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Bibliografia (29)

1. Baia, A. (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies,159 (3): 341–356.
2. Barnes, E., Cameron, R. (2008). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies, 146 (2): 291–309.
3. Barnes, E., Cameron, R. (2011). Back to the Open Future. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1): 1–26.
4. Belnap, N. (2002). Double Time References: Speech-Act Reports as Modalities in an Indeterminist Setting. W: F. Wolter, H. Wansing, M. de Rijke,
5. M. Zakharyaschev (red.), Advances in Modal Logic, t. 3 (s. 37–58). World Scientific Publishing.
6. Belnap, N., Perloff, M., Xu, M. (2001). Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterministic World. New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Besson, C., Hattiangadi, A. (2014). The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion. Philosophical Studies, 167 (2): 251–271.
8. Besson, C., Hattiangadi, A. (2020). Assertion and the Future. W: S. Goldberg (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (s. 481–504). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Cariani, F. (2021). The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Cariani, F., Santorio, P. (2018). Will Done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy. Mind, 127 (505): 129–165.
11. Davies, M., Humberstone, L. (1980). Two Notions of Necessity. Philosophical Studies, 38 (1): 1–31.
12. Florio, C. De, Frigerio, A. (2022). Future, Truth, and Probability. Inquiry, 0 (0): 1–13.
13. Iacona, A. (2014). Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines. Synthese, 191: 2633– 2652.
14. Iacona, A. (2022). Knowledge of Future Contingents. Philosophical Studies, 179 (2): 447–467.
15. Kierland, B., Monton, B. (2007). Presentism and the Objection from Being-Supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85 (3): 485–497.
16. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
17. Lampert, F. (2022). A Puzzle about the Fixity of the Past. Analysis, 82 (3): 426–434.
18. MacFarlane, J. (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (212): 321–336.
19. MacFarlane, J. (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. W: M. García-Carpintero, M. Kölbel (red.), Relative Truth, (s. 81–102). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20. MacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
21. Øhrstrøm, P. (2009). In Defence of the Thin Red Line: A Case for Ockhamism. Humana.mente, 8: 17–32.
22. Rosenkranz, S. (2012). In Defence of Ockhamism. Philosophia, 40 (3): 617– 631.
23. Rosenkranz, S., Correia, F. (2018). Nothing to Come: A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time. Springer.
24. Tkaczyk, M. (2015). Futura Contingentia. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
25. Todd, P. (2021). The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Wawer, J. (2014). The Truth about the Future. Erkenntnis, 79: 365–401.
27. Wawer, J. (2021). Tensed Metaphysics and Non-Local Grounding of Truth. Disputatio, 13: 411–22.
28. Wawer, J. (2023). A Problem with the Fixed Past Fixed. Synthese, 202. Pobrano z: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6.
29. Wawer, J., Malpass, A. (2020). Back to the Actual Future. Synthese, 197: 2193–2213.

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