bigger enemy warships. Moreover, at the end of the year, General Brandt arrived there as a garrison commander, apparently also assuming tenancy of the Puck starostship. His arrival was undoubtedly connected to his earlier theoretical project. He promptly undertook the construction of coastal fortifications to protect the ships anchored nearby.[65] Privateering under Polish royal flag was soon to be halted by upcoming winter, during which the privateers managed to sell captured goods from the prizes in Puck.

The Counteraction of the Danes and Swedes: Legality Controversy

News of the presence of Polish privateers in the Baltic caused confusion and disrupted shipping. On 14 November 1700, a group of Swedish merchants, sent a memorandum to the Swedish board of trade in which they described the threat. In the ports of Skåne there were 15 to 20 ships, loaded especially with Swedish copper, whose destination was the ports of the Sound and northern Germany, where their skippers did not want to go except under convoy. They also presented the college with the (undoubtedly exaggerated) gloomy forecast: that the abundance of vessels carrying Swedish goods would attract numerous privateers, whose activities would lead to stagnation, if not the ruin, of Swedish trade in the coming years.[66] The Swedish Admiralty assigned several warships to convoy Swedish vessels and to seek and combat privateers, ordering that the latter be treated by throwing overboard in the same way as pirates. Orders to sub-commanders emphasised that Augustus II, "having no ports in Poland, had no right to send privateers

64 RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 11 and 15 December 1700; RS, FFA, E II c, vol. 25, fol. 144v–145, Cuypercrona to Wachtmeister, Gdańsk, 2 February 1701. In a previous article I stated incorrectly that only 3 privateers had arrived. The error was due to an over-interpretation of Cuypercrona's report of 1 December 1700. See: Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 14.

65 Smolarek, "Próba," 350. HStAD, GeKa, loc. 03611/01, fol. 266–269, Bötticher to Beichlingen, Gdańsk, 8 April 1701. The information about Gen. Brandt tenure the Puck starostship is not confirmed by Marek Wagner, *Słownik biograficzny oficerów polskich drugiej połowy XVII w.*, vol. 2 (Oświęcim: Napoleon V, 2014), 35–36.

66 RS, RM, vol. M 1858, Om den polsk kapare, [no pagination], Hendrick Siquet et al. to Kommerskollegium, 21 November/ 1 December 1700.

against the Swedes."[67] The Swedish argumentation was not new, as it had been employed for nearly half a century beforehand.[68] Sovereignty over the sea was a subject of intense debate in the early modern period. However, the concepts advanced by Hugo Grotius (*Mare Liberum*), William Welwod, and John Selden (*Mare Clausum*) were not merely abstract theoretical reflections but were tied to the interests of their respective states. By the early 18th century, Cornelis van Bijnkershoek's postulate was accepted: sovereignty extended as far as it was enforceable (then considered the range of a cannon shot). Although the Baltic region differed from the wide oceanic perspectives of the West, Sweden's approach stemmed from a similar pragmatic rationale: declaring the whole Baltic Sea a specific *Mare Clausum*, to which only two Scandinavian monarchs were entitled, enforceable by their strong navies (*Dominium Maris Baltici*).[69] Thus, the Swedish interpretation was undoubtedly intended also to discourage the Danes from supporting Augustus II's privateering venture; yet, even independently of this, it became a matter of concern for them.

Frederick IV initially did not believe the incoming reports of privateers (at least officially), but when they were confirmed, bound by the imposed peace, he categorically refused to have anything to do with such dangerous enterprise. On 16 November 1700, he ordered his envoy extraordinary in Warsaw, Adam F. Trampe, not only to dissuade the king of Poland from further promoting privateering, but also, if possible, to persuade him to cancel the issued letters of marque and recall privateers from the sea.[70] In response to the remonstrance presented by the envoy, Augustus II replied that the privateering was aimed solely against the Swedish crown and did not threaten anyone else. Furthermore, he justified it as fulfilling the oath he had sworn to the Commonwealth during the coronation. There was also the matter of prestige – the king of Poland emphasized his "rights to use the sea, on an equal footing with those of his neighbours," rejecting

67 RS, FFA, B I a, vol. 74, 1742–45, Amiralitetskollegium's orders to Capt. Grubb, Karlskrona, 22 November/ 12 December 1700; vol. 75, 425–427, Amiralitetskollegium's orders to Capt. Lewen. 26 March/ 4 April 1701. See: Wendt, *Amiralitetskollegiets historia*, 69.

68 Alleged plans to re-establish the Polish navy in 1654 and sporadic attacks by Polish privateer in 1658 provided Sweden with pretexts for wars against its neighbours in the following years. Wojciech Krawczuk, *Samuel Pufendorf and some stories of The Northern War 1655–1660* (Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 2014), 118.

69 Ibidem, 122; Richard J. Blakemore, "Law and the sea," in: *The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 1400–1800* (London – New York: Routlege, 2020), 256, 396–397; Martine J. van Ittersum, *Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595–1615* (Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2006), liv–lxi passim, 396; Lewitter, "Russia, Poland," 6. Such a policy, paired with the course of the Baltic borders in the second half of the 17th century, resulted in political and economic impairment for Brandenburg, Russia and Poland – in the case of the latter, often accompanied by actions that could be seen as breaches of the mutual agreements concluded earlier.

70 RK, Tyske Kancelli, Udenrigske afdeling (hereinafter TKUA), Polen: Adam Frederik Trampes gesandtskabsarkiv (1700–1702), package no. 71–53, [no pagination], Frederick IV to Trampe, Copenhagen, 13 November 1700; report published by: Smolarek, "Próba," 341.

the Danish demands. According to the Envoy's account, Augustus II was said to have as many as 15 privateers in the Baltic. Trampe, however, obtained a promise from Beichlingen that they would shortly be ordered to cease operations, under the pretext of the approaching winter.[71] On 20 November 1700, without waiting for the outcome of the negotiations, Danish monarch issued a universal edict forbidding his subjects, under threat of severe punishment, from enlisting aboard privateers cruising the Baltic.[72] The Danes indeed were not going to tolerate privateers' activities, and such a case occurred not long afterwards. On 17 December, an unknown Polish kaper brought the Swedish galliot "Maria" to Prestø, where it was seized; by royal decree of 25 December 1700 the vessel was then handed over to Leijonkloo, at his request.[73] In early January 1701, "The English Post" reported that Augustus II had indeed decided to recall his privateers from the Baltic, which, according to the newspaper's publisher, was supposed to herald an imminent truce between the warring parties. However, no agreement was reached, and "Wochentliche Post-Zeitung" in a communiqué of 2 April 1701 from Copenhagen reported on plans to send the kapers back to sea.[74] Then, however, the Swedish counter--attack took a turn for the worse.

On 4 April 1701, two Swedish frigates entered the Bay of Gdańsk, where their commander, Captain Heinrich von Lewen, sighted a lone Polish kaper accompanied by a prize. Unfamiliar with the local waters, Swedish commander dispatched two launches to secure the prize and capture the privateer. The ship in question proved to be the "Postillion," which greeted the approaching Swedes with gunfire, but realising their superiority, Captain Neuvell decided to retreat to Puck, where his ship ran aground near the harbour. Meanwhile, the Swedes seized the prize and pursued Neuvell, but as they approached Puck they were fired upon and repulsed by the local garrison, which came to the kaper's aid. The Swedish attack prompted an intervention at Cuypercrona by the Voivodes of Pomerania, Jan Gniński, and of Inowrocław, Franciszek Gałecki (present in Gdańsk at the time), who demanded that Poland – as a non-belligerent in the ongoing conflict – be spared from hostile actions. The commissioner promised to investigate the matter, but immediately afterwards the voivode

71 RK, TKUA, Polen: Gesandtskabsrelationer og -beretninger, til dels med bilag, fra gesandter, korrespondenter og andre (1645–1770), package no. 71–25, [no pagination], Trampe to Frederick IV, Warsaw, 2 December 1700, 10 December 1700, report published by: Smolarek, "Próba," 346–347.

72 Frederick IV's placat on privateering in the Baltic, Copenhagen, 20 November 1700, in: *Livonica Oder einiger Zu mehrer Erläuterung Der Mit Anfang des 1700. Jahrs in Liefland entstandenen Unruhe dienlicher Stücke und Actorum Publicorum, Fasciculus Quartus* (s.l.: s.n.), 71–72. See: Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 16.

73 RS, DD, 1, 13, vol. 110, 378–378 v, Frederick IV's decree regarding the galliot "Maria," 25 December 1700 (copy).

74 *Wochentliche Post-Zeitung (Freytags-Ord: Beylage, zur Wöchentlichen Post-Zeitung)* 15 (1701), accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1588959.

reported to him that the Swedes had also plundered the village of "Esther,"[75] which belonged to the Puck starostship. This particularly angered General Brandt, who demanded an explanation in an official letter to the commander of the Swedish squadron.[76] In response to the official Cuypercrona's inquiry, Captain von Lewen emphatically denied that he had plundered any coastal villages or fired on Polish shores, claiming that his ships were anchored at a distance from the town exceeding the range of cannon fire; he also asked what should be done with the privateer lying aground. The commissioner suggested not to escalate the conflict and break the peace in the face of the upcoming Sejm. In Cuypecrona's view, Lewen could have demanded that the garrison hand over the privateer or attempted to burn her, claiming that "what occurs at sea does not concern the Commonwealth."[77] Nonetheless, undaunted by failure, Captain Neuvell sought to refit the ship and set sail again. However, his efforts proved futile, as on 7 June 1701, the Swedes conducted a night attack using two launches under the Captain Peter Rosenwall, commanding the frigate "Postiljon" (note the coincidence of the Swedish and Polish ship names!).[78] Having confused the soldiers on shore – who mistook them for night fishermen – the Swedes managed to set fire to the "Postillion," which burned down to the waterline. As Bötticher reported, the ruined Captain Neuvell, wounded in the hand, decided to entrust himself to the mercy of Augustus II.[79]

However, this event did not end the activity of Polish royal privateers in the Baltic. One of the Charles XII's reasons for imposing a blockade of Courland was that the Courlanders tolerated bringing prizes into their harbours by Polish privateers – and presumably helped with sale.[80] "The English Post" of 2 June 1701 reported that one of the conditions for removing the blockade was to demand that the Courlanders forbid the privateers from entering the harbours.[81]

75 Most likely misspelled "Heisternest," today Jastarnia on the Hel Peninsula.

76 HStAD, GeKa, loc. 03611/01, fol. 266–269, Bötticher to Beichlingen, Gdańsk, 8 April 1701. RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 9 April 1701. *The London Post* 290 (1701), 11–14 April [j.s.] 1701.

77 RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 16 April 1701. *Stralsundischer Relations-Courier* 46 (1701), 6 June [s.s.] 1701, accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1430970: Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 17–18. Such an argumentation shows how far Sweden's claims to the Baltic Sea as its exclusive *Mare Clausum* extended – denying Poland military sovereignty even over its nearest coastal waters.

78 RS, DP, II, 5, vol. 256, [no pagination], Cuypercrona to Charles XII, Gdańsk, 23 April 1701; *Stralsundischer Relations-Courier* 49 (1701), 17 June [s.s.] 1701, accessed 1 March 2025, https://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/titleinfo/1430982; *Ordinarie Stockholmiske Post Tijdender* 26 (1701), 24 June [s.s.] 1701, accessed 1 March 2025, https://tidningar.kb.se/k3wbsnsw0bt2vdm.

79 HStAD, GeKa, Loc. 03611/01, fo. 307–308, Bötticher to Beichlingen, Gdańsk, 10 July 1701.

80 For the Swedish full reasons of the blockade. See: Daniel Schneider, ed., *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 16 (Franckfurt am Main: Anton Heinscheidt, 1717), 421–422; *The English Post* 95 (1701), 19–21 May [j.s.] 1701.

81 *The English Post* 101 (1701), 2–4 June [j.s.] 1701.

As it seems, one of the last active kapers surrendered to the Swedes in July 1701, when they blocked her on the Boulderaa River near the fortress of Dünamünde, taking 36 crewmen prisoner.[82] This event was likely reported in "The English Post" at the beginning of September, and it was the last communiqué on the activity of Augustus II's privateers in the Baltic that appeared in European newspapers.[83]

Conclusions

Privateering under the flag of king of Poland, which began in the autumn of 1700, did not yield spectacular results. This was due not only to the late start of operations, but above all to the small size of the kaper flotilla, which most probably did not exceed six ships (counting those confirmable by sources), two of which were destroyed by the Swedes and one captured. Their effectiveness was also unimpressive, with only a few captured prizes. Nevertheless, even the mere presence of privateers in the Baltic briefly paralysed Swedish freight, forcing the Swedes to protect it and to detach forces to counter them – which was beneficial for Augustus II's war effort. The Saxon-Polish court's propaganda, which exaggerated the size of the force in the Baltic, may have served a similar purpose.

In light of the above considerations, the aims of establishing a privateer flotilla seem clear: undermining the enemy's trade and transport potential. The latter aspect is indicated by the plan to make the harbours of Courland, located relatively close to Swedish communication routes, the main bases of privateers. However, it should be noted that the first steps to send the latter to sea were taken in mid-May 1700 – almost at the same time as the Senate of the Commonwealth refused Augustus II to engage the State in the war. Despite this, the kapers operated under a flag commonly identified as that of the king of Poland, not of the Saxon elector. This was probably due to prestige considerations and Augustus' ambitions to have his privateers use the vexillum associated with his highest title. They were also most often described as Polish, while the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not officially participate in the war. Assuming, therefore, that the initial rationale for the establishment of the privateer flotilla was military pragmatism, one must ask whether it did not also (or perhaps primarily) acquire political significance, being a royal attempt to drag Poland into the war. By drawing the wrath of the Swedes – particularly by challenging their claims to exclusive sovereignty over the Baltic – for the activities of ships under the (so called) Polish flag, the Commonwealth would eventually

82 Christian Kelch, *Liefländische Historia. Continuation 1690 bis 1707*, ed. Johannes Lossius (Dorpat: Schnakenburg's, 1875), 224.

83 "The King of Poland's Privateers near the Dunamunder Schans, have submitted to the Swedes." *The English Post* 142 (1701), 5–8 September [j.s.] 1701; Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 20.

be forced to participate in the conflict by the method of fait accompli, thus helping the unlucky Saxons in carrying its burden. Regardless of this hypothesis, it should be noted that, in Augustus II's political narrative, the flotilla at one point was presented as enforcement of the Polish king's – and thus also the Commonwealth's – justified claim to the *Dominium Maris Baltici*, which in this sole respect could be seen as aligned with the Polish interest. Nevertheless, it was the most successful and resilient naval venture of Augustus II's reign. Although he would later return to similar ideas, they either ended at the planning stage or never reached such a scale.[84]

It is also worth noting that even the short-lived activity of Polish royal privateers attracted the attention of publishers. The total number of reports in the above-mentioned newspapers exceeds fifty over ten months. Ironically, it was the first and last case in the early-modern era when military operations of ships flying the flag identified as Polish were so widely reported in the European press. A similar case did not occur until more than two centuries later, after 1918, when the independent Polish state was reborn, and the naval jack depicting the arm wielding a sword once again fluttered over the decks of Polish warships.

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84 Kuczyński, "Kaprzy," 20.

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SUMMARY

At the beginning of the Great Northern War, the Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, August II Wettin, established a privateer flotilla under his own flag, whose task was to combat Swedish shipping. The aim of this article is to show the reasons for its establishment, organization, military operations in the Baltic, and the influence it had on the early stage of the war. The study is based on the analysis of documents available mainly in the Riksarkivet in Stockholm, the Rigsarkivet in Copenhagen, and the Hauptsaatsarchiv in Dresden, as well as using reports from European press titles at the time. The presented research shows that the reasons for establishing privateers were problems in Danish-Saxon cooperation at sea. The organisation of the flotilla began in May 1700, yet the privateers did not appear in the Baltic until late October of that year. Their small number (most likely no more than 6 ships) resulted in low effectiveness; Only a few Swedish vessels were captured. However, this was enough to cause a short-term stagnation in Baltic shipping and provoke an armed response from the Swedes by engaging part of their fleet in fighting the kapers, who were finally pacified in July 1701. The circumstances of their establishment also prompt the question of to what extent the flotilla's activities had only a military basis, and to what extent they were political, calculated to draw the neutral Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into the conflict. The actions of the privateers, conducted under a flag identified as Polish, also found wide resonance in the European press, which was the first and last such case in the early modern era.

Kaprzy Augusta II Wettina w latach 1700–1701: znaczenie militarne i polityczne w świetle najnowszych badań

Słowa Kluczowe: Wielka Wojna Północna (1700–1721), korsarstwo, flota, August II, Polska, Saksonia, Inflanty, Morze Bałtyckie

STRESZCZENIE

Na początku wielkiej wojny Północnej Elektor Saski i król Polski August II Wettin, powołał flotyllę kaperską pod własną banderą, której zadaniem miało być zwalczanie szwedzkiego frachtu. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie przyczyn jej powołania, organizacja, działania militarne na Bałtyku oraz wpływ jaki wywarła na wczesny etap wojny. Opracowanie sporządzono na podstawie analizy dokumentów dostępnych głównie w Riksarkivet w Sztokholmie, Rigsarkivet w Kopenhadze oraz Hauptsaatsarchiv w Dreźnie, jak również wykorzystując doniesienia ówczesnych europejskich tytułów prasowych. Z przedstawionych badań wynika, że u przyczyn powołania kaprów leżały problemy w duńsko-saskiej kooperacji na morzu. Organizację flotylli rozpoczęto w maju 1700 r., jednak kaprowie pojawili się na Bałtyku dopiero pod koniec października. Ich niewielka liczebność (najprawdopodobniej nie więcej niż 6 okrętów) skutkowała niską skutecznością; zdołano przechwycić jedynie kilka szwedzkich statków. Wystarczyło to jednak do spowodowania krótkotrwałego zastoju w żegludze bałtyckiej i sprowokowania zbrojnej odpowiedzi Szwedów angażując część ich floty w zwalczanie kaprów, których spacyfikowano w lipcu 1701 r. Okoliczności ich powołania skłaniają również do pytania, na ile działalność flotylli miała jedynie podłoże militarne, a na ile polityczne, obliczone na wciągnięcie neutralnej Rzeczypospolitej do konfliktu na północy. Działania kaprów, prowadzone pod banderą identyfikowaną jako polska, odbiły się także szerokim echem w europejskiej prasie, co było pierwszym i ostatnim takim przypadkiem w epoce nowożytnej.

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Radosław Gaziński
Institute of History
University of Szczecin
radoslaw.gazinski@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-6734-9303

From the History of Prussian Naval Policy: Plans to Establish a Waterway on the Dziwna Strait and Build a Seaport near Kamień Pomorski in the 18th Century

Keywords: Prussia, maritime policy, waterway, Dziwna Strait, 18th century

The article explores the circumstances surrounding attempts in the 18th century to improve the navigability of the Dziwna Strait and to construct a seaport at its mouth. It examines the hydrological conditions of the strait as well as the projected costs of building the waterway, including labour and the materials necessary for the investment. The analysis also highlights the economic impracticality of the planned works, particularly in light of the already operational waterway on the Świna Strait.

In contemporary terms, maritime policy is understood as the deliberate and purposeful actions of a state aimed at securing its best possible position along coasts and seas. Among such actions, the most prominent are the organisation and maintenance of a naval, merchant, and fishing fleet; the construction of ports and naval bases; support for shipbuilding; the organisation and protection of national trade and shipping; and, finally, full control over the country's coastal territories. This understanding of maritime policy is not solely a modern concept.[1] It was similarly perceived in the early modern period, as exemplified by Poland's maritime policy *Dominium Maris Baltici* during the reign of King Sigismund II Augustus.[2] A comparable approach can be

1 Edward Włodarczyk, *Studia z dziejów pruskiej gospodarki i polityki morskiej w latach 1815–1939*, (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2020), 41–42, 45–46.

2 Wacław Odyniec, *Polskie dominium maris Baltici* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982), 245–250.

observed in Sweden's policy aimed at turning the Baltic Sea into an internal lake, as well as in Denmark's efforts to control Baltic trade, particularly through imposing tolls in the Øresund Strait.[3]

In this context, a fundamental question arises: did the Kingdom of Prussia pursue a maritime policy in the 18th century? In older historiography, the maritime inactivity of Frederick William I and Frederick II was often contrasted with the active approach of Elector Frederick William. Influenced by the mercantilist model of economic development and inspired by the economic success of the 17th-century Dutch Republic, Elector Frederick William believed that strengthening the Brandenburg-Prussian state required active engagement in maritime trade. Consequently, he supported the development of a merchant fleet, established a naval force, and even sought to acquire colonies in Africa, founding the African Company in Królewiec (Königsberg). During his reign, Brandenburg-Prussia pursued an active maritime and colonial policy.[4] Unfortunately, under his successors, Elector Frederick III and later King Frederick I, the naval fleet deteriorated. King Frederick William I deemed his predecessors' colonial policies an expensive "chimera," dissolved the African Company, and sold the rights to the already lost colonies to the Dutch. Given this historical context, can we speak of 18th-century Prussia as having a maritime policy? It seems that the economic model adopted by Prussian rulers in the 18th century, known as *Kameralismus* (a version of mercantilism adapted to Prussian conditions) necessitated maintaining a positive trade balance, which inevitably led to support for trade, including maritime commerce. Frederick William I, for instance, supported the development of fleets in Prussia's coastal cities through customs and tax policies that favoured maritime trade. His reign saw the modernisation of ports in Szczecin (Stettin), Kołobrzeg (Kolberg), and Królewiec. The king encouraged and even stimulated the establishment of trading companies by merchants in these coastal towns.[5] Moreover, Frederick William I engaged in persistent negotiations with Sweden to reduce excessive maritime tariffs imposed on Szczecin's trade via the Peene Strait.[6] When diplomacy failed, he took decisive action by initiating the construction of a new waterway through the Świna Strait to facilitate Szczecin's maritime trade.

3 Michael North, *Historia Bałtyku* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2018), 132–172.

4 Richard Schück, Paul Kayser, *Brandenburg-Preussens Kolonialpolitik unter dem Grossen Kurfürsten und seinen nachfolgern (1647–1721)* (Leipzig: FW Grunow, 1889); Otto Hintze, *Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk 1415–1915*, (reprint), (Hamburg-Berlin: Verlag Pau Parey, 1987), 244–246; Sebastian Haffner, *Prusy bez legendy. Zarys dziejów* (Warszawa: Oficyna Historii XIX i XX wieku, 1996), 31–32.

5 Karl Heinrich Kaufhold, "Leistungen und Grenzen der Staatswirtschaft," in: *Preussen. Politik, Kultur, Gesellschaft*, ed. Manfred Schlenke, vol. 1 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1986), 123–133; Hugo Rachel, "Der Merkantyllismus in Brandenburg-Preussen," in: *Moderne Preussische Geschichte 1648–194: Eine Antologie*, eds. Oskar Büsch, Wolfgan Neugebauer, vol. 2 (Berlin–New York: de Gruyter, 1981), 951–993.

6 Radosław Gaziński, "Z dziejów stosunków gospodarczych między Szwecją a Prusami. Spór o handel na Pianie i Świnie w latach 1720–1763," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 35 (1992), 1: 39–46.

His successor, Frederick II, continued these initiatives, completing the Świna waterway and building a seaport at its mouth, which gave rise to the town of Świnoujście (Swinemünde). Frederick II also supported the development of municipal fleets and encouraged the merchants of coastal towns to engage actively in maritime trade.[7] Prussia's maritime expansion was further facilitated by the establishment of trading companies and a network of consulates in key European ports.[8] However, due to financial constraints, Frederick II rejected the idea of building a naval fleet, considering its maintenance too costly. His priority remained the expansion of the land army, as he believed Prussia's great power status would be determined on land battlefields. This synthetic overview of the actions taken by 18th-century Prussian monarchs to support maritime trade, commerce, ports, and municipal fleets should be seen as the implementation of key elements of maritime policy.[9] Within this framework, efforts to create a waterway on the Dziwna Strait and to build another seaport at its mouth fit perfectly. Therefore, the core research questions that this article aims to address can be formulated as follows:

1. Who initiated the efforts to create a waterway on the Dziwna Strait, and when?
2. What was the planned course of this waterway?
3. What were the costs associated with its construction?
4. Was the proposed investment economically justified?

In both German and Polish historiography, there are virtually no publications addressing the 18th-century attempts to establish a waterway on the Dziwna Strait. This issue is overlooked in German monographs on Kamień Pomorski (Cammin in Pommern), such as those by Ludwig Kücken and Rudolf Spuhrmann.[10] Similarly, in the most recent monograph on the town, edited by Radosław Gaziński, the matter is dismissed in just a few sentences.[11] Maritime navigation on the Dziwna is also treated as insignificant in the sections on maritime trade found in monographs on Szczecin.[12] The situation is

7 Stanisław Salmonowicz, *Fryderyk II* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk- Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1985), 144–150; Bogdan Wachowiak, ed., *Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2010), 519–533.

8 Radosław Gaziński, *Handel morski Szczecina w latach 1720–1805* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe US, 2000), 251–255.

9 Radosław Gaziński, "Polityka morska Prus w XVIII wieku," in: *Instantia est mater doctrinae. Księga jubileuszowa prof. dr hab. Władysława Filipowiaka*, eds. Eugeniusz Wilgocki, et al. (Szczecin: "Recto," 2001), 387–394.

10 Ludwig Kücken, *Geschichte der Stadt Cammin in Pommern und Beiträge zur Geschichte des Camminer Dom-Capitels* (Cammin in Pommern: Gedruckt und Commission bei H. L. Behrendt in Cammin, 1880); Rudolf Spuhrmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Cammin in Pommern und des Camminer Domkapitels* (Cammin: Druck und Verlag von Formazin & Knauff, 1924).

11 Radosław Gaziński, "Kamień Pomorski w czasach nowożytnych (ok 1523-1806)," in: *Dzieje Kamienia Pomorskiego*, vol. 1: till the year 1945, ed. Radosław Gaziński (Wrocław: Chronicon, 2024), 304–305.

12 Martin Wehrmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Stettin* (Stettin: Verlag von Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1911); Jerzy Wiśniewski, "Początki układu kapitalistycznego 1713–1805," in: *Dzieje Szczecina wiek X–1805*, ed. Gerard Labuda (Warszawa-Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1985) or Tadeusz Białecki,

somewhat better in analytical works focusing specifically on Szczecin's maritime trade and the settlements along the Szczecin Lagoon in the 18th century, though even these do not provide information on the efforts to improve the navigability of the Dziwna Strait.[13] Moreover, neither German nor Polish historical studies on Pomerania,[14] nor works on 18th-century Prussia,[15] offer any insights into this subject. Given this lack of scholarly attention, the present article is highly source-based. Its primary foundation lies in archival materials preserved in the Secret Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem. These documents pertain to the plans for dredging the Dziwna Strait and opening it to maritime navigation. The Russian Company, established at that time in Szczecin, was particularly interested in a prospect of the new trade route. Additionally, the archival records address the proposal to build a new seaport in Dziwnów (Divenow) or to expand the small existing port in Kamień Pomorski (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbestz, Hauptabteilung II Generaldirektorium, Abt.12 Städteverwaltung, Stadt Cammin, nr 17 Instandsetzung des Hafens in Cammin 1772–1801).

The initial discussions regarding the creation of a waterway on the Dziwna Strait date back to 1720–1721 and 1728–1729. Following the failure of two rounds of negotiations with Sweden (1720–1722 and 1725–1729) concerning the excessive customs duties imposed on Prussian ships navigating to and from Szczecin through the Peene Strait (collected at the customs office in Wolgast), serious consideration was given in Berlin to the idea of establishing a new waterway. Two straits were under consideration: the Świna and the Dziwna. The Świna Strait's main drawback was a sandbank blocking its mouth, reducing the navigable depth to 1.5 metres. There was also a problem of the complexity of the backward delta on the northern part of the Szczecin Lagoon. The Dziwna Strait, on the other hand, was longer and passed through shallow waters of the Kamień Lagoon and the Wrzosowo Bay, squeezing through a narrow passage between two growing sandspits, one extending from the east near Dziwnów and the other from the west near Międzywodzie (Heidebrink). Given these challenges, there was even consideration of digging a canal through the island of Wolin, connecting Lake Wicko

Historia Szczecina. Zarys dziejów miasta od czasów najdawniejszych do 1980 r. (Warszawa–Wrocław–Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1992).

13 Henryk Lesiński, "Udział Kamienia i Wolina w żegludze i handlu morskim w XVI-XVIII wieku," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 24 (1981), 1: 17–25; Radosław Gaziński, "Handel morski małych portów Zalewu Szczecińskiego w XVIII wieku," *Nautologia* 32 (1997), 3–4: 7–13; eadem, *Handel morski.*

14 *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas, Pommern,* ed. Werner Buchholz, (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1999); Gerard Labuda, ed., *Historia Pomorza*, vol. 2: till the year 1815, part 3: *Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1648–1815*, comp. by Zygmunt Szultka, and Henryk Lesiński in cooperation with Dariusz Łukasiewicz, and Alfreda Wielopolskiego (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2003).

15 Otto Hintze, *Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk 1415–1915* (Hamburg-Berlin: Verlag Pau Parey, 1987) reprint; Stanisław Salmonowicz, *Prusy dzieje państwa i społeczeństwa* (Warszawa: "Książka i Wiedza," 1998); Wachowiak, *Prusy w dobie*; Christopher Clark, *Prusy. Powstanie i upadek 1600–1947* (Warszawa: Bellona, 2009).

Wielkie and Lake Wicko Małe to the customs inn located in what is now Międzyzdroje (Misdroy).[16] However, after inspections of both straits and the area proposed for the canal, as well as lengthy discussions and financial calculations, which were of great importance to Frederick William I, it was ultimately decided that the best solution would be to establish a new waterway on the Świna Strait. The first, albeit unsuccessful, works began in 1730. However, the project officially commenced in 1739 and was successfully continued by Frederick II. As a result, by the mid-18th century, most vessels travelling to and from Szczecin used the Świna Strait or were unloaded at the newly established port at its mouth.[17]

Discussions about the potential creation of a waterway on the Dziwna Strait resumed only in 1772, as part of Frederick II's broader plans to improve communication with the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and to integrate newly acquired territories into the Prussian state following the First Partition of Poland. In this context, the key project, aimed at connecting the new lands with Prussia, was the Bydgoszcz Canal. It was constructed between 1773 and 1774. The issue of establishing a waterway on the Dziwna Strait was reopened by a cabinet order from Frederick II on the 21 June 1772. The order instructed for cost-estimation of the entire investment, including the construction of a port in Kamień Pomorski. The king believed that the costs should not be excessive, given that navigation on the Dziwna was already taking place. In his view, minor adjustments to the Dziwna Strait could significantly improve navigational conditions. Frederick II wanted a detailed assessment of the costs associated with deepening the strait and constructing a port in Kamień Pomorski.[18] The execution of the king's order was entrusted to Franz Balthasar von Brenckenhoff, a secret financial counselor. According to the king, this issue was already partially resolved, as during the reign of Frederick William I. The possibility of building seaports on both the Świna and Dziwna straits had been examined then, along with the associated costs and technical difficulties of deepening both waterways. The relevant documents and plans, according to the Frederick II, should have been stored in the archive of the Main Financial Directorate, part of the General Directory.[19] These records were eventually found in the mentioned archive, as confirmed by a note from von Brenckenhoff from the 8 July 1772. The records from 1720–1721

16 August Zöllner, *Die Geschichte des Misdroyer Erbkruges* (Berlin-Misdroy, 1940), 13–21, 24–27, 30–40, 48, 52, 58, 60; Radosław Gaziński, "Dzieje Międzyzdrojów do 1945 roku," in: *Słoneczne Międzyzdroje. Historia i przyroda*, eds. Kazimierz Kozłowski and Bogdan Jakuczun (Międzyzdroje: "Dokument," 2015), 19–26.

17 Robert Burkhard, *Geschichte des Hafens und der Stadt Swinemünde*, vol. 1 (Swinemünde: Verlag W. Fritzsche, 1920), 13–15, 18–19, 21–23; Radosław Gaziński, "Dzieje Świnoujścia do 1806 roku," in: *Świnoujście tradycja i współczesność*, ed. Stefan Molin (Świnoujście: "Dokument," 2007), 53–65.

18 Cabinet order Poczdam (Potsdam), June 1772: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbeisitz (hereinafter GStA PK), II Hauptabteilung, Generaldirektorium, Abteilung 12 Städteverwaltung, Stadt Cammin, nr 17, Instandsetzung des Hafens in Cammin 1772–1801, k. 4.

19 GStA PK, II HA, Abt 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 3.

pertained primarily to the general issue of establishing a port at the mouth of the Odra River (on the Świna or Dziwna Strait). They also referenced potential dredging works on the Świna Strait and the construction of a port at its mouth. Additionally, the documents included general concepts from 1728 and 1754 regarding the construction of a seaport in Dziwnów.[20]

In an analysis from the 4 August 1772, Counselor von Brenckenhoff pointed out that the land designated for the construction of the port in Dziwnów belonged to the town of Kamień Pomorski, meaning that municipal council approval would be required. This, however, did not pose a significant obstacle. A greater issue was the mouth of the Dziwna Strait, obstructed on both sides by sandspits, which made it shallow and difficult to navigate. Brenckenhoff also emphasised that storm events frequently altered the shape and depth of the Dziwna's mouth, further complicating navigation. Additionally, the mouth of the strait was very shallow, with a depth of only 5 to 6 feet (approximately 1.6 to 1.9 metres), allowing passage only for small ships and boats. To make the strait accessible for larger vessels, its mouth would need to be reinforced with stone-filled cribs and significantly deepened. Further obstacles were the shallow waters of the Wrzosowo Bay and the narrow passage through Sokolniczka (a constriction located above Żółcino (Soltin) between the Wrzosowo Bay and the Kamień Lagoon). This passage was littered with numerous stones, and the water depth ranged from 3 to 6 feet (approximately 1 to 1.9 metres). Deepening this section of the waterway and removing the stones would be extremely difficult and significantly increase the overall cost of the investment. According to Brenckenhoff's estimates, the cost of deepening the waterway to Kamień Pomorski would amount to 148.621 thalers. He argued that this considerable financial effort would benefit only Kamień Pomorski, because the primary goal of creating a water route to Szczecin would still require additional costly work. The most significant challenge was the sediment deposits (Madder Grund) on the bed of the strait between Kamień Pomorski and Wolin (Wollin). These consisted mainly of clay with minor sand content and were difficult to dredge. Additionally, the Szczecin Lagoon, particularly along the eastern shores and near Wolin Island, was very shallow due to a large sandbank extending about 600 rods (over 2 kilometres) into the lagoon's waters. This greatly impacted the water depth in the area, which rarely exceeded 5 feet (about 1.6 metres). Therefore, a navigable channel would need to be dredged through the sandbank, requiring intensive and continuous dredging efforts. Without regular maintenance, any channel created in the sand would quickly become silted and shallow again. In this situation, Brenckenhoff suggested revisiting the 1728 plan to establish a route from Szczecin through the Roztoka Odrzańska to Stepnica (Stepenitz) and then excavate a canal from Stepnica through the marshlands toward Wolin, connecting to the Dziwnów waterway. However, Brenckenhoff argued that these works would

20 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 5–6.

entail enormous costs without any guarantee of success. Furthermore, he deemed such efforts unnecessary, given that the Świna waterway and the port at its mouth were already functioning well. Navigation from Szczecin faced no significant obstacles, and the depths on the Świna Strait were sufficient for maritime traffic (around 10 feet, or 3.5 metres, at Lake Wicko, and 8 feet, or 2.8 metres, at the Świna mouth during normal water levels). Brenckenhoff also noted that in 1766, King Frederick II had approved plans by General Inspector Bourdet and Pomeranian Chamber Director Sprenger to deepen the port basin in Świnoujście to a depth of 9 to 10 feet (approximately 3 to 3.5 metres). He further reported that the town of Świnoujście, founded in 1765, had grown significantly, reaching over 200 houses and 1,396 residents by 1772.[21] Therefore, von Brenckenhoff concluded that any investment in the Dziwna Strait was economically unjustifiable.

The general memorandum was supplemented with detailed cost estimation for the planned works. Brenckenhoff proposed that the project should begin with the placement of 32 large stone blocks on the eastern spit along the mouth of the Dziwna and 30 blocks on the western spit. Each block was to be 40 feet long (approximately 13 metres), 30 feet wide (approximately 10 metres), and 12 feet high (approximately 4 metres). The 62 crates containing these stones were to be constructed from 186 wooden beams, each 40 feet long (approximately 13 metres) and 12 inches thick (approximately 30 centimetres). These materials were essential for building two breakwaters to protect the mouth of the Dziwna from the sea. Additionally, 11,532 sturdy piles were needed to secure the construction, each costing 2 thalers and 12 groschen. To reinforce the eastern breakwater, 80 rods of bundles made from fascines and branches gathered from meadow shrubs were required, while 40 rods were needed for the western breakwater. These bundles were to be 18 feet high (approximately 5.5 metres) and 6 feet wide and deep (approximately 2 metres). The total cost of the materials required for the breakwaters, excluding the stones, was estimated at 29,121 thalers. Labour costs included the sinking of the 62 massive stone blocks, with the placement of each block costing 1,250 thalers. Thus, the total labour cost for constructing both breakwaters amounted to 77,500 thalers. In addition, the breakwaters needed to be further reinforced with piles and fascines. Next, a waterway through the mouth of the Dziwna and the Wrzosowo Bay had to be marked out and deepened to 7 feet (approximately 2.5 metres). The length of the proposed channel was estimated at around 400 rods (approximately 1.5 kilometres), with a width of 5 rods (approximately 18 metres). The dredging work was to be carried out by four dredgers. The cost of marking and deepening the described waterway was calculated at 42,000 thalers. Therefore, the total cost of reinforcing the mouth of the Dziwna with breakwaters and creating a navigable waterway to the Kamień Lagoon was estimated at 148,621 thalers.[22]

21 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 8–8a, 15–17, 20.

22 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 9, 18.

The additional costs of building a connection between Szczecin and the mouth of the Dziwna included the deepening of the Roztoka Odrzańska to Stepnica and the excavation of a canal through the Stepnica marshlands, passing the villages of Gąsierzyno (Ganserin), Świętowice (Schwantefitz), Kopice (Köpitz), and Czarnocin (Zartenthin). This canal was to connect with the Dziwna near the village of Gogolice (Gaulitz), close to Wolin. From there, the waterway would continue along the Dziwna from Wolin to Kamień Pomorski. The proposed canal was planned to be 6 rods wide (approximately 20 metres) and 4 feet deep (approximately 1.3 metres), with a total length estimated at 3,200 rods (11 kilometres). The initial construction of the canal was expected to cost 25,600 thalers. Once the canal was completed, it would need to be deepened to 8 feet (approximately 2.8 to 3 metres), adding an additional cost of 384,000 thalers. Furthermore, the Dziwna between Wolin and Kamień would also need to be deepened. To achieve this, it was necessary to prepare timber, construct, and equip eight dredgers, which would cost an additional 11,075 thalers. Thus, including the so-called extraordinary expenses, the total cost of constructing a waterway from Stepnica to Wolin was estimated at 420,675 thalers.[23] Consequently, the overall expense of creating an entire water route from Szczecin through the Roztoka Odrzańska to Stepnica, digging a canal to Wolin, deepening the Dziwna to Kamień Pomorski, and establishing a navigable passage through the Kamień Lagoon, the Wrzosowo Bay, and the mouth of the Dziwna (including the construction of two breakwaters and short quays at the port) would amount to the enormous sum of 569,296 thalers.

In response to Brenckenhoff's memorandum and the attached cost estimate, Frederick II stated on the 11 August 1772, that the success of the project was uncertain and that it must not interfere with the ongoing works in Świnoujście. While agreeing that Świnoujście should remain an absolute priority, the king expressed interest in reviewing the previous plans and documents prepared for Frederick William I, concerning the Dziwna Strait.[24] In accordance with Frederick II's order, the Department of Finance of the General Directory forwarded these plans to Minister Joachim Christian von Blumenthal, who then presented them directly to the Prussian monarch.[25] After analysing the documents, Frederick II sought an additional opinion from the Pomeranian War and Treasury Chamber regarding the feasibility of constructing a waterway on the Dziwna. On the 15 October 1772, the Pomeranian War and Treasury Chamber, represented by its director, Sprenger, submitted a memorandum to Minister von Blumenthal and Frederick II. In the memorandum, the Chamber fully endorsed the opinion of Financial Counselor von Brenckenhoff from the 4 August 1772. To reinforce this stance, Director Sprenger once again forwarded Brenckenhoff's report and cost calculations

23 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 9a, 19.

24 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 10–11.

25 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 12–13.

to the ministry.[26] Ultimately, the arguments presented by the officials convinced Frederick II to abandon the plan to create a new waterway on the Dziwna Strait.

After the death of Frederick II, the initiative to build a waterway on the Dziwna Strait was taken up by the authorities of Kamień Pomorski. In November 1786, the town's mayors, council, and merchants submitted a petition to Frederick William II (from the 11 November 1786), requesting that the king kindly turn his attention to the town of Kamień and the Dziwnów port. The petition included drawings and a description of the proposed waterway from the mouth of the Dziwna to Kamień Pomorski, along with plans for a new port. The municipal authorities argued that the project would not only benefit their town but would also alleviate the congestion in Świnoujście caused by the high volume of ship traffic. In response, the General Directory, in a letter from the 23 November 1786, pointed out that such plans had previously been abandoned due to the substantial costs involved in the project, and that the situation had not changed in this regard.[27]

Another attempt to establish a waterway at the mouth of the Dziwna Strait and create a seaport in Dziwnów or the Wrzosowo Bay was undertaken in 1801, during the reign of Frederick William III. The initiative came once again from the Kamień Pomorski magistrate in early January 1801. Although the General Directory expressed approval of the town's proposal, it was unwilling to support the project with state funds. The authorities considered it a manifestation of local ambitions that should be realised through local efforts. The initiative from Kamień Pomorski was described in a memorandum from the 13 January 1801, which was sent to Berlin. The document, written in a tone of loyal submission, informed the authorities that Kamień Pomorski, located on the eastern branch of the Oder (The Dziwna Strait), about half a mile from the open sea, was well-suited for maritime trade and navigation. The memorandum further emphasised that Frederick II had previously considered the construction of a new port and waterway to the Baltic Sea and had been prepared to undertake the investment. However, the king had postponed the project at the time, deeming the costs too high. The memorandum concluded that a modern port in Kamień Pomorski was necessary because there were no significant ports between Świnoujście and Gdańsk (Danzig). The port in Kołobrzeg, mentioned in the document, was too small to accommodate large ships. The Kamień Pomorski magistrate's proposal was supported by prelate von Puttkammer, the owner of part of the Wrzosowo Bay and the nearby village of Radawka (Raddack). In a separate letter, von Puttkammer declared his willingness to participate in financing the project, though he did not specify the amount of his contribution. The Kamień Pomorski memorandum suggested that the selected port area in the Wrzosowo Bay be deepened to about 12–14 feet (approximately 4 to 4.5 metres) to allow large ships to dock.

26 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 14–20.

27 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12, Cammin, nr 17, k. 22, 23.

Despite the significant costs, the magistrate believed the investment would quickly pay off and that the port would become self-sustaining. The town proposed introducing a tonnage fee of 16 groschen per last of cargo capacity and issuing securities to raise the necessary funds for the project. The townspeople emphasised that building the port would bring prosperity not only to Kamień Pomorski but also to the surrounding region, transforming the town into a significant trading centre. Moreover, the municipal authorities reminded the Prussian government that Kamień Pomorski held old Hanseatic privileges, exempting its trade from the Sound tolls. The town's commercial connections with Szczecin and Silesia would further strengthen its trade.[28] However, in a letter from the 10th of February 1801, after a thorough analysis of the Kamień Pomorski memorandum, Prussian officials pointed to the enormous costs of clearing the Dziwna's mouth, a factor that had not been adequately addressed in the memorandum. The good functioning of the Świna waterway and the port of Świnoujście also played a decisive role in their decision. Investments at the mouth of the Świna had already consumed significant funds and continued to require care and substantial financial resources, leaving no room for new projects on the Dziwna. Finally, officials stressed that Szczecin did not require two routes to the Baltic Sea.[29]

In response to the letter from the Berlin Directory, a second memorandum was submitted on the 10th of March 1801, by prelate von Puttkammer himself. In this document, he proposed a solution to the financial challenges of the planned investment. The prelate's main recommendation was the establishment of a *Port Association* that would assume the primary costs of constructing the port. The funds would be raised through a subscription of securities, with their repayment guaranteed by tonnage fees collected from every ship docking at the port. According to von Puttkammer, the new port would not compete with Świnoujście, and its maintenance costs would be significantly lower than those of the port at the mouth of the Świna Strait. He estimated, though it is unclear on what basis, that the annual profits from the port would amount to 40,000 thalers, a sum that would easily cover its maintenance expenses. Furthermore, von Puttkammer argued that there was no need to significantly deepen the Dziwna Strait, as trade between the new port and Szczecin could be handled by *Oderkahnen,* specialised barges designed for shallow waters. This was already the case for Świnoujście, where much of the trade with Szczecin was carried out using such vessels. The prelate even suggested that profits generated by the port at the mouth of the Dziwna could be used to pay special compensation to the residents of Świnoujście, amounting to 50,000 thalers. He also emphasised that the port at the mouth of the Świna consumed enormous sums of money, while a port in Kamień Pomorski, with an open route through the Øresund,

28 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 25–27.

29 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 30–32.

would save the Prussian state 50,000 thalers annually in Sound tolls. Additionally, von Puttkammer claimed, though it is unclear where he obtained this information, that the approach to Świnoujście was difficult, leading to numerous shipwrecks and accidents. In contrast, he argued that a port on the Wrzosowo Bay would be much safer.[30] In response to von Puttkammer's memorandum, the Berlin authorities issued a reply on the 19 March 1801. They stated that the port in Świnoujście was the primary port facility and had been profitable for years. Moreover, the Świna waterway was sufficient to handle Szczecin's maritime trade.[31] Given this, the government had no intention of investing state funds in the construction of a port near Kamień Pomorski. However, they did not prohibit the construction of the port using private funds. Ultimately, the local merchant community proved financially too weak to undertake the proposed initiative.

To conclude the above considerations, it must be stated that the Dziwna Strait lost its competition with the Świna Strait as early as the 1720s due to unfavourable hydrological conditions. The Świna was deemed more suitable for the construction of a waterway by Prussian officials. Firstly, it was shorter and, secondly, its mouth to the sea was better formed. It was there, toward the end of Frederick William I's and during Frederick II's reign, that a new waterway was established, and a seaport was built at its mouth. The port's destruction by the Swedes during the Seven Years' War did not alter Berlin's approach to the two straits. After 1763, the restoration of the navigability of the Świna's mouth and the reconstruction of the port at its entrance solidified the secondary, or even tertiary, role of the Dziwna in maritime trade. A potential shift could have occurred after 1772, when Frederick II sought stronger ties between Prussia and the territories acquired during the First Partition of Poland. This ambition was accompanied by a desire to expand Prussia's influence in the eastern Baltic region. However, the king's plans clashed with financial realities presented by his officials. The high costs associated with improving the Dziwna and the lack of a clear economic justification led Frederick II to abandon the idea of making the strait navigable. In 1786, when the Kamień Pomorski authorities revisited the idea of making the Dziwna navigable, they encountered strong opposition from Berlin officials. The same outcome occurred in 1801, although in this instance, central authorities in Berlin did not entirely rule out the possibility of granting permission for work on the Dziwna, provided it was financed by local entities. However, the local merchant community in Kamień Pomorski proved too financially weak to undertake the investment, even if only to deepen the mouth section of the Dziwna.

30 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammin, nr 17, k. 33–36.

31 GStA PK, II HA, Abt. 12 Cammni, nr 17, k. 36a–37.

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English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The article, based on archival sources preserved in the Secret Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem, examines the attempts undertaken since 1720 to make the Dziwna Strait navigable and to build a seaport at its mouth. The hydrological analysis of the strait conducted by Prussian officials in 1720–1721 concluded that clearing the Dziwna would be extremely costly, and the expenses incurred would not guarantee success. Consequently, it was ultimately decided that the Świna Strait was better suited to become the primary waterway connecting Szczecin to the sea. The first dredging works at the mouth of the Świna began in 1730, although significant funding from the Prussian state for deepening the strait and constructing a seaport only commenced in 1739. By around 1750, most goods traveling to or from Szczecin were already passing through the Świna. Meanwhile, traffic on the Dziwna consisted solely of small, local vessels. In 1772, Frederick II initiated a new effort to deepen the Dziwna and build a seaport at its mouth. However, the king was persuaded by his officials that the investment would be exceptionally expensive and economically unviable, given the well-functioning waterway on the Świna. As a result, no works were undertaken on the Dziwna Strait. The third phase of attempts to make the Dziwna navigable occurred in 1786 and 1801, led by the Kamień Pomorski magistrate, which submitted relevant memoranda to the Berlin authorities. After reviewing the town's arguments, the Prussian government rejected the requests for large-scale dredging works on the Dziwna and the construction of a port on the Wrzosowo Bay. However, local merchant communities were not prohibited from undertaking the project on their own. Ultimately, the financially weak merchant community of Kamień Pomorski was unable to fund the planned works. Thus, until the end of the early Prussian period, making the Dziwna fully navigable remained solely in the realm of plans.

Z dziejów pruskiej polityki morskiej. Plan wytyczenia drogi wodnej na Dziwnie i wybudowania portu morskiego pod Kamieniem Pomorskim w XVIII wieku

Słowa kluczowe: Prusy, polityka morska, droga wodna, Dziwna, XVIII wiek

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł opisuje na podstawie źródeł przechowywanych w Tajnym Archiwum Pruskim w Berlinie-Dahlem podejmowane od 1720 roku próby mające na celu doprowadzenie do żeglowności Cieśniny Dziwny i zbudowanie u jej ujścia portu morskiego. Analiza hydrologiczna cieśniny przeprowadzona przez urzędników pruskich w latach 1720–1721 doprowadziła jednak do stwierdzenia, że udrożnienie Dziwny jest niezwykle kosztowne, a poniesione wydatki nie gwarantują sukcesu. W tej sytuacji ostatecznie uznano, że to Świna jest bardziej predysponowana do stania się główną drogą prowadzącą ze Szczecina na morze. Pierwsze prace pogłębiarskie u ujścia Świny podjęto już w 1730 roku, chociaż dopiero od 1739 roku państwo pruskie zaczęło łożyć duże kwoty pozwalające na pogłębienie cieśniny i budowę u jej ujścia portu morskiego. Około 1750 roku większość towarów idących do lub ze Szczecina przechodziło już Świną. Tymczasem na Dziwnie ruch niewielkich statków i łodzi miał wyłącznie charakter

lokalny. Dopiero w 1772 roku Fryderyk II podjął inicjatywę pogłębienia Dziwny i zbudowania u jej ujścia portu morskiego. Jednak król dał się przekonać swoim urzędnikom, którzy uważali, że inwestycja na Dziwnie będzie wyjątkowo kosztowna i dodatkowo ekonomicznie nieopłacalna wobec dobrze funkcjonującej drogi wodnej na Świnie. Ostatecznie żadnych prac na cieśninie nie podjęto. Trzecia faza starań o udrożnienie Dziwny przypadająca na lata 1786 i 1801 wiązała się z inicjatywami magistratu Kamienia Pomorskiego, który zwracał się w tej sprawie z odpowiednimi memoriałami do władz w Berlinie. Te ostatnie po zapoznaniu się z argumentacją władz miejskich odrzucały postulaty dużych prac pogłębiarskich na Dziwnie i wybudowania portu na Zatoce Wrzosowskiej. Jednocześnie nie zabraniano miejscowym środowiskom kupieckim podjęcia planowanej inwestycji. Okazało się jednak, że słabe środowisko kupieckie Kamienia Pomorskiego nie było w stanie sfinansować planowanych prac. Zatem do końca epoki staropruskiej doprowadzenie do pełnej żeglowności Dziwny pozostało wyłącznie w sferze planów.

Citation

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Bert Becker
Department of History
The University of Hong Kong
becker@hku.hk
ORCID: 0000-0003-1887-2942

Chief President Julius Lippmann and the Port of Stettin in the Weimar Republic*

Keywords: Seaports, Economic Crisis, Jews, Anti-Semitism, Prussia, Administration

Introduction

This article intends to explore the political and economic history of the port of Stettin (Szczecin) in the 1920s and the important role played by Julius Lippmann, Chief President of Prussia's Province of Pomerania (*Oberpräsident der Provinz Pommern*) from 1919 to 1930, in maintaining and developing the organisation and infrastructure of this key Baltic seaport. The study combines a biographical approach to Lippmann's life and work with an analysis of his economic policy toward the port. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to the broader history of the port of Szczecin and of Pomerania in the early 20th century.

Although Stettin was unable to regain its pre-war position as a leading Baltic seaport due to geopolitical and territorial changes after the First World War, the combined efforts of the City of Stettin, the Chief President and the Prussian Government contributed to the port's economic survival and further development. The role of Chief President Lippmann in this process has been largely overlooked by both Polish and German historians to this day. To do Lippmann justice, this article presents a newer approach to research on the history of the Weimar Republica, placing

* An earlier version of this article was presented as a conference paper at the Ninth World Congress on Polish Studies "Poland in the World," The Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences of America (PIASA), Warsaw, June 2024.

greater emphasis on the commitment of individuals who championed democracy and the republic.[1] With that intention in mind, the article seeks to present Julius Lippmann as an example that highlights the efforts and achievements of those who worked for a democratic political system and a stable economy, even though global economic changes and crises set clear limits to their personal commitment. In doing so, it aims to stimulate interest in the history of democracy, and its supporters and defenders, about whom little is known at the level of the former Prussian provinces.[2]

A comprehensive study would be required to fully examine Lippmann's life and work as Chief President of Pomerania during the Weimar Republic. Important aspects such as his policy of democratising the Pomeranian administration and his initiatives to build a modern welfare state – to which he devoted much time and energy – deserve more detailed attention.[3] His role as a crisis manager was highly valued by industry and commerce and was even acknowledged by the agricultural sector, which had initially been almost hostile toward him.[4] This largely positive attitude of the Pomeranian agricultural industry towards Lippmann at the end of his term as Chief President remains a little-known fact. It was mainly due to his active support for extensive credit subsidies for agriculture. In January 1929, Johann Georg von Dewitz, third chairman and director of the Pomeranian Land League (*Pommerscher Landbund*), wrote a personal letter to Lippmann describing him as an advocate of agricultural interests who had defended the values of agriculture and was determined to continue protecting them.

1 There is now a wealth of literature on this new research approach that looks at the Weimar Republic from its hopeful beginnings rather than its tragic end, for example see: Nadine Rossol and Benjamin Ziemann, "Einleitung," in: *Aufbruch und Abgründe: Das Handbuch der Weimarer Republik*, eds. Nadine Rossol and Benjamin Ziemann (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2022), 9–37.

2 In 2021, the Society for the Study of the History of Democracy (*Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der Demokratiegeschichte e.V*) in Weimar, Germany, launched a biographically oriented research project aimed at raising awareness of the federal history of the first German democracy (1918–33) and presenting Germany's regional political history concisely. To generate broader public interest, the project focused on virtually unknown regional political figures, thereby strengthening knowledge of democratic history and contributing to the identity of the present-day federal states of Germany. As part of this project, the author of this article was the sole contributor for the Prussian Province of Pomerania, compiling biographical sketches of the three Pomeranian Chief Presidents (*Oberpräsidenten*) and two Provincial Directors (*Landeshauptmänner*) of the Weimar Republic. Following an exhibition in Schwerin in 2025, the Society is preparing an online catalogue of these officeholders in the then German federal states (including the Minister-Presidents) and in the former Prussian provinces.

