ISSN: 2450-7733
OAI
DOI: 10.18276/sip.2018.52/1-08
Lista wydań /
nr 52/1 2018
Zarządzanie i nadzór nad firmą rodzinną w kontekście teorii agencji i służebności
| Autorzy: |
Malwina
Szczepkowska
Uniwersytet Szczeciński |
| Słowa kluczowe: | firmy rodzinne przedsiębiorstwa rodzinne nadzór korporacyjny ład kor- poracyjny teoria agencji teoria służebności |
| Data publikacji całości: | 2018 |
| Liczba stron: | 11 (91-101) |
| Klasyfikacja JEL: | G30 G31 G33 |
Abstrakt
W artykule zaprezentowano istotę i problemy funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstw rodzinnych, które ze względu na swoją specyfikę wynikającą z połączenia interesów przedsiębiorstwa i rodziny budzą duże zainteresowanie naukowców i praktyków. Poszukuje się zwłaszcza odpowiedzi na pytanie, co je wyróżnia i umożliwia długookresowe funkcjonowanie na rynku? A także jak zwykle skoncentrowana własność rodzinna wpływa na sytuację finansową family business? W artykule skupiono się na teorii agencji i służebności, które mogą być dobrą perspektywą do przeanalizowania specyfiki firm rodzinnych. Celem jest zatem prezentacja istoty i problemów funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstw rodzinnych w świetle teorii agencji i służebności.
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