Autorzy: |
Adam
Łukasik
Alexander Miller Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand |
Słowa kluczowe: | Kripke, Kripkeański Wittgenstein, George Wilson, faktualizm w kwestii znaczenia, fakt znaczeniowy |
Data publikacji całości: | 2015 |
Liczba stron: | 39 (5-43) |
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12. | Miller A.(2010), Rule-Following Skepticism, [w:] The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, S. Bernecker, D. Pritchard (red.), London: Routledge, s. 454–463. |
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