3 Lippmann's democratisation policy in Pomerania has so far been studied in detail for the year 1919, see: Bert Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten der Revolutionsperiode," in: *November 1918: Revolution an der Ostsee und im Reich*, ed. by Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann (Vienna: Böhlau, 2020), 226–235. As the historical archival records show, Lippmann's social policy in Pomerania, which built on the initiatives of his predecessor Georg Michaelis (in office 1918–19) but expanded them considerably, was truly exemplary for a Prussian province.

4 Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten," 224–225, 245–247.

In his reply, Lippmann pledged to continue doing his utmost, as he had in the past, to achieve the goals he considered essential for the vital interests of Pomeranian agriculture. This correspondence impressively documents the new, positive relationship between the Pomeranian agricultural lobby and the Chief President in the tenth year of his tenure.[5]

The annual constitutional celebrations held on 11 August since 1922, which Lippmann organised in Stettin represent another important aspect in his commitment to stabilising and defending the Weimar Republic. Since it is not possible to cover all of Lippmann's activities within the scope of this article, the focus will be on his economic policy for the port of Stettin, which for him as a committed local patriot of Stettin was one of his main concerns at that time. The aim is to critically evaluate Lippmann's role and achievements in the cooperation between the Prussian Government, the Stettin Magistrate, and the Stettin Corporation of Merchants in the financing and further development of the port from 1922 to 1930. This analysis may also be valuable for today's Szczecin, since the port remains a central element of the city's identity.[6]

Regarding primary sources by Julius Lippmann, there are hardly any personal documents or memoirs. If such materials ever existed, he probably destroyed them after Hitler came to power when he lost his position as a lecturer at the University of Greifswald at the hands of the Nazis. Other materials may have been lost due to the emigration of his family. Thanks to the initiative of his great-granddaughter, Nicola Bernstein, valuable documents that had belonged to Lippmann and had been brought to the United States when his son's family emigrated were returned to Germany and permanently loaned to the Pomeranian State Museum in Greifswald in 2024. Brief biographical essays on Lippmann's life and work exist exclusively in German, many of which also cover his term as Chief President of Pomerania.[7] Additionally, the Polish historians Bogdan Dopierała, Edward Włodarczyk, and Włodzimierz Stępiński have addressed Pomerania's most senior state official in their broader studies of Szczecin and its port.[8] Since there

5 Landesarchiv Greifswald [Greifswald State Archives] (hereinafter LAG), "Oberpräsident von Pommern" [Chief President of Pomerania], Ref. no. 60, file 2391, *Die Förderung der Landwirtschaft, Verbesserung der Landeskultur, Lage der Landwirtschaft*, vol. 9, 1926–1930, letter of Johann Georg von Dewitz (Berlin) to Julius Lippmann (Stettin), 19 January 1929; reply from Lippmann, 23 January 1929. Dewitz was a co-founder of the Pommerscher Landbund and from 1924 to 1928 a member of the Reichstag in the conservative German National People's Party faction (*Fraktion der Deutschnationalen Volkspartei*).

6 Karolina Izdebska and Urszula Kozlowska, "The cultural landscape and maritime identity of Szczecin: The past and present of a port city," *International Journal of Maritime History* 34 (2022), 1: 83–100.

7 A list of these publications can be found in Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten," 216, footnote 18.

8 Bogdan Dopierała, *Kryzys Gospodarki Morskiej Szczecina w Latach 1919: Studia z dziejów portu szczecińskiego na tle niemieckiej i polskiej polityki morskiej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1963), 21–30; Edward Włodarczyk, "Życie gospodarcze," in: *Dzieje Szczecina 1806–1945*, vol. 3,

are no personal correspondences such as letters or diaries, the historical administrative records of the Province of Pomerania kept in the state archives in Szczecin and Greifswald, and the records of the Prussian Government kept in Berlin, and relating to Lippmann's main political and administrative tasks were reviewed systematically and thoroughly in order to document his activities and assess them in their entirety. Personal contact with Nicola Bernstein, first made possible in the autumn of 2021 through online research, was also very stimulating and helpful.

The Early Years

The Lippmann family was of Jewish descent and originated from the fortified town of Nakel an der Netze (Nakło nad Notecią), a small town near Bromberg in the Prussian province of Posen. Michael Georg Lippmann (1817–1887), Julius's father, was born in Nakel, which had 787 Jews at the end of 1837.[9] At an unknown date, he moved to Danzig (Gdańsk), where he got a position as cantor (*chasan* in Hebrew) of the Weinberg synagogue community, one of six Jewish communities in the West Prussian port and trading city. Of the almost 54,000 inhabitants of Danzig in 1834, Jews, including many merchants, constituted only a small minority of 3.8 per cent.[10] After Michael Lippmann's first marriage to a Jewish Danziger, Julius was the youngest child of six children from his second marriage to a Jewish Königsberger, Rosalie Kokoski (1826–1905). Nothing is known about the mother's family.[11] Although Michael Lippmann had served as cantor of the Weinberg community for about 46 years, he only received a fixed salary and pension after the unification of the Danzig Jewish communities in 1883.[12]

ed. by Bogdan Wachowiak (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo "13 MUZ," 1994), 574, 618; Włodzimierz Stępiński, "Życie polityczne w Szczecinie w latach 1919–1939," in: *Dzieje Szczecina 1806–1945*, vol. 3, 743–745, 756.

9 *Der Orient: Berichte, Studien und Kritiken für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur* 9 (1840): 69.

10 Michael K. Schulz, *Sozialgeschichte der Danziger Juden im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: be.bra, 2020), 18, table 1.

11 Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku [States Archives Gdańsk] (hereinafter AP Gdańsk], Fonds: "Prezydium Policji, Gdańsk" [Gdansk Police Headquarters], Ref. no. 14: *Personenkartei*, vol. 26–27, file 14, 4 (Lippmann, Michael); Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin, George Adler, *Family Tree – Lippmann Branch*, 2002; Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie [Szczecin States Archives] (hereinafter AP Szczecin), Fonds: "Akta urzędników administracji Prowincji Pomorskiej" [Personnel files of the administration of the province of Pomerania], Ref. no. 1151, file 1024, *Studienrätin Else Lippmann, 1923–1945*, Fragebogen zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums [Questionnaire on the implementation of the law for the restoration of the professional civil service], Else Lippmann, July 1933. This law, enacted on 7 April 1933, radically purged the civil service and discriminated against people of Jewish descent and political opponents of National Socialism. The questionnaire included questions on ancestry, including maternal and paternal parents and grandparents.

12 Schulz, *Sozialgeschichte*, 111, 118, 123, 136.

Therefore, Julius's early and university years were overshadowed by the family's limited financial means.

In Danzig, Lippmann attended the City Grammar School from 1873 to 1881 and completed his school-leaving certificate at Easter. In the winter semester of 1881, he began studying classical philology at the Friedrich Wilhelm University (since 1949: Humboldt University of Berlin) and attended lectures by the historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) on politics and English history. In the summer semester of 1882, Lippmann changed direction and began studying law. A minimum of three years of study was required to pass the first state law examination, which he completed in exactly six semesters. On 10 December 1885, he was ex-matriculated from the Berlin university.[13] After passing the first state examination in Berlin in September 1886, Lippmann was appointed a court trainee (*Gerichtsreferendar*) on 18 December 1886. He completed his practical legal training at public prosecutor's offices, courts, and in a law firm in his home province of West Prussia. After passing the second (major) state law examination with the grade "good" in September 1891, Lippmann was appointed as a court assessor (*Gerichtsassessor*). Due to overcrowding in the judiciary and limited accessibility of civil service careers for Jewish academics, he apparently opted for the independent legal profession. He left the judicial service and was admitted to the Regional Court I in Berlin as an attorney on 6 February 1892. Lippmann soon relinquished his legal work in Berlin on 26 April 1892 and was admitted to the bar at the Higher Regional Court in Stettin on 14 June 1892.[14]

Together with a partner, Lippmann ran the law firm "Lippmann & Heinrich – Rechtsanwälte beim Königlichen Oberlandesgericht Stettin" at Augustastraße 53 (Augusta Street, today Małopolska) in the northern city centre. After Lippmann was appointed a justice counsellor (*Justizrat*), an honorary title bestowed by the King of Prussia on long-serving and distinguished lawyers, on 20 December 1910, the practice was renamed "Lawyers Justice Counsellor Lippmann & Heinrich, Stettin" and relocated to the second floor of a house on nearby Schillerstraße (Schiller Street, today Mazowiecka), where the Lippmann family's private apartment was also located.

13 Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universitätsarchiv [Humboldt University Archives, Berlin], Fonds: "Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin," files *Studentenliste 1878–1883*, *Matrikelbuch 1880–1885*, *Abgangszeugnisse 1885*. According to Lippmann's leaving certificate, he received a grant of 417 marks in legal college fees, of which he repaid 150 marks in his final year of study (1884–85) using a scholarship from a Jewish association in Danzig. Private Archives Michael K. Schulz, Potsdam (from The Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem), Fonds: "Jüdische Gemeinden Danzig," file Da 547, *Protokollbuch des Comité zur Verwaltung des Vermögens der ehemaligen israelitischen Knabenfreischule Danzig, 1868–1919*. I am grateful to Professor Schulz for providing this information.

14 Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten," 216–217.



Figure 1. Briefcase folder for the lawyers Lippmann & Heinrich, Stettin, c. 1900

Source: Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin.

Lippmann married Margarete Werner (1871–1947), the daughter of a Jewish lawyer and notary in Stettin. Their children were baptised and raised as Lutheran Protestants. The baptism of their eldest daughter, Else, took place in St. Jakobi (today Św. Jakuba), the main Lutheran church in Stettin, on 27 November 1897. Lippmann and his wife also converted from Judaism to Lutheranism in the same church on 18 November 1901. The exact reasons for this decision remain unknown but were likely influenced by the rising anti-Semitism in Germany since the 1870s and a desire for assimilation into German society.[15]



Figure 2. Julius Lippmann with his wife Margarete (1871–1947) and their eldest children Else (1894–1980), Werner (1896–1979) and Hildegard (1900–1982), c. 1903

Source: Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin.

15 Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin, George Adler, *Family Tree – Lippmann Branch*, 2002; Briefcase folder for the lawyers Lippmann & Heinrich, Stettin, c. 1900. AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 1151, file 1024, *Studienrätin Else Lippmann, 1923–1945*, Fragebogen zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums. About Jewish families in Germany around 1900 and their religious conversion, see: Marion Kaplan, *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 81–83.

Member of Stettin's City Council and the Prussian Parliament

From 15 March 1900 to the end of February 1919, Lippmann held his first political office as an elected member of the Stettin City Council (*Stadtverordnetenversammlung*). Due to the war-related loss of most of the Szczecin city archives,[16] Lippmann's activities as city councillor can no longer be traced. During these years, the port city developed into an important industrial and port metropolis with shipyards, machine and vehicle factories, as well as cement, paper, and chemical factories. Industrialisation and the influx of workers led to a rapid increase in population of the city and its surroundings, which rose from 112,000 in 1875 to 246,000 in 1900 and 275,000 in 1914.[17]


In June 1908, for the elections to the Prussian Parliament (*Preußisches Abgeordnetenhaus* or *Preußischer Landtag*), Lippmann stood as a candidate in the Stettin 3 constituency for the Free-minded Union (*Freisinnige Vereinigung*, FVg). This small left-wing liberal party strongly emphasised liberal economic goals, reflecting the influence of members with interests in shipping and foreign trade, banks, and insurance companies. The FVg's strongholds were in port cities of northern and eastern Germany, particularly in Bremen, Lübeck, Stettin and Danzig (Gdańsk). Lippmann's election campaign speech on 2 June 1908, which was published in the press, is apparently the first surviving statement of his political interests and intentions.[18] At the beginning of his speech, he explicitly referred to the economist Max Broemel, his predecessor as Stettin member of the Prussian Parliament and highly active figure both as a liberal politician and a senior manager in business associations in Stettin and Berlin. When Lippmann promised to represent Stettin "in a liberal sense," he cited Broemel as a "brilliant example, whose liberal attitude was beyond reproach and was exercised at every opportunity." As a "liberal man," as he called himself, Lippmann clearly identified with Broemel's political orientation: "My desires and intentions lead me to the same circles, [and] in the same paths."[19]

16 Paweł Gut and Radosław Gaziński, "The lost historical archives of the City of Szczecin," *Archival Science* 24 (2024): 14–15.

17 These are rounded figures. Edward Włodarczyk, "Szczecin in the 19th and first half of the 20th century," in: *A short history of Szczecin*, ed. by Jan M. Piskorski, Bogdan Wachowiak, and Edward Włodarczyk (Poznań: Sorus SC, 2002), 152, table 2: Population of Szczecin 1875–1918.

18 *Ostsee-Zeitung und Neue Stettiner Zeitung*, evening edition, 2 June 1908, "Rede des Landtagskandidaten Herrn Rechtsanwalt Lippmann" [Speech by the parliamentary candidate, Mr Lippmann, attorney-at-law].

19 Max Broemel had also been secretary of the Korporation der Kaufmannschaft zu Stettin [Corporation of Merchants in Stettin] and then secretary general of the Verein zur Förderung der Handelsfreiheit [Association for the Promotion of Trade Freedom] in Berlin. Lippmann's orginal final sentence was: "Mein Wünschen und Wollen führt mich in dieselben Kreise, dieselben Geleise." *Ostsee-Zeitung und Neue Stettiner Zeitung*, evening edition, 2 June 1908.


Nr. 29. — 1. Jahrgang Sonnabend, 18. Juli 1908

Stettiner

Illustrierte Zeitung

Moderne Wochenrundschau

Rechtsanwalt Julius Lippmann. Vertreter Stettins im Abgeordnetenhause

Figure 3. Attorney-at-Law Julius Lippmann, Deputy of Stettin in the Prussian Parliament, 1908. *Stettiner Illustrierte Zeitung: Moderne Wochenrundschau* 29 (18 July 1908), front page

Source: Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin.

In the 1908 elections, the Free-minded Union was able to send eight representatives to Berlin, including Lippmann, who had prevailed against his local competitor Fritz Herbert, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD) and owner of a printing house in Stettin. On 6 March 1910, the party merged with two other left-wing liberal parties to form the Progressive People's Party (*Fortschrittliche Volkspartei*, FVP) which particularly represented the interests of the export industry, shipping, trade, banks, and crafts. In addition to defending economic liberalism and supporting the imperialist and global policies

of the Reich Government, the party increasingly advocated for the development of a more extended welfare state by the government. However, the extension of political freedoms – especially the elimination of the Prussian three-class electoral law and the reform of municipal electoral law – remained of paramount importance to the FVP in the parliament.[20] In his parliamentary speeches between 1908 and 1918, Lippmann frequently touched on these issues, mostly with special references to Pomerania. In the Prussian elections in May/June 1913, the Progressives won forty seats, only one of which was in Pomerania – Lippmann's in Stettin. Elected as the second deputy FVP faction leader in the Prussian Parliament, he was particularly committed to developing the transport infrastructure of Stettin and repeatedly acted as a political advocate of the city's municipal interests before the Prussian Government. Reviewing the parliamentary session protocols from 1908 to 1918, it is evident that Lippmann frequently addressed the concerns of Stettin and its port in lengthy speeches.[21] In December 1912, while declaring the FVP faction's support for maintaining the strength and influence of Hamburg and Bremen "as world harbours" in the interest of the German Reich's foreign policy, he emphasised the need to support Stettin in its difficult competition with Hamburg. In his speech, he referred to the acquisition of the port city by Prussia's King Friedrich Wilhelm I in 1720 and even to a well-known fairy tale when he said: "There I see a famous harbour city, which the Hohenzollerns have struggled for 100 years, and which used to be the lap child of the Prussian Government; this lap child has now become Cinderella (*Aschenbrödel*), and instead not only other Prussian cities, but other non-Prussian cities have become lap children."[22] This criticism of the alleged neglect of Stettin by the Prussian Government was a common argument in the city's leading circles at the time and also in the 1920s.

20 Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918,* vol. 2: *Machtstaat vor der Demokratie* (Munich: Beck, 1998), 531–536; Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten," 217–219.

21 Lippmann spoke on the following days about Stettin's economic and transport situation, as well as the city's local political issues. *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Preußischen Hauses der Abgeordneten*, 21. Legislative Term, III. Session 1910, vol. 3, meeting of 8 April 1910; 21. Legislative Term, IV. Session 1911, vol. 3, meetings of 3–4 March 1911 and 15 May 1911; 21. Legislative Term, V. Session 1912/13, vol. 2, meeting of 8 March; vol. 7, meeting of 11 December 1912; vol. 9, meeting of 21 February 1913; vol. 10, meeting of 14 April 1913 (Berlin: Preußische Verlagsanstalt, 1910–1913); *Stenographische Berichte*, 22. Legislative Term, II. Session 1914/15, vol. 3, meeting of 24 February 1914; 22. Legislative Term, III. Session 1916/18, vol. 1, meeting of 19 February 1916; vol. 2, meeting of 22 March 1916; vol. 4, meeting of 19 February 1917 (Berlin: Preußische Verlagsanstalt, 1914–1917).

22 Lippmann's orginal final sentence was as follows: "Da sehe ich eine alte berühmte Hafenstadt, um die die Hohenzollern 100 Jahre gerungen haben, und die früher das Schoßkind der preußischen Regierung war; dieses Schoßkind ist jetzt zum Aschenbrödel geworden, und Schoßkinder sind anstatt dessen nicht nur andere preußische Städte, sondern andere nichtpreußische Städte geworden." *Stenographische Berichte,* 21. Legislative Term, V. Session 1912/13, vol. 7 (Berlin: Preußische Verlagsanstalt, 1913), meeting of 11 December 1912, 8931–8934 (The quote: 8933).

Election Winner and Chief President

With the German Revolution of 1918–19, the outdated political system of the Hohenzollern monarchy broke down and was replaced by a modern democratic parliamentary system in the Western style. In preparation for the nation-wide general elections to the German National Assembly (*Deutsche Nationalversammlung*) and the Prussian elections in January 1919, political parties were reorganised and began their election campaigns. With the Progressive People's Party being dissolved, Lippmann became a member of its successor, the newly founded left-wing liberal German Democratic Party (*Deutsche Demokratische Partei*, DDP), and stood as the top candidate on the DDP list for Pomerania in both elections. For Lippmann, this dramatic political change fulfilled a long-held hope, and he wholeheartedly supported the founding of the new democratic republic. He presented his political goals on 13 January 1919 in an election speech at the Stettin Stock Exchange.[23] In the election to the National Assembly on 19 January 1919, Lippmann won the top seat for the DDP in constituency 7 Pomerania and became a member of the new parliament convening in Weimar.[24] According to the speech registers, he attended the National Assembly's opening session on 6 February 1919 and went to Weimar several times afterwards. These visits are occasionally mentioned in the files consulted, but he never appeared as a speaker in the plenary sessions.[25] This was probably out of consideration for the initially fierce criticism of conservative circles regarding his surprising appointment as Pomeranian Chief President and his caution in avoiding statements on current political issues that might provoke such criticism in Pomerania. After completing the assembly's first legislative period in 1919–20, Lippmann did not stand in the next election (then for the Reichstag) on 6 June 1920.

The decisive factor in Lippmann's appointment to the top office of the Prussian state administration in Pomerania was the political composition of the Weimar Government coalition in both the Reich and the federal state of Prussia. Although the DDP was the smallest coalition party in both governments, it had a large pool of experienced politicians on local and regional levels and the right to propose candidates for top positions in the government and the civil service. These combined factors secured the party the decisive influence over personnel decisions, even against the much stronger SPD, which had very few candidates because Social Democrats had previously been largely

23 The speech has been preserved as a printed pamphlet: *Das Programm des Herrn Justizrats Lippmann, Kandidat der Deutschen demokratischen Partei. Wesentlich aufgrund seiner Rede vom 13. Januar 1919, gehalten im großen Börsensaale* (Stettin: Stettiner Druckerei, 1919).

24 In the election to the Prussian Constituent Assembly on 26 January 1919, Lippmann also won the top seat, but he refused it, probably because he had already been elected to the German National Assembly. Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten," 226.

25 *Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung,* vol. 334 (Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 1921).

excluded from civil service positions.[26] Furthermore, Lippmann was a well-known figure in government and parliamentary circles in Berlin, thanks to his ten years of political work for Stettin and Pomerania and his eloquent commitment to structural political reforms in Prussia. His democratic legitimacy was further strengthened by the two election victories.[27] After the Prussian Interior Minister Paul Hirsch (SPD) proposed Lippmann to the cabinet, his appointment as Chief President of Pomerania took place the following day, on 25 March 1919.

Although his many years as a lawyer, city councillor, and parliamentarian made Lippmann more vulnerable for a critique that generally opposed filling important positions with party members, his background gave him strong backing within his own party, which was almost always part of governing coalitions in the Reich and in Prussia since 1919. The DDP's direct political competitor, the right-wing liberal German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei*, DVP), held a similar position of influence since the early 1920s and was also able to successfully propose eligible candidates for top civil service positions, as demonstrated in Pomerania.[28] Ideologically, however, Lippmann was closer to the Social Democrats than to the business-friendly right-wing liberals. This was most evident in his demand for state subsidies for the port of Stettin, the maritime industry, and agriculture in Pomerania. His commitment to building a modern welfare state in the province further reflects this orientation. Politically, Lippmann can therefore be described as a social liberal who worked most closely with the left-wing liberal and social democratic ministers of the Prussian Government. Crucial to his work in Pomerania was the Prussian Interior Minister Albert Grzesinski (SPD) and his State Secretary Wilhelm Abegg (DDP), with whom he cooperated closely in the democratisation of the Pomeranian administration, and the Prussian Trade Ministers Wilhelm Siering (SPD) and Walther Schreiber (DDP), who were his most important partners in the maintenance and modernisation of the port of Stettin. The consulted records indicate that former colleagues from his time as a Stettin city councillor and member of

26 Wolfgang Runge, *Politik und Beamtentum im Parteienstaat: Die Demokratisierung der politischen Beamten in Preußen zwischen 1918 und 1933* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1965), 36–37, 46–47, 50–51.

27 Unlike his predecessors in the Pomeranian civil service, Lippmann did not come from the higher Prussian administrative service, but from local and regional politics, so that he was included in a list of so-called outsiders at the Professional Association of Senior Administrative Officials of Prussia and the German Reich. Bundesarchiv, Berlin [German Federal Archives] (hereinafter BAB), Fonds: "Berufsverein der höheren Verwaltungsbeamten Preußens und des Reiches" [Professional Association of Senior Administrative Officials of Prussia and the German Reich]. Ref. no. 8082, file 67, *Außenseiter* [Outsiders], vol. 1, 1923–1924.

28 These top leadership positions included, above all, the District Presidents (*Regierungspräsidenten*) of the three administrative districts of this Prussian province: the Stralsund district (Hermann Haussmann, DDP, in office 1919–1932); the Köslin (Koszalin) district (Otto Junghann, DDP, in office 1919–1924, and Curt Cronau, close to the DDP, in office 1925–1934); and the Stettin (Szczecin) district (Leopold Höhnen, DVP, in office 1922–1927, and Carl von Halfern, DVP, in office 1927–1930). In 1930, Halfern succeeded Lippmann in the office of Chief President of Pomerania.

the Prussian Parliament were also occasional points of contact for him, although he does not appear to have had a close personal relationship with any of them. Thus, during his term as Chief President, Lippmann maintained a small network of republican-minded, left-wing liberal and social-democratic partners, both in Pomerania and in Berlin.

Prussian Chief Presidents in the Weimar Republic were part of the German administrative elite, although their powers were also disputed. The Chief President (*Oberpräsident*) was a specific administrative post unique in Prussia, with no exact equivalent elsewhere in Germany, although comparable to a voivode in Poland, a prefect in France, a *Statthalter* in Austria, a royal commissioner in the provinces of the Netherlands, or a colonial governor. The key function of the office was to represent the Prussian Government in the province. During the monarchy (1815–1918), Chief Presidents were classified as "political officials" (*politische Beamte*) from 1849 onwards, as were District Presidents (*Regierungspräsidenten*), Police Chiefs (*Polizeipräsidenten*), and District Administrators (*Landräte*), all representing the conservative policies of the Prussian Government in the twelve provinces. In the Weimar Republic (1918–33), the party composition of the Prussian coalition governments largely determined the selection of the Chief Presidents. However, party membership was not always decisive; professional competence also played an important role. From the mid–1920s onwards, the distribution of parties among the Chief Presidents remained relatively stable: by 1930, four of the twelve *Oberpräsidenten* came from the SPD, three from the Catholic Centre Party, two from the DDP and three from the DVP.[29]

In the Weimar Republic, the Prussian Chief Presidents continued to be regarded as top-ranking officials, positioned second in the civil service hierarchy only behind the State Secretaries (*Staatssekretäre*). Their powers in the provinces remained considerable, encompassing overall supervision of District Governments and District Presidents, and the Provincial Self-government (*Provinzialverband*) including the Provincial Parliament (*Provinziallandtag*). Their immediate responsibilities included waterway administration, maritime authorities, and police academies. However, *Oberpräsidenten* were not the superiors of the *Regierungspräsidenten*, who were directly subordinate

29 Hans Fenske, *Die Verwaltung Pommerns 1815–1945: Aufbau und Ertrag* (Köln: Böhlau, 1993), 24–28; Horst Möller, "Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten der Weimarer Republik als Verwaltungselite," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 30 (1982), 1: 3, 12–14; Georg-Christoph von Unruh, "Der preußische Oberpräsident – Entstehung, Stellung und Wandel," in: *Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten 1815–1945*, ed. by Klaus Schwabe (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1985), 17–31; Marie-Bénédicte Vincent, "The Positions of *Oberpräsident*, *Regierungspräsident*, and *Landrat* in Nineteenth-Century Prussian Administration: What We know and Current Enquiry," in: *Prefects and Governors in Nineteenth-century Europe: Towards a Comparative History of Provincial Senior Officials*, ed. by Pierre Karila-Cohen (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 118–119. Special studies on the *Oberpräsidenten* in Pomerania are: Hans Branig, "Die Oberpräsidenten der Provinz Pommern," in *Baltische Studien* New Series 46 (1959), 92–107; Hansjoachim Henning, "Die Oberpräsidenten der Provinzen Brandenburg, Pommern und Sachsen 1871–1918," in: *Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten 1815–1945*, ed. by Klaus Schwabe (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1985), 307–314.

to the Prussian Interior Minister, which often created authority conflicts. Furthermore, *Oberpräsidenten* did not make personnel decisions regarding the appointment of *Regierungspräsidenten* and *Landräte*, nor did they take fundamental political decisions in their provinces.

In 1926, the Chief President of East Prussia, Ernst Sier, submitted a memorandum to the Prussian Government, based on his own research and a survey of his colleagues. It criticised the fact that the Chief Presidents were hardly involved in the drafting of laws affecting their areas of responsibility and were insufficiently consulted. However, the Prussian Government rejected such increased influence on legislation. Minister of Justice Hugo am Zehnhoff (Centre Party) replied that "The new state, which knows no king, has no need for viceroys in the provinces."[30] The files of the Prussian Government from the Weimar Republic contain further complaints by the Chief Presidents about their exclusion by both the Prussian Government and the District Presidents, who often addressed their reports directly to the relevant Minister of State, thus bypassing the Chief Presidents. Lippmann himself complained in 1926 that he had not been informed in advance of, nor invited to attend, a visit by a medical study commission from the League of Nations' Hygiene Department to inspect the port of Stettin. Instead, the Stettin District President had been assigned this task by Reich Interior Minister Wilhelm Külz (DDP). Lippmann protested vigorously against his "exclusion" (*Ausschaltung*), which he argued "could not be conducive to the authority of his position."[31] The incident was all the more bitter for Lippmann because the minister came from his own party, while the District President was a member of the DVP and even a member of the Pomeranian Provincial Parliament.[32] The accumulation of such cases, which reflected more than just the personal ambitions of the Chief Presidents, prompted historian Horst Möller to describe the problem as a structural one in the conception of this intermediate authority. This was probably one of the reasons why the Prussian Interior Ministers in the following years were particularly keen to strengthen the important political function of the *Oberpräsidenten* and to use the office to further consolidate democracy against political extremism, especially in rural areas.[33]

30 Memorandum of Ernst Sier (Königsberg), 18 February 1926, as quoted in Möller, "Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten," 16–17.

31 AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 1625, *Der Stettiner Hafen: Die Erweiterung der Hafenanlagen und Errichtung eines Freibezirks in Stettin*, vol. 2, 1922–1933, letter of Lippmann (Stettin) to Külz (Berlin), 24 September 1926.

32 At that time, the DVP was represented in the Reich Government by three ministers, namely Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, Economics Minister Julius Curtius and Reich Transport Minister Rudolf Krohne. In his reply the Minister claimed ignorance but agreed with Lippmann in principle. AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 1625, letter of Külz (Berlin) to Lippmann (Stettin), 1 October 1926.

33 Möller, "Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten," 19–26.



Figure 4. Historical postcard: The city centre of Stettin with the castle of the Dukes of Pomerania [Zamek Książąt Pomorskich, top right], the seat of the *Oberpräsidium der Provinz Pommern* 1815–1945, and St. Jakobi Church [Św. Jakuba, left], c. 1910

Source: Private Archives Bert Becker, Seebad Ahlbeck.

Crisis Manager for Stettin's Economy and the Port

In Pomerania, the official seat of the provincial government (*Oberpräsidium*) was in the castle of the Pomeranian dukes located in the centre of Stettin. In terms of staffing, in 1921, there was a deputy (*Oberpräsidialrat*, referred to as *Vizepräsident* from 1924) to Chief President Lippmann, ten senior officials (*Oberregierungsräte* and *Regierungsräte*), fourteen low-ranking civil servants (*Bürobeamte*, *Kanzleibeamte* and *Unterbeamte*), and thirty-seven clerks (*Angestellte*), making a total of sixty-three employees in the *Oberpräsidium*.[34] In his daily administrative work, the *Oberpräsident* cooperated closely with the District Presidents (*Regierungspräsidenten*) of the Stettin, Köslin and Stralsund districts. He was also responsible for maintaining political contacts with other supreme authorities in Stettin, namely the Provincial Self-government (*Provinzialverband*), including the Provincial Parliament (*Provinziallandtag*) and the head of the self-government, the provincial director (*Landeshauptmann*). Additional contacts included the magistrate of the City of Stettin, the railway administration, the state finance office, the postal

34 AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 513, *Dienstordnung und Geschäftsbetrieb im Oberpräsidium*, vol. 2, 1921–1924, circular listing all names of employees in the *Oberpräsidium von Pommern*, 24 November 1921.

administration, and the consistory of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Pomerania.[35] The records of the *Oberpräsidium von Pommern*, now divided between the state archives in Szczecin and Greifswald, reveal the comprehensive and diverse nature of its political and administrative tasks. It was, of course, up to the respective office holder to set his priorities.

In his economic policy for the port of Stettin, Lippmann clearly drew on his knowledge as Stettin city councillor and as member of the Prussian Parliament. Before the First World War, Stettin had been the largest German and Prussian Baltic Sea port, with imports and exports exceeding the total maritime traffic of Danzig (Gdańsk), Lübeck and Königsberg combined, but the territorial changes brought about by the Versailles peace treaty, in 1919, and the founding of the Second Polish Republic and the Free State of Danzig led to economic disruptions in Baltic Sea trade. In inland shipping, Stettin, as the traditional seaport of Berlin, competed with the semi-autonomous Northwest German city-state of Hamburg, which was expanding its waterways to the east. In the autumn of 1921, Stettin's important shipbuilding industry went through its first crisis when armaments orders failed to materialise and unemployment rose.[36] When it became known that Prussia wanted to transfer parts of its territory to Hamburg to create an economically-strong agglomeration region called *Groß-Hamburg* (Greater Hamburg), Lippmann immediately joined the vivid protest of the Stettin magistrate, the Stettin Corporation of Merchants (*Korporation der Kaufmannschaft zu Stettin*) and the Provincial Parliament of Pomerania. The Chief President had already been informed in early March 1922 by the leaders of the Stettin merchant corporation about their upcoming initiative against the Prussian Government. On 13 March 1922, Lippmann informed them that he "intended to strongly support the wishes of the merchant community."[37] The merchants' memorandum of 31 March 1922, with its demand to the Prussian Government to improve Stettin's water connections, relieve it of state shipping duties and further expand the port facilities was strongly supported by Lippmann towards Berlin government circles shortly later.[38]

35 Fenske, *Die Verwaltung Pommerns*, 28–41; Bert Becker, "Verwaltung und höhere Beamtenschaft in Pommern 1918/19," in: *Pommern zwischen Zäsur und Kontinuität: 1918–1933–1945–1989*, ed. by Bert Becker and Kyra T. Inachin (Schwerin: Helms, 1999), 41–43.

36 Of the quite extensive German literature of the interwar period on these questions, see for example: Renate von Heinemann, *Die Stellung Stettins in der Weltwirtschaft* (Berlin: Wilhelm Christians, 1927); Erich Ewert, "Der Stettiner Hafen seit Beendigung des Weltkrieges" (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cologne, 1932).

37 LAG, Ref. no. 60, file 2109, *Erweiterung der Hafenanlagen und Errichtung eines Freibezirks in Stettin*, 1853–1922, letter of Stettin Merchant Corporation to Lippmann (Stettin), 6 March 1922, and Lippmann's reply, 13 March 1922.

38 *Pommersche Tagespost* 30/31, March 1922; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin [Prussian Privy Archives] (hereinafter GStA), I. HA, Rep. 77, "Ministerium des Innern" [Prussian Interior Ministry], Tit. 471, no. 28, *Stettin: Ausbau des Hafens*, 1921–1927, letter of Lippmann (Stettin) to Prussian Trade Minister Siering (Berlin), 6 April 1922.

From then on, Lippmann took on an important mediating and coordinating role, initially at a conference on 4 November 1922 with Lord Mayor Friedrich Ackermann and Franz Gribel, the head of the merchant corporation, in which a state equity stake in the local seaport (which was the sole property of the City of Stettin), and its future expansion were discussed. At the subsequent conference on 23 November 1922 chaired by Lippmann and with Dr Rudolf Krohne (DVP), ministerial director in the Prussian trade ministry, and representatives of Stettin's magistrate and local merchants, a contract was drafted that was discussed and finally passed by the Stettin City Council on 30 April 1923 and the Prussian Parliament on 30 June 1923.[39] The two resolutions created two companies, firstly the Stettin Port Community (*Stettiner Hafengemeinschaft*) as a state-municipal company for the joint administration, expansion of the port facilities and operation of the port railway, and secondly the Stettin Harbour Operating Company (*Stettiner Hafenbetriebsgesellschaft*) with the State of Prussia, the City of Stettin and the Corporation of Merchants as shareholders for the administration and operation of the port facilities as well as the handling and storage facilities. While the Stettin Port Community made the port of Stettin the joint property of Prussia and Stettin, thereby guaranteeing state financial participation, the Stettin Harbour Operating Company dedicated itself to the structural modernisation and expansion of the port under private-sector conditions. This was a major step forward thanks to the efficient co-operation of those responsible in Stettin and Berlin. It made it possible to financially secure the maintenance and expansion of the port of Stettin, even for the future and before the major economic and political crisis of the Weimar Republic occurred in 1923–24 causing hyperinflation, mass strikes, and hunger riots. After a few years of experience with the two companies, the managements were merged in 1928 to better align Stettin's harbour development projects with Prussia's general economic policies. Krohne, who had in the meantime been Reich Minister of Transport (1925–1927), was made director-general of the new Stettin Port Company (*Stettiner Hafengesellschaft*).[40]

After the German national currency had fully stabilised and the economy recovered, the Prussian Government decided on 15 January 1925 to provide further financial aid to Prussian shipyards and shipping companies. Following this decision,

39 AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 2220, *Beteiligung des Staats am Stettiner Hafen*, 1922–1924, negotiation minutes of 4 November 1922 and 23 November 1922; letter of Ackermann (Stettin) to Lippmann (Stettin), 30 April 1923; GStA, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 471, no. 28, Prussian Landtag, *Draft law on the maintenance and further expansion of the port of Stettin*, 30 June 1923.

40 Hans August Hoppe, Die *Wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der Stadt Stettin unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Organisation* (Stettin: Louis Pasenow, 1930), 59–71; Dopierała, *Kryzys Gospodarki*, 21–26; Edward Włodarczyk, "Der Staat Preußen und die Stadt Stettin: Zur Entstehung der «Stettiner Hafengemeinschaft m.b.H. in Stettin» im Jahre 1923," *Studia Maritima* 10 (1997), 123–144; idem, "Krisenzeit: Pommern in der Weimarer Republik (bis 1933)," in *Pommern im Wandel der Zeiten*, ed. Jan M. Piskorski (Szczecin: Zamek Książąt Pomorskich, 1999), 283–303.

a major infrastructure programme was drawn up in Stettin. This included not only the construction of three heavy ore loading bridges in the bulk cargo handling port, but also the deepening of the fairway to the Baltic Sea and the construction of a long harbour canal, new harbour basins and a quay for the handling of herrings, in which Stettin had been the leader among all German seaports for decades. However, the large financial resources for the maritime industry requested by Trade Minister Schreiber and approved by the Prussian Parliament on 31 July 1926 were only distributed after fierce disputes with local and regional stakeholders over the respective capital shares were resolved.[41] As the correspondences in the consulted archival records indicate, Lippmann was involved in virtually all these discussions between the respective interest groups. He appears to have had a close relationship with the Stettin merchants and their traditional corporation, which was transformed into a modern Chamber of Industry and Commerce (*Industrie- und Handelskammer*, IHK) on 11 February 1926; the board constitution followed on 12 April 1926. This initiative, undertaken in advance of the forthcoming marathon negotiations with the Prussian Government, created a powerful lobby organisation representing the economic interests of the City of Stettin and its surrounding area.[42] The relevance of IHK was demonstrated during the difficult discussions with three Prussian ministries about the distribution of port construction costs in autumn 1926. While the Finance Ministry demanded that the City contribute half of the costs, the magistrate only wanted to take on a quarter of the financial burden, which was supported by IHK experts. In these lengthy discussions, Lippmann acted as a coordinator, and his proposal to limit the city's share to one third of the costs from 1928 onwards was finally accepted by the state. Because the expansion of Prussia's largest port also affected the economic interests of all of eastern Germany, the Prussian Parliament on 30 September 1927 approved a state subsidy of almost eleven million Reichsmarks, ensuring that Prussia would bear two thirds of the estimated construction costs.[43]

41 Extensive correspondence and negotiation records from the various interested parties can be found in the following files: GStA, I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 471, no. 28, and AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 2220, *Beteiligung des Staats am Stettiner Hafen*, 1922–1924.

42 *Stettiner Abendpost*, 3 and 11 February 1926. The last article provides an overview of the history of the Stettin Chamber of Industry and Commerce and a detailed description of the opening session. The correspondence is in LAG, Ref. no. 60, file 2122, *Die Industrie- und Handelskammer in Stettin*, vol. 4, 1926–1933.

43 From the following correspondence it is evident that the Prussian Government followed Lippmann's suggestion: GStA, Ref. no. I. HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 471, no. 28, note of Trade Minister Schreiber (Berlin), 10 November 1926; letter of Interior Minister Grzesinski to Schreiber, 19 November 1926. Lippmann's mediation proposal was also discussed during negotiations between representatives of the Prussian Finance Ministry, the Chief President and Ackermann. Idem, Minutes of the meetings in Stettin, 29 November 1926.

In recognition of Lippmann's major contribution to this success, the IHK presented him with a special honour. At the annual general meeting on 26 October 1927, chamber president Hellmut Toepffer (1876–1947), managing director of the Portland cement factory in Stettin and formerly a higher official in the German Foreign Ministry, praised Lippmann's "tireless energy" and his influence on all economic processes, highlighting his major contribution to the successes achieved. He presented the honouree with a heavily gilded silver medal, specially struck for this occasion, which on one side expressed the thanks of the business community and on the other depicted the coat of arms of the old Stettin Merchant Corporation, now serving as the new seal of the IHK. A graphically elaborate certificate expressed heartfelt thanks to "[t]he protector and helper of the seaport, maritime and inland shipping, industry and trade, the far-sighted promoter of the economy of Pomerania and Stettin" and combined this with the wish "that the Pomeranian state, Pomerania's economy and Stettin may continue to have the proven head for a long time to come."[44]



Figure 5. Medal of Honour for Julius Lippmann, Chief President of Pomerania, presented by the Stettin Chamber of Industry and Commerce, 26 October 1927. The text on the front reads: "Dedicated with gratitude to the Chief President of the Province of Pomerania, Mr Julius Lippmann, 1927"

Source: Photo collection in Private Archives Bert Becker, Seebad Ahlbeck.

44 This certificate and the IHK's medal were taken to the USA when Lippmann's son Werner Lippmann and his family emigrated in 1939. In 2024, they were donated by Werner Lippmann's granddaughter Nicola Bernstein to the Pomeranian State Museum in Greifswald along with other documents from Julius Lippmann. Pommersches Landesmuseum, Greifswald [Pomeranian State Museum] (hereinafter PLM), Nachlaß Julius Lippmann [Personal Archives of Julius Lippmann] (hereinafter NL JL), no. 2, *Zweiseitige Verleihungsurkunde, Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Stettin, an Julius Lippmann, "Goldene Medaille für hervorragende Leistungen,"* 25 October 1927, no. 4, *Medaille, IHK zu Stettin, für Julius Lippmann*, 1927.

The "Pommersche Tagespost," the most important publication of the conservative German National People's Party (DNVP) and the agricultural lobby in Pomerania, reported that in his reply, Lippmann had emphasised the view of the civil servant as an appointed servant, friend and promoter of the economy, which in his opinion was shared by the entire Pomeranian civil service. He announced that he would continue to work in the spirit of the province's far-sighted businessmen in the future. This newspaper, which had verbally and even anti-Semitically insulted Lippmann in 1919, demonstrated through its positive tone the already greatly changed attitude of the conservatives toward the Chief President in the eighth year of his term of office.[45] In response to the congratulatory letter from Interior Minister Grzesinski (SPD) for this honour, Lippmann wrote that he hoped "to gradually bring the Pomeranians in the depths of their mind closer to the social republic."[46] These words show that Lippmann regarded crisis management and his coordinating role as a political task of him as civil servant with the goal of strengthening the Weimar Republic as a social people's state.



Figure 6. Julius Lippmann as Chief President of Pomerania (*Oberpräsident von Pommern*), 1928

Source: *Pommern-Jahrbuch* 3 (1928), ed. by Alfred Berger (Stettin: Leon Sauniers, 1928), 5.

45 *Pommersche Tagespost* 26, October 1927. For the verbal and anti-Semitic attacks against Lippmann in this press in 1919, see: Becker, "Die pommerschen Oberpräsidenten," 235–240.

46 BAB, "Reichsministerium des Innern" [Reich Interior Ministry], Ref. no. R 1501, file 133416, *Die Oberpräsidenten der Provinz Pommern*, 1924–1944. Lippmann's orginal sentence was as follows: "Ich hoffe, den Pommern die soziale Republik doch nach und nach innerlich näher zu bringen."

The special honour for Lippmann was undoubtedly associated with the expectation in Stettin's business circles that the industrious official would also play his important role as a coordinator between the city and the Prussian Government in the impending serious shipyard crisis in 1927–28. Already in the previous year, Lippmann had participated in a conference in Berlin with representatives of the Reich and Prussian ministries on the fate of the "Vulcan Works" (*Vulcan-Werke*), the traditional shipbuilding and mechanical engineering company in Stettin, founded in 1857. In combination with its shipyard in Hamburg, "Vulcan Works" was one of the leading German enterprises in civilian and warship construction, and in the construction of steam locomotives. After a short-lived war and post-war economic boom, overcapacity in global shipbuilding and a sharp decline in orders resulted into the Stettin company operating on low capacity supported with state loans.[47] This situation was discussed at the Berlin conference on 2 November 1926 which took the decision not to grant any further state loans to the "Vulcan Works," which was considered economically pointless. Therefore, the company was forced to sell their Hamburg shipyard, which was taken over by the newly founded "Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbaugesellschaft" ("Deschimag") in Bremen. This company was a fusion of the shipbuilding companies, "AG Weser" and "Joh. C. Tecklenborg AG," based in the Bremen region and a clear reaction to the shipyard crisis caused by global overproduction.[48]

In Stettin, the "Vulcan Works" shipyard and the engine and locomotive factory continued as an independent company under the name "Stettiner Maschinenbau-A.G. Vulcan." The firm profited from the Reich Government's annual subsidies for German shipping companies which commissioned new ships at German yards and was able to secure low-interest loans for itself from the Prussian State Bank. Such grants led to a short boom for German shipyards, as 120 vessels with a value of about 140 million marks were commissioned in 1927.[49] However, with the worsening major crisis in the global shipyard industry, the Reich and Prussia decided to merge the "Vulcan Works" with "Deschimag" hoping that this larger organisation would be more efficient and profitable.

47 Karin Lehmann, "Staatsgelder für die Vulcan-Werke in Hamburg und Stettin A. G. 1925 bis 1927: Auseinandersetzungen über staatsmonopolistische Subventionspolitik," *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, (1980): 26–34.

48 The crisis in the global shipbuilding industry led to mass layoffs: while the 26 largest shipyards worldwide still had 83,200 workers in 1922, by 1926 this figure had fallen to just 25,600. Lars U. Scholl, "Struggling Against the Odds: The German Merchant Marine in the Inter-War Period 1920–1932," in: *Shipping and Trade (1750–1950)*, eds. Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 93; Lehmann, "Staatsgelder," 35–40; Reinhold Thiel, *Die Geschichte der Actien-Gesellschaft "Weser" 1843–1983*, vol. 2 (Bremen: Hauschild, 2006), 59–76.

49 Scholl, "Struggling Against the Odds," 93–94.

During the merger in the summer of 1927, "Deschimag" also took over the majority of shares in the small "Nüscke" shipyard in Stettin and other northern German shipyards.[50]

In the following months, the increasingly strong competition from the seaports of the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk) and, in particular, the Polish-dominated Gdingen (Gdynia) – which had been expanded and heavily subsidised by the Polish government as the country's most important seaport – alongside intensified competition with Hamburg and Bremen, left Stettin with few options. Plans to promote the city's maritime economy were discussed with high-ranking representatives of the Reich and Prussian ministries at a first crisis meeting in Stettin chaired by Lippmann on 24 May 1928.[51] After that, events unfolded in rapid succession. In August 1928, when "Deschimag" announced that it would close its plants in Stettin as soon as possible because of inefficiency and it planned to scrap the entire equipment,[52] Lippmann immediately started negotiations with Prussian Trade Minister Schreiber (DDP), Finance Minister Hermann Höpker-Aschoff (DDP), and Welfare Minister Heinrich Hirtsiefer (Centre Party) regarding short-term government aids for the employees of the shipyard industry and their families. At the Reich Railway Directorate in Stettin (*Reichsbahndirektion Stettin*), he strongly advocated railway construction that would possibly create jobs for those who lost their jobs in the shipbuilding industry. However, these were more long-term solutions, although short-term solutions were needed in this situation, as proposed by the Stettin District President. In his report of 16 August 1928 for the Prussian Ministry of Welfare, Carl von Halfern called for short-term social policy measures such as unemployment benefits as well as state-funded housing and school building programmes to alleviate the urgent emergency. On 28 August 1928, Lippmann gave his explicit approval to these socio-political proposals.[53]

50 Lehmann, "Staatsgelder," 40–41.

51 LAG, Ref. no. 60, file 1911, *Maßnahmen zur Hebung der pommerschen Wirtschaft*, vol. 1, 1928–1929, Minutes of the negotiations on measures to promote the Stettin economy, 24 May 1928.

52 Thiel, *Die Geschichte*, vol. 2, 114–130.

53 LAG, Ref. no. 60, file 1911, letter from Lippmann (Stettin) to *Reichsbahndirektion Stettin*, 24 August 1928; letter from Halfern (Stettin) to Lippmann (Stettin), 16 August 1928; letter from Lippmann (Stettin) to Hirtsiefer (Berlin), 28 August 1928. Further extensive correspondence and negotiation records from the various interested parties can be found in this file.





Figures 7 and 8. Chief President Julius Lippmann during his visit to the Stettin factory of the "Best Company" for the processing of coal, coke, and anthracite (*Bestwerke: Kohlen-Koks-Anthracit GmbH*) on 18 October 1928. The company, founded in 1895 under a different name, imported raw anthracite from Wales, UK, which was broken, screened and washed in Stettin to remove the worthless components. The final product, fine anthracite coal, was used to produce highly efficient perforated briquettes (*Lochbriketts*) with almost thirty percent higher efficiency than solid briquettes, for which the *Bestwerke* had a monopoly. The perforated briquettes were sold for domestic heating and industrial use.[54] The file which included these photos does not reveal why Lippmann was invited to visit the plant. It is possible that the company was seeking state financial subsidies and wanted the support of the Chief President.

Source: AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 558: *Handakten für den Oberpräsidenten Lippmann*, vol. 7, 1928, 355.

54 *Pommern-Jahrbuch* 4 (1929), ed. by Alfred Berger (Stettin: Leon Sauniers, 1929), 102.

Lippmann's persistent advocacy of the economic interests of Stettin and Pomerania was the decisive factor for another special honour: on the tenth anniversary of his appointment as Chief President on 25 March 1929, he received graphically elaborate congratulatory certificates from the Stettin IHK and the Pomeranian Association of Cities (*Pommerscher Städtetag*).[55] These honours were likely accompanied by the expectation that the capable mediator and crisis manager would continue to fight for the interests of Stettin and Pomerania. This proved only partially true, because the global economic crisis that began in October 1929 presented a challenge that a single top official in a Prussian province could no longer overcome. By 1930, the IHK in Stettin observed that the city ranked third among German cities with over 45,000 unemployed, corresponding to 18 per cent of the urban population. According to the IHK report, this situation was due to "a process of dissolution among the commercial, industrial and transport companies in the district, which continues on a scale that is a cause for great concern."[56] The IHK predicted even more company closures, which occurred shortly thereafter. In Stettin's important metal industry, the number of employees fell from 11,965 workers in 1925 to just 887 in 1931, a decline of almost 92 per cent.[57] One of the most important companies in the metal industry in Stettin, "Stoewer-Werke" founded in 1899 and specialising in the construction of motor vehicles also struggled to survive the crisis. Although Lippmann had promised the company in December 1929 that he would stand up for the interests of the automotive industry,[58] he soon reached the limits of his capacity as a crisis manager and acted helplessly in the face of the global depression with its serious effects on Germany. His many years of devoted service to Stettin and its industrial interests came to an end when he retired from his office as Chief President of Pomerania only four months later.[59]

55 PLM, NL JL, no. 5, *Ehrungsschreiben/-rede, IHK, für Julius Lippmann*, 25 March 1929, no. 12, *Ehrungsurkunde, Der Pommersche Städtetag, an Julius Lippmann*, 25 March 1929.

56 AP Szczecin, Ref. no. 73, file 71, *Besuch des Herrn Reichskanzlers [Heinrich Brüning] in Stettin*, 1931, letter from Stettin Chamber of Commerce and Industry to Reich Chancellor Brüning (Berlin), 10 January 1931, published in: Bogdan Dopierała, *Ekonomiczne i demograficzne problemy Pomorza Zachodniego w świetle niemieckich materiałów źródłowych z lat 1926–1932*, document 26, 191–197 (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1959).

57 LAG, Ref. no. 60, file 1918, *Förderung der Industrie, des Handels und der Wirtschaft*, vol. 5, 1930–1932, letter from the Stettin Magistrate to Chief President Carl von Halfern (Stettin), 29 February 1932.

58 LAG, Ref. no. 60, file 1917, *Förderung der Industrie, des Handels und der Wirtschaft*, vol. 4, 1926–1930, letter from Lippmann (Stettin) to Stoewer-Werke (Stettin), 4 December 1929.

59 After Lippmann's retirement on 31 March 1930, Stettin's lord mayor Ackermann donated a bronze bust of him to honour the long-standing Chief President. It was modelled by the Stettin sculptor Kurt Schwerdtfeger (1897–1966) and placed in the entrance hall of the municipal museum. The bust was brought to the museum storeroom in 1933, confiscated in 1945 and taken to an unknown location. I would like to thank Dr Szymon Piotr Kubiak, Head of European Art Department 1800–1945, Muzeum Narodowe w Szczecinie, for this information.

After a brief interlude as a lecturer in administrative law at the University of Greifswald from 1930 to 1933, a position terminated by the National Socialists,[60] Lippmann moved with his family from Stettin to Berlin. He rented a house in the Westend district of Charlottenburg where he died on 13 November 1934 from a car accident and subsequent peritonitis. The cremation took place in the Wilmersdorf crematorium at the municipal cemetery on 16 November 1934. Several top officials from Pomerania were apparently present, as a meeting of the Rotary Club of Stettin scheduled for that day had to be postponed.[61] It is no longer known whether the urn was buried in Wilmersdorf cemetery or elsewhere. In 1938, his wife Margarete emigrated with her daughters Else and Hildegard to the United Kingdom. Lippmann's son Werner continued to work as a psychiatrist with his own practice in Stettin before emigrating with his wife and two daughters to the USA in 1939.[62]

Conclusions

During the Weimar Republic, the political-economic history of the port of Stettin (Szczecin) was marked by remarkable efforts of three players – the Stettin Magistrate, the Chief President of Pomerania and the Prussian Government – to preserve and further develop the port amid competition with the German ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, as well as with Baltic Sea ports dominated by the newly independent Polish state, namely Danzig (Gdańsk) and Gdingen (Gdynia). In this struggle for economic survival, Chief President Julius Lippmann played a crucial role as crisis manager, a contribution that has been overlooked by both Polish and German historians.

60 In 1927, the University of Greifswald had honoured Chief President Lippmann's special commitment to the university during his term in office by appointing him an honorary senator. PLM, NL JL, no. 11, *Urkunde, Ernennung von Julius Lippmann zum Ehrensenator der Universität Greifswald*, 7 May 1927; Werner Buchholz, ed., *Lexikon Greifswalder Hochschullehrer 1775 bis 2006*, vol. 3: *Lexikon Greifswalder Hochschullehrer 1907-1932*, ed. by Meinrad Welker (Bad Honnef: Bock, 2004), 144; Irene Vorholz, "Angehörige der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät zwischen 1933 und 1945," in: *Greifswalder Fakultäten im Nationalsozialismus: Gedenktag für die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus am 27. Januar 2011 in Greifswald*, ed. by Johanna Eleonore Weber (Greifswald: Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität, 2011), 14–15.

61 Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin, *Obituaries for Julius Lippmann*, 1934; GStA, Fonds: "Rotary International." Ref. no. I. HA, Rep. 228, file 1690, *Korrespondenz des Rotary Klubs Stettin*, 1934–1935, letter from Rotary Klub Stettin to Rotary Klub Halle/Saale, 26 November 1934.

62 While Else remained unmarried, Hildegard became the wife of Fritz Jacob Sigismund Adler (1899–1949), a Jewish lawyer in Berlin. Werner Lippmann was married to Gertraud Immisch (1906–1997); the couple had two daughters, Margrit (1937–2008) and Ruth (1930–2024). Private Archives Nicola Bernstein, Berlin, George Adler, *Family Tree – Adler Branch* and *Lippmann Branch,* 2002. A short biography of Werner Lippmann can be found in: Kathleen Haack, *Vom "Anstaltsboom" zum NS-Krankenmord: Psychiatrie in Ueckermünde und Pommern im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2025), 209–216.

