ISSN: 1734-9923
eISSN: 2300-7621
OAI
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.67-02
Issue archive /
67 (2024)
Autonomia osobowa z perspektywy relacyjnej teorii autonomii Catriony Mackenzie
(Personal autonomy according to Catriona Mackenzie's relational theory of autonomy)
| Authors: |
Mateusz
Penczek
Uniwersytet Śląski |
| Keywords: | autonomy personal autonomy relational autonomy relational theories of autonomy Catriona Mackenzie |
| Whole issue publication date: | 2024 |
| Page range: | 28 (27-54) |
Abstract
The purpose of the article is to analyze the relational theory of personal autonomy proposed by Catriona Mackenzie. First, the theoretical context of the theory is shown, including key features and examples of relational theories of personal autonomy. Then Mackenzie's theory is presented, according to which seven conditions of autonomy should be distinguished. The conditions are grouped into three separate axes: self-determination, self-governance, and self-authorization. According to the theory, none of the conditions is necessary, and the assessment of the level of an individual's autonomy is to be contextual. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the value of the conception proposed by the Australian scholar. It is argued that the condition of authenticity of practical identity should be replaced with the condition of coherence of practical identity. It is also suggested that for the theory to be useful in assessing the autonomy of decisions it should be supplemented with two further conditions: the coherence of a decision made by a person with her practical identity, and the absence of controlling influence such as coercion, persuasion, and manipulation.
Download file
Article file
Bibliography
| 1. | Anderson, J., Honneth, A. (2005). Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice. W: J. Christman, J. Anderson (red.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (s. 127–149). New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 2. | Barclay, L. (2000). Autonomy and the Social-Self. W: C. Mackenzie, N. Stoljar (red.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (s. 52–71). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 3. | Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F. (2009). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 4. | Beauchamp, T.L. (2010). Standing on Principles. Collected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 5. | Benson, P. (1991). Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization. Social Theory and Practice, 17 (3), 385–408. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract199117319. |
| 6. | Benson, P. (2005). Taking Ownership. Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency. W: J. Christman, J. Anderson (red.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (s. 101–126). New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 7. | Benson, P. (2014). Feminist Commitments and Relational Autonomy. W: A. Vel- tman, M. Piper (red.), Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender (s. 87–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 8. | Brison, S.J. (2000). Relational Autonomy and Freedom of Expression. W: C. Macken- zie, N. Stoljar (red.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (s. 280–299). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 9. | Christman, J. (2004). Relational autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social constitution of selves. Philosophical Studies, 117 (1–2), 143–164. |
| 10. | Christman, J. (2005). Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy. W: J.S. Taylor (red.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (s. 277–298). New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 11. | Christman, J. (2009). The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio- -Historical Selves. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 12. | Christman, J. (2014). Relational Autonomy and the Social Dynamics of Paternalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17 (3), 369–382. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10677-013-9449-9. |
| 13. | D’Ambrosio, J., Hedden, B. (2023). Multidimensional adjectives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Pobrano z: https://philarchive.org/archive/DAMMANv (11.12.2023). |
| 14. | Dworkin, G. (1976). Autonomy and Behavior Control. Hastings Center Report, 6, 23–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/3560358. |
| 15. | Dworkin, G. (1988). The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 16. | Faden, R.R., Beauchamp, T.L. (1986). A History and Theory of Informed Consent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 17. | Feinberg, J. (1986). Harm to Self. The Moral Limits of The Criminal Law. Vol. 3. Law and Philosophy, 7 (1), 107–122. |
| 18. | Friedman, M. (2000). Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women. W: C. Mackenzie, N. Stoljar (red.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (s. 35–51). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 19. | Friedman, M. (2003). Autonomy, Gender, Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 20. | Govier, T. (1993). Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem. Hypatia, 8 (1), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1993.tb00630.x. |
| 21. | Frankfurt, H.G. (1997). Wolność woli i pojęcie osoby. Tłum. J. Nowotniak. W: J. Hołówka (red.), Filozofia moralności. Postanowienie i odpowiedzialność moralna (s. 21–39). Warszawa: Aletheia. |
| 22. | Haworth, L. (1991). Review: Dworkin on Autonomy. Ethics, 102 (1), 129–139. |
| 23. | Hedden, B., Nebel, J.M. (b.d.w.). Multidimensional Concepts and Disparate Scale Types. Pobrano z: https://philpapers.org/archive/HEDMCA.pdf (3.12.2023). |
