Studia i Prace WNEiZ US
Previously: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Studia i Prace WNEiZ
Kartele i patenty a nakłady badawczo-rozwojowe przedsiębiorstw
(Cartels and patents, and R&D expenditures of companies)
DOI: 10.18276/sip.2018.51/3-13
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The full text is available
| ISSN: | 2450-7733 |
| eISSN: | 2300-4096 |
| Authors: |
Adam
Karbowski
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie Katedra Ekonomii Biznesu Jacek Prokop Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie Katedra Ekonomii Biznesu |
| Keywords: | research and development patents cartels Cournot competition quadratic cost function |
| Issue / book publication date: | 2018 |
| Page range: | 12 (163-174) |
| OAI-PMH: | Metadata |
| Klasyfikacja JEL: | O32 |
| |
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of R&D cartel, full industry cartel, and patents on process innovation of companies, and consumer surplus, and total welfare. The reference scenario is here the Cournot rivalry without patent protection of inventions. In this paper, the quadratic costs of production of goods and R&D investments are assumed. The results of modelling and numerical analyses allowed to state that R&D cooperation (in the form of R&D cartel) is more effective and socially preferred instrument to stimulate innovation in the industry than interfirm rivalry motivated by patents. However, in industries characterized by relatively weak or medium knowledge spillovers, the most effective tool to enhance innovation is interfirm rivalry without patents. The latter constitutes one more argument against patents.
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