When he took office in Stettin on 1 April 1919, Lippmann was already a well-known figure in Berlin government and parliamentary circles. His many years as a left-wing liberal party politician for Stettin initially made him the target of verbal attacks from Pomeranian conservatives, military personnel and leading agrarians. In his influential but not uncontroversial position as Chief President during the Weimar Republic, Lippmann found himself in authority conflicts with the District Presidents of Pomerania, who reported directly to the Prussian Interior Minister and sometimes acted without his knowledge. These disputes are evident in the consulted files and require closer examination.

Lippmann saw himself as an advocate for Stettin and Pomerania and proved to be an able mediator between local and regional interests in the province and the Prussian Government, especially during times of severe economic crises, which characterised the remainder of his term of office. Given Stettin's and Pomerania's particular structural challenges, exacerbated by global economic developments, Lippmann was unable to find the simple solutions many demanded. Nevertheless, he consistently endeavoured to provide effective assistance or organise support in Berlin. This commitment earned him much recognition, especially in trade and industry, but even in the eyes of the agrarian industry, not only because of his network of politically aligned officials in the province and the capital, but above all due to his balanced and authoritative nature, which combined firmness with a necessary degree of distance.[63]

As the highest Prussian civil servant in Pomerania, *Oberpräsident* Lippmann represented the Weimar Republic for eleven years this province, guided by a firm commitment to the republican Reich constitution, the political system of parliamentary democracy, and the principle of a social people's state. During the early years of his tenure, he played a key role in the creation of a modern welfare state in this Prussian province, as confirmed by the first examination of the relevant historical records. Lippmann's guiding principle – to implement democratic and constitutional ideals and thereby strengthen the general acceptance of the Weimar Republic in Pomerania – was expressed most clearly at the constitutional celebrations which were regularly held in Stettin on 11 August. Yet, as the growing political radicalisation and ultimately Hitler's rise to power demonstrated, Lippmann, a committed democrat, could only achieve limited success, something that must have pained him. As a Jewish convert, he and his family found no place in the totalitarian state that followed; they were ultimately forced to emigrate from Germany. Significant documents from Julius Lippmann's

63 Lippmann's granddaughter Ruth, a daughter of his son Werner and the mother of Nicola Bernstein (1958–), recalled these typical character traits of Julius Lippmann, probably from hearsay in her family. Private Archives Bert Becker, Seebad Ahlbeck, *Transcript of a Zoom conversation with Ruth Bookey (Maine, USA), Michael Adler and John Adler (Kent, UK) and Nicola Bernstein (Berlin)*, 13 January 2023.

private collection were brought to the United States of America and thus preserved from destruction. With the return of his great-granddaughter, Nicola Bernstein, to Berlin forty years later and her active interest in the research pursued by the present author, the memory of Julius Lippmann endures.

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SUMMARY

One of the longest-serving senior civil servants in the Prussian province of Pomerania and a committed local patriot of Stettin (Szczecin) has remained an almost unknown figure to this day. This article therefore aims to provide a critical appraisal of his achievements. Above all, Julius Lippmann, a native of Danzig (Gdańsk) from a Jewish family of modest means, was a beacon of democracy and a key initiator and promoter of economic and social programmes for the port of Stettin, as well as Pomeranian welfare and agriculture. Lippmann began his career as a lawyer in a partner firm and made his way into politics from 1900, both as a liberal-minded city councillor of Stettin and as member of the Prussian Parliament. From the outset, he stood up for the interests of Stettin vis-à-vis the Prussian Government, a position he consistently maintained in his economic policy during his term of office as Chief President of Pomerania. Early on, Lippmann chose a left-wing liberal political direction, combining market economy ideas with a strong sense of the rule of law and social responsibility. His political career of almost twenty years enabled him to cooperate closely with a small network of liberal and social-democratic politicians and officials in Berlin and Pomerania, although he always maintained a certain distance. Lippmann's work for the port of Stettin demonstrates how he acted as an important coordinator between the City of Stettin, local merchants, and the Prussian Government from 1922. This helped him to put the port of Stettin on a secure and sustainable footing. As a Prussian civil servant in a single province, however,

he was powerless against the economic crises of the second half of the 1920s, which reached global dimensions in 1929. In the wake of the collapse of the shipbuilding industry and crises in many other sectors including agriculture, he continued to advocate for the interests of Stettin and Pomerania and took on social projects for the affected workers and arranged loans for the farmers. Although Lippmann and his family had converted from Judaism to Lutheranism as early as 1901, he did not escape persecution by the Nazis. After his death, his son's family took important documents belonging to Lippmann with them to the United States. It was not until 2024 that these historical documents could be returned to Germany and handed over to the Pomeranian State Museum in Greifswald by one of Lippmann's great-granddaughters. Since Lippmann left no other personal documents or even memoirs, it is primarily his correspondence from administrative files kept by archives in Szczecin, Greifswald and Berlin that form the most important basis for this article.

Prezydent Julius Lippmann i port w Szczecinie w Republice Weimarskiej

Słowa klucze: Porty morskie, kryzys gospodarczy, Żydzi, antysemityzm, Prusy, administracja

STRESZCZENIE

Jeden z najdłużej urzędujących wyższych urzędników państwowych w pruskiej prowincji Pomorze oraz oddany lokalny patriota Szczecina (Stettina) pozostaje do dziś postacią niemal nieznaną. Niniejszy artykuł ma zatem na celu krytyczną ocenę jego dokonań. Przede wszystkim Julius Lippmann, urodzony w Gdańsku (Danzigu) w żydowskiej rodzinie o skromnych środkach, był symbolem demokracji oraz kluczowym inicjatorem i promotorem programów gospodarczych i społecznych dla portu w Szczecinie, a także dla pomorskiego systemu opieki społecznej i rolnictwa. Lippmann rozpoczął swoją karierę jako prawnik w kancelarii partnerskiej, a od 1900 roku wkroczył na drogę polityki – zarówno jako liberalnie nastawiony radny miejski Szczecina, jak i jako poseł do pruskiego parlamentu. Od samego początku opowiadał się za interesami Szczecina wobec państwa pruskiego, co konsekwentnie realizował również w swojej polityce gospodarczej podczas kadencji jako prezydent prowincji Pomorze. Już we wczesnym etapie swojej działalności politycznej opowiedział się za lewicowo-liberalnym kierunkiem, łączącym idee gospodarki rynkowej z silnym poczuciem praworządności i odpowiedzialności społecznej. Jego niemal dwudziestoletnia kariera polityczna umożliwiła mu bliską współpracę z niewielką siecią liberalnych i socjaldemokratycznych polityków oraz urzędników w Berlinie i na Pomorzu, choć zawsze zachowywał pewien dystans. Działalność Lippmanna na rzecz portu w Szczecinie pokazuje, że od 1922 roku pełnił rolę ważnego koordynatora między miastem Szczecin, lokalnymi kupcami a państwem pruskim. Dzięki temu udało mu się zapewnić portowi stabilne i trwałe podstawy rozwoju. Jako pruski urzędnik państwowy działający w jednej prowincji był jednak bezsilny wobec kryzysów gospodarczych drugiej połowy lat 20., które w 1929 roku osiągnęły również wymiar globalny.

W obliczu załamania przemysłu stoczniowego i kryzysów w wielu innych sektorach, w tym w rolnictwie, nadal zabiegał o interesy Szczecina i Pomorza, podejmując projekty społeczne dla dotkniętych kryzysem pracowników oraz organizując pożyczki dla rolników. Choć Lippmann i jego rodzina przeszli z judaizmu na luteranizm już w 1901 roku, nie uniknął prześladowań ze strony nazistów. Po jego śmierci rodzina syna zabrała ze sobą do Stanów Zjednoczonych ważne dokumenty należące do Lippmanna. Dopiero w 2024 roku udało się zwrócić te historyczne dokumenty do Niemiec, gdzie zostały przekazane do Pomorskiego Muzeum Państwowego w Greifswaldzie przez jedną z prawnuczek Lippmanna. Ponieważ Lippmann nie pozostawił żadnych innych dokumentów osobistych ani wspomnień, to przede wszystkim jego korespondencja zawarta w aktach administracyjnych przechowywanych w archiwach w Szczecinie, Greifswaldzie i Berlinie stanowi najważniejszą podstawę niniejszego artykułu.

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Paweł Jaworski
History Institute
University of Wrocław
pawel.jaworski@uwr.edu.pl
ORCID:0000-0001-5256-1238

Westerplatte, Sweden and the League of Nations in the Early 1920s

Keywords: history of diplomacy, Free City of Danzig, Swedish foreign policy, international organizations

The Free City of Danzig (now: Gdańsk) was established after the Paris Peace Conference and the compromise reached by the Entente powers. According to the Treaty of Versailles, the city was to function under the protection and supervision of the League of Nations, whose representative was the high commissioner. He had the right to make decisions in all disputes between Danzig and Poland. Most of these were closely related to the aspirations of the Danzig authorities for the greatest possible independence from Poland. The practice of future relations between Poland and Danzig was defined in a mutual agreement signed in Paris in November 1920. The port and issues related to customs were to be administered by a mixed Port and Waterways Board. Danzig had no diplomatic relations and no army of its own. Its foreign policy was entrusted to Poland. At the same time, the Free City's authorities – the Sejm (Volkstag) and the government (Senate) – strongly emphasised its separateness.[1] Notably, the German state supported Danzig financially and politically to help "limit Poland's influence and sustain hopes for a revision of the borders, which was an unquestionable dogma of German foreign policy."[2] Indeed, Danzig became an instrument of German

1 Stanisław Sierpowski, *Liga Narodów w latach 1919–1926* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2005), 161–173; idem, "Rola Ligi Narodów w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku w pierwszych latach okresu międzywojennego," in: *Międzymorze. Polska i kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej XIX-XX wiek. Studia ofiarowane Piotrowi Łossowskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, ed. Andrzej Ajnenkiel, et al. (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 1995), 241–253.

2 Peter Oliver Loew, *Danzig. Biographie einer Stadt* (München: C.H. Beck, 2011), 195.

revisionist policy. In 1922, during Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg's visit to Marienburg (East Prussia), Senate President Heinrich Sahm gave a speech in which he said: "We are waiting until we belong to the Fatherland. I have come here to announce it, Your Excellency."[3] Therefore, it's no surprise that Polish-German relations were constantly strained. Disputes between the two sides were continuously the subject of negotiations at the League of Nations in Geneva. In fact, since establishing the League, it has been one of the most important topics for discussion, along with disputes over the island of Corfu, the port of Klaipeda, and the situation in Saarland.

One of the questions became Poland's right to receive and continue transporting war materials, such as arms, armaments, and ammunition, to Poland. When military equipment from France and Britain arrived in Danzig in July 1920 to support the Polish army's fight against Soviet Russia, German dockers refused to unload it. Without the help of Allied soldiers, the aid would have been stuck in the port for good. Polish authorities proposed designating a special zone in the port for unloading military goods transported to Poland. Eventually, the Paris Agreement of November 1920 granted Poland the right to import and export any goods not prohibited by Polish law through the port of Danzig. Initially, war materials were stored in the so-called free port zone, near the city. Later, for safety reasons, the location where these materials were transshipped was moved to Holm Island, further into the harbour.[4] The Danzig authorities insisted that the transshipment site be moved out of the Free City area altogether, arguing that the transported materials carried the risk of explosion.[5] The Polish authorities requested that the Council of the League of Nations hear the matter, ignoring British High Commissioner Richard Haking, who was reluctant towards the Polish position. Finally, on 22 June 1921, the Council of the League of Nations recognised the Polish state's right to a military material transshipment site in Danzig without specifying a permanent location. Therefore, the dispute continued. Its most crucial stage ended with the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on 14 March 1924, placing the Westerplatte peninsula at Poland's disposal, which eventually took place on 31 October 1925.

3 *Historia Gdańska*, vol. IV/2: 1920–1945, ed. Edmund Cieślak (Sopot: Wydawnictwo Lex, 1999), 46.

4 *Historia Gdańska*, 42–47; Stanisław Mikos, *Wolne Miasto Gdańsk a Liga Narodów 1920–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1979), 49–66.

5 On 18 December 1921, Police President Helmut Froböss did not allow the Belgian ship "Gauja," transporting explosives, to enter the port. The Port and Waterways Board stated to the Polish government and the Senate of the Free City that it could not do anything about it. The Senate issued an order to allow the ship to enter the port. However, in response, the dockers went on strike, which still prevented the transport and can be interpreted as a continuation of the obstruction from the Polish-Soviet War. Finally, the cargo was unloaded after a 10-day standstill. However, similar incidents were regularly repeated. See Henryk Stępniak, *Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku* (Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe & Ossolineum, 1971), 44–45.

The history of Westerplatte during the period of the Free City of Danzig has been featured in several publications. In particular, the construction of the depot, its development, and especially its defence in September 1939 have been described in detail.[6] The problem of Westerplatte inevitably appeared in publications about the League of Nations and its attempts at international arbitration.[7] Still, new findings are emerging. A few years ago, it became a sensation that the delegate of the Polish government in Danzig in 1919–1920, Mieczysław Jałowiecki, contributed to the acquisition of Westerplatte by Poland through dealing with the purchase of real estate in the city.[8]

The article aims to analyse the decision-making process, focusing on the relatively unrecognised participation of the Swedish delegation, led until early 1925 by Prime Minister, leader of social democrats, Hjalmar Branting. Sweden, elected as a non-permanent member of the League's Council in the autumn of 1922, participated in the deliberations from 1923 to 1926. The country represented the interests of smaller states, supporting the idea of collective security and international arbitration.[9] Based on this, an attempt

6 Among the monographs: Andrzej Drzycimski, *Westerplatte. Misja specjalna* (Gdańsk: Oficyna Gdańska, 2015); idem, *Westerplatte. Reduta w budowie* (Gdańsk: Fundacja Gdańska, 2014); idem, *Westerplatte 1939. Historia i legenda. Przed szturmem* (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2009); Jarosław Tuliszka, *Westerplatte 1926–1939* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2011).

7 Stępniak, *Rada Portu*, 32; Wolfgang Ramonat, *Der Völkerbund und die Freie Stadt Danzig 1920–1934* (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1979); Elisabeth Morrow Clark, "The Free City of Danzig: Borderland, Hansestadt or Social Democracy?", *The Polish Review* 42 (1997), 3: 259–276; eadem, "Gdańsk, Story of a City when Diplomatic History and Personal Narrative Intersect," *The Polish Review* 61 (2016), 1: 61–79; important remarks in the memoirs by Erik Colban, *Femti* år (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1952), 75–79.

8 Cf. an article on the website of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk: *Polska zawdzięcza im Westerplatte – Mieczysław Jałowiecki (1876–1962),* Muzeum II Wojny Światowej, 17.11.2022, accessed 20.03.2025, https://muzeum1939.pl/polska-zawdziecza-im-westerplatte-mieczyslaw-jalowiecki-18761962/aktualnosci/5775.html. In his memoirs, Jałowiecki stressed the importance of the purchase of real estate, without specifying which properties were actually involved: "Whoever owns Westerplatte controls the entrance to the port of Danzig," he stressed. "The German government, for reasons I did not understand, did not attach much weight to the strategic importance of Westerplatte. (…) It was only at the end of August 1919 that I was informed that the owner of the site began to hesitate, and he was ready to sell Westerplatte, but only into German hands." According to Jałowiecki's account: "It was a beautiful morning in the early Kashubian autumn, when I signed the deed of purchase of Westerplatte in my name in the office of attorney Bielewicz." See Mieczysław Jałowiecki, *Wolne Miasto* (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 2002), 81–84; next extended edition: idem, *Na skraju imperium i inne wspomnienia* (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 2019), 497–499.

9 Sweden's accession to the League of Nations was supported by the Social Democrats and Liberals, with relatively strong opposition from the right, the peasant party and the extreme left. In the first chamber of parliament, the ratio of votes on 3 March 1920 was 86 to 47, and in the second chamber: 152 to 67. On the Branting's attitude towards the League: Nils-Olof Franzén, *Hjalmar Branting och hans tid* (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1985), 336–344. As historian Torbjörn Norman emphasised: "Branting's League of Nations policy was motivated not only by his conviction that, after the neutrality and isolation of the war years, Sweden's peace and security were best served by the League of Nations' system for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and collective security, but also by his view of democracy and socialist ideology." Cf. Torbjörn Norman, *Hjalmar Branting, freden och Folkens förbund samt andra studier i svensk och nordisk 1900-talshistoria*, ed. Karl Molin, Alf W. Johansson (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg Bokförlag, 2014), 70.

was made to explain the role of the smaller states in the League of Nations' conciliation activities, as well as the motivations and circumstances surrounding the activities of their representatives, with accusations from the Polish side of bias in the background. The participation of Swedish expert Per Gustaf Hörnell in developing the compromise on the transshipment point also proved to be an essential topic. Analysing his role contributed to trying to answer the question of the real influence of the League of Nations Secretariat and the experts appointed by the League of Nations on the course of international disputes.[10] Sources from the Riksarkivet in Stockholm, the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw and the League of Nations Archives in Geneva have also helped shed more light on the potential significance of the Polish authorities' buyout of the property in 1919–1920 for the League of Nations Council's subsequent decision on the future of Westerplatte.

The Polish Opinions on the Swedish Activity in the League of Nations

Sent to Sweden in September 1920 on behalf of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the Polish Government, Karol Lutostański, after establishing contacts in Swedish legal circles (among others, Lars Birger Ekeberg[11]) noted: "Although my interlocutors try to remain independent of the German way of thinking in their works, they represent a great veneration for German culture and science. Today's generation of scientists was mostly educated in Germany. Therefore, despite their apparent agreement with my arguments, it seems that my interlocutors were not sufficiently convinced of the validity of our claims against the Germans. Although they condemned Germany's imperialist and nationalist policies, they were also of the opinion that Germans are harmed when they are deprived of the lands on which they have deposited their cultural heritage."[12]

10 On recent research on the history of the League of Nations Secretariat, see: Haakon A. Ikonomou and Karen Gram-Skjoldager, eds., *The League of Nations. Perspectives from the Present* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2019); Karen Gram-Skjoldager, Haakon A. Ikonomou and Torsten Kahlert, eds., *Organizing the 20th-Century World. International Organization and the Emergence of International Public Administration 1920–1960s* (London-New York: Bloomsbury, 2020); Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Haakon A. Ikonomou, "Making Sense of the League of Nations Secretariat – Historiographical and Conceptual Reflections on Early International Public Administration," *European History Quarterly* 49 (2019), 3: 420–444; Karen Gram-Skjoldager and Haakon A. Ikonomou, "The League of Nations Secretariat: An Experiment in Liberal Internationalism?", *Monde(s)* 19 (2021), 1: 31–50.

11 From 27 October 1920 (i.e. just after Lutostański's departure from Sweden) to 13 October 1921, then, in the years 1923–1924, the Minister of Justice; he led to the abolition of the death penalty in Sweden in 1921.

12 Marek Jabłonowski, Włodzimierz Janowski and Adam Koseski, eds., *O niepodległą i granice*, vol. 3: *Raporty i informacje Biura Propagandy Zagranicznej Prezydium Rady Ministrów 1920–1921* (Warszawa-

Similar opinions can be found in many other Polish reports on Swedish politicians and diplomats. Polish authorities typically viewed Swedish diplomats as sympathetic to the Germans. The head of the Northern Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Gustaw Potworowski, summarised reports from the Polish embassy in Stockholm in 1923, emphasising the Germanophilism of the Swedes. He stated: "The Germanophilism of the Swedish elite and the uncritical attitude of the entire society towards everything of German origin is well known."[13]

The Polish envoy in Stockholm until 1924, Jan Zygmunt Michałowski, stressed in his reports that "Sweden was able to use its power in Geneva and influence many issues thanks to the personal abilities of Hjalmar Branting." Michałowski stressed that Branting never supported the Polish delegates because he considered the Polish state a client of France. As an example, he cited the 7 July 1923, session of the League Council, which considered a Polish complaint about the completely arbitrary interpretation of signed agreements by the Senate of the Free City of Danzig and the excessive power of the high commissioners (who usually supported the Danzig side). Poland protested the arbitrariness of the British high commissioners' decisions, which gradually reduced the Polish presence in Danzig. This attempt failed, leaving the impression in Geneva that Poland was as ready as ever to initiate new conflicts. What was Branting's attitude to this issue? According to Michałowski: "During the dispute on 7 July [1924], Branting, as usual, was against Poland, claiming that our demands were excessive and it was right that they were rejected."[14]

Michałowski's successor in Stockholm, Alfred Wysocki, was convinced that the political and cultural background was decisive in building an unfavourable aura around Poland: "As a result, whether I met the socialist Hjalmar Branting, or the conservative Marx von Würtemberg, or Bo Östen Undén, or the liberal Eliel Löfgren, as foreign minister I was almost always met with an evasive, aloof attitude, not respectfully accepting our opinions and démarches." Wysocki's remarks about the Swedish strategy in the League of Nations were surprising for a professional diplomat. He complained: "The way they talked to me was also troublesome. They never denied or simply said no, so I often hoped that I could convince them after the second or third attempt, when I presented our argument. They even seemed to agree with me. But later, when they were

Pułtusk: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego & Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora, 2002), doc. no. 86, A report by Karol Lutostański, a delegate to Stockholm of the Bureau of the Propaganda Abroad at the Polish Government, on the visit to Sweden 4.09–26.10.1920, 197.

13 Archiwum Akt Nowych [The Central Archives of Modern Records], (hereinafter AAN), Fonds: "Delegacja RP przy Lidze Narodów," reference 513, folder 16, Report of the Northern Department, Swedish issues from 1 July to 31 December 1923, Warsaw, 22.04.1924.

14 Ibidem.

in Geneva, they usually voted against us."[15] The Polish diplomat interpreted the matter in a very formulaic and simplistic way. Wysocki presented his view in these words: "Sweden between 1918 and 1928, having to choose between friendship towards Poland, which always caused dissatisfaction in Germany, or friendship with the German state, usually chose the latter."[16] Even stronger words were used by a member of the Polish delegation to the League of Nations in 1925, Kajetan Dzierżykraj-Morawski, reporting that Sweden represented "The most pro-German element in the Council."[17]

Whenever persons active in Swedish public life made statements unfavourable to the interests of the Polish state, Polish politicians and diplomats primarily blamed German influence in the royal family, the media, and the economic and financial circles. Perhaps the accusations were thrown around too nonchalantly. Still, it is worth noting Branting's nonchalant statements about Poland that were given to journalists after the Council of the League of Nations meetings. In March 1924, he expressed the opinion that "The Poles, as usual, caused trouble."[18]

A British-Swedish Political Alliance in Genèva?

The aforementioned Polish diplomat Gustaw Potworowski was sure that before the outbreak of World War I, "Sweden could be considered a German quasi-province." Only after Germany's defeat did the Swedes see that "there are other powers in the world connected to the lives of smaller countries." According to the Polish diplomat, Swedish policy became compatible with British strategy concerning the support for Germany and the lack of reinforcement for France.[19]

Indeed, in the Polish view, the actions of Swedish diplomacy resembled the central tenets of British policy during and after the Paris Peace Conference. The then British Prime Minister David Lloyd George believed that: "We should do everything

15 Alfred Wysocki, *Na placówce dyplomatycznej w Sztokholmie 1924–1928. Wspomnienia*, ed. Paweł Jaworski (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004), 51.

16 Ibidem. Such an explanation of the Swedish positive attitude to Germany was proposed by Östen Undén in his memoirs: "(…) Sweden was sometimes forced to intervene in the Council in a way that could and often was interpreted as characterised by special German-friendliness. But Sweden's policy on such matters was simply dictated by the conviction that it was right and in the public interest that the League of Nations acted fairly and objectively towards Germany." Östen Undén, *Minnesanteckningar* (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1966), 72.

17 AAN, Fonds: "Delegacja RP przy Lidze Narodów," reference 513, folder 211, 169 [no date]. On the role played by Sweden: Stanisław Sierpowski, *Gra o Niemcy. Międzynarodowy kontekst wstąpienia Niemiec do Ligi Narodów w roku 1926* (Poznań: Instytut Historii UAM, 2015), 122.

18 "Branting om NFs sista mote," *Göteborgs Aftonblad*, 20.03.1924.

19 AAN, Fonds: "Delegacja RP przy Lidze Narodów," folder 16, Report of the Northern Department *Swedish issues from 1 July to 31 December 1923*, Warsaw, 22.04.1924. More on the rapprochement between Sweden and Great Britain see: Norman, *Hjalmar Branting*, 210–232.

possible to put the German people back on their feet. We cannot cripple Germany and at the same time expect them to pay us."[20] Sweden fully supported this policy.[21] It can be said that the Swedish government became involved in implementing British foreign policy after the end of World War I. Erik Boheman, a member of the Swedish delegation to the League of Nations from 1921 to 1927, described it in his memoirs: "Sweden's policy in the League of Nations in many respects pursued affiliation with the English. Britain at the time represented a more conciliatory attitude toward Germany than France and did not hold rigidly to some of the more impossible provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Regarding security issues, the English position was for a long time in line with the Swedish one."[22] Cooperation went so well that Lord Parmoor, representing Britain in the Council, was instructed by his government to trust the head of the Swedish delegation: "On all questions of any importance Lord Parmoor should consult with Mr. Branting." According to Boheman, this was "more or less" the message that Parmoor was to show Branting.[23]

Until the end of the war, Branting was considered Sweden's greatest enemy of Germany. The armistice at Compiègne changed his attitude. He thought that democratic Germany, governed by Social Democrats, was to be one of the pillars of post-war Europe. Therefore, Branting supported their immediate accession to the League of Nations. At the same time, he also endorsed the idea of realistic reparations for the destruction in northern France.[24] He was also wary of German territorial losses in Upper Silesia, which he considered "unfortunate and dangerous."[25]

In January 1923, at the beginning of Sweden's membership in the Council of the League of Nations, Branting tried to involve the League of Nations in negotiations over German reparations to the victorious Entente powers. British politicians welcomed the initiative.[26] Erik Lönnroth, an expert on the history of Swedish foreign policy between the wars, noted a convergence with the general British political course.

20 Stanisław Sierpowski, Źródła do historii powszechnej okresu międzywojennego, vol. 1 (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1989), 79.

21 Ibidem, 41, 61, 83, 181. It concerned the following cases: a general demand for Germany's accession to the League of Nations, contesting the restrictive policy of the Inter-Allied Control Commission towards Germany in the field of disarmament, attacking the treatment of German citizens by the Polish government (in their opinion, it was too harsh), accusations against the actions of the French administration in the Saar Basin.

22 Erik Boheman, *På vakt. Från attaché till sändebud. Minnesanteckningar* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1963), 70.

23 Ibidem.

24 Norman, *Hjalmar Branting*, 84–85.

25 Ibidem, 96.

26 Ibidem, 223. Franzén, *Hjalmar Branting*, 344–345. See also Riksarkivet [Swedish National Archives] (hereinafter RA) RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1181, Excerpt from the minutes of the Cabinet meeting on 1 September 1923.

However, he stressed that "this did not mean any consistent pro-English orientation, but it did mean that a certain degree of cooperation with British foreign policy representatives became part of the habits of the Swedish delegation in Geneva."[27]

Holm or Westerplatte? A Diplomatic Dilemma

The issue of Poland's authority to transship and temporarily store war materials in the port of Danzig was a recurring topic of discussion in Geneva. On 23 June 1921, the League Council confirmed these rights, adding that the site should be "sufficiently distant from the city" and that it could be guarded by "armed and uniformed" Polish guards. However, until 11 March 1922, the President of the Port Board designated the southwestern part of the port basin on Holm Island for this purpose. Both Poland and Danzig protested this location with High Commissioner Haking. Therefore, Haking decided on 7 April 1922, that Poland would temporarily use the northwestern part of the island. At the same time, he designated the estuary of the Vistula River to the sea as a permanent ammunition reloading site. Although he did not use the name Westerplatte, this was the place in question. On 19 June, the Polish government submitted a "recourse" [French: *appeal*] to the League Council because: "The thinness of the [allotted] area [on Holm] does not guarantee safety when handling explosives."[28] The Poles demanded a larger portion of the island for unloading (as the High Commissioner had decided) and as a transit ammunition depot. This was motivated by experiences in 1920, when some of the unloaded material could not be fully reloaded immediately into railroad cars and sent on. There were insufficient warehouses on Holm for the amount of material needed to be stored. In addition, the lack of exclusive use of the port basin was unacceptable to the Polish side. Through the League of Nations, it was requested that Poland be given the entire basin on Holm Island and that Polish warships be able to enter there. The proposal for another location was ignored. Meanwhile, the Free City authorities sought a complete ban on Poland's transportation of ammunition through the Danzig port.

The League Council supported the high commissioner, but the negotiations dragged on, with neither side willing to give way.[29] The head of the League of Nations Military Office at the General Staff in Warsaw, Rear Admiral Jerzy Zwierkowski,

27 Erik Lönnroth, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, vol. V: 1919–1939 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1959), 53–54.

28 AAN, Fonds: "Sztab Główny," reference 1190, folder 1190, 405, A note: Miejsce dla wyładunku amunicji na Holmie, 4.10.1923.

29 AAN, Fonds: "Sztab Główny," folder 1190, 431, Pro memoria by Rear Admiral Zwierkowski concerning the Polish ammunition depot on Holm, Warsaw, 25.09.1923.

analysed the situation, arguing that there had been a stalemate in Polish-German relations while asking rhetorically: "Is the boulevard on the Holm suitable for military purposes? As a landing site – yes! As a transit ammunition depot – no!" He pointed out that Poland needed a much larger area of the island for a transit depot. With the League Council giving the High Commissioner (Haking's successor from 22 February 1923, Mervyn MacDonnell) a free hand in making further decisions, Zwierkowski proposed to "demand the immediate convening of League of Nations experts for Danzig for a visual inspection."[30] This position was in line with the intentions of Chief of Naval Command Vice Admiral Kazimierz Porębski, who recommended adhering to the proposal for expanding Polish possessions on the island of Holm in the face of indisputable arguments related to treating Danzig as the home port of the Polish Navy (*port d'attaché*) and the spatial requirements for the transshipment and storage of war materials.[31]

Chief of the General Staff General Stanisław Haller stressed in a letter to the Polish military attaché to the Polish Legation in Paris that he could count only on French support to remain on the Holm. At the same time, he recalled that since the principle of unanimity was in force in the Council of the League, "without the consent of the French delegate, no new harm can happen to Poland, for at worst the status quo ante must be preserved."[32] As he reassured, "if France's security requires maintaining a strong and well-armed Polish army, our common interest dictates that Poland secures the absolute and unlimited import of war material through Danzig as soon as possible, despite all potential pacifist and humanitarian counter-arguments on the part of the Senate of the Free City. For this purpose, it is necessary to extend the parcel of land already granted to us on the island of Holm, without which it will be impossible to supply the Polish army with weapons and ammunition."[33] Haller recommended seeking support in this matter from Marshal Foch, who would further stress the importance of maintaining a tenacious stance in the League Council. At the end of November, Polish envoy in Berne, Jan Modzelewski, took up the subject with the director of the Administrative Commissions and Minorities Section, Norwegian lawyer and diplomat Erik Colban. Modzelewski demanded that the matter be submitted to the Permanent Military Advisory Commission of the League of Nations, explaining that professionals from various countries best versed in these problems should look at the conditions on the ground and express their opinions. Colban did not object.[34]

30 Ibidem, 432.

31 Ibidem, 437, Porębski to Zwierkowski, Warsaw, 18.10.1923.

32 Ibidem, 465, Haller to military attaché in Paris, 15.11.1923.

33 Ibidem, 465–466.

34 Ibidem, 484–486, Modzelewski to Polish Foreign Office, Geneva, 29.11.1923.

The matter was discussed in the following months. From the perspective of the League of Nations Secretariat, Danzig became a field for stabilising this new organisation's international position. The League intended to act here as an impartial mediator and advocate for the weaker side.[35]

Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting of Sweden, having learned the essence of the Polish-German disputes, concluded that the best way to resolve them would be to let both sides speak, discuss, and only then have the League of Nations Council make decisions. The first natural instance was the League of Nations High Commissioner in the Free City, but both sides frequently questioned his choices. When they could not reach an agreement, the dispute went to Geneva. Protocols of Swedish government meetings show that the role played by Colban's section in Danzig affairs was appreciated. It was there that a compromise was worked out, which was later approved at a session of the Council.[36] It is worth noting that Colban kept Swedish diplomacy informed about the progress of negotiations with both the Danzig and Polish authorities and the position of the British and French authorities, with whom he consulted at the time. In June 1923, the Swedish delegation perceived a threat to the Polish-Danzig relations following the formation of a new Polish government, which was described as "more nationalist than the previous one." Dominated by Roman Dmowski's National Democracy and Wincenty Witos's (who became prime minister) Polish People's Party Piast; the government carried out an anti-Piłsudski and anti-Jewish purge among Polish diplomats. Among its victims was Szymon Askenazy, Poland's delegate to the League of Nations. Boheman predicted that someone "more uncompromising" would take his place. Colban also predicted "serious difficulties."[37]

Presumably also considering the attitude of the Free City of Danzig's representatives, a member of the Swedish delegation to the League, Östen Undén, in his report on the 25th session of the Council, held in Geneva from 2 to 7 July 1923, began the part on Polish-Danzig relations with the sentence: "There are grounds for concern that these

35 Sierpowski, "Rola Ligi Narodów," 252.

36 RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1181, Erik Boheman to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5.05.1923. Years later, Erik Colban summarised the nature of the compromises reached in the Danzig disputes, which had often been prepared in earlier informal discussions between a small group of representatives: typically, the Free City (usually the President of the Senate Heinrich Sahm), Poland (including General Commissioners Leon Pluciński and Henryk Strasburger, as well as Polish delegate to the League of Nations Szymon Askenazy), and the League of Nations High Commissioner in the Free City (from 1922 to 1925, the British officials Richard Haking and Mervyn S. MacDonnell, respectively). Reflecting on these meetings, Colban recalled: "Almost without exception, the projects we achieved in this way passed in the Council. But the negotiations in my office were sometimes difficult and sometimes stormy." See Colban, *Femti* år, 77.

37 RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1181, PM by Erik Boheman concerning a conversation with Colban on 5 June 1923, Geneva, 5.06.1923.

issues will prove extremely difficult to resolve and will put the impartiality and political competence of the League of Nations Council to a severe test."[38]

Indeed, no agreement was reached on the Westerplatte issue. In this situation, the Council of the League of Nations appointed a special commission to study Poland's military formation issue, chaired by Spanish delegate Quiñones de León. Instead, a survey committee was established on 14 December 1923, whose four members – French Colonel A. L. Rémond, Swedish engineer Per Gustaf Hörnell, Danish Copenhagen harbour master Thorvald Borg and British Rear Admiral Aubrey Smith – were sent to Danzig to conduct an on-site inspection and recommend a suitable site for a Polish military depot.[39]

Per Gustaf Hörnell's Role as a League of Nations Expert

The experts were in Danzig in late January and early February 1924. There, they met with representatives of the Free City of Danzig and Poland. According to Rear Admiral Zwierkowski, the opinion of the Swedish expert became important during these talks. Hörnell, then 48 years old, an experienced engineer and professor at the Royal Technical College (Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan) in Stockholm, and an expert to the League of Nations on port matters in China and Klaipeda, "stated, that he has long been interested in the port of Danzig, that he has conferred with very competent people in Sweden on this issue, and that in his opinion only one place is possible in Danzig for ammunition transports, namely on the Westerplatte peninsula, at the very entrance to the port." Hörnell, adding some technical and financial details, concluded his speech by asking whether the Polish government "would agree to his proposal to place ammunition on Westerplatte instead of Holm."[40] Zwierkowski responded cautiously, hiding behind the lack of instructions that would apply to areas other than Holm, but he did not reject the proposal. Meanwhile, an English expert immediately endorsed the Swede's idea. Zwierkowski consulted with the military authorities in Warsaw and, upon his return to Danzig, expressed a desire to study the idea further. He immediately pointed out certain drawbacks to its execution: the need for time-consuming construction work on the waterfront, the necessity of relocating residents, and the impossibility of abandoning the Holm until

38 RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1181, VPM by Östen Undén concerning the 25. session of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva, 2–7 July 1923, Stockholm, 13.07.1923.

39 Mikos, *Wolne Miasto*, 118–119; cf. John Brown Mason, *The Danzig Dilemma. A Study in Peacemaking by Compromise* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1946), 202–203.

40 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," reference 1192, folder 18, 38, A report by Rear Admiral Zwierkowski on negotiations with the commission of the League of Nations concerning the ammunition depot on Holm, Warsaw, 11.02.1924.

a new transit site was prepared. The British committee member argued that these obstacles are removable and believed that constructing a port basin is also rational from an economic point of view. Zwierkowski expressed doubts, giving examples of irrational decisions by the Danzig authorities that were dictated by hostility toward Poland. Hörnell, on the other hand, was hopeful, stating that "at least in the Holm case, Danzig will be guided by common sense." After thoroughly analysing the issue, he concluded that locating the Polish depot at Westerplatte was the best solution, and consistently defended his position. Zwierkowski and other Polish delegation members believed that "The Swede was outright aggressive in his argument, which only irritated those present, instead of convincing them." Suspicious and greatly disappointed, Zwierkowski even concluded that "Hörnell must have a personal interest in taking Holm from Poland, since he is pursuing his stated goal so fiercely and illogically," later in his report even adding that "it was difficult to find a more overt enemy of Poland in the League of Nations than this Swede."[41] On 16 February, Poland's delegate to the League of Nations, Konstanty Skirmunt, considered it a foregone conclusion that the only solution to the transit issue was to settle on Westerplatte. He proposed that the Foreign Ministry let go of efforts to establish a presence on Holm and focus on securing Polish exclusivity in the use of Westerplatte.[42] However, what emerges from Zwierkowski's report is regret that Poland eventually had to relinquish its rights to the Holm.[43] Also of a different opinion than Zwierkowski, including regarding Hörnell's motivation, was the Polish envoy in Stockholm, Alfred Wysocki. Before the Swedish surveyor's return visit to Danzig, the deputy assessed him cautiously but positively: "Based on the conversation that his legation secretary [Przemysław] Kowalewski had with him, it can be assumed that Eng. Hörnell has a good grasp of Danzig relations and is not ill-disposed toward us. Above all, he is well aware that the basis of all Polish-Danzig quarrels is political, and he is by no means concealing his opinion that the Danzigers would like to exploit all possible advantages of their geographical location in their relations with Poland, giving it as little as possible in return."[44] The Ministry of Military Affairs also quickly realised that, with the long-unresolvable dispute between the Polish authorities and the Free City, handing over the decision to a League of Nations expert proved to be the most advantageous solution from the Polish perspective.

41 Ibidem, 44–45.

42 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 18, 70, Polish delegate to the Polish Foreign Office, Geneva, 16.02.1924.

43 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 18, 84–86, A report by Rear Admiral Zwierkowski on negotiations with the commission of the League of Nations concerning the ammunition depot on Holm, Warsaw, 25.03.1924.

44 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 21, 81, Wysocki to the Polish Foreign Office, Stockholm, 31.05.1924.

The commission's final report, dated 8 February 1924, was unequivocal. In its conclusions, the commission recommended Westerplatte as the best location for a military depot.[45] Experts emphasised that the best solution was to move such warehouses away from the city centre for safety reasons. The topic of debate was just a solution for the interim period, i.e. until the new site is ready for use. Only the French committee member insisted that the Poles should use Holm Island until then. At this point, it is worth quoting the opinion of the chargé d'affaires in Paris, Aleksander Szembek, who described the situation after the commission's report on 6 March 1924: "Incidentally, as we were told in confidence, Colonel Rémond [a French member of the commission] also considers Westerplatte to be the best and only reasonable solution. However, he wanted to make our tactics easier and therefore continued to insist on Holm."[46]

At the same time, the Polish delegates rejected any compromise, although Polish resistance to the move to Westerplatte was weakening in the face of the commission's firm conclusion. On 14 March 1924, the commission's rapporteur proposed the most flexible solution, allowing the Polish side to unload war materials at the Holm Island site for six months. The parties eventually agreed to this compromise. Poland's representative in the discussion, Rear Admiral Jerzy Zwierkowski, wanted to weaken the firmness of the decision and proposed a provision stating that the interim period could be extended after six months "if the work could not be completed within that time." Danzig Senate President Sahm suggested dishonest intentions of the Polish authorities and refused to add such a provision to the Council's decision. Branting then joined the discussion, declaring that he would support six months of continued use of the Holm by the Polish side, if treated as a maximum. He was immediately endorsed by Lord Parmoor.[47] Thus, the commission's report became the basis for resolving the issue of the Westerplatte

45 Hörnell presented the grounds of the conclusions, signed by the committee members, in a letter to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1924. He justified the exclusion of the island of Holm ("preferred by the Polish side"), describing the place as completely unsuitable for military transports, "without adequate equipment and railway connection." See Adam Staniszewski, *Po dwóch stronach Bałtyku. Polityczno-gospodarcze stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1918–1932* (Toruń: Europejskie Centrum Edukacji, 2013), 113.

46 AAN, Fonds: "Delegacja RP przy Lidze Narodów," folder 288, Chargé d'affaires in Paris Jan Szembek to Polish Foreign Office, 6.03.1924.

47 RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1181, VPM by Erik Boheman concerning the most important issues discussed during the 28. Session of the Council of the League of Nations, 10–16 March 1924, 20.03.1924; League of Nations Archive, R1419-27-34556-2764-Jacket2.pdf, Twenty eighth Session of the Council. Minutes, Eighth Meeting held on 14 March 1924. Heated Geneva discussions around Westerplatte were reported by the Swedish press: "Skall Polen få rätt att i Danzig upprätta ammunitionsdepå," *Svenska Dagbladet*, 28.02.1924; "Polen förvarar sin ammunition inom Danzig," *Dagens Nyheter*, 15.03.1924; "Hr Branting hemkommen från Genève," *Aftonbladet*, 19.03.1924; "Det senaste rådsmötet i Genève ger gott resultat," *Jämtlandposten*, 20.03.1924; "Branting om NFs sista möte," *Göteborgs Aftonblad*, 20.03.1924. Everywhere, quoting Branting, it was emphasised that Poland would not be allowed to use Danzig as a transit point for explosives.

depot adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. Not surprisingly, the Swedish delegation fully supported the experts' conclusion, based on Hörnell's opinion. Erik Boheman, who was involved in preparing the working materials for the Swedish delegation to the Council of the League of Nations and regularly noted the progress of the discussions on the Danzig issue, recalled before the decision was made that the Danzig authorities had complained about the possibility of transiting military material to Poland via Holm Island because "due to its location, it means a threat to the Free City."[48]

Westerplatte for Poland – What Comes Next?

The Danzig authorities still tried to block the decision of the League of Nations Council. Members of the Danzig Volkstag and the Danzig press sharply attacked the League of Nations for its decision on Westerplatte, "using rather brutal and unparliamentary terms against it."[49] On the other hand, the Senate argued that it is a recreational site, a popular beach area among the city's residents, and it is difficult to accept putting a military garrison there.[50] The local structures of the Protestant Church also protested. The congregation (Landessynode) in Danzig, led by Generalsuperintendent Paul Kalweit and Superintendent Karl Polenske, passed a protest resolution against the League Council's decision to grant Westerplatte to Poland. The resolution was publicised by being sent to the president of the World Congress of Evangelicals, Archbishop Nathan Söderblom of Uppsala.[51] The Foreign Ministry hoped that the Polish envoy in Stockholm Alfred Wysocki would take steps "to neutralize, as far as possible, the Danzig campaign, both by possibly preventing Archbishop Söderblom from sending the Danzig resolution to Anglo-Saxon Protestant organizations, as well as by informing the authoritative Swedish Protestant circles of the proper state of affairs, in particular of the fact that around Westerplatte, already before the war, large quantities of ammunition and war

48 RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1181, VPM by Erik Boheman on the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations 10 March 1924, Genewa, 18.02.1924.

49 AAN, Fonds: "MSZ," reference 322, folder 1455, 5, Polish Foreign Office to the Polish Delegation to the League of Nations, Warsaw, 05.04.1924.

50 On the history of Westerplatte as a spa resort, see: Andrzej Drzycimski, *Westerplatte. Misja specjalna* (Gdańsk: Oficyna Gdańska, 2015), 9–19. The President of the Danzig Senate, Heinrich Sahm, tried to use this argument in September 1924 in a conversation with Eric Colban, Norwegian Head of the Administrative Commissions and Minorities Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations. He gave him a written note with photographs of sunbathers on the peninsula. See League of Nations Archive, R149-4-11429-38858.pdf, Minute by Erik Colban, 15.09.1924.

51 AAN, Fonds: "MSZ," folder 1455, 2–3, the Polish Foreign Office to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, Warsaw, 04.04.1924.

material were permanently accumulated by the Prussian government (…) The dangers projected by Danzig are thus purely political and anti-Polish in origin, all the more so because Westerplatte is not intended as a Polish arsenal, as insinuated by the Danzig authorities, but as a place for unloading ammunition and war material for transit to Poland."[52]

Officially, the Polish authorities were disappointed that they had failed to retain the Holm site. In the short term, the decision to stop using Holm Island complicated Polish transport activities in Danzig. However, the Polish delegate to the League of Nations, Konstanty Skirmunt, in a report to Warsaw dated 17 March, provided a positive assessment of the experts' work: "In general, I believe," he wrote, "that the Danzig issues have been resolved relatively favorably. In particular, the issue of the military depot ended successfully." He argued that after the Council's decision granting Poland Westerplatte, the only question was how to stay on Holm until the new site was ready to receive military transports: "We have reached a compromise and will leave Holm in six months. This compromise is undoubtedly not based on any legal or practical principles. Nevertheless, after arriving at Westerplatte, we continue to stay on Holm, and after the deadline confirmed by the Council, we will be able to ask for an extension of our stay on the island if necessary."[53]

On the possible extension of the stay on Holm, Skirmunt was overly optimistic, though he was aware that Poland was supported on this issue only by the French delegate. The delegates of Great Britain and Sweden were opposed. Admittedly, the Polish envoy in Stockholm, Alfred Wysocki, intended to influence Hjalmar Branting not to be so intransigent. He tried to arrange an appointment with Branting in his office to present the Polish point of view in an honest conversation. He wanted to emphasise that decisions in Danzig affairs are usually unfair because they do not consider Polish commercial and industrial interests. First, Wysocki met with Swedish Foreign Ministry Secretary General Erik Sjöborg. The Swedish diplomat refuted the allegations. He admitted attending the meeting before the League Council session, but "there was no discussion of whether or not the Swedish delegate should present an unfavorable attitude toward Poland." The ammunition depot on Holm Island was considered "secondary", in which Branting had "complete freedom of action." Sjöborg asserted that Branting's "integrity and idealism in life" were well known. He emphasised: "Everything Mr. Branting does in the League is a consequence of his sense of fairness and impartiality." When Wysocki finally met with Branting, the Swedish prime minister explained that the Polish envoy only presented a one-sided view, while different opinions should be heard.

52 Ibidem.

53 AAN, Fonds: "Delegacja RP przy Lidze Narodów," folder 288, Delegate to the League of Nations to Polish Foreign Office, 17.03.1924.

Branting said: "I have investigated the matter very thoroughly. I have spoken to the High Commissioner many times. I have developed my own view. I very much regret that it is not the same as Poland's view."[54] Wysocki replied that it was difficult to accept such a view, since the freedom of any activity in Danzig was inevitable for the future development of the Polish state, and the slogans for the defence of human rights used by the Senate of the Free City were only a cover for its foul policy toward Poland. Branting did not discuss the issue. He only assured that he was a friend of Poland.[55] Staying on Holm beyond the allotted six-month period proved impossible. After that time, the only solution was to use the duty-free basin in the New Port for transporting ammunition and explosives.

At subsequent negotiations on the size of the port basin at Westerplatte, the Council of the League of Nations already placed the decision solely in the hands of Hörnell, who arrived in Danzig again in June 1924. According to the chairman of the Polish delegation to the Port and Waterways Board, Adm. Michal Borowski, "Hörnell had already formed his final opinion and was only trying to bring about a compromise that would somewhat satisfy the Polish side."[56] In conclusion, Borowski emphasised: "It remains to be stated that, on the one hand, the aspirations of the Danzig side (…) have been radically overturned by the opinion of Eng. Hoernell. On the other hand, the Polish desiderata have not been considered in all their fullness." However, in practice, "The solution can be considered completely satisfactory for Polish interests." Despite this, Rear Admiral Zwierkowski decided to protest on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior to the President of the Port Board against failing to consider all the demands regarding the size of the port basin (mainly its width), citing security considerations, which the Free City authorities charged exclusively to the Polish side.[57]

Only after the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, in early July 1924, did Vice Adm. Porębski take an interest in the buildings on Westerplatte purchased in 1919–1920 by Mieczysław Jałowiecki and belonging to the Polish government. Porębski asked the staff of the Polish Commissariat General about the possibility of using

54 AAN, Fonds: "Delegacja RP przy Lidze Narodów," folder 289, Wysocki to the Polish Foreign Office, 12.05.1924.

55 Interestingly, the Danish envoy in Stockholm, Herluf Zahle, expressed a different view. He was convinced that Branting regarded the Polish delegation in Geneva as a competitor in the effort to secure a stronger position among the smaller states. It was therefore not surprising to him that Sweden's attitude toward Poland could appear unfriendly.

56 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 21, 117, M. Borowski: Report on progress of the case of summoning of Eng. Hoernell [sic!] as an arbitrator and further negotiations with him, Danzig, 08.06.1924.

57 On Hörnell's opinion, see: Drzycimski, *Westerplatte. Reduta*, 98–101. However, the author has doubts about the expert's identity.

them for military purposes.[58] After an inspection by Polish officers, it was found that "all the buildings, except the Strandhalle restaurant, are suitable for military accommodation purposes with prior moderate renovation and insulation of the buildings (…)."[59] First, there was the Bathing Facility complex and three villas. All the buildings were of light, wooden construction. In total, they made up 20 percent of the peninsula. It is therefore difficult to speak of land ownership by the Polish government on this site, and indeed, it was not the whole peninsula.[60] Nor was this ownership an argument for taking over Westerplatte, as the Polish side consistently sought to locate the reloading site permanently on Holm. Nevertheless, some of the owned buildings were later used for barracks. The problem for the next few months was the dozens of families who resided there. It is worth noting that most of the families who remained there the longest were former Polish residents of Danzig.[61]

There were also heated discussions between the Polish delegation and the Port Board and the High Commissioner about the demarcation of the peninsula's area controlled by Poland. It should be noted that the Minister of Military Affairs, Gen. Sikorski, who was responsible for negotiations on these matters, and especially Rear Admiral Zwierkowski, tried to stick to the literalness of the League Council's resolution to give the entire peninsula to Poland. As a result, he was reluctant to place the narrow coastal strip under the Port Board's administration, especially on the Vistula side, over which a new dispute arose. Sikorski even insisted that "not wishing to set a precedent in the League of Nations of voluntarily yielding from the rights granted to us, I cannot agree to any cutting off of the Westerplatte coast from the Vistula."[62] The Polish military authorities did not share the opinion of Polish Commissar General Henryk Strasburger, who proposed to give up a 4–5 metre strip, which he considered a "slight concession."[63] Eventually, the matter was again discussed in Geneva at a Council meeting in September 1925 when Quiñones de Leon included a sentence in his report for the next Council meeting that stated the surrender of Westerplatte only "after settling the border dispute." With the prospect of Germany's imminent entry into the League of Nations, Commissioner General Strasburger went to Erik Colban to protest the text amendment.

58 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 16, 3, Commandor Metzger (Military Department of General Commissariat) to Rear Admiral Zwierkowski, Danzig, 03.07.1924.

59 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 16, 9, Inspection report, Gdańsk, 18.07.1924.

60 Janusz Dargacz. "Polska własność na Westerplatte w latach 1919–1925," *Gdański Notatnik Historyczny* 1 (2022): 41.

61 Ibidem.

62 AAN, Fonds: "Sztab Główny," folder 1190, 532, Sikorski to the Polish Commissioner General, Warsaw, 25.08.1925.

63 Ibidem, 557, Strasburger to the Polish Foreign Office, Danzig, 07.08.1925.

Colban explained that he had nothing to do with the revision: "Quiñones de Leon had the report amended," he said, "and it was at the request of Mr. Sahm, supported by the Swedish delegation."[64] In the end, Drummond settled the matter. He placed the decision on the demarcation in the hands of the President of the Port Board, stipulating that he should factor in the opinion of the "experts of the League of Nations" and settle the matter "as soon as possible." The surrender of the peninsula was in the hands of the high commissioner. However, in confidential discussions at the Secretariat, it was agreed that this should occur "no later than 1 November 1925." This is also how the Council deliberated on 19 September. Strasburger stressed that the Polish authorities had left Holm by the deadline (within six months), so Westerplatte should already have been handed over to Poland. Sahm consistently protested against transporting Polish war materials through Danzig and demanded that decisions be withheld until the border dispute was settled. High Commissioner MacDonnell, on the other hand, following earlier conclusions of the Secretariat talks, specified 1 November as the date of surrendering the peninsula to Poland. Zwierkowski rightly considered the course of the Council a success for Poland. As he stated, "taking advantage of the favourable situation for us," he still raised the issue of the Polish garrison's size.[65]

The issue was revisited at a Council meeting on 9 December 1925. There was no objection to placing a Polish military unit of 88 officers and soldiers on the peninsula. However, Swedish delegate Östen Undén decided to voice his opinion on the composition of the garrison. Trying to continue Branting's policy in the Council, he adhered to the idea of compromise and the principle of defending the interests of the weaker party, and he considered the Free City of Danzig to be such.[66] The discussion of the presence of Polish soldiers at Westerplatte is a good example of this. Undén asked whether "from a practical point of view," it would not be better "to install a civilian police force at Westerplatte instead of a military unit." The Swedish politician and diplomat stressed that this was not a proposal, but only a question to the high commissioner, to whom he passed the initiative to act in consultation with the Polish government. However, it should be noted that the chairman of the Danzig Senate immediately expressed "deep gratitude for the proposal made by the Swedish representative." Sahm argued that Westerplatte is not extraterritorial; it is subject to Danzig law and accepting the Swedish representative's proposal will facilitate relations between the Danzig police and the unit located

64 AAN, Fonds: "MSWojsk, Biuro Wojskowe Ligi Narodów," folder 13, 2–3, Report by Zwierkowski on activities at the 35. session of the Council of the League of Nations concerning Westerplatte, Geneva, 19.09.1925.

65 Ibidem.

66 The Swedish press presented a picture of the threat of Danzig from its Southern neighbour: „En fri stad med kringskuren frihet," *Aftonbladet*, 10.02.1925; "Memel – Danzig," *Aftonbladet*, 25.04.1924.

on the peninsula. At the end of his speech, he referred to Undén's proposal for the third time, asking that it be recorded in the meeting protocol. British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain responded briefly, stating that High Commissioner MacDonnell had the final say in the matter, and that the Council may not be competent to decide on this issue.[67] The Italian delegate to the League of Nations, Vittorio Scialoja, who chaired the session, concluded that Undén had expressed his opinion and recommendation, but that the issue should be resolved by the high commissioner.[68]

Conclusions

From its establishment, the Free City of Danzig became an arena of conflict between the local authorities and the Polish state, defending its rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent bilateral agreements. As Polish diplomacy tried to direct its demands concerning Danzig directly to Geneva, experiencing the reluctance of British high commissioners on the ground, the Council of the League of Nations constantly had to take a position on Polish-Danzig relations, involving the staff of the Secretariat in Geneva and experts. As Stanisław Sierpowski stated, "The Free City became synonymous with an irresolvable international dispute, which came with strong emotions, especially of the parties directly involved."[69] One of the most difficult to resolve was the dispute over where to transship war materials. Danzig sought to remove the possibility of transit and storage of such materials through Poland altogether. On the other hand, the Polish side demanded a sufficiently large space for such purposes on Holm Island.