| 24. | Hill, T.E. (2013). Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy. W: O. Sensen (red.), Kant on Moral Autonomy (s. 15–31). New York: Camb- ridge University Press. |
| 25. | Hinchman, L. (1996). Autonomy, Individuality, and Self-Determination. W: J. Schmidt (red.) What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth- -Century Questions (s. 488–516). Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: Univer- sity of California Press. |
| 26. | Kant, I. (1953). Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności. Tłum. M. Wartenberg. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. |
| 27. | Korsgaard, Ch.M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 28. | Mackenzie, C. (2000). Imagining oneself otherwise. W: Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (s. 124–150). Oxford University Press. |
| 29. | Mackenzie, C. (2002). Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions. Philosophical Explorations, 5 (3), 186–206. |
| 30. | Mackenzie, C., Scully, J.L. (2007). Moral imagination, disability, and embodiment. Journal of applied philosophy, 24 (4), 335–351. |
| 31. | Mackenzie, C. (2008a). Introduction: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. W: C. Mackenzie, K. Atkins (red.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency (s. 1–28). New York: Routledge. |
| 32. | Mackenzie, C. (2008b). Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectio- nism. Journal of Social Philosophy, 39 (4), 512–533. |
| 33. | Mackenzie, C. (2014a). Three Dimensions of Autonomy: A Relational Analysis. W: A. Veltman, M. Piper (red.), Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender (s. 15–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 34. | Mackenzie, C. (2014b). Embodied agents, narrative selves. Philosophical Explora- tions, 17 (2), 154–171. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2014.886363. |
| 35. | Mackenzie, C., Rogers, W., Dodds, S. (2014). Introduction: What is vulnerability and why does it matter for moral theory. W: C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers, S. Dodds (red.), Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (s. 1–29). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 36. | Mackenzie, C., Walker, M. (2015). Neurotechnologies, personal identity, and the ethics of authenticity. W: J. Clausen, N. Levy (red.), Handbook of Neuroe- thics (s. 373–392). Dordrecht: Springer. |
| 37. | Mackenzie, C. (2015). Responding to the agency dilemma: Autonomy, adaptive pre- ferences, and internalized oppression. W: M. Oshana (red.), Personal autonomy and social oppression (s. 48–67). New York–London: Routledge. |
| 38. | Mackenzie, C. (2017). Feminist Conceptions of Autonomy. W: A. Garry, S.J. Khader, A. Stone (red.), The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy (s. 515–527). New York–London: Routledge. |
| 39. | Mackenzie, C. (2019). Feminist innovation in philosophy: Relational autonomy and social justice. Women’s Studies International Forum, 72, 144–151. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.wsif.2018.05.003. |
| 40. | Mackenzie, C. (2021). Relational Equality and the Debate Between Externalist and Internalist Theories of Relational Autonomy. W: N. Stoljar, K. Voigt (red.), Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches (s. 32–56). New York–London: Routledge. |
| 41. | Mackenzie, C., Stoljar, N. (2000). Introduction. W: C. Mackenzie, N. Stoljar (red.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (s. 3–31). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 42. | McLeod, C. (2002). Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. |
| 43. | Meyers, D.T. (1987). Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socia- lization. Journal of Philosophy, 84 (11), 619–628. https://doi.org/10.5840/ jphil198784117. |
| 44. | Meyers, D.T. (2005). Decentralizing Autonomy. Five Faces of Selfhood. W: J. Christ- man, J. Anderson (red.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (s. 27–55). New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 45. | Meyers, D.T. (2014). The Feminist Debate over Values in Autonomy Theory. W: A. Veltman, M. Piper (red.), Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender (s. 114–140). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 46. | Mele, A.R. (2005). Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will. W: R. Kane (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (s. 529–548). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| 47. | Oshana, M.A.L. (1998). Personal Autonomy and Society. Journal of Social Phi- losophy, 29 (1), 81–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00098.x. |
| 48. | Rawls, J. (1994). Teoria sprawiedliwości. Tłum. M. Panufnik, J. Pasek, A. Romaniuk. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. |
| 49. | Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
| 50. | Schneewind, J.B. (1998). The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 51. | Schneewind, J.B. (2013). Autonomy after Kant. W: O. Sensen (red.), Kant on Moral Autonomy (s. 146–168). New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 52. | Stoljar, N. (2011). Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 36 (4), 375–384. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jmp/jhr029. |
| 53. | Stoljar, N., Voigt, K. (2021). Introduction: A Relational Turn in Political Philosophy. W: N. Stoljar, K. Voigt (red.), Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches (s. 1–31). New York–London: Routledge. |
| 54. | Taylor, J.S. (2005). Introduction. W: J.S. Taylor (red.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Phi- losophy (s. 1–29). New York: Cambridge University Press. |
| 55. | Taylor, J.S. (2009). Practical Autonomy and Bioethics. New York–London: Rout - ledge. |
| 56. | Westlund, A.C. (2009). Rethinking Relational Autonomy. Hypatia, 24 (4), 26–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01056.x. |