Analiza i Egzystencja
Czy emocje mogą być racjonalne. Analiza wybranych aspektów filozofii emocjiRonalda de Sousy
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2016.35-06
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| ISSN: | 1734-9923 |
| eISSN: | 2300-7621 |
| Autorzy: |
Andrzej
Dąbrowski
Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania w Rzeszowie |
| Słowa kluczowe: | racjonalność emocji racjonalność prawdziwość emocji obiektywność emocji emocje racjonalność aksjologiczna |
| Data wydania numeru / monografii: | 2016 |
| Liczba stron: | 25 (113-137) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadane |
 
  
 
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Abstrakt
CAN EMOTIONS BE RATIONAL?THE ANALYSIS OF SOME ASPECTS OF RONALD DE SOUSA’S PHILOSOPHYOF EMOTIONSummaryIn the paper I examine the three aspects of Ronald de Sousa’s philosophy of emotions:intentionality, objectivity, and rationality of emotions. In the beginning, I putup the basic question, how he sees emotions? De Sousa argues that emotions are a kind of perception (perception of axiological properties). At the same time hedefends an objectivist approach to emotions. It implies that emotion apprehendssomething in the world that exists independently of us. The fundamental question,how emotions relate to their objects, leads to the inquiry on the intentional structureof emotion and, then, to the study of the truth of emotion. Finally, I reconstruct a veryimportant study concerning rationality: cognitive rationality, strategic rationality,and axiological rationality. The latter one is specific to the emotions.
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