The Swedish delegation became an active participant in the Polish-Danzig negotiations, taking part in the Council of the League of Nations deliberations as a non-permanent member since 1 January 1923. On the one hand, Swedish Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting, as a supporter of British foreign policy, gained a reputation among Polish diplomats as a typical representative of Swedish Germanophilia and therefore an opponent. His friendlier attitude toward Danzig's demands was evident in Geneva. He expressed the conviction that the international order after World War I required strengthening Germany's position. Political ties between the Swedish and German Social Democrats also played an important role. Above all, however, his policies were based on his belief in the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and its consequences.

67 League of Nations Archive [hereinafter LONA], R1423-27-48174-2764.pdf, 37. session of the Council. Verbatim report of the 6. meeting held at Geneva, 9 December 1925.

68 LONA, R1424-27-48234-2764-Jacket-1.pdf, 37. session of the Council. Minutes, Sixth Meeting held on 9 December 1925.

69 Sierpowski, *Gra o Niemcy*, 158–159.

On the other hand, the Scandinavian members of the League of Nations, in general, gained a reputation as mediators proposing "more sophisticated ways of solving problems that are the subject of negotiations and disputes."[70] In the dispute over the transshipment site, you can see their sympathy for Danzig and their participation in attempts to find a compromise and break the impasse. Such a solution was the appointment of a group of experts who reduced a politically charged dispute to the level of a technical issue. Among them, a key role was played by a Swedish engineer, Per Gustaf Hörnell, who pointed to Westerplatte as the best place for a Polish transit depot, instead of Holm Island, which was sought by the Polish side.

The Danzig authorities and Polish representatives lodged routine protests after the Council of the League of Nations approved the experts' proposal. However, a behind-the-scenes analysis of the Polish strategy on the choice of the landing site for war materials shows that Polish diplomacy adopted the logic of compromise as more effective than the rigid position of the Danzig authorities and was satisfied with the final decision.

On the other hand, Branting and, after his death, Undén consistently tried to indicate their favouritism toward Danzig. This occurred in connection with the effective limitation of the continued Polish presence on Holm to six months after the decision on the location of the Westerplatte transhipment site, as well as the (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to establish a police rather than military garrison on the peninsula.

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70 Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1936), 4–5; Sierpowski, *Gra o Niemcy*, 218.

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SUMMARY

The Free City of Danzig became an arena of conflicts between the local authorities and the Polish state defending its rights assured by the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent bilateral agreements. Polish diplomacy tried to address its demands concerning their own rights in Danzig directly to Geneva, and the Council of the League of Nations actually had to constantly take a position on Polish-Gdansk relations, involving the staff of the Secretariat in Geneva and experts. One of the most difficult to resolve proved to be the dispute over where to transship war materials. Danzig authorities sought to remove the possibility of transit and storage of such materials through Poland in general. The Polish side, on the other hand, demanded a suitably large space for such purposes on Holm Island. The Swedish delegation became a participant in the negotiations in the disputes, taking part in the meetings of the Council of the League of Nations as a non-permanent member from 1 January 1923. The Swedish authorities, headed by Prime Minister Hjalmar Branting, tried to support the Danzig side in the disputes with Poland, as a result of their conviction of the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and their cooperation with British diplomacy. On the issue of the transshipment site, the Swedish delegation contributed in trying to find a compromise and break the deadlock. Such a solution was the appointment of a group of several experts, which brought a politically charged dispute down to the level of a technical issue. Among the experts, a key role was played by the Swedish engineer Per Gustaf Hörnell, who pointed to the Westerplatte peninsula as the best place for a Polish transit depot.

Westerplatte, Szwecja i Liga Narodów w pierwszej połowie lat 20-tych XX wieku

Słowa kluczowe: historia dyplomacji, Wolne Miasto Gdańsk, polityka zagraniczna Szwecji, organizacje międzynarodowe

STRESZCZENIE

Wolne Miasto Gdańsk stało się areną konfliktów między lokalnymi władzami a państwem polskim broniącym swych praw zapewnionym traktatem wersalskim i kolejnymi umowami dwustronnymi. Polska dyplomacja starała się kierować swoje postulaty dotyczące Gdańska bezpośrednio do Genewy, Rada Ligi Narodów właściwie stale musiała zajmować stanowisko w stosunkach polsko-gdańskich, angażując personel Sekretariatu w Genewie oraz ekspertów. Jednym z najtrudniejszych do rozstrzygnięcia okazał się spór o miejsce przeładunku materiałów wojennych. Gdańsk dążył do usunięcia w ogóle możliwości tranzytu i składowania takich materiałów przez Polskę. Strona polska natomiast domagała się odpowiednio dużej przestrzeni dla takich celów na wyspie Holm. Uczestnikiem negocjacji w sporach polsko-gdańskich stała się delegacja szwedzka, która od 1 stycznia 1923 r. brała udział w obradach Rady Ligi Narodów jako jej niestały członek. Szwedzkie władze z premierem Hjalmarem Brantingiem na czele starały się popierać stronę gdańską w sporach z Polską, co wynikało z przekonania o niesprawiedliwości traktatu wersalskiego i współpracy z dyplomacją brytyjską.

W sprawie miejsca przeładunku delegacja szwedzka miała swój wkład w próbach szukania kompromisu i przełamania impasu. Takim rozwiązaniem było powołanie kilkuosobowej grupy ekspertów, co spór o dużym ładunku politycznym sprowadziło do poziomu problematyki technicznej. Wśród ekspertów kluczową rolę odegrał szwedzki inżynier Per Gustaf Hörnell, który wskazał na półwysep Westerplatte jako najlepsze miejsce na polską składnicę tranzytową.

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Jarosław Drozd
Faculty of History
University of Gdańsk
jaroslaw.drozd@ug.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-5577-5696

The Establishment and Activities of the Company "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe S.A." in Gdynia in the Interwar Period in the Light of Commercial Register Files

Keywords: Gdynia, shipping, Polish merchant navy, interwar period, state archives

The uniqueness of the archival team of the Municipal Court in Gdynia (ref. APG OG 149), stored in the State Archives in Gdańsk, Branch in Gdynia, lies in the registration files of local companies and partnerships. The Commercial Register was established by decree of the Head of State Józef Piłsudski on 7 February 1919 and by regulation of the Minister of Justice Leon Supiński on 22 April 1919. It was divided into three sections: general partnerships and limited partnerships were entered in the RHA, limited liability companies and joint-stock companies in the RHB, and capital companies with foreign participation in the RHC. For each registered commercial entity, books and appendices were kept in the form of registration files, i.e. documents related to proceedings before the registration court. The files of this type in Gdynia have been preserved in good condition, and although, as in the case of the vast majority of Polish archives that survived the war, it cannot be said that they are complete, they are one of the richest sources of historical information for research on the history of the Polish merchant navy in the Second Polish Republic. On their basis, the author of this article has already described the origins of the state-owned enterprise and joint-stock company "Żegluga Polska."[1] This time, the analysis covers three volumes of registration files (RHB 58) of the "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe S.A. w Gdyni"

1 Jarosław Drozd, "Register Files of The State Enterprise and the Joint Stock Company «Żegluga Polska» in Gdynia as a Source in Research on the Polish Merchant Navy under the Second Polish Republic," *Studia Maritima* 34 (2021): 87–101. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-04.

(hereinafter the PBTO) from 1929–1938. They are notable for their rich content, courtesy of the diligence of the company's Management Board, which systematically sent documents (mainly in the form of reports) to the Municipal Court concerning commercial and financial results, fleet and work organisation. Thanks to this, the registration files, unlike many articles published in the maritime press in the 1920s and 1930s, are a fully reliable, official, source material for the well-known "Polbryt" and, in the author's opinion, they contribute to the preparation of a more comprehensive monograph. The purpose of this article is to establish the most important events in the history of PBTO, from the establishment of the company until the end of 1938, i.e. the last period covered by the report. The author also focuses on the company's commercial and financial results, broken down into individual lines, and all statistics on which its reporting was based.

A detailed plan for establishing the first Polish shipping company financed from state funds was developed as early as 1920, but due to a change in the position of the Minister of the Treasury, it was not implemented. For the next six years, no initiative was taken to create a merchant fleet in the form of a state-owned enterprise. Its absence became more apparent in the Polish economy with each passing year, and sent a clear sign that without its own fleet, it would not be possible to solve the country's economic problems.[2] Changes came in the autumn of 1926, when it was decided to establish the state-owned company "Żegluga Polska." In January 1927, it launched its first cargo ships, which began to transport domestic export goods to Baltic and Western European ports under the Polish flag. The expansion of the port in Gdynia and the increase in its cargo turnover led to the development of regular shipping connections. A pioneer in this field was "Żegluga Polska," which gained extensive experience in tramp shipping in order to prepare for the launch of the first regular lines under the Polish flag. The establishment of regular transport required both experience and international contacts. This marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Polish merchant navy. Developing it in accordance with the maritime programme of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (hereinafter MPiH), the Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Kazimierz Bartel, decided at the end of 1928 to establish partnerships with foreign shipping companies in order to take advantage of their commercial contacts and experience. First, it was decided to establish a partnership with Ellerman's Wilson Line Limited (hereinafter EWL) from Kingston near Hull.[3] The establishment of PBTO and the opening of shipping lines connecting the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia with London and Hull, important centres of British trade, was one of the most important successes of the Polish government during the Second Polish Republic in the field of

2 Bogdan Dopierała, *Wokół polityki morskiej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1978), 232.

3 "Próba regularnego połączenia Gdyni z Anglią," *Morze* 2 (1928): 25.

maritime trade development. "Polbryt" was established with the objective of facilitating the export of goods from Poland to Great Britain, strengthening trade relations with that country and taking over part of the emigration traffic, which had previously been carried out under foreign flags. The deed of company formation was signed on 21 December 1928 in Gdynia, at the premises of the state-owned company "Żegluga Polska." The Polish side owned 75% of the company (PLN 10,114,000), while EWL, owning 25% (PLN 3,371,000), contributed its experience, contact network on shipping markets, representative offices and four cargo and passenger ships.[4]

In accordance with its articles of association, PBTO was to provide maritime transport services on its own or chartered ships, and more specifically: a) transport passengers, emigrants, immigrants and cargo by sea and land; b) perform commercial and financial activities related to this purpose and operate an industrial enterprise; c) sell ship tickets; d) issue transport documents for persons, luggage and goods in maritime and mixed, i.e. land and sea, transport; e) accept luggage, live cargo and goods for storage; f) insure luggage, live cargo and goods; g) perform customs, forwarding, brokerage and other activities related to the transport of passengers and the transport and storage of live cargo and goods; h) grant loans for goods accepted for storage and transport; i) build and maintain its own harbours and warehouses with technical equipment in the country and abroad; k) tow and bunker ships in port, in the roadstead and on the open sea; l) participate in other shipping or maritime-related enterprises in the country and abroad.[5]

The PBTO office was initially located on Portowa Street in Gdynia, and after two years it was moved to Dom Żeglugi (Shipping House) at 15 Waszyngtona Street. At the beginning of its activity, the company was headed by: Captain Stanisław Witkowski (head of the Merchant Navy Office in the Free City of Danzig, member of the Polish delegation of the Port and Waterways Council in the Free City of Danzig) as managing director and Cecil Harold Jeffrey from Sopot (later Vice-Consul of Great Britain in Gdynia)[6]

4 Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni (hereinafter APG OG), Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni (hereinafter SGG), Akta rejestrowe "Polsko-Brytyjskiego Towarzystwa Okrętowego S.A. w Gdyni" (hereinafter PBTO), vol. 1, File No. 149/455, Akt notarialny (rep. 1313/28) sporządzony przez notariusza Hilarego Ewerta-Krzemieniewskiego w Gdyni z umową spółki, 3–12. See also Władysław Gieysztor, "Bolączki żeglugowe," *Polska Gospodarcza* 46 (1930): 2009–2011; Wanda Czerwińska, *Rola państwa w polskiej gospodarce morskiej (1919–1939)*, (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie: 1975), 97; Zbigniew Machaliński, *Gospodarcza myśl morska II Rzeczypospolitej 1919–1939*, (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1975), 241.

5 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol 1, File No. 149/455, Statut PBTO, 123–128. Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 1532/31) sporządzony przez Bronisława Okołowicza w Warszawie z protokołem z nadzwyczajnego walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 29.12.1931, 142. Ibidem, Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego SGG, 11.02.1932, 150. Ibidem, Wpis do rejestru handlowego SGG, 11.02.1932, 151.

6 "1937 styczeń 3, Gdynia - Informacje Inspektoratu Straży Granicznej Gdynia dla Pomorskiego Inspektora Okręgowego Straży Granicznej w Bydgoszczy o firmie «Polbryt» Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe w Gdyni," in: *Wywiad gospodarczy Straży Granicznej wobec firm gdańsko-gdyńskich*

as a commercial director. The first Supervisory Board of the company consisted of: Teodozy Nosowicz (Director of the Maritime Department of the Ministry of Trade and Industry), Leon Barański (Director of the Monetary Transactions Department of the Ministry of the Treasury), Julian Rummel (Director of "Żegluga Polska"), Kazimierz Rothert (Deputy Director of "Żegluga Polska"), Włodzimierz Tokarski (proxy of "Żegluga Polska"), Captain Hugon Pistel (head of the Shipping Department at the Ministry of Maritime Affairs) and Bolesław Bator (lawyer), and on behalf of EWL: Lancelot Manby Metcalfe Ives (director of United Shipping Company Ltd. in London) and Henry Hoblyn Peter (accountant). Changes in the composition of the Supervisory Board took place on 30 May 1929 during the first general meeting of shareholders. J. Rummel became the president, and Hubert Stanley Holden (director of EWL) replaced Hoblyn as vice-president. Michał Benisławski, MPiH delegate for "Polbryt," also joined the Supervisory Board, while Bolesław Nakoniecznikoff (director of the Emigration Office at the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare) became the emigration commissioner at the company's Supervisory Board.[7]

The company's first balance sheet, prepared on 31 December 1929, has been preserved in the registration files, showing a profit of PLN 182,763.21.[8] The report for the first year of work states that it has four passenger and cargo steamers with passenger cabins, rooms for emigrants, classic cargo holds and cold stores necessary for the transport of foodstuffs (butter, bacon, eggs, etc.). At the beginning of its operation, the fleet was British, but the flag, captains and crew were Polish. The PBTO ships were given new names: SS "Premier" (formerly "Tasso"), SS "Warszawa" ("Smolensk"), SS "Łódź" ("Kovno") and SS "Rewa" ("Kolpino") and during the first year they made 74 round trips, carrying 12,700 passengers and 42,621 tonnes of cargo. This was a promising result, as due to very difficult winter navigation conditions (especially in February and March 1929), the company did not start operations until April, when it inaugurated transport between Gdańsk and London and Hull and back.[9] "Polbryt's" revenues in its first nine months amounted to PLN 2,893,000 (GBP 66,638) from freight for the transport of goods and PLN 2,496,000 (GBP 57,489) from passenger transport. In the year preceding the establishment of the company (1928), exports of foodstuffs and general cargo (excluding bulk goods) from Poland to England amounted to 42,543 tonnes.

w latach 1932–1938, compiled by Piotr Kołakowski, Ryszard Techman (Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2010), 111.

7 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol 1, File No. 149/455, Akt notarialny (rep. 487/29) sporządzony przez Hilarego Ewerta-Krzemieniewskiego z protokołem z nadzwyczajnego walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 30.05.1929, 34–36; Ibidem, Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego SGG, 29.12.1928, 38–39.

8 Ibidem, Bilans PBTO na dzień 31 grudnia 1929 r., 42; Ibidem, Sprawozdanie rewizorów z przeprowadzonej rewizji bilansu i rachunku strat i zysków za 1929 r., 49.

9 Ibidem, Sprawozdanie PBTO za 1929 r., 48.

Thanks to the work of the new shipping company, this figure increased to 49,814 tonnes in 1929. The growth of Polish exports to England in this short period is best illustrated by the following figures: 15,378 tonnes (6,835 tonnes in 1928) of bacon; 3,815 tonnes (1,645 tonnes) and 2,918 tonnes (2,329 tonnes) of eggs. Out of the 49,814 tonnes of total exports achieved in 1929, PBTO ships transported as much as 34,849 tonnes of goods worth approximately PLN 86,000,000 to England.[10] Passenger traffic statistics were less optimistic, as 1929 was marked by a decrease in emigration to Canada and the USA. In total, during the year, the company's ships carried 6,813 fewer passengers than in 1928 on the routes connecting the Port of Gdańsk with England. There were 1,561 passengers from London (1,633 in 1928), 72 fewer than the previous year, and 392 from Hull (571), a decrease of 179. A total of 14,988 passengers travelled to London (17,791 in 1928), 2,803 fewer than in the previous year, while 3,818 travelled to Hull (7,577), a decrease of 3,759. Statistics showed that PBTO accounted for approximately 60% of passenger traffic to London and 100% to Hull, which meant that, if emigration remained at the level of 1928, it would be possible to carry approx. 5,060 more passengers, and thus income from this source would increase to approx. PLN 1,215,000 (GBP 28,000) with a slight increase in expenditure. Taking into account the above circumstances, the Management and Supervisory Board of PBTO considered the first year of its operation to be "satisfactory." The report emphasised the desire to transfer ship traffic to Gdynia, where the Management Board had its registered office, as soon as possible. It was therefore announced that in the following year, the port of Gdynia would also be served, even if only sporadically, and that regular transport connections with London and Hull would be organised from there as soon as possible.

The first balance sheet, report and budget of PBTO were approved on 6 May 1930 during the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders held at the Ministry of Industry and Trade building in Warsaw.[11] Two months later, the Management Board submitted an application to the Municipal Court in Gdynia for the entry of the Warsaw Branch in the commercial register, which took place on 22 July 1930.[12] Aleksander Romuald Leszczyński was appointed director of the branch, which was located in the company's

10 See also "Polsko-Angielskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi," *Przemysł i Handel* 48 (1928): 1966; "Polsko-Brytyjskie Tow. Okrętowe," *Polska Gospodarcza* 30 (1930): 1341–1342; Bolesław Kuźmiński, "Regularne połączenia żeglugowe portu gdyńskiego," *Morze* 8 (1930): 9; "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe Spółka Akcyjna (Polish-British Steamship Company Limited)," *Flota Narodowa* 13 (1930): 8; "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe (pierwszy rok eksploatacji)," *Flota Narodowa* 14 (1930): 11; "Sprawozdanie z działalności Polsko-Brytyjskiego T-wa Okrętowego w Gdyni," *Flota Narodowa* 21 (1930): 14–15.

11 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 1, File No. 149/455, Akt notarialny (rep. 580/30) sporządzony przez B. Okołowicza z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 06.05.1930, 50–51.

12 Ibidem, Wniosek władz PBTO o wpisanie Oddziału w Warszawie do rejestru handlowego SGG, 11.07.1930, 64; Ibidem, Postanowienie SGG o wpisie do rejestru handlowego, 22.07.1930, 69.

Warsaw office at 116 Sienkiewicza Street, at the corner of Marszałkowska Street.[13] The second half of 1930 brought changes in the composition of the Management Board. By resolution of the Supervisory Board of 28 August 1930, Captain Witkowski's resignation from his duties was accepted. He was replaced as acting Chief Executive Officer by J. Rummel, while the position of Deputy Director was entrusted to Feliks Kollat, who, together with C. H. Jeffrey, formed a two-person Management Board from September 1930.[14]

In 1930, the company's ships made 95 round trips, maintaining regular weekly service on the following routes: from Gdynia and Gdańsk to London (with the SS "Premjer" and SS "Warszawa") and from Gdynia and Gdańsk to Hull (with the SS "Łódź" and SS "Rewa"). From June 1930, the ships also regularly called at Gdynia. The following goods were exported from Gdańsk: wood and wood products, paraffin and general cargo, while Gdynia mainly exported goods that required refrigeration (bacon, ham, butter, eggs) and, at the end of the year, small quantities of zinc. Gdynia was also the main centre of passenger traffic, mainly emigration.[15] Freight traffic in 1930 increased particularly in exports, by as much as 81.37%. A total of 50,546 tonnes of cargo was transported (26,597 tonnes to London and 23,949 tonnes to Hull). Unfortunately, the situation in imports did not improve so significantly, with an increase of only 10.94% compared to 1929. A total of 12,661 tonnes of cargo were imported to Polish ports (3,861 tonnes from London and 8,800 tonnes from Hull), which was justified by the difficult economic situation in the country and a general decrease in imports from England to Poland. Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, thanks to the establishment of regular connections and an effective freight policy, "Polbryt" began to play an important role in the development of Polish exports to England. As a result of this campaign, a new Polish industry developed – bacon production – and there was a rapid increase in the amount of bacon exported. In 1930, as much as 11,197 tonnes were exported, with almost 100% of exports coming from Gdynia. The first five months of 1931, during which 21,652 tonnes were exported, gave grounds for even greater optimism. In 1930, revenues from cargo transport on the company's ships amounted to PLN 3,326,245.48, while their value exceeded PLN 100,000,000.[16] Passenger transport, heavily dependent

13 "Ostatnie wiadomości z nad morza," *Polska Gospodarcza* 29 (1930): 1299.

14 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 1, File No. 149/455, Uchwała Rady Nadzorczej, 28.08.1930, 77; Ibidem, Wniosek o dokonanie wpisu w rejestrze handlowym SGG, 23.09.1930, 76; Ibidem, Postanowienie SGG o wpisie do rejestru handlowego, 16.10.1930, 80. See also "Ostatnie wiadomości z nad morza," *Polska Gospodarcza* 39 (1930): 1741.

15 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 1, File No. 149/455, Akt notarialny (rep. 678/31) sporządzony przez B. Okołowicza z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy oraz sprawozdaniem, 22.06.1931, 85. See also "Rozkład jazdy statków P.B.T.O.," *Morze* 2 (1931): 11.

16 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 1, File No. 149/455, Akt notarialny (rep. 678/31) sporządzony przez B. Okołowicza z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 22.06.1931, 85–86.

on emigration, which had started successfully in the first months of 1930, collapsed in the second quarter and almost completely stopped at the end of the year due to restrictions on emigration to North America (PBTO ships transported emigrants to English ports, where they boarded ocean liners). Passenger traffic was also affected by a decree of the President of the Republic of Poland, which restricted the transport of emigrants to Polish ports and Polish shipping lines maintaining direct communication with the countries where the emigrants were settling. Despite the efforts of the Management Board, tourist traffic was low, with the company's ships carrying 12,213 people (7,552 to London, 3,137 to Hull, 1,251 from London and 273 from Hull), generating revenue of PLN 2,357,486.54 from ticket sales. The collapse of emigrant traffic and the inadequate adaptation of ships to cargo-only traffic prompted the Management Board to conclude an agreement with the "United Baltic Corporation" (hereinafter UBC) in October 1930. Under this agreement, joint operation of the line from Gdynia and Gdańsk to London was commenced, while regular traffic was reduced by 50%. In the weeks when PBTO ships did not sail, communication was maintained by UBD vessels, e.g. SS "Baltavia." Under this agreement, both companies withdrew one ship from the London line, allowing the remaining ships to carry full loads and larger numbers of passengers. They made a profit, covering part of the losses caused by the immobilisation of half of the fleet sailing to London and the uninterrupted work of the loss-making line to Hull. The agreement with UBC meant that SS "Warszawa," which was technically the least suited to the new requirements, was withdrawn from service. The SS "Rewa" also caused unexpected trouble when it ran aground in Friedrichsort (near Kiel) on 3 February 1930.[17] As the company's financial results were determined not so much by the transport of goods as by the transport of passengers, its balance sheet for 1930, submitted to the general meeting of shareholders, showed a loss of PLN 1,713,403.33. However, it did not include the depreciation of ships and other write-offs permitted by the applicable regulations. Therefore, guided by the rule of maximum savings in the administration and operation of ships, the Management Board of PBTO closed the Branch in Gdańsk, and moved its administration centre to Gdynia.[18]

At the end of 1930, economic journalists and economists noticed that the potential of Polish-English capital was not properly exploited. It was also evident that both sides had very different views on the most important issues related to "Polbryt's" activities. For the British, the very fact of concluding the agreement was a success, while for the Polish side, the real goal was a reasonable expansion of the company. In the long term, the partnership between the two capitals did not represent much value for Poland, and therefore in 1931, the State Treasury's share in the company was increased to 91%.

17 Ibidem, 87; "Ostatnie wiadomości z nad morza," *Polska Gospodarcza* 42 (1930): 1867.

18 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 1, File No. 149/455, Protokół z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 22.06.1931, 88.

This was achieved by reducing the share capital and taking into account changes in PBTO's accounting, which were caused by the crisis in global shipping. Therefore, on 22 June 1931, the general meeting of the company adopted a resolution to reduce the share capital from PLN 13,485,000 to PLN 3,643,000, of which PLN 2,732,000 was allocated to the Polish side and PLN 911,000 to the British side. The amount obtained in this way was written off to cover losses. In order to provide the company with working capital and obtain funds for the purchase of two new ships, it was decided to increase the reduced share capital by PLN 6,500,000, i.e. to PLN 10,143,000, by issuing a second issue of 6,500 registered shares with a par value of PLN 1,000 each. As EWL was unable to participate in the new share issue, with the consent of the parties, the entire issue was acquired by the Poles, while the British were given the possibility to purchase some of the new shares at the issue price (until 30 June 1932), but only up to such an amount that their share in the company, together with the shares already held, did not exceed 40% of the share capital. From that moment on, PBTO's capital amounted to PLN 10,143,000 and was divided as follows: "Żegluga Polska," representing the interests of the Polish State Treasury, held 9,232 shares (worth PLN 9,232,000) and EWL held 911 shares (PLN 911,000). During the general meeting, changes were also made to the composition of the Supervisory Board, which from then on was made up of Benisławski, Holden, Rothert and Metcalfe Ives, as well as Marian Turski, Stanisław Nowak and Witold Broniewski.[19]

PBTO's balance sheet for 1931 showed a gross profit of PLN 118,954.92.[20] During that year, the Company's freight traffic increased significantly, with exports amounting to 84,703 tonnes (36,860 tonnes to London and 47,843 tonnes to Hull), representing a 143% increase compared to 1929 and a 67.57% increase compared to 1930. The situation in imports improved slightly (compared to 1929, the increase was 19.18%, but compared to 1930, it increased by 3%). In 1931, 13,049 tonnes of cargo were imported to Gdańsk and Gdynia (5,497 tonnes from London and 7,552 tonnes from Hull). The trade in goods, especially the export of food products, clearly became the dominant activity of the port of Gdynia, thanks to lower costs of cargo handling and better cargo handling efficiency compared to Gdańsk. Revenues from the transport of goods amounted to PLN 5,521,896.23. Unfortunately, revenues from the transport of passengers and emigrants decreased significantly, amounting to only PLN 384,369.06.

19 Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 678/31) sporządzony przez B. Okołowicza z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 22.06.1931, 90–94; Ibidem, Wniosek do SGG ze zgłoszeniem obniżenia kapitału zakładowego, 28.12.1931, 101; Ibidem, Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego SGG, 11.01.1932, 119; Ibidem, Wpis do rejestru handlowego SGG, 12.01.1932, 120. See also Stefan Szyszkowski, "Zmiany w strukturze polskich towarzystw żeglugowych," *Polska Gospodarcza* 23 (1932): 669–670.

20 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 2, File No. 149/456, Sprawozdanie Zarządu i Rady Nadzorczej za 1931 r., 25.05.1932, 5.

During 1931, 90 round trips were made with non-owned and chartered ships. Although PBTO vessels did not suffer any serious accidents and maintained their class in accordance with the requirements of cargo traffic, the Company had to charter three ships for 13 round trips. As the passenger certificate of SS "Rewa" was not renewed, it became necessary for the Company to purchase new ships. In accordance with a resolution of the Supervisory Board and in arrangement with the shareholders, the shipyards in Helsingør and Elsmore were urgently commissioned to build the steamers SS "Lublin" and SS "Lwów" for the transport of perishable foodstuffs (half of the ships' compartments were equipped with refrigeration equipment) They were small and fast enough to be operated more intensively and economically than SS "Łódź" and SS "Rewa," which had previously sailed to Hull. The new ships were to be ready by 15 May 1932.[21]

During the general meeting of shareholders held on 25 May 1932 in Gdynia, M. Benisławski and K. Rothert resigned from the Supervisory Board. They were replaced by Dr Stanisław Wachowiak and Marian Węgrzynowski (head of the personnel office at the Ministry of the Treasury). However, the latter was not appointed until 4 October 1932, by virtue of a resolution of the next general meeting.[22]

The PBTO Management Board report for 1932 notes a worsening of the global economic crisis, which had a particularly severe impact on shipping. The previously unrecorded imbalance between supply and demand for tonnage, resulting from the decline in international trade, led to the immobilisation of a significant part of the merchant fleet. Nevertheless, "Polbryt" ships made 77 round trips, maintaining regular service on both lines. In terms of cargo traffic, the operating results were as follows: 72,130 tonnes of cargo were exported (29,804 tonnes to London and 42,326 tonnes to Hull), while 20,785 tonnes were imported (7,762 tonnes from London and 13,023 tonnes from Hull). (7,762 tonnes from London and 13,023 tonnes from Hull).[23] The company's proceeds amounted to PLN 4,645,181.95 (PLN 4,430,236.36 from the transport of goods and PLN 214,945.59 from passengers). Although the annual balance sheet of PBTO presented by the Management Board showed a gross loss of PLN 171,291.17, considering the poor economic situation and difficult working conditions, the balance sheet and results were considered "satisfactory." Changes in tonnage were reported. During the year, the construction of twin ships was completed: SS "Lublin" (launched on 19 March 1932)

21 Ibidem, 4–5; "Ostatnie wiadomości z nad morza," *Polska Gospodarcza* 39 (1931): 1386; "Nowe jednostki polskiej floty handlowej," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 10 (1931): 18–19; "Dalszy rozwój polskiej floty handlowej," *Morze* 10-11 (1931): 27.

22 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 2, File No. 149/456, Akt notarialny (rep. 640/32) sporządzony przez H. Ewerta-Krzemieniewskiego z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 25.05.1932, 7–9; Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 1284/32) sporządzony przez H. Ewerta-Krzemieniewskiego z protokołem z nadzwyczajnego walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 04.10.1932, 32–33.

23 Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Zarządu i Rady Nadzorczej za 1932 r., 54.

and SS "Lwów" (launched on 1 May 1932), which were immediately put into service on the Hull line. In October 1932, SS "Łódź" was withdrawn from service and sold to the Navy Command, and from that moment on it sailed under the name ORP "Sławomir Czerwiński" as a submarine base.[24]

The general meeting of shareholders reconvened on 14 June 1933 in Warsaw to appoint a new Supervisory Board. Alongside Wachowiak, Holden, Nowak, Ives, Turski and Węgrzynowski, Jan Tadeusz Lipka also joined the board.[25] The appointment was confirmed by the general meeting held on 30 April 1934 in Warsaw. The Polish State Treasury was represented by the director of the maritime department at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, engineer Leonard Możdżeński, while the British side was represented by Holden. After reviewing and approving the report and balance sheet, adopting depreciation write-offs for property, movable assets and ships, acknowledging the fulfilment of duties by the authorities and electing new ones, the agreement concluded on 11 August 1933 was approved. by resolution of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the company, with the shipyard "Swan, Hunter & Wigham Richardson Ltd." of Newcastle-on-Tyne, for the construction of SS "Lech" (launched on 15 January 1934). The ship was to resemble SS "Lublin" and SS "Lwów" in appearance, although it was expected to be faster than them. It was to have a modern silhouette with a straight bow and a rounded full stern in the above-water section, as well as a double bottom. As it was assumed that it would be used in the future for shipping in the eastern Baltic Sea, it was also reinforced to withstand ice .[26]

In 1933, as a result of further import restrictions introduced in England, the volume of cargo transported by PBTO to English ports decreased. This decline was more than compensated for by an increase in the transport of imported goods. Although the economic crisis continued and global shipping was still in the grip of depression,

24 Ibidem, 60–61; See also Tadeusz Ocioszyński, "Polska marynarka handlowa w dobie kryzysu," *Polska Gospodarcza* 44 (1931): 1501–1503; "Nowy statek Polbrytu," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 11 (12.05.1932): 17; "Nowy statek Polsko-Brytyjskiego Tow. Okrętowego," *Morze* 5 (1932): 13; "Nowe polskie statki handlowe," *Morze* 6 (1932): 13; "Nowy statek Polsko-Brytyjskiego Tow. Okrętowego," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 7 (1932): 21; "Statek «Łódź» pod banderą wojenną," *Morze* 11 (1932): 18–19; "S/S «Łódź» w doku," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 2 (1933): 19.

25 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 2, File No. 149/456, Akt notarialny (rep. 866/33) sporządzony przez Mieczysława Jabłońskiego w Warszawie z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 14.06.1933, 63–64.

26 Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 1029/34) sporządzony przez Zygmunta Nowickiego w Warszawie z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 30.04.1934, 73–74. See also "Walne zgromadzenie S. A. «Żegluga Polska" oraz Polsko-Brytyjskiego T-wa Okrętowego," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 5 (1934): 39; "Budowa nowego statku dla Polsko-Brytyjskiego T-wa Okrętowego," *Polska Gospodarcza* 33 (1933): 1023; Stanisław Kosko, "Rozwój polskiej marynarki handlowej," *Morze* 8–9 (1933): 3–4; "Nowy parowiec polski," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 1 (1934): 31; "Roczne walne zgromadzenie Sp. Akc. «Żegluga Polska» i Polsko-Brytyjskiego Tow. Okr.," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 12 (05.05.1934): 10.

with some tonnage laid up, freight rates falling and fierce competition, PBTO ships made 83 round trips, maintaining service on both routes. Out of this number, 78 voyages were made by the company's own ships and 5 by the chartered SS "Chorzów." The company's annual balance sheet showed a gross profit of PLN 857,959.21.[27] Operational results in freight traffic showed that 68,551 tonnes of cargo were exported (28,655 tonnes to London and 39,896 tonnes to Hull), while 27,379 tonnes were imported (9,632 tonnes from London and 17,747 tonnes from Hull). A total of 1,627 passengers and emigrants sailed westward, and 871 eastward. Total revenue amounted to PLN 4,344,932.18 (PLN 4,086,250.41 from the transport of goods, but only PLN 258,681.77 from the transport of passengers).[28]

In 1934–1935, minor changes were made to the composition of the Supervisory Board. It was not until the general meeting of shareholders held on 4 November 1935 in Warsaw that Robert Ceceniowski, Tadeusz Ocioszyński and Kazimierz Stamirowski were appointed to the board. The following members remained from the previous board: Holden, Ives, Nowak, Turski and Węgrzynowski.[29]

The PBTO report on activities for 1934 took into account the unfavourable economic situation and increased competition in shipping, so the results achieved were again considered satisfactory. The company's ships maintained biweekly service to London and weekly service to Hull. They made 79 round trips (27 to London, of which SS "Lech" made 19, SS "Warszawa" made 7 and SS "Premjer" made 1, and 52 to Hull, of which SS "Lublin" made 26, SS "Lwów" made 24 and SS "Lech" made 2). The SS "Rimfrost" was chartered for this purpose and made four trips with a cargo of herring from Great Yarmouth to Gdynia between 10 September and 10 December. During the summer season (from May to September), SS "Warszawa" made 12 cruise voyages (to Copenhagen, Stockholm, Riga, Tallinn, Helsinki, Leningrad and Bornholm) on behalf of "Polbryt" and "Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe." In 1934, PBTO ships exported 61,016 tonnes of cargo (27,189 tonnes to London, 33,777 tonnes to Hull and 50 tonnes to Great Yarmouth), and imported 28,909 tonnes (from London 11,109 tonnes, from Hull 16,837 tonnes and from Great Yarmouth 963 tonnes). Passenger traffic was less successful, with 1,397 people travelling on PBTO ships (895 to England and 502 in the opposite direction). In total, the company recorded revenues of PLN 4,243,637.52 (from the transport of goods PLN 3,515,398.22, passengers PLN 130,187, warehouse operation and sales in ship canteens PLN 112,814.26, and PLN 485,238.04 from concluded agreements).[30]

27 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 2, File No. 149/456, Sprawozdanie z działalności towarzystwa za 1933 r., 78.

28 Ibidem, 76–77.

29 Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 1414/35) sporządzony przez Z. Nowickiego z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 04.11.1935, 137–138.

30 Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Zarządu z działalności towarzystwa za 1934 r., 142–143.

Its annual balance sheet showed a gross profit of PLN 1,097,276.76, and after deducting losses of PLN 239,131.47 (on the sale of SS "Rewa"), the gross profit amounted to PLN 858,145.29.[31] SS "Rewa," withdrawn due to its age (26 years) and uneconomical operation, was sold for scrap to "Eisen-Union A. G." in March 1934. Its place in the fleet was taken by SS "Lech," launched in March 1934, which proved to be a valuable acquisition. At the beginning of 1934, PBTO began leasing a warehouse (hangar No. 3) in the port from the Maritime Office in Gdynia, with a usable area of 3,781 m^2, in which 8,590 tonnes of cargo were stored during the first year. It also housed the Free Trade Department and the Transit Department, operating under a special concession from the Ministry of the Treasury.[32] The Management Board's report for 1934 states that PBTO held shares in "Syndikat Emigracyjny Spółka z o.o." in Warsaw and belonged to: the Polish Shipowners' Association in Gdynia (from 1933, F. Kollat from PBTO served as President of the Management Board), the Polish Shipbrokers' Association in Gdynia, the Association of Owners and Lessors of Port Warehouses in Gdynia, The Baltic & International Maritime Conference in Copenhagen, the Non-Federated Shipowners Dock Labour Committee in London, the Polish-British, Polish-Romanian and Polish-Hungarian Chambers of Commerce (it did not become a member of the Polish-French Chamber of Commerce until 1938) and the Polish-Czech Agreement. Like other shipping companies affiliated with the Polish Shipowners' Association, on the initiative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, PBTO concluded an agreement with "Towarzystwo Budowy Osiedli S.A." w Gdyni (Housing Development Company in Gdynia), granting it an interest-free loan for a period of 18 years to the amount of PLN 11,500. Until it was mortgaged on houses built in the Witomino district, it was secured by a letter of guarantee from the municipality of Gdynia.[33]

In 1935, PBTO ships regularly sailed to English ports, making 78 round trips (26 to London, including 25 by SS "Lech" and 1 by SS "Warszawa," and 52 to Hull, including 26 by SS "Lwów," SS "Lublin" 25 and SS "Warszawa" 1). In addition, from April 1935, SS "Warszawa" sailed on a newly opened passenger and cargo line to Le Havre, calling at Cherbourg and Dover on the way. In total, the ship made 18 round trips, mainly transporting emigrants for transatlantic lines that maintained regular connections with

31 Ibidem, 146.

32 Ibidem, 144. See also "Zamówienie nowego statku," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 9 (1933): 39; "Zamówienie nowego statku dla «Polbrytu»," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 22 (15.08.1933): 24; Rowmund Piłsudski, "Odnawianie taboru polskiej floty handlowej," *Polska Gospodarcza* 12 (1934): 382–383.

33 APG OG, SGG, "Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 2, File No. 149/456, Sprawozdanie Zarządu z działalności towarzystwa za 1934 r., 145. In 1935, the construction of the seafarers' housing estate in Witomino was completed, resulting in 10 double houses – 20 flats. See Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Rady Nadzorczej z działalności spółki w 1935 r., 186; Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Zarządu z działalności za 1935 r., 188–189.

North American ports. Despite best efforts it was not possible to obtain cargo for this line, which was explained by the low level of trade between Poland and France. Out of necessity the company chartered the SS "Leo," which made 10 round trips to English ports. In terms of exports, PBTO ships transported 61,741 tonnes of cargo to England (30,475 tonnes to London and 31,266 tonnes to Hull), 10,786 tonnes on the SS "Leo" and 61 tonnes from Gdynia to Le Havre, for a total of 72,588 tonnes. As usual imports were not particularly successful. The company's ships brought 29,468 tonnes of cargo to Polish ports (12,296 tonnes from London, 15,829 tonnes from Hull, 618 tonnes from Le Havre and 725 tonnes from Rotterdam). Thanks to the launch of the line to Le Havre, passenger transport statistics improved, as the number of passengers reached 4,692 people (to/from England 442/379, to/from Le Havre 3,796/75). The Company continued to operate a warehouse in the port, receiving 9,055 tonnes of cargo. Annual income from operations amounted to PLN 5,070,293.32 (from the transport of goods PLN 3,646,768.10, passenger transport PLN 425,245.06, warehouse operation and profits from shipboard canteens PLN 112,264.38, concluded agreements PLN 585,400 and other PLN 300,615.84). The profit and loss account showed a gross profit of PLN 1,483,324.05, but after deducting the loss on the sale of SS "Premjer" (PLN 715,944.27), it ultimately amounted to PLN 767,379.78.[34]

Thanks to the long-awaited improvement in economic conditions, in 1936 PBTO achieved better results than in previous years, which was reflected in an increase in freight and passenger traffic. On regular British lines, the company's ships made 77 ½ round trips (26 to London on the SS "Lech," 26 to Hull on the SS "Lwów" and 25 ½ on the SS "Lublin"). On the French line, SS "Warszawa" made 24 voyages, calling at Le Havre, London, Cherbourg, Dover, Dunkirk and Antwerp. Exports amounted to 108,260 tonnes of cargo and 639 mine and work horses (35,212 tonnes to London and 495 horses, to Hull 35,612 tonnes and 144 horses, and to Le Havre only 313 tonnes). Import statistics were less optimistic. PBTO ships transported 37,123 tonnes of cargo to Polish ports of cargo, including: from London (to Gdynia) 15,295 tonnes, from Hull 20,944 tonnes and from Le Havre (to Gdynia) 531 tonnes, Dunkirk 121 tonnes, Cherbourg 120 tonnes, Antwerp 112 tonnes, i.e. a total of 844 tonnes. Passenger and emigration traffic carried 5,159 people (4,680 westbound and 479 eastbound). The company's annual revenue amounted to PLN 5,773,617.58 grosz (from goods PLN 2,276,703.11, passengers PLN 469,732.56, warehouse operations PLN 195,394.88, concluded agreements PLN 386,125, other PLN 445,662.03).

34 Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Rady Nadzorczej z działalności spółki w 1935 r., 184; Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Zarządu z działalności za 1935 r., 186–190. See also "Linia Gdynia – Havre," *Polska Gospodarcza* 19 (1935): 615. SS "Premjer" was purchased in November 1935 by the shipowner "Tirrenia Flotte Riunite Florio – CITRA" of Naples ("S/S «Premjer» sprzedany zagranicę," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 11 (1935): 19; "S/S «Premjer» odpłynął z Gdyni pod włoską banderą," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 33 (25.11.1935): 14–15).

The annual lease of hangar No. 3 in the port cost PLN 26,142. In 1936, 18,263 tonnes of cargo were accepted for storage there, of which 17,540 tonnes were in transit and 723 tonnes were in free circulation. The total gross annual profit amounted to PLN 1,945,787.78.[35]

During the Management Board meeting held on 23 April 1937 in Warsaw, it was decided to liquidate the Warsaw Branch and revoke the power of attorney granted to A. R. Leszczyński. This decision was confirmed on 1 May 1937 in Warsaw by the General Meeting of Shareholders.[36]

The PBTO's report on activities in 1937 assessed its situation as roughly comparable to the previous year. Regular communication with London, Hull and Le Havre was maintained.[37] The company's ships made 99 round trips (25 to London on the SS "Lech," 24 to "Hull" on the SS "Lublin," 24 on the SS "Lwów," and 26 on the French route on the SS "Warszawa," calling not only at Le Havre, but also at London, Cherbourg and Dunkirk.[38] For the first time, tables were used in the annual report, which made it easier to analyse the company's operating and financial results in comparison with the previous year. The company's turnover also included the transport of chartered ships operating on British lines. In passenger and emigration traffic, PBTO ships carried 6,938 people (6,381 to British and French ports and 557 to Polish ports), which represented an increase of 1,779 people (34%) compared to the previous year. Expanding the scope of its activities, the company became interested in the trade of bulk goods, in particular the export of timber. In connection with this, tramp ships were chartered on its account, which carried 60,846 tonnes of cargo. The cargo handling warehouse in the port of Gdynia received 17,218 tonnes, which was a decrease of 5.8% compared to 1936. Annual proceeds amounted to PLN 7,007,343 (PLN 4,183,458.95 from the transport of goods by own ships, foreign ships PLN 1,554,985.93, passenger transport PLN 619,043.26, warehouse PLN 181,979.67, special proceeds PLN 112,200 and other PLN 355,675.19).[39] In connection with the above, a gross profit of PLN 1,165,516.63 was achieved.[40]

35 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 3, File No. 149/457, Sprawozdanie Zarządu z działalności za 1936 r., 4–7.

36 Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 817/37) sporządzony przez M. Jabłońskiego z protokołem z obrad Zarządu towarzystwa, 01.05.1937, 41–46; Ibidem, Wniosek o wpis do rejestru handlowego SGG, 08.06.1937, 17; Ibidem, Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego SGG, 18.06.1937, 47.

37 Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Zarządu z działalności w 1937 r., 74.

38 Ibidem, 76–77.

39 Ibidem, 78–79.

40 Ibidem, Sprawozdanie Rady Nadzorczej za 1937 r., 81.

Table 1. PBTO turnover in freight transport in 1936–1937

Port	Export			Import	Total	Increase in 1937
	Years	Tonnes	Horses			
London	1937	35,754	56	15,858	51,612	2.4%
	1936	35,062	495	15,295	50,357	
Hull	1937	42,481	250	19,372	61,853	9.4%
	1936	35,612	144	20,944	56,556	
French ports	1937	1,031	–	778	1,809	51.0%
	1936	313	–	884	1,197	
Total	1937	72,266	306	36,008	115,274	6.6%
	1936	70,987	639	37,133	108,110	

Source: APG OG File No. 149/457, 76–77.

During the general meeting of shareholders held on 30 May 1938 in Warsaw, the purchase of SS "Lida," a new cargo ship, was approved. Its construction had been commissioned on 22 December 1937 from the shipyard "Swan, Hunter & Wigham Richardson Ltd."[41] Launched on 27 August 1938, it was the thirteenth vessel built for Poland in British shipyards. Interestingly, the port of registry of SS "Lida" was Gdańsk (it was the seventh and largest seagoing vessel entered in the register of the local Merchant Navy Office).[42] During the general meeting of shareholders held on 18 July 1939 in Gdynia, the Management Board and Supervisory Board of the company approved the order (agreement with the shipyard "Werf De Noord Jan Ulrich Smit, Alblasserdam" concluded on 23 December 1938) for the passenger and cargo ship MS "Warszawa (II)" for service on the Gdynia–Le Havre–London route, which was to replace SS "Warszawa" after 15 March 1940.[43]

In international shipping, 1938 brought an economic slowdown. Freight rates for tramp ships were not much higher than in 1936, and in some months fell below that level. Operating costs (bunkers, insurance, port charges, crew wages, etc.) remained at the 1937 level, when the economic situation was considered favourable.

41 Ibidem, Akt notarialny (rep. 1328/38) sporządzony przez M. Jabłońskiego z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 30.05.1938, 63–67. See also "S/S «Lida»," *Polska Gospodarcza* 46 (1938): 1673–1674; "Bilanse polskich towarzystw okrętowych," *Wiadomości Portu Gdyńskiego* 6 (1938): 25.

42 "S/S «Lida» w porcie gdyńskim," *Polska Gospodarcza* 45 (1938): 1551; "S/S «Lida» polski frachtowiec drzewny," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 20 (30.10.1938): 11.

43 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 3, File No. 149/457, Akt notarialny (rep. 725/39) sporządzony przez H. Ewerta-Krzemieniewskiego z protokołem z walnego zgromadzenia akcjonariuszy, 18.07.1939, 108–113. See also "Zamówienie nowego statku pasażersko-towarowego," *Polska Gospodarcza* 3 (1939): 92; "Nowe jednostki polskiej floty handlowej," Wiadomości Portowe 1–2 (1939): 17–18; "Nowe zamówienie dla polskiej floty handlowej," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 2 (30.01.1939): 16.

This year was characterised by an increase in tonnage unemployment, which at the end of December 1938 was estimated to exceed 3.1 million GRT, without taking into account the large number of ships waiting in ports for cargo. It developed its activities in the area of maintaining existing shipping connections and continued the irregular service to the ports of western England, launched in 1937.[44] PBTO ships completed 104 ½ round trips (to London SS "Lech" 25, to Hull SS "Lublin" 25 ½ and SS "Lwów" 26; on the French line to Le Havre, calling at London SS "Warsaw" 26, and on the line to the ports of western England SS "Lida" 2 voyages).[45]

Table 2. PBTO turnover in goods transport in 1937–1938

Port	Export			Import	Total	Increase in 1938
	Years	Tonnes	Horses			
London	1937	35,754	56	15,858	51,612	–0.48%
	1938	36,435	54	14,931	51,366	
Hull	1937	42,481	250	19,372	61,853	–1.51%
	1938	39,349	212	21,574	60,923	
French ports	1937	1,031	–	778	1,809	64.1%
	1938	921	–	2,048	2,969	
Ports of western England	1937	–	–	–	–	100.0%
	1938	3,041	–	–	3,041	
Total	1937	72,266	306	36,008	115,274	4.4%
	1938	79,746	266	38,553	120,337	

Source: APG OG File No. 149/457, passim.

The company's warehouse in the port of Gdynia received 19,153 tonnes of cargo, which was an increase of 1,935 tonnes (11.3%) compared to 1937. Passenger traffic improved, as PBTO ships carried 7,110 people (6,011 to British and French ports, 1,099 to Gdynia), which was an increase of 172 people (2.4%). Annual revenues amounted to PLN 273,288.20 (from the transport of goods by own ships PLN 4,817,720.84, by foreign ships PLN 879,009.41, passenger transport PLN 671,243.03, warehousing PLN 218,526.71, special income PLN 27,400), which represented an increase of PLN 686,000, despite the decline in the pound sterling exchange rate. The gross profit for 1938 amounted to PLN 1,532,443.52, which was PLN 366,926.89 more than in 1937.[46]

44 APG OG, SGG, Akta rejestrowe PBTO, vol. 3, File No. 149/457, Sprawozdanie Zarządu za 1938 r., 114.

45 Ibidem 117–118.

46 Ibidem, 119–120, 212.

The planned expansion of the Polish merchant fleet was one of the key factors in the development of the entire maritime economy, and PBTO, one of the most important domestic shipping companies of the Second Polish Republic, played a major role in this process. From 1929, it sent its ships to London and Hull, and from 1935 to Le Havre, Dover and Cherbourg, transporting goods and passengers (mainly emigrants). Despite the unfavourable economic situation in international shipping, the Polish merchant fleet, including PBTO, showed systematic growth in 1939. Unfortunately, due to the outbreak of World War II, these advances were not reflected in the company's registration files, which means that historians researching the history of the Polish merchant navy during this period have to rely on unreliable (and often inaccurate) press reports. These sources provide PBTO's monthly and quarterly reports for the first half of 1939, but, unfortunately, we cannot verify this information and statistics using official records.[47] There is no doubt that in the period preceding the outbreak of World War II, issues related to shipping were at the forefront of the Polish maritime economy. The expansion of the merchant fleet and the creation of new shipping routes under the Polish flag were important elements of the maritime economy. Right before the war the development of the domestic merchant fleet, thanks to an increase in its tonnage, attracted the interest of broad economic circles. The expansion of the merchant navy followed a systematic plan. A four-year shipping investment plan, developed at the end of 1936, was implemented. It constituted the first stage of a 10-year plan, which envisaged the construction or purchase of 30 sea-going vessels with a deadweight of approx. 90,000 tonnes by 1941. Considering that by the outbreak of the war Poland had managed to acquire 22 ships with a carrying capacity of over 70,000 tonnes, most of this programme had been completed. According to statistics available in the press, the tonnage of the Polish merchant fleet as of 1 July 1939 was approx. 122,000 GRT (merchant and fishing vessels), and it was expected to increase by another 30% by the end of the year.[48] The PBTO's registration files show that its activities supported the development of economic relations between Poland and Great Britain and France.

47 "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w styczniu," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 4 (28.2.1939): 20–21; "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w lutym," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 6 (31.03.1939): 9–11; "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w marcu," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 9 (15.05.1939): 11–12; "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w marcu 1939 r.," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 10 (30.05.1939): 11–13; "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w kwietniu," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 10 (30.05.1939): 13–14; "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w maju," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 11 (15.06.1939): 10–11; "Działalność polskiej floty handlowej w czerwcu," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 14 (30.07.1939): 10–12; Jan Korolkiewicz, "Praca polskiej floty handlowej w I kwartale 1939 r.," *Polska Gospodarcza* 28 (1939): 1056–1057.

48 Edmund Urbański, "Programowa rozbudowa polskiej floty handlowej," *Biuletyn Izby Przemysłowo-Handlowej w Gdyni* 14 (30.07.1939): 3–5.

The launch and regular operation of a regular shipping line allowed for the systematic development of Polish exports to Britain, which was of particular importance in Polish trade as an export market for livestock products. The three volumes of PBTO registration files are an excellent source of information and a basis for detailed research on issues related to the Polish maritime economy. The documents contained in them concerning shareholders, changes in share capital, work organisation, tonnage characteristics, forms of activity, turnover and financial results reveal interesting aspects of the development of Polish shipping companies during the Second Polish Republic and should serve as a basis for the preparation of a more comprehensive monograph, something which these companies undoubtedly deserve.

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English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Three volumes of register files of the "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe S.A." from 1929–1938, which are part of the archival team of the Municipal Court in Gdynia, contain the most important documents (mainly in the form of reports and correspondence) related to the company's operational and financial results, fleet and work organisation. They are not only comprehensive and diverse in terms of content, but, above all, they are an official source of information on the history of the popular "Polbryt," created in its office. The information contained in them provides a basis for further research into the history of this shipping company, which had its most important period in the years 1929–1938. The company was established on 21 December 1928 after lengthy negotiations with Ellerman's Wilson Line Limited. The result was the purchase of four cargo and passenger ships, which ensured regular transport between Gdańsk and Gdynia and ports in England (London, Hull, Dover) and France (Le Havre, Cherbourg and Dunkirk). The main goal of PBTO was to transport butter, bacon and eggs, i.e. perishable goods, as well as passengers (mainly emigrants travelling via Britain and France to North America) and horses. The company was established at a particularly difficult time for the development of global shipping. From its very first year, it had to combat not only a disastrous freight market and poor emigration conditions, but also difficulties arising from its lack of experience. Nevertheless, PBTO played an important role in the development of Polish-English and Polish-French trade relations. This article, like the company's registration files, ends on 31 December 1938 due to the outbreak of World War II and the suspension of work by Polish courts keeping commercial records.

