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Analiza i Egzystencja
44 (2018)
OpenAlex

For the whole journal, according to OpenAlex.

Citations
237
Publications
481
H-index
6
I10-index
2
Mean citedness (2 years)
0.17
Citations received by year
Journal citation chart. Exact values are available in the table below. 2017: 4 2018: 13 2019: 12 2020: 17 2021: 27 2022: 31 2023: 31 2024: 33 2025: 36 2026: 19 2017 2026
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Citations received by year
YearPublicationsCitations
2017254
20182313
20192312
20202017
20212127
20222631
20232531
20242633
20252536
20262019

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Publications and citations cover records linked to this journal in OpenAlex. H-index is the largest number h of publications with at least h citations each. I10-index counts publications cited at least 10 times. The chart shows citations received in each year; the current year is incomplete. Coverage may differ from WNUS and other services.

The 2-year mean is an OpenAlex metric. It is not the Clarivate Journal Impact Factor.

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O typach kawy. Kontekstualizm DeRose’a jako strategia antysceptycka (On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)


(On Types of Coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2018.44-04
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Abstract

On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy Semantic contextualism is often used in order to offer solutions for problems in other branches of philosophy, including epistemology. One of such attempts is epistemic contextualism, according to which the semantic value of the word “knows” changes with the context of its utterance. The aim of this paper is to critically investigate Keith DeRose’s contextualism to see up to what extent does it provide a valid anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that while it can be seen as a good rival for global and Ungerian scepticism, it does not lead to the refutation of other variants of classical scepticism.
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