Analiza i Egzystencja


ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2023.64-01
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Issue archive / 64 (2023)
Emocje epistemiczne – czym są i czy przysługują wyłącznie ludziom?
(Epistemic emotions - what are they and are they exclusive to humans?)

Authors: Anna Dutkowska ORCID
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: epistemic emotions animal emotions comparative interspecies research simple minds
Whole issue publication date:2023
Page range:19 (5-23)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

In general, epistemic emotions can be characterized as emotions that concern the subject's own states and mental processes and are associated with cognition and knowledge acquisition. They are the result of a cognitive inconsistency that may appear as a consequence of unexpected information that contradicts previous knowledge. They have a significant impact on the exploration and generation of knowledge about oneself and the world, as well as on conceptual changes and cognitive efficiency. There is no interspecies comparative perspective in experimental studies on epistemic emotions. At first glance, this situation is not controversial, because the category of epistemic emotions has been defined in such a way that it seems to belong only to people. Inconsistencies arise when comparative research in the field of cognitive ethology, primatology or comparative psychology is analyzed. Researchers point to a number of behaviors of nonhuman animals that prove that they have a wide range of emotions - including those that stand out in the catalog of epistemic emotions, i.e. surprise, curiosity or uncertainty. The presented article is an attempt to answer the questions posed in the title and an introduction to research on an adequate model of epistemic emotions, taking into account the results of research in the above-mentioned areas.
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