Analiza i Egzystencja
O sprawcy działania i odpowiedzialnym działaniu u Arystotelesa
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2017.38-04
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| ISSN: | 1734-9923 |
| eISSN: | 2300-7621 |
| Autorzy: |
Maciej
Smolak
Instytut Filozofii UJ |
| Słowa kluczowe: | decision fine man of the highest order responsibility virtue of character |
| Data wydania numeru / monografii: | 2017 |
| Liczba stron: | 22 (67-88) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadane |
 
 
 
| |
Abstrakt
At EN III.1 1109b31-32 Aristotle says we praise and censure voluntary actions and
we feel sympathy for involuntary actions, and sometimes even pity. Next he examines
which actions are voluntary and involuntary. This examination is connected with
determination of the conditions under which the person is auctor agendi and thus
can respond for the action. But it is not right to say, when somebody is auctor agendi
his action is responsible. Hence, to answer to the question which action is responsible
action in Aristotle, the author considers the issue in two stages. The first stage
is devoted to clarification what does it mean to be the agent of action. The second
stage gives the explanation of what does it mean “to decide for the action accordance
with virtue because of it”. As the result, the author demonstrates that the responsible
action is taken on the basis of decision and for the sake of fine. He shows such action
is fine because: a) the realized end is fine; b) it is choiceworthy in itself; c) the
motive of the agent is the fine.
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