Powstanie i działalność "Polsko-Brytyjskiego Towarzystwa Okrętowego S.A. w Gdyni" w okresie międzywojennym w świetle akt rejestru handlowego

Słowa kluczowe: Gdynia, żegluga, polska marynarka handlowa, okres międzywojenny, archiwum państwowe

STRESZCZENIE

Trzy tomy akt rejestrowych "Polsko-Brytyjskiego Towarzystwa Okrętowego S.A. w Gdyni" z lat 1929–1938, wchodzących w skład zespołu archiwalnego Sądu Grodzkiego w Gdyni zawierają najważniejsze dokumenty (głównie w formie sprawozdań i korespondencji), związane z wynikami eksploatacyjnymi i finansowymi spółki, spraw taboru i organizacji pracy. Są nie tylko wszechstronnym i różnorodnym ze uwagi na treść, ale przede wszystkim oficjalnym materiałem źródłowym do dziejów popularnego "Polbrytu," powstałym w jego kancelarii. Informacje w nich zawarte stanowią przyczynek do prowadzenie dalszych badań nad historią tego towarzystwa okrętowego, którego najważniejszy okres w historii przypadał na lata 1929–1938. Spółkę zawiązano 21 grudnia 1928 r. po długich pertraktacjach z firmą "Ellerman's Wilson Line Limited." W efekcie zakupiono 4 statki towarowo-pasażerskie, którymi utrzymywano regularną komunikację między Gdańskiem i Gdynią a portami Anglii (Londyn, Hull, Dover) i Francji (Le Havre, Cherbourg i Dunkierka). Celem utworzenia PBTO był przede wszystkim przewóz ładunków masła, bekonów i jaj, czyli towarów łatwo psujących się oraz pasażerów (głównie emigrantów, płynących via Anglia i Francja do krajów Ameryki Północnej) i koni. Spółkę zawiązano w okresie szczególnie trudnym dla rozwoju światowej żeglugi. Od pierwszego roku musiała walczyć nie tylko z katastrofalnym rynkiem frachtowym i złą koniunkturą emigracyjną, ale również z trudnościami, powstałymi wskutek jej niewielkiego doświadczenia. Mimo to PBTO spełniło ważną rolę w rozwoju kontaktów handlowych polsko-angielskich i polsko-francuskich. Niniejszy artykuł – podobnie jak akta rejestrowe spółki – chronologicznie zamyka się na 31 grudnia 1938 r. z uwagi na wybuch II wojny światowej, a w raz z nią zatrzymanie pracy polskich sądów, prowadzących rejestru handlowe.

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Anna Żeglińska
Faculty of History
University of Gdansk
anna.zeglinska@ug.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-3429-8242

Records of Polish Maritime Offices and Institutions Operating on the Eve of the Outbreak of World War II: Historical and Archival Guide*

Keywords: Maritime administration, Navy, Merchant marine, Maritime and Colonial League, Maritime courts, maritime education, World War II, Archives, archival finding aids

The Treaty of Versailles,[1] signed on 28 June 1919, ending World War I, divided the province of West Prussia, up to that moment belonging to Germany, between three parties: Poland (Pomeranian Voivodeship), Germany (Grenzmark Posen–Westpreußen), and the Free City of Danzig (Wolne Miasto Gdańsk). As a result, Poland gained 71 km of sea frontier, which, together with the Hel peninsula, gave it 147 km of coastline. On 15 November 1920, the Free City of Danzig was proclaimed, to secure free outlet to the sea for Poland: "(…) the City itself has been taken away from Germany because there was no other possible way of providing that «free and safe access to the sea,» which Germany had promised to grant."[2] Therefore, the Treaty of Versailles conferred special powers to Poland in the Free City of Danzig. Danzig turned out to be a specific

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1 The Treaty of Versailles, 28 July 1919, Part III, accessed 26.07.2024, https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19200350200.

2 Raport hr. Ishiego i rezolucja Rady Ligi Narodów w sprawie postanowień konstytucji gdańskiej, konwencji polsko-gdańskiej i mandatu obrony Gdańska, in: *Zbiór dokumentów urzędowych dotyczących stosunku Wolnego Miasta Gdańska do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (*Collection of Official Documents Pertaining to the Relations of the Free City of Danzig to the Republic of Poland*), vol. 1 (Gdańsk: Biuro Komisarza Generalnego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1923), 120.

political and legal construct,[3] and its territory became the intersection of diverse interests of (1) former "allied and associated" states, pursued by the League of Nations, (2) Danzig, backed up by the German Reich, exploiting the unstable political situation and local authorities to overturn the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and (3) the Second Republic of Poland, which regained its independence after 123 years of partitions. These interests were pursued by various offices and individual posts performing specific functions in the political and legal structure of the Free City of Danzig.

One of the most pivotal issues of the reborn Polish State was to enforce and make use of its rights stated in the Treaty of Versailles. The condition of Poland at that time (and its political situation in particular – the war with Bolshevik Russia) did not allow Poland to implement the authority, administration and exploitation of the port, waterways and railways servicing the port of Danzig as guaranteed by Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles. These powers were limited substantially by the Port and Waterways Board in the Free City of Danzig,[4] established on 24 March 1921. The Board became a joint Polish-Danzig body composed of 5 representatives of Poland and 5 of Danzig, led by a neutral president.[5] It was a separate legal entity with its own property, and its costs were shared evenly between Poland and the Free City of Danzig.[6] To reload and store explosives Poland was granted the Westerplatte peninsula, as well as the right to keep its warships in the Danzig port, following disputes on this subject in front of the League of Nations.[7] As these issues were not legally settled in the Treaty of Versailles, they became the matter of the League of Nation's regulations. Among the most significant ones was the resolution of the League of Nations of 17 November 1920 stating that Danzig could not be used as a military base.[8]

3 To this day the research has been carried out to determine Danzig's legal and government status; among the most up-to-date works you can find in: Simon Friedrich Wilhelm Wollenberg, *Die Regierung von Konfliktgebieten durch die Vereinten Nationen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl. –Ges, 2007), 84–90.

4 *Zbiór dokumentów urzędowych dotyczących stosunku Wolnego Miasta Gdańska do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* [Collection of Official Documents Pertaining to the Relations of the Free City of Danzig to the Republic of Poland], vol. 2 (Gdańsk: Biuro Komisarza Generalnego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1924), 19.

5 An announcement by the government on the treaty between Poland and the Free City of Danzig signed in Paris on 9 November 1920, Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Law] (hereinafter Dz.U.) of 1922, No. 13, item 117.

6 The Danzig Port and Waterways Board [Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych Gdańska/ Conseil du Port et des Voies d'Eau de Dantzig/ Ausschuß für den Hafen und die Wasserwege von Danzig], as an international institution, does not fall within the scope of this research, as it covers Polish offices and institutions. See Henryk Stępniak, *Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku* (Gdańsk: Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1971).

7 See Stanisław Mikos, *Wolne Miasto Gdańsk a Liga Narodów 1920–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydaw. Morskie, 1979); Stanisław Sierpowski, *Liga Narodów w najlepszym czasie (1926–1929)* (Poznań: Instytut Historii UAM, 2018).

8 See *Zbiór dokumentów urzędowych dotyczących stosunku Wolnego Miasta Gdańska do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* [Collection of Official Documents Pertaining to the Relations of the Free City of Danzig

The sea access through the Danzig port, which was only included in the Polish customs area and administered by an international institution – the Port and Waterways Board in the Free City of Danzig, did not secure the opportunity to pursue an independent maritime policy. These difficulties prompted Poland to construct its own commercial and naval port in the part of the Baltic Sea coast granted to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles[9] (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Part of the Baltic Sea coast granted to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles

Source: The Treaty of Versailles, 28 July 1919, accessed 26.07.2024, https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19200350200.

As Poland began to organise its access to the Baltic Sea, institutions and offices were established for that purpose in the territory of the Republic of Poland and in the Free City of Danzig. They all contributed to creating records, as their operations resulted in generating specific types of documentation. Their activities were interrupted by the outbreak

to the Republic of Poland], vol. 1–11 (Gdańsk: Biuro Komisarza Generalnego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1923–1937).

9 71 km of sea frontier were granted to Poland, which together with the Hel Peninsula constituted 147 km of coastline.

of World War II. At dawn on 1 September 1939 the Danzig SS men attacked objects belonging to the Polish State located in the territory of the Free City, namely the Polish Post Office building, and opened fire at the Polish garrison of the Military Transit Depot at Westerplatte.[10] As a result of the war and its after-effects records (registries) of Polish authorities and offices dedicated to administration and exploitation of the Baltic Sea access were destroyed, as described below.

All researchers of the interwar period face the challenge of limited archival records, as many documents were lost—not only from that era but also from earlier periods—due to the destruction of archives during World War II. War losses in older holdings have been analysed in depth by their archivists. However, the problem of current records (record registries) of institutions established after Poland regained its independence in 1918, and which ceased to exist 20 years later (when World War II began), has not been discussed so far.[11] This problem also pertains to institutions which came into existence at the Baltic Sea coast when Poland was granted access to it after World War I.

By *registry* (Polish: *registratura*) I mean complete records accumulated in an office, institution, enterprise before archiving them. The subjects of my research are therefore "records of current activities accumulated continuously, day by day" of the institution's organisational units, as well as inactive files kept in repositories, constituting complete archives of the institution (together with records acquired by succession).[12]

In the case of the registries of the Second Republic of Poland, there are also repetitive materials scattered in various assemblies: reports, orders, information prepared in many copies for different levels of offices. These do not belong to the subject of the study, but in view of the scale of destruction of the records of the maritime offices and institutions' own records, their existence may be of crucial documentary importance. This is because the files that were archived at the addressee or several addressees and survived may make it possible to reconstruct some of the lost documents of the document-producing institution.

10 On 28 April 1939, Hitler presented Poland with an ultimatum. One of its requirements was to incorporate the Free City of Danzig into the German Reich. These demands were totally rejected by Poland, as they threatened the country's independence and violated international agreements.

11 Anna Żeglińska, "Losy i straty zasobu registratur władz i urzędów II Rzeczypospolitej – założenia metodologiczne przewodnika historyczno-ustrojowego," in: *Historia i pamięć. Studia z dziejów XX wieku*, eds. Witold Gieszczyński, Wiesław Bolesław Łach, Karol Sacewicz (Olsztyn: Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, 2011), 445–489.

12 Bohdan Ryszewski, "O niektórych podstawowych pojęciach archiwalnych (kancelaria, registratura, zespół archiwalny, archiwum," *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici, Historia V, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne* 35 (1969): 100–104. The author indicates the equivalents of the word "registratura" in other languages, namely in French: *les archives courantes* and *les archives versées*, in Italian: *archivio corrente* and *archivio deposito*, in Dutch: *new fonds* (*Nieuwarchief*) and *old fonds* (*Oudarchief*).

Archives are responsible for selecting archival materials, and one of the selection criteria is the documentation's information value. The state – through the medium of archives service – usually, after 25 years, evaluate the holdings kept in archives (registries), assessing which parts of it, having lost their practical value, may be of use for researchers and should be transferred into archival custody. Consequently, the selection of records in the archives (registries) of state authorities and offices that operated in the interwar period along the sea coast granted to Poland has not yet been completed by Polish archives service.[13] Military units were exceptional, as their archives belonged to the so-called separated archives in the Polish archival network. They transferred copies of "Orders" ("Rozkazy") to the Central Military Archives (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe),[14] whereas their remaining documentation was kept in their offices and onboard warships.

The subject matter of this research includes records coming from registries of offices and institutions, that is materials, which were primarily not processed by archives service. Legislation related to archives administration standards was in its early stages of development, as were offices established after 1918.[15] Records were being accumulated in organisational units and archived in their registries. Provided there had been no war, they would have been subject to selection resulting in transferring parts of this documentation into the national archival custody, legally protected in accordance with regulations in force at that time.[16] Due to the scale of destruction, of authorities and offices' records, which are the subject of this research, contemporary archives – based on the degree of preservation of this type of records[17] – collect all preserved records of the interwar period, and they even attempt to complement their holdings with oral histories, memoirs and diaries. These materials are not only of state provenance,

13 The territory of the Pomeranian Voivodeship was under supervision of the State Archives in Bydgoszcz, which was a branch of the State Archives in Poznań. On the other hand, in the State Archives of the Free City of Danzig (Staatsarchiv) separate rooms were allocated for the Polish archives, but records of newly established Polish institutions in the Free City of Danzig were not stored there.

14 "By order of the day No. 195 of 22 August 1919 of the Ministry of Military Affairs, the Military Archives received a new name – the Central Military Archives [Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe – CAW], and its structure and tasks were indicated precisely." See Wanda Krystyna Roman, *Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe 1918–1998: tradycje, historia, współczesność służby archiwalnej Wojska Polskiego* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2002), 1.

15 On 21 December 1931, framework regulations were enacted for records keeping in public administration offices (The Polish Monitor 1932, No. 2, Item 3); more information to be found in: Irena Mamczak-Gadkowska, *Archiwa państwowe w II Rzeczypospolitej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, 2006).

16 This statement excludes from the scope of research those institutions, authorities, and offices whose activities were discontinued even before the outbreak of World War II, unless they became subject to succession.

17 Bohdan Ryszewski, "Metodyka archiwalna ogólna," in: *Archiwistyka*, by Halina Robótka, Bohdan Ryszewski, Andrzej Tomczak (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989), 37–43.

but also private – in compliance with the National Archives and Archives Act of 14 July 1984 (unified law text, Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Law] of 2020, item 164). Therefore, all preserved records of authorities and registries of Polish maritime institutions existing on the eve of World War II are now part of Poland's national archives.

I based my research on the political system's analysis, which enabled me to draw up a list of all authorities and offices, mainly of the state provenance, but including private organisations which associated enterprises dealing with maritime transportation and freight forwarding. In their concise descriptions I included information on locations in which saved records are kept (which were possible to determine), and the number of archival units. These data are based on published guides and directories, which I updated using the online databases of specific archives and the *Search the Archives* (*Szukaj w Archiwach*) website,[18] as of 1 September 2024. In this way, based on the presented list of authorities and maritime institutions, the complete account of preserved records has been compiled in the form of an archival guide, which should facilitate access to these sources currently held in archives in Poland and abroad. In addition, I have included information on materials held in other fonds that either complement lost records or shed light on the same subject matter from a different perspective. The lack of comprehensive summary of numerous questions related to the management and exploitation of access to the Baltic Sea has been emphasised by nearly every researcher working on this topic. Some of these issues are even considered impossible to fully reconstruct or understand.[19]

The guide, therefore, covers the following authorities, offices, and institutions engaged in activities related to the access to the Baltic Sea, whose development was interrupted by the outbreak of World War II:

1. Special (maritime) administration
2. Merchant Navy. Polish Shipping Companies (state-owned companies)
3. Maritime associations of high public utility
4. Associations of shipping enterprises (transportation and freight forwarding)
5. Special courts (maritime chambers)
6. Maritime education
7. The Polish Navy

18 Anna Żeglińska, "Metoda wyszukiwania informacji," in: *Problemy wyszukiwania informacji w polskich archiwach,* eds. Anna Żeglińska, Mariusz Żuławnik (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2020), 94–106.

19 Jan Tymiński in his summary (essay) of his doctoral thesis: "Administracja morska w Gdyni w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Organizacja, kadry, działalność" [The maritime administration in Gdynia in the Second Republic of Poland. Organization, human resources, operations] stated that due to a lack of preserved sources, he limited his research to territorial administration. Thus, the central maritime administration was excluded from the scope of the research; see: Jan Tymiński, "Administracja morska w Gdyni w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Organizacja, kadry, działalność," *Dzieje Najnowsze* 51 (2019), 3: 351–362, DOI: 10.12775/DN.2019.3.15; idem, *Administracja morska w Gdyni w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej: organizacja, kadry, działalność* (Gdynia: Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej, 2020).

1. Special (maritime) administration

The entirety of Polish maritime affairs, particularly merchant navy matters, organisation and exploitation of seaports, sea fishery, and sea coast protection, was the responsibility of the **Maritime Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Warsaw** (Departament Morski Ministerstwa Przemysłu i Handlu w Warszawie). We do not know how many records were created in the Maritime Department, as only **1** archival unit (from 1938) has been preserved, currently kept in the Central Archives of Modern Records (reference code: 2/12/0/11).

In Danzig the organ responsible for implementing rights resulting from the sea access granted to Poland was the **General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland in Danzig** (Generalny Komisarz Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Gdańsku), who at the same time was a superior for all Polish offices in the territory of the Free City, including the **General Representative of the Government for Westerplatte** (Generalny Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Westerplatte), who in turn represented the Polish Ministry of Military Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych) in Danzig. In 1995, files related to Westerplatte (128 archival units) were transferred from the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw to the State Archives in Danzig and added to the fonds of the General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland in Danzig (reference code: 10/259/0). In the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw (Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie– AAN) there are still 7 archival units related to Westerplatte (from 1924 to 1926), kept in the fonds of the Ministry of Military Affairs (reference code: AAN 2/1192/0/3).

Another office operating within the organisational structure of the General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland in Gdańsk was **the Merchant Fleet Office in the Free City of** Danzig (Urząd Marynarki Handlowej w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku), under the authority of the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Warsaw (Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu w Warszawie). It exercised rights of the Polish State in terms of e.g., registering vessels under the Danzig flag, it registered Polish merchant ships and supervised their efficiency and signing on crews (Dz.U. of 1922, No. 32, item 258).[20] Its own records (registry) have not been preserved. However, among the related records we can find 1 archival unit dated 1925, kept in the fonds of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in Warsaw (Prezydium Rady Ministrów w Warszawie) (reference code: 2/8/0/4.1/IV Rkt.1 t.14 podt.9).

The activity of the Polish administration regarding the development of the Polish sea coast was described in the report prepared by the Maritime Office in Gdynia (Urząd Morski w Gdyni):

20 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 3 kwietnia 1922 r. w sprawie utworzenia Urzędu Marynarki Handlowej w Wolnym Miescie Gdańsku [The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 April 1922 on establishing the Merchant Fleet Office in the Free City of Gdańsk], Dz.U. of 1922, No. 32, item 258.

> The Polish administration, taking up the management of seaports and the sea coast, attempted something completely new, unknown to Poland. Contrary to old maritime nations, Poland did not have those centuries of tradition and experience, which characterised administrations of nations with a long naval past. Hence, all Polish efforts in this respect were of a pioneering nature.[21]

Undoubtedly, the construction of a commercial seaport in Gdynia, as a port of public utility, was the achievement of the maritime administration. The legal basis for it was defined in the act of 23 September 1922 on the construction of the Port of Gdynia (Dz.U. of 1922, No. 90, item 824). The act entrusted this task to the Ministry of Industry and Trade in agreement with the Ministers of Treasury, Military Affairs and Public Works (Minister Skarbu, Spraw Wojskowych i Robót Publicznych). As a matter of fact, already in the spring of 1921 the Ministry of Military Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych) began to construct "a temporary naval port and a fishing harbor."[22] Constructing and commercial exploitation were conducted simultaneously. As individual parts of the port were completed, they were immediately built upon, equipped with necessary reloading and storage installations, and put to use.

The structure of maritime and port authorities, with the **Ministry of Industry and Trade** (Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu) as a power of third instance, Maritime Office in Gdynia (Urząd Morski w Gdyni) – of second instance and Port Authorities (Kapitanaty Portu) – of first instance, were regulated by the Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland of 22 March 1928 on the organisation and spectrum of activities of merchant navy authorities (Dz.U. of 1928, No. 38, item 366).[23]

The Maritime Office in Gdynia at Portowa Street was established through transforming the Merchant Fleet Office (Urząd Marynarki Handlowej), which had existed in Wejherowo from 1920. In 1928 it acquired the Seaport Authority in Tczew and the competence of the Merchant Fleet Office in Gdynia (Dz.U. of 1928, No. 26, item 233). From 1931, it was responsible for constructing the port in Gdynia (Dz.U. of 1931, No. 6, item 28).

21 Central Archives of Modern Records [Archiwum Akt Nowych] (hereinafter AAN), AAN, 2/12/0/11/192, 19, Działalność Urzędu Morskiego i urzędów podległych w roku 1937/1938, z krótkim zarysem historycznym poszczególnych zagadnień należących do kompetencji władz administracji morskiej. Sprawozdanie, tabele, wykresy, plan, mapka, fotografie [The activities of the Maritime Office and subordinate offices in the year 1937/1938, with a short historical outline of respective issues falling under the competence of maritime administration authorities. Report, tables, diagrams, plan, map, photographs].

22 Ibidem, 3.

23 The Minister of Industry and Trade took over all affairs related to the merchant navy based on the regulation of the Council of Ministers of 1 December 1921 (Dz.U. of 1921, No. 103, item 742).




Figure 2. Organisational chart of the Maritime Office and subordinate offices

Source: AAN, 2/12/0/11/192, Działalność Urzędu Morskiego, 22.

The Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig keeps a fonds titled Danzig Maritime Office in Gdynia (Gdański Urząd Morski w Gdyni) (93/3/0/-/827, 828),[24] containing records of both the Merchant Fleet Office and the Maritime Office in Gdynia, beginning from 1926, 7 archival units in total, including maps and plans of the port and sea coast, German and Polish, from 1932–1949.

The Ministry of Industry and Trade, with its regulation of 3 February 1936, established the **Port Council** (Rada Portowa) by the Maritime Office in Gdynia, administered by the secretariat of the Director of the Maritime Office (Monitor Polski of 1936, No. 59, item 73). Simultaneously, the regulation of the Minister of Industry and Trade of 18 February 1929, on establishing a Temporary Port Council at the Maritime Office in Gdynia (Monitor Polski of 1929, No. 52, item 101) became invalid.

Port authorities and lighthouses constituted separate organisational units.[25] They included the Port Authority in Wielka Wieś (Władysławowo) constructed in 1935–1938,[26] the Port Authority and Lighthouse in Hel, the Lighthouse in Rozewie, the Port of Tczew and the Port of Puck, the Lighthouse in Bór and the Port of Jastarnia (constructed in 1926–1929 as a fishing and tourist port). Records of these eight lowest level administration offices have not been preserved. Their operations might be vaguely reflected in 37 archival units from 1922–1939 in the fonds of the Gdynia Port Authority, kept in the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig (reference code: 93/793/0). Of the nine organisational units operating on the eve of World War II, the records of only one of them survived, amounting to a total of 37 archival units.

The Sea Fishing Authority (Morski Urząd Rybacki), initially with its headquarters in **Puck** (but in practice in Wejherowo), acting in compliance with the Ordinance of the Minister of the Former Prussia Province of 18 June 1921 (Rozporządzenie Ministra byłej Dzielnicy Pruskiej, Dz.U. of 1921, No. 23, item 150), was responsible for supervising fishery in coastal waters, examining the condition of the sea fishery and the fishing industry, registering fishermen and providing them with supplies required for their trade. In 1928, it was moved to Gdynia (Waszyngtona Street) and became subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Dz.U. of 1928, No. 21, item 184). The Branch Office in Gdynia of the State Archives in Danzig keeps its 300 archival units from the interwar period (reference code: 93/217/0).

24 The fonds "Gdański Urząd Morski w Gdyni" [Gdańsk Maritime Office in Gdynia), comprising records from 1926–2004 (10,154 archival units in total), also contains archival materials from its]redecessor, the Merchant Fleet Office in Wejherowo, which in 1928 changed its location and name into the Maritime Office in Gdynia.

25 See Rozporządzenie Ministra Przemysłu i Handlu z dnia 7 marca 1934 r. w sprawie statutu organizacyjnego Urzędu Morskiego w Gdyni [The Regulation of the Minister of Industry and Trade of 7 March 1934 on the organisational status of the Maritime Office in Gdynia], Monitor Polski of 1934, No. 70, item 107.

26 On 4 May 1938, the opening of the port took place, combined with naming it Wejherowo.

Summing up the activities of Polish administration in terms of sea access management, we may refer to the text of the aforementioned report prepared by the Maritime Office in Gdynia in 1938:

> The fact that Poland was granted access to the sea contributed to creating a new branch of state administration, namely the state maritime administration, aiming on one hand at constructing, administering and exploiting commercial seaports and the conservation of the whole sea coast, and on the other hand safeguarding the shipping, inspecting ships, protection over labour relations in the merchant fleet, issuing port police and maritime regulations, penal and administrative judiciary, etc. […] In other words managing the sea coast and creating a technical and legal environment, so that private enterprises could work in the maritime part of our national economy under the easiest conditions, the most beneficial for them; whereby the state exploits and administers seaports, and first of all the great enterprise – the commercial port in Gdynia.[27]

2. Merchant Navy. Polish Shipping Companies (state-owned or with mixed ownership – of the Ministry of Industry and Trade)

When describing the Polish Merchant Navy, the top management of the Maritime Office – aware of the significance of private entrepreneurship and the necessity to commercialise the seaport exploitation – argued that:

> […] its exploitation by the state authority office, that is by a body hindered by tight state cameralism standards and doomed to conduct affairs slowly by dragging them through respective organisational levels, is kind of anachronistic in case of affairs requiring by its nature quick decision-making and commercial elasticity. To survive in difficult conditions of international competition, a huge commercial enterprise, such as the Port of Gdynia, needs resilient, elastic port administration operating according to commercial rules.[28]

Furthermore, they insisted that:

> […] the Port of Gdynia, at a fast rate, unrecorded in the history of seaports, turned from a transshipping port into a commercial one, and in some measure even into an industrial one. This phenomenon was intensified after 1933, when all elements of modern commercial machinery began to develop in the port. Importing and exporting firms were established, auction sales expanded, banking institutions were founded to finance specifically imports and exports, appraisal institutions, railway, customs and telegraph service adapted to the port's needs and requirements.[29]

27 AAN, 2/12/0/11/192, Działalność Urzędu Morskiego, 4.

28 Ibidem, 14.

29 Ibidem, 13.

Lack of experience in sea trade, and first of all lack of adequate large private capital, were the reasons why in the first years of regained statehood Poland did not show sufficient interest in establishing its own merchant fleet.[30] As a consequence, out of four Polish shipping companies three were state controlled, and only one was a private initiative. The only Polish private shipping company was "Polskarob" – "Polish-Scandinavian Transporting Company" with headquarters in Gdynia, owned by the coal corporation "Robur" from Katowice.

The first Polish state-owned shipping company to be established was "Polish Shipping" ("Żegluga Polska S.A.") with headquarters in Gdynia.[31] It came into operation in November 1926 and began to export coal to the Scandinavian and Baltic countries.[32] In the same year it launched a passenger coastal service, and in 1930 it engaged in liner traffic. In 1932, it was transformed into a joint-stock company,[33] which enabled it to gain private capital; however, up to 1938 it was owned solely by the state. From 1934, "Żegluga Polska" provided towage and rescue services based on the agreement with the Maritime Office in Gdynia.[34] Before the outbreak of World War II, "Żegluga Polska" had 14 merchant and combination vessels, 4 passenger ships for coastal service and 6 tugboats at its disposal.[35] In the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig some records documenting its operations in 1928–1940 have been preserved, namely 152 archival units standing 4 linear metres of files (reference code: 93/1034/0).

The remaining two shipping companies specialised in selected types of shipping and displayed less diversified activities. **The Polish-British Shipping Company "Polbryt"** (Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe "Polbryt" S.A.), established in 1929, with headquarters in the "Żegluga Polska" building in Gdynia, carried cargo between Gdynia and Danzig, and London, Hull and Le Havre (in some cases to Dover or London).[36]

30 Ustawa z dnia 25 listopada 1925 r. o popieraniu polskiej żeglugi morskiej [The act of 25 November 1925 on supporting maritime shipping], Dz.U. of 1925, No. 125, item 891.

31 Established on the initiative of the government, beginning the actual formation of Polish commercial shipping – see: Wanda Czerwińska, *Rola państwa w polskiej gospodarce morskiej 1919–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1975), 88; eadem, *Polska żegluga morska w latach II Rzeczypospolitej* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1971), 35–47.

32 A detailed historical outline was presented: Jordan Siemianowski, "The Circumstances of the Establishment of «Żegluga Polska» in 1926." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 85–111, DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-03.

33 Ustawa z dnia 17 marca 1932 r. o przekształceniu przedsiębiorstwa państwowego "Żegluga Polska" na spółkę akcyjną [The act of 17 March 1932 on the transformation of the state-owned company "Żegluga Polska" into a joint-stock company], Dz.U. of 1932, No. 32, item 339.

34 *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny*, 1938 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ligi Morskiej i Kolonialnej, 1938), accessed 10.07.2024, http://bibliotekacyfrowa.eu/Content/55042/60956.pdf, 132.

35 Data for 1 July 1935. See *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy 1936* (Warszawa: PAT, 1936), 848–849.

36 *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny,* 1938, 138.

In the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig some records documenting its operations in 1928–1940 have been preserved, namely 79 archival units (reference code: 93/1034/0).

"Gdynia–America Shipping Lines," or "Gdynia–America Line, GAL" ("Gdynia–Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe S.A."), founded in 1930 as "Polish Transatlantic Shipping Company" ("Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe"), with a Danish shareholder East Asiatic Company Ltd., dealt with passenger transportation, mainly migrants, but also tourists. It operated on four routes: (1) to North America (Copenhagen – Halifax – New York), (2) along a Jewish migrant transportation line organized in 1933 between Constanța and Palestinian ports (Constanța – Jaffa – Haifa via Istanbul – Piraeus), (3) to South America (Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santos, alternatively to Victoria, Montevideo), and (4) to ports of the Gulf of Mexico and Florida (New Orleans – Houston – Galveston).[37] Cargo shipping played a marginal role in its operations. The company operated five transatlantic ships: MS "Piłsudski," MS "Batory," SS "Polonia," SS "Pułaski," and SS "Kościuszko"; under construction were two new motor ships to serve the growing South America line, and two motor ships to operate on the so-called cotton line – to the Gulf of Mexico ports. Due to these investments, the company began to amass the majority of express sea mail from the Baltic Sea to the United States of America.

The Board of Directors of this largest Polish shipping line in the interwar period was located in Warsaw at 4 Małachowskiego Square, its port office in Gdynia at the Marine Station (Dworzec Morski), and its port office in Constanța at 5 Strada General Angelescu. The company had branch offices in many larger cities in Europe, the United States and Canada.

In the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig there is a fonds titled "Gdynia–America Shipping Lines" in Gdynia ("Gdynia–Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe S.A." w Gdyni, reference code: 93/795/0), containing 2,182 archival units from 1930–1964, and records of the interwar period (up to 1939) amounting to ca. 1000 archival units. These materials, although incomplete to a large extent, may serve as sources for examining the company's organisational and financial issues, its development strategies, staff matters, as well as operating and building new vessels.

The Central Archives of Modern Records, in turn, holds records of the Bucharest branch office of the "Gdynia–America Shipping Lines" from 1934–1939, 180 archival units in total (2.0 linear metres). Complementary materials, including legal, administrative and financial documentation of the company from 1936–1939, 9 archival units in total, are to be found in the Wojtczak Family Archives (Archiwum rodziny Wojtczak), kept in the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw (reference code: 2/2890/0).

37 Ibidem, 140–142.

After the outbreak of World War II shipping companies from Gdynia moved its operations to London. The Gdynia Branch of the State Archive in Gdansk holds 50 archival units of the receivership management of the shipping companies "Gdynia–America Shipping Lines" S.A. and "Polish Shipping" in Gdynia from [1930] 1939–1944 (reference code: 93/796/0). After the war they returned to Poland, to Gdynia, where state management was established over them. In the Gdynia archive the records of the three companies under state administration ("Polish Shipping," "Polish–British Shipping Company" and "Gdynia–America Shipping Lines" are kept jointly in one fonds, reference code: 93/812/0). These records come mainly from 1945–1964, and only 3 archival units refer to 1939.[38]

Closely related to shipping companies were the activities of the "Polish Shipping Agency Ltd.," ("Polska Agencja Morska Sp. z o.o."), established with the participation of "Żegluga Polska S.A." Its main objective was ship clearance and affreightment. The Gdynia Archives keeps 141 archival units (1.0 linear metre) of its records from 1935–1942. They include daily reports from the delegation of the "Polish Maritime Agency" in Warsaw ("Polska Agencja Morska" w Warszawie) from 1939, financial records from 1935–1941, correspondence run by a German trustee (Treuhänder) on enforcement of dues, and – the most numerous part of it – 120 files of cleared vessels, mainly from 1939 (reference code: 93/794/0).

3. Maritime associations of high public utility

The most resilient maritime association with the largest number of members, considered to be particularly useful for the state and social interests of the Republic of Poland (in compliance with Article 46 of the Law of associations – Prawo o stowarzyszeniach, Dz.U. of 1932, No. 94, item 808), was Maritime and Colonial League (Liga Morska i Kolonialna) with its headquarters in Warsaw at 10 Widok Street. It was registered under this name on 14 March 1931. It existed earlier but was subject to a few transformations. It originated from the Polish Flag (Bandera Polska) association founded on 1 October 1918, which in May 1919 changed its name into Liga Żeglugi Polskiej (League of Polish Navigation), and on 27 April 1924 into Liga Morska i Rzeczna (Maritime and River League).[39] Individual persons and legal entities, public organisations and self-government institutions could become members of the league. In its last 1937 statutes

38 186 archival units (3.0 linear metres) from [1939–] 1945–1964.

39 *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny,* 1938, 339–403; Taras Hunczak, "Polish Colonial Ambitions in the Inter-War Period," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967), 4: 648–56. DOI: 10.2307/2492615.

the league's main objectives and aims were listed, such as: (1) maritime defence matters, (2) maritime matters, (3) colonial and migration matters, (4) inland navigation matters, and (5) maritime upbringing matters.[40] The league ran the Maritime Defence Fund (Fundusz Obrony Morskiej – FOM) aiming solely at building new vessels for the Polish Navy.

The league had 18 **Divisions** (covering voivodeships) and 211 **Districts**, 2,154 **Local or Vocational Branches** (of postmen, railway workers, bank personnel, etc.), 1,101 **Circles**, and 3,086 **School Circles**, 841.278 members in total.[41] Their activities are currently represented in 14 fonds kept in 11 archives.

Table 1. List of records (fonds) of the Maritime and Colonial League kept in archives

#	Title of the archival fonds	Starting Date	End date	Number of archival units	Location	Reference code
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Liga Morska i Kolonialna – Zarząd Okręgu Poznańskiego (Maritime and Colonial League – Board of the Poznań Division)	1937	1938	2	State Archives in Poznań	53/887/85
2	Liga Morska i Kolonialna – Okręg Śląski w Katowicach (Maritime and Colonial League – Silesian Division in Katowice)	1926	1939	14	State Archives in Katowice	12/74/0
3	Liga Morska i Kolonialna Zarząd Okręgu w Jarosławiu (Maritime and Colonial League Board of the Jarosław Division)	1935	1939	1	State Archives in Przemyśl	56/1661/0
4	Liga Morska i Kolonialna Obwód w Łukowie (Maritime and Colonial League Łuków District)	1933	1939	46	State Archives in Lublin, Radzyn Podlaski Branch	38/146/0
5	Liga Morska i Kolonialna Obwód w Nowym Sączu (Maritime and Colonial League Nowy Sącz District)	1930	1937	4	National Archives in Kraków, Nowy Sącz Branch	31/187/0/1
6	Liga Morska i Kolonialna, Obwód Miejski w Chorzowie (Maritime and Colonial League Chorzów Municipal District)	1934	1939	8	State Archives in Katowice	12/657/0
7	Liga Morska i Kolonialna Oddział w Tyszowcach (Maritime and Colonial League Tyszowce Branch)	1938	1939	2	State Archives in Zamość	88/332/8
8	Liga Morska i Kolonialna, Oddział Katowice – Zawodzie (Maritime and Colonial League, Katowice – Zawodzie Branch)	1935	1939	6	State Archives in Katowice	12/75/0

40 Ibidem, 404–405.

41 *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy,* 1936, 620–621.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	Liga Morska i Kolonialna Oddział IV w Łodzi przy Zarządzie Miejskim (Maritime and Colonial League IV Branch in Łódź at the City Board)	1934	1939	3	State Archives in Łódź	39/304/0
10	Stowarzyszenia i organizacje społeczne powiatu bocheńskiego – zbiór szczątków zespołów; Tytuł j.a.: Liga Morska i Kolonialna Oddział w Bochni – protokoły komisji rewizyjnej, okólniki, kalendarzyk propagandowy na 1938 rok, poradnik aktywisty Ligi Przyjaciół Żołnierza, plakat obchodów Dni Kolonialnych w 1938 r. (Associations and civic organisations of the Bochnia Powiat – collection of remnants of fonds; Title of the archival unit: Maritime and Colonial League Bochnia Branch – reports of the auditing committee, circulars, propaganda calendar for 1938, League of Friends of the Soldier activist's guide, poster for 1938 Colonial Days.)	1933	1938	1	National Archives in Kraków	29/4046/0/-/3
11	Liga Morska i Kolonialna Okręg w Wilnie (Maritime and Colonial League in Vilnius) *	1924	1939	37	Lietuvos centrinis valstybės archyvas	1187/1
12	Liga Morska i Kolonialna (Maritime and Colonial League)	1935	1937	3	State Archives in Płock, Kutno Branch	51/104/0/15
13	Liga Morska i Kolonialna w Iłży (Maritime and Colonial League in Iłża)	1934	1939	23	State Archives in Kielce	21/3041/0
14	Liga Morska i Kolonialna w Muszynie (Maritime and Colonial League in Muszyna)	1936	1939	2	National Archives in Kraków, Nowy Sącz Branch	31/187/0/37

* It also contains records of the predecessors: Wileński Oddział Ligi Morskiej i Rzecznej (1924–1926) and Wileński Oddział Ligi Żeglugi Morskiej i Rzecznej (1926–1931).

Source: *Szukaj w Archiwach*, https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/strona_glowna, accessed 26.07.2024; Electronic Archive Information System, accessed 26.07.2024, https://eais.archyvai.lt.

The records (registry) of the league's Board of Directors in Warsaw have not been preserved. It should have contained records of its predecessors, namely Polish Flag (Bandera Polska), League of Polish Navigation (Liga Żeglugi Polskiej), and Maritime and River League (Liga Morska i Rzeczna), that is public utility institutions which were entrusted with performing important functions by the authorities. In the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, in its Collection of statutes, programs and intent declarations of associations, trade unions and political parties (Zbiór statutów, programów i deklaracji ideowych stowarzyszeń, związków zawodowych i partii politycznych), the aforementioned 1931 statutes[42] of the Maritime and Colonial League are

42 The statutes of the association registered in 1931 under the name of Maritime and Colonial League (Liga Morska i Kolonialna) was accepted at the III general Assembly of the Delegates, which took place in Gdynia on 25–27 October 1930. See *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny*, 1938, 403.

kept (reference code: 2/2520/0/-/270). Franciszek Doleżał[43] Papers (Akta Franciszka Doleżała, reference code: 2/413/0/7/39), however, contain not only the statutes, but also minutes of meetings, reports, budgets, draft speeches, and circulars of the Board of the Maritime and Colonial League from 1935–1939.

4. Associations of shipping enterprises (transportation and freight forwarding)

Private business activity did not arise interest of the archival service, which as a state authority organ had limited possibility to interfere in a private sector. Hence, the significance of records kept in the Gdynia Branch of the Danzig State Archives, which were created by associations of companies dealing with maritime transportation and freight forwarding services.

Table 2. Records of enterprises kept in the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig

#	Title of the archival fonds	Starting Date	End date	Number of archival units	Reference code
1	"Korab" Towarzystwo Połowów Dalekomorskich Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni ("Korab" Deep Sea Fishing Co., Ltd. in Gdynia)	1938	1938	1	93/215/0
2	"Mewa" Towarzystwo Okrętowe Połowów Dalekomorskich S.A. w Gdyni ("Mewa" Deep Sea Fishing Ships Company in Gdynia)	1937	1938	1	93/213/0
3	Morskie Zakłady Rybne Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni (Sea Fish Factory Co., Ltd. in Gdynia)	1937	1939	2	93/82/0
4	Lloyd Bałtycki Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni (Baltic Lloyd Co., Ltd. in Gdynia)	1928	1942	3	93/628/0
5	"Progres" Morski Eksport Węgla Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni ("Progress" Coal Exports by Sea Co., Ltd. in Gdynia)	1936	1941	16	93/214/0

Sources: *Szukaj w Archiwach*, accessed 26.07.2024, https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/strona_glowna; Andrzej Regliński, *Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni: przewodnik po zasobie archiwalnym* (Warszawa: Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, Wydział Wydawnictw, 2007).

Among the most notable organisations was Freight Forwarders Association in Gdynia (Związek Armatorów Polskich) with headquarters in Gdynia at 15 Waszyngtona Street. The Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig keeps the records of this organisation (295 archival units, that is 1.44 linear metres), but from the years

43 Franciszek Doleżal (born 1880), economist. He studied in Paris and Brussels. In Poland in 1918–1919 he was a deputy head of a department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1919–1925 commercial attaché of the Polish embassy in Paris, in 1925–1936 under-secretary of state in the Ministry of Industry

[1937] 1939–1945 [–1946], so they refer to the period when its temporary headquarters was moved to London (reference code: 93/797/0). Although these records fall outside of the chronological framework of my research, they reflect the state (amount) of records (registry) created and accumulated during a few years of organisational activity. No files of Freight Forwarders Association in Gdynia "Zrzeszenie Ekspedytorów Portowych w Gdyni" ("Association of Port Forwarders in Gdynia") have been preserved.

State-owned, cooperative and private enterprises dealing with shipbroking in the whole territory of the Republic of Poland were members of Polish Shipbrokers' Association (Polski Związek Maklerów Okrętowych) with headquarters in Gdynia. Of all its records, 2 archival units have been saved (reference code: 93/239/0), but only from 1945–1950. The office of this association was run by Port of Gdynia Stakeholders Council (Rada Interesantów Portu w Gdyni"). All records of this council have been lost. There are no records not only of the Freight Forwarders Association in Gdynia, but also of other associations which cared for shipping, maritime trade, and other types of activity enabled by gaining the Baltic Sea access. The lack of source documentation forces researchers to present their activities in the light of *Annals* (*Roczniki*) published by the council, which include, among other things, copies of statutes of particular organisations and companies, as well as key unions mentioned above.[44]

5. Special courts (maritime chambers)

Maritime chambers established in 1925 (Dz.U. of 1925, No. 36, item 243) dealt with conducting investigations and awarding judgements in accidents at sea encountered by commercial ships.[45] They included the Maritime Chamber (Izba Morska) at the Powiat Court in Wejherowo, and the Maritime Chamber at the Merchant Fleet Office (Urząd Marynarki Handlowej) in Danzig,[46] as well as the Maritime Appeals Chamber (Odwoławcza Izba Morska) at the District Court in Starogard. The Maritime Chamber at the Merchant

and Trade. From 1927 member of the Economics Committee of the League of Nations. See *Encyklopedia Gutenberga*, accessed 10.07.2024, https://www.gutenberg.czyz.org/word,15515#google_vignette.

44 Mariusz Kardas, "Rada Interesantów Portu Gdyni w świetle Roczników Rady z lat 1931–1938," *Zeszyty Gdyńskie* 7 (2012): 81–106; *Roczniki Rady Interesantów Portu w Gdyni z lat 1932–1938*, in: Federacja Bibliotek Cyfrowych, accessed 10.07. 2024, fbc.pionier.net.pl.

45 See also The act of 15 February 1933 on a partial change of the act of 18 March 1925 on maritime chambers, Dz.U. of 1933, No. 18, item 117 and the Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland of 28 December 1934 on regulating the competences of authorities and the proceedings in selected parts of the state administration, Dz.U. of 1934, No. 110, item 976.

46 The Merchant Fleet Office in Gdańsk was positioned within the General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland in the Free City of Gdańsk.

Fleet Office in Danzig was a part of the organizational structure of the General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland in the Free City of Danzig.[47]

In 1930, two changes were implemented in the existing maritime chambers, which were influenced by the growth of Gdynia – from a small fishing village into a seaport city.[48]

The act of 21 February 1930 replaced the Maritime Chamber in Wejherowo with the Maritime Chamber in Gdynia (Dz.U. of 1930, No. 17, item 126). The act of 30 October 1930 established the Maritime Appeals Chamber in Gdynia at the Gdynia Branch of the District Court in Starogard (Dz.U. of 1930, No. 76, item 600).

The Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig holds 25 archival units documenting the proceedings of the Maritime Appeals Chamber in the interwar period (reference code: 93/234/0). Records of lower-level chambers – namely the Maritime Chamber in Gdynia and the Maritime Chamber in Danzig, which operated within the Merchant Fleet Office under the General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland in the organisational structure of the Free City of Danzig – have been lost.

6. Maritime education

Before the outbreak of World War II, there was a State Maritime School (Państwowa Szkoła Morska) located on Szosa Gdańska Street in Gdynia, established by the act of 22 February 1937 (Dz.U. of 1937, No. 16, item 103) as an academic and formative institution. It was a vocational school that trained navigating and engineering officers through three-year programs, while also providing them with a broad general curriculum. It was founded in 1920 in Tczew,[49] and in 1930 was moved to its own building

47 Czesław Stodolny, *Inwentarz akt Komisarza Generalnego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Gdańsku 1919–1939* (Warszawa: Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 1967).

48 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 10 lutego 1926 r. o nadaniu gminie wiejskiej Gdyni praw gminy miejskiej [The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 February 1926 on granting municipality rights to the rural commune of Gdynia], Dz.U. of 1926, No. 21, item 127; Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 29 kwietnia 1930 r. o rozszerzeniu granic miasta Gdyni w województwie pomorskim [The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 29 April 1930 on enlarging the borders of the city of Gdynia in the Pomeranian Voivodeship, Dz.U. of 1930, No. 34, item 277; Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 30 stycznia 1933 r. w sprawie zmiany granic miasta Gdyni w województwie pomorskim [The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 30 January 1933 on changing the borders of the city of Gdynia in the Pomeranian Voivodeship], Dz.U. of 1933, No. 10, item 64. The development of Gdynia, which was transformed from a fishing village, is reflected in the size of its territory, which in 1930 occupied the place in Poland after Warsaw, Vilnius, Poznań, Bydgoszcz, Lviv (*Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny,*1938, 26). See also Kazimierz Małkowski, *Zarys dziejów sądownictwa gdyńskiego 1928–1988* (Gdynia: Instytut Badania Prawa Sądowego. Ośrodek Terenowy w Gdańsku, 1995).

49 The State Maritime School in Tczew was founded on 17 June 1920 as the initiative of the then Chief of the Department for Maritime Affairs by the Ministry of Military Affairs. On 1 January 1922, it was subordinated to the Department of the Merchant Navy in the Ministry of Industry and Trade (later the Maritime Department).

complex constructed in Gdynia.[50] The school's design project is to be found in the file: State Maritime School in Gdynia. Designed by architect W. Tomaszewski (Państwowa Szkoła Morska w Gdyni. Projektował architekt W. Tomaszewski, reference code: 2/9/0/5.5/I 2528) in the fonds: Ministry of Internal Affairs in Warsaw (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych w Warszawie). In the same year the school received a school full-rigged ship "Dar Pomorza" as a gift from the Pomeranian population, which replaced the withdrawn "Lwów."

Its own records have not been preserved, but in the Central Archives of Modern Records, in the fonds Józef Piłsudski Museum in Belvedere in Warsaw [fonds and collection] (Muzeum Józefa Piłsudskiego w Belwederze w Warszawie [zespół i zbiór]) there is an outline of the monograph of the school's predecessor, State Maritime School in Tczew (Państwowa Szkoła Morska w Tczewie, reference code: 2/109/0/2.2/267).




Figure 3. The State Maritime School in Gdynia according to W. Tomaszewski's design project

Source: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Muzeum Józefa Piłsudskiego w Belwederze w Warszawie, AAN, 2/109/0/2.2/267, Państwowa Szkoła Morska. Zarys monografii, 7.

Among scientific institutions conducting research of the Baltic Sea before World War II, Sea Fisheries Laboratory in Hel (Morskie Laboratorium Rybackie na Helu), founded in 1921 and subject to the Sea Fishing Authority (Morski Urząd Rybacki), is worth noting. In 1932, because of financial problems, it was taken over by Institute of Experimental Biology in Warsaw (Instytut Naukowy Biologii Doświadczalnej), and its name was changed into the Marine Station in Hel. At the turn of 1938/1939 it was moved to Gdynia.[51]

50 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Muzeum Józefa Piłsudskiego w Belwederze w Warszawie, Reference No: AAN, 2/109/0/2.2/267, Państwowa Szkoła Morska. Zarys monografii, 7.

51 *Szukaj w Archiwach*, accessed 10.07.2024, https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/zespol/-/zespol/155052.

In the records of the Sea Fishing Authority kept in the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig, in the series "Organization" ("Organizacja") there are 59 archival units of its predecessors, namely the aforementioned Marine Station and Sea Fisheries Laboratory, as well as of an association affiliated to the latter, called Sea Fishing Institute (Morski Instytut Rybacki), active from 1928 (reference code: 93/100/0).

Scholarly activity was also conducted by the Maritime Department of the State Meteorological Institute, located in Gdynia; no records of it have been preserved.[52]

7. The Polish Navy

The Polish Navy[53] was under the command of the Chief of the Polish Naval Command with headquarters in Warsaw, direct subordinate of the Minister of Military Affairs (Warsaw, 6 sierpnia Street 1–3–5).[54] Thus, on behalf of the Minister of Military Affairs he was in charge of both sea and river naval forces and was responsible for their supplies. Educating navy second lieutenants was the responsibility of the Navy Officers School in Toruń (Szkoła Podchorążych Marynarki Wojennej w Toruniu), which on 5 September 1938 was moved to Bydgoszcz. It was active there until the beginning of World War II. It was formally dissolved on 12 September 1939.

The Polish Navy staff was educated starting from 1918, first in Modlin, then in Toruń (1919–1921), and from 1921 in Świecie on the Vistula River. In 1931, it was transferred to the Polish Navy base in Gdynia-Oksywie and named Naval Seamen Cadre (Kadra Szeregowych Floty). Onboard the ORP "Bałtyk" in the Port of Gdynia there was Naval Specialists School (Szkoła Specjalistów Morskich), which in 1935 was renamed to Naval Specialists Education Centre (Centrum Wyszkolenia Specjalistów Floty).

In the interwar period, at the time of the Second Republic of Poland, its Navy had the following warships at its disposal: torpedo ships – "Kujawiak," "Mazur," "Ślązak," "Krakowiak" and "Podhalanin" (all of them former German navy vessels), two destroyers built in France – "Burza" and "Wicher," and submarines: "Wilk," "Ryś" and "Żbik". These navy vessels, together with British-built destroyers "Grom" and "Błyskawica" and a minelayer "Gryf," were the core of the Polish Navy. Under construction were two other submarines – "Sęp" and "Orzeł" commissioned by the Maritime and Colonial

52 *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy,* 1936, 500.

53 When the Polish Navy was established, Poland had no access to the sea. The Chief of State – Józef Piłsudski issued an order: "On 28 November 1918 I order to establish the Polish Navy." It was almost a year and a half before Poland formally gained access to the sea, which took place during a ceremony known as Poland's wedding to the sea on 20 February 1920 near Puck.

54 See Rozporządzenie Prezydenta R. P. z dnia 3 kwietnia 1922 r. o Marynarce Wojennej [The Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland of 3 April 1922 on the Polish Navy], Dz.U. of 1922, No. 30, item 243.

League (by its Maritime Defense Fund FOM).[55] They were complemented by the Naval Air Squadron (Morski dywizjon lotniczy) stationed in the Port of Puck.[56]

Before the surrender of the Polish troops defending Westerplatte and Gdynia, military documentation, as well as surviving documents from sunk or disarmed surface vessels, were burnt. Records kept in navy vessels, which fled to Great Britain, are kept in the **Archives of the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London**. Three collections are noteworthy:

1) Marynarka Wojenna we Francji 1939–1940 (The Polish Navy in France 1939–1940), 5 archival units (reference code: MAR.A.IV),
2) Marynarka Wojenna w czasie kampanii 1939 (The Polish Navy during the 1939 campaign), 3 archival units containing accounts of the pilots of the Naval Air Squadron and of major H. Sucharski and his crew at Westerplatte (reference code: MAR.A.II),
3) Marynarka Wojenna w Wielkiej Brytanii z lat (1939–1947) (The Polish Navy in Great Britain in 1939–1947), including the records of Oddział Planowania KMW (The Planning Department of the Polish Naval Command) (reference code: MAR.A.V.4, 10 archival units), Attache Morski i Ekspert Morski w Sztokholmie (Polish Maritime Attaché and Maritime Expert in Stockholm, reference code: MAR.A.V.9, 5 archival units) and ORP "Błyskawica" (reference code: MAR.A.V.16.).

In audiovisual materials kept in the Archives of the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London, the most notable is the Film and Audio Archives (Archiwum Filmu i Dźwięku), including the Sikorski Collection (Catalogue No.: SIK). It contains 21 archival units (recordings) presenting the port in Gdynia, naval vessels (ORP "Piorun," ORP "Dragon," ORP "Krakowiak," ORP "Ślązak," ORP "Błyskawica," ORP "Wilk," ORP "Grom") and a recording of the 10 February 1920 event celebrating Poland's regained access to the Baltic Sea.

In the Central Military Archives of the Military Historical Bureau in Warsaw, archival materials from 1908–1939 constitute a separate PART 1, containing records created by:

a) Departament Spraw Morskich i Kierownictwo Marynarki Wojennej (Department of Maritime Affairs and Polish Naval Command) containing 713 archival units from 1918–1939, 25 linear metres (reference code: I.300.21),
b) Szkoła Podchorążych Marynarki Wojennej (Navy Officers School), documented by 26 archival units from 1921–1939, 0.3 linear metres (reference code: I.340.74),

55 *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny,* 1938, 240–242.

56 See The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, Morski Dywizjon Lotniczy 1939 – Relacje, Spostrzeżenia osobiste z wojny lotniczej w Polsce (z obrony wybrzeża i Gdyni) ppor.[podporucznika] pil.[ota] Edmunda Jereczka [Personal observations from an air combat in Poland (from the defence of the sea coast and Gdynia) of second-lieutenant and pilot Edmund Jereczek], Archives Reference No: MAR.A.II.4/1, 27–28.

c) Oddziały Marynarki Wojennej (the Polish Navy units), which form a group of records containing a homogenous type of documentation, namely orders of the day, military record books, materials related to training courses and correspondence of 34 units of the Polish Navy (reference code: I.328.1-34) from 1918–1939, 5.8 linear metres.[57]

The second Part titled "Materiały archiwalne Wojska Polskiego z lat (1943–1945)" (Archival materials of the Polish Armed Forces from 1943–1945), beginning on 8 May 1943, that is on the date of the first agreement between the representatives of the Union of Polish Patriots and the Soviet government[58] on establishing the first Polish military formation (1 Dywizja Piechoty im. T. Kościuszki [1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division]) in the territory of the Soviet Union, contains records of the Polish Navy from 1918-1939, namely:

1) "Marynarka Wojenna, spis 1799/91" (The Polish Navy, directory 1799/91) – 188 archival units from [1894, 1918] (1929–1946), 2 linear metres,
2) "Marynarka Wojenna, spis 1827/92" (The Polish Navy, directory 1827/92) – 468 archival units from 1918–1939 [1942– 1944], 2 linear metres,
3) "Polowy Szpital Ewakuacyjny nr 2146 (Szpital Marynarki Wojennej – Gdynia)" (Field Evacuation Hospital No. 2146 [Navy Hospital – Gdynia]) – 105 archival units, 3.3 linear metres (reference code: III-581).

It should be noted, however, that records of the **Navy Court in Gdynia**, which operated within the military jurisdiction, have not been preserved.

