Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2018.44-04
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Issue archive / 44 (2018)
O typach kawy. Kontekstualizm DeRose’a jako strategia antysceptycka (On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)
(On Types of Coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy)

Authors: Tomasz Szubart ORCID
Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Keywords: scepticism invariantism contextualism knowledge
Data publikacji całości:2018
Page range:21 (61-81)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

On types of coffee. DeRose's contextualism as an anti-sceptical strategy Semantic contextualism is often used in order to offer solutions for problems in other branches of philosophy, including epistemology. One of such attempts is epistemic contextualism, according to which the semantic value of the word “knows” changes with the context of its utterance. The aim of this paper is to critically investigate Keith DeRose’s contextualism to see up to what extent does it provide a valid anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that while it can be seen as a good rival for global and Ungerian scepticism, it does not lead to the refutation of other variants of classical scepticism.
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