Przejdź do treści
Analiza i Egzystencja
35 (2016)

Czy emocje mogą być racjonalne. Analiza wybranych aspektów filozofii emocjiRonalda de Sousy

DOI: 10.18276/aie.2016.35-06
Cytuj

Pełny tekst jest dostępny

ISSN:1734-9923
eISSN:2300-7621
Autorzy: Andrzej Dąbrowski
Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania w Rzeszowie
Słowa kluczowe: racjonalność emocji racjonalność prawdziwość emocji obiektywność emocji emocje racjonalność aksjologiczna
Data publikacji całości:2016
Liczba stron:25 (113-137)
OAI-PMH:Metadane
Cited-by (Crossref) ?: Włącz JavaScript, aby pobrać dane cytowań.
CC BY-SA Open Access DOAJ CEEOL ERIH PLUS Scopus Diamond Discovery Hub
Kod QR

Abstrakt

CAN EMOTIONS BE RATIONAL?THE ANALYSIS OF SOME ASPECTS OF RONALD DE SOUSA’S PHILOSOPHYOF EMOTIONSummaryIn the paper I examine the three aspects of Ronald de Sousa’s philosophy of emotions:intentionality, objectivity, and rationality of emotions. In the beginning, I putup the basic question, how he sees emotions? De Sousa argues that emotions are a kind of perception (perception of axiological properties). At the same time hedefends an objectivist approach to emotions. It implies that emotion apprehendssomething in the world that exists independently of us. The fundamental question,how emotions relate to their objects, leads to the inquiry on the intentional structureof emotion and, then, to the study of the truth of emotion. Finally, I reconstruct a veryimportant study concerning rationality: cognitive rationality, strategic rationality,and axiological rationality. The latter one is specific to the emotions.

PDF

Pobierz PDF
Podgląd PDF

Otwórz PDF

Bibliografia (66)
  1. Ben-Ze’ev, A. (2000). The Subtlety of emotions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  2. Brady, M.S. (2013). Emotional Insight. The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience.
  3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  4. Brentano, F. (1999). Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia. Warszawa:
  5. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
  6. Brun G., Doğuoğlu U., Kuenzle D., (eds.). (2008). Epistemology and Emotions.
  7. Hampshire: Ashgate.
  8. Elgin, C.Z. (2008). Emotion and Understanding. W: G. Brun, U. Doğuoğlu, D. Kuenzle,
  9. (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions (s. 33–49). Hampshire: Ashgate.
  10. Elster, J. (1999). Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. New York:
  11. Cambridge University Press.
  12. Elster, J. (2009). Reason and Rationality. Princeton–New York: Princeton University
  13. Press.
  14. Elster, J. (2009). Emotions. W: P. Hedström, P. Bearman, (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
  15. of Analytical Sociology (s. 51–71). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  16. Elster, J. (2010). Emotional Choice and Rational Choice. W: P. Goldie, (eds.),
  17. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions (s. 263–282). Oxford:
  18. Oxford University Press.
  19. Goldie, P. (ed.). (2010). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions. Oxford:
  20. Goldie, P. (2000). The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon
  21. Griffiths, P.E. (1997). What Emotions Really are: The Problem of Psychological
  22. Categories. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  23. Hedström, P., Bearman, P., (eds.). (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Analytical
  24. Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  25. Helm, B.W. (2007). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature
  26. of Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  27. James, W. (2002). Psychologia. Kurs skrócony. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe
  28. PWN.
  29. Krzemkowska-Saja, J. (2014). Ontologia i epistemologia emocji w ujęciu Ronalda
  30. De Sousy. Analiza krytyczna. Uniwersytet Szczeciński [doktorat].
  31. Krzemkowska-Saja, J. (2013). Czy potrzebujemy pojęcia prawdy emocjonalnej?,
  32. Przegląd Filozoficzny, 1 (85), 47–61.
  33. Larrazabal, J.M., Pérez Miranda, L.A. (eds.). (2004). Language, Knowledge, and
  34. Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
  35. Levi-Strauss, C. (2001). Myśl nieoswojona. Warszawa: KR.
  36. Łukasiewicz, J. (1987). O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa. Warszawa: PWN.
  37. Marks, J. (1982). A Theory of Emotion. Philosophical Studies: An International
  38. Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 42 (2), 227–242.
  39. Marks, J., Ames, R.T. (eds.). (1995). Emotions in Asian Thought. A Dialogue
  40. in Comparative Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
  41. Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  42. Pisula, W. (2003). Psychologia zachowań eksploracyjnych zwierząt. Gdańsk:
  43. GWP.
  44. Prinz, J.J. (2004). Gut Reactions: a Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York:
  45. Rorty, A.O. (ed.). (1980). Explaining Emotions, Berkeley: University of California
  46. Salmela, M. (2014). True Emotions. Amstrdam/Filadelfia: John Benjamins Publishing
  47. Company.
  48. Searle, J.R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. New York:
  49. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  50. Solomon, R. (1983). The Passions. The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion. Notre
  51. Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
  52. Sousa, R. de (1980). The Rationality of Emotions. W: A.O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining
  53. Emotions (s. 127–151). Berkeley: University of California Press.
  54. Sousa, R. de (1987). The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA – London:
  55. The MIT Press.
  56. Sousa, R. de (2011). Emotional Truth. New York: Oxford University Press.
  57. Sousa, R. de (2008). Logic and Biology: Emotional Inference and Emotions in Reasoning.
  58. W: J.E. Adler, L.J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning Studies of Human Inference and
  59. its Foundations (s. 1002–1015). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  60. Sousa, R. de (2004). Twelve Varieties of Subjectivity: Dividing in Hopes of Conquest.
  61. W: J.M. Larrazabal, L.A. Pérez Miranda (eds.). Language, Knowledge, and
  62. Representation (s. 147–164). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
  63. Sousa, R. de (2010). The Mind Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and
  64. Empirical Science. W: P. Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy
  65. of Emotions (s. 95–117). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  66. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.