Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.68-02
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Issue archive / 68 (2024)
Główne trendy w analitycznej filozofii języka w XXI wieku
(Major trends in analytical philosophy of language in the 21st century)

Authors: Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska ORCID
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Keywords: conceptual engineering contextualism experimental philosophy semantic minimalism social turn relativism
Whole issue publication date:2024
Page range:14 (25-38)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

In this text I briefly describe the main trends in the analytic philosophy of language in the 21st century. Among the most important developments that influenced the way in which the philosophy of language is done I mention experimental philosophy and conceptual engineering. Among the new topics I highlight the social and political turn of the analytic philosophy of language with its focus on gender terms, slurs, fig leaves, dog whistles and other linguistic phenomena that have significant societal impact. I also mention the debate between semantic minimalism, contextualism and relativism, which has its roots in earlier philosophy but which has been very lively in the first quarter of the 21st century.
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