Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2019.47-01

Issue archive / 47 (2019)
Philosophy without Psychology: a case of wishful thinking?

Authors: Hans-Johann Glock
Universität Zürich
Keywords: Wittgenstein wishful thinking
Data publikacji całości:2019
Page range:25 (5-29)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:


The topic of this lecture is the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and Wittgensteinian philosophy on the one hand, psychology and psychologism on the other. It will start by clarifying how the label ‘psychologism’ should be understood in this context, opting for a neutral rather than derogatory conception. Next it discusses the relation between Frege’s anti-psychologism and that of the early Wittgenstein. The main focus will be on Wittgenstein’s denial that assertion and judgement are of logical relevance. The final sections turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Can it avoid the intrusion of psychology concerning the following areas: – meaning – philosophical psychology – philosophical method? Giving short shrift to psychological notions like understanding, perception, judgement and belief is impossible even in philosophy of language and epistemology, given their connections to notions like meaning and knowledge. If Wittgensteinian philosophizing were a kind of psychotherapy, it would also be wholly irresponsible to ignore psychological theories. Fortunately it isn’t. Nevertheless it is neither feasible nor desirable to insulate the clarification of philosophical problems and contested concepts against empirical considerations. I shall substantiate this claim by looking at the problem of animal minds and the role that abilities play for mental and epistemic phenomena. If conceptual analysis is to serve as an instrument of critical thinking, it had better be impure.
Download file

