Heidegger and δόξα: an Ambiguous Affair

The purpose of this article is a clarification of Heidegger`s philosophical stance on δόξα. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in his magnum opus, Being in Time, δόξα is always in the background of philosopher`s analyses of Mitsein, being-with-others, rhetoric or speech (Rede), our self-understanding in the world, etc. Much of Heidegger`s stance toward δόξα derived from his early analyses of Aristotle and presocratic notion of ἀλήϑεια. While δόξα is in itself ambiguous, namely that is not aimed only at what is possible, contingent (πρακτá), but also what is eternal (πáντα), what cannot be otherwise, it is also true that Heidegger`s treatment of δόξα is very ambiguous. Many of Heidegger`s commentators have split views regarding the intersubjective nature of others in fundamental ontology; based on his strong anti-Cartesian Geschmack, some view it positively, others do not. In the article, I will argue for the latter in the sense that his phenomenological reflections on δόξα paradoxically led to the conclusion, which Heidegger tried to avoid, namely the hierarchy between Being and appearance.