Analiza i Egzystencja
On the notion of well-being
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2018.43-01
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| ISSN: | 1734-9923 |
| eISSN: | 2300-7621 |
| Authors: |
Katarzyna
Lazari-Radek
Uniwersytet Lódzki |
| Keywords: | well-being good for us good for the world resonance requirement F. Feldman P. Railton H. Sidgwick Sumner |
| Issue / book publication date: | 2018 |
| Page range: | 18 (5-22) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadata |
 
 
 
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Abstract
The aim of the article is to present a formal definition of well-being and to search for a quality that would allow to differentiate prudential values from other kinds of values. In order to achieve this aim, I will first look at a historical discussion run in analytical philosophy. This will allow me to state how not to understand the notion of well-being. Then, I will concentrate on a positive definition. I hope to be able to offer a necessary (though not sufficient) requirement for all prudential values.
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