Article file


1.Anderson, R. L. (2005) Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 13(2), 287-323.
2.Anscombe, G.E.M. (1959). An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. London: Hutchinson.
3.Beaney, M. (2014) What is Analytic Philosoph?. In Beaney M. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (pp. 3-29). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4.Carl, W. (1994). Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5.Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
6.Dipert, R. (1998). Logic in the 19th Century. In Craig, E. (Ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
7.Erdmann, J.E. (1896). Die deutsche Philosophie seit Hegel’s Tode, Anhang zu: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie 2. Berlin: Herz Verlag.
8.Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift, trl. Conceptual Notation and Related Articles, trl. and ed. T.W. Bynum. Oxford: Clarendon.
9.Frege, G. (1891). Funktion und Begriff. In: McGuinness, B. (Trl.) (1984), Collected papers on mathematics, logics and philosophy. Cited after the original pagination.
10.Frege, G. (1923). Gedankengefüge. In Patzig, G. (Ed.) (1980), Frege. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
11.Frege. G. (1892). Sinn und Bedeutung. In: McGuinness, B. (Trl.) (1984), Collected papers on mathematics, logics and philosophy. Cited after the original pagination.
12.Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Breslau: Koebner.
13.Frege, G. (1891). Funktion und Begriff. In Patzig, G. (Ed.) (1980), Frege. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung (pp. 17-39). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. cited after the original pagination.
14.Frege, G. (1892). Sinn und Bedeutung. In Patzig, G. (Ed.) (1980), Frege. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. cited after the original pagination.
15.Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I. Jena: Hermann Pohle. In Furth, M. (Trl. & Ed.)(1964), The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
16.Frege, G. (1906). Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie III. In Angelelli, I. (Ed.), Gottlob Frege:
17.Kleine Schriften. Darmstadt: WBG. Cited after the original pagination.
18.Frege, G. (1918). Der Gedanke. In Patzig, G. (Ed.) (1980), Frege. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung (pp. 35-62). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
19.Frege, G. (1918/1919). Negation. In Beaney, M. (Ed.) (1997), The Frege Reader (pp. 346–61). Oxford: Blackwell. [‘Die Verneinung’, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I: 143–57.]
20.Frege, G. (1923). Compound Thoughts. In: McGuinness, B. (Trl.) (1984), Collected papers on mathematics, logics and philosophy. Cited after the original pagination.
21.Frege, G. (1879). Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze. Hildesheim: Olms.
22.Frege, G. (1979). Posthumous Writings. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach, P. Long and R. White (Trl. & Ed.) Oxford: Blackwell.
23.Frege, G. (1980). Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. McGuinness, B. & Kaal, H. (Trl. & Ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
24.Frege, G. (1983). Nachgelassene Schriften. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach (Ed.), Hamburg: Meiner.
25.Frege, G. (1989). G. Frege, Briefe an Ludwig Wittgenstein. Grazer Philosophische Studien 33(4), 5-33.
26.Gabriel, G. (1980). Logizismus. In Ritter, J.& Gründer, K. (Eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (p. 483). Basel: Schwabe.
27.Glock, H.J. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell.
28.Glock, H.J. (1997). Kant and Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Necessity and Representation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 5, 285-305.
29.Glock, H.J. (1999b). Vorsprung durch Logik: The German Analytic Tradition. In O’Hear, A. (Ed.), German Philosophy since Kant (pp. 137-166). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30.Glock, H.J. (2003). Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31.Glock, H.J. (2008). What is Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32.Glock, H.J. (2015a). Neo-Kantianism and analytic philosophy. In de Warren, N. & Staiti, A. (Eds.), New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism (pp. 59-81). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33.Glock, H.J. (2015b). Propositional Attitudes, Intentional Contents and other Representationalist Myths. In Coliva, A., Moyal-Sharrock, D. & Munz, V. (Eds.), Mind, Language and Action (pp. 512-537). New York: de Gruyter.
34.Glock, H.J. (2017a). Impure Conceptual Analysis. In Overgaard, S. & d’Oro, G. (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology (pp. 83-107). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35.Glock, H.J. (2017b) Philosophy and Philosophical Method. In Glock, H.J. & Hyman, J. (Eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 231–251). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
36.Glock, H.H. (forthcoming). What is meaning? A Wittgensteinian answer to an UnWittgensteinian question, In Greve, S. and Conant, J. (Eds.), Wittgenstein on
37.Objectivity, Intuition, and Meaning, New York: Cambridge University Press.
38.Husserl, E. (1900). Logical Investigations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
39.Kant, I. (1902). Akademie Ausgabe. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Berlin: de Gruyter.
40.Kant, I. (1998). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Meiner. Original work from 1781.
41.Kneale, W. & Kneale, M. (1984). The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
42.Künne, W. (2009). Wittgenstein and Frege’s Logical Investigations. In Glock, H.J. & Hyman, J. (Eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy (pp. 26-63). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
43.Künne, W. (2010). Die Philosophische Logik Gottlob Freges: ein Kommentar. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
44.Kusch, M. (1995). Psychologism. A case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge. London: Routledge.
45.Leibniz, G. W. (1704). New Essays on Human Understanding. Remnant, P. & Bennet, J. (Trl. & Ed.) (1981). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain. Philosophische Schriften, vol. 3.]
46.McGuinness, B. (1988). Wittgenstein, a Life: Young Ludwig. London: Penguin.
47.Pfisterer, C.C. (2010). Kitcher and Frege on A Priori Knowledge. Conceptus, 94, 29-43.
48.Russell, B. (1903). Principles of Mathematics. London: Allen and Unwin.
49.Russel, B. (1913). `The Theory of Knowledge', The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. In Eames E. and Blackwell, K. (Eds.) (1984). London: Allen and Unwin.
50.Russel, B. (1914). Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin.
51.Russel, B. & Whitehead, A.N. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
52.Sluga, H. (1997). Frege on Meaning. In Glock, H.J. (Ed.), The Rise of Analytic Philosophy (p. 17-34). Oxford: Blackwell.
53.Star, D. (2018) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Nomativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
54.Textor, M. (2011). Frege on Sense and Reference. London: Routledge.
55.Trendelenburg, A. (1840). Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I. Leipzig: Hirzel.
56.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1913a). Review of Coffey, The Science of Logic. Cambridge Review, 34, 351..
57.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1913b). Notes on Logic. In 1961 (pp. 93–107).
58.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1914). Notes Dictated to Moore in Norway. In 1961 (pp. 108–119).
59.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961). Notebooks 1914–16. Anscombe, G.E.M. & von Wright, G.H. (Eds.);Anscombe, G.E.M (Trl.) (1979). Second edition. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.]
60.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. D.F. Pears, D.F. & McGuinness, B.F. (Trl.) (1961). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
61.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974). Philosophical Grammar Rhees, R. (Ed.); Kenny, A.J.P. (Trl.). Oxford: Blackwell.
62.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1954–1955). Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33. Mind, 63, 1–15 & 289–316; 64, 1–27 and 264..
63.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1933). The Big Typescript. In Luckhardt, C.G. &. Aue, M.A.E (Ed. & Trl.). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell 2005.
64.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations Hacker, P.M.S. & Schulte, J. (Eds.); Anscombe, G.E.M., Hacker, P.M.S. & Schulte, J. (Trl.) (2009). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
65.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974) Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore. Ed. G.H. von Wright. Trans. B.F. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell.
66.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980). Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930–32, From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee. Lee, D (Ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
67.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1979). Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, From the Notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ambrose, A. (Ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
68.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1976). Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, From the Notes of R.G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and Y. Smythies. Diamond, C. (Ed.). Sussex: Harvester.
69.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1988). Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946–47, Notes by P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah, and A.C. Jackson. Ed. P.T. Geach. Sussex: Harvester.
70.Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1977). Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. von Wright, G.H., Nyman, H. (Ed.) Winch, P. (Trl.) (1998). Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.]