Dziecko i filozofia. Spór o filozofowanie dzieci

The answer to the question of child’s philosophizing requires the prior decisions on fundamental issues in areas such as metaphilosophy, epistemology, psychology and pedagogy. The position in the dispute over a child’s philosophy is usually the consequence of adopting a certain attitude towards issues related to understanding the nature of philosophy itself, what childhood is, how human cognitive competences develop, and what the education is and what it should be. Supporters of child’s philosophizing probably have different definition of the philosophy, they also have another vision of child’s cognitive development than philosophers who are skeptical towards philosophy practiced by children. In this paper I will attempt to order the arguments of supporters and skeptics of child’s philosophizing, stressing the importance of various authors’ positions on issues which are substantial for the problem of child’s philosophizing. A special role in this dispute plays criticism of Piaget’s theory of development of cognitive competences. According to critics of Piaget, he is focused on constructing a model of development and does not notice the phenomenon of child’s philosophizing. Children are in the wrong at any stage of development. But their mental constructions are essentially brilliant philosophical problematizing of the world.