Analiza i Egzystencja


ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.67-01
CC BY-SA   Open Access   DOAJ  ERIH PLUS  DOAJ

Issue archive / 67 (2024)
Werystyczna epistemologia społeczna i problemy komunikacji sieciowej
(Veritistic social epistemology and network communication problems)

Authors: Tomasz Walczyk ORCID
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
Keywords: social epistemology veritism truth reliability disinformation epistemic injustice echo chamber
Whole issue publication date:2024
Page range:22 (5-26)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

The project of veristic social epistemology is based on the evaluation of social practices directed at acquiring knowledge and avoiding error. This research aims to analyse the social and technological dimensions of information processes. A number of practices in the network environment have a significant impact on the cognitive processes of individuals. They give rise to the acquisition of both true and false beliefs, ranging from reliable information practices to unreliable disinformation practices. The prevalence of phenomena such as echo chambers, fake news, clickbait or deepfakes indicates that the condition of the contemporary infosphere is under serious threat. Disinformation processes, reinforced by technological progress, prompt reflection on the reliability of social practices. In addition to the strictly veristic consequences, the importance of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice should also be pointed out.
Download file

Article file

Bibliography

1.Abels, G. (2023). Can ChatGPT fact-check? We tested. https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2023/chatgpt-ai-replace-fact-checking/
2.Brownstein, M. (2019). Implicit Bias. Pobrane z: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/
3.Buchanan, B., Lohn A., Musser M., Sedova K. (2021). Truth, Lies, and Automation. How Language Models Could Change Disinformation. Pobrane z: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/truth-lies-and-automation/
4.d’Ancona, M. (2018). Postprawda. Tłum. Michał Sutowski. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.
5.Dreyfus, H.L. (2001). Telepistemology: Descartes’s Last Stand. W: K. Goldberg (red.) The Robot in the Garden. Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6.Fallis, D. (2015). What Is Disinformation?. Library Trends, 63 (3). https://doi.org/10.1353/lib.2015.0014
7.Fetzer, J. H. (2004). Disinformation: The use of false information. Minds and Machines, 2 (14). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000021683.28604.5b
8.Fricker, M. (2009). Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics in Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9.Frost-Arnold, K. (2014). Trustworthiness and Truth: The Epistemic Pitfalls of Internet Accountability. Episteme. 2 (1). https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.43
10.Frost-Arnold, K. (2023). Who Should We Be Online? A Social Epistemology for the Internet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11.Goban-Klas, T. (1999). Media i komunikowanie masowe. Teorie i analizy prasy, radia, telewizji i Internetu. Warszawa, Kraków: PWN.
12.Goldberg, K. (red.) (2001). The Robot in the Garden. Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of Internet, Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
13.Goldman, A. (1986), Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
14.Goldman, A. (2001). Telerobotic Knowledge: A Reliabilistic Approach, w: K. Goldberg (red.) The Robot in the Garden. Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
15.Goldman, A. (2008). Social epistemology of blogging. W: J. van den Hoven, J. Weckert (red.). Information Technology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498725.007
16.Goldman, A. (2009). Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246109000022
17.Goldman, A. (2020). The What, Why, and How of Social Epistemology. W: The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. M. Fricker. i in. (red.). New York: Routledge.
18.Goldman, A. (2021a). Wiedza a świat społeczny. Warszawa: PWN.
19.Goldman, A. (2021b), A Different Solution to the Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism. Philosophical Topics, 49 (2). https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149217
20.Griffiths, M. D. (2014). Adolescent trolling in online environments: A brief overview, Education and Health, 32 (3).
21.Groh, M., Epstein, Z., Fireston C., Picard R. (2022). Deepfake detection by human crowds, machines, and machine-informed crowds. PNAS, 119 (1). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2110013119
22.Habermas, J. (2007). Strukturalne przeobrażenia sfery publicznej. Tłum. W. Lipnik, M. Łukasiewicz. Warszawa: PWN.
23.Habgood-Coote, J. (2023). Towards a Critical Social Epistemology of Social Media. W: J. Lackey, A. McGlynn (red.). Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford Univerisity Press. Pobrane z: https://philarchive.org/rec/HABTAC-2
24.Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
25.Jamieson, K. H., Cappella, J. N. (2008). Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26.Lamża, Ł. (2020). Światy równoległe. Czego uczą nas płaskoziemcy, homeopaci, różdżkarze. Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne.
27.McIntyre, L. (2019). Post-Truth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
28.Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17 (2). https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32
29.Pariser, E. (2012). The Filter Bubble: What The Internet Is Hiding From You. London: Penguin Books.
30.Pisarek, W. (2008). Wstęp do nauki o komunikowaniu. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
31.Pritchard, D. (2010). Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Synthese, 175 (1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y
32.Pritchard, D. (2018), Extended Epistemology. W: J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos, D. Pritchard (red.). Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33.Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
34.Toffler, A. (1985). Trzecia fala. Tłum. E. Woydyłło, Warszawa: PIW.
35.Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (2012). Osądy w warunkach niepewności: heurystyki i błędy poznawcze. W: D. Kahneman. Pułapki myślenia. Tłum. P. Szymczak. Poznań: Media Rodzina.
36.WHO. (2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19) Situation Report – 45. Pobrane z: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/331356
37.Ziemińska, R. (2020). The Epistemic Injustice Expressed in Normalizing Surgery on Children with Intersex Traits, Diametros, 17. https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1478
38.https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/04/28/yuval-noah-harari-argues-that-ai-has-hacked-the-operating-system-of-human-civilisation
39.https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/