The Chief of the Polish Naval Command, rear admiral Jerzy Świrski, while describing the legal meaning of the Polish Navy in the context of statehood in his report to the Minister of Military Affairs, dated 7 October 1939, claimed:

> (…) After the whole of Poland's territory was seized by enemy forces, Poland as a state, continued to exist "de jure", but it did not cease to exist "de facto" only due to Polish warships, which did not fall within jurisdiction of any other state, but exist as Poland's territory (commercial vessels fall within such jurisdiction).
>
> It is the only military force, which at the moment is at direct disposal of the Polish State, moreover – it is the only keystone of Poland's sovereignty.
>
> **If these vessels were sunk, in the same moment the Polish State would cease to exist "de facto" despite having its own government, as both the newly established Polish army, and the Polish Government are in foreign territory** [bold formatting added by article author].[59]

57 Data from the website: *Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne*, accessed 10.07.2024, https://wbh.wp.mil.pl/pl/pages/zasob-2018-11-16-qr5i/.

58 Archiwalia Wojska Polskiego z lat 1943–1945 [Archival materials of the Polish Armed Forces from 1943–1945], Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne [Military Historical Bureau], accessed 10.07.2024, https://wbh.wp.mil.pl/pl/pages/archiwalia-wojska-polskiego-z-lat-1943-1945-2018-11-16-rfw3/.

59 The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, Marynarka Wojenna we Francji, Archives Reference No: MAR.A.IV.1/1, Organizacja i prace kierownictwa Marynarki Wojennej w Paryżu, 3–4.

* * *

Complementary materials referring to the aforementioned authorities, offices and organisations, which had to fulfil legal and formal obligations related to their activities, may be found in records of state administration offices which operated at that time. These records are not complete either, they have been preserved in a fragmentary state. Particularly information-rich are registers related to granting permissions for business activity and various public undertakings, as well as their completion reports.

Among significant complementary records kept in the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig there are register files of shipping companies which are to be found in the fonds Municipal Court in Gdynia (Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni) (reference code 93/149/0), and construction and extension plans of the port in Gdynia to be found in the fonds Government Commissioner in Gdynia (Komisariat Rządu w Gdyni, reference code: 93/682/0).

Other complementary materials worth mentioning include Collection of photographs of the city and port in Gdynia (Zbiór fotografii miasta i portu w Gdyni, reference code: 93/90/0), which contains pictures collected by the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Danzig, documenting the images of the city and its port in 1920–1973, previously kept in Municipal Urban Workshop at the Praesidium of the City Council in Gdynia (Miejska Pracownia Urbanistyczna przy Prezydium Miejskiej Rady Narodowej w Gdyni). Furthermore, the legislative records of the Shipping Department of the Ministry of Shipping in Warsaw (reference code: 2/1633/0/4.1) include 16 archival units presenting the state of the Polish merchant fleet in 1945–1947 and detailed reports and correspondence related to reclaiming of vessels and shipping lines from 1947–1950. Archival queries may also be conducted in the records of the Maritime Department of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, currently held in the Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw (reference code: 2/132/0/8). They include 14 archival units related to the situation of Polish merchant ships in 1939, conditions of cooperation with Great Britain during World War II, Polish maritime education in Great Britain, as well as military regulations and correspondence on searching for and reclaiming Polish ships (from 1939–1945). The separate series (created from files added later to these records) there is one archival unit containing balance sheets for 1944 of the "Gdynia – America Shipping Lines" (GAL) joint-stock company and the "Polish-British Shipping Company" (reference code: 2/132/0/10/1641) as well as two archival units with plans and technical drawings of the Atlas tugboat.[60]

60 See also Waldemar Danielewicz, *Polskie holowniki morskie 1920–2015* (Gdynia: Porta Mare Pomorska Oficyna Wydawniczo-Reklamowa, 2015).

Conclusions

Poland, when beginning to develop its coastline by establishing the first institutions responsible for maritime affairs – both in the civil and military aspects – did not yet have access to it. A symbolic act of Poland's wedding to the sea took place in Puck on 20 February 1920. Furthermore, Poland's access to the port in the Free City of Danzig granted by the Treaty of Versailles was limited by establishing the Port and Waterways Board in Danzig. Not until the port in Gdynia did Poland became self-contained and founded several offices, institutions and organisations, civil and military, state-owned and private, to deal with maritime issues. The condition of the Polish maritime administration on the eve of World War II is summed up in the report of the Maritime Office in Gdynia:

> The maritime administration has developed from its humble, experimental beginnings, into a modern administrative apparatus, often being an example to follow for foreign countries. This apparatus cannot be considered as finally crystallised and unchangeable: a speedy economic development of the coast requires constant adaptations of the maritime administration and its forms to the needs and necessities of life. […] Following the commercialisation of the Port of Gdynia, the Maritime Office will remain a purely administrative authority operating in the sphere towards maritime relations, and its scope of activities, already devoid of mercantile aspects, will include – on behalf of the state – being on guard of the safety of shipping, social issues in commercial fleet, ship inspections, protection of the sea coast, in other words to wield authority in all matters related to the merchant navy.[61]

The development of administration, as well as of civic and private institutions was interrupted by the outbreak of World War II – the attack of the German Reich at Polish institutions located in the Free City of Danzig (Polish Post Office and Military Transit Depot at the Westerplatte peninsula) on 1 September 1939.

The analysis of the state of preservation of the records of maritime institutions and organisations operating before World War II shows that in the archives we can find 473 archival units created by the special (maritime) administration, as well as 1605 archival units created by state-owned merchant navy companies, 152 archival units by associations of high public utility, namely the Maritime and Colonial League, 601 archival units by maritime associations of shipping enterprises, 12 archival units created by special courts, 59 archival units by organisations dealing with maritime education and 1851 archival units by the Polish Navy (Figure 4).

61 AAN, 2/12/0/11/192, 20.




Figure 4. The state of preserved records of maritime institutions and organisations operating on the eve of the outbreak of World War II (archival units)

Source: Own elaboration based on the sources indicated in the article - prepared as part of the implementation of a research project funded by the Jan Karski Institute of War Losses.

Not even one archival unit has been left of the records off 11 institutions and organisations enumerated in this paper (Table 3). All the more, I would like to invite readers to make contact in the case there being a possibility to enrich the current database, both in terms of information on saved records, and the lost ones.

Table 3. List of offices, of which no fonds (registries) have been preserved

#	Name of the organisational unit
1	Rada Portowa Urzędu Morskiego w Gdyni (Port Council of the Maritime Office in Gdynia)
2	Kapitanaty portu oraz latarnie morskie (Port authorities and lighthouses)
3	Rada Interesantów Portu w Gdyni (Port of Gdynia Stakeholders Council)
4	Zrzeszenie Ekspedytorów Portowych w Gdyni (Freight Forwarders Association in Gdynia)
5	Izba Morska w Gdańsku (Maritime Chamber in Danzig)
6	Izba Morska w Gdyni (Maritime Chamber in Gdynia)
7	Państwowa Szkoła Morska w Gdyni (State Maritime School in Gdynia)
8	Wydział Morski Państwowego Instytutu Meteorologicznego w Gdyni (Maritime Department of the State Meteorological Institute in Gdynia)
9	Szkoła Podchorążych w Bydgoszczy (Navy Officers School in Bydgoszcz)
10	Morski Dywizjon Lotniczy w Pucku (Naval Air Squadron in Puck)
11	Sąd Marynarski w Gdyni (Navy Court in Gdynia)

I would describe the condition of preserved office and organisational records as residual, since none of them have been preserved in a complete form, and, at the same time as fragmentary, because the remaining records document only some of their operations. The state of preservation presented in this paper – depicted in a comprehensive manner, that is, within the scope of the specified seven sections – of archival records of offices and institutions may provide an impulse to take up scholarly reflection on the critical edition of archival sources documenting the adaptation and exploitation of the Baltic Sea coast, together with dispersed information in records of other offices, which were formally related to maritime institutions and organisations.[62] The indicated losses of organisational records of numerous offices prove the significance and impact of all organisations and institutions dealing with collecting, storing, registering and providing access to archival sources, and complementing them with accounts, memoirs and diaries of historical value, this way filling in the void in the remaining archival material.

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62 Mieczysław Wojciechowski, "Źródła do okresu międzywojennego na Pomorzu: (1918–1939)," in: *Stan badań i potrzeby edycji źródłowych dla historii Pomorza i innych krajów południowej strefy bałtyckiej: materiały konferencji ogólnopolskiej z 25–26 listopada 1994 r. w Toruniu*, ed. Marian Biskup (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1995), 104–11.

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English version: Karina Ukleja, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Poland, having regained its independence after 123 years of partitions, had to face one of its most significant tasks: to enforce and exploit its rights granted in the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, which ended World War I. These rights were exercised with the help of various authorities and posts fulfilling specific functions in the political and legal system of the Republic of Poland, and in the Free City of Danzig, in which Poland gained special powers resulting from free access to the sea secured by the peace treaty.

As Poland began to organise its access to the Baltic Sea, institutions and offices were established for that purpose in the territory of the Republic of Poland and in the Free City of Danzig. They all contributed to creating records, as their operations generated specific types of documentation. Their activities were interrupted by the outbreak of World War II. Military operations and their postwar effects resulted in devastation of archives. The paper presents a summary of remaining records in the form of an archival guide, based on the directory of maritime authorities and institutions drawn up by the author. The guide ought to facilitate access to the preserved records and at the same time, indicate institutions, of which all records have been lost.

The guide, therefore, covers the following authorities, offices and institutions undertaking activities related to the gained access to the Baltic Sea, existing on the eve of the outbreak of World War II, covered in 7 sections:

a) Special (maritime) administration
b) Merchant Navy. Polish Shipping Companies (state-owned companies)
c) Maritime associations of high public utility
d) Associations of shipping enterprises (transportation and freight forwarding)
e) Special courts (maritime chambers)
f) Maritime education
g) The Polish Navy

The analysis of the state of preservation of the records of maritime institutions and organisations operating before World War II shows that in the archives we can find 473 archival units created by the special (maritime) administration, as well as 1605 archival units created by state-owned merchant navy companies, 152 archival units by associations of high public utility, namely the Maritime and Colonial League, 601 archival units by maritime associations of shipping enterprises, 12 archival units created by special courts, 59 archival units by organizations dealing with maritime education and 1851 archival units by the Polish Navy.

Not even one archival unit has been left of the records of 11 institutions and organisations enumerated in this paper. Even more I would like to invite readers to make contact in the case there being a possibility to enrich the current database, both in terms of information on saved records, and the lost ones.

Akta polskich urzędów i instytucji morskich działających w przededniu wybuchu II wojny światowej. Przewodnik historyczno-archiwalny

Słowa kluczowe: Administracja morska, marynarka wojenna, marynarka handlowa, Liga Morska i Kolonialna, Izby morskie, szkolnictwo morskie, II wojna światowa, archiwa, archiwalne pomoce informacyjne

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STRESZCZENIE

Jedną z ważniejszych spraw odrodzonego po 123 latach zaborów państwa polskiego stało się wyegzekwowanie i wykorzystanie uprawnień zapisanych w Traktacie Wersalskim z dnia 28 czerwca 1919, który kończył I wojną światową. Realizowane były one za pośrednictwem różnych urzędów i osobnych stanowisk spełniających określone funkcje w ustroju Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz Wolnego Miasta Gdańska, w którym Polska uzyskała specjalne uprawnienia wypływające z zagwarantowanego w nim wolnego dostępu do morza.

W wyniku podjętych przez Polskę działań związanych z zagospodarowaniem przyznanego dostępu do Morza Bałtyckiego powstały na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku urzędy i instytucje je realizujące. Wszystkie one stanowiły czynniki aktotwórcze, bowiem ich działalność powodowała powstanie określonego typu dokumentacji. Ich pracę przerwał wybuch II wojny światowej. W wyniku działań wojennych i ich powojennych skutków nastąpiło ich zniszczenie. Na podstawie sporządzonego wykazu władz i instytucji morskich w artykule został zaprezentowany bilans zachowanych akt ujęty w formie przewodnika archiwalnego. Powinien on ułatwić dostęp do zachowanych źródeł, a jednocześnie wskazać te instytucje, po których działalności nie zachowały się żadne akta. Przewodnik obejmuje zatem następujące władze, urzędy i instytucje podejmujące działalność związaną prowadzące działalność związaną z uzyskanym dostępem do Morza Bałtyckiego, istniejące w przededniu wybuchu II wojny światowej, ujęte w 7 działach:

a) Administracja specjalna (morska)
b) Marynarka Handlowa. Polskie Przedsiębiorstwa Okrętowe (z udziałem Skarbu Państwa)
c) Morskie stowarzyszenia wyższej użyteczności
d) Morskie związki przedsiębiorstw przewozowych (transport i ekspedycja)
e) Sądy specjalne (izby morskie)
f) Morskie szkolnictwo i nauka
g) Marynarka Wojenna

Przeprowadzona analiza stanu zachowania akt morskich instytucji i organizacji działających w przededniu wybuchu II wojny światowej wskazuje, iż w archiwach znajduje się 473 jednostek archiwalnych wytworzonych przez administrację specjalną i odpowiednio: 1605 jednostek archiwalnych [j.a.] przez przedsiębiorstwa państwowe marynarki handlowej,

152 przez stowarzyszenia wyższej użyteczności, tj. Ligę Morską i Kolonialną, 601 j.a. przez związki przedsiębiorstw przewozowych, 25 j.a. przez sądy specjalne, 59 przez organizacje zajmujące się nauką i szkolnictwem oraz 1851 j.a. wytworzonych przez Marynarkę Wojenną.

Po działalności 11 wskazanych w artykule instytucji i organizacji nie zachowała się nawet jedna jednostka archiwalna. Tym bardziej zachęcam czytelników do kontaktu w sprawie ewentualnego poszerzenia prowadzonej bazy danych, zarówno w zakresie informacji o zachowanych, jak również utraconych aktach.

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Ludmiła Filina-Dawidowicz
Faculty of Maritime Technology and Transport
West Pomeranian University of Technology in Szczecin
ludmila.filina@zut.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-6916-6066

Daria Cybulska
Faculty of Maritime Technology and Transport
West Pomeranian University of Technology in Szczecin
daria.mozdrzen@zut.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-4761-6270

Analysis of Selected Disruptions Occurring in Ferry Shipping

Keywords: ferry shipping, disruption, ferry terminal, maritime transport

1. Introduction

Ferry shipping is a special type of regular shipping.[1] It complements the rail and road transport networks allowing to create a coherent transport system. Trucks and passenger vehicles, railway wagons and general cargo, as well as passengers may be carried using specialised ships.[2] These ships include passenger ferries, roll-on/roll-off ferries, car ferries and others. In addition, ferry services constitute an important element of land and sea transport chains, supporting intermodal transport operations and travellers' movement between countries.[3]

1 Jerzy Kujawa, ed., *Organizacja i technika transportu morskiego* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2015), 156–157.

2 Ilona Urbanyi-Popiołek and Magdalena Klopott, "Nowe Wyzwania dla Żeglugi Bilskiego zasięgu na Morzu Bałtyckim," *Logistyka* 2 (2012): 747–756; Harald Høyem and James Odeck, "Assessing the socially optimal capacity at a selection of Norwegian car ferry crossings," *Case Studies on Transport Policy* 10 (2022), 1: 41–59, accessed 26.11.2023; Maja Škurić, et al., "Optimal allocating and sizing of passenger ferry fleet in maritime transport," *Research in Transportation Economics* 90 (2021): 100868, accessed 28.11.2023.

3 Włodzimierz Rydzkowski and Krystyna Wojewódzka-Król, eds. *Transport* (Warszawa: PWN, 2009), 488–493; Izabela Kotowska, Marta Mańkowska and Michał Pluciński, *Morsko-lądowe łańcuchy*

Ferry shipping plays an important role in the sustainable development of transport.[4] It is characterised by, among others:

- regularity of performed services,
- the use of specialised vessels–ferries,
- the need to use specialised infrastructure and equipment in ports and terminals to ensure efficient services for passengers and cargo handling,
- performing transport services based on agreements and specific transport tariffs, etc.[5]

In Poland, ferry connections are carried out from/to seaports that are of fundamental importance for the national economy. It should be emphasised that 90% of trade between the Scandinavian countries and Poland takes place using maritime transport.[6] Thus, in the Baltic Sea region, ferry shipping is of great significance, which is also reflected by the activities performed by ferry carriers. It should be noted that ferry terminals are the elements of intermodal transport networks and are usually well connected with the hinterland ensuring cargo deliveries to final destinations. Intermodal transport infrastructure in Poland is well developed and includes linear (e.g., motorways, railroads) and punctate (e.g., container, ro-ro and ferry terminals in seaports, rail-road terminals) elements[7].

Market conditions, including high competition, impact the occurrence of various obstacles in ferry shipping operations, which in turn affects the transport companies' behaviour. The conducted literature analysis revealed that different disruptions in ferry services may occur. For example, the limitations in ferry traffic in 2020, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, were observed.[8] Moreover, disturbances in ferry traffic

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transportowe (Warszawa: Difin, 2016), 180; Høyem and Odeck, "Assessing the socially optimal capacity," 41–42.

4 Izabela Kotowska, "The Role of Ferry and Ro-Ro Shipping in Sustainable Development of Transport," *Review of Economic Perspectives* 15 (2015), 1: 35–48, accessed 24.01.2024.

5 Kujawa, *Organizacja i technika transportu*, 156–159.

6 Rydzkowski and Wojewódzka-Król, *Transport*, 391–400.

7 Ludmiła Filina-Dawidowicz, et al., "Directions for Improving the Efficiency of Intermodal Transport," in: *Smart Technologies in Urban Engineering.* Proceedings of STUE *2022. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems*, eds. Olga Arsenyeva et al. (Cham: Springer, 2023), 808–809.

8 Lora Jones, Daniele Palumbo and David Brown, *Coronavirus: How the pandemic has changed the world economy*, BBC News, accessed 15.09.2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225; Sebastian Jabeen et al., "COVID and World Stock Markets: A Comprehensive Discussion," *Frontiers in Psychology* 12 (2021): 13, accessed 25.11.2023; Ilona Urbanyi-Popiołek, "Maritime tourism in the time of the Covid-19 pandemic in the Baltic Sea region – challenges for ferry and cruise operators," in: *Economic and Social Development: Book of Proceedings, 63rd International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development – Building Resilient Society*, eds. Luka Burilovic, Tomislav Rados and Nicholas Recker (Zagreb: Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship Agency, 2020), 397–405.

due to weather conditions may take place, especially in the winter period. Therefore, complex analysis of disruptions in ferry shipping is needed.

The aim of the presented study is to identify disruptions occurring in ferry traffic and analyse the causes of disruptions reported by selected carriers operating in the ferry terminal in the Świnoujście seaport (Poland). The ferry transport market in Poland was analysed, and the causes of disruptions in ferry traffic were examined based on data provided by the Unity Line Limited (Unity Line) shipowner, operating in the ferry terminal in Świnoujście.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Characteristics of the Ferry Transport Market in Poland

The transport policy of the European Union (EU) places great emphasis on the promotion of intermodal transport, environmental protection and the creation of a single European transport area, in which there is a wide network of connections between EU member states.[9] Moreover, developing of modern infrastructure, intelligent IT systems and ticketing services, etc. support transport services evolution and create favourable conditions for the widespread use of ferry shipping in passenger and freight transport.[10]

In 2023, ferry connections in Poland were carried out by four shipowners/carriers, such as: Stena Line, TT-Line, Polish Baltic Shipping Co. (Polferries), Unity Line. These carriers offered their customers the transport services between selected ports of the Baltic Sea region on routes running, among others, through seaports in Świnoujście, Gdańsk and Gdynia (Fig. 1) to seaports located in Ystad, Trelleborg, Nynäshamn or Karlskrona (Sweden) and Copenhagen (Denmark).[11]

9 David Romiro Troition, "Transport policy in the European Union," *MEST Journal* 3 (2015), 2: 135–141, accessed 24.11.2023.

10 Komisja Europejska, Dyrekcja Generalna ds. Mobilności i Transportu, *Biała Księga Transportu* (Luksemburg, 2011), https://op.europa.eu/pl/publication-detail/-/publication/bfaa7afd-7d56-4a8d-b44d-2d1630448855, accessed 07.02.2023.

11 Polferries, accessed 07.02.2023, https://polferries.pl/; Unity Line, accessed 07.02.2023 and 07.04.2023, https://www.unityline.pl/; TT-Line, accessed 07.02.2023, https://www.ttline.com/pl/; Stena Line, accessed 07.02.2023, https://www.stenaline.pl/.




Figure 1. Ferry connections carried out in Polish seaports in 2023

Source: own study based on: Google Maps, accessed 12.12.2023, https://maps.google.com/.

Over the last decade, a significant interest in ferry services in Poland has been observed. Figure 2 presents the international passenger traffic in Polish seaports in 2014–2022. It should be mentioned that the largest number of passengers serviced in the analysed years was noticed in the port of Świnoujście. From 2014 to 2022 this port handled 9,219,513 passengers in total. In turn, during this period the port of Gdynia serviced 5,130,628 passengers, the port of Gdańsk – 1,192,880.[12] A collapse in passenger transport in 2020 was due to the COVID-19 pandemic occurrence. The situation changed in 2021, when it was possible to travel taking into account the existing restrictions (including mandatory vaccinations, protective masks, limited number of passengers, increased disinfection efforts, etc.). It should be noted that ferry services are used not only by truck drivers, but also by tourists or people working outside their place of residence.

12 *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2018* (Warszawa-Szczecin: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2018), 322; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2022* (Warszawa-Szczecin: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2022), 308; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2023* (Warszawa-Szczecin: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2023), 302.




Figure 2. International passenger traffic in selected seaports in 2014–2022 (number of passengers)

Source: own study based on: *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2018* (Warszawa-Szczecin: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2018), 322; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2022* (Warszawa-Szczecin: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2022), 308; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2023* (Warszawa–Szczecin: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2023), 302.

Among Polish seaports, the port of Świnoujście is also the leader in handling trucks, both with and without accompanying trailers (Fig. 3). While analysing the statistical data, an overall increase in the number of serviced trucks in this seaport over the analysed period 2014–2022 can be noticed. As in the case of international passenger traffic, a decrease in trucks handling in 2020 and 2022 was recorded. The reason for this downturn was the COVID-19 pandemic. Between 2014 and 2022 the port of Świnoujście handled 3,977,368 trucks with/without accompanying trailers, the port of Gdynia – 1,060,341 and Gdańsk – 140,801 vehicles.[13]




Figure 3. International trucks with/without accompanying trailers traffic in selected seaports in 2014–2022 (number of trucks)

Source: own study based on: *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2018*, 110–111; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2022*, 101–102; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2023*, 101–102.

13 *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2018*, 110–111; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2022*, 101–102; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2023*, 101–102.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to a decrease in the number of passenger vehicles and motorcycles handled in the Polish seaports (Fig. 4). During this period the total number of passenger vehicles and motorcycles handled in the port of Świnoujście was 2,257,862, in the port of Gdynia – 925,280, in the port of Gdansk – 572,647.[14]




Figure 4. International traffic of passenger vehicles and motorcycles in selected seaports in 2014–2022 (number of passenger vehicles and motorcycles)

Source: own study based on: *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2018, 108; Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2022*, 99; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2023*, 99.

To sum up, it can be stated that over the analysed years a trend of an increase in the number of trucks handled was observed, which may be related to the development of international trade and favourable conditions for the expansion of intermodal transport services in Poland. The pandemic significantly impacted the international traffic of passengers, passenger vehicles and motorcycles, causing downturns in seaport transhipments. The leader in ferry traffic handling in Poland was the port in Świnoujście, where the Świnoujście Ferry Terminal Ltd. is located. In 2023, this terminal cooperated with three shipowners, such as Unity Line, TT-Line, Polferries[15] and provided a wide range of services throughout the year.[16]

14 *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2018*, 108; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2022*, 99; *Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Morskiej 2023*, 99.

15 Polferries, accessed 07.02.2023, https://polferries.pl/; Unity Line, accessed 07.02.2023 and 07.04.2023, https://www.unityline.pl/; TT-Line, accessed 07.02.2023, https://www.ttline.com/pl/.

16 Terminal Promowy w Świnoujściu, accessed 14.02.2022, http://www.sft.pl/.

2.2. Division of Disruptions Occurring in Ferry Traffic

Various situations affecting ferry traffic may occur at ferry terminals. These situations may be due to the disruptions, which are understood as unplanned or undesirable situations, which may result in the reorganisation of ferry handling processes in the terminal. Disruption is also defined as "a violation of the established order or course of affairs, processes, etc."[17] or "an unexpected phenomenon leading to interruption, or at least delay, in the tasks performance."[18] Wieteska G. defined disruption as "an expected or unplanned event, causing unplanned negative deviations in the processes of delivering products and services carried out in accordance with the objectives of the organisation."[19]

It can be assumed that disruption in ferry traffic is a situation that causes disorganisation of the entities' service processes and leads to a delay or change in the manner of performing a given task, including loading/unloading the ferry and handling the transport means or servicing passengers inside the terminal. Disruptions occur in various modes of transport, including air[20], road[21], and rail transport.[22] In addition, in the subject literature the disruptions occurring in intermodal transport were examined.[23] It should be noted that available publications do not contain a comprehensive analysis of disruptions, the selected cases are mainly characterised.

17 *Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN*, accessed 10.11.2023, https://sjp.pwn.pl/.

18 Sylwia Konecka, "Determinanty ryzyka zakłóceń w łańcuchu dostaw," *Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu* 382 (2015): 66–79, quoted on 67.

19 Grażyna Wieteska, *Zarządzanie ryzykiem w łańcuchu dostaw na rynku B2B* (Warszawa: Difin, 2011), 16.

20 Kam K.H. Ng, et al., "A Large Neighbourhood Search Approach to Airline Schedule Disruption Recovery Problem," *2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management* (Singapore: IEEM, 2020): 600–604, accessed 04.01.2024; Anna Kwasiborska and Krzysztof Kądzioła, "Application of causal analysis of disruptions and the functional resonance analysis method (fram) in analyzing the risk of the baggage process," *Scientific Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport* 119 (2023): 63–81, accessed 04.01.2024.

21 Xiaohui Lu, Faith Ka Shu Chan and Hing Kai Chan, "Investigation of Transport Logistics Disruptions from Urban Floods: A Case Study of the Chinese Coastal Megacity—Guangzhou, China," in: *Intelligent and Transformative Production in Pandemic Times. Lecture Notes in Production Engineering*, eds. Chin-Yin Huang et al., 637–647 (Cham: Springer, 2023), accessed 04.04.2024; Amulya Gurtu, "Truck transport industry in the USA: challenges and likely disruptions," *International Journal of Logistics Systems and Management* 44 (2023), 1: 46–58, accessed 03.01.2024; Gread J.M. Read, et al., "Managing the risks associated with technological disruption in the road transport system: a control structure modelling approach," *Ergonomics* 5 (2023): 1–17, accessed 04.04.2024.

22 Juan Pineda-Jaramillo and Francesco Viti, "Identifying the rail operating features associated to intermodal freight rail operation delays," *Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies* 147 (2023): 103993, accessed 10.03.2024; Fredrik Monsuur, et al., "Modelling the impact of rail delays on passenger satisfaction," *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice* 152 (2021): 19–35, accessed 18.01.2024.

23 Ginger Y. Ke and Manish Verman, "A framework to managing disruption risk in rail-truck intermodal transportation networks," *Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review* 153 (2021), C: 102340, accessed 18.01.2024; M. Hakan Akyüz, Rommert Dekker and Shadi Sharif Azadeh. "Partial and complete replanning of an intermodal logistic system under disruption," *Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review* 169(C) (2023): 102968, accessed 15.04.2024.

Konecka S. reviewed the literature on features of disruptions in the supply chains and made an attempt to classify disruptions based on the attributes that characterise them (Table 1).[24] In turn, Hoffa-Dąbrowska P. proposed the criteria for division disruptions of logistics processes.[25] The main causes of disruptions occurrence may be related to the natural environment (e.g., unfavourable weather conditions), technical and technological breakdowns, human activities.

Table 1. Examples of disruptions division

Example	Criterion
Example 1	– caused by the natural environment, e.g., blizzards, – caused by technical and technological breakdowns, e.g., failures of technical equipment, – caused by human activities, e.g., strikes, product recall.
Example 2	– impact strength, e.g., small, medium, large, – impact on supply chain links, e.g., related to one link or the whole supply chain, – the number of supply chain links that were affected at the same time by the disruption, – the duration of the disruptive event, e.g., short, medium, long. – the link responsible for the disruption, e.g., resulting from the fault of the carrier, supplier/subcontractor, recipient.
Example 3	– location, close to suppliers, inside the company, close to customers, joint responsibility, – range of duration, – significance/volume of the losses caused by the disruption, e.g., small, medium, large, – cyclicality of disruptions, – disruption profile – the dynamics of losses caused by the disruption during its occurrence, – level of consequences following the disruption – the level of stability achieved after the disruption has subsided.
Example 4	– category, e.g., planned, unplanned, – frequency of disruption, e.g., every minute, hour, every day, every week, every month, every year, – type of occurrence, e.g., normal (related to daily activities carried out by the enterprise), abnormal (not related to daily activities performed by the enterprise), – severity of the disruption, e.g., insignificant, minor, routine, serious, critical, catastrophic, – probability of occurrence, e.g., unlikely, rare, occasional, probable, frequent, – cost, e.g., low, medium, high, – resources involved, e.g., small, medium, large, – source of disruption, e.g., known, unknown, – the impact of the disruption on supply chain planning, e.g., short-term plans, general plans, aggregated plans, strategic plans in the field of logistics, strategic plans at the business unit level, strategic plans at the corporate level, – type of flow within the supply chain, e.g., flow of information, goods, funds, – recommended actions against disruption, e.g., acceptance, avoidance, transfer, insurance.

Source: own study based on: Konecka, "Determinanty ryzyka zakłóceń w łańcuchu dostaw," 75–77; Hoffa-Dąbrowska, "Metodyka modelowania," 33–39.

24 Konecka, "Determinanty ryzyka," 75–77.

25 Patrycja Hoffa-Dąbrowska, "Metodyka modelowania zakłóceń procesów logistycznych" (PhD diss., Poznań: Politechnika Poznańska Wydział Inżynierii Zarządzania, 2016), 33–39.

The factors affecting the occurrence of disruptions in seaports or ferry terminals are presented in Table 2. These are factors that can be known in advance and occur during the operation of ships, as well as those that may be unexpected. Infrastructural factors have a significant impact on the quality of ferry traffic because seaport's quays must be adapted to service the calling ships, transport means and cargo. The occurrence of these factors may be related to bottlenecks existing at ferry terminals, for example, limited number of parking places for trucks in the terminal or limited handling capacity, which may result in an extension of the service time required for vehicles service at the ferry terminal. Disruptions may impact the delays or cancellations of ferries.

Table 2. Examples of factors affecting the disruptions' occurrence

Factor	Description
Environmental	Unfavourable weather conditions, storm, fog, atmospheric precipitation, etc.
Technical and technological	Technical problems of transport vehicles and handling equipment, e.g., failure of ships' components, material failure and degradation, etc.
Human	Human mistakes caused by inattention, routine, non-compliance with procedures, etc.
Infrastructural	Infrastructure limitations, insufficient number of quays or parking lots, limited storage area, etc.
Organisational	Interruption within transport chains, delays in deliveries, non-compliance with the "Just in Time" rule, etc.
Economical	Lack of funds for the expansion or modernisation of the terminal's infrastructure, etc.
Informative	Inadequate communication, errors in information flow, commands, documents, etc.
Social and political	Strikes, war, terrorism, travel restrictions, pandemic, Brexit, etc.
Cybercrime	Attacks/interceptions on electronic systems for the management of ports, terminals, ships, etc.

Source: own elaboration based on: Filina-Dawidowicz, et al., "Directions for Improving the Efficiency of Intermodal Transport,"; Unity Line, accessed 07.02.2023 and 07.04.2023, https://www.unityline.pl/; Vytautas Paulauskas, Donatas Paulauskas and Ludmiła Filina-Dawidowicz, "Evaluation of Seaports and Terminals Possibilities to Adapt to Changes in Market and Economic Conditions," in: *Transport Means 2022. Part II. Proceedings of the 26th International Conference* (Kaunas: Kauno Technologijos Universitetas, 2022), 617–622, accessed 04.01.2024; Iouri Semenov, Ludmiła Filina-Dawidowicz and Piotr Trojanowski, "Integrated approach to information analysis for planning the transport of sensitive cargo," *Archives of Transport* 51 (2019), 3: 65–76; Iouri Semenov, et al., "The quality assessment of ro-pax ferries services: Research techniques and procedures," *World Review of Intermodal Transportation Research* 10 (2021), 3: 202–224, accessed 05.01.2024; Ludmiła Filina-Dawidowicz, et al., "Information support of cargo ferry transport: Case study of Latvia," *Procedia Computer Science* 176 (2020): 2192–2201, accessed 05.01.2024; Ilona Urbanyi-Popiołek, "New Insights into the Ferry Business in the Turbulent Environment," *European Research Studies Journal* XXV (2022), 4: 63–73, accessed 05.01.2024; Robert Bronk and Paula deWitte, "Maritime Cybersecurity: Meeting Threats to Globalization's Great Conveyor," *Computational Methods in Applied Sciences* 56 (2022): 241–254, accessed 05.01.2024; Maritti Lehto, "Cyber Security in Aviation, Maritime and Automotive," *Computational Methods in Applied Sciences* 54 (2020): 19–32, accessed 05.01.2024; Dimitrios Paraskevadakis and Adeyeri Ifeoluwa, "An industry-level analysis of the post-Brexit and post-Covid 19 Ro-Ro ferry market and critical maritime freight transport links between the UK and the EU," *Journal of Shipping and Trade* 7 (2022): 27, accessed 05.01.2024.

It was noticed that seaport infrastructure should be adapted to meet global technical standards.[26] This applies primarily to the infrastructure required to operate ships, ensure the efficiency and convenience of cargo handling and passengers' service, as well as to IT ports' infrastructure.[27] It was stated that smaller and medium-sized ports may need more financial outlays to be able to introduce modern IT technologies in order to avoid system disruptions in the future.[28] Moreover, the vessels' technical state should be regularly maintained to ensure their uninterrupted operation.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a lot of disruptions to ferry traffic around the world. The introduced restrictions affected the volume of international trade and production of goods. This has contributed to disruptions in maritime transport chains,[29] changing the directions and frequency of ferry connections. It should be noted that the scale and nature of the impact of COVID-19 on land and sea transport chains depended on the type of terminal and the function it performed. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to stricter security requirements for travellers both at terminals and onboard.[30]

In the available literature an in-depth analysis of transport services, needs and requirements of consumers using ferry services in the Baltic Sea region was performed.[31] It was mentioned that regular surveys should be carried out among customers in order to get their opinions and determine ways to increase the efficiency of ferry services. The main issue considered by people choosing ferry services is the availability of these

26 Srećko Krile, Nikolai Maiorov and Vladimir Fetisov, "Forecasting the operational activities of the sea passenger terminal using intelligent technologies," *Transport Problems* 13 (2018), 1: 27–36.

27 Kok-Lim Alvin Yau, Shuhong Peng, Junaid Qadir, Yeh-Ching Low and Mee Hong Ling, "Towards Smart Port Infrastructures: Enhancing Port Activities Using Information and Communications Technology," *IEEE Access* 8 (2020): 83387–83404, accessed 28.11.2023; Markus Fruth and Frank Teuteberg, "Digitization in maritime logistics—What is there and what is missing?" *Cogent Business and Management* 4 (2017), 1: 1411066; Marija Jović, et al., "The role of electronic transportation management systems in seaport digitalization," *BLED 2019 - Conference Proceedings* BeC 32 (2019): 1–15, accessed 28.11.2023; Assunta Di Vaio and Luisa Varriale, "Digitalization in the sea-land supply chain: experiences from Italy in rethinking the port operations within inter-organizational relationships," *Production Planning and Control* 31 (2020), 2–3: 220–232.

28 Vytautas Paulauskas, Ludmiła Filina-Dawidowicz and Donatas Paulauskas, "Ports digitalization level evaluation," *Sensors* 21 (2021), 18: 6134, accessed 28.11.2023.

29 Marta Mańkowska, et al., "Seaports during the Covid-19 pandemic: The terminal operators' tactical responses to disruptions in maritime supply chains," *Energies* 14 (2021), 14: 4339, accessed 28.11.2023; *Koronawirus a promy zawijające do polskich portów*, GospodarkaMorska.pl, accessed 17.02.2023, https://www.gospodarkamorska.pl/porty-transport-koronawirus-a-promy-zawijajace-do-polskich-portow-47882.

30 Srećko Krile, Nikolai Maiorov and Vladimir Fetisov, "Modernization of the infrastructure of marine passenger port based on synthesis of the structure and forecasting development," *Sustainability* 13 (2021), 7: 3869, accessed 28.11.2023.

31 Iouri Semenov, et al., "The quality assessment," 202–224.

services, including ships' capacity[32] and number of ferry departures offered by the terminal.[33] The quality of service, price, convenience and travel time[34] also impact the choice of the carrier by passengers. Moreover, travellers' attention is paid to the need to shorten the waiting time at the ferry terminal.[35] Therefore, limitation of the number of delayed ferries is expected.

Based on a conducted literature review it can be concluded that the disruptions occurring in ferry traffic so far have been analysed selectively. This justifies the need to undertake research in this area and to examine the causes of disruptions in ferry traffic.

3. Research Methodology

Based on the analysis of the subject literature and the observations made, information on selected disruptions occurring in ferry traffic was collected.

In order to identify and analyse the causes of disruptions, a case study of ferry traffic performed by the Unity Line carrier at the ferry terminal in Świnoujście seaport was considered. Unity Line carries out ferry services on the Świnoujście–Trelleborg and Świnoujście–Ystad routes. The data available at the information portal Promy24.com,[36] where messages for travellers using Unity Line services were published and archived, was used in the study. The data available from 06.08.2020 to 19.06.2023 were analysed in detail. Then collected data were examined and appropriate conclusions were drawn.

4. Research Results

During the analysed period 89 cases of disruptions were identified. Based on the obtained data, it can be noticed that the number of cancellations of ferries accounted for 93% of all recorded disruptions, while 7% were delays (Fig. 5).

32 Angelos M. Pantouvakis, "Who pays the ferryman? An analysis of the ferry passenger's selection dilemma," *Maritime Policy & Management* 34 (2007), 6: 591–612.

33 Høyem and Odeck, "Assessing the socially optimal capacity," 41–56.

34 Škurić, et al., "Optimal allocating," 1–3.

35 Thor-Erik Sandberg Hanssen and Berner Larsen, "The influence of waiting time on the value of headway time on a ferry service in Norway," *Research in Transportation Economics* 82 (2020): 100879.

36 Promy24.com, accessed 19.06.2023, www.promy24.com.




Figure 5. Cancellations and delays of ferries in the analysed period (percentage share)

Source: own study based on data coming from Promy24.com, accessed 19.06.2023, www.promy24.com.

Among the causes of ferry cancellations, the weather conditions that occurred in the period from autumn to spring formed 71% of all cancellations (Fig. 6). 23% of ferry cancellations occurred due to technical problems (e.g., failure of ship components). The remaining 6% of cancellations were faced in the result of periodic inspections/repairs of ferries in the shipyard. Unlike cancellations due to weather and technical reasons which were unplanned, the cancellations due to periodic inspections/repairs in the shipyard were planned in advance.




Figure 6. Causes of cancelling ferries (percentage share)

Source: own study based on data from Promy24.com, accessed 19.06.2023, www.promy24.com.

It can be noticed that the largest number of cancellations due to weather conditions affected m/f "Galileusz," m/f "Copernicus" and m/f "Jan Śniadecki" ferries. Furthermore, these three vessels were listed at the top of cancellations for technical reasons. This result may be influenced by the technical condition of ships and the intensity of ferry operations. In the analysed database there were also messages without a defined vessel name ("no name" item in Figure 7), which may mean that these messages concerned all ships of the analysed shipowner.




Figure 7. Causes of cancelling ferries by vessel's name (number of cancellations in the analysed time)

Source: own study based on data from Promy24.com, accessed 19.06.2023, www.promy24.com.

The main causes of ferry delays were weather conditions (83% of all delays) and technical problems (17%). The reason of ferries' periodic inspections/repairs in the shipyard was not listed among the causes impacting the delays (Fig. 8).




Figure 8. Causes of ferry delays (percentage share)

Source: own study based on data from Promy24.com, accessed 19.06.2023, www.promy24.com.

Summing up the above results, it can be concluded that the disruptions occurring in ferry traffic, which were identified during the available data analysis, may be caused by unfavourable weather conditions, ferries' technical problems and periodic inspections/repairs in the shipyard. It is difficult to predict when, for example, a technical defect of a ship will occur; the same applies to unfavourable weather conditions. These disruptions may not be predicted in every case. In turn, a vessel's periodic inspections/repairs in the shipyard are planned in advance and vessels are withdrawn from service for a certain time. That information should be provided to travellers early enough to take a decision. A prolonged overhaul could be an unforeseen situation that will extend the waiting time for the ship to return to its sailing schedule.

Conclusions

Ferry shipping is an important part of maritime transport and intermodal transport chains. It should be noted that, in Poland over the analysed years (2014–2022), ferry shipping was developing, and its popularity is growing.

Disruptions occurring in ferry traffic were identified and analysed. These disruptions may be caused by different factors, such as environmental, technical and technological, human, infrastructural, organisational, and other. In order to ensure the proper functioning of ferry traffic, it is necessary to analyse possible impact of these factors to avoid unfavourable consequences, such as ferry delays or cancellations. The examples of possible disruptions' division were also presented.

The analysis of the data provided by the selected shipowner revealed that unfavourable weather conditions were the main cause of both cancellations and delay occurrence in ferry traffic in the examined terminal. Based on analysed messages, three causes of disruptions were identified. It is worth noting that information on disruptions provided to the passengers by the ferry line did not include messages about human factor impact on cancellations or delays of ferries, which does not exclude its occurrence. This factor may not be presented by the carrier, but it may affect the disturbances' occurrence in ferry terminals. The impact of this factor can be related, among others, to the behaviour of vehicles' drivers (e.g., non-compliance with the rules of moving around the terminal).

Research results are influenced by the number of analysed cases, the data shared by one shipowner was analysed. Therefore, the Authors would like to continue the examination of problems occurring at ferry terminals and will investigate the disruptions noticed by other ferries' carriers in future research studies.

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English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Over the last decade, a dynamic development of ferry traffic in Poland has been observed, which influences the need to improve the services offered by ferry carriers. When managing ferry traffic, disruptions may occur due to the influence of various factors. The occurrence of these disruptions poses challenges for ferry operators and ferry terminals' managers, cooperating and taking decisions on the organisation of ferry services in ports. The aim of the article is to identify disruptions occurring in ferry traffic and to analyse the causes of disruptions reported by a selected carrier operating in the ferry terminal in the seaport of Świnoujście (Poland). The ferry transport market in Poland was analysed in the article, and disruptions that may occur in ferry traffic were identified. The analysis of disruption causes reported by the selected ferry carrier showed that unfavourable weather conditions were the most frequent cause of ferry cancellations and delays. The results of the study may be of interest to ship owners, managers of ferry terminals and seaports.

Analiza wybranych zakłóceń występujących w żegludze promowej

Słowa kluczowe: żegluga promowa, zakłócenie, terminal promowy, transport morski

STRESZCZENIE

W ciągu ostatniej dekady obserwowany jest dynamiczny rozwój przewozów promowych w Polsce, co wpływa na potrzebę doskonalenia usług oferowanych przez przewoźników promowych. Podczas zarządzania ruchem promowym mogą występować zakłócenia spowodowane wpływem różnych czynników. Wystąpienie tych zakłóceń wiąże się z wyzwaniami dla armatorów i menedżerów terminali promowych, współpracujących i podejmujących decyzje odnośnie organizacji obsługi promów w portach. Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja zakłóceń występujących w ruchu promowym oraz analiza przyczyn zakłóceń zgłaszanych przez wybranego przewoźnika funkcjonującego w terminalu promowym w porcie morskim Świnoujście (Polska). W artykule przeanalizowano rynek przewozów promowych w Polsce, a także zidentyfikowano zakłócenia mogące wystąpić w ruchu promowym. Analiza przyczyn zakłóceń raportowanych przez wybranego przewoźnika promowego wykazała, że najczęstszą przyczyną odwołań i opóźnień promów były niekorzystne warunki atmosferyczne. Wyniki badań mogą być interesujące dla armatorów statków, menedżerów terminali promowych i portów morskich.

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Joanna Kos-Łabędowicz
University of Economics in Katowice
Department of International Economic Relations
jkos@ue.katowice.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-9523-9609

Danuta Zwolińska
University of Economics in Katowice
Faculty of Management
Department of Economic Logistics
danuta.zwolinska@ue.katowice.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-0960-5826

Anna Drab-Kurowska
University of Szczecin
Institute of Spatial Management and Socio-Economic Geography
anna.drab-kurowska@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-1396-9390

Maritime Transport Resilience – Charted Seas or Unknown Territory?

Keywords: resilience, maritime transport, systematic literature review, COVID-19

1. Introduction

Maritime transport is a key component of global logistics, as it accounts for around 80 per cent of global trade volume, according to the World Trade Organisation, and more than 75 per cent of European's Union external trade.[1] Through an extensive network of ports and maritime connections, it is possible to ensure the international

1 *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Maritime safety: at the heart of clean and modern shipping*, 01.06.2023 (report No. COM/2023/268 final, prepared for the European Commission, Brussels: European Commission, 2023), accessed 01.10.2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2023:268:FIN.

and transcontinental flow of materials, semi-finished and finished products, allowing other industries and the global economy as a whole to grow and develop. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report *Review of Maritime Transport 2024 – Navigating Maritime Chokepoints* indicates that, despite improvements in 2023, expectations regarding the future condition of the industry are cautious and not without a number of challenges.[2] Some of the potential problems are well-known and related to infrastructural constraints (e.g. bottlenecks in the form of the Suez and Panama Canals) or pressures to meet sustainability goals and reduce the industry's environmental impact by increasing the energy efficiency of the means of transport used. Nevertheless, maritime transport is an industry that is also susceptible to disruptions that are difficult to predict due to a dynamically changing geopolitical situation, climate change and its impact on weather and topological conditions, and many other factors that are difficult to predict. The overview of the mentioned UNCTAD report, published in October 2024, stressed the challenges faced by the maritime transport sector due to mentioned disruptions highlighting their economic, social, political, and ecological consequences for different stakeholders.[3]

The increasing frequency of unforeseen events that cause disruptions and destabilise the functioning of organisations and markets, including the maritime transport sector, is thus contributing to a growing interest in research into methods of adapting to them more quickly and minimising their overall negative impact. The term "resilience," meaning the ability to return to a state prior to disruption or change,[4] has attracted interest and is the subject of study across various disciplines from engineering and ecology to psychology and others. There are many ways of defining the concept in the literature; Fisher identified at least 70 of them.[5] Also, in economics and management, the concept of resilience is increasingly emerging in the context of research on the resilience of economies, regions, markets and organisations, referring mainly to methods and strategies for dealing with unforeseen events and their consequences.

The concept of resilience in relation to maritime transport is applied both systemically to the industry as a whole (and, according to the aforementioned UNCTAD 2024 report and European Commission 2023 communication, is a desirable feature that

2 *Review of maritime transport 2024: Navigating maritime chokepoints. Overview*, accessed 25.04.2025, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2024overview_en.pdf.

3 Ibidem.

4 The Britannica Dictionary, Britannica.com, accessed 10.11.2024, https://Www.Britannica.Com/Dictionary/Resilience.

5 Len Fisher, "More than 70 ways to show resilience," *Nature* 518 (2015): 35, accessed 11.11.2024. DOI: 10.1038/518035a.

increases the chances of its faster growth) and to the individual actors (such as ports, shipping lines, and others) that make up its ecosystem. Previous studies approaching maritime transport resilience in a systematic way[6] have indicated certain research gaps and further research directions, which this paper attempts to fill. In this paper, the authors aim to examine and add to the state of the art of research on maritime transport resilience in an increasingly uncertain environment.

The article attempts to answer the following research questions:

1. Has the interest in maritime transport resilience increased in recent years with the increasing disruptions in operating conditions?
2. Can the growing interest in maritime transport resilience be linked to specific disturbances coming from the environment?
3. To what extent/aspect (symptoms, tools measurement tools and methods, strategies and actions for creating/improving) of maritime transport resilience are subjects for research?

The authors hope that the study they have undertaken will allow for indicating the state of the art of research on the resilience of maritime transport. In order to answer the research questions and achieve their goal, the authors conducted a systematic literature review, incorporating bibliometric and contextual analysis, using searches on maritime transport and the activities it performs for other sectors of the economy. This study fits in with and complements previous studies on maritime transport resilience, attempting to fill the research gaps identified by them. The article is divided into five parts. The first part presents the background of the study, indicating the basic concept, research goals and assumptions. Section 2 presents the methodology used to conduct a systematic literature review, and then (Section 3) presents and discusses the results of the contextual analysis. In Section 4, references are made to other works before conclusions and summary are presented in Section 5.

2. Materials and Methods

The paper uses the systematic literature review methodology described by Czakon.[7] Subsequent steps were carried out between June and September 2024 (Figure 1).

6 Thanh-Thuy Nguyen, et al., "Managing disruptions in the maritime industry–a systematic literature review," M*aritime business review* 8 (2023), 2: 170–190, accessed 10.112024, DOI: 10.1108/MABR-09-2021-0072; Yui-Yip Lau, et al., "Maritime transport resilience: A systematic literature review on the current state of the art, research agenda and future research directions," *Ocean & Coastal Management* 251 (2024), 2: 107086, accessed 10.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2024.107086.

7 Wojciech Czakon, ed., *Podstawy metodologii badań w naukach o zarządzaniu* (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2015).




Figure 1: Methodology adopted for systematic literature review, step by step

Source: own study.

Developing a scenario for selecting studies that would allow for a state-of-the-art analysis of maritime transport resilience research was a crucial and non-trivial step, as indicated by the studies of Nguyen et al. and Lau et al.[8] The choice of the database of scientific publications that were the basis for conducting the study was the first and easiest step – the authors decided to choose the Scopus database for two reasons. Firstly, it would be the first time the Scopus database would be used for systematic literature review on the resilience of the maritime transport. In the previous studies only the Web of Science scientific publication database was used.[9] Employing the Scopus scientific journals database in our research would allow for the comparison/confrontation of the obtained results. The second selection criterion was the possibility of precisely matching the search criteria to the needs of the conducted research.

8 Nguyen, "Managing disruptions"; Yui-Yip Lau, et al., "Maritime transport resilience."

9 Ibidem.

Refining the search criteria was the second, and much more complicated, step taken by the authors. "Resilience" is the subject of research in many scientific fields – an initial search using the word "resilience" and its variants such as "resilient" and "resiliency" returned over 290,000 publications. Limiting the search results in the database of scientific publications to the results most similar to the adopted aim of the study and the research questions required the Authors to make several assumptions. Firstly, due to the fact that resilience is very often the subject of research in the fields of engineering, social sciences and computer sciences, it was decided to narrow the search by field to the following "Economics, Econometrics and Finance and Business, Management and Accounting" – which allowed for a significant reduction in the number of results (to approximately 23,000). Subsequently, there was the problem of how to narrow down the searches to refer to resilience in relation to maritime transport. Unfortunately, attempts to narrow down using the terms "maritime" and "marine" proved to be insufficient (over 4,450 results), and many of the results obtained concerned issues related to the agricultural-food, energy, etc. sectors, and not the transport sector. After several further attempts to narrow down the criteria based on a combination of "maritime" and terms indicating the activities of entities involved in maritime transport such as "transport," "logistics" or "shipping," it was decided to use terms describing maritime transport activities without the qualifier "maritime" itself in the final search – on the assumption that these studies would be identified during the analysis of the abstracts, which was planned as the next step. Additional restrictions adopted were the limitation, resulting from the research questions posed, to publications from the years 2019–2024 and, to ensure the possibility of replicating the research, the limitation to English-language articles in open access. The search using the criteria described above allowed the creation of a database of 327 scientific publications based on the Scopus database in July 2024.

The next step taken by the Authors was to analyse the abstracts of the studies from the prepared database in terms of their relationship with maritime transport. At this stage, articles that were not related to the subject of the research were removed from the final database. Unfortunately, in the results, despite narrowing the search criteria, it was possible to find articles referring to other issues, which resulted from, for example, the methods used (e.g. the use of a logistic regression model), or the increased interest of researchers in the topic of resilience and indicating it in keywords despite the fact that it was not the subject of the study. The Authors also decided to remove from the final database those studies that mainly focused on the analysis of supply chains, treating maritime transport issues as a secondary topic. In this way, after the analysis of abstracts conducted in August 2024, 25 studies describing the resilience of entities and activities in the area of maritime transport were obtained – 302 studies were rejected.

Using data from the Scopus database, the selected texts were subjected to a simple bibliometric analysis using MS Excel and VOSviewer version 1.6.20. This allowed us to indicate certain features of texts intended for full-text analysis, such as their place of publication, popularity (in terms of citations) and frequency of keywords and connections with other topics. The texts subjected to analysis were mostly published in 2022 and 2023 and most often in the journals "Maritime Policy" and "Maritime Economics and Logistics" (Table 1).

Table 1. Place and time of publication of the analysed studies

Year of publication	No. of articles	Place of publication	No. of articles
2019	1	"Marine Policy"	5
2020	1	"Maritime Economics and Logistics"	4
2021	6	"Transportation Research"*	2
2022	7	Other: "Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics"; "Baltic Region"; "Cleaner Logistics and Supply Chain, Decision Support Systems"; "International Journal of Logistics Management"; "International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management"; "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control"; "Journal of ICT Standardisation"; "Journal of Shipping and Trade"; "Maritime Business Review"; "Production and Operations Management, Resources"; "Conservation & Recycling"; "Tourism Management"; "Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta."	14
2023	7		
2024	3		

* Both Part A: Policy and Practice and Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.

Source: own study.

The data presented in Table 1 indicate a growing interest in issues related to resilience in maritime transport after 2020, which may be due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Interest in the topic remains at a similar level in the following years (2022–2023), which can also be expected for 2024 (The database was acquired in mid-year). Most of the studies were published in journals dealing with maritime-related topics (11 articles) or transport and logistics (7 articles). The remaining publications (7 articles) are from journals with a different main thematic profile.

A citation analysis based on data from the Scopus database as of 06.10.2024 shows that all studies intended for full-text analysis were cited a total of 620 times (excluding self-citations – 577 times). Of these, one article garnered more than 1/3 of the citations and the 3 most cited articles account for more than half of the citations (Table 2).

Table 2. The most cited publications indexed in the Scopus database containing all words derived from "resilience," in the fields of Economics, Econometrics and Finance and Business, Management and Accounting between 2019 and 2024

Document Title	Authors & Publication Year	Journal Title	Cited by (excluding self-citations)
Disruptions and resilience in global container shipping and ports: the COVID-19 pandemic versus the 2008–2009 financial crisis.	Notteboom, Pallis, Rodrigue, 2021	"Maritime Economics and Logistics"	261 (252)
Analytics with digital-twinning: A decision support system for maintaining a resilient port.	Zhou, Xu, Miller-Hooks, Zhou, Chen, Lee, Chew, Li, 2021	"Decision Support Systems"	67 (60)
Maritime port network resiliency and reliability through co-opetition.	Asadabadi, Miller-Hooks, 2020	"Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review"	56 (52)
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on seafarers' mental health and chronic fatigue: Beneficial effects of onboard peer support, external support and Internet access.	Pauksztat, Grech, Kitada, 2022	"Marine Policy"	38 (38)
Adapting our sea ports to the challenges of climate change: Development and validation of a Port Resilience Index.	León-Mateos, Sartal, López-Manuel, Quintás, 2021	"Marine Policy"	34 (31)
Enhancing resilience through port coalitions in maritime freight networks.	Li, Asadabadi, Miller-Hooks, 2022	"Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice"	31 (30)

Source: own study based on the Scopus citation overview. Date: 06.10.2024.

