Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2019.45-01

Issue archive / 45 (2019)
O fundamentach dla metafizycznego fundowania
(On the Grounds for Metaphysical Grounding)

Authors: Karol Lenart ORCID
Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Wydział Filozoficzny, Instytut Filozofii
Keywords: grounding essence ground relation facts superinternality regress
Year of publication:2019
Page range:20 (5-24)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:


In this article I defend a meta-grounding thesis according to which facts that express metaphysical grounding are grounded (are not fundamental). First, I claim that it is justified to accept the meta-grounding thesis. In the next step I discuss two theories that explain how metaphysical grounding is grounded: a theory that involves a notion of superinternal relation and a theory that uses a notion of essences of facts. I argue that later theory is preferable over the former one.
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