Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2018.41-01

Issue archive / 41 (2018)
Problem antecedencji fallibilizmu w poglądach Karneadesa
(The antecedents of fallibilism in the philosophy of Carneades)

Authors: Dariusz Kubok
Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: fallibilism Carneades skepticism epistemology criterion
Year of publication:2018
Page range:20 (5-24)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:


THE ANTECEDENTS OF FALLIBILISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CARNEADES Summary In this article, I undertake an attempt at recognizing and critically analyzing antecedents of fallibilism in the philosophy of Carneades. Because descriptions of fallibilism are somewhat ambiguous, it is imperative that we first determine the semantic root of this doctrine (both in its negative and positive dimensions) before discussing it in historical and philosophical reflections. The main goal of this article is not to prove that Carneades was a fallibilist before Peirce and Popper, or that he was a precursor of this position; rather, the aim is to critically review arguments for and against fallibilistic interpretations of Carneades’ views. To this end, I introduce a distinction between global and local fallibilism, as well as discuss the position of eudaimonological fallibilism. The reflections contained in this article fit with the current lively debate on the historical roots of fallibilism.
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