Among the analysed studies, 11 have a citation count (excluding self-citations) not exceeding 5, but it should be borne in mind that these are mostly articles published in 2023 and 2024. It is interesting that the most frequently cited study concerns disruptions and resilience in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic – this seems to indicate the existence of a relationship between the increasing popularity of research on resilience in maritime transport and the increasing instability of the environment, resulting, among others, from the pandemic situation.

The last step taken by the Authors before undertaking the content analysis of the selected studies was to examine the keywords indicated by the authors of the selected studies. In the 25 studies selected for analysis, the authors indicated a total of 216 keywords, among which the most common were "resilience" (mentioned 7 times) and "covid-19" and "maritime transportation" (mentioned five times). Table 3 indicates the keywords that were indicated at least three times.

Table 3. Most frequently occurring keywords from publications meeting the selection criteria after abstract analysis

Rank	Keyword	Frequency of keyword occurrence
1	resilience	7
2	covid-19	5
	maritime transportation	5
3	ports	4
	shipping	4
4	container shipping	3
	investments	3
	market condition	3
	stakeholder	3

Source: own study based on the data analysis performed in VOSviewer. Source data from 06.10.2024.

When creating a graphical representation of the frequency and relationships between keywords assigned to the studies selected for full-text analysis, using VOSviewer, the Authors decided to include only the keywords that were indicated by at least two different studies – Fig. 2.




Figure 2: Map of authors keywords co-occurrence in publications related to resilience meeting the selection criteria

Source: own study based on the analysis performed in VOSviewer.

Comparing the visualisation of keyword frequencies (Fig. 2) with data on the most frequently used keywords (Table 3) allowed us to draw attention to an interesting relationship, i.e. the use of both singular and plural form in relation to ports. The verification that the singular number "port" (used 2 times) and the plural number "ports" (used 4 times) were not used simultaneously in any keyword article allows us to assume that ports and/or port resilience was more frequently investigated than the keyword ranking would indicate (Table 3).

3. Results

Selected texts were subjected to full-text analysis, for which the Authors used the narrative review method[10] and the meta-analysis method (taking into account such elements of the analysed studies as: research questions, methods used, considered theories, obtained results, conclusions, indicated further research directions).

Full-text analysis indicated the need to exclude from further consideration several of the studies qualified for further research based on abstracts and keywords. This was mainly due to the fact that the subject of the research, despite referring to resilience, did not directly concern maritime transport or resilience was relegated to a negligible component of the study. Studies by Kuhla et al. and Pauksztat et al., despite referring to maritime transport, do not directly examine its resilience.[11] The first of them concerns the impact of disruptions resulting from worsening climatic conditions and the typhoons caused by them on international trade. Maritime transport disruptions are a destabilising factor and reduce the resilience of both the actors involved in trade and individual economies, and diversification of trade partners is one of the possible strategies to counter these disruptions. Also, a study by Pauksztat points to a maritime transport initiative, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), as a potential trade route and an opportunity to improve relations between Russia and India in terms of counteracting the effects of climate change. In this study, both resilience and maritime transport play a marginal and, at most, auxiliary role in the authors' considerations, which was the reason for rejecting this study at this stage. Also, Druzhinin, despite pointing out the significant

10 Czakon, "Metodyka metaanalizy w naukach o zarządzaniu," in: *Podstawy metodologii badań w naukach o zarządzaniu*, 141.

11 Kilian Kuhla, et al., "Resilience of international trade to typhoon-related supply disruptions," *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 151 (2023), accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104663; Birgit Pauksztat, et al., "The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on seafarers' mental health and chronic fatigue: Beneficial effects of onboard peer support, external support and Internet access," *Marine Policy* 137 (2022), accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104942.

importance of coastal areas in the socio-economic transformation of Russia, especially in the Baltic Sea area, focuses on the aspect of economic growth and development and not on the resilience of maritime transport.[12]

As an example of the low importance of the concept of "resilience" for research in relation to maritime transport, both the study by Nuttall et al. and Papadakis & Kopanaki were rejected from further consideration.[13] In the first case, the authors examine the possibilities of decarbonising shipping between the Pacific islands and indicate resilience as one of the desirable features of shipping, but they stop there and focus on technological possibilities of improving energy efficiency, reducing emissions of harmful substances and alternative sources of energy and fuels.[14] In Papadakis & Kopanaki's study, the main focus is the possibility of using blockchain technology as a way to digitally transform maritime operations and supply chains. Resilience in this paper is a goal to be pursued when innovating in the maritime transport sector, but this goal was not subjectified or specified, which was the reason for rejecting this study from further consideration.[15]

The remaining 20 studies can be divided into three subgroups based on the dominant subject of the study. Ports are the most studied maritime transport actor (described in section 3.1). Issues related to shipping lines, shipping network and their impact on other maritime actors are the second distinguished group (section 3.2). The remaining studies, described in section 3.3, deal with various issues related to the resilience of maritime transport, such as employees or the implementation of modern technologies. A study by Nguyen et al., which, as a literature review is an exception from this classification, is included in Section 4 in relation to the results obtained by the Authors.[16]

12 Alexander G. Druzhinin, "The geopolitical effect of the maritime factor on the spatial development of post-soviet Russia: the Baltic case," *Baltic Regio* 15 (2023), 4: 6–2, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.5922/2079-8555-2023-4-1.

13 Peter Nuttall, et al., "Pacific island domestic shipping emissions abatement measures and technology transition pathways for selected ship types," *Marine Policy* 132 (2021), accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104704; Manos – Nikolaos Papadakis, Evangelia Kopanaki, "Innovative Maritime Operations Management Using Blockchain Technology & Standardization," *Journal of ICT Standardization* 10 (2022), 4: 469–508, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.13052/jicts2245-800X.1041.

14 Nuttall, "Pacific," 104704.

15 Papadakis, "Innovative," 469–508.

16 Nguyen, "Managing," 170–190.

3.1. Ports

Asadabadi & Miller-Hooks examine the resilience and reliability of ports and their potential impact on the resilience of the entire maritime transport system.[17] Making decisions related to investments aimed at preparing a port to withstand unforeseen disruptions is a complex problem and depends on many factors, such as the characteristics of a specific port or the approach to the risk of stakeholders deciding on financing port development. The starting point for the study is the analysis of previous models supporting resilience prepared based on examples of specific ports and disruptive events. Planning investment strategies in protective infrastructure without consideration for the broader perspective – ports are part of a network and actions or problems affecting other elements of this network may directly or indirectly affect their performance – is not acceptable from the point of view of creating resilience of either the ports themselves or the network. The stochastic optimisation model proposed and tested on actual data concerning four Asian ports (Port Klang, Singapore, Belawan, Jakarta) can be a useful tool in planning investments aimed at increasing port resilience. The results indicate the possibility of achieving benefits and improving the resilience of a given port through cooperation and supporting actions aimed at improving the resilience of other ports in a given/considered network. The authors suggest further work on the models, possibly using heuristic solutions, in order to consider more complex scenarios taking into account a larger number of actors/ports that make up a given transport network. The study by Li et al. extends the concept of creating port resilience through cooperation indicated by Asadabadi & Miller-Hooks and proposes and tests coalition strategies as a tool to increase the resilience of ports and the maritime network. The limitation of this approach is testing using numerical experiments and considering a small number of cooperating ports.[18]

The study by León-Mateos et al. addresses the issue of studying port resilience and, in particular, the lack of tools to measure it.[19] Using the Delphi method, the authors proposed the Port Resilience Index (PRI), a composite index to determine port resilience, developed on the example of the Spanish port of A Coruña. The study focuses

17 Ali Asadabadi, Elise Miller-Hooks, "Maritime port network resiliency and reliability through co-opetition," *Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review* 137 (2020), accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.101916.

18 Wenjie Li et al., "Enhancing resilience through port coalitions in maritime freight networks," *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice* 157 (2023): 1–23, accessed 11.10.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2022.01.015; Li, "Enhancing," 1–23; Asadabadi, "Maritime," 703714.

19 Fernando León-Mateos et al., "Adapting our sea ports to the challenges of climate change: Development and validation of a Port Resilience Index," *Marine Policy* 130 (2021): 4, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104573.

on the risks and disruptions arising from climate change and a tool that could support stakeholders in making decisions regarding investment and adaptation of port infrastructure to mitigate risks. A novelty of the proposed tool is the inclusion of external and internal stakeholders involved in port operations in its preparation, which may increase their involvement in building port resilience. A certain limitation of the proposed tool is that it is tailored to one specific type of disturbance/threat. As potential further research directions, the authors indicated the possibility of rescaling the model to include many ports, which would allow for a comparison of the resilience of different ports.

Another tool to improve port resilience by better mitigating the effects of disruptions is the use of the Decision Support System (DSS) using digital-twinning to better support port authorities when encountering complex decisions, proposed by Zhou et al.[20] The authors demonstrate that the proposed DSS using digital-twinning can be integrated with the Terminal Operating System (TOS) as a planning module. The proposed system can be used to assess resilience at the planning stage of actions, taking into account diverse input parameters for preparing experimental scenarios, that would include as much real-life data as possible to better predict actions for the post-recovery timeframe. The proposed model is verified using a numerical experiment (using realistic but synthetic data) assuming three different scenarios of power supply disruptions. The described work is groundbreaking in terms of the detail of the data used, which allows for a more realistic assessment of port resilience; however, the authors indicate further possibilities for extending the proposed approach.

Ayaz et al. undertook the task of identifying and assessing strategies for creating port resilience in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic.[21] They conducted their research based on a literature review and interviews with representatives of Turkish container ports. The selection of Turkish ports for the study was determined by the effectiveness of their operations during the pandemic – while seaborne cargo tonnage and world container port traffic declined, Turkish ports recorded an increase in both. Based on interviews with port authorities and a literature review, the authors identified 15 strategies for creating resilience in a pandemic situation. The identified strategies were prioritised using the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) based on expert assessment (ports' managers) to determine the most effective ones. The obtained results allow for proposing effective actions to increase port resilience; however, their usefulness is limited by the specificity of the ports examined. Further research using the applied methodology

20 Zhou et al., "Analytics with digital-twinning: A decision support system for maintaining a resilient port," *Decision Support Systems* 143 (2021): 7, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2021.113496.

21 İlke Sezin Ayaz et al., "Resilience Strategies of Ports against Covid-19 in Terms of Chaos Theory," *Marine Policy* 146 (2022), accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2022.105323.

for ports dealing with other types of cargo or comparing the strategies used by different types of ports under pandemic conditions would allow for the generalisation of recommended strategies for creating ports' resilience. In a similar format, a study was conducted by Gracia et al., where, based on a literature review, semi-structured interviews and workshops, governance best practices that allowed Latin American (LAC) ports the best performance during the COVID-19 disruption, were identified.[22] The study included different types of ports so that the resulting recommendations (for digitalisation and greater stakeholder engagement) could be used to support port resilience during other disruptions. A limitation of the study is the specificity of governance regulations in LAC ports – the large share of public agencies or authorities mapped in the research sample may not translate to the operating conditions of ports from other regions of the world.

Nsikan et al., based on a survey of 67 seaport practitioners from two ports located in Lagos, identified actions that could mitigate the effects of disruptions on port operations and the whole maritime supply chain.[23] Among the suggested actions to reduce port congestion and delays in loading/unloading were actions to optimise the flow of information between individual entities, as well as better integration of stakeholders and implementation of new systems (such as autonomous drones) that have gained popularity during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A study by Fedi et al. links the issue of port resilience with the adaptive behaviour of shipping lines during the COVID-19 pandemic.[24] The authors wanted to investigate whether trade disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic affected the Mediterranean Sea and Northern Range port resilience and hierarchy. A comprehensive 2018, 2019 and 2020 database of vessels (size, name, alliance membership) arriving at each port was prepared, allowing tracking activity at individual ports and the fleet management methods of shipping companies. The obtained results, using data from 2020 for the assessment, did not show significant changes in the hierarchy of the examined ports; however, they indicated significant differences in their resilience. The ports that showed the highest resilience and activity in 2018 were in a similar or better situation in 2020, but some smaller ports lower in the hierarchy (e.g. in the British Isles) had significant

22 Maria D. Gracia et al., "Assessing the implementation of governance best practices by Latin American ports," *Maritime Economics and Logistics* 24 (2022), 4:806–834, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1057/s41278-022-00224-y.

23 John Nsikan et al., "Robust practices for managing maritime supply chain risks: A survey of Nigeria's seaports," *Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics* 39 (2023), 4: 1–7, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.ajsl.2023.09.001.

24 Laurent Fedi et al., "COVID-19 as a catalyst of a new container port hierarchy in Mediterranean Sea and Northern Range," *Maritime Economics and Logistics* 24 (2022), 4: 747–777, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1057/s41278-022-00223-z.

problems and their position deteriorated (although this may be due to the overlap of the Brexit effect with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic). An interesting conclusion is the identification of the great importance of shipping alliances and their ability to impose solutions on the condition of ports and transport users – which indicates the existence of a disparity in the relations between carriers, transport users and port service providers. The authors' main conclusion is to postulate the need to re-evaluate existing shipping alliances using for this purpose the digital transformation accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic also in maritime transport.

3.2. Shipping lines, shipping networks and maritime ecosystems

Lee et al. investigated the impact of liner service providers on shippers' resilience based on information about freight schedules and durations.[25] This is a novel approach, as previous attempts to optimise service provider selection have mainly considered freight rates alone. In the approach adopted by Lee et al., taking into account the time that the cargo spends *en route* or waiting for loading/unloading allows for taking into account other costs (operational, downtime, storage) on the shipper's side and allows optimisation of the service provider selection decision. The proposed model allows a shipper to schedule ocean transport of container cargo using multiple service providers, which translates into increased resilience and reduced operating costs. A limitation of the proposed solution is the practice of concluding long-term contracts for cargo transportation between service providers and shippers, which does not allow for a flexible change of service provider depending on the market situation.

Notteboom et al. were the first to attempt to examine how much disruption in the maritime transport ecosystem (a perspective including ports and entities operating in them and shipping lines) was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic from the point of view of supply chain resilience, referring to the experience of the 2008/2009 financial crisis.[26] The data used from the initial period of the pandemic indicated higher resilience in the case of shipping lines than during the 2008/2009 crisis. The situation was more ambiguous in the case of ports and terminal operators. In the case of the latter, the initial reduction in volume affected financial performance, but the implemented strategies allowed to limit the effect. In the case of ports, other factors unrelated to the pandemic (such as location and importance to the maritime transport network)

25 Chung-Yee Lee, et al., "Optimal Global Liner Service Procurement by Utilizing Liner Service Schedules," *Production and Operations Management* 30 (2020), 3: 703–714, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1111/poms.13311.

26 Theo Notteboom et al., "Disruptions and resilience in global container shipping and ports: the COVID-19 pandemic versus the 2008–2009 financial crisis," *Maritime Economics and Logistics* 23 (2021), 22: 179–210, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1057/s41278-020-00180-5.

often negated or deepened the effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The decisions of shipping lines and retained connectivity levels had a major impact on port resilience – bigger ports with better connectivity fared better, and those that experienced connectivity losses fared far worse. The research by D'agostini et al. confirms better preparedness and resiliencies of shipping lines than during the 2007/2008 financial crisis indicated by Notteboom et al.[27] D'agostini et al. point to the importance of adjusting chartering strategies, both for aggregate values and individual shipping lines, as a way to limit the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their operational and financial performance. This is another of the analysed studies, alongside Fedi et al., indicating the high resilience of shipping lines compared to other entities in the maritime transport ecosystem.[28]

The study by Rogerson et al. in an attempt to fill the gap related to the underrepresentation of studies concerning maritime supply chain resilience used the case study method.[29] The study focuses on the flexibility-based tools and strategies used to increase resilience – flexibility is treated as an inherent element of resilience. The authors use the same tool to assess and compare the effects and actions applied in the case of two disruptions of a different nature and scope – a local conflict in the port of Gothenburg, the effects of which were felt for 2 years and the COVID-19 pandemic with an international scope and difficult to predict long-term effects. The study considered various actors participating in the supply chain (ports, terminal operators, shippers and shipping lines) and the methods they used to limit the impact of disruptions, with shipping lines given the most attention. In the case of the first, localised disruption (port conflict), the greatest impact concerned actors conducting operations in the port. In the case of the second, the assumptions of Notteboom et al.[30] and the results of D'agostini et al. about the high resilience of shipping lines to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic were confirmed.[31] The authors identified which flexibility-based actions were the most effective for countering effects of different types of disruption.

Wan et al. investigate the resilience of liner shipping networks (LNS) using a global network efficiency index to measure its performance, and then based on the resilience triangle (depth of the efficiency loss after disruption and time needed to reach

27 Enrico D'agostini et al., "Chartering policies and operational efficiency of shipping lines: exploring strategic changes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic," *Journal of Shipping and Trade* 9 (2024): 1, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1186/s41072-024-00169-w; Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210.

28 Fedi, "COVID-19," 747–777.

29 Sara Rogerson, "Comparing flexibility-based measures during different disruptions: evidence from maritime supply chains," *International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management* 54 (2024), 2: 163–191. accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1108/IJPDLM-02-2023-0075.

30 Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210.

31 D'agostini, "Chartering."

the pre-disruption performance level) propose a resilience index for the entire network.[32] The obtained values for the index (range 0–1) after a given disruption should help in selecting an appropriate recovery strategy for the network, provided that the costs of this response to the disruption are also an important factor to be taken into account. Wan et al. tested the proposed network resilience assessment model and the selection of appropriate recovery strategies using a case study of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) under storm threat conditions.[33] Validation carried out using available data on the effects and costs of damage to ports included in the case studies allowed to indicate which are crucial for the resilience of the entire LNS, and what priorities should be adopted to strengthen it. The proposed model can be used by various stakeholders to improve the efficiency of the global liner shipping network when considering proper responses to disruptions and resource allocations as it can be recalibrated for other types of disruptions. However, due to its assumptions and need for more data about lines traffic volumes it should be further elaborated and tested.

Yue & Mangan undertook to systematise the understanding of the concept of "reliability" in transport in relation to container shipping networks. In their systematic literature review, one of the three identified sub-areas of the shipping network reliability was shipping networks' "vulnerability and resilience."[34] The authors pointed out the lack of a clear definition of the term "reliability," often used interchangeably with other terms – including "resilience," which for the purposes of shipping networks in the literature is defined rather explicitly (from a systems perspective). The study was of a theoretical nature in order to organise the concepts for the needs of potential stakeholders, indicating the existing gaps in the studies on the resilience of shipping lines and maritime networks.

Chrysafis et al. proposed a model to evaluate the performance of the three largest entities in the shipping sub-sector, the cruise industry, to assess their resilience to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.[35] The conclusions of the study allow recommendations to be made on financial and investment strategies for shipping industry companies. Drawing on the experience of all three entities studied and identifying the most effective actions; Chrysafis et al. emphasise the great importance

32 Chengpeng Wan, "Evaluating recovery strategies for the disruptions in liner shipping networks: a resilience approach," *International Journal of Logistics Management* 33 (2022), 2: 389–409, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1108/IJLM-05-2021-0263.

33 Wan, „Evaluating," 389–409.

34 Zhongyun Yue, John Mangan, "A framework for understanding reliability in container shipping networks," *Maritime Economics and Logistics* 26 (2024), 3: 523–544, accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1057/s41278-023-00269-7.

35 Konstantinos A. Chrysafis et al., "Measuring financial performance through operating business efficiency in the global cruise industry: A fuzzy benchmarking study on the «big three»," *Tourism Management* 100 (2024), accessed 11.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2023.104830.

of maintaining liquidity to preserve resilience, which, due to the nature of the cruise industry and its high dependence on revenue generation on the quality and characteristics of its fleet, is difficult in the short term.[36]

3.3. Other focus on resilience in maritime transport

In the database of retrieved articles, the study by McVeigh & MacLachlan on supporting seafarers' resilience qualified for analysis.[37] Despite the fact that the article focuses on the mental health and resilience of seafarers, this issue is treated as part of building resilience in shipping lines by supporting employees and preparing them to cope with difficult situations. The study was conducted using the focus group method among employees of a large shipping organisation and its results were used to implement the employer's resilience programme as part of the holistic health programme for the employees. The second study by Pauksztat et al. on mental health problems of seafarers focused on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and related changes in the operations of international shipping. Pauksztat et al. conducted a survey among crews of various types of commercial vessels.[38] The assumption was to focus on crews who had been on board for at least a week at the time of the survey. It was verified which activities were perceived as useful and helpful in improving their well-being. The obtained results allowed for the preparation of recommendations that can be used to improve the working conditions of seafarers and the overall resilience of shipping companies.

In the case of the study by Sugimura & Murakami, the Authors had serious doubts about whether to include it in the full-text analysis – the study concerns an international system of sustainable reverse logistics using Japan as an example.[39] Nevertheless, the content analysis indicated that, in the case of the described network, maritime transport plays an important role in creating the resilience of the entire network. The study takes a comprehensive approach to resilience, breaking it down into further elements (e.g. robustness and redundancy) trying to balance the parameters of the modelled network in terms of efficiency (hub/port and spikes model) and resilience (introducing secondary and tertiary local ports).

36 Ibidem.

37 Joanne McVeigh, Malcolm Maclachlan, "A silver wave? Filipino shipmates' experience of merchant seafaring," *Marine Policy* 99 (2019): 283–297, accessed 12.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2018.10.012.

38 Pauksztat, "The impact."

39 Yoshihisa Sugimura, Shinsuke Murakami, "Designing a resilient international reverse logistics network for material cycles: a Japanese case study," *Resources, Conservation and Recycling* 170 (2024), accessed 12.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105603.

The last study analysed, Fjørtoft et al. aimed to propose a methodology for assessing the resilience of a sustainable autonomous maritime transport network, a concept developed as part of the European AEGIS project (*Advanced, Efficient and Green Intermodal Systems*).[40] The study uses the case of the maritime corridor between Trondheim and Rotterdam to compare the conditions, possible events, sources of threats, potential responses to threats and possible mitigation actions (of various types, e.g. human-associated, organisational) between utilising manned vessels and autonomous (or mostly autonomous) vessels in maritime transportation. The obtained results have shown that the implementation of autonomous systems can have a positive impact on safety in maritime transportation, reducing or eliminating certain types of threats (mainly resulting from human errors), but at the same time, by causing the emergence of new risks, it does not significantly affect the overall resilience of shipping.

4. Discussion

The analysis identified eight studies that concerned port resilience, including one by Fedi et al. that linked port resilience to actions and decisions taken by shipping lines.[41] The study by Li et al. developed the concept of creating port resilience through network cooperation proposed by Asadabadi & Miller-Hooks.[42] The remaining studies concerned the measurement of port resilience or methods, strategies (Ayaz et al.) and good practices supporting its creation, also through actions mitigating the risk and impact of disruptions resulting from difficult-to-predict events.[43] In half of the cases, the COVID-19 pandemic was the disruption which prompted the considerations related to resilience.[44] The León-Mateos et al. study considered climate change and Zhou et al. energy supply disruptions as relevant events that needed mitigation - in both cases, the authors indicated that the proposed solutions could be tailored for other disruptions.[45] Both studies focusing on the potential benefits for resilience resulting from cooperation between ports in a given network did not indicate a specific type of disruption. In the analysed papers,

40 Kay Fjørtoft, "Assessing the resilience of sustainable autonomous shipping: New methodology, challenges, opportunities," *Cleaner Logistics and Supply Chain* 9 (2023), accessed 9.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.clscn.2023.100126.

41 Fedi, "COVID-19," 747–777.

42 Li, "Enhancing," 1–23; Asadabadi, "Maritime," 703–714.

43 Zhou, "Analytics"; Gracia, "Assessing," 806–834; Mateos, "Adapting"; Ayaz, "Resilience," 806–834; Nsikan, "Robust."

44 Ayaz, "Resilience," 806–834; Gracia, "Assessing," 806–834; Nsikan, "Robust"; Fedi, "COVID-19," 747–777.

45 Zhou, "Analytics"; Mateos, "Adapting."

where models were developed, attempts were made to prepare them based on specific examples using real data; unfortunately, in many cases verification was only possible using numerical experiments.[46] Also, for all studies using the experiences of actors during the pandemic period, specific examples were used and, interestingly, recommendations were prepared based on comparisons of the effectiveness of the solutions applied by each actor (e.g. with reference to their maintained effectiveness or the change in hierarchical position with respect to the pre-pandemic situation).[47]

Among the seven analysed articles on resilience in relation to shipping lines, networks and the maritime ecosystem, the majority of them examined their resilience to disruptions, and in one case their impact on the resilience of other entities (as was the case in the study by Fedi et al.).[48] Among the indicated disruptions, the predominant ones were those resulting from the pandemic situation, which in two studies were compared to other, earlier disruptions: the global financial crisis and a local conflict in a port.[49] Other studies either did not indicate specific disruptions or, as in the case of ports, these were climate and weather disruptions.[50] Most of the analysed studies used specific actors as examples and real data, which, especially in works published in 2024, referring to the pandemic situation, allowed for the comparison and verification of some earlier conclusions. This was the case when D'agostini et al. and Rogerson et al. confirmed the early conclusions of Notteboom et al. on the relatively high resilience of shipping lines to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In general, when comparing the studies on the resilience of ports and shipping lines to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, one can point to a greater resilience of the latter, sometimes even at the expense of ports, which may be due to the implementation of appropriate strategies in response to previous disruptions, such as the 2007/2008 financial crisis.[51]

Among the other analysed studies, half of them concerned the resilience of seafarers and indirectly the resilience of carriers.[52] The analysed works also included a methodological approach to developing a tool to enable the measurement of the resilience of autonomous solutions for maritime transport and a proposal to use maritime

46 Li, "Enhancing," 1–23; Zhou, Analytics; Asadabadi, "Maritime," 703–714.

47 Fedi, "COVID-19," 747–777; Ayaz, "Resilience," 806–834.

48 Lee, "Optimal," 703–714.

49 Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210; Rogerson, "Comparing," 163–191.

50 Lee, "Optimal," 703–714; "Wan, Evaluating," 389–409.

51 Fedi, "COVID-19," 747–777; Rogerson, "Comparing," 163–191; Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210; D'agostini, "Chartering."

52 Joanne McVeigh., Malcolm MacLachlan, M. "A silver wave? Filipino shipmates' experience of merchant seafaring," *Marine Policy* 99 (2019): 283–297, accessed 12.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2018.10.012; Pauksztat, "The impact."

transport in planning a reverse logistics system based on the example of Japan.[53] Only one of the studies in this group concerned the impact of disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic (Pauksztat et al.).[54] All of them either used primary data or developed a model based on a specific example, indicating the need for further refinement and verification.[55]

The study by Nguyen et al., which was qualified for full-text analysis but was not described in section 3 due to its scope, is the first systematic literature review of studies on managing disruption in maritime transportation.[56] The authors used the scientific publications database Web of Science, from which they downloaded studies published in 2006–2021 on 3 June 2021. The justification for taking up the topic was similar to that adopted by the Authors – an increase in disruptions in maritime transport resulting from, among others, the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the thematic scope, although it included "resilience" in its second research question, focused more on disruption management or mitigation strategies for disruptions. Among the identified research gaps, Nguyen et al. indicated 1) a large share of theoretical, mathematical and model solutions that can be used to improve the management of disruptions in maritime transport and the lack of empirical verification of these proposed solutions, especially those that would take into account internal and external stakeholders, 2) the need to verify solutions for different types of actors that make up the maritime transport system and 3) conducting a systematic literature review using another database of scientific publications as a basis. A systematic literature review conducted by the Authors three years later using a different database of scientific publications (Scopus) indicated that the research gaps indicated by Nguyen et al.[57] were partially filled. For example, the issue of taking into account stakeholders appears, for example, in the studies by León-Mateos et al., Fedi et al., and Ayaz et al. create recommendations based on data on the resilience strategies used by Turkish container ports, just as Fedi et al. indicate the need for changes in maritime alliances based on data on port operations.[58] The gap in the verification of the proposed solutions according to the analysis carried out by the Authors still remains in force – in most cases, the verification was based on numerical experiments and not actual implementations and their subsequent evaluation. The Authors' study works quite well to fill the last of the research gaps indicated by Nguyen et al. – the need to conduct a review using a different database of scientific publications.[59]

53 Sugimura, "Designing"; Fjørtoft, "Assessing."

54 Pauksztat, et al., "The impact."

55 McVeigh, "A silver"; Pauksztat, et al., "The impact"; Sugimura, "Designing"; Fjørtoft, "Assessing."

56 Nguyen, "Managing," 170–190.

57 Ibidem.

58 León-Mateos, "Adapting"; Fedi, "COVID-19," 747–777; Ayaz, "Resilience," 806–834.

59 Nguyen, "Managing," 170–190.

Only two publications were repeated in both reviews regardless; one should bear in mind the differences in the timing of the retrieval of publications in the two cases and the different emphasis on the meaning of "resilience" in the search criteria used.[60]

The second systematic literature review considered, Lau et al., concerns publications on resilience in maritime transport published between 1997 and 2023 (publications downloaded on 20 March 2023) in the Web of Science Core Collection database.[61] This article is available in the scientific publication database Scopus but was not included in the Authors' review due to its failure to meet their accepted search criteria (including assigned disciplines and open access). In the case of this article, although the Lau et al., focused mainly on bibliometric analysis, some similarities to the results obtained by the Authors can be noted.[62] Firstly, despite the fact that due to the longer analysis period, included many more studies (735), they note, as did the Authors, a marked increase in interest in the issue of maritime transport resilience after 2019, which was attributed to the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic situation in 2020.[63] Also in terms of the keywords most frequently occurring among the analysed articles, there is agreement on "resilience" and "COVID-19" among those most frequently assigned to the articles. Lau et al.[64] divided the analysed studies into 6 thematic clusters, depending on the adopted point of view and research optics, and on this basis indicated the lack of studies that would comprehensively and systematically address the topic of resilience in maritime transport. The research trends identified by Lau et al.[65] included, among others, the resilience of ports and supply chains, the impact of climate change on the resilience of ports, and the resilience of port infrastructure – topics that were also present in the studies analysed by the Authors. Lau et al., among the suggestions for further research directions, indicated the use of methods other than bibliometric analysis or conducting a literature review from the point of view of specific fields, which could be useful in preparing recommendations for potential stakeholders.[66] With their study, the Authors partially filled this research gap by using a different method of analysis in their literature review and by narrowing the search criteria for scientific publications to the fields of "Economics, Econometrics and Finance" and "Business, Management and Accounting." Despite the similar scope of keywords used, only one study occurred both in the review by Lau et al. and the one conducted

60 Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210; Zhou et al., "Analytics."

61 Lau, "Maritime."

62 Ibidem.

63 Ibidem.

64 Ibidem.

65 Ibidem.

66 Ibidem.

by the Authors, and this is, as in the case of concurrence with the review by Nguyen et al., the study by Notteboom et al.[67] which indicates the validity of the literature review conducted by the Authors using a different database of scientific publications.

5. Conclusions

The maritime transportation is under constant pressure from internal (e.g. operational or organisational) and external (e.g. technical or legislative) conditions as well as hard-to-predict disruptive events influencing its effectiveness and overall resilience. An efficient, resilient, and more sustainable maritime sector is essential for both the smooth flow of global trade and the more local scale for the EU's commercial competitiveness.

The analyses of the studies on maritime transport resilience allowed achieving the adopted goal and answering the research questions. In recent years, especially after 2019, it was possible to observe an increase; there has been a clear increase in interest in maritime transport resilience, which was also noted in the study by Lau et al.[68] The increased interest in this topic was attributed by Lau et al. to the disruption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic situation, which can be observed from 2020 onwards.[69] This is a conclusion with which the Authors, based on their analysis, are inclined to agree – almost half of the works subjected to in-depth analysis in this study concerned the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on maritime transport and various actors operating within its ecosystem. The COVID-19 pandemic had a strong impact on the economies of countries and the global economy as a whole, earning it the title of a "black swan," i.e. an event that is unlikely to happen but has a major impact on reality.[70] Among other causes of disruption that may affect maritime transport resilience, climate change and induced weather phenomena and energy supply disruptions emerged – but these studies accounted for 1/5 among all those analysed. The COVID-19 pandemic, as a global disruption, forcing different entities to reevaluate and revisit their previous crisis management strategies, allowed a comparison to be made of the actions taken and strategies adopted between different actors – previous studies of resilience in maritime transport as pointed out by Nguyen et al. were usually concerned with individual actors. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was a disruption affecting multiple

67 Nguyen, "Managing," 170–190; Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210.

68 Lau, "Maritime."

69 Lau, "Maritime."

70 Maria Nicola, et al., "The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review," *International journal of surgery* 78 (2020): 185–193, accessed 12.11.2024, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijsu.2020.04.018.

actors at the same time with varying intensity, allows for an unprecedented learning and benchmarking opportunity.[71] The possibility to compare the effects of actions implemented by these actors has a very high application value in relation to potential future disruptions.[72] Interestingly, attempts to compare the responses of entities to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the earlier international financial crisis of 2007/2008 seem to confirm the transferability of experience and the effectiveness of previously developed strategies for mitigating risks caused by various disruptions, all the more indicating the application value of these studies.[73]

Among the analysed studies, two main approaches to the subject of resilience can be identified: 1) an attempt to develop ways to ensure/increase it and 2) the development of tools to measure/predict the resilience of a given actor/actors/system. It is also important to point out that the resilience of a given actor may depend on the actions taken by other entities, directly or indirectly related to it, which indicates the need for a comprehensive analysis of the resilience of maritime transport as a system, which is also in line with the suggestion of further research indicated by Lau et al.[74] The present study is not without limitations - as in the case of two other literature reviews by Nguyen et al. and Lau et al. whose results the Authors cited for the discussion - the results obtained are dependent on the adopted search criteria.[75] Changing or extending the search criteria (other databases of scientific publications, different time frames, other keywords, narrowing down to other scientific fields or a specific type of actor within the maritime transport ecosystem). Also, repeating the study based on the same assumptions at a later stage may yield interesting results regarding the further evolution of maritime transport resilience research in the context of corporate behaviour in the post-pandemic period (e.g. strategy building, inclusion of different stakeholder groups to build resilience not only of the organizations but also of supply chains). Similarly, the application of other methods of analysis (e.g. using machine learning) could be an interesting direction for further consideration.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning that some of the implemented solutions, like digitalisation and implemented remotely controlled autonomous technology in modern ships can lead to new risks and disruptions (as e.g. an exponential increase in cyber-attacks around the world). The starting discussion on the cyber resilience of ships' information systems may become an interesting future research direction.[76]

71 Nguyen, "Managing," 170–190.

72 Ayaz, "Resilience," 806-834; Gracia, "Assessing," 806-834; D'agostini, "Chartering."

73 Notteboom, "Disruptions," 179–210; D'agostini, "Chartering."

74 Asadabadi, "Maritime"; Lee, "Optimal," 703–714; Lau, "Maritime."

75 Nguyen, "Managing," 170–190; Lau, "Maritime."

76 *Communication from the Commission*.

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SUMMARY

In recent years, especially after 2019, there has been a clear increase in interest in maritime transport resilience, so the main objective of this article is to examine and add to the state of the art of research on the maritime transport resilience in an increasingly uncertain

environment. Through a systematic literature review (SLR), this study comprehensively examines the relevant literature on resilience and maritime transport resilience. For bibliometric analysis, 327 articles from the 2019-2024 period on the topic of resilience in the maritime transport were selected from the Scopus database. Selected texts were subjected to full-text analysis, for which the Authors used the narrative review method and the meta-analysis method. Analysed texts were divided into three subgroups based on the dominant subject of the study i.e.: (1) ports, (2) issues related to shipping lines, shipping network and their impact on other maritime actors, and (3) those dealing with various issues related to the resilience of maritime transport, such as employees or the implementation of modern technologies. The Authors have indicated causes of disruption that may affect maritime transport resilience i.e.: COVID-19, climate change and induced weather phenomena, and energy supply disruptions. The Authors indicated the need for a comprehensive analysis of the resilience of the maritime transport as a system.

Odporność transportu morskiego – zmapowane morza czy nieznane terytorium?

Słowa kluczowe: odporność, transport morski, systematyczny przegląd literatury, COVID-19

STRESZCZENIE

W ostatnich latach, zwłaszcza po 2019 r., nastąpił wyraźny wzrost zainteresowania odpornością transportu morskiego, dlatego głównym celem tego artykułu jest zbadanie i uzupełnienie stanu wiedzy na temat odporności transportu morskiego w coraz bardziej niepewnym otoczeniu. Poprzez systematyczny przegląd literatury (SLR) niniejsze badanie kompleksowo analizuje odpowiednią literaturę na temat odporności i odporności transportu morskiego. Do analizy bibliometrycznej wybrano 327 artykułów z okresu 2019-2024 na temat odporności w transporcie morskim z bazy danych Scopus. Wybrane teksty poddano analizie pełnotekstowej, w której Autorzy zastosowali metodę przeglądu narracyjnego i metodę metaanalizy. Analizowane teksty podzielono na trzy podgrupy w oparciu o dominujący przedmiot badania, tj.: (1) porty, (2) kwestie związane z liniami żeglugowymi, siecią żeglugową i ich wpływem na innych aktorów morskich oraz (3) te, które zajmują się różnymi kwestiami związanymi z odpornością transportu morskiego, takimi jak pracownicy lub wdrażanie nowoczesnych technologii. Autorzy wskazali przyczyny zakłóceń, które mogą mieć wpływ na odporność transportu morskiego, tj.: COVID-19, zmiany klimatu i wywołane nimi zjawiska pogodowe oraz zakłócenia w dostawach energii. Autorzy wskazali potrzebę kompleksowej analizy odporności transportu morskiego jako systemu.

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Aleksandra Bilik
Department of Logistics, Warsaw University of Life Sciences
aleksandra_bilik@sggw.edu.pl
ORCID: 0009-0009-8596-3044

Vladyslav Liashuk
Faculty of Economic Sciences at the Koszalin University of Technology
u16187@s.tu.koszalin.pl
ORCID: 0009-0000-5195-6297

Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea on Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax Vessels – Application of IMDG Regulations in Practice

Keywords: transport, maritime logistics, dangerous goods, legal regulations, safety

Introduction

The transport of dangerous goods (DG) is a key element of the global supply chain, regulated on land by the ADR (Accord Dangereux Routier) and at sea by the IMDG code (International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code). The IMDG Code adapts the ADR regulations to the specific requirements of maritime transport, ensuring safety and consistency in trade. This code contains guidelines regarding classification, packaging, labelling, documentation, and emergency procedures.[1] Transport of dangerous goods requires strict compliance with IMDG regulations, which encompass loading, unloading, packaging, and labelling.[2] Documentation must include details about the goods and procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency. This research aims to analyse the practical aspects of applying the IMDG regulations on Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro)

1 Meike Schröder, Gunnar Prause, "Transportation of Dangerous Goods in Green Transport Corridors – Conclusions from Baltic Sea Region," *Transport and Telecommunication* 17 (2016), 4: 322–334, DOI: 10.1515/ttj-2016-0029.

2 Jan Hołowiński, *Umowa o przewóz ładu nku drogą morską. Istota i charakter prawny* (Gdynia: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1964).

and Roll-on/Roll-off[3] passenger (Ro-Pax)[4] vessels, in order to enhance the safety of transporting dangerous goods and to improve collaboration among the entities involved.[5] Legal regulation analysis methods, process modeling, as well as data from relevant literature, and cooperation with the shipowner, were utilized.[6] The findings are presented in descriptive, graphic, and tabular forms.[7]

Legal Framework for Transporting Dangerous Goods (DG)

Characteristics of International Legal Regulations

Transporting dangerous goods is governed by international agreements and regulations that ensure uniform safety standards.[8] The key regulations in this area depend on the mode of transport used:

- ADR, the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road,
- RID, the Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail,
- ADN, the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways. [9]

The history of legal regulations concerning the transport of dangerous goods dates back to the mid-twentieth century. The first step was the creation of the ADR Agreement, aimed at harmonising regulations related to the road transport of dangerous goods across Europe.[10] In subsequent years, with technological advancements and growth of international trade, it became necessary to regularly update these regulations.

3 Stefan Dahlbom et al.,"Fire Risk Model for Fires in Ro-Ro Ship Ro-Ro Spaces," *Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response* 14 (2024), 3: 147–162, DOI: 10.54560/jracr.v14i3.503.

4 Edward Czermański, Żegluga promowa w regionie morza bałtyckiego w układzie północ – *Południe* (Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański Wydział Ekonomiczny, 2010).

5 Francisco Rodero, and María Casal, ed. "Fire Hazard Reduction in Ro-Ro Spaces by Means of Using a Water Mist System," *Safety Science* 166 (2023): 106205, DOI: 10.1016/j.trpro.2023.11.092.

6 Baolin, Bian et al., "A Hybrid Approach for Quantitative Analysis of Fire Hazards in Enclosed Vehicle Spaces on Ro-Ro Passenger Ships," *Sustainability* 15, (2023), 17: 13059, DOI: 10.3390/su151713059.

7 Kihyun Kim and Hyunjoo Jeon, "The Causes and Responses to Cargo Hold Fire Accidents in Ro-Ro Ships Using AcciMap," *Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Shipping* 7 (2023), 4: 214–227, DOI: 10.1080/25725084.2023.2274227.

8 Andrzej Salomon, *Spedycja w handlu morskim. Procedury i dokumenty* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2004), 87.

9 Agnieszka Skowrońska and Marek Suchecki, *Zarządzanie przewozami ładunków niebezpiecznych* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, 2022), 12–20.

10 Eugeniusz Gostomski and Tomasz Nowosielski, *Międzynarodowy handel morski* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2020), 167.

New classifications of hazardous substances were introduced, along with detailed packaging and safety procedure requirements.

The ADR provisions specify detailed requirements for transport of dangerous goods, which include their classification. Goods are classified according to the types of hazards they pose, which is crucial for appropriate risk management. They set forth safety requirements and emergency procedures designed to minimise risk in the event of an accident or failure. The global transport of dangerous goods is regulated by a set of international regulations. In the context of maritime transport, such operations are regulated by the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG).[11] Although the two systems differ in their transport-specific details, they share a common objective: to ensure safety in the transport of hazardous materials.[12]

The IMDG Code was developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and regulates the transport of dangerous goods by sea. The Code, like the ADR, covers the classification of dangerous goods, packaging, labelling, documentation, and emergency procedures.[13] The IMDG is a key document for shipowners, carriers, and all participants in maritime transport as it provides consistent safety standards on an international scale.[14]

European Union Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods

The transport of dangerous goods within Europe is strictly regulated by a series of legal provisions to ensure the safety of people, the environment, and infrastructure. The main legal act governing the road transport of dangerous goods in Europe is the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR).[15] It is updated every two years to reflect new technologies, materials, and best practices in the transport of dangerous goods.

11 Grzegorz Nowacki, Cezary Krysiuk, Rafał Kopczewski, "Dangerous Goods Transport Problems in the European Union and Poland," *TransNav – International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation* 10 (2016), 1: 37–42, DOI: 10.12716/1001.10.01.16.

12 Samuel C. Orzechowski, *Learning from Regulation in Air, Rail, Road and Sea Transport* (Springer: Marine Policy, 2025), 43–44.

13 Matej Renčelj, Andrej Zorić and Bojan Jakšić, "Assessment of Dangerous Goods Transport: Case Western Balkans," *Sustainability* 17 (2025), 3: 891.

14 Beata Janicka, "FIATA Documents," in: *Freight Forwarder's Handbook: Transport, Forwarding and Logistics*, ed. Danuta Marciniak-Neider and Janusz Neider, vol. 1 (Gdynia: Polish International Freight Forwarders Association, 2014), 153–168.

15 Grzegosz Nowacki and Marek Chmieliński, "Analiza transportu towarów niebezpiecznych w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej," *Autobusy. Technika, Eksploatacja, Systemy Transportowe* 9 (2017): 104–111.

The most comprehensive EU legal act is Directive 2009/45/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on safety rules and standards for passenger ships, which covers passenger ships of 24 metres in length and above, constructed of steel or equivalent material, as well as high-speed craft, regardless of their length. The objective of this Directive is to establish a uniform level of safety rules for the protection of life and property on passenger ships and high-speed passenger craft, both new and existing, operating in domestic navigation, and to establish negotiation procedures at the international level to harmonise the rules applicable to passenger ships engaged in international navigation. In addition to the above, the following documents containing detailed provisions applicable to Ro-Ro passenger ships, including Ro-Pax vessels, high-speed craft, and the registration of persons on board are in force within the European Union:

- Directive 2003/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on specific stability requirements for Ro-Ro passenger ships,
- Council Directive 1999/35/EC of 29 April 1999 on a system of mandatory surveys for the safe operation of regular Ro-Ro ferry and high-speed passenger craft services,
- Council Directive 98/41/EC of 18 June 1998 on the registration of persons sailing on board passenger ships operating to or from ports of the Member States of the Community.

In 2017, the European Commission published three directives regulating the safety of passenger ships, the rules for registering persons travelling on board passenger ships, and the safety of Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax passenger ships. The overarching goal was to create a clear legal framework that would be easier to apply, monitor, and enforce, thereby reducing the overall level of risk.

The safety of passenger ships in the EU is regulated at three levels: international, EU, and national. At the international level, the IMO has established regulations for passenger ships, which are included in, among others:

- The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Convention, 1974), concerns, among other things, requirements for damage stability of the Ro-Ro units, as well as common safety standards for stability, machinery, electrical installations, fire protection, and life-saving appliances on passenger ships, i.e., ships carrying more than twelve passengers,
- The International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, under which international conventions and some EU regulations apply to ships engaged in international voyages. For ships operating on domestic voyages, EU and national regulations apply.

Systematisation of the Content Directives and the Maritime Code in Relation to the Transport of Dangerous Goods

According to the Act of 1 December 1961 – the Maritime Code, the requirements ensuring the safety of maritime transport of dangerous goods are defined, in particular the packaging, marking, storage, transhipment, transport within the port, stowage, and sea carriage of these materials. Dangerous materials are goods that may, by themselves or under the influence of external factors, pose a threat to human life, health, or property. The Maritime Offices supervise the safety of maritime transport of dangerous goods. Dangerous materials are divided, according to the nature of the hazard, into the following classes and subclasses.. The classification is used in all cases where it is required to determine the properties of dangerous materials in maritime transport:


- class 1 – explosives,
- class 2 – flammable, non-flammable (non-toxic), toxic gases,
- class 3 – flammable liquids,
- class 4 – flammable materials: flammable solids, self-igniting materials, materials that emit easily flammable gases upon contact with water,
- class 5 – oxidizing materials and organic peroxides,
- class 6 – toxic and infectious materials,
- class 7 – radioactive materials,
- class 8 – corrosive materials,
- class 9 – miscellaneous other hazardous materials and articles not included in other classes but which display hazardous properties.

Each ship undergoes a classification process every year, which aims to confirm its compliance with safety requirements and its suitability to carry specific cargoes. In the case of vessels registered in Poland, classification is carried out by the Polish Register of Shipping S.A. (PRS).[16] As part of this assessment, PRS issues a classification certificate, which specifies what types of cargo can be carried on a given ship and identifies the decks for this purpose.[17] For the ship examined, the certificate indicates that the authorisation to carry dangerous goods covers only decks 3 and 5 (Fig. 1). This document contains a detailed list of the classes of dangerous goods per the IMDG Code, which may be carried on a given deck. In addition, it contains information on exceptions and limitations that may apply to specific cargoes or transport conditions.[18]

16 Stanisław Matysik, *Prawo morskie. Zarys systemu*, vol. 2 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1973), 55.

17 Marek Chmieliński, "Requirements Regarding Safety Maritime Transport of Dangerous Goods Class 1," *TransNav – International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation* 17 (2023), 2: 287–294, DOI: 10.12716/1001.14.01.13.

18 Jarosław Kabus, "Analiza operacji transportowej. Studium przypadku," *Zarządzanie i Jakość* 5 (2023), 1: 33–43.



KOPIA

GDA/32/22

DOCUMENT OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPS CARRYING DANGEROUS GOODS

This document shall be supplemented by an Appendix (Form A3a) and a Record (Form 363a)

Issued in pursuance of the requirement of regulation II-2/19.4 of the
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974, as amended
and in pursuance of the requirement of the
Memorandum of Understanding for the Transport of Dangerous Goods in Ro/Ro Ships in the Baltic
under the authority of the Government of
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS
by Polish Register of Shipping[1]

Name of ship	**NOVA STAR**	Document No.	26/GDA/22
Distinctive No./letters	C6DU6	IMO No.	IMO 9462067
Port of registry	Nassau	Type of ship	Passenger/Ferry

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that:

1 The construction and equipment of the above-mentioned ship have been found to comply with the provisions of regulation II-2/15P of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.
2 The ship is suitable for the carriage of those classes of dangerous goods as specified in the appendix hereto, subject to any provisions in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) and the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC) for individual substances, materials or articles also being complied with.
3 The ship is suitable for the carriage of dangerous goods as listed in the Appendix hereto in compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding for the Transport of Dangerous Goods in Ro/Ro Ships in the Baltic (MoU), subject to stowage conditions given in the Appendix.

This Document is valid until 2023-03-04

Issued at Gdańsk, 2022-02-18


e-certificate

This document is signed electronically in accordance with IMO FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 and it's authenticity and validity may be verified in https://eseal.prs.pl using Unique Tracking Number (UTN): 108B-0F5D

L. Pokora
Signature

[1] Polish Register of Shipping means Polski Rejestr Statków S.A., seated in Gdańsk, al. gen. Józefa Hallera 126, 80-416 Gdańsk, Poland, registered in the Register of Entrepreneurs of the National Court Register, under entry number 0000019880. Polish Register of Shipping, its affiliates and subsidiaries, their respective officers, employees or agents are, individually and collectively, referred to as Polish Register of Shipping or as PRS for short.
[2] There are no special requirements in the above-mentioned regulation II-2/19 for the carriage of dangerous goods of classes 6.2 and 7, and for the carriage of dangerous goods in limited quantities, as required in chapter 3.4 of the IMDG Code, and excepted quantities, as required in chapter 3.5 of the IMDG Code.

PRS 2219-07-15a UTN: 108B-0F5D 1/1



A3a

GDA/32/22

APPENDIX

This Appendix shall be permanently attached to the Document of Compliance No. 26/GDA/22

Name of Ship **NOVA STAR**

UNDER-DECK SPACES

ON DECK SPACES

Hold/Space No.[1]	Description	Hold/Space No.[1]	Description
1	Car Deck No.3/(closed ro-ro space)	6	-
2	Car Deck No.5 & 6/(closed ro-ro space)	7	-
3	-	8	-
4	-	9	-
5	-	10	-

Issued at Gdańsk, 2022-02-18
Place, date


e-certificate

This document is signed electronically in accordance with IMO FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 and it's authenticity and validity may be verified in https://eseal.prs.pl using Unique Tracking Number (UTN): 108B-0F5D

L. Pokora
Signature

[1] Holds/spaces for the carriage of dangerous goods are to be indicated in the plans with numbers corresponding with the tables.

PRS 2011-06-13a UTN: 108B-0F5D 1/2



A3a

Dangerous goods		Hold/Space No.[2]										Remark No.
Class	Description	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1.1-1.6	Explosives	X	X									
1.4S	Safe' explosives[3]	P	P									
2.1	Flammable gases	X	X									
2.2	Non-flammable, non-toxic gases	P	P									
2.3	Flammable toxic gases	X	X									
2.3	Non-flammable toxic gases	X	X									
3	Flammable liquids FP < 23°C c.c.	X	X									
3	Flammable liquids 23°C ≤ FP ≤ 60°C c.c.	P	P									
4.1	Flammable solids	P	P									
4.2	Substances liable to spontaneous combustion	P	P									
4.3	Liquids which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases	P	P									1
4.3	Solids which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases	P	P									
5.1	Oxidizing substances (agents)	P	P									
5.2	Organic peroxides	X	X									
6.1	Toxic liquids FP > 60°C c.c.	X	X									
6.1	Toxic liquids FP < 23°C c.c.	X	X									
6.1	Toxic liquids 23°C ≤ FP ≤ 60°C c.c.	X	X									
6.1	Toxic solids	P	P									
8	Corrosive liquids FP > 60°C c.c.	P	P									2
8	Corrosive liquids FP < 23°C c.c.	X	X									2
8	Corrosive liquids 23°C ≤ FP ≤ 60°C c.c.	P	P									
8	Corrosive solids	P	P									
9	Miscellaneous	P	P									3

REMARKS
1. Except goods having a flashpoint less than 23°C listed in the IMDG Code.
2. Except goods having a subsidiary risk class 6.1.
3. Other than goods evolving flammable vapour.

[2] A – packaged and bulk goods allowed. P – packaged goods permitted. X – not allowed.
Cargoes in bulk may be listed individually by class and name.
[3] Explosives so packed or designed that any hazardous effects arising from accidental functioning are confined within the package.

2/2

Figure 1. Compliance document certifying the carriage of dangerous goods

Source: Own elaboration based on materials obtained from the ship-owner, accessed 17.09.2025, https://prs.ms.gov.pl/.

This classification ensures that shipowners and the ship's crew have clear guidelines ensuring compliance with safety regulations and minimising the risks associated with the transport of dangerous goods.

Considering the regulations in force in Poland, in addition to the Maritime Code, they are supplemented by the Maritime Safety Act, introduced in 2011.[19] Its provisions complement the Maritime Code, ensuring a comprehensive approach to safety. The Act also imposes obligations on shipowners and captains to comply with safety regulations and international standards, particularly SOLAS and the IMDG Code. An important aspect is the origin of the vessel transporting dangerous goods. A ship operating in Polish waters may fly the flag of another country, in which case the regulations of that country apply; conversely, a ship flying the Polish flag in the Mediterranean Sea, is subject to Polish regulations. Another crucial legal consideration involves the internal regulations established by shipowners and carriers.

Documentation for Dangerous Goods

Dangerous Goods Declaration (DGN)

All documents related to the maritime transport of hazardous materials, such as bills of lading, waybills, manifests, cargo lists, mate's receipts, notices, storage receipts, orders, instructions, and Dangerous Goods Note (DGN), must include all necessary information to ensure transparency for each shipment. The classification of the material in the DGN (also referred to as Dangerous Goods Declaration) must correspond to its designated class and include the number assigned by the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, known as the UN number.

Cargo documentation, prepared by the shipper, must include a declaration confirming that the hazardous materials have been properly packaged and labelled. When loading takes place in a foreign port, the ship's captain is required to request the presentation of such a certificate. A manifest or a special dangerous goods list, detailing these materials and their stowage locations, must be kept on board. For hazardous materials that may be transported in limited quantities, all shipments must be reported to the carrier at least 24 hours in advance, and vehicles must be properly marked. Drivers are required to carry a physical copy of the DGN document at all times. Stowage operations may only be carried out under the supervision of the appropriate officers, depending on the category of materials. During cargo handling, it is recommended

19 Janusz Neider, *Transport międzynarodowy* (Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 2018), 143–158.

that hazardous materials be unloaded first and loaded last. The ship's captain is also required to provide the crew with written instructions on handling dangerous goods before the voyage begins.

The requirement to hold a DGN extends beyond mere legal compliance. The document serves several key functions, such as informing logistics and freight forwarding companies about the proper handling, storage, and transport of dangerous goods. It also serves to inform port authorities, who must be aware of the hazardous nature of the cargo to ensure appropriate safety measures during unloading and storage. Apart from ships carrying dangerous goods, the DGN is also used by customs offices and emergency services. Customs officials and recipients rely on the DGN to process cargo properly and ensure regulatory compliance, while emergency responders use it to implement appropriate response measures in the event of an accident or spill.

