ISSN: 1734-9923
eISSN: 2300-7621
OAI
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2021.55-02
Issue archive /
55 (2021)
Holism and Atomism in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
| Authors: |
Krystian
Bogucki
Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski |
| Keywords: | Ludwig Wittgenstein Holism Atomism Meaning Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. |
| Data publikacji całości: | 2021 |
| Page range: | 24 (25-48) |
Abstract
The aim of my paper is to describe and evaluate different conceptions of holism in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I distinguish three readings of holistic elements in this work: i) Minimal Holism (E. Anscombe, M. Black, D. Pears); ii) Moderate Holism (J. Conant, C. Diamond, G. Ryle); and iii) Radical Holism (G. Bar-Elli, M. Kremer, P. Livingston). The conclusion is that the most viable option is the Moderate Holism since it embraces the logico-syntactial notion of use, rejects anachronistic interpretation of Tractatarian ontology and allows us to see that the holistic elements are complementary to the initial atomism of the work. Moreover, I point to the consequences of the topic for the overall reading of Wittgenstein’s early and late work.
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