Analiza i Egzystencja


ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2024.68-08
CC BY-SA   Open Access   DOAJ  ERIH PLUS  DOAJ

Issue archive / 68 (2024)
Jutro będzie bitwa kosmiczna: Futura contingentia w XXI wieku
(There will be a space-battle tomorrow: Future contingents in the 21st century)

Authors: Jacek Wawer ORCID
Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Keywords: Future contingents relativism pragmatics epistemology metaphysics
Whole issue publication date:2024
Page range:11 (117-127)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

This is a summary of the recent research related to the issue of future contingents. It focuses on the aspects that were largely neglected in the traditional debate, such as relativism, pragmatics of assertion, probability, epistemology, and metaphysics.
Download file

Article file

Bibliography

1.Baia, A. (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies,159 (3): 341–356.
2.Barnes, E., Cameron, R. (2008). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies, 146 (2): 291–309.
3.Barnes, E., Cameron, R. (2011). Back to the Open Future. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1): 1–26.
4.Belnap, N. (2002). Double Time References: Speech-Act Reports as Modalities in an Indeterminist Setting. W: F. Wolter, H. Wansing, M. de Rijke,
5.M. Zakharyaschev (red.), Advances in Modal Logic, t. 3 (s. 37–58). World Scientific Publishing.
6.Belnap, N., Perloff, M., Xu, M. (2001). Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterministic World. New York: Oxford University Press.
7.Besson, C., Hattiangadi, A. (2014). The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion. Philosophical Studies, 167 (2): 251–271.
8.Besson, C., Hattiangadi, A. (2020). Assertion and the Future. W: S. Goldberg (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (s. 481–504). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9.Cariani, F. (2021). The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10.Cariani, F., Santorio, P. (2018). Will Done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy. Mind, 127 (505): 129–165.
11.Davies, M., Humberstone, L. (1980). Two Notions of Necessity. Philosophical Studies, 38 (1): 1–31.
12.Florio, C. De, Frigerio, A. (2022). Future, Truth, and Probability. Inquiry, 0 (0): 1–13.
13.Iacona, A. (2014). Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines. Synthese, 191: 2633– 2652.
14.Iacona, A. (2022). Knowledge of Future Contingents. Philosophical Studies, 179 (2): 447–467.
15.Kierland, B., Monton, B. (2007). Presentism and the Objection from Being-Supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85 (3): 485–497.
16.Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
17.Lampert, F. (2022). A Puzzle about the Fixity of the Past. Analysis, 82 (3): 426–434.
18.MacFarlane, J. (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (212): 321–336.
19.MacFarlane, J. (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. W: M. García-Carpintero, M. Kölbel (red.), Relative Truth, (s. 81–102). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20.MacFarlane, J. (2014). Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
21.Øhrstrøm, P. (2009). In Defence of the Thin Red Line: A Case for Ockhamism. Humana.mente, 8: 17–32.
22.Rosenkranz, S. (2012). In Defence of Ockhamism. Philosophia, 40 (3): 617– 631.
23.Rosenkranz, S., Correia, F. (2018). Nothing to Come: A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time. Springer.
24.Tkaczyk, M. (2015). Futura Contingentia. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
25.Todd, P. (2021). The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26.Wawer, J. (2014). The Truth about the Future. Erkenntnis, 79: 365–401.
27.Wawer, J. (2021). Tensed Metaphysics and Non-Local Grounding of Truth. Disputatio, 13: 411–22.
28.Wawer, J. (2023). A Problem with the Fixed Past Fixed. Synthese, 202. Pobrano z: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6.
29.Wawer, J., Malpass, A. (2020). Back to the Actual Future. Synthese, 197: 2193–2213.