Analiza i Egzystencja


ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.67-06
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Issue archive / 67 (2024)
Wyobrażeniowy opór
(Imaginative Resistance)

Authors: Piotr Biłgorajski ORCID
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: imagination imaginative resistance perception moral beliefs fiction
Whole issue publication date:2024
Page range:22 (127-148)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

The phenomenon of imaginative resistance occurs when the reader of fiction is invited to imagine as morally right a situation that the reader finds morally repugnant (e.g., that murder is morally good). The problem of imaginative resistance boils down to the question of how it is possible that we can imagine situations that are inconsistent with our knowledge of the facts (magic, teleportation, spaceships moving faster than light), while we have difficulty imagining situations that are inconsistent with our moral knowledge. The purpose of this article is to present two popular concepts that explain the phenomenon of imaginative resistance, the so-called cantian response and the wontian response, and to propose an original solution. The first hypothesis states that imaginative resistance is a response to conceptual impossibility. In this conception, resistance to imagining a particular object or situation comes from the fact that such objects or situations are contradictory and therefore impossible to imagine. The second hypothesis states that imaginative resistance occurs when the recipient does not want to imagine a certain state of affairs. In the last part of the article, I try to show that the source of imaginative resistance can be the inability to imagine oneself as someone with different moral beliefs.
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