Most Common Errors in Completing the DG Declaration for Dangerous Goods Transport on Ro-pax Vessels

In the context of analysing the accuracy of declarations for the transport of dangerous goods (DG) on Ro-Pax vessels operating between Poland and Sweden, the Delphi method was used to gather comprehensive knowledge from specialists across various areas of maritime transport. Data collected in October 2024, based on the authors' observations, source materials from onboard documentation, and in-depth interviews with representatives of the Cargo Departments in both Polish and Swedish ports, as well as with the Chief Officer and a Safety Specialist, served as the foundation for identifying the most common errors in DG transport documentation.[20]

Experts emphasise that maintaining the correct order and completeness of data in the Dangerous Goods Note (DGN) is crucial for ensuring regulatory compliance and transport safety. Observations and interview data from the Cargo Department indicate frequent omissions of critical information, such as the UN number, hazard class, proper shipping name, and packing group. Experts attribute this issue mainly to carelessness and insufficient familiarity with IMDG Code guidelines among personnel responsible for documentation. Additionally, specialists highlighted the importance of specifying the flashpoint for flammable materials (below 60°C). Interviews with port staff and the safety specialist revealed that failing to provide this information—often due to a lack of awareness of potential hazards—poses a risk to the entire maritime transport process. Furthermore, experts unanimously stressed the necessity of including the term

20 Edward Czermański, "Żegluga promowa w regionie Morza Bałtyckiego w układzie północ–południe," *Współczesna Gospodarka* 3 (2010): 68–81.

"marine pollutant" when declaring dangerous goods that pose a threat to the marine environment. Omitting this information, which is relatively common, can lead to serious legal and environmental consequences.

Interviews with Cargo Department employees and data analysis also revealed that shipments of waste often lack the required designation before the shipment name, as mandated by IMDG documentation. Experts consistently observed that the container packing certificate is frequently omitted or completed inadequately. This certificate confirms the proper loading of hazardous goods, and skipping this step increases the risk of accidents. Experts also confirmed that, for limited quantity goods, the absence of the "Limited Quantity" designation in documentation is a widespread issue, which complicates the work of loading personnel and constitutes a violation of IMDG regulations. Safety specialists recommend rigorously implementing this information in documentation to ensure proper cargo segregation and enhance operational compliance with regulations.

Transport Process Modelling

An example of the transport of dangerous goods in October 2024 on the Gdańsk–Nynäshamn route illustrates the process of shipping lithium batteries (UN3480) on a ferry. This type of cargo is classified under Class 9 of the IMDG Code, meaning it falls into the category of "miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles." The assigned EmS codes F-A and S-I correspond to emergency procedures in the event of fire (F-A) and spillage or substance release (S-I), which are crucial for the crew's emergency preparedness. The net weight of the cargo was 3,020 kg.

Based on PRS classification, this cargo was required to be placed on deck 3 or 5, as both decks meet the ventilation, security, and hazard control requirements essential for the safe transport of lithium batteries. Their transportation involves special precautions, as they can ignite or explode if damaged or overheated. The transport of dangerous goods, such as lithium batteries, on the Gdańsk–Nynäshamn Ro-Pax ferry is meticulously planned and carried out in strict accordance with safety procedures.

The transport process begins with the carrier booking a ticket for cargo shipment no earlier than 24 hours before the ferry's departure. During the booking process, detailed information must be provided, including cargo type, hazard classification, UN number, and packing group. The Cargo Department approves the reservation after consulting with the ship's crew to verify whether the transport of the specific dangerous goods is feasible. Once approved by this department, the reservation is finalised, and the carrier receives the final confirmation.

The driver must arrive at the port no later than three hours before the ferry departs. Upon arrival, the driver reports to the cargo department to verify their identity and receive a boarding pass. At this stage, they also complete the "Cargo Stowage and Securing Declaration" (Fig. 2), which confirms that the cargo has been properly secured for transport.

DEKLARACJA SZTAUOWANIA I MOCOWANIA ŁADUNKU
CARGO STOWAGE AND SECURING DECLARATION

NR REZERWACJI **RESERVATION NR**	

PORT DOCELOWY DESTINATION	YSTAD	COPENHAGEN	NYNASHAMN	ŚWINOUJŚCIE	GDAŃSK

NR CIĄGNIKA I NACZEPY TRUCK AND TRAILER NR				
DŁUGOŚĆ LENGHT				m
SZEROKOŚĆ WIDTH				m
WYSOKOŚĆ HEIGHT				m
RODZAJ NAPĘDU DRIVE TYPE	DIESEL	ELEKTRIC	HYBRID	GAS

RODZAJ ŁADUNKU TYPE OF CARGO			
WAGA ŁADUNKU WEIGHT OF CARGO			kg
ADR/IMDG	TAK YES	NIE NO	
PRZYŁĄCZE ELEKTRYCZNE 400V ELECTRICAL CONNECTION 400V	TAK YES	NIE NO	
KRAJ ZAŁADUNKU COUNTRY OF LOADING		KRAJ PRZEZNACZENIA COUNTRY OF DESTINATION	

Niniejszym deklaruję, że ładunek w w/w pojeździe/ kontenerze został właściwie zaszłauowany i zabezpieczony do transportu morskiego z uwzględnieniem Poradnika IMO/ILO dot.: Pakowania ładunku w pojazdach i kontenerach.
I hereby declare that the cargo on the above mentioned vehicle has been properly stowed and Secured for sea transport, by taking into account the IMO/ILO Guidelines for Packing Cargo In Freight Containers or Vehicle.

IMIĘ I NAZWISKO KIEROWCY NAME OF DRIVER		
IMIĘ I NAZWISKO 2 KIEROWCY NAME OF 2 DRIVER		
DATY URODZENIA DATES OF BIRTH		
NUMER TELEFONU PHONE NUMBER		
PODPIS SIGNATURE		
DATA DATE		

Figure 2. Sample Cargo Stowage and Securing Declaration

Source: Own elaboration based on shipowner's materials, accessed 17.09.2025, https://polferries.pl/.

Next, the vehicle transporting dangerous goods (DG) is marked accordingly. The driver places an ADR (IMDG) label on the front windscreen, completing it with the required information, including the UN number, cargo class, packing group, vehicle weight with cargo, and vehicle dimensions (Fig. 3). If the vehicle requires an external power connection (e.g. for refrigerated transport), the driver must also provide the transport temperature and vehicle weight using the Electric Connection label (Fig. 4).



Figure 3. Sample ADR (IMDG)




Figure 4. Sample Electric Connection Label

Source: Own elaboration on shipowner's materials, accessed 17.09.2025, https://polferries.pl/.

For the studied vessels, the loading and placement of cargo on the ferry are specific to each type of vehicle. On the M/F Wawel (operating on the Gdańsk–Nynäshamn route), dangerous goods are stowed on deck 4, specifically in sections AB, AC, AD, and AE (Fig. 5). This deck is semi-open, ensuring adequate ventilation and safety. Additionally, the deck is equipped with special chemical doors, which further isolate hazardous cargo from other shipments, minimising the risk of contact with substances that could pose a threat.




Figure 5. Dangerous Goods Placement on the Ship's Deck

Source: Own study based on shipowner's materials, accessed 17.09.2025, https://polferries.pl/.

Figure 6 illustrates the placement of dangerous goods (DG) on the M/F *Nova Star*, which operates on the same Gdańsk–Nynäshamn route. This vessel is equipped to transport hazardous cargo on decks 3 and 5, both of which are specifically designed and adapted for the safe carriage of such goods.




Figure 6. Dangerous Goods Placement on the Ship

Source: Own study based on shipowner's materials, accessed 17.09.2025, https://polferries.pl/.

The ship's documentation includes several key records provided by the carrier: the Dangerous Goods Note (DGN), the IMO FAL Form 7—completed by the ferry crew to report cargo details—and the Hazardous Cargo Stowage Plan. On ferries such as Nova Star, the safety officer is responsible for maintaining complete documentation and ensuring that information regarding hazardous cargo is available in two key locations: the bridge and the crew mess room. In these locations, an emergency response schedule is displayed, outlining procedures in the event of spillage or fire.

Key Data Analysis of Dangerous Goods Transport on Ro-Pax Vessels

To assess the activity and movement characteristics of dangerous goods (DG) transported on Ro-Pax ferries, a statistical analysis was conducted using voyage data collected between May to November 2024 (Table 1). During this period, 19 shipments of hazardous cargo were recorded.

Table 1. Summary of Dangerous Goods Transport Data on Ro-Pax Ferries (May–October 2024)

NO	ROUTE	DATE	DECK	LOCATION	DG CLASS	ADDIATIONAL INFORMATION	UN
1	GD-NYN	18.10.2024	3	23S	9	LITHIUM ION BATTERIES	3480
2	GD-NYN	14.10.2024	3	19S	9	–	
3	NYN-GD	12.10.2024	3	23S	3	–	
4	NYN-GD	10.10.2024	3	10	9	–	
5	NYN-GD	5.09.2024	3	9S	9	–	
6	NYN-GD	24.08.2024	3	23S	9	–	
7	GD-NYN	11.08.2024	3	–	9	ZINC SULPHATE	3082
8	NYN-GD	10.08.2024	3	–	9	LITHIUM ION BATTERIES	3480
9	GD-NYN	3.08.2024	5	–	3	FLAMMABLE LIQUID MATERIAL	1993
10	NYN-GD	31.07.2024	3	9S	9	POZYAMIDOAMINES	3082
11	NYN-GD	17.07.2024	3	23	9	POLYAMIDOAMINES /PG III	3082
12	GD-NYN	16.07.2024	3	18S	2.2(5.1)	NITROUS OXIDE 2.2/ 5.1	1070
13	GD-NYN	10.07.2024	3	3S	2.2(5.1)	NITROUS OXIDE 2.2/ 5.1	1070
14	GD-NYN	24.06.2024	3	23S	9	LITHIUM ION BATTERIES	3480
15	GD-NYN	20.06.2024	3	18	2.2(5.1)	NITROUS OXIDE 2.2/ 5.1	1070
16	NYN-GD	19.06.2024	3	10S	9	POLYAMIDOAMINES /PG III	3082
17	GD-NYN	12.06.2024	3	23	8	CAUSTIC ALKALI LIQUID/ PG III	1719
18	GD-NYN	10.06.2024	3	17S	9	LITHIUM ION BATTERIES	3480
19	NYN-GD	16.05.2024	3	10S	9	LITHIUM ION BATTERIES	3480

Source: Own study based on data collected on the M/S WAWEL and M/S NOVA STAR ferries on the Poland-Sweden route, operated by Polferries.

Analysis of the data presented in Table 1 shows that the most frequently transported goods were those of Class 9, classified as other dangerous goods. Due to the adaptation of deck number 3 for the transport of dangerous goods (DG), these goods were mostly placed on this deck. Considering the frequency of voyages in both directions, no deviations were observed, and the Gdańsk–Nynäshamn–Gdańsk routes were operated evenly during the studied period (Fig. 7). With one more shipment to Sweden than to Poland, the transportation of dangerous goods to Sweden exceeded that of consignments to Poland. No trends were observed regarding the popularity of this solution in either direction.




Figure 7. Distribution of Dangerous Goods Transport by Direction (GD-NYN-GD) and the Hazard Class of the Transported Goods.

Source: Own study based on data collected on the M/S WAWEL and M/S NOVA STAR ferries on the Poland-Sweden route, operated by Polferries.

Dangerous goods on Ro-Pax vessels were most frequently transported during the summer months which could be related to the demand for specific goods at that time (Fig. 8). Only one voyage was recorded in May and September, which significantly differs from the number of voyages in other months.




Figure 8. Frequency of Ship Voyages by Month, Categorised by the Hazard Class of Transported Goods.

Source: Own study based on data collected on the M/S WAWEL and M/S NOVA STAR ferries on the Poland-Sweden route, operated by Polferries.

The correlation of classes concerning the total number of shipments showed moderate dependencies for classes 8 and 2.2, while a very strong correlation of nearly 0.93 was recorded for class 9. The correlation results within individual classes are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2. The Correlation Coefficient for Individual Classes of Dangerous Goods.

DG Class	Correlation coefficient
3 to 8	–0,32
3 to 2.2	–0,46
9 to 2.2	0,12
8 to 2.2	0,29
8 to 9	0,42
3 to 9	0,66

Source: Own study based on data collected on the M/S WAWEL and M/S NOVA STAR ferries on the Poland-Sweden route, operated by Polferries.

It was observed that the strong correlation between Classes 3 and 9 (0.66) may suggest that these classes are often transported together. This could be due to similar transport requirements (e.g. similar types of vehicles, routes) or industrial demand. In this case, optimising logistical processes by focusing on joint transport of these classes may be beneficial, while also assessing whether combining these shipments increases the risk of failure or challenges in managing transportation.

The transport of classes 8 and 9 shows a moderate interdependence, which may indicate shared transport routes, albeit to a lesser extent than for classes 3 and 9. Potential logistical benefits may be gained by using shared routes for these classes, provided that the impact of combining them on cost savings is evaluated. Preventing regulatory conflicts, such as chemical reactions or different procedures for these classes, plays a key role in this process.

Class 3 tends to decrease when the transport of Classes 8 and 2.2 increases. This may result from different transport or infrastructural requirements, or the prioritisation of one class over others on specific routes or during certain seasons. Conversely, the weak positive correlations for class 2.2 with classes 8 (0.29) and 9 (0.12) suggest that it is transported independently of the other classes. Various classes may have specific seasons that influence these correlations. Classes 3 and 9 stand out, which may indicate that they play a crucial role in logistical operations, as confirmed by the number of shipments for these classes.

Recognition and response methods to threats resulting from the transport of hazardous goods

Procedures for crew action in emergencies

Safety on Ro-Ro (Roll-on/Roll-off) passenger ships is a crucial element of maritime operations due to the specific nature of these vessels and their intensive use. It requires specialised knowledge and skills, particularly in cargo operations, passenger safety management, and maintaining the integrity of the hull. For this reason, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed the IMO Model Course 1.29, which meets the requirements of Section A-V/2, paragraph 4 of the STCW Code, concerning training for the safety of passengers, cargo, and hull integrity on Ro-Ro vessels. Evacuation planning includes the designation of evacuation routes, the placement of life-saving appliances, and crew training in crowd management. Regular drills enable the crew to respond quickly to various emergency scenarios, such as fires, spills, or mechanical failures, which increases the chances of a successful evacuation and minimises losses.

The effectiveness of emergency procedures depends on the speed and accuracy of the crew's and passengers' responses. Managing these reactions requires not only the crew's knowledge of their duties but also the ability to communicate clearly and decisively with passengers. Ensuring calm and discipline among passengers is crucial to preventing panic and ensure a smooth evacuation. Optimal utilisation of resources on board requires coordinated management of both the crew and equipment. In daily operations, this includes regular inspections, maintenance, and crew training. In emergencies, effective management involves quick access to key resources such as life-saving appliances and precise coordination of the crew's actions to minimise the impact of the crisis. Optimizing safety and operational efficiency on board requires the implementation of, and adherence to, effective procedures that consider both the specifics of the vessel and the current sea conditions. Regular audits, risk analyses, and procedural updates are essential.

Technical and Operational Requirements Regarding the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea

International regulations for passenger ships require the installation of a fire detection system (FDS) in all areas where there is a risk of fire. The main FDS control panel is located on the navigation bridge, where it is constantly monitored by the crew. The fire detection system (FDS) not only identifies the location of the fire but also provides information on any preliminary hazards or faults related to specific fire detectors. The control panel is connected to detectors that detect smoke, temperature, and flame, as well as manual fire alarms. Additionally, the control panel is supported by sub-panels located in the passenger reception area, the engine room control centre, and the onboard office. This ensures that, even when the navigation bridge is unmanned, or when the ferry is docked, the hazard information can reach the appropriate personnel efficiently.

To increase the level of safety, constant monitoring of the situation is necessary, especially when the ferry is transporting trucks. Regular patrols are conducted—firefighting patrols—following a strictly planned route that covers all key areas. Additionally, the ship's CCTV system is helpful, allowing for monitoring of areas from the bridge and the engine room control centre.

The transport of dangerous goods on Ro-Pax vessels, which also carry passengers, comes with numerous additional safety requirements. Dangerous goods (DG) must be stowed in separate, secured areas, which necessitates the separation of cargo space from passenger areas. Detailed evacuation plans and emergency procedures must also be developed, considering the presence of passengers.

Conducting stability calculations to ensure the vessel's operational safety under various sea conditions. This requires precise determination of weight distribution on the deck, accounting for potential cargo shifts, and the impact of external factors such as waves and wind. Regularly conducting these calculations is essential to assess whether the vessel can safely undertake the planned voyage, minimising the risk of capsizing. Another important technical aspect regarding safety at sea is the watertight integrity of the Ro-Ro vessel's hull. Closing and securing doors, hatches, and access points must be done according to strictly defined procedures to prevent water from entering the ship's interior.

Application of the FMEA Method to Assess Potential Hazards Related to the Transport of Dangerous Goods

In the transportation of dangerous goods, the FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) method allows for the identification of risks, such as package damage, accidents, or documentation errors, and the development of actions aimed at their elimination. These actions include training, audits, and improved and more efficient loading procedures. As a result, it becomes possible to minimise risks to people, the environment, and logistical processes while reducing costs associated with failures. Table 3 presents a sample risk analysis using the FMEA method, prepared based on discussions with the Ro-Pax vessel crew regarding potential hazards, their probability, impact, and detectability.

Table 3. FMEA Analysis for the Sea Transport of Dangerous Goods

No	Failure mode	Causes	Effects	Probability (P)	Severity (S)	Detection (D)	RPN (P × S × D)	Recommenations
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Packaging Damage	Improper storage, vibrations during transport	Chemical leaks, fire hazard, loss of cargo	4	8	5	60	Regular quality checks of packaging, especially before transport
2	Incorrect documentation	Lack of employee training, data discrepancies	Transport delays, financial penalties, misclassification	3	6	7	126	Document management system, training, and documentation audits.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	Improper storage	Overloading of containers, lack of cargo segregation	Cargo degradation, explosions, fires	5	9	4	180	Automation of processes, implementation of monitoring systems.
4	Transport damage	Improper cargo securing	Spillage of substances, environmental contamination, health hazards	3	9	6	162	Driver training, better cargo securing systems

Source: Own study based on data collected on the M/S WAWEL and M/S NOVA STAR ferries on the Poland-Sweden route, operated by Polferries.

- **P** – Probability (1–10, where 10 means very high probability),
- **S** – Severity (1–10, where 10 means very severe consequences),
- **D** – Detectability (1–10, where 10 means low possibility of detection).

The highest risk priority number (RPN) is associated with improper storage (180), highlighting the need for careful attention to loading and storage processes. The FMEA risk analysis for the transport of hazardous goods points to areas requiring improvement to minimise threats like cargo degradation, leaks, or fire, which could have severe environmental and financial consequences. Documentation errors also increase the risk of delays, fines, and incorrect classifications. To mitigate these risks, regular packaging inspections, crew training, stricter loading procedures, and systematic monitoring of transport are essential. These actions will enhance transport safety, protect the environment, and improve logistical efficiency.

Discussion

The transport of hazardous materials on Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax vessels requires special attention due to the high operational risks and potential threats to the environment and passenger safety. The conducted research and analyses highlight key aspects related to managing hazardous cargo, documentation, and emergency procedures. Despite the implemented safety measures, some areas require further exploration, which could contribute to improve transport efficiency and minimising the risk of incidents.

One of the crucial aspects requiring further research is the optimisation of the placement of hazardous materials on Ro-Pax vessels. Data analysis has shown that Class 9 materials are most commonly transported, suggesting the need for a thorough examination of their stowage methods on the vessel. There is a need to develop simulation

models for optimal cargo placement to minimise the risk of failure and improve operational efficiency. Future studies should consider the impact of dynamic factors, such as cargo shifting during voyages and the influence of waves on the vessel's stability. Simultaneously, it would be valuable to analyse the possibility of implementing modern monitoring systems for transport conditions, such as sensors that detect leaks or temperature increases in storage areas. Another important issue is the analysis of the seasonality effect on hazardous cargo transport. Moreover, it is essential to study the impact of weather conditions, such as storms and strong winds, on transport safety and develop solutions to enhance operational resilience under extreme maritime conditions. The use of modern technology for monitoring hazardous cargo is another area requiring attention. Current procedures comply with international standards but do not fully exploit the potential of advanced technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) or artificial intelligence (AI). Additionally, it is worth exploring the potential of using AI algorithms for automatic anomaly detection and failure prediction, which can significantly enhance safety and reduce incident risk.

Conclusions

The article presents the key aspects of the transport of hazardous materials by sea on Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax vessels, with a particular focus on the application of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG).

The paper reviewed the applicable legal regulations at the European Union and international levels governing the transport of hazardous materials. The basic differences and similarities between ADR and IMDG regulations were identified. The relationships between EU regulations and international regulations in the context of maritime transport were also characterised. The Dangerous Goods Note (DGN) was discussed in detail, along with the most common mistakes made when filling it out. The paper also outlined the procedures that the crew should follow in the event of an emergency. The article dealt with safety issues related to the transport of hazardous materials. Technical and operational requirements that must be met to ensure safe transport were discussed, with particular emphasis on fixed firefighting systems used on Ro-Pax ferries and procedures for handling emergency events.

The conducted analyses suggest that the effectiveness of rescue operations depends not only on the equipment aboard the vessels but also on the level of training of the crew and passengers. It would be beneficial to examine the effectiveness of current alarm and evacuation systems and the possibility of upgrading them by incorporating augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) technologies into crew training.

The last key research area is the analysis of the impact of international regulations on the safety of hazardous cargo transport. The existing regulations set detailed requirements for hazardous cargo transport, but the dynamic development of technology and the changing structure of transportation may require updates to these regulations. Further studies should focus on assessing the alignment of these regulations with modern transport methods and evaluating their effectiveness in risk mitigation. As a result, recommendations for potential regulatory changes can be developed to improve maritime transport safety.

In conclusion, the transport of hazardous materials by sea is an activity requiring a high level of safety. Compliance with IMDG regulations and proper crew preparation are key to minimising the risks associated with this type of transport. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and solutions related to this issue and serves as a good starting point for further research on the transport of hazardous materials. However, to gain a more comprehensive understanding, it is worth considering expanding the thematic scope, deepening the analysis, and including the latest trends and technologies.

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SUMMARY

The aim of the study was to examine the implications of the transport process of dangerous goods (DG) by sea on Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax vessels, with particular emphasis on the practical application of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. The research focuses on legal frameworks, operational requirements, and safety procedures, addressing the problem of how effectively IMDG regulations are implemented in daily maritime practice.The study employs legal regulation analysis, process modelling on the Gdańsk–Nynäshamn route, statistical evaluation of 2024 voyage data, and qualitative data from shipowner documentation and expert interviews. Methods include the Delphi approach and FMEA risk analysis. The findings indicate recurring errors in Dangerous Goods Notes (DGNs), such as missing UN numbers, hazard classes, or "marine pollutant" designations. Statistical results show that Class 9 materials, especially lithium-ion batteries, dominate DG shipments, while correlation analysis highlights potential risks when certain classes are transported together. FMEA results point to improper storage and documentation deficiencies as the most significant hazards. The study concludes that compliance with IMDG standards ensures a high safety level, but continuous improvement is required. Enhancing documentation accuracy, crew training, and monitoring systems, along with adapting regulations to new technologies, is essential for safer and more efficient DG transport on Ro-Pax vessels.

Transport towarów niebezpiecznych drogą morską na statkach typu Ro-Ro i Ro-Pax – Zastosowanie przepisów IMDG w praktyce

Słowa kluczowe: transport, logistyka morska, towary niebezpieczne, regulacje prawne, bezpieczeństwo

STRESZCZENIE

Celem artykułu była identyfikacja implikacji związanych z procesem transportu towarów niebezpiecznych (TN) drogą morską na statkach typu Ro-Ro i Ro-Pax, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem praktycznego zastosowania Międzynarodowego Morskiego Kodeksu Towarów Niebezpiecznych (IMDG). Badania koncentrują się na ramach prawnych, wymaganiach operacyjnych i procedurach bezpieczeństwa, podejmując problem skuteczności wdrażania przepisów IMDG w codziennej praktyce żeglugowej. W pracy dokonano analizy regulacji prawnych, modelowania procesu na trasie Gdańsk–Nynäshamn, statystycznej oceny rejsów z 2024 roku oraz danych jakościowych pochodzących z dokumentacji armatora i wywiadów z ekspertami. Wykorzystano metodę delficką oraz analizę ryzyka FMEA. Wyniki wskazują na powtarzające się błędy w deklaracjach towarów niebezpiecznych, takie jak brak numerów UN, klas zagrożeń czy oznaczenia „zanieczyszczenie morza". Wyniki analizy statystycznej wykazały, że w przewozach dominują towary klasy 9, szczególnie baterie litowo-jonowe, natomiast analiza korelacji uwidoczniła potencjalne ryzyka przy łączonym transporcie niektórych klas.

Wyniki FMEA wskazują na niewłaściwe składowanie i braki w dokumentacji jako najpoważniejsze zagrożenia. Wnioski z badań pozwoliły na podkreślenie, że zgodność z przepisami IMDG zapewnia wysoki poziom bezpieczeństwa, jednak konieczne są dalsze usprawnienia. Kluczowe jest zwiększenie dokładności sporządzonej dokumentacji, doskonalenie szkoleń załogi i systemów monitorowania oraz dostosowanie regulacji do nowych technologii, aby transport towarów niebezpiecznych na statkach Ro-Pax był jeszcze bezpieczniejszy i bardziej efektywny.

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Bartosz Namieciński
Faculty of Law and Administration
University of Szczecin
e-mail: bartosz.namiecinski@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-6066-6635

Dominika Trzeszczoń
Faculty of Law and Administration
University of Szczecin
e-mail: dominika.trzeszczon@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-8318-0278

Taxation of Shipping Entrepreneurs with Tonnage Tax in Poland and Its Significance as a Source of State Budget Revenue – A Perspective of Several Years of Its Functioning

Keywords: tax, tonnage tax, shipping entrepreneur, income, state budget

Introduction

The development of activities conducted on seas and oceans, as well as the ongoing digitisation of all spheres of life, influences the directions of changes in the Polish legal order regarding the broadly understood maritime economy. The issue of taxing shipping entrepreneurs has gained particular importance in recent years, as it is closely related to processes aimed at creating a stable and secure financial system. Appropriate tax regulations influence the development and ensure the transparency of the maritime sector, which plays a crucial role in the national economy.

The main objective of the research conducted in this area is to verify the rationale and effectiveness of taxing shipping entrepreneurs with the tonnage tax in Poland. The research hypothesis is that the tonnage tax has limited fiscal significance for the state budget. However, it should be noted that although the fiscal function should be the dominant one for this public levy, the tonnage tax can also serve non-fiscal functions, particularly stabilising and record-keeping/control functions.

To verify the hypothesis, the following research questions were posed:

1. Why was the tonnage tax introduced in Poland?
2. Can the construction of the tonnage tax in Poland and the principles of its collection be associated with any difficulties in the settlement of this form of taxation by shipping entrepreneurs?
3. What is the amount of revenue for the state budget from the tonnage tax in Poland for the years 2007–2024, taking into account the number of taxpayers of this levy?
4. What is the share of revenue from the tonnage tax in total tax revenues?

Many factors influence the development of the maritime economy, and among those that should be given particular attention are legal regulations that set the normative framework for the functioning of maritime transport. Issues related to the financing of shipping entrepreneurs should first be considered in an international context, particularly in light of Poland's membership in the European Union (EU). In the context of maritime shipping taxation, the tonnage tax holds a special place. It serves as a fundamental tool for implementing transport policy not only in Poland but across the entire EU.[1] For shipping entrepreneurs, this form of taxation is applied in most EU member states. It is also worth noting that the possibility of subjecting shipping entrepreneurs to the tonnage tax derives from the EU document: Commission Communication C(2004) 43 – Community Guidelines on State Aid to Maritime Transport (2004/C 13/03).[2]

Considering the adopted research methodology, it can be noted that, from a historical perspective, the introduction of the tonnage tax in EU Member States was a response to the "mass exodus of ships from national flags."[3] Furthermore, the purpose of the adopted tax regulations should be seen as an effort to create conditions for shipping entrepreneurs based on the principle of competitiveness in the cross-border shipping market, as well as in the "return of ships under the national flags of EU member states."[4] In the literature[5] it has been indicated that the tonnage tax was first introduced in 1957 in Greece, whereas in Poland, it has been in effect since 2007 based on the Act of

1 Justification for the Draft Bill on Tonnage Tax, Print No. 372, Sejm of the 5th Term, 1–2, accessed: 20.03.2025, https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki5ka.nsf/wgdruku/372.

2 Komunikat Komisji C(2004) 43 – Wytyczne Wspólnoty w sprawie pomocy państwa dla transportu morskiego, Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Law] (hereinafter Dz. U.) C 13 z 17.01.2004 [Communication from the Commission — Community Guidelines on State Aid to Maritime Transport (2004/C 13/03), Official Journal of the European Union, C 13, 17.01.2004]. Accessed 20.03.2025. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:JOC_2017_120_R_0003&from=EN#ntc1-C_2017120PL.01001001-E0001.

3 Cezary Łuczywek, "Podatek tonażowy a inne formy pomocy publicznej dla transportu morskiego," *Prawo Morskie* 27 (2012): 217–234.

4 Justification for the Draft Bill.

5 Łuczywek, "Podatek tonażowy," 217–225.

24 August 2006, on Tonnage Tax.[6] The main objective of the introduced regulations should be seen in the need to align the operating conditions of domestic shipping entrepreneurs with EU standards. It also serves as a tool for ensuring tax comparability between EU member states and other countries worldwide.[7]

According to the authors, the tonnage tax, due to the high degree of complexity of legal regulations and inconsistent interpretations, can be considered enigmatic. Therefore, conducting research in this area is necessary and justified, especially considering the connection of this tax with maritime activities. The tonnage tax functions within the Polish tax system alongside other forms of taxation, mainly as an alternative to the standard income tax. It is applied in a lump-sum form and is associated with the operation of commercial ships in international shipping.[8] This means that the choice of this form of taxation depends on meeting the conditions outlined in legal regulations, as it is a specialised form of taxation aimed at supporting ship owners. This prompts the authors to explore not only the purely fiscal aspects but also to look for elements connecting the analyzed form of taxation with the public finance system, seeking justifications for the current legal solutions, their completeness, and adequacy.

In response to the first research question, it should be stated that the tonnage tax was introduced in Poland to align national regulations with EU standards. The introduction of this public levy was consistent with the EU transport policy and with the recommendations of the European Commission, which emphasised the need to support shipping as a strategic tool for the national economy. Furthermore, the purpose of the tonnage tax can be found in the need to create more attractive fiscal conditions for shipping entrepreneurs. The tonnage tax was intended to address the issue of ship registration in countries offering more favourable tax conditions. Additionally, it represents a simplified form of taxation, replacing the traditional income tax, which in its original design aimed to provide greater stability and financial transparency within the maritime sector.

Subject and Object of Taxation

The second of the research questions refers to the elements of the construction of the tonnage tax. First of all, it should be indicated that the tonnage tax, used for taxing a shipping entrepreneur, covers only certain types of income earned by entrepreneurs

6 Act of 24 August 2006, on Tonnage Tax, Dz. U. of 2021, item 985 as amended (hereinafter TTA).

7 Justification for the Draft Bill.

8 Rafał Dowgier and Robert Sieńko, "Zryczałtowane formy opodatkowania podatkiem dochodowym," in: *Prawo podatkowe. Minirepetytorium*, ed. Rafał Dowgier, and Robert Sieńko (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2017), 151–152.

operating sea-going merchant vessels in international shipping.[9] Moreover, it should be noted that taxation under the tonnage tax is not obligatory. This means that the entrepreneur may decide to choose this form of taxation or to settle the obtained income under the general rules.

The tonnage tax is imposed exclusively on shipping entrepreneurs who provide services in international shipping, using vessels with a gross tonnage (GT) of more than 100 units each. A shipping entrepreneur is understood to mean a natural person, a legal person, and a partner in a civil law partnership, and a partner in a registered partnership that is not a corporate income tax payer within the meaning of the Act of 15 February 1992 on Corporate Income Tax,[10] as well as a partner in a limited partnership, a joint-stock limited partnership, or a general partnership,[11] having their place of residence, registered office, or management located in Poland. In addition, a shipping entrepreneur is also understood to mean a foreign entrepreneur that is, a Polish citizen conducting business activity abroad. Certain types of legal persons have therefore been excluded from the subjective scope of the tonnage tax, certain types of legal persons (e.g., joint-stock companies and limited liability companies), and furthermore, this form of taxation cannot be applied by entrepreneurs providing services on smaller vessels, i.e., with a gross tonnage of up to 100 units.

The tonnage tax covers activities in the field of international shipping consisting of the carriage of cargo or passengers. It also applies to deep-sea rescue operations, as well as other shipping-related activities connected with the transport of persons and goods, such as the leasing and use of containers; loading, unloading, and repair activities; the operation of passenger terminals; the sale of goods or services; the conclusion of lease, tenancy, or charter agreements for ships; and the provision of services by shipping agents and brokers.

In addition, under the Tonnage Tax Act (TTA), the legislator excluded from taxation activities in the fields of fishing or fish processing, the construction of seaports, the construction and repair of port infrastructure or port facilities, the construction of wind farms, the construction of waterways or dredging of riverbeds and water reservoirs, as well as education, scientific research, sport, and recreational transport. Thus, it should be recognised that the material scope of the tonnage tax is specialised. As a form of taxation addressed to a defined group of entities, it essentially encompasses strictly maritime activities. In doing so, the legislator has limited the possibility of applying

9 Stanisław Dolata, *Podstawy wiedzy o polskim systemie podatkowym* (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2013), 399.

10 Act of 15 February 1992 on Corporate Income Tax, Dz. U. of 2025, item 278.

11 Paweł Małecki and Małgorzata Mazurkiewicz, "Komentarz do art. 1," in: *CIT. Komentarz. Podatki i rachunkowość*, eds. Paweł Małecki and Małgorzata Mazurkiewicz, 16th ed. (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2024), Lex/el 2025, accessed 15.10.2025, https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587279163.

this tax exclusively to activities that are directly connected with international maritime transport. The exclusions provided for in Article 3(3) of the TTA should be interpreted as a deliberate restriction aimed at preventing potential abuse. It should be noted that the above personal and material limitations significantly restrict the possibility of using tonnage taxation for many entrepreneurs. The solutions adopted by the legislator in this respect therefore have a substantial impact on the number of entities that settle their taxes using this form of taxation. Possibly, an extension of the personal and material scope could contribute to increasing the popularity of the tonnage tax among shipping entrepreneurs.

Basis of Taxation and the Rate of Tax

The tax base is the income of the shipping entrepreneur from taxable activities, corresponding to the product of the daily rate and the period of operation in a given month of all the ships of the shipping entrepreneur, from which the income is subject to tonnage tax.[12] An important characteristic of this tax is, therefore, its detachment from the actual level of the taxpayer's revenue or income. Instead, the tax is levied on the potential income, which is calculated based on the rules set out in in the TTA. For this reason, it is emphasised in the literature that this tax essentially has a lump-sum nature.[13] From the above regulation, it follows that an important element for calculating the tax base is the daily rate, set in euros, multiplied by the period of operation of all the shipowner's vessels in a given month.[14] The daily rate is determined based on the net tonnage of the ship, with every 1000 NT (net tonnage) being subject to rates expressed in euros. The amount of the daily rate depends on the ship's tonnage. The relationship between the ship's tonnage and the rates used to calculate income resembles a regressive scale: as the ship's tonnage increases, the daily rates on which the shipping entrepreneur's income depends decrease.[15] The daily rate determined in this way is converted into Polish zloty (PLN) according to the average exchange rate of the euro on the last day of the month for which the rate is calculated, as announced by the National Bank of Poland (NBP).

12 Dominik Mączyński, "Przedmiot podatku, podstawa opodatkowania i stawka podatkowa," in: *Podatki i prawo podatkowe*, eds. Dominik Mączyński and Andrzej Gomułowicz (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2022), 696.

13 Ryszard Mastalski, *Prawo podatkowe* (Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 2018), 471.

14 Stefan Babiarz, et al., *Ryczałty w prawie podatkowym* (Warszawa: LexisNexis, 2012), 49.

15 Katarzyna Wojewoda-Buraczyńska, "Podatek tonażowy," in: *Zarys finansów publicznych i prawa finansowego*, ed. Wanda Wójtowicz (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2020), 322–323.

The income of the shipping entrepreneur is determined by multiplying the daily rate for a given ship by the number of days of operation in the month (The days on which the ship was registered). This process is repeated for each ship subject to the tonnage tax. The sum provides the income from the activities taxed with the tonnage tax.[16] It should also be noted that in the case of taxation of income or revenues from this activity under the tonnage tax, they are not combined with other income of the shipowner taxed under the income tax or the lump-sum tax on recorded revenues. When calculating the basis for taxation (potential income), it should be observed that the period of operation of the ship refers not to the actual period of its use in international shipping, but to the potential period of use of the ship in such shipping.[17] Moreover, the income as the basis for taxation is determined separately for each ship, and then the income from all ships is summed up. The total income must account for the sum of the operational periods of all the shipowner's ships, regardless of whether the shipowner is an individual, a legal entity, or a foreign entrepreneur.[18] The amount of the tonnage tax due is calculated from the established tax base by applying a 19% rate.

In legal doctrine, it is pointed out that determining income in an estimated manner seems to be a favourable solution for the taxpayer. Firstly, it means there is no obligation to keep detailed records of income and calculate costs. Secondly, the tonnage tax was designed as a tax preference; therefore, the estimated income should be lower than the actual income earned by the taxpayer. As a result, the tax paid should also be lower, even though it is calculated based on the same, or even a higher, rate than the tax paid under the general rules. However, estimating income also has its drawbacks. If the taxpayer's business does not generate profits or even results in losses, this does not affect the amount of tax. In such cases, the tonnage tax is certainly a less favorable solution than the tax paid under the general rules.[19] It should also be noted that in the case of the tonnage tax, the tax base is not reduced by the costs of earning income incurred by the shipping entrepreneur. Therefore, the taxpayer will not be able to deduct from the tax costs such as repairs, equipment, or operation of the vessel. In the case of significant expenditures related, for example, to business development, depreciation, or employment costs, abandoning the general taxation rules in favor of the tonnage tax may prove disadvantageous for the entrepreneur.

In conclusion, it should also be noted that revenues obtained by a shipping entrepreneur from the sale of ships are also subject to tonnage tax. These revenues, to the extent not used for the acquisition of ownership or a share in co-ownership, repair,

16 Alina Majchrzycka-Guzowska, *Finanse i prawo finansowe* (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2019), 220.

17 Babiarz, *Ryczałty w prawie podatkowym,* 49.

18 Ibidem.

19 Wojewoda-Buraczyńska, "Podatek tonażowy," 322–323.

modernisation, or reconstruction of ships, within a period of 3 years from the date of sale, are taxed at a lump-sum rate of 15%. However, if the entrepreneur, within the specified period, uses (in whole or in part) the revenue obtained from the sale of a ship, e.g., for the acquisition or modernisation of another ship, then that portion of the revenue will not be subject to tonnage tax.

Tax Collection Rules

As already mentioned, the tonnage tax is not a mandatory form of taxation. Since 2007, maritime entrepreneurs have had the option to choose between tonnage tax and taxation of income under the so-called general rules. This means that they may also choose to be taxed in accordance with the Act of 26 July 1991, on personal income tax[20] or the Corporate Income Tax Act.[21] It is worth noting that if tonnage tax is selected as the primary form of settlement, shipping entrepreneurs are not subject to income tax.[22] Consequently, it should be emphasized that the taxation with the tonnage tax depends on the will of the shipping entrepreneur. If they decide to choose this form of taxation, they are required to submit a declaration of choice for the tonnage tax (PT declaration), which must be filed with the head of the tax office responsible for income tax matters.[23] The required declaration must be submitted by 20 January of the first tax year of the taxation period. However, if a shipping entrepreneur begins operations during the tax year, the declaration must be submitted no later than the day preceding the commencement of such activity. Therefore, the option to use the tonnage tax is a right, not an obligation, of the taxpayer. Legal literature notes that settling taxes under this form of taxation entails significantly more far-reaching legal consequences than other taxation methods, from which taxpayers can relatively easily withdraw.[24] If a taxpayer chooses to be taxed under the tonnage tax system, their decision is binding for no fewer than ten tax years.[25] During this period, it is not possible to change the form of taxation.[26]

20 Act of 26 July 1991 on Personal Income Tax, Dz. U. of 2025, item 163.

21 Act of 15 February 1992 on Corporate Income Tax.

22 Robert Wolański, *System podatkowy. Zarys wykładu* (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2020), 195 and n.

23 Aleksandra Krajewska, "Podatek tonażowy," in: *Opodatkowanie działalności gospodarczej w Polsce*, ed. Adam Mariański (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2016), 75.

24 Ireneusz Mirek, "Podatek tonażowy," in: *Prawo podatkowe. Podręcznik dla Podyplomowego Studium Prawa Podatkowe*go, ed. Małgorzata Sęk, vol. 2 (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2014), 568.

25 Przemysław Panfil, "Podatek tonażowy," in: *Podstawy finansów i prawa finansowego*, ed. Andrzej Drwiłło (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2018), 581–582.

26 Robert Wolański, *System podatkowy. Zarys wykładu* (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2020), 198–199.

In light of the above, it can be considered that this is a situation that may discourage future taxpayers from choosing this type of taxation. Consequently, it may lead to a reduction in state budget revenues from the tonnage tax. This circumstance makes the decision to settle taxes under the tonnage tax scheme have far more significant and lasting consequences than the decision to use any other simplified form of taxation, which can be abandoned in the following tax year without major difficulties.[27]

Both the structural elements of the tonnage tax and the rules governing its collection raise questions about whether the complexity of these regulations might deter shipping entrepreneurs from choosing this form of taxation. In addressing the second research question, it is evident that the structure of the tonnage tax system is marked by a certain ambivalence. On one hand, it allows shipping entrepreneurs to settle their taxes independently of their actual income, which is particularly beneficial when generating high profits. Furthermore, such entrepreneurs can maintain only simplified accounting records. On the other hand, several factors reduce the attractiveness of this tax system. Firstly, its scope is limited both in terms of eligible entities and activities. The tonnage tax applies only to shipping entrepreneurs engaged in strictly defined international shipping activities, using vessels with a gross tonnage exceeding specific thresholds set in the relevant legislation. Moreover, the law outlines numerous exclusions from tonnage tax eligibility. If a shipping entrepreneur operates multiple types of business activities, taxation can become problematic. Additionally, calculating the tax base appears complex. The so-called "daily rates" depend on the vessel's tonnage and are expressed in euros, requiring conversion into Polish currency based on the exchange rate on the last day of each month. These rates must be multiplied by the number of days the vessel was in operation that month. Only after determining the tax base can the 19% tax rate be applied to calculate the tax due. Moreover, the period of taxation under the tonnage tax amounts to as much as ten years, during which it is not possible to change the form of taxation. In light of the above, it should be stated that these requirements do not simplify the fulfilment of tax obligations by a shipping entrepreneur.

The Significance of the Tonnage Tax as a Source of State Budget Revenue

When discussing the issue of the tonnage tax, it is also necessary to pay attention to the practical dimension of this public levy. In this context, it is essential to present data concerning both the number of tonnage taxpayers and the amount of revenues to the state budget from the tonnage tax. The period covered by the study was 2007–2024.

27 Krajewska, "Podatek tonażowy," 75.

Consequently, the analysis considered data from the last 18 years, i.e., from the date the tonnage tax was introduced into the Polish legal system until the end of the previous calendar year. The data in question originate both from reports and materials provided by the Ministry of Finance and from information obtained through public access to information requests. The results of the analytical studies conducted are presented in table 1. At this point, it should be noted that the scope of the study covered only those entities that decided to settle their income under the tonnage tax. The data below do not include shipping entrepreneurs who, having the option of tonnage taxation, chose to settle their income according to general taxation rules. It should be emphasized that it is not possible to precisely determine the total number of shipping entrepreneurs in Poland, as such data are not collected in a central register. This information is dispersed across various offices and registers, and access is limited due to business confidentiality and tax secrecy. For example, as of 2025, the Polish Association of Shipping Entrepreneurs comprised approximately 21 companies in the shipping sector.

Table 1. Revenues from tonnage tax in Poland in the Context of Total Tax Revenues

Fiscal year	Total tax revenues (in thousand PLN)	Number of tonnage tax taxpayers	Revenues from tonnage tax (in thousand PLN)	Share of tonnage tax revenues in total tax revenues (in %)
2007	206,385,202	2	0	0
2008	219,499,380	2	9	0.00000410
2009	214,878,835	2	7	0.00000326
2010	222,552,687	2	3	0.00000135
2011	243,210,936	2	7	0.00000288
2012	248,274,572	2	7	0.00000282
2013	241,650,924	2	7	0.00000290
2014	254,780,985	1	1	0.00000039
2015	259,673,511	1	0.3	0.00000012
2016	273,138,413	1	0.3	0.00000011
2017	315,257,413	1	0.3	0.00000010
2018	349,353,843	1	0	–
2019	367,290,721	1	24	0.00000653
2020	370,261,752	1	–23*	–
2021	432,170,399	1	0	–
2022	465,456,109	1	–0.2*	–
2023	506,866,723	1	0	–
2024	555,936,540	1	0	–

* A negative revenue value each year results from the refund of overpaid tax from previous years.

Source: Own study based on data from the Ministry of Finance obtained in 2025 through a public information access request.

The tonnage tax is a specialised form of taxation applied in the shipping sector. It was intended to serve as an alternative to the traditional income tax by introducing a fixed tax based on the tonnage of the fleet. At the same time, it should be emphasised that shipping entrepreneurs have the option of choosing between tonnage tax and corporate income tax (CIT) or personal income tax (PIT). The research hypothesis put forward is that the tonnage tax has little fiscal significance for the state budget, but from the perspective of the financial law system, this is not the only function attributed to public taxes.[28] The authors believe that the primary function of this tax should be its fiscal function. However, due to its complex structure, it is impossible to assert that this is its only function.[29] The research indicates that the structure of the tonnage tax also suggests that it serves stabilising and record-keeping functions. The conducted studies confirm the validity of the hypothesis put forward. A doctrinal-legal analysis of the legislation and the academic literature on the subject, as well as the verification of statistical data, indicates that the current legal framework contains legislative solutions that hinder the use of this form of taxation, which in turn leads to a reduction in revenues from the tonnage tax to the state budget. The following research questions were designed to verify the hypothesis:

1. Why was the tonnage tax introduced in Poland?
2. Could the structure of the tonnage tax in Poland and the principles of its collection be associated with difficulties in tax settlement for shipping entrepreneurs?
3. What is the amount of revenue generated for the state budget from the tonnage tax in Poland between 2007 and 2024, considering the number of taxpayers subject to this tax?
4. What is the share of tonnage tax revenue in total tax revenues?

In response to the questions posed, it should first be recalled that the introduction of regulations concerning the tonnage tax into Polish legislation was, on the one hand, aimed at aligning national provisions with EU guidelines, and on the other hand, was driven by the need to create conditions for shipowners that would enable them to operate competitively on the international shipping market and encourage the return of vessels under national flags. Therefore, in this regard, one can observe the manifestation of the regulatory function of public finances, as well as, incidentally, the record-keeping and control functions.

28 Jadwiga Glumińska-Pawlic, "Ogólna charakterystyka danin niepodatkowych," in: *System prawa finansowego*, vol. 3: *Prawo daninowe,* ed. Leonard Etel (Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2010), 863; Katarzyna Święch-Kujawska, "Dochody podatkowe jednostek samorządu lokalnego a standardy wynikające z Europejskiej Karty Samorządu Lokalnego," in: *Europejska Karta Samorządu Lokalnego a prawo samorządu terytorialnego*, ed. Małgorzata Ofiarska (Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński, 2015), 446.

29 Wojciech Bożek, *Publicznoprawne kary pieniężne o charakterze prewencyjnym stanowiące źródło dochodów budżetu państw*a (Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 2022), 27.

Secondly, the legislator has explicitly defined the criteria that must be met by shipping entrepreneurs in order to be subject to the tonnage tax. Thus, the tonnage tax is a special form of taxation targeted at a selected group of entities engaged in specific activities. By choosing to settle taxes under the tonnage tax, a shipping entrepreneur can maintain only simplified accounting. However, attention should be drawn to the numerous factors that diminish the attractiveness of this form of taxation. These include the limited scope of eligible entities and activities. The calculation of the tax base also seems quite complex. The rules governing the collection of this tax can also lead to numerous practical problems. Given the above, it can be concluded that the formal requirements do not simplify the fulfilment of tax obligations for shipping entrepreneurs when using the tonnage tax system. These issues may significantly influence shipping entrepreneurs' decisions not to choose tonnage tax as a form of taxation. In such a situation, these entities will remain obliged to pay traditional income tax.

Thirdly, as part of the conducted research, financial data provided by the Ministry of Finance was verified, which shows that from 2007 to 2013, only two entrepreneurs paid the tonnage tax, and since 2014, there has been only one taxpayer. Revenue from taxing shipping entrepreneurs with this form of tax is therefore insignificant. However, it should be remembered that an entrepreneur's income may also be taxed using CIT or PIT. During the examined period, a total of PLN 65,900 from tonnage tax was collected by the state budget, while the refund amount was PLN 23,200, meaning that only PLN 42,700 ultimately reached the state budget. It is noted that, from the perspective of 18 years of the tonnage tax's existence, the average annual revenue for the state budget is approximately PLN 2,372, which indicates the low fiscal effectiveness of the adopted solution. However, these figures do not include shipping companies which, despite being eligible for tonnage tax, decided to settle their income tax liability under the general rules. Therefore, it can be concluded that the adopted model of taxing shipping entrepreneurs with tonnage tax does not yield the expected results, which leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to change or introduce more effective regulations.

Fourthly, the authors observed that revenues from the tonnage tax play only a marginal role in the state budget. As a result, it is justified to state that their potential absence would not have a significant impact on the stability of the national economy, including the security of public finances. However, tonnage tax revenue cannot be equated with all revenue that the Polish State receives from the taxation of shipping entrepreneurs.

In the conclusions *de lege ferenda*, it should be recognized that, due to the limited fiscal effectiveness of the tonnage tax, consideration should be given to introducing changes to its structure. Considering the above, it seems that a change that could encourage a larger number of taxpayers to choose this form of taxation would be to simplify

the rules for calculating the tax base by eliminating the current requirement to convert the so-called daily rate from euros to PLN. Furthermore, the requirement to settle the tax every month is not encouraging for taxpayers. In this regard, consideration should be given to the possibility of annual settlement or the introduction of four instalments due at the end of each quarter. Finally, choosing the tonnage tax as a form of taxation binds the taxpayer for a period of up to ten years. This solution does not promote efficiency and flexibility in managing a shipping enterprise. This period should be significantly shorter, ideally a maximum of three years. Moreover, the authors observe that there may also be a need to clarify the subject and object scope of this tax, so that the regulations become more transparent.

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SUMMARY

As of 1 January 2007, the tonnage tax was introduced in the Republic of Poland. This tax, as an instrument of state policy, was intended to restore the comparability of the tax burden on shipowners in Poland with the tax burden in countries with so-called "flags of convenience." As a result, the purpose of introducing this regulation was to bring EU shipowners' vessels back under national flags, and consequently, to increase state budget revenues from this source. Over 18 years have passed since then, making it necessary to verify the achievement of these goals.

During the research, the hypothesis was formulated that the tonnage tax has a limited fiscal significance for the state budget, although as a public levy, it primarily serves a fiscal function. Four research questions were formulated to verify the hypothesis. The study initially focused on discussing the structure of the tonnage tax. In this context, attention was given to the subject and object of taxation, as well as the tax base and rates. A significant portion of the analysis was dedicated to presenting the principles governing the calculation and collection of the tax. Next, the fiscal significance of this public levy for the state budget was examined from the perspective of eighteen years of its operation. This assessment focused on the revenue generated from the collection of the tonnage tax, which served as a basis for conclusions regarding the justification of its continued application.

The main research method used in this study was the dogmaticlegal and formalanalytical methods. Additionally, the historical-legal method was also used. In the dogmatic-legal method, normative legal sources, including Polish legislation, were analyzed. The study also relied on the contributions of doctrine. Within the research using the analytical-formal method, financial data regarding the tonnage tax provided by the Ministry of Finance were verified. This data was taken from both annual reports on the execution of the state budget and those obtained through a public access to information request. The analysis concludes with a summary and the formulation of *de lege ferenda* conclusions.

Opodatkowanie przedsiębiorcy żeglugowego podatkiem tonażowym w Polsce i jego znaczenie jako źródła dochodu budżetu państwa – perspektywa kilkunastu lat jego funkcjonowania

Słowa kluczowe: podatek, podatek tonażowy, przedsiębiorca żeglugowy, dochód, budżet państwa

STRESZCZENIE

Na obszarze Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dniem 1 stycznia 2007 r. wprowadzony został podatek tonażowy. Podatek ten jako instrument polityki państwa miał przywrócić porównywalność obciążeń podatkowych armatorów w Polsce z obciążeniem, jakie obowiązuje w państwach tzw. wygodnej bandery. W konsekwencji celem wprowadzenia tej regulacji miał być powrót statków armatorów unijnych pod bandery narodowe, a co za tym idzie zwiększenie wpływów do budżetu państwa z tego tytułu. Od tego czasu minęło ponad 18 lat, w związku

z czym konieczne wydaje się poddanie weryfikacji realizacji ww. celów. W ramach prowadzonych badań postawiona została teza, że podatek tonażowy ma niewielkie znaczenie fiskalne dla budżetu państwa, choć jako danina publiczna pełni przede wszystkim tę funkcję. Weryfikacji postawionej tezy służyć miały cztery pytania badawcze. W opracowaniu w pierwszej kolejności skoncentrowano się na omówieniu konstrukcji podatku tonażowego. W tym zakresie zwrócono uwagę na podmiot oraz przedmiot podatku, a także na podstawę opodatkowania i stawki podatkowe. Zasadniczą cześć rozważań poświecono także na przedstawienie zasad związanych z obliczeniem i poborem podatku. Następnie weryfikacji poddano fiskalne znaczenie tej daniny publicznej dla budżetu państwa z perspektywy 18 lat funkcjonowania. W tym zakresie oceniono wysokość dochodów uzyskanych z tytułu poboru podatku tonażowego, co stanowiło asumpt do wniosków w przedmiocie zasadności jego stosowania.

Głównymi metodami badawczymi zastosowanymi w ramach prowadzonych badań były metody dogmatycznoprawna oraz formalno-analityczna. Akcesoryjnie wykorzystano także metodę historyczno-prawną. W zakresie metody dogmatycznoprawnej analizie poddano normatywne źródła prawa, w tym ustawodawstwo polskie. Pomocniczo skorzystano także z dorobku doktryny. W ramach badań prowadzonych z wykorzystaniem metody analityczno-formalnej weryfikacji poddano dane finansowe dotyczące podatku tonażowego udostępnione przez Ministerstwo Finansów. W tym zakresie wykorzystane zostały zarówno dane zawarte w corocznych sprawozdaniach z wykonania budżetu państwa, jak i udostępnione na wniosek skierowany w trybie dostępu do informacji publicznej. Całość rozważań zamyka podsumowanie i sformułowane wnioski *de lege ferenda*.

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