Analiza i Egzystencja
Czy istnienie móże być lepsze albo gorsze od nieistnienia? Część II: Wartości osobowe a obiektywne racje moralne
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2016.36-02
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| ISSN: | 1734-9923 |
| eISSN: | 2300-7621 |
| Autoren: |
Mirosław
Rutkowski
Uniwersytet Szczeciński |
| Schlüsselbegriffe: | istnienie, nieistnienie, dobrostan, wartość osobowa |
| Erscheinungsdatum der Ausgabe / Monografie: | 2016 |
| Seitenanzahl: | 27 (25-51) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadaten |
 
  
 
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Abstract
CAN EXISTENCE BE BETTER OR WORSE THAN NONEXISTENCE? PART I
The aim of this paper is to examine whether there is any possibility to compare the value of someone’s existence with his nonexistence. The final conclusion is that such a comparative evaluation can never be made in a meaningful and valid manner. Nobody can know as well whether he would be better off or worse off created than he would have been had he never existed.
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