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Analiza i Egzystencja
35 (2016)
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Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

DOI: 10.18276/aie.2016.35-05
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ISSN:1734-9923
eISSN:2300-7621
Authors: Paweł Zięba
Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Keywords: alternative-denialism epistemic justification hallucination perception co-constitutive relation causal relation disjunctivism
Issue / book publication date:2016
Page range:25 (87-111)
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Abstract

DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE NATURE OF PERCEPTUAL RELATIONSummaryThis paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysicaland epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logicalstructure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two mainconclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is notsuch a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of theseviews could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests,disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.

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