ISSN: 1734-9923
eISSN: 2300-7621
OAI
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.68-06
Issue archive /
68 (2024)
O nowych trendach w filozofii analitycznej na przykładzie metaetyki, etyki i filozofii polityki oraz o filozofowaniu w dobie sztucznej inteligencji
(About new trends in analytical philosophy in metaethics, ethics, and political philosophy, and about philosophizing in the era of artificial intelligence)
| Authors: |
Artur
Szutta
Uniwersytet Gdański |
| Keywords: | analytical philosophy metaethics ethics political philosophy metaethical realism intuitionism virtue ethics artificial intelligence democracy meritocracy. |
| Whole issue publication date: | 2024 |
| Page range: | 20 (81-100) |
Abstract
The article is devoted to selected new trends in metaethics, ethics, political philosophy, and the practice of philosophy with the use of artificial intelligence. It consists of five parts. In the first part, I analyze the meaning of the question about new trends in analytical philosophy. In the second part, I present the latest trends in metaethics. In the third part, I briefly characterize the ethics of artificial intelligence. The fourth part, devoted to political philosophy, includes a presentation of the latest publications on meritocracy. The article concludes with considerations about practising philosophy in the age of artificial intelligence
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