Analiza i Egzystencja
O fundamentach dla metafizycznego fundowania
(On the Grounds for Metaphysical Grounding)
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2019.45-01
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| ISSN: | 1734-9923 |
| eISSN: | 2300-7621 |
| Authors: |
Karol
Lenart
Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Wydział Filozoficzny, Instytut Filozofii |
| Keywords: | grounding essence ground relation facts superinternality regress |
| Issue / book publication date: | 2019 |
| Page range: | 20 (5-24) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadata |
 
 
 
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Abstract
In this article I defend a meta-grounding thesis according to which facts that express metaphysical grounding are grounded (are not fundamental). First, I claim that it is justified to accept the meta-grounding thesis. In the next step I discuss two theories that explain how metaphysical grounding is grounded: a theory that involves a notion of superinternal relation and a theory that uses a notion of essences of facts. I argue that later theory is preferable over the former one.
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