Analiza i Egzystencja
Wartość osobowa
(Person's value)
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2015.32-01
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The full text is available
| ISSN: | 1734-9923 |
| eISSN: | 2300-7621 |
| Authors: |
Mirosław
Rutkowski
Uniwersytet Szczeciński |
| Keywords: | experience machine well-being life’s value relative values objective values person’s value bad good ethics |
| Issue / book publication date: | 2015 |
| Page range: | 45 (4-48) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadata |
 
  
 
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Abstract
The main aim of this paper is searching the nature of the relation between a personand certain things that constitutes their being good or bad for her, and explainingwhat it is for something to have for us exactly